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THEOLOGICAL    ESSAYS: 


REPRINTED  FROM  THE 


PRINCETON   REVIEW. 

v 


NEW  YORK  &  LONDON : 
WILEY    AND    PUTNAM 

1846. 


J5 


Entered  according  to  act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1846,  by 

WILEY  &  PUTNAM, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District  of  New  York. 


R.    CRAIGHEAD,   PRINTER,    112  FULTON   STREET. 


PREFACE. 


It  is  no  more  than  justice  to  the  conductors  of  the  Princeton  Review,  to 
state  distinctly,  that  the  thought  of  this  republication  did  not  originate 
with  them.  For  the  selection  of  the  articles,  and  the  mode  of  their 
present  appearance,  neither  they  nor  the  respective  authors  have  any 
responsibility. 

For  a  number  of  years  it  has  been  impossible  to  make  up  complete 
sets  of  this  periodical  work ;  and  numerous  orders  for  the  earlier  volumes 
remain  unfulfilled.  As,  however,  the  demand  for  these  discussions  was 
manifestly  increasing,  it  was  judged  suitable  to  make  choice  among  the 
more  valuable  theological  articles :  the  result  is  the  volume  now 
offered.  This,  it  is  confidently  believed,  will  have  a  permanent  value, 
as  representing  a  class  of  doctrinal  opinion  which,  not  without  conflict, 
is  making  wide  and  rapid  progress  in  America.  The  topics  here  treated, 
by  some  of  the  ablest  pens  in  the  Presbyterian  Church  in  the  United 
States,  are  of  great  importance  in  theology.  They  involve  the  grave 
questions  agitated  between  the  Evangelical  scheme,  on  one  hand,  and 
Infidels,  Papists,  Socinians,  Pelagians,  Arminians,  and  Enthusiasts,  on 
the  other.  In  reproducing,  for  the  use  of  clergymen,  theological 
students,  and  accomplished  laymen,  dissertations  which  have  a  polemical 
aspect,  it  is  by  no  means  intended  to  revive  old  controversies ;  yet  it  is 
the  persuasion  of  those  who  make  this  publication,  that  the  value  of  the 
truths  contended  for  cannot  well  be  overrated. 

The  "  Biblical  Repertory"  has  now  reached  its  twenty -second  volume. 
It  was  commenced,  at  Princeton,  in  the  year  1825,  by  Professor  Hodge, 
to  whose  care  and  learning  it  has  continued  to  owe  much  of  its  value 
and  popularity.  At  the  time  of  its  inception,  the  plan  did  not  extend 
much  beyond  the  field  of  criticism  and  hermeneutics ;  and  it  was  largely 


IV  PREFACE. 

occupied  with  translations  and  reprints  of  biblical  treatises,  thus  verifying 
both  parts  of  its  title.  After  three  or  four  years,  it  began  to  assume 
more  of  the  attributes  of  a  theological  and  literary  review,  which  charac- 
ter it  has  avowedly  sustained  for  the  last  seventeen  years. 

To  speak  of  the  living  contributors  to  this  work  might  savour  of 
indecorum  ;  nor  have  we  authority  to  intrude  upon  the  privacy  of  those 
respected  men  whose  labours  we  use.  Among  the  dead,  we  may  record, 
as  ornaments  of  this  publication,  by  essays  and  reviews  of  great  merit, 
the  following  honoured  and  beloved  names : — The  Reverend  Dr.  John  H. 
Rice,  the  Reverend  Dr.  Fisk,  the  Reverend  Dr.  John  Breckinridge, 
President  Marsh,  Professor  Patton,  the  Reverend  Mr.  Winchester,  and 
the  Reverend  Professor  Dod.  In  regard  to  the  writings  of  the  eminent 
man  last-mentioned,  it  is  proper  to  say,  that  the  publishers  have  been 
restrained  from  incorporating  his  valuable  contributions  into  this  volume, 
by  the  welcome  information  that  a  separate  edition  of  his  remains  is  in 
preparation. 

Ample  materials  still  remain  for  a  similar  volume,  in  case  that  which 
is  now  respectfully  offered  should  meet  with  the  patronage  which  is 
expected. 

New  York,  April  15,  1846. 


CONTENTS. 


Essay 


Page 

r         I. 

The  Rule  of  Faith        ....                                     1 

II. 

The  Sonship  of  Christ 

27 

III. 

The  Decrees  of  God     . 

60 

IV. 

The  Early  History  of  Pelagianism 

80 

V. 

Original  Sin      ..... 

109 

VI. 

The  Doctrine  of  Imputation    . 

128 

VII. 

The  Doctrine  of  Imputation    .            .            , 

165 

VIII. 

The  Doctrine  of  Imputation    . 

195 

IX. 

Melancthon  on  the  Nature  of  Sin 

218 

X. 

Doctrines  of  the  Early  Socinians 

228 

XI. 

The  Power  of  Contrary  Choice 

250 

XII. 

The  Inability  of  Sinners 

265 

XIII. 

The  New  Divinity  Tried 

285 

XIV. 

Beman  on  the  Atonement 

30S 

XV. 

Sacerdotal  Absolution  . 

352 

XVI. 

Regeneration     . 

367 

XVII. 

Sanctification    . 

405 

XVIII. 

Transubstantiation 

444 

XIX. 

Sunday  Mails    . 

470 

XX. 

Bodily  Effects  of  Religious  Excitement 

510 

XXI. 

Tholuck's  History  of  Theology 

524 

■XXII. 

Transcendentalism 

608 

XXIII. 

Cause  and  Effect 

694 

«  « 


ESSAY    I. 

THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.' 


The  recent  publication  in  England  of  so  many  works  on  Tra- 
dition indicates  a  new  and  extended  interest  in  the  subject ;  and 
their  republication  in  America  shows  that  the  interest  is  as  great 
here  as  it  is  in  England.  It  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  this. 
The  rapid  increase  of  Romanism  in  some  parts  of  the  world,  the 
revival  of  zeal  and  confidence  among  the  Papists,  and  the  advo- 
cacy of  the  leading  principles  of  the  church  of  Rome  by  the  Ox- 
ford Tracts,  have  rendered  this  and  kindred  points  the  prominent 
subjects  of  religious  discussion  in  Great  Britain,  and  consequently, 
to  a  great  extent  in  this  country.  We  question  whether  at  any 
period  since  the  Reformation,  or,  at  least,  since  the  days  of  Arch- 
bishop Laud  and  the  non-jurors,  the  public  mind  has  been  as  much 
turned  to  these  subjects  as  it  is  at  present.  This  is  no  doubt  prin- 
cipally owing  to  the  publication  of  the  Oxford  Tracts.  It  is 
enough  to  arouse  a  Protestant  community,  to  hear  the  Reforma- 
tion denounced  as  a  schism,  Protestantism  decried  as  anti-chris- 
tian,  and  all  the  most  dangerous  errors  of  Romanism  espoused  and 
defended  by  members  of  the  leading  Protestant  university  of  Eu- 
rope. It  is  no  wonder  that  this  movement  excites  the  joy  of  Pa- 
pists, and  the  indignation  of  Protestants.  It  is  no  wonder  that  the 
press  teems  with  answers  to  the  artful  and  subtle  effusions  of  men, 
who,  though  sustained  by  a  Protestant  church,  direct  all  their  ener- 
gies to  obliterate  her  distinctive  character  and  to  undermine  her 
doctrines.  The  wonder  rather  is  that  men,  professing  godliness, 
can  pursue  a  course  so  obviously  unfair ;  or  that  they  are  allowed 
to  retain  the  stations  which  give  them  support  and  influence. 

*  Originally  published  in  1842,  in  review  of  the  following  works  : 

1.  The  Divine  Rule  of  Faith  and  Practice.  By  William  Goode,  M.A.,  of  Trinity 
College,  Cambridge. 

2.  A  Treatise  concerning  the  Right  Use  of  the  Fathers  in  the  Decision  of  Con- 
troversies in  Religion.  By  John  Daill£,  Minister  of  the  Gospel  in  the  Re- 
formed Church  at  Paris. 

3.  JVot  Tradition,  but  Scripture.     By  Philip  N.  Shuttleworth,  D.D.,  Warden  of 

New  College,  Oxford  (late  Bishop  of  Chichester). 

4.  The  Authority  of  Tradition  in  Matters  of  Religion.  By  George  Holden, 
M.A. 

5.  Tradition  Unveiled.    By  Baden  Powell,  of  Oriel  College,  Oxford 

1 


2  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

It  is  certainly  time,  when  not  only  the  Romanists  are  redoubling 
their  efforts  for  the  extension  of  their  errors,  but  when  they  find 
their  most  efficient  allies  in  our  own  camp,  that  Protestants  should 
rouse  themselves  to  a  sense  of  their  danger,  and  renew  their  pro- 
test against  the  false  doctrines  of  Rome,  and  their  testimony  in 
behalf  of  the  truth  of  God.  It  is  conceded  that  the  turning  point 
in  these  controversies  is  the  Rule  of  Faith.  Are  the  scriptures  of 
the  Old  and  New  Testaments  the  only  infallible  rule  of  faith  and 
practice  ?  if  so,  Romanism  and  Puseyism  are  confessedly  without 
any  adequate  foundation.  We  say  confessedly,  first  because  their 
advocates  admit  that  the  whole  controversy  turns  upon  the  author- 
ity due  to  tradition ;  and  secondly,  because,  in  enumerating  the 
doctrines  which  tradition  is  necessary  to  prove,  they  include  the 
very  doctrines  by  which  they  are  distinguished  from  Protestants. 
"  The  complete  rule  of  faith,"  says  a  distinguished  Romanist,  "  is 
scripture  joined  with  tradition,  which  if  Protestants  would  admit 
all  the  other  controversies  between  us  and  them  would  soon 
cease."*  "  It  may  be  proved,"  says  Mr.  Keble,  "  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  any  reasonable  mind,  that  not  a  few  fragments  yet  remain, 
very  precious  and  sacred  fragments  of  the  unwritten  teaching  of 
the  first  age  of  the  church.  The  paramount  authority,  for  exam- 
ple, of  the  successors  of  the  apostles  in  church  government ;  the 
three-fold  order  established  from  the  beginning ;  the  virtue  of  the 
blessed  eucharist  as  a  commemorative  sacrifice ;  infant  baptism  ; 
and  above  all,  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  -the  most  Holy  Trinity,  as 
contained  in  the  Nicene  creed.  All  these,  however  surely  con- 
firmed from  scripture,  are  yet  ascertainable  parts  of  the  primitive 
unwritten  system  of  which  we  enjoy  the  benefit."!  "  Without  its 
aid  [i.  e.  ot  primitive  tradition]  humanly  speaking,  I  do  not  see 
how  we  could  now  retain  either  real  inward  communion  with  our 
Lord  through  his  apostles,  or  the  very  outward  face  of  God's  church 
and  kingdom  among  us.  Not  to  dwell  on  disputable  cases,  how 
but  by  the  tradition  and  the  practice  of  the  early  church  can  we 
demonstrate  the  observance  of  Sunday  as  the  holiest  day,  or  the 
permanent  separation  of  the  clergy  from  the  people  as  a  distinct 
order?  Or  where,  except  in  the  primitive  liturgies,  a  main  branch 
of  that  tradition,  can  we  find  assurance,  that  in  the  holy  eucha- 
rist, we  consecrate  as  the  apostles  did,  and  consequently  that  the 
cup  of  blessing  which  we  bless  is  the  communion  of  the  blood  of 
Christ,  and  the  bread  which  we  break  is  the  communion  of  the 
body  of  Christ  ?"J  This,  in  the  language  of  the  sect,  means,  How 
but  by  tradition  can  we  establish  the  doctrine  of  the  real  presence  ? 
Again  the  same  writer  says,  "  The  points  of  Catholic  consent, 
known  by  tradition,  constitute  the  knots  and  ties  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem ;  being  such  as  these :  the  canon  of  scripture,  the  full  doc- 
trines of  the  Trinity  and  Incarnation,  the  oblation  and  consecra- 

*  See  Goode,  vol.  i.,  p.  90. 

f  Keble,  Sermon  on  Tradition,  p.  32.  J  Ib>  P-  38. 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  3 

tion  of  the  eucharist,  the  apostolical  succession."  To  these  he 
afterwards  adds,  "  baptismal  regeneration,"  and  the  doctrine  "  that 
consecration  by  apostolical  authority  is  essential  to  the  participation 
of  the  eucharist." 

After  quoting  these  and  many  other  passages  from  Mr.  Keble's 
sermon,  and  from  other  writings  of  the  Tractarians,  Mr.  Goode 
thus  enumerates  and  classifies  the  doctrines,  which  according  to 
their  system  depend  on  tradition  alone,  or  upon  scripture  as  ex- 
plained by  tradition.  "  Relating  to  points  disused,  1.  The  non- 
literal  acceptation  of  our  Lord's  words  respecting  washing  one 
another's  feet.  2.  The  non-observance  of  the  seventh  day  as  a 
day  of  religious  rest. 

"  Relating  to  ordinances  in  use  among  us,  1.  Infant  baptism. 
2.  The  sanctification  of  the  first  day  of  the  week.  3.  The  per- 
petual obligation  of  the  eucharist.  4.  The  identity  of  our  mode 
of  consecration  in  the  eucharist  with  the  apostolical.  5.  That 
consecration  by  apostolical  authority  is  essential  to  the  participa- 
tion of  the  eucharist.  6.  The  separation  of  the  clergy  from  the 
people  as  a  distinct  order.  7.  The  three-fold  order  of  the  priest- 
hood. 8.  The  government  of  the  church  by  bishops.  9.  The 
apostolical  succession. 

"Of  points  purely  doctrinal,  1.  Baptismal  regeneration.  2.  The 
virtue  of  the  eucharist  as  a  commemorative  sacrifice.  3.  That 
there  is  an  intermediate  state,  in  which  the  souls  of  the  faithful  are 
purified,  and  grow  in  grace ;  that  they  pray  for  us,  and  that  our 
prayers  benefit  them. 

"  Of  points  concerning  matters  of  fact,  and  things  that  do  not 
immediately  belong  either  to  the  doctrines  or  the  rites  of  Christian- 
ity, 1.  The  canon  of  the  Scripture.  2.  That  Melchisedec's  feast 
is  a  type  of  the  eucharist.  3.  That  the  book  of  Canticles  repre- 
sents the  union  between  Christ  and  his  church.  4.  That  wisdom, 
in  the  book  of  Proverbs,  refers  to  the  Second  Person  of  the  Trinity. 
5.  The  alleged  perpetual  virginity  of  the  mother  of  our  Lord." 

"  It  is  impossible,"  says  Mr.  Goode,  "  not  to  see  that,  among  all 
these  points,  the  stress  is  laid  upon  those  which  concern  the  gov- 
ernment and  sacraments  of  the  church  ;  and  our  opponents  being 
persuaded  that  patristical  tradition  delivers  their  system  on  these 
points  ....  are  very  anxious  that  this  tradition  should  be  recog- 
nised as  a  divine  informant  ;  and  in  the  zealous  prosecution  of  this 
enterprise,  are  desirous  further  of  impressing  it  upon  our  minds, 
that  almost  all  the  other  points  relating  either  to  doctrine  or  prac- 
tice, yea  even  the  fundamentals  of  the  faith,  must  stand  or  fall 
according  as  this  recognition  takes  place  or  not."*  This  is  true. 
The  writers  of  the  Tracts,  knowing  and  admitting  that  their  pecu- 
liar doctrines,  that  is,  doctrines  which  they  hold  in  common  with 
the  Romanists,  and  which  distinguish  both  from  Protestants,  can- 
not be  proved  except  by  tradition,  are  led  to  assert,  not  only  that 

*  Goode,  vol.  ii.,p.  18. 


$X?*' 


THE    RULE    OP    FAITH. 


the  doctrines  peculiar  to  Episcopalians,  but  even  some  of  the  fun- 
damental doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  rest  on  the  same  unstable  founda- 
tion. If  we  understand  the  fundamental  principles  of  Romanism 
and  of  the  Oxford  Tracts  they  are  the  following.  That  sacraments 
are  the  only  ordinary  channels  of  communicating  the  grace  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  and  the  benefits  of  Christ's  merits  ;  that  participation 
of  these  sacraments  is  therefore  the  great  means  of  salvation :  that 
the  sacraments  have  this  efficacy  only  when  administered  by  duly 
ordained  ministers  (except  that  the  Papists  admit  the  validity  of  lay 
baptism  in  cases  of  necessity)  ;  that  ordination  confers  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  imparts  the  power  and  authority  to  consecrate  the  bread 
and  wine  in  the  eucharist  so  that  they  become  the  body  and  blood 
of  Christ,  and  when  offered,  are  a  propitiatory  sacrifice  effectual  for 
the  remission  of  the  sins  of  the  living  and  the  dead ;  and  that  the 
right  to  ordain  and  the  power  to  confer  the  Holy  Spirit  belong 
exclusively  to  prelatical  bishops  as  the  successors  of  the  apostles. 
These,  as  it  seems  to  us,  are  the  bones,  or,  as  Mr.  Keble  would  say, 
the  knots  and  ties  of  the  whole  system.  This  is  the  foundation  of 
the  whole  fabric  of  papal  and  priestly  domination  and  delusion. 
Bishops  are  the  successors  of  the  apostles  "  in  all  the  plenitude  of 
their  power  ;"  "  what  Christ  was  in  his  own  house,  such  now  are 
they.  The  authority  which  he  possessed  in  his  human  nature,  he 
transfers  to  them  ;"*  they  alone  have  the  right  to  confer  the 
authority  and  power  to  administer  the  sacraments  which  are  the 
appointed  channels  of  grace :  hence  they  are  the  dispensers  of  sal- 
vation ;  those  whom  they  excommunicate,  justly  or  unjustly,  perish  ; 
those  whom  they  receive  and  retain  in  communion  of  the  church 
are  saved.  Everything  depends  on  them.  They  are  in  the  place 
of  Christ.  That  such  a  system  should  find  favour  with  the  clergy, 
human  nature  would  lead  us  to  expect  ;  and  that  it  should  be 
adopted  by  the  people,  experience  teaches  us  not  to  be  surprised  at. 
It  is  the  easiest  of  all  methods  of  salvation ;  the  least  self-denying, 
the  most  agreeable  to  the  indolent  and  depraved  heart.  But  as  it 
is  contrary  to  the  word  of  God,  men  adopt  it  at  their  peril ;  and  its 
very  attractiveness  is  a  reason  why  its  falsehood  and  its  dangerous 
tendency  should  be  exposed. 

As  the  advocates  of  this  system  urge  its  acceptance  on  the 
ground  of  tradition,  it  is  not  surprising  that  so  large  a  portion  of  the 
works  written  against  the  system,  are  directed  against  tradition  as 
a  rule  of  faith.  All  the  books  mentioned  at  the  head  of  this  article, 
with  one  exception,  are  the  productions  of  clergymen  of  the 
Church  of  England,  and  were  written  in  answer  to  the  Oxford 
Tracts.  The  work  of  Daille  on  the  Use  of  the  Fathers,  is  an  old 
book,  which  has  retained  its  p\ace  as  a  standard  for  nearly  two  cen- 
turies, and  is  the  store-house  whence  modern  writers  draw  not  a 
few  of  their  arguments  and  illustrations.  Its  publication  by  our 
Board  in  an  improved  form,  thus  rendering  it  easily  accessible  at  a 

*  Mason's  Tract  on  Catholic  Unity,  p.  10. 


v'i 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  5 

cheap  rate,  is  an  important  service  to  the  church,  and  we  heartily 
recommend  it  to  the  careful  study  of  our  fellow  ministers.  The 
works  of  the  Bishop  of  Chichester,  of  Professor  Powell,  and  of  Mr. 
Holden,  have  been  already  noticed  in  our  pages,  and  are  here  men- 
tioned again  only  with  a  view  of  renewing  our  recommendation 
to  our  readers  to  sustain  the  publisher  in  his  laudable  enterprise  to 
disseminate  such  reasonable  books. 

Mr.  Goode's  book,  which  is  dedicated  to  the  Archbishop  of  Can- 
terbury and  the  Bishop  of  London,  is  devoted  to  the  refutation  of 
the  Oxford  Tracts.  It  gives  at  length  the  doctrine  on  tradition 
taught  in  those  writings  ;  proves  that  it  is  identical  with  the  Popish 
doctrine  on  the  same  subject  ;  demonstrates  that  patristical  tradi- 
tion is  not  "  a  practically  infallible  witness  of  the  oral  teaching  of 
the  apostles,  nor  receivable  as  a  divine  informant ;"  and  vindicates 
the  claim  of  holy  scripture  as  the  sole  divinely-revealed  rule  of 
faith  and  practice,  and  sole  infallible  judge  of  controversies,  and 
consequently,  in  the  credenda  of  religion,  the  sole  authority  which 
binds  the  conscience  to  belief  in  what  it  delivers.  He  vindicates 
the  fulness  and  sufficiency  of  the  divine  revelation  as  contained  in 
the  scriptures,  and  in  doing  this  examines  at  length  the  doctrines 
which,  as  Tractarians  affirm,  tradition  is  necessary  to  establish. 
He  then  shows  that  his  doctrine  on  this  whole  subject  is  the  doc- 
trine of  the  fathers  themselves,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Church  of 
England.  He  pronounces  the  appeal  made  by  the  Tractators  in 
their  Catena  Patrum,  to  the  opinions  of  the  English  divines  in  sup- 
port of  their  doctrines,  "  one  of  the  most  unaccountable,  and  pain- 
ful, and  culpable  (however  unintentional)  misrepresentations  with 
which  history  supplies  us."  He  convicts  them  of  the  grossest 
unfairness  in  quoting  in  support  of  their  views  distorted  fragments 
of  works  written  in  direct  and  avowed  opposition  to  them. 
He  accuses  them  of  borrowing  not  merely  their  arguments,  but  in 
a  great  degree  their  learning,  at  second  hand  from  the  Romanists  ; 
and  brings  forward  cases  of  egregious  blunders  in  their  quotations 
from  the  fathers.  He  shows  that  the  famous  tract  No.  90,  design- 
ed to  show  that  the  thirty-nine  articles  are  consistent  with  the  Tri- 
dentine  decrees,  is  little  else  than  the  reproduction  of  a  work  writ- 
ten by  a  Jesuit  more  than  two  centuries  ago.* 

The  theory  of  the  traditionists  is,  that  the  holy  scriptures  are 
both  defective  and  obscure.  They  contain,  indeed,  all  the  essential 
doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  but  they  give,  in  many  cases,  mere  hints 
or  notices  of  them,  'which  could  not  be  understood  unless  explain- 

*  The  title  of  this  work  is,  "  Deus,  natura,  gratia,  sive,  Tractatus  de  Predestina- 
tione,  de  meritis,  et  peccatorum  remissione,  seu  de  justificatione  et  deniquc  de  sancto- 
rum invocatione.  Ubi  ad  trutinam  fidei  Catholicae  examinatur  contVssio  Anglicana,  &c. 
Accessit  paraphrastica  expositio  reliquorum  articulorum  confessionis  Anglicanae." 
It  was  written  by  an  English  convert  to  Popery,  namo^  Christopher  Davenport,  and 
after  his  conversion  called  Francis  a  Sancta  Clara,  and  designed  to  prove  the  English 
articles  to  be  conformable  to  the  Tridentine  doctrines.  "And  for  learning  and  in- 
genuity our  modern  reconciler,"  says  Mr.  Goode,  •'  is  not  to  be  compared  to  him. 
But  in  all  the  most  important  points",  the  similarity  between  the  two  is  remarkable." 


6  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

ed  and  developed  by  tradition,  "  It  is  a  near  thing,"  says  Tract 
85,  "  that  they  are  in  scripture  at  all ;  the  wonder  is  that  they  are 
all  there  ;  humanly  judging,  they  would  not  be  there  but  for  God's 
interposition ;  and  therefore  since  they  are  there  by  a  sort  of  acci- 
dent, it  is  not  strange  they  should  be  but  latent  there,  and  only 
indirectly  producible  thence."  The  same  writer  says,  the  gospel 
doctrine  "  is  but  indirectly  and  covertly  recorded  in  scripture  un- 
der the  surface."  But  besides  these  doctrines  which  are  essential 
to  salvation,  there  are  others  which  are  highly  important  which  are 
not  in  the  scriptures  at  all,  which  we  are  bound  to  believe.  These 
doctrines  we  must  learn  from  tradition ;  it  is,  therefore,  "  partly  the 
interpretation,  partly  the  supplement  of  Scripture."* 

The  authority  due  to  tradition  is  the  same  as  that  which  belongs 
to  the  written  word  of  God.  In  the  language  of  the  Council  of 
Trent,/'  Traditiones  non  scriptas  pari  pietatis  affectu,  et  reverentia, 
cum  scriptura  esse  recipiendas."  So  Mr.  Keble  says,  that  con- 
sentient patristical  tradition  is  "  God's  unwritten  word,  demanding 
the  same  reverence  from  us."  Dr.  Pusey  says,  "  we  owe  faith  to 
the  decisions  of  the  church  universal."  "  Our  controversy  with 
Rome,"  he  says,  "  is  not  an  dpriori  question  on  the  value  of  tradi- 
tion in  itself,  or  at  an  earlier  period  of  the  church,  or  of  such  tradi- 
tions as,  though  not  contained  in  scripture,  are  primitive,  universal, 
and  apostolical,  but  it  is  one  purely  historical,  that  the  Romanist 
traditions,  not  being  such,  but  on  the  contrary  repugnant  to  scrip- 
ture, are  not  to  be  received." 

The  ground  on  which  this  authority  is  ascribed  to  tradition  is, 
that  it  is  a  practically  infallible  informant  of  the  oral  instructions  of 
Christ  and  his  apostles.  "  Let  us  understand,"  says  Mr.  Newman, 
"  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  antiquity  is  of  authority  in  religious 
questions.  Both  Romanists  and  ourselves  maintain  as  follows  :  that 
whatever  doctrine  the  primitive  ages  unanimously  attest,  whether 
by  consent  of  fathers,  or  by  councils,  or  by  the  events  of  history,  or 
by  controversies,  or  in  whatever  way,  whatever  may  fairly  and 
reasonably  be  considered  the  universal  belief  of  those  ages,  is  to  be 
received  as  coming  from  the  apostles."  This  is  the  ground  com- 
monly taken  both  by  Romanists  and  the  Oxford  writers.  Certain 
doctrines  are  to  be  received,  not  on  the  authority  of  the  fathers, 
but  upon  their  testimony  that  those  doctrines  were  taught  by  the 
apostles.  Both  however  rely  more  or  less  on  the  gift  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  communicated  by  the  imposition  of  hands,  who  guides  the 
representative  church  into  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and  renders 
it  infallible.  "Not  only"  says  Mr.  Newman,  "is  the  church 
catholic  bound  to  teach  the  truth,  but  she  is  ever  divinely  guided 
to  teach  it ;  her  witness  of  the  Christian  faith  is  a  matter  of  pro- 
mise as  well  as  of  duty  ;  her  discernment  of  it  is  secured  by  a 
heavenly  as  well  as  a  human  rule.  She  is  indefectible  in  it,  and 
therefore  not  only  has  authority  to  enforce  it,  but  is  of  authority  in 

*  Newman's  Lectures,  p.  298. 


THE   RULE   OF    FAITH.  7 

declaring  it.  The  church  not  only  transmits  the  faith  by  human 
means,  but  has  a  supernatural  gift  for  that  purpose ;  that  doctrine 
which  is  true,  considered  as  an  historical  fact,  is  true  also  because 
she  teaches  it."*  Hence  he  says,  "  that  when  the  sense  of  scrip- 
ture, as  interpreted  by  reason,  is  contrary  to  the  sense  given  to  it 
by  Catholic  antiquity,  we  ought  to  side  with  the  latter."  Page  160. 

Such  being  the  high  office  of  tradition,  it  is  a  matter  of  great 
moment  to  decide  how  we  are  to  ascertain  what  tradition  teaches. 
The  common  answer  to  this  question  is,  Catholic  consent ;  what- 
ever has  been  believed  always,  everywhere,  and  by  all^rnust  be 
received  as  derived  from  the  apostles. 

Such  then  is  the  theory.  The  scriptures  are  obscure  and  defec- 
tive. They  contain  only  covertly  and  under  the  surface  even,  some 
of  the  essential  doctrines  of  the  Gospel ;  and  some  important  doc- 
trines they  do  not  contain  at  all.  The  oral  teaching  of  the  apos- 
tles was  sufficient  to  explain  these  obscurities  and  to  supply  these 
defects,  and  was  of  course  of  equal  authority  with  their  written 
instructions.  This  oral  teaching  has  been  handed  down  to  us  by 
the  church  catholic,  which  is  a  divinely  appointed  and  divinely 
guided  witness  of  the  truth.  To  her  decisions,  therefore,  we  owe 
faith.  And  as  every  particular  church  may  err,  our  security  is 
in  adhering  to  the  church  universal,  which  is  practically  infallible. 

It  rarely  if  ever  happens  that  any  theory  on  any  subject  gains 
credence  among  any  number  of  competent  men,  which  has  not  a 
great  deal  of  truth  in  it.  And  of  the  two  great  causes  of  the  long-con- 
tinued and  extensive  prevalence  of  faith  in  tradition  as  a  divine 
informant,  one  no  doubt  is,  that  there  is  so  much  truth  in  the  theory 
as  above  propounded ;  and  the  other  is,  that  men  find  tradition  to 
teach  what  they  are  anxious  to  believe.  The  principal  elements  of 
truth  in  the  above  theory  are,  first,  that  the  testimony  of  God  is  the 
only  adequate  foundation  of  faith  in  matters  of  religion  ;  second, 
that  as  much  confidence  is  due  to  the  oral  teachings  of  the  apostles 
as  to  their  written  instructions ;  and  third,  that  the  fact  that  all  true 
Christians  in  every  age  have  believed  any  doctrine,  admits  of  no 
other  satisfactory  solution,  than  that  such  doctrine  was  derived  from 
the  apostles. 

The  application  of  these  principles  and  the  arguments  founded 
upon  them  by  the  traditionists,  are,  however,  full  of  fallacy  and  un- 
fairness. They  speak  of  the  church  catholic  being,  in  virtue  of 
the  promise  of  God,  indefectible,  and  practically  infallible,  as  far  as 
concerns  fundamental  truth.  This  every  one  will  admit,  if  you 
take  the  word  church  in  its  scriptural  sense.  The  church  is  the 
body  of  true  believers  ;  the  company  of  faithful  men.  That  this 
company  cannot  err  in  essential  doctrines ;  that  is,  that  all  true 
Christians  will,  by  the  grace  of  God,  ever  believe  all  that  is  essen- 
tial to  their  salvation,  we  have  no  disposition  to  dispute.  And 
moreover,  that  the  promise  of  our  Lord  secures  the  continued  ex- 

*  Lectures  on  Romanism,  8cc.,  p.  225. 


8  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

istence  of  his  church,  or,  in  other  words,  a  continued  succession  ot 
true  believers,  we  also  readily  admit.  And  we  are  consequently 
ready  to  acknowledge,  that  if  you  can  ascertain  what  this  church 
(i.  e.,  true  Christians)  has  ever,  everywhere,  and  universally  be- 
lieved, you  have  a  practically  infallible  rule  for  determining,  as  far  as 
fundamentals  are  concerned,  what  is  the  true  faith.  But  of  what  avail 
is  all  this  1  How  are  you  to  ascertain  the  faith  of  all  true  believers  in 
every  age  and  in  every  part  of  the  world  ?  They  have  never  formed 
a  distinct^visible  society,  even  in  any  one  age  or  place,  much  less 
in  all  ages  and  places.  They  are  scattered  here  and  there  in  all 
visible  churches,  known  and  numbered  by  no  eye  but  His  who 
searches  the  heart.  You  might  as  well  attempt  to  collect  the  suf- 
frages of  all  the  amiable  men  who  have  ever  lived,  as  to  gather  the 
testimony  of  all  the  people  of  God  to  any  one  doctrine.  And  if  it 
could  be  done,  what  would  it  amount  to  ?  You  would  find  them 
agreed  in  receiving  the  doctrines  which  lie  on  the  very  face  of 
scripture,  and  in  nothing  else.  You  would  find  that  the  plain  tes- 
timony of  God  had  been  universally  understood  and  received  by  his 
people.  This  would  not  be  a  source  of  new  information,  though  it 
might  be  a  consolation,  and  a  confirmation  of  our  faith. 

The  first  fallacy  and  unfairness  of  traditionists  then  is,  confound- 
ing the  true  church,  or  the  company  of  faithful  men,  with  the  ex- 
ternal and  visible  church.  As  it  is  an  acknowledged  impossibility 
to  ascertain  the  opinions  of  the  sincere  people  of  God,  they  ap- 
peal to  the  promiscuous  mass  of  professing  Christians,  organized  in 
different  societies  in  various  parts  of  the  world.  This  proceeding 
is  obviously  fallacious  and  unfair.  There  is  no  promise  of  God, 
securing  any  or  every  external  church  from  apostasy,  even  as  to 
fundamental  truth.  As  far  as  we  know,  every  external  organiza- 
tion connected  with  the  Jewish  church  had  apostatized  in  the 
days  of*  Ahab  ;  the  seven  thousand,  who  had  not  bowed  the  knee 
to  Baal,  were  hid  from  the  sight  of  Elias.  During  the  prevalence 
of  the  Arian  heresy,  the  great  majority  of  the  churches  had  de- 
parted from  the  faith ;  popes  and  councils  declared  in  favour  of 
Pelagianism  ;  and  in  the  ages  before  the  Reformation,  if  the  voice  of 
the  external  church,  or  the  mass  of  professing  Christians,  is  to  be 
taken  as  the  voice  of  the  true  people  of  God,  and  a  practical  and 
infallible  witness  of  the  truth,  we  shall  have  the  Bible  completely 
superseded,  and  the  whole  mass  of  popish  error  and  superstition 
firmly  established.  The  rule  of  the  traditionists,  therefore,  which 
is  true  in  relation  to  M  the  faith  of  God's  elect,"  is  as  false  and  fal- 
lacious as  possible  in  its  application  to  the  external  church. 

But  besides  this,  the  voice  of  all  professing  Christians,  every- 
where and  at  all  times,  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain.  And  if  it 
could  be  ascertained,  the  points  of  agreement  would  not  include 
one  half  of  the  doctrines  admitted  to  be  fundamental.  It  is  notori- 
ous that  neither  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity,  nor  of  the  atonement, 
nor  of  regeneration,  have  been  received  everywhere,  always,  and  by 
all ;  much  less  have  all  so  far  agreed  in  their  explanations  of  these 


THE    RULE    OP   FAITH.  9 

doctrines  as  to  retain  what  all  admit  to  be  essential  to  their  inte- 
grity. To  meet  the  former  of  these  difficulties,  that  is,  to  obviate 
the  difficulty  arising  from  the  impossibility  of  gathering  the  faith  of 
the  whole  visible  church,  traditionists  insist,  that  we  are  bound  to 
take  the  testimony  of  the  pastors  or  rulers  of  the  church.  But  in 
the  first  place,  the  pastors  are  not  the  church,  and  the  promises  given 
to  the  church  were  consequently  not  given  to  them.  The  declara- 
tion, that  the  church  shall  never  perish,  does  not  mean  that  the 
great  body  of  its  pastors  shall  never  become  unfaithful.  Again, 
though  the  number  of  pastors  is  so  rriuch  less  than  that  of  the  whole 
church,  the  impossibility  of  gathering  their  united  testimony  to  any 
one  truth  is  not  less  clear  and  decided.  This  cannot  be  done  in 
any  one  age,  much  less  in  all  ages  and  places.  Who  can  gather 
the  opinions  of  all  the  present  ministers  of  the  Church  of  England? 
Their  public  creed  does  not  express  their  opinions,  for  they  differ 
fundamentally  in  their  explanation  of  that  creed.  Some  are  vir- 
tually Romanists :  some  are  Pelagians  ;  some  are  Calvinists  ;  some, 
we  know,  have  been  Socinians.  Mr.  Newman  tells  us,  "  In  the 
English  church,  we  shall  hardly  find  ten  or  twenty  neighbouring 
clergymen  who  agree  together  ;  and  that,  not  in  non-essentials  of 
religion,  but  as  to  what  are  its  elementary  and  necessary  doctrines  ; 
or  as  to  the  fact  whether  there  are  any  necessary  doctrines  at  all, 
any  distinct  and  definite  faith  required  for  salvation."*  And  on 
the  same  page,  speaking  of  the  laity,  he  says,  "  If  they  go  to  one 
church  they  hear  one  doctrine,  in  the  next  that  comes  they  hear 
another ;  if  they  try  to  unite  the  two,  they  are  obliged  to  drop  im- 
portant elements  in  each,  and  waste  down  and  attenuate  the  faith 
to  a  mere  shadow."  The  leading  modern  advocate  of  tradilion 
therefore  assures  us  that  we  cannot  gather  the  faith  of  the  English 
clergy,  even  as  to  "  elementary  and  necessary  doctrines,"  from 
their  public  creeds  ;  that  they  do  not  in  fact  agree,  and  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  find  out  what  they  believe.  All  this  is  said  of  a  church  with 
which  we  are  contemporary;  in  an  age  of  printing,  of  speaking,  of  as- 
semblies, and  of  every  other  means  of  intercommunion  and  publica- 
tion of  opinions  ;  an  age  of  censuses  and  statistics,  when  the  colour 
of  every  man's  eyes  may  almost  be  ascertained  and  published  to  the 
world.  And  yet  this  same  man  would  have  us  believe  that  he  can 
tell  what  all  pastors  everywhere  believed,  seventeen  centuries  ago, 
not  in  one  church,  but  in  all  churches  !  If  the  creed  of  the  church 
of  England  does  not  express  the  faith  of  the  English  clergy,  how 
are  we  to  know  that  the  creeds  of  the  ancient  church  express  the 
faith  of  the  clergy  of  the  early  centuries?  The  difficulty  is 
greatly  increased  by  the  consideration,  that  there  was  no  one 
creed  which  the  clergy  were  then  obliged  to  adopt  and  subscribe, 
as  at  the  present  day.  What  is  now  called  the  apostles'  creed,  was 
only  the  creed  of  the  Church  of  Rome,  and  did  not  assume  its 
present  form  before  the  fourth  century.      Irenasus,  Tertullian  and 

•  Lectures,  p.  395. 


10  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

Origen  have  left  formulas  of  doctrine  for  which  they  claim  the 
consent  of  all  the  churches,  but  even  these  afford  very  imperfect 
evidence  of  the  consent  of  all  the  pastors.  In  the  first  place,  the 
testimony  of  a  few  men  as  to  what  all  other  men  believe,  is  of  no 
decisive  weight.  Let  Dr.  Pusey,  or  Mr.  Newman,  state  the  faith 
of  the  English  church,  and  it  will  be  one  thing  ;  let  the  Bishop  of 
Chester  state  it,  and  it  will  be  quite  a  different  thing.  In  the 
second  place,  these  creeds  contain  some  things  which  are  incorrect, 
and  in  all  probability  the  faith  of  a  very  small  part  of  the  existing 
church.  Thus  Origen  says  the  whole  church  believed,  that  the 
scriptures  "  have  not  only  a  sense  which  is  apparent,  but  also 
another  which  is  concealed  from  most.  For  those  things  which 
are  described  are  the  outlines  of  certain  mysteries,  and  the  images 
of  divine  things."  He  says,  it  is  not  clearly  discerned  whether  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  to  be  considered  "  as  begotten  or  not,"  or  as  Je- 
rome says  the  words  were,  "  made  or  not  made."  Origen  him- 
self believed  him  to  be  a  creature.  Tertullian's  exposition  of  the 
Trinity,  if  understood  according  to  his  own  sense  of  the  terms,  is 
as  little  orthodox  as  that  of  Origen.  Here  then  the  very  earliest 
creeds  now  extant,  for  which  the  faith  of  all  churches  was  claimed, 
are  yet  infected  with  acknowledged  error.  They  did  not  and 
could  not  represent  the  faith  of  all  the  pastors  of  the  age  of  their 
authors,  much  less  the  faith  of  all  who  had  preceded  them. 

But  suppose  we  should  admit  that  the  early  creeds  ought  to  be 
taken  as  expressing  the  sense  of  the  whole  ancient  church,  what 
should  we  gain  by  it  ?  They  contain  nothing  beyond  the  simplest 
doctrines  of  the  scripture,  and  that  in  such  general  terms  as  decide 
nothing  against  Arianism,  Pelagianism,  and  various  other  forms  of 
error.  They  have  no  relation  to  the  points  in  dispute  between 
Papists  and  Protestants,  or  between  Oxford  and  the  English  Re- 
formers. They  yield  no  support  to  the  baptismal  regeneration,  the 
sacrifice  of  the  mass,  or  episcopal  grace.  As  far  as  the  creeds 
are  concerned,  they  are  an  insufficient  and  uncertain  evidence  of 
catholic  consent ;  and,  if  admitted,  decide  nothing  as  to  any  one  of 
the  questions  between  Protestants  and  traditionists. 

Appeal  however  is  made  to  the  decisions  of  councils.  These 
bodies,  called  together  by  pubhc  authority  and  representing  all 
parts  of  th.3  church,  are  regarded  as  bearing  trustworthy  testimo- 
ny as  to  the  Catholic  faith.  But  to  this  argument  it  has  been  fairly 
objected  that  the  church  catholic  does  not  admit  of  being  repre- 
sented. The  delegates  from  the  several  provinces  can  at  best  re- 
present only  the  majorities  in  the  bodies  deputing  them.  The  mi- 
norities, whether  large  or  small,  must  be  unrepresented.  Experience 
teaches  us  that  truth  is  not  always  with  the  many.  What  would 
have  been  the  fate  of  orthodoxy  had  it  been  put  to  the  vote  under 
Constantius  or  Valens  ?  What  would  have  become  of  Protestant- 
ism, had  all  churches  sent  delegates  to  Trent,  and  the  cause  of  God 
been  confided  to  the  decision  of  the  urn  ?  Our  objection,  however, 
now  is,  that  no  general  council  can  so  represent  the  church  as  to 


THE   RULE    OF    FAITH.  11 

give  us  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  faith  of  all  its  members.  Ano- 
ther objection  is  that  the  councils  called  general  are  not  deserving 
of  the  name.  They  have  in  no  case  been  either  a  full  or  fair  re- 
presentation of  the  existing  church.  Take  that  of  Nice  for  exam- 
ple. We  should  be  glad  to  believe  that  Christendom  was,  as  to 
the  main  point,  there  fully  represented.  But  What  are  the  facts  ? 
There  were  present  at  that  council  about  three  hundred  and 
eighteen  bishops  ;  of  these,  seventeen  were  from  the  little  province 
of  Isauria  ;  while  there  was  but  one  from  all  Africa,  but  one  from 
Spain,  and  but  one  from  Gaul.  Is  it  not  absurd  to  say  that  one 
bishop  could  represent  the  faith  of  a  whole  province,  and  that  one 
acting  without  authority  and  without  delegation  ?  Suppose  the  at- 
tempt to  be  now  made  to  hold  a  general  council,  and  an  invitation 
to  be  issued  to  all  bishops  and  presbyters  to  assemble  at  a  given 
time  and  place.  Suppose  further  that  Mr.  Newman  should  attend 
from  England,  Bishop  Hughes  from  America,  the  Abbe  Genoude 
from  France,  could  the  assent  of  these  volunteer  delegates,  with 
any  show  of  reason,  be  taken  as  proving  what  was  the  faith  of  the 
Church  of  England,  or  of  the  church  of  God  in  these  United 
States  ?  Yet  this  was  the  way  in  which  councils  were  generally 
called.  The  reigning  emperor  issued  his  summons,  and  those  who 
had  the  inclination  or  ability  attended ;  those  who  were  disinclined 
to  the  object  of  the  council,  or  unable  to  travel,  remained  at  home. 
It  is  obvious  that  such  councils  could  not  give  a  fair  expression  to 
the  voice  of  the  church.  It  may  be  said  indeed,  that,  however  im- 
perfect the  representation,  the  acquiescence  of  all  parts  of  the 
church  in  their  decisions,  affords'  proof  of  unanimity  of  faith. 
There  would  be  some  force  in  this  suggestion,  had  we  any  evidence 
of  such  acquiescence.  We  know  however  that  decisions  in  coun- 
cils were  in  almost  all  important  cases  more  or  less  resisted ;  and 
the  struggle  continued  until  one  party  or  the  other  obtained  the 
advantage,  and  then,  by  excommunicating  the  dissentients,  the 
voice  ot  the  whole  church  was  claimed  for  the  majority.  This 
has  been  the  course  of  Rome  from  the  beginning.  Refusing  to 
recognise  as  a  part  of  the  church  all  who  do  not  adhere  to  her, 
she  boasts  of  having  the  suffrage  of  the  whole  church  in  her  favour. 
A  still  more  decisive  proof  that  councils  cannot  be  relied  upon 
as  expressing  the  faith  of  the  whole  church,  is  that  they  contradict 
each  other.  The  council  of  Nice  decided  against  Arianism  ;  a 
much  larger  council,  within  twenty-five  years,  decided  in  its  favour.* 
The  church  was  thrown  into  a  state  of  violent  contention.  At 
one  period  or  in  one  part  of  the  empire  the  orthodox  prevailed  ;  in 
others,  the  Arians.     Each  party  had  their  councils ;  each  at  differ- 

*  The  council  which  met  for  the  western  church  at  Ariminum,  and  for  the  eastern 
at  Seleucia,  "which,"  says  Bishop  Stillingfleet,  "  make  up  the  most  general  council 
we  read  of  in  church  history.  For  Bellarmine  owns  that  there  were  six  hundred 
bishops  in  the  western  part  of  it.  So  that  there  were  many  more  bishops  assembled 
there  than  were  in  the  councils  of  Nice ;  there  was  no  exception  against  the  sum- 
mons nor  against  the  bishops  present." 


12  THE   RULE    OF    FAITH. 

ent  times  could  claim  the  majority  of  the  whole  church  ;  one 
bishop  of  Rome  was  with  the  orthodox,  another  with  the  Arians, 
and  thus  the  conflict  was  continued  with  various  success  for  more 
than  three  hundred  years.  How  then  can  catholic  consent  be 
claimed  for  the  Nicene  creed  ?  If  catholic  consent  means  the  con- 
sent of  all,  everywhere,  and  at  all  times,  it  is  a  gross  imposition 
and  absurdity  to  claim  it  for  a  creed  with  regard  to  which  for  a 
long  time  Christendom  was  nearly  equally  divided. 

The  heresy  of  Eutyches,  respecting  the  person  of  Christ,  was 
first  condemned  by  a  council  held  at  Constantinople,  A.  D.  448 ; 
then  approved  by  the  second  general  council  at  Ephesus,  in  449  ; 
and  then  again  condemned  by  the  council  of  Chalcedon,  in  451. 
Pelagianism  was  condemned  in  Africa,  sanctioned  in  Palestine,  ap- 
proved by  the  council  of  Diospolis,  pronounced  to  be  according  to 
scripture,  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  Bishop  of  Rome^  afterwards 
repudiated  by  the  same  bishop,  and  finally  condemned  By  the  coun- 
cil of  Ephesus,  A.  D.  431.  Even  with  regard  to  the  canon  of 
scripture,  we  have  council  against  council ;  that  of  Laodicea  ex- 
cluding the  Apocrypha,  that  of  Carthage  including  them  in  the  list 
of  inspired  books.  It  is  therefore  a  plain  historical  fact,  that  even 
those  councils,  which  have  most  deserved  the  name  of  general, 
have  not  agreed,  and  therefore  can  neither  be  regarded  as  infalli- 
ble, nor  as  any  conclusive  evidence  of  catholic  consent. 

There  is  another  objection  to  the  notion  that  the  faith  of  the 
church  universal  can  be  gathered  from  the  decisions  of  councils, 
which  ought  not  to  be  overlooked.  The  authority  of  tradition  is, 
both  by  Romanists  and  the  writers  of  the  Oxford  Tracts,  defended 
mainly  on  the  ground  of  its  apostolic  origin.  The  fact  that  all 
Christians  have  received  any  doctrine  is  held  to  be  proof  that  it 
wTas  derived  from  the  apostles ;  and  to  ascertain  what  all  the  early 
Christians  believed,  we  are  referred  to  the  decisions  of  the  ancient 
general  councils.  But  unfortunately,  there  was  no  council,  having 
the  least  pretension  to  be  called  general,  held  during  the  first  three 
centuries.  How  is  this  chasm  to  be  got  over  ?  We  can  under- 
stand how  an  assembly,  even  at  the  present  day,  with  the  scriptures 
before  them,  can  give  a  judgment  as  to  the  doctrines  of  Christiani- 
ty, which  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  deference  due  to  their  opinion. 
But  since  the  world  began,  has  any  such  thing  been  known  as  the 
transmission  of  unwritten  doctrines  unchanged  for  three  hundred 
years  ?  Without  a  miracle,  for  which  we  have  neither  promise  nor 
evidence,  the  thing  is  impossible.  Would  it  be  possible  for  the 
present  clergy  of  Germany  to  bear  trustworthy  testimony  to  the 
unwritten  teaching  of  Luther  and  Melancthon  ?  Does  there  exist 
now  in  England  any  knowledge  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Reformers, 
not  to  be  gathered  from  their  writings  ?  Would  not  the  claim  of 
an  English  convocation  to  enforce  any  doctrine,  not  contained  in 
their  Articles,  Liturgy,  or  Homilies,  on  the  ground  of  traditionary 
knowledge  of  the  oral  teaching  of  Cranmer  or  Latimer,  be  received 
with  ridicule  by  the  whole  church  ?     How  then  can  we  believe 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  13 

that  the  council  of  Nice  had  any  tradition  or  knowledge  of  the  oral 
teaching  of  the  apostles  worthy  of  confidence  ?  If  a  tradition 
cannot  be  traced  up  historically  to  the  times  of  the  apostles,  it  can, 
on  the  very  principles,  though  not  according  to  the  practice,  of  our 
opponents,  be  of  no  authority.  The  prevalence  of  an  opinion  in 
the  church,  three  hundred  years  after  the  apostles,  is  no  proof  that 
it  was  derived  from  the  apostles,  any  more  than  the  prevalence  of 
Arminianism  in  the  Church  of  England,  or  of  Rationalism  in  Ger- 
many, proves  that  these  forms  of  error  were  derived  from  the  Re- 
formers. It  is  therefore  not  from  the  decisions  of  councils  that  we 
can  gather  catholic  consent. 

The  only  other  important  source  of  knowledge  of  the  faith  of  the 
early  church,  is  the  writings  of  the  fathers.  It  has  been  assumed 
that  the  consent  or  agreement  of  the  early  Christian  writers,  in  the 
belief  of  any  doctrine,  is  to  be  considered  satisfactory  evidence  of 
the  derivation  of  such  doctrine  or  usage  from  the  apostles.  Tra- 
ditionists  have  generally  felt  the  necessity  of  some  caution  in  lay- 
ing down  this  rule.  It  is  so  obvious  that  the  fathers  differ  among 
themselves,  and  that  the  same  father  differs  in  many  cases  from 
himself,  that  we  are  cautioned  carefully  to  distinguish  between 
what  they  deliver  as  teachers,  which  is  often  erroneous,  from  what 
they  deliver  as  witnesses.  It  is  necessary  that  we  should  have 
not  only  their  unanimous  consent,  but  also  their  unanimous  testi- 
mony, that  the  doctrine  taught  is  part  of  the  faith  of  the  church. 
We  do  not  say  that  traditionists  adhere  to  these  limitations,  for  they 
do  not,  but  they  feel  the  necessity  of  stating  them,  to  secure  even 
the  semblance  of  authority  for  their  rule. 

The  question  then  is,  whether  the  unanimous  consent  of  the 
fathers  is  proof  of  the  apostolic  origin  of  any  doctrine  ?  This 
question,  as  far  as  it  has  any  bearing  on  the  present  controversy, 
must  be  understood  of  doctrines,  not  clearly  contained  in  the  scrip- 
tures. Their  unanimous  consent  to  the  being  of  a  God,  to  the  di- 
vine mission  of  Christ,  to  the  fact  that  he  was  born  of  the  Virgin 
Mary,  suffered  under  Pontius  Pilate,  was  crucified,  dead,  and  bu- 
ried, that  he  rose  again  on  the  third  day  and  ascended  into  heaven  ; 
cannot  be  considered  as  in  any  degree  increasing  our  assurance 
that  these  doctrines  and  facts  are  contained  in  the  New  Testament. 
It  is  not  for  such  purposes  that  their  testimony  is  required.  But  is 
their  consent  a  warrant  to  us  of  the  oral  teaching  of  the  apostles  1 
Must  we  believe  what  they  happen  to  agree  in  believing  ?  We 
think  this  a  most  unreasonable  demand,  for,  in  the  first  place,  the 
consent  of  some  sixteen  writers,  is  very  insufficient  evidence  of  the 
faith  of  the  whole  Christian  church  for  three  hundred  years,  and  it 
is  only  as  witnesses  for  catholic  consent  that  their  writings  are  as- 
sumed to  be  of  any  authority.  The  fact  that  the  remains  of  the 
first  three  centuries  are  so  scanty,  creates  of  itself  almost  an  im- 
possibility that  we  should  find  in  them  any  fair  or  full  representa- 
tion of  the  whole  church  during  that  long  period.  Would  any 
man  dream  of  extracting  from  some  ten  or  twenty  works,  many  of 


14  THE    RULE    OP    FAITH. 

them  mere  fragments,  taken  at  hazard  from  the  whole  list  of  Eng- 
lish divines,  any  knowledge  of  the  doctrines  of  the  English  Reform- 
ers, which  is  not  to  be  found  in  their  authentic  writings  ?     Would 
it  not  be  considered  in  the  highest  degree  absurd,  to  maintain  that 
the  interpretation  of  the  thirty-nine  articles  must  be  regulated  by 
the  consent  of  these  fragments  ?     Suppose  all  these  remains  of 
English  theology  were  of  one  school,  say  the  Laudean,  what  view 
should  we  then  be  forced  to  take  of  the  English  articles  ?     Or  sup- 
pose that  some  were  of  the  school  of  Whitgift,  some  of  that  of 
Laud,  and  some  of  that  of  Hoadly,  contradicting  each  other  on 
almost  all  points,  each  accusing  the  others  of  departure  from  the 
faith  of  the  church ;  would  it  not  be  a  perfectly  hopeless  task,  to 
attempt  to  gather  from  their  conflicting  statements,  the  meaning  of 
the  articles  ?     Yet  this,  and  even  worse  than  this,  is  the  rule  of 
faith  which  traditionists  would  impose  upon  the  church.     We  say 
worse,  for  the  supposed  fragments  of  English  writers  would  at 
least  be  all  genuine,  in  a  language  we  understand,  relating  to  con- 
troversies with  which  we  are  familiar.      The  remains  of  the  first 
centuries  have  no  one  of  these  advantages.     They  are  confessedly 
more  or  less  mutilated  and  corrupted.     It  is  really  a  matter  of  sur- 
prise to  read  the  frequent  and  loud  complaints  made  by  the  fathers 
of  the  frauds  to  which  they  were  subjected.     Spurious  writings 
were  issued  on  all  occasions ;  the  writings  of  distinguished  men 
curtailed  or  interpolated  to  serve  the  purposes  of  a  party.    We  hear 
not  only  of  the  gospel  of  St.  Thomas,  the  epistle  to  the  Laodiceans, 
of  the  acts  of  Paul  and  Thecla,  but  complaints  are  made  of  the 
name  of  one  father  being  put  to  the  writings  of  another  to  give 
them  currency.     This  is  a  difficulty  and  an  evil  which  Romanists 
themselves  are  forced  to  admit.  On  this  point  Mr.  Goode  remarks, 
"  Above  one  hundred  and  eighty  treatises,  professing  to  be  written 
by  authors  of  the  first  six  centuries,  are  repudiated  by  the  more 
learned  of  the  Romanists  themselves,  as,  most  of  them,  rank  forgeries, 
and  the  others  not  written  by  those  whose  names  they  bear;  though, 
be  it  observed,  they  have  been  quoted  over  and  over  again  by  cele- 
brated controversial  writers  of  the  Romish  communion,  in  support 
of  their  errors  against  Protestants."     An  evil  still  greater  than  for- 
gery, because  more  difficult  to  detect,  is  interpolation.     Many  of 
the  early  Greek  works  are  extant  only  in  a  Latin  translation,  which 
is  so  corrupt  as  to  be  unworthy  of  credit.     This  is  the  case  with 
the  work  of  Irenseus,  and  with  the  translations  by  Ruffinus,  whom 
Jerome  charges  with  the  most  shameless  adulteration  of  his  authors. 
This  is  a  subject  which  cannot  be  treated  without  going  into  details, 
which  our  limits  forbid.     It  is  however  a  notorious  fact  that  the 
remains  of  the  early  ages  have  come  down  to  us  in  a  most  cor- 
rupted state,  and  that  it  is  a  task  of  great  difficulty,  if  not  of  abso- 
lute impossibility,  to  separate  what  is  genuine  from  what  is  spuri- 
ous.    What  a  rule  of  faith  is  here  ! 

But  besides  this  difficulty,  the  writings  of  the  fathers  are  on  va- 
rious accounts  hard  to  be  understood ;  not  only  because  of  the  Ian- 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  15 

guage  in  which  they  are  written,  but  from  the  principles  on  which 
their  authors  proceeded.  They  relate  also  in  a  great  degree  to 
controversies  with  which  we  have  no  immediate  concern,  being 
directed  against  Paganism,  or  obsolete  heresies.  These  are  the 
writings  which  are  to  remove  the  obscurities  of  scripture,  and  sup- 
ply its  deficiencies.  We  might  as  well  take  the  waters  of  the 
Thames,  after  it  has  traversed  all  London,  to  purify  the  limpid  river 
at  its  source. 

Besides  all  this,  the  fathers  are  not  trustworthy,  as  witnesses  of 
the  faith  of  the  early  church.  They  are  too  credulous.  This  is 
proved  by  the  fact,  that  they  claim  the  support  of  tradition  for  ac- 
knowledged error  or  for  opposing  doctrines.  Some  say  they  de- 
rived it  from  the  successors  of  the  apostles,  that  our  Lord  was  fifty 
years  old  at  the  time  of  his  death  ;  others,  on  the  same  authority, 
assure  us  that  his  ministry  continued  but  for  one  year ;  Origen,  as 
we  have  seen,  claims  the  tradition  of  all  the  churches  in  support  of 
the  allegorical  sense  of  the  historical  parts  of  scripture ;  he  says 
tradition  leaves  it  doubtful  whether  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  have 
souls  or  not.  Papias,  who  flourished  about  ninety  years  after 
Christ,  says,  "  As  the  elders  remember,  who  saw  John  the  disciple 
of  the  Lord,  that  they  heard  from  him  what  the  Lord  taught  about 
those  times,  and  said,  The  days  shall  come  in  which  vines  shall  ex- 
ist, each  containing  10,000  shoots,  and  in  each  shoot  shall  be  10,000 
§arms,  and  in  each  true  shoot  shall  be  10,000  branches,  and  on  every 
branch  10,000  clusters,  and  in  every  cluster  10,000  grapes,  and 
every  grape,  when  pressed,  shall  give  twenty-five  firkins  of  wine," 
&c,  &c,  &c.  This  account  is  endorsed  by  Irenaeus,  who  quotes  Pa- 
pias "  as  a  hearer  and  companion  of  rolycarp."  The  eastern 
churches  affirmed  that  the  observance  of  Easter  on  the  fourteenth 
day  of  the  moon,  had  been  delivered  to  them  by  the  apostle  John ; 
the  Romans  and  those  in  the  western  parts  said  that  their  usage 
was  delivered  by  the  apostles  Peter  and  Paul.  Cyprian  insisted 
that  those  who  had  been  baptized  by  heretics  and  schismatics, 
should  be  rebaptized,  and  appeals  to  the  catholic  faith  and  church 
in  his  support.  Stephen,  the  Bishop  of  Rome,  said,  "The  apostles 
forbade  that  those  who  came  over  from  any  heresy  should  be  bap- 
tized, and  delivered  this  to  posterity  to  be  observed."  Augustin 
says;  it  is  the  "  catholic  faith,"  that  all  unbaptized  infants  are  lost, 
though  he  is  suspected  of  being  himself  the  father  of  the  doctrine. 
Many  claim  the  authority  of  the  church  for  the  notion  that  the 
angels  have  bodies.  Some  say  that  tradition  taught  that  all  souls 
are  immediately  created,  others  that  they  are  derived,  ex  traduce. 
So  in  all  their  disputes,  each  party  appealed  to  tradition  in  its  own 
behalf,  and  condemned,  all  others.  The  heretics,  especially,  driven 
by  argument  from  the  scriptures,  were  distinguished  by  their  ap- 
peals to  patristical  tradition.  Irenaeus  says,  "When  they  are  re- 
proved by  the  scriptures  they  immediately  begin  to  accuse  the 
scriptures  themselves,  as  if  they  were  not  correct,  nor  of  authori- 
ty, and  that  they  are  not  consistent ;  and  that  the  truth  cannot  be 


16  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

found  out  from  them  by  those  who  are  ignorant  of  tradition."  The 
same  complaint  is  made  by  other  fathers. 

The  thing  to  be  proved  is,  that  certain  doctrines  are  derived 
from  the  oral  teaching  of  the  apostles.  The  proof  is,  that  the 
fathers  say  so.  We  answer,  their  saying  so  is  no  sufficient  proof. 
They  are  too  few,  too  far  removed  from  the  apostles  ;  their  testi- 
mony is  hard  to  get  at,  since  so  many  writings  are  attributed  to 
them  which  they  never  wrote,  and  since  their  genuine  writings  are 
so  much  corrupted ;  besides,  their  testimony  when  obtained  is  not 
decisive,  because  they  testify  to  what  cannot  be  true.  They  say 
they  received  doctrines  from  the  apostles,  which  everybody  must 
admit  to  be  false ;  and  they  make  the  claim  for  conflicting  state- 
ments. No  court,  civil  or  ecclesiastical,  would  decide  any  cause 
involving  the  value  of  a  straw  on  such  testimony. 

To  all  this  it  may  be  said,  that  admitting  all  that  has  been  urged, 
still,  where  the  fathers  do  all  concur,  there  we  have  ground  to  be- 
lieve they  are  right,  often  as  they  are  individually  wrong.  To 
this  we  answer,  that  the  consent  of  the  few  writers  of  the  first  three 
centuries  is  as  nothing  compared  with  the  whole  church  which  they 
are  assumed  to  represent.  But  further,  their  consent  can  be  fairly 
pleaded  for  nothing  which  is  now  a  matter  of  dispute.  They  agree 
in  nothing  but  the  plainest  and  simplest  biblical  facts  and  doctrines. 
Hear  what  even  Bishop  Taylor,  one  of  the  witnesses  quoted  by 
Mr.  Keble  in  his  Catena  Patrum  in  favor  of  tradition,  says  on  this 
subject.  "  Catholic  consent,"  he  says,  "  cannot  be  proved  in  any- 
thing but  in  the  canon  of  scripture  itself ;  and,  as  it  is  now  re- 
ceived, even  in  that  there  is  some  variety."  Again :  "  There  is 
no  question  this  day  in  contestation  in  the  explication  of  which  all 
the  old  writers  did  consent.  In  the  assignation  of  the  canon  of 
scripture,  they  never  did  consent  for  six  hundred  years  together ; 
and  when  by  that  time  the  bishops  had  agreed  indifferently,  and 
but  indifferently  upon  that,  they  fell  out  in  twenty  more  ;  and  ex- 
cept it  be  the  apostles'  creed  and  articles  of  that  nature,  there  is 
nothing  which  may,  with  any  colour,  be  called  a  consent,  much  less 
tradition  universal."*  This  want  of  consent  of  the  fathers  of  the 
first  three  centuries ;  their  silence  or  their  conflicting  statements 
on  all  questions  having  any  bearing  on  present  controversies,  is  so 
obvious  and  notorious,  that  it  is  virtually  conceded  even  by  tradi- 
tionists  themselves.  The  author  of  Tract  85  says,  in  reference  both 
to  the  canon  of  scripture  and  to  "  catholic  doctrines,  "  We  be- 
lieve mainly  because  the  church  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  unanimous- 
ly believed."     "  We  depend  for  the  canon  and  creed  upon   the 

fourth  and  fifth  centuries Viewing  the  matter  as  one  of 

moral  evidence,  we  seem  to  see  in  the  testimony  of  the  fifth,  the 
very  testimony  which  every  preceding  century  gave,  accidents 
excepted,  such  as  the  present  loss  of  documents  once  extant,  or 
the  then  existing  misconceptions  which  the  want  of  intercourse 

*  See  his  Liberty  of  Prophesying,  sec.  v.,  8. 


< 

1 


THE   RULE    OP    FAITH.  17 

among  the  churches  occasioned.     The  fifth  century  acts  as  a  com- 
ment on  the  obscure  text  of  the  centuries  before  it,  and  brings  out 
a  meaning  which,  with  the  help  of  the  comment,  any  candid  person 
sees  to  belong  to  them.     And  in  the  same  way  as  regards  the 
catholic  creed,  though  there  is  not  much  to  account  for.     Not  so 
much,  for  no  one,  I  suppose,  will  deny  that  in  the  fathers  of  the 
fourth  century,  it  is  as  fully  developed  and  as  unanimously  adopted 
as  it  can  be  in  the  fifth."     This  is  the  precise  doctrine  of  the  Ro- 
manists.    The  obscurities  and  deficiencies  of  scripture  are  to  be 
explained  or  supplied  by  the  writings  of  the  first  three  centuries ; 
the  obscurities  and  deficiencies  of  those  centuries  are  to  be  made 
good  by  the  writings  of  the  fourth  and  fifth ;  those  of  the  fourth 
and  fifth,  by  the  tenth  and  twelfth,  those  of  the  tenth  and  twelfth, 
by  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth.     Thus  we  have  the  whole  accumu- 
lated mass  of  superstition  and  error  sanctioned  by  apostolic  au- 
thority, and  imposed  upon  the  church.     It  is  as  plain  as  it  can  be 
that  we  have  here  the  concession  of  the  failure  of  the  whole  theory. 
The  theory  is,  that  the  oral  teachings  of  the  apostles  are  a  part  of 
our  present  rule  of  faith ;  that  catholic  consent  is  our  warrant  for 
believing  certain  doctrines  to  be  part  of  that  oral  teaching  ;  catholic 
consent  is  the  consent  and  testimony  of  the  whole  church  at  all 
times.     But  it  is  admitted  that  the  first  three  centuries  do  not  testi- 
fy to  what  are  called  catholic  doctrines.     This  fact  is  accounted 
for  by  loss  of  documents  and  misconceptions  of  the  churches.     To 
account  for  a  fact  is  to  admit  it.     It  is  admitted,  therefore,  that  the 
first  three  centuries  do  not  consent  to  or  testify  catholic  doctrines. 
To  say  that  the  first  three  do,  because  the  fourth  and  fifth  do,  is  so 
unreasonable  as  to  give  the  whole  matter  the  air  of  insincerity  and 
imposture.     Is  the  rationalism  of  the  present  German  churches  an 
exponent  of  the  faith  of  those  churches  during  the  preceding  cen- 
tury ?     Is  the  Socinianism  of  the  modern  clergy  of  Geneva  a  proof 
that  Calvin  and  Beza  were  Socinians  ?     Or  are  the  Pelagianism 
and  infidelity  of  the  English  church,  during  a  large  part  of  the  18th 
century,   when,   according   to    Bishop   Butler,  Christianity  itself 
seemed  to  be  regarded  as  a  fable  "  among  all  persons  of  discern- 
ment," to  be  considered  as  proving  the  faith  of  that  church  in  the 
preceding  centuries  ?    Here  is  a  church,  a  true  church,  an  episcopal 
church,  an  apostolic  church,  to  which  all  the  promises  ever  made  to  an 
external  church  belong  in  all  their  plenitude, sunk  so  low  as  scarcely 
to  retain  the  semblance  of  belief ;  and  even  now,  according  to  Mr. 
Newman,  you  cannot  find  any  ten  or  twenty  of  its  neighbour- 
ing clergy  who   agree   even   in  the   elementary  and    necessary 
doctrines  of  the  gospel.     With  what  colour,  then,  of  reason,  or 
even  honesty,  can  it  be  maintained  that  all  the  superstitions  and 
false  doctrines  of  the  fifth  century  are  to  be  taken  as  part  of  the 
faith  of  the  first  three  centuries,  and  of  the  apostles  themselves  ?    Of  all 
rules  by  which  to  determine  what  men  must  believe  in  order  to  be 
saved,  this  would  seem  to  be  the  most  absurd.     We  believe,  say 
the  Tractarians,  not  because  the  apostles  believed,  not  even  be- 

2 


18  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

cause  the  early  church  believed,  but  because  the  fifth  century  be- 
lieved. 

This,  however,  is  not  the  only  way  in  which  traditionists  aban- 
don their  own  theory.  They  believe  many  doctrines  for  which 
catholic  consent  cannot  be  pleaded,  and  they  reject  many  in  which 
the  early  church  were  to  a  very  great  degree  unanimous.  With 
regard  to  the  first  class,  we  of  course  do  not  believe  that  the  con- 
sent of  the  three  centuries  can  be  fairly  claimed  for  prelatical 
episcopacy.  We  might,  without  undue  confidence,  say  we  know 
that  it  cannot  be  so  claimed ;  not  only  because  such  consent,  ac- 
cording to  Bishop  Taylor,  can  be  claimed  for  nothing  except  such 
principles  of  the  faith  as  are  contained  in  the  apostles'  creed,  but 
because  it  is  notorious  that  the  identity  of  the  office  of  bishop  and 
presbyter  was  maintained  by  many  in  the  early  church,  and  that 
presbyters  had  the  right  of  ordaining  bishops  even  after  the  intro- 
duction of  prelacy.  Mr.  Goode  himself,  while  he  holds  episcopacy 
to  be  of  apostolical  origin,  admits  that  its  necessity  cannot  be 
proved.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  in  any  church,  a  presbyter  be  appointed 
by  his  co-presbyters  to  be  bishop,  or  superintendent,  or  president 
of  that  church,  and  perform  the  usual  duties  of  the  episcopal  func- 
tion, we  cannot  prove  either  by  scripture,  or  by  the  consent  of  the 
apostolically-primitive  church,  that  his  acts  are  by  apostolic  ordi- 
nance invalid."  Again :  "  Supposing  the  apostles  to  have  ap- 
pointed the  first  bishops  in  twelve  churches,  I  want  to  know  where 
we  are  informed  that  when  the  bishop  of  one  of  them  died,  the 
church  of  the  deceased  bishop  depended  upon  the  will  and  pleasure 
of  the  remaining  eleven  bishops  for  a  president,  and  could  not  ap- 
point and  create,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  its  own  president,  out 
of  its  own  body  of  presbyters."*  As  for  the  popish  doctrine  of 
orders,  episcopal  grace,  the  sacrificial  character  of  the  eucharist, 
&c,  it  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  virtually  admitted,  that  they 
cannot  be  sustained  by  the  consent  of  the  first  centuries.  They 
rest  upon  the  fifth,  even  in  the  creed  of  their  advocates. 

But  besides  these  false  doctrines,  which  are  not  only  not  in  the 
scriptures,  but  anti-scriptural,  there  are  important  and  even  funda- 
mental scriptural  doctrines  for  which  not  even  the  general  consent 
of  fathers  can  be  produced.  The  early  fathers  were  accustomed 
to  use  the  language  of  the  Bible  in  their  religious  discourses,  and 
unless  driven  to  explanations  by  the  errors  of  opposers,  they  sel- 
dom so  defined  as  to  render  their  testimony  available  against  the 
subtle  heretics  of  later  time.  They  spoke  of  Christ  as  God,  they 
prayed  to  him,  they  worshipped  him  ;  but  the  Arians  were  willing 
to  do  all  this.  And  if  the  doctrine  of  the  essential  equality  of  the 
Father  and  Son  in  the  adorable  Trinity  is  to  depend  upon  tradi- 
tion, it  cannot  be  proved  at  all.  It  is  also  a  notorious  fact  that  the 
divinity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  plainly  as  it  is  taught  in  scripture,  is  not 
a  doctrine  for  which  catholic  consent  can  be  claimed.     Jerome 

•  Vol.  ii.,  pp.  58,  59. 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  19 

says,  "  Many,  through  ignorance  of  the  scriptures,  assert  that  the 
Father  and  Son  are  often  called  Holy  Spirit.  And  while  we 
ought  clearly  to  believe  in  a  Trinity,  they,  taking  away  the  third 
person,  imagine  it  not  to  be  a  hypostasis  of  the  Trinity,  but  a 
name."  Basil  says,  the  question  concerning  the  Holy  Spirit  was 
"  passed  over  in  silence  by  the  ancients,  and  owing  to  its  not  being 
opposed,  was  left  unexplained."  And  he  therefore  proceeded  to 
discuss  it  "  according  to  the  mind  of  scripture."  A  doctrine  which 
the  ancients  passed  over  in  silence,  they  cannot  be  cited  to  prove. 
If,  therefore,  tradition  is  our  rule  of  faith ;  if  we  are  to  believe  no- 
thing for  which  catholic  consent  cannot  be  produced,  we  shall  have 
to  give  up  even  the  essential  doctrines  of  the  gospel. 

The  traditionists  moreover  depart  from  their  own  theory,  or 
rather,  show  that  they  proceed  in  a  perfectly  arbitrary  manner,  by 
rejecting  many  doctrines  for  which  a  much  greater  degree  of  una- 
nimity among  the  fathers  can  be  produced  than  for  those  which 
they  adopt.  Mr.  Keble  says,  "  We  know  with  certainty  that  Mel- 
chisedec's  feast  was  a  type  of  the  blessed  eucharist,"  "  from  the 
constant  agreement  of  the  early  church."  In  proof,  he  refers  to 
Cyprian,  Augustine,  Jerome,  and  the  Roman  liturgy,  as  "  represent- 
ing the  sense  of  the  western  church,"  and  to  Chrysostom  for  the 
Greek.  This  is  proof  of  the  constant  agreement  of  the  early  church ! 
One  man  in  the  first  three  hundred  years  of  the  church,  and  one 
for  the  whole  Greek  church,  and  this  is  taken  as  fulfilling  the  con- 
dition, quod  semper,  quod  ubique,  quod  ab  omnibus !  Why,  twice 
the  amount  of  evidence  of  antiquity  and  catholicity  may  be  pro- 
duced for  the  grossest  heresies  or  the  greatest  absurdities.  This 
is  only  an  illustration  of  the  coolness  with  which  catholicity  is 
claimed  for  any  doctrine  which  suits  the  feelings  of  the  writer.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  three  times  as  much  evidence  can  be  pro- 
duced of  a  general  belief  in  the  early  church  of  the  unlawfulness  of 
oaths,  of  the  necessity  of  infant  communion,  of  the  establishment  of 
a  glorious  visible  kingdom  at  Jerusalem,  of  the  re-appearance  of 
Enoch  and  Elias  to  wage  war  with  antichrist,  and  for  other  doc- 
trines and  usages  which  modern  traditionists  unhesitatingly  reject. 
It  is  true,  therefore,  what  Bishop  Taylor  says,  that  "  it  is  not  honest" 
to  press  the  authority  of  the  fathers,  unless  we  "  are  willing  to  sub- 
mit in  all  things  to  the  testimony  of  an  equal  number  of  them, 
which  I  am  certain  neither  side  will  do."  It  is  a  sheer  impossibili- 
ty to  prove  anything  by  the  rule  of  the  traditionists  as  they  state 
it,  because  catholic  consent  is  absolutely  unattainable.  The  rule  is 
worthless  as  it  stands  ;  and  if  they  choose  to  assume  catholic  con- 
sent in  one  instance  on  a  certain  amount  of  testimony,  let  them 
assume  it  in  others,  on  the  same  degree  of  evidence,  before  they 
attempt  to  urge  it  upon  others  as  "  the  unwritten  word  of  God." 

The  advocates  of  tradition  as  a  part  of  the  rule  of  faith  are 
therefore  chargeable  with  great  fallacy  and  unfairness.  They  lay 
down  a  rule  which,  according  to  its  obvious  meaning,  commands; 
the  assent  of  all  men.     They  say  what  all  true  Christians,  in  all 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 


ages  and  everywhere,  have  believed,  must,  as  far  as  the  essential 
doctrines  of  the  gospel  are  concerned,  be  regarded  as  part  of  the 
faith  once  delivered  to  the  saints.  This  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but 
they  immediately  and  artfully  substitute  for  true  Christians,  the  ex- 
ternal visible  church,  with  regard  to  which  it  is  not  true  that  it 
cannot  err  even  in  fundamental  doctrines.  And  further,  though 
the  consent  of  all  visible  churches,  at  all  times  and  places,  would 
not  be  conclusive  proof  of  the  truth  of  any  doctrine,  it  would  be  a 
very  strong  proof,  they  assume  such  consent  on  the  most  insuffi- 
cient evidence  ;  evidence  which  they  themselves  reject  in  its  ap- 
plication to  the  church  at  the  present  time,  and,  in  many  cases,  in 
its  application  to  the  ancient  church.  If  an  ancient  church  had  a 
creed,  that  creed  expressed  the  faith  of  all  its  members.  The 
Church  of  England  has  a  creed,  which  is  no  index,  according  to 
these  same  writers,  to  the  faith  of  its  clergy.  If  a  delegate  at- 
tended an  ancient  council  from  Africa  or  Gaul,  he  fairly  represent- 
ed his  province,  and  committed  his  brethren  to  the  decisions  of  the 
council.  The  delegate  of  the  Church  of  England  sanctions  Calvin- 
ism at  the  Synod  of  Dort,  and  he  is  a  mere  individual,  misrepre- 
senting and  dishonouring  the  church  to  which  he  belonged.  Some 
half-dozen  fathers  in  the  course  of  as  many  centuries  testify  to  one 
doctrine,  and  it  is  "  catholic  consent ;"  twenty  or  thirty  testify  to 
another  doctrine,  and  it  is  set  down  to  the  "  misconceptions  of  the 
churches."  Antiquity  is  said  to  be  necessary  to  prove  a  tradition 
apostolical ;  but  if  the  first  of  these  three  centuries  is  silent  on  the 
subject  or  opposed  to  the  tradition,  we  may  suppose  loss  of  docu- 
ments or  misinformation.  We  must  believe  what  the  fifth  century 
believed,  and  take  for  granted  that  the  preceding  centuries  agreed 
with  it.  This  boasted  rule  therefore  .turns  out  to  be  no  rule  at  all. 
It  cannot  from  its  nature  be  applied,  and  therefore  we  must  take 
the  opinion  of  one  age,  as  evidence  of  antiquity,  universality  and 
catholicity. 

One  of  the  most  natural  and  uniform  effects  of  making  tradition 
a  part  of  the  rule  of  faith,  is  to  destroy  the  authority  of  the  Bible. 
Our  Saviour  charged  the  Pharisees  with  making  the  word  of  God 
of  none  effect  by  their  traditions.  The  Talmud  has  superseded  the 
Law  of  Moses  among  the  modern  Jews ;  and  the  whole  system  of 
popery  is  sustained  on  the  authority  of  the  church  teaching  for 
doctrines  the  commandments  of  men.  Chillingworth  well  says, 
"  He  that  would  usurp  an  absolute  lordship  and  tyranny  over  any 
people,  need  not  put  himself  to  the  trouble  and  difficulty  of  abro- 
gating and  disannulling  the  laws,  made  to  maintain  the  common 
liberty ;  for  he  may  frustrate  their  intent  and  gain  his  own  design 
as  well,  if  he  can  get  the  power  and  authority  to  interpret  them  as 
he  pleases,  and  add  to  them  what  he  pleases,  and  to  have  his  inter- 
pretations and  additions  stand  for  laws  ;  if  he  can  rule  his  people 
by  his  laws,  and  his  law  by  his  lawyers."*     This  is  the  avowed 

*  Chillingworth's  Works,  American  edition,  p.  105. 


THE    RULE    OF    FAITH.  21 

office  of  tradition,  as  the  interpretation  and  supplement  of  scrip- 
ture.    It  undertakes  to  explain  the  sense  and  to  supply  the  defects 
of  the  word  of  God  ;  and  in  doing  this  it  effectually  supersedes  its 
authority.     "  When  the  sense  of  scripture,  as  interpreted  by  rea- 
son," says  Mr.  Newman,  "  is  contrary  to  that  given  it  by  catholic 
antiquity,  we  ought  to  side  with  the  latter."     This  is  practically 
saying,  that  when  scripture  and  tradition  clash,  we  must  side  with 
tradition.     This  must  in  practice  be  its  meaning.     For  to  say  when 
scripture  interpreted  by  reason  gives  a  certain  sense,  can  mean 
only,  when  we  believe  it  to  convey  that  sense.     That  is,  we  must 
give  up  what  we  believe  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  word  of  God,  to 
the  authority  of  tradition,  which  is  but  another  name  for  the  au- 
thority of  man.     If  the  Bible  says,  we  are  justified  by  faith  in 
Jesus  Christ ;  and  tradition  says,  we  are  justified  by  baptism  ;  then 
the  Bible  is  made  to  mean  not  the  faith  of  the    individual,  but 
of  the  church.     If  the  Bible  says,  Except  a  man  be  born  again  he 
cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  and  tradition  says,  Whosoever  is 
baptized  is  born  again  ;  then  the  Bible  is  made  to  mean,  that  bap- 
tism conveys  the  Holy  Spirit  in  every  case,  where  there  is  not  the 
special  impediment  of  mortal  sin.     If  the  Saviour  says,  Come  unto 
me  all  ye  who  are  heavy  laden  and  I  will  give  you  rest ;  and  tra- 
dition says,  There  is  no  remission  of  sin  without  priestly  absolution ; 
then  our  Lord  is  made  to  mean,  we  must  come  unto  him  through 
the  priest.     If  the  Bible  requires  repentance,  and  tradition  penance  ; 
then  repentance  means  penance.     The  Bible  addresses  its  instruc- 
tions, its  promises,  its  threatenings,  to  every  reader,  according  to 
his  character.     It  speaks  to  him  that  reads  it,  promising  to  the 
penitent  believer  pardon  of  sin,  the  aid  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the 
light  of  God's  countenance  ;  tradition  says  there  are  no  promises 
but  to  the  church,  and  there  is  no  church  where  there  is  not  a  cer- 
tain form  of  government.     Thus,  through  the  whole  system  of  di- 
vine truth,  the   Bible  yields   to   tradition ;  the  voice   of  God  is 
drowned  in  that  of  men  ;  the  merits  of  Christ  are  abstracted  by  the 
priest,  who  for  bread  gives  us  a  stone,  and  for  an  egg,  scorpions. 

The  writings  of  the  traditionists  are  consequently  filled  with  ir- 
reverent depreciation  of  the  scriptures.  They  are  said  to  contain 
even  essential  truths  only  by  a  sort  of  accident ;  it  is  a  wonder  that 
they  are  all  there,  and  though  there,  they  are  latent,  hid  under  the 
surface,  intimated  by  mere  hints  and  notices.  "  The  Bible,"  it  is 
said,  "  does  not  carry  its  own  interpretation."  The  texts  of  scrip- 
ture "  may  imply  the  catholic  doctrine,  but  they  need  not ;  they  are 
consistent  with  any  of  several  theories,  or  at  any  rate  other  per- 
sons think  so."  The  answers  which  Unitarians  make  to  Trinita- 
rians, in  defence  of  their  claim  to  be  considered  orthodox,  are  said 
to  be  resistless,  if  we  grant  that  the  Bible  is  "  the  sole  authoritative 
judge  in  controversies  of  faith."  Certain  individuals,  says  Mr. 
Newman,  may  not  be  injured  by  this  principle,  but  "  the  body  of 
men  who  profess  it  are,  and  ever  must  be  injured.  For  the  mass 
of  men,  having  no  moral  convictions,  are  led  by  reasoning,  and  by 


22  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

mere  consistency  of  argument,  and  legitimately  evolve  heresy  from 
principles  which  to  the  better  sort  of  men  may  be  harmless."  In 
the  same  tone  Dr.  Hook  says,  "  I  believe  it  to  be  only  on  account 
of  their  being  bad  logicians,  that  they  are  not  Socinians.  I  be- 
lieve that  they  ought  to  be,  if  consistent,  both  Dissenters  and  Soci- 
nians. If  they  accuse  church  principles  of  tending  to  popery,  we 
think  that  their  opinions  must  lead  logical  and  unprejudiced  minds 
to  Socinianism."*  According  to  the  traditionists,  therefore,  men 
may,  and  the  mass  of  them  must,  legitimately  evolve  heresy  from 
the  Bible,  which,  if  taken  by  itself,  "  must  lead  logical  and  unpreju- 
diced minds  to  Socinianism."  It  is  thus  that  men  allow  themselves 
to  speak  of  the  word  of  God,  in  order  to  exalt  tradition.  Nay, 
worse  than  this,  they  seem  willing  to  destroy  all  faith,  that  they 
may  introduce  their  system  of  priestly  and  ecclesiastical  domina- 
tion. For,  unable  to  meet  the  obvious  objection,  that  if  the  Bible 
is  obscure,  so  are  the  fathers ;  if  the  latent  doctrines  of  the 
scriptures  are  hard  to  find,  so  is  catholic  consent ;  they  say 
that  doubt  is  essential  to  faith  ;f  that  we  have,  at  most,  only 
probability  to  show  for  revelation  at  all,  or  even  for  the  exist- 
ence of  an  intelligent  Creator.  J  They  assert  that  there  is  but  "  a  bal- 
ance on  the  side  of  revelation ;"  "  there  are,  so  to  say,  three  chances 
for  revelation,  and  only  two  against  it."  The  whole  ground  of 
faith  is  swept  away,  and  mere  feeling  put  in  its  place.  "  Why,"  asks 
the  author  of  Tract  85,  "  why  should  not  the  church  be  divine  ? 
The  burden  of  proof  is  surely  on  the  other  side.  I  will  accept 
her  doctrines,  and  her  rites,  and  her  Bible — not  one,  and  not  the 
other,  but  all — till  I  have  a  clear  proof  that  she  is  mistaken.  It  is, 
I  feel,  God's  will  that  I  should  do  so ;  and  besides  I  love  these,  her 
possessions — I  love  her  Bible  (?)  her  doctrines,  and  her  rites,  and 
therefore  I  believe."  This  is  the  same  gentleman  who  says,  "  We 
believe  mainly  because  the  church  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  centuries 

*  This  is  quoted  by  Mr.  Goode,  vol.  i.,  p.  4S7,  as  said  of  those  who  hold  that  "  the 
Bible  is  the  sole,  infallible  rule  of  faith." 

■f  "  Evidence  complete  in  all  its  parts,"  says  Mr.  Keble,  "  leaves  no  room  for  faith." 
Sermon  on  Tradition,  p.  82.  Newman  says,  "  Doubt  may  even  be  said  to  be  implied 
in  a  Christian's  faith."     Lectures,  p.  104. 

{  Speaking  of  the  appeal  to  antiquity,  Mr.  Newman  says,  "  Where  men  are  indis- 
posed to  such  an  appeal,  where  they  are  determined  to  be  captious  and  to  take  ex- 
ceptions, and  act  the  disputant  and  sophist  instead  of  the  earnest  inquirer,  it  admits 
of  easy  evasion,  and  may  be  made  to  conclude  anything  or  nothing.  The  rule  of  Vin- 
cent is  not  of  a  mathematical  or  demonstrative  character,  but  moral,  and  requires 
practical  judgment  and  good  sense  to  apply  it.  For  instance,  what  is  meant  by  being 
4  taught  always  ?'  Does  it  mean  in  every  century,  or  every  year,  or  every  month  ? 
Does  •  everywhere'  mean  in  every  country,  or  in  every  diocese  ?  And  does  the 
*  consent  of  fathers'  require  us  to  produce  the  direct  testimony  of  every  one  of  them  ? 
How  many  fathers,  how  many  instances,  constitute  a  fulfilment  of  the  test  proposed  ? 
It  is,  then,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  a  condition  which  never  can  be  satisfied  as 
fully  as  it  might  have  been ;  it  admits  of  various  and  unequal  application  in  various 
instances ;  and  what  degree  of  application  is  enough  must  be  decided  by  the  same 
principles  which  guide  us  in  the  conduct  of  life,  which  determine  us  in  politics,  or 
trade,  or  war,  which  lead  us  to  accept  revelation  at  all,  for  which  we  have  but  pro- 
bability to  show  at  most,  nay,  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  Creator." 
Lectures,  p.  69. 


THE   RULE    OP    FAITH.  23 

unanimously  believed."  That  is,  he  likes  the  doctrines  of  those 
centuries,  and  therefore  he  believes.  Here  is  the  whole  logic 
of  tradition.  This  same  writer  says,  our  Saviour  required  the 
Pharisees  to  believe  "on  weak  arguments  and  fanciful  deduc- 
tions ;"  and  hence  we  have  no  right  to  complain  if  we  are 
required  to  believe  on  the  slight  and  fanciful  evidence  which 
traditionists  can  produce.  He  seems  to  have  no  conception  of 
the  infinite  difference  between  the  cases,  which  is  no  less  than 
the  difference  between  the  authority  of  God  and  that  of  man.  The 
Pharisees  were  required  to  believe  on  the  authority  of  Christ :  "  If 
I  do  not  the  works  of  my  Father,  believe  me  not ;  but  if  I  do, 
though  ye  believe  not  me,  believe  the  works ;  that  ye  may  know 
and  believe  that  the  Father  is  in  me  and  I  in  him."  To  call  the 
reasons  proposed  by  such  a  teacher  weak  and  fanciful,  is  in  the 
highest  degree  irreverent.  And  to  represent  the  Saviour  as  resting 
the  whole  authority  of  his  doctrines  on  the  exposition  of  certain 
passages  of  the  Old  Testament,  is  to  misstate  the  fact.  Christ 
showed  the  Jews  that  his  doctrines  were  confirmed  by  their  own 
scriptures ;  and  his  expositions  of  those  scriptures  were  to  be 
received,  not  only  because  they  were  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  his  opponents,  but  because  of  his  authority  as  a  teacher 
whose  divine  mission  was  fully  established.  The  declaration  of 
Christ  is  the  strongest  of  all  possible  reasons  as  a  ground  of  faith ; 
and  his  testimony  to  the  sense  of  scripture  is  the  strongest  of  all 
possible  grounds  of  assurance  that  such  is  its  true  sense.  It  is  not, 
however,  to  the  irreverence  of  the  language  referred  to  that  we 
would  call  attention ;  it  is  to  the  implied  admission  that  tradition 
can  offer  us  nothing  but  weak  reasons  and  fanciful  deductions  as  a 
ground  of  belief,  which  the  passage  quoted  contains.  The  uncer- 
tain teaching  of  tradition  is  admitted.  It  may,  as  Mr.  Newman 
says,  be  made  to  conclude  anything  or  nothing.  But  then,  say  the 
traditionists,  we  have  no  better  ground  of  faith  in  anything.  Our 
Saviour  required  his  hearers  to  believe  on  weak  reasons  ;  we  have 
only  a  probability  to  offer  even  for  a  divine  revelation;  three, 
chances,  so  to  say,  for  it,  while  there  are  two  against  it.  The 
stream,  says  Mr.  Keble,  can  never  rise  higher  than  the  fountain ; 
we  have  but  historical  tradition  for  the  scriptures  themselves, 
and  of  course  nothing  more  for  any  of  the  doctrines  which  they 
contain ;  and  we  have  the  same  historical  tradition  for  catholic 
doctrines,  i.  e.,  for  the  oral  teaching  of  the  apostles.  Every  step 
of  this  argument  is  unsound.  It  is  not  true  that  we  have  nothing 
but  historical  tradition  for  the  authority  of  scripture  and  of  the  doc- 
trines they  contain.  Mr.  Goode,  in  accordance,  we  had  almost 
said,  with  all  Christians,  says,  "  It  will  not,  I  hope,  be  denied  that 
a  saving  belief  in  scripture  being  the  work  of  God,  must  be  the 
work  of  the  Spirit  of  God  upon  the  heart  ;  and  that  such  a  faith 
might  be  produced  under  that  influence,  even  though  the  external 
evidence  should  be  in  itself  weak  and  insufficient ;  and  that  such  a 
faith  is  of  the  highest  and  most  perfect  kind,  including  all  and  more 


i 


24  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

than  all,  which  can  be  produced  by  a  faith  wrought  by  the  force 
of  evidence  alone ;  and  that  any  other  faith,  as  long  as  it  stands 
alone,  is,  in  fact,  useless."*  No  true  Christian's  faith  rests  exclu- 
sively or  mainly  upon  historical  tradition,  but  upon  the  testimony 
of  the  Spirit,  by  and  with  the  truth  upon  the  heart.  And  in  the 
second  place,  it  is  not  true  that  we  have  the  same  historical  tradi- 
tion for  the  oral  teaching  of  the  apostles,  that  we  have  for  the 
authenticity  of  the  scriptures.  The  historical  tradition  in  the 
Church  of  England,  in  favour  of  the  derivation  of  the  Thirty-Nine 
Articles  from  the  Reformers,  is  perfect  and  conclusive.  No  man 
ever  has  doubted  the  fact,  or  ever  can  doubt  it.  Though  the  evi- 
dence is  of  a  different  kind,  no  mathematical  demonstration  is  more 
convincing.  But  the  tradition  of  that  church  for  any  oral  teach- 
ing of  the  Reformers,  is  absolutely  null,  it  is  nothing.  In  like 
manner  the  testimony  of  the  church  to  the  authenticity  of  the  New 
Testament  is  as  strong  as  historical  testimony  can  be,  while  its 
testimony  to  the  oral  teaching  of  the  apostles  may  be  made  "  to 
conclude  anything  or  nothing." 

It  is  very  clear  that  the  men  who  remove  our  faith  from  the  sure 
and  stable  foundation,  and  place  it  on  one  which  is  false  and  feeble, 
are  in  fact  taking  the  best  course  to  destroy  faith  altogether.  The 
testimony  of  the  scripture  is  true  and  trustworthy  ;  the  testimony 
of  tradition,  taken  as  a  whole,  is  in  the  highest  degree  uncertain, 
unsatisfactory,  and  erroneous.  This  is  so,  and  men  cannot  but  find 
it  out,  and  when  required  to  believe  on  grounds  which  they  see  to 
be  so  unstable,  they  will  either  not  believe  at  all,  or  they  will 
commit  themselves  blindfold  to  the  guidance  of  their  priests.  In- 
fidelity, therefore,  or  blind,  superstitious  faith,  is  invariably  attend- 
ant on  tradition.  Speaking  in  general  terms,  such  is  and  ever  has 
been  its  effect  in  the  Romish  Church.  Those  who  think  are 
infidels  ;  those  who  do  not,  are  blind  and  superstitious. 

As  it  is  the  tendency  and  actual  working  of  tradition  to  super- 
sede the  word  of  God,  and  to  destroy  the  very  foundation  of  faith, 
so  it  has  never  failed  to  introduce  a  system  of  false  doctrines  and 
of  priestly  tyranny.  If  you  take  men  from  the  infallible  teaching 
of  God,  and  make  them  depend  on  the  foolish  teaching  of  men,  the 
result  cannot  fail  to  be  the  adoption  of  error  and  heresy.  This  is 
a  conclusion  which  all  experience  verifies.  And  as  to  ghostly 
domination,  the  result  is  no  less  natural  and  certain.  The  inalien- 
able and  inestimable  right  of  private  judgment,  which  is  nothing 
else  than  the  right  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  his 
word,  is  denied  to  us.  We  are  told  that  we  must  not  trust  that 
voice ;  it  is  too  indistinct ;  it  says  too  little ;  and  is  too  liable  to 
lead  us  into  error.  We  must  hearken  to  tradition.  When  we  ask, 
where  is  this  tradition  ?  we  are  told,  in  the  church.  When  we  ask 
further,  which  church?  we  are  told,  the  catholic  church.  When 
we  ask  which  church  is  catholic  ?    we  are  told,  that  one  whose 

•  Vol.  i.,  p.  59. 


THE    RULE    OP    rAITH.  25 

teachings  and  institutions  can  stand  the  test  of  antiquity,  universality, 
and  catholicity.  When  we  say  that  this  is  a  test  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  apply,  requiring  immense  labour  and  research,  and  that  it  is 
exceedingly  precarious,  concluding  "  anything  or  nothing  f  we 
receive  two  answers,  one  on  rare  occasions,  which  is  absurdly  in- 
consistent with  the  whole  theory,  and  that  is,  that  we  must  judge 
for  ourselves ;  we  must  use  our  "  common  sense,"  and  act  as  we 
do  in  "  trade,  politics  or  war  ;"  take  that  for  the  true  church,  and 
that  for  the  teaching  of  tradition,  which  we  on  the  whole  think 
most  likely  to  be  so.  That  is,  although  we  are  forbid  to  judge  for 
ourselves  what  our  blessed  Lord  means,  when  he  says, "  Come  unto 
me  all  ye  that  labour  and  are  heavy  laden,  and  I  will  give  you  rest;" 
"  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  you,  he  that  bclieveth  on  me  hath  ever- 
lasting life  ;  and  him  that  cometh  to  me,  I  will  in  no  wise  cast  out ;" 
yet  we  are  told  to  judge  for  ourselves,  what  all  the  Greek  and  Latin 
fathers  mean  ;  in  what  points  they  all  agree  ;  which  of  the  conflict- 
ing councils  were  truly  general,  whether  that  in  which  three  hundred 
bishops  decided  right,  or  that  in  which  six  hundred  decided  wrong. 
When  we  have  done  all  this,  then  we  may  judge  for  ourselves, 
which  is  that  true  catholic  church  which  is  authorized  to  tell  us 
what  those  things  mean  which  are  revealed  even  unto  babes.  As 
this  is  such  a  many-sided  absurdity,  we  rarely  hear  this  answer 
given.  It  is  only  when  an  unwonted  sprightliness  or  levity  leads 
the  traditionist,  as  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Newman,  to  strip  the  mask 
from  the  whole  system  of  fraud  and  imposture. 

It  is  so  manifest  an  impossibility  for  the  mass  of  ordinary  Chris- 
tians to  apply  the  test  of  antiquity,  universality,  and  catholicity,  in 
order  to  decide  which  is  the  true  church,  and  what  tradition  really 
teaches,  that  the  inquirer  is  commonly  simply  told  to  "  hear  the 
church ;"  and  as  he  cannot  tell  which  church  he  ought  to  hear,  he 
must  hear  the  one  that  speaks  to  him,  be  it  the  Romish,  the  Greek, 
or  the  English.  If  the  church  within  whose  pale  he  happens  to 
live,  teaches  him  error,  even  fundamental  error,  he  has  no  relief. 
He  must  submit  his  soul  to  his  church ;  he  must  subject  his  heart, 
his  conscience,  and  his  life  to  her  guidance,  and  wait  until  he  enters 
eternity  to  find  out  whither  she  has  led  him.  Still  further,  as  every 
church  speaks  to  its  members  mainly  through  the  parish  priest ; 
as  he  is  her  organ  of  communication,  the  parish  priest  is  to  the 
great  majority  of  Christians  the  ultimate  arbiter  of  life  and  death. 
They  must  take  his  word  for  what  is  the  true  church,  and  for  what 
that  church  teaches.  Thus,  what  in  sounding  phrase  is  called  the 
church  catholic  and  apostolic,  turns  out  in  practice  to  be  one  poor 
priest.  The  Bible,  Christ  and  God,  are  all  put  aside  to  make  the  soul 
depend  on  the  fidelity  and  competency  of  one  sinful,  feeble  man. 
Where  tradition  has  its  perfect  work,  there,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
souls  of  the  people  are  in  the  power  of  the  priest,  their  faith  and 
practice  are  subject  to  his  control. 

This  same  result  is  reached  in  another  way.  We  have  seen  that 
it  is  virtually  admitted  by  traditionists  that  their  system  cannot  be 


26  THE    RULE    OF    FAITH. 

found  in  the  scripture,  nor  in  the  first  three  centuries.  We  believe, 
say  they,  what  the  fifth  century  believed,  and  because  the  church 
of  that  age  believed.  The  reason  of  this  is  obvious.  Priestly 
power  was  not  fully  established  before  the  fifth  century.  To  find 
a  system  suited  to  their  taste,  they  must  come  away  from  the  Bible 
and  from  the  early  church,  and  turn  to  an  age  in  which  salvation 
was  doled  out  for  pence ;  when  priestly  excommunication  was  a 
sentence  of  death ;  when  pardon,  grace,  and  eternal  life  were 
granted  or  withheld  at  the  option  of  the  clergy ;  when  the  doctrines 
of  episcopal  grace,  and  sacramental  religion,  had  subjected  all 
classes  of  men  and  all  departments  of  life  to  ghostly  domination. 
We  do  not  say  that  the  modern  traditionists  love  this  system, 
merely  or  mainly  because  of  the  power  it  gives  the  clergy;  but  we 
say  that  the  system  which  they  love,  has  ever  had,  and  from  its 
nature  must  have,  the  effect  of  exalting  the  priesthood  and  of  de- 
grading the  people. 

Where  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  is  there  is  liberty.  The  men  who 
read  the  Bible  and  hear  there  the  voice  of  God,  cannot  but  be  free . 
It  commands  their  assent  and  secures  their  homage.  They  cannot 
be  subject  to  men  in  things  whereof  God  has  spoken.  All  the  tra- 
ditionists in  the  world  cannot  persuade  them  that  the  Bible  is  not 
the  intelligible  voice  of  God,  or  that  there  is  either  duty  or  safety 
in  closing  their  ears  to  that  voice,  in  order  to  listen  to  the  mutter- 
ings  of  tradition.  Our  blessedness  is  to  be  free  from  men,  that  we 
may  be  subject  to  God  ;  and  we  cannot  be  thus  subject,  without 
being  thus  free. 

We  have  reason  then  still  to  assert  and  defend  the  position  that 
the  Bible,  the  Bible  alone,  is  the  religion  of  Protestants ;  we  want 
no  other  and  we  want  no  more.  It  is  the  rule  of  our  faith.  It  is 
infallible,  perspicuous,  complete,  and  accessible.  It  is  able  to  make 
us  wise  unto  salvation ;  being  inspired  of  God,  it  is  profitable  for 
doctrine,  for  reproof,  for  correction,  for  instruction  in  righteous- 
ness ;  that  the  man  of  God  may  be  perfect,  thoroughly  furnished 
unto  every  good  work.  A  better,  surer  rule  than  inspired  scrip- 
ture we  cannot  have  ;  and-  it  must  stand  alone,  or  fall.  If  men 
bring  their  torches  around  the  pillar  of  fire,  the  sacred  light  goes 
out,  and  they  are  left  to  their  own  guidance ;  and  then  the  blind 
had  the  blind. 


ESSAY    II. 

THE  SONSHIP  OF  CHRIST. 

PUBLISHED    IN    1829. 


One  of  the  most  difficult  points  of  knowledge  is,  to  know  how 
much  may  be  known  ;  to  decide  where  the  limits  are  to  be  placed 
to  the  speculations  of  the  inquisitive  mind  of  man.  Neither  philo- 
sophers nor  theologians  have,  in  any  age,  observed  these  limits, 
and  the  consequence  has  been,  that  philosophy  and  theology,  in- 
stead of  being  a  systematic  arrangement  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
material  and  spiritual  world,  so  far  as  they  come  within  the  range 
of  our  observation,  or  of  the  facts  revealed  in  the  word  of  God, 
are  to  so  great  an  extent  the  useless  and  contradictory  specula- 
tions of  men  on  things  beyond  the  reach  of  our  feeble  powers. 
These  speculations,  as  it  regards  divine  things,  are  so  mixed  and 
inwoven  with  the  facts  and  principles  contained  in  the  sacred 
scriptures,  that  it  is  no  easy  task  to  determine,  in  every  instance, 
what  is  revelation,  and  what  is  human  philosophy.  Yet,  with  re- 
spect to  almost  every  doctrine  of  the  Christian  faith,  this  is  a  task 
which  every  sincere  inquirer  after  truth  is  called  upon  to  per- 
form. The  modes  of  conceiving  of  these  doctrines,  in  different 
minds  and  in  different  ages,  are  so  various,  that  it  is  evident  at  first 
view,  that  much  is  to  be  referred  to  the  spirit  of  each  particular 
age,  and  to  the  state  of  mind  of  every  individual.  The  history  of 
theology  affords  so  much  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  that 
it  probably  will  not  be  called  in  question.  It  must  not  be  sup- 
posed, however,  that  everything,  either  in  philosophy  or  theology, 
is  uncertain  ;  that  the  one  and  the  other  is  an  ever-changing  mass 
of  unstable  speculations.  There  are  in  each  fixed  principles  and 
facts,  which,  although  frequently  denied  by  men  whose  minds  have 
so  little  sense  of  truth,  that  evidence  does  not  produce  conviction, 
have  maintained,  and  will  maintain,  their  hold  on  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  men.  With  regard  to  theology,  the  uniformity  with 
which  the  great  cardinal  doctrines  of  our  faith  have  been  em- 
braced is  not  less  remarkable  than  the  diversity  which  has  pre- 
vailed in  the  mode  of  conceiving  and  explaining  them.  The  fact, 
that  there  is  one  God,  and  that  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost 
are  this  God ;  that  there  is  such  a  distinction  between  the  Father, 
Son,  and  Spirit,  as  to  lay  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  reciprocal  use 


1 


f 


28  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

of  the  personal  pronouns,  has  been  the  faith  of  the  Christian  church 
from  first  to  last.     And  yet  there  is  probably  no  one  doctrine  con- 
tained  in   scripture   which  has    been   so  variously  denned  and 
explained  as  this.     In  the  earlier  ages  of  the  church,  when  the 
religion  of  the  gospel  was  glowing  in  the  hearts  of  all  the  followers 
of  Christ,  when  it  was  peculiarly  a  religion  of  feeling,  it  was  not  to 
be  expected  that  this  mysterious  doctrine  should  be  very  accurately 
denned.     To  the  early  Christians,  Jesus  Christ  was  God  ;  to  him 
their  prayers  were  directed,  their  praises  given — in  him  all  their  con- 
fidence was  reposed.     In  their  preaching,  sermons,  and  apologies, 
they  presented  God  the  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit,  as  the  great  object 
of  their  worship, — as  the  Christian's  God.     It  is  true,  that  very 
early  some  few  of  the  fathers,  who  had  previously  been  specula- 
tive men,  introduced  their  speculations  into  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  but  this  was  far  from  being  the  prevalent  character  of.  this 
period,     lrenaeus  is  a  much  better  representative  of  this  age  than 
Justin  Martyr,  and  we  find  him  expostulating  against  the  various 
attempts  which  had  been  made  to  explain  the  inexplicable  myste- 
ries of  the  Godhead.     When  religion  had,  in  some  measure,  passed 
from  the  heart  to  the  head ;  when  the  different  modes  of  thinking 
and  speaking  on  the  subject  of  the  Trinity,  which  had  long  pre- 
vailed, began  to  give  rise  to  serious  evils  ;  and  when  opinions  were 
adopted  inconsistent  with  the  great  Bible-fact,  which   had  pre- 
viously been  almost  universally  admitted ;  then  a  necessity  arose 
for  those  in  authority  to  state  with  more  precision  what  was  the 
faith  of  the  church  on  this  important  point.     That  the  modes  of 
expression  employed  in  their  authoritative  exposition  of  this  doc- 
trine were  derived  from  the  prevalent  modes  of  thought  of  that 
age,  and  were  intended  to  meet  particular  forms  of  error,  may  be 
readily  admitted;   while  we  maintain  that  the  truth  which  they 
meant  to  convey  was  nothing  more  than  the  great  fundamental 
doctrine  of  the  Christian  church.     It  need  not  be  concealed,  that 
the  expressions  which,  in  various  ages,  and  by  distinguished  writers, 
have  been  employed  on  this  subject,  have  often  be'en  infelicitous 
and  improper  ;  expressions  which,  if  strictly  interpreted  and  urged, 
would  imply  either  Tritheism  on  the  one  hand,  or  Sabellianism 
on  the  other.     While,  at  the  same  time,  to  the  minds  of  those  who 
used  them,  they  implied  only  what  all  Christians  recognise  as  the 
corner-stone  of  their  faith.     It  is  much  to  be  lamented  that  so  much 
animosity  has  been  excited,  and  so  much  time  and  labour  wasted  on 
points  of  dispute,  which  arose  from  the  imperfection  of  human  lan- 
guage, or  the  weakness  of  the  human  mind.     There  has  this  good 
effect,  however,  resulted  from  these  controversies,  that  the  Church 
has  been  driven  from  one  unguarded  mode  of  expression  to  another, 
until  it  has  come  back  to  the  simple  statement  of  the  word  of  God, 
and  consented  to  leave  the  inexplicable  unexplained.     It  is  to  be 
remarked,  too,  that  this  advantage  has  been  derived  mainly  from 
the  opposers  of  the  doctrine  in  question.     They  have  seen  and 
exposed  the  difficulties  attending  the  various  definitions  of  the  doc- 


THE   S0N8HIP    OF    CHRIST.  29 

trine  of  the  Trinity,  and  have  falsely  imagined,  that  in  showing  the 
inconsistency  of  a  theological  definition  they  have  thereby  refuted 
the  doctrine  itself.  It  would  certainly  be  very  unjust  to  accuse 
the  modern  defenders  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  of  having 
renounced  the  faith  of  the  church,  because  in  their  statement  of 
this  article  they  abstain  from  the  exceptionable  or  unintelligible 
terms  which,  in  former  times,  have  been  employed  to  set  it  forth. 
The  Bible-fact  has  ever  been,  and  still  is,  by  the  great  body  of  the 
Christian  community,  maintained  and  defended,  although  we  have 
been  taught  to  confine  ourselves  more  closely  to  what  the  scrip- 
tures more  immediately  teach. 

The  same  series  of  remark  may  be  applied,  with  equal  propriety, 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  Sonship  of  Christ.     With  regard  to  this  doc- 
trine, even  in  a  greater  degree  than  the  one  just  alluded  to,  it  is  true 
that  the  explanations  and  definitions  of  which  it  has  been  the  sub- 
ject have  obscured  the  great  truth  meant  to  be  taught.     It  may  be 
stated,  with  the  consent  of  the  opposers  of  what  is  called  the 
eternal  generation  of  the  Son,  that  in  every  age  of  the  church  the 
great  body  of  Christians  have  believed  that  Christ  is  called  the  Son 
of  God,  on  account  of  the  relation  existing  between  him  as  God 
and  the  first  person  of  the  Trinity.      Whether  this  doctrine  is 
taught  in  the  word  of  God,  is  disputed ;  but  that  it  has  been  the 
faith  of  the  church,  is  admitted.     In  the  early  ages,  it  is  not  impos- 
sible that  the  ideas  attached  to  the  expression  were  more  vague 
even  than  those  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  are  still  enter- 
tained by  those  who  maintain  the  common  doctrine  on  this  point. 
Christians  were  taught  to  believe  in  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost,  and  they  were  led  to  consider  these  terms  as  the  appro- 
priate names  of  the  several  persons  of  the  Trinity  as  such.     As 
soon,  however,  as  men  began  to  ask  what  was  the  nature  of  the 
relation  indicated  by  these  terms,  we  find  the  same  variety  of 
modes  of  thinking,  and  the  same  diversity  of  language,  which  have 
been  exhibited  in  the  explanation  of  most  other  leading  doctrines 
of  the  Scriptures.     In  the  first  few  centuries,  almost  every  mode 
of  explanation  and  illustration  was  adopted,  which  has  ever  been 
employed  since.     Some  of  the  Fathers  had  recourse  to  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  Logos  iv&iaQtrot,  and  the  Logos  irpo<f,opi>eds.     To  what 
extent  this  philosophical  theory  prevailed  in  the  church,  it  is  not 
our  object  to  inquire.      We   merely  wish  to  note  the  diversity 
which  obtained  among  those  who  all  united  in  believing  that  Christ, 
as  Logos,  was  the  Son  of  God.     Irenaeus  objected  to  this  and 
all  other  explanations  of  the  doctrine,  while  he  maintained  the 
doctrine  itself.     What  the  nature  of  Christ's  Sonship,  or  genera- 
tion, was,  he  pretended  not  to  say,  and  complained  of  those  who 
did.     "  When  any  one  asks  us,"  he  says,  "  how  the  Son  is  produced 
from  the  Father  ?  we  answer,  no  one  knows.     Since  his  genera- 
tion is  inexplicable,  they  who  pretend  to  explain  it  know  not  what 
they  say.     That  a  word  proceeds  from  the  understanding  every- 
body knows.     What  great  discovery,  then,  is  made  by  those  who 


30  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

apply  what  is  familiar  to  every  one,  to  the  only  begotten  Word  of 
God,  and  undertake  to  explain  so  definitely  his  incomprehensible 
generation."* 

Origen's  explanation  was  derived  from  the  Platonic  doctrine  of 
the  relation  of  the  vovs  to  the  fa,  as  the  latter  was  always  revealed 
in  the  former,  so  the  Father  is  from  eternity  exhibited  in  the  Son, 
as  the  effulgence  of  his  glory.  He  maintained  an  eternal  genera- 
tion of  the  Son,  but  rejected  every  mode  of  expression,  and  every 
illustration  borrowed  from  material  objects,  as  utterly  inconsistent 
with  the  spirituality  of  the  Supreme  Being.  He  objected  to  the 
expression,  "  generation  from  the  divine  essence"  {ykrnmt  Ik  n?s  oiaias 
rov  Geov),  as  implying  that  God  was  capable  of  division.  Tertul- 
lian's  mode  of  thinking  was  far  less  refined.  "  He  could,"  as  Nean- 
der  (Kirchengeschichte,  p.  1035)  says,  "  very  well  conceive,  ac- 
cording to  his  emanation  theory,  how  a  being  could  emanate  from 
the  Godhead,  possessed  of  the  same  substance,  though  in  a  less 
degree ;  just  as  a  ray  emanates  from  the  sun.  He  maintained, 
therefore,  one  divine  essence  in  three  intimately  united  persons." 
Una  substantia  in  tribus  cohaerentibus.  And  says  of  the  Son, 
Deus  de  Deo,  modulo  alter,  non  numero. 

The  mode  of  explaining  this  doctrine,  adopted  by  the  Nicene 
fathers,  is  familiar  to  every  one.  "  We  believe  in  one  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  the  Son  of  God,  the  only  begotten  of  the  Father,  that  is, 
of  the  essence  of  the  Father,  God  of  God,  Light  of  Light,  very 
God  of  very  God,  begotten,  not  made,  of  one  essence  with  the 
Father,  by  whom  all  things  were  made,"  &c.  Since  this  period, 
this  has  been  the  general,  though  by  no  means  the  universal,  me- 
thod of  speaking  on  this  subject. 

'  Amongst  Protestant  divines,  there  is  a  general  coincidence  as  to 
the  manner  of  explaining  the  generation  of  the  Son  of  God.  It  is 
commonly  defined  to  be,  "  an  eternal  and  incomprehensible  com- 
munication of  the  same  numerical  essence,  from  the  Father  to  the 
Son."f  Not  that  the  divine  essence  produces  another  divine  es- 
sence, but  the  Father  as  a  Person,  communicates  the  same  divine 
essence  to  the  Son.J  It  will  be  seen  at  once,  that  this  is  not  a 
simple,  statement  of  a  Bible  fact,  but  a  philosophical  explanation  of 
what  the  scriptures  are  supposed  to  teach,  viz.,  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
the  eternal  Son  of  God.  This  definition  is  founded  almost  exclu- 
sively on  the  idea  of  generation  itself,  and  has  arisen  from  urging 
unduly  the  analogy  of  the  relation  between  Father  and  Son, 
among  men,  when  applied  to  God.  De  Moor  expressly  says,  we 
must  consider  the  generation  of  Christ,  as  including  all  that  is 
essential  to  the  idea  of  generation ;  and  as,  among  men,  generation 

*  Adv.  Haer.,  lib.  ii.,  c.  28. 

f  Aeterna  et  incomprehensibilis,  ejusdem  numero  divinae  essentiae  communicatio 
a  Patre  facta  Filio.     De  Moor,  Com.  in  Markii  Comp.,  torn,  i.,  p.  742. 

X  Generatio  inquam  Filii  a  Patre,  non  enim  essentia  gignit  essentiam sed  Per- 
sona generat  personam.  De  Moor,  Commentarius  in  Joh.  Markii  Compendium, 
Theol.  Christ.,  caput  v.,  §  8. 


THE    SON8HIP    OF    CHRIST.  31 

is  the  communication  of  life,  therefore,  there  must  be  a  like  com- 
munication in  the  case  of  the  Son  of  God.     (See  De  Moor,  torn, 
i.,  p.  736.)     This  analogy,  and  the  passage  in  John  v.  26,  in  which 
the  Father  is  said  to  have  given  the  Son  to  have  life  in  himself 
(which  some  of  the  advocates  of  this  doctrine  explain  as  referring 
to  Christ  in  his  divine  nature),  are  almost  the  only  grounds,  as  far 
as  we  know,  for  this  particular  view  of  the  subject.     It  should  be 
remarked,  however,  that  the  venerable  men,  who  felt  themselves 
constrained  to  present  the  doctrine  in  question,  in  this  light,  were 
very  far  from  attaching  any  of  those  gross  ideas  to  the  phrase, 
"  communication  of  the  divine  essence,"  which  have  been  supposed 
to  be  necessarily  included  in  it.     They  expressly  state,  in  what 
sense  they  use  the  expression ;  that  all  ideas,  inconsistent  with  the 
spirituality  and  infinite  perfection  of  God,  are  to  be  excluded  from 
it ;   and  consequently,   all   idea    of  posteriority,   dependence,   or 
change.     Generatio,  non  nisi  summa  i*tpopxv  Deo  tribuitur,  ita  omnes 
imperfectiones,  quae  finitam  creaturarum  generationem  sequi  so- 
lent,  a  generatione  hac  divina  longissime  sunt  removendae,  nimirum 
dependentia,  successio,  mutatio,  divisio,  multiplicatio,  &c.  (De  Moor, 
p.  736.)     If  it  be  said,  that  the  ideas  of  posteriority,  dependence, 
and  mutability  are  necessarily  included  in  this  phrase,  and  that  if 
these  be  denied,  the  very  thing  asserted  is  denied  ;  the  friends  of 
this  definition  would  say,  that  all  such  objections  arise  from  trans- 
ferring the  gross  ideas  which  we  derive  from  sensible  objects,  to 
an  infinite  spirit.     That  it  is  just  as  impossible  to  conceive  how  the 
Father  and  Son  should  have  the  same  divine  essence,  and  yet 
remain  distinct  persons,  as  that  this  essence  should  be  communi- 
cated from  one  to  the  other.     And  we  are  free  to  confess  that  if 
the  d  priori  objections  urged  against  tliis  doctrine,  are  to  be  con- 
sidered valid,  we  cannot  see  how  we  can  consistently  remain  be- 
lievers in  God's  omnipresence,  eternity,  or  any  other  doctrine  which 
is  confessedly  incomprehensible.     We  are  not,  however,  the  advo- 
cates of  this  definition,  nor  do  we  consider  it  as  at  all  essential  to 
the  doctrine  of  Christ's  divine  and  eternal  Sonship.     It  has  never 
secured  the  favour  of  many  who  are  firm  believers  in  this  doctrine. 
Lampe,  in  his  Commentary  on  John  v.,  26,  expressly  rejects  the 
interpretation  of  the  passage   which  is  considered  as  the  chief 
ground  of  this  particular  view  of  the  Sonship  of  Christ.     The  life 
there  said  to  be  given  to  the  Son  cannot,  he  maintains,  be  referred 
to  his  divine  nature  ;  because  such  a  gift  would  be  inconsistent 
with  his  independence  and  necessary  existence.     He  opposes,  stre- 
nuously, the  idea  of  any  communication  of  essence,  and  yet  de- 
clares, se  generationem  Filii  Dei  naturalem,  ad  ipsam  divinam  es- 
sentiam   pertinentem,  unicam,    aeternam    absolute    necessariam, 
sancte  agnoscere,  libere  confiteri  masculeque  asserere.     (See  Pre- 
face to  vol.  iii.  of  his  Commentary.)     It  is  true  that  Lampe,  by 
many  of  his  brethren,  was  blamed  for  taking  this  course,  and  they 
accused  him  of   thus  committing  an    "atrocious  injury"  on  the 
cause  of  orthodoxy.     This,  however,  does  not  alter  the  case,  nor 


32  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

affect  the  correctness  of  our  position,  that  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
divine  Sonship  does  not  consist  in  this  idea  of  the  communication 
of  essence.  The  same  view  of  John  v.  26,  as  that  presented  by 
Lampe,  had  been  given  before,  by  Calvin,  Beza,  and  many  others. 

Morus,  in  his  Commentarius  Exegeticus  in  suam  Theol.  Christ. 
Epitomen,  torn,  i.,  p.  256,  would  explain  the  doctrine  thus :  Filius 
per  Patrem  est,  et  talis,  qualis  est,  per  Patrem  est ;  which  in  the 
language  of  the  church,  would  be,  Filius  natus  est  ex  Patre,  and 
in  philosophical  language,  Pater  cum  Filio  essentiam  communi- 
cavit.  On  page  249,  and  seq.,  when  speaking  of  the  appellation 
vios  rov  Oeov  as  applied  to  Christ,  he  says,  Significatus  dogmaticus 
nominis  »Ios  rov  Qeov  hue  redit ;  aequalis  Deo,  qui  habet  eandem  natu- 
ram ;  eadem  attributa,  eadem  opera,  quae  Pater.  Such  passages 
as  John  v.  26,  Matthew  xxviii.  18,  and  John  xvii.  2,  in  which  life, 
power,  and  ability  to  save,  are  said  to  be  given  to  the  Son,  he  un- 
derstands, not  as  referring  to  Christ  as  Mediator,  but  as  God,  and 
consequently  as  affording  ground  for  the  statement,  that  the  Son 
has  what  he  has,  and  is  what  he  is,  through  the  Father.  He  ap- 
pears to  lay  no  stress  upon  the  philosophical  definition  of  the  Son- 
ship,  so  often  mentioned ;  but  says  that  we  should  tell  the  people, 
that  when  they  hear  the  word  generation  used  in  reference  to 
Christ,  they  should  think  that  the  Son  is  even  as  the  Father,  has  the 
same  essence  and  the  same  attributes ;  that  he  can  and  does  do 
whatever  the  Father  does.     Only  the  Son  is  through  the  Father. 

Knapp,  in  his  Vorlesungen  fiber  die  Christliche  Glaubenslehre 
Erster  Theil,  p.  214,  in  speaking  of  the  sense  in  which  God  is 
called  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  after  stating  that  the 
expression  sometimes  refers  to  the  relation  which  Jesus,  as  the 
Saviour  of  men,  sustains  to  the  Father,  says  that  "  it  undeniably 
refers,  in  several  passages,  to  a  certain  internal  relation  in  the  God- 
head, of  the  Godhead  of  Jesus  to  the  Godhead  of  the  Father ;  the 
real  nature  of  which,  however,  the  Bible  -has  nowhere  clearly  ex- 
plained, and  which  indeed  must  be  incomprehensible  to  men.  Only 
the  Son,  says  he,  has  all  from  the  Father,  although  he  makes  him- 
self equal  with  God."  In  like  manner  he  maintains  that  the  name 
via  tov  Oeov  in  Rom.  i.  3,  4,  John  v.  17,  John  i.,  and  Heb.  i.,  un- 
questionably refers  to  the  divine  nature  of  Christ.  The  name,  Son 
of  God,  he  says,  should  only  awaken  in  us  the  idea  of  the  partici- 
pation of  Christ  in  the  divine  essence — that  he  is  of  the  same 
nature  with  the  Father,  even  as,  among  men,  a  son  is  of  the  same 
nature  with  his  parent. 

Zacharia,  in  his  Biblische  Theologie,  Gottingen,  1775,  vol.  i.,  p. 
503,  gives,  as  the  result  of  his  examination  of  the  scriptural  doc- 
trine of  the  Sonship  of  Christ,  in  substance  the  following  state- 
ment. There  is  in  God  himself,  that  is,  in  the  divine  essence,  an 
internal  relation  which  has  some  similarity  to  the  relation  between 
father  and  son  among  men.  This  follows  from  the  names  father 
and  son,  if  these  names  refer,  as  in  his  opinion  they  do,  to  the  first 
and  second  persons  in  the  Trinity  as  such,  and  are  founded  on 


THE    SONSHIP    OP    CHRIST.  33 

their  relation  the  one  to  the  other.  This  relation  includes  the  idea 
of  the  sameness  of  nature,  and  this  is  the  only  idea  essential  to  it. 
Everything  else  included  in  it,  being  merely  human,  cannot  be 
transferred  to  God.  The  Son,  therefore,  must  have  the  divine  na- 
ture because  the  Father  has  it,  or  in  other  words,  there  must  be  a 
certain  relation,  in  virtue  of  which  the  Son  is  a  partaker  of  the 
divine  nature  or  essence.  A  nearer  or  more  definite  explanation 
of  the  nature  of  this  relation  between  the  Father  and  the  Son,  can- 
not be  given,  on  account  of  our  limited  knowledge  of  the  divine 
Being ;  or  because  there  is  nothing  analogous  to  it  among  men. 
And  at  best  our  analogical  knowledge  of  God  extends  but  a  little 
way.  This  relation  must  have  existed  from  eternity,  and  is  there- 
fore a  necessary  and  unchanging  relation. 

The  idea  of  generation,  strictly  speaking,  considered  as  an  in- 
ternal act  of  the  Father,  by  which  he  confers  the  distinct  charac- 
ter of  Son  on  the  second  person  in  the  Trinity,  is  neither  in  his  opi- 
nion taught  in  the  scriptures  nor  essential  to  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
divine  and  eternal  Sonship. 

We  think  that  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  essence  of  the  doc- 
trine under  consideration  is  something  different  from  any,  or  all  of 
the  various  definitions  of  which  it  has  been  the  subject.  The  re- 
vealed fact,  as  we  believe,  is  that  Christ,  in  his  divine  nature,  is  the 
Son  of  God.  That  this  implies  that  there  is  some  ground  in  the 
nature  of  the  relation  of  the  Father  and  Son,  for  the  application  of 
these  relative  terms,  will  hardly  be  questioned.  But  what  the  na- 
ture of  this  relation  is,  the  scriptures  have  not  revealed,  and  we 
therefore  cannot  undertake  to  decide.  It  will  not  be  denied,  that 
much  evil  has  been  produced,  by  the  attempt  to  reduce  to  distinct 
formulas  the  general  truths  of  the  Bible,  nor  that  many  have  been 
led  to  reject  this,  as  well  as  other  doctrines  of  the  word  of  God, 
from  the  difficulties  with  which  they  conceived  the  definitions  of 
them  to  be  incumbered.  Calvin  long  ago  exclaimed,  Utinam 
sepulta  essent  nomina  (Trininatis  duoowiov,  &c.)  constaret  modo  haec 
inter  omnes  fides,  Patrem  Filium  et  Spiritum  Sanctum  esse  unum 
Deum :  nee  tamen  aut  Filium  esse  Patrem,  aut  Spiritum  Filium ; 
sed  proprietate  quadam  distinctos.  (Inst.  Christ.,  Lib.  i.,  cap.  13,  § 
5.)  It  might,  with  equal  propriety,  be  desired,  that  theologians  had 
contented  themselves  with  asserting  the  Bible  fact  on  this  subject, 
without  attempting  to  decide  whether  Christ  was  the  Son  of  God 
by  emanation,  communication  of  essence,  or  merely  by  oneness  of 
nature. 

A  mere  statement  of  the  principal  a  priori  objections  to  the  di- 
vine Sonship  of  the  Redeemer,  will  be  sufficient  to  show,  that  they 
are  all  directed  against  the  idea  of  derivation  of  the  second  per- 
son in  the  Trinity  from  the  first,  and  consequently  that  they  bear 
not  against  the  doctrine  itself,  but  against  some  few  of  the  forms 
in  which  it  has  been  exhibited.  We  shall  mention  the  principal  of 
these  objections,  as  they  are  given  in  substance,  in  Roell's  Disser- 
tatio  de  generatione  Filii  Dei,  as  they  are  the  same  which  have 

3 


34  THE    S0NSHJP   OF    CHRIST. 

been  presented  both  before  and  since.  It  is  said  that  the  doctrine 
contains  a  contradiction  in  terms,  that  it  is  utterly  incomprehensi- 
ble how  the  divine  essence  can  be  communicated  to  the  Son,  and 
yet  retained  by  the  Father.*  That  this  objection  is  directed  to 
the  idea  of  communication  of  essence,  its  very  terms  imply.  And 
that  it  is  valid,  may  be  admitted,  if  the  word  communication  is  to 
be  taken  in  a  physical  sense.  But  those  who  employ  this  term, 
tell  us  that  this  is  not  the  sense  in  which  they  use  it ;  that  being 
applied  to  a  spiritual  being,  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  whole  and  part, 
as  though  God  were  capable  of  division  ;  and  that  if  it  be  allowa- 
ble to  demand  how  the  divine  essence  can  be  communicated  from 
the  Father  to  the  Son,  and  yet  retained  by  the  Father,  the  ob- 
jector must  submit  to  a  similar  demand,  how  three  distinct  persons 
can  have  the  same  numerical  essence  ?  how  God  can  be  in  heaven 
and  on  earth  at  the  same  time,  and  yet  not  partly  in  the  one  and 
partly  in  the  other  ?  It  is  evident,  that  when  we  speak  thus,  we 
use  words  nearly  without  meaning ;  human  language  is  so  little 
adapted  to  the  things  of  God,  and  our  knowledge  is  so  limited, 
that  we  may  be  said  not  to  know  what  we  say,  nor  whereof  we 
affirm.  When  speaking  of  God's  essence,  his  omnipresence,  his 
unsuccessive  eternal  existence,  or  mode  of  subsistence,  our  ideas 
are  at  best  merely  negative.  We  endeavour  to  deny  everything 
inconsistent  with  absolute  perfection,  but  we  are  unable  to  state 
affirmatively,  what  we  mean  by  any  of  these  terms.  Frequently, 
as  the  distinction  between  the  bn  and  the  ™$  is  upon  our  lips,  we 
are  constantly  disposed  to  forget  it.  Nor  do  we  feel  as  we  ought 
how  infinitely  such  subjects  are  beyond  our  reach. 

A  second  objection  is,  that  the  doctrine  in  question  is  inconsis- 
tent with  the  eternity  of  the  divine  nature  of  Christ,  since,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  the  Father  must  be  prior  to  the  Son.f  And 
thirdly,  it  is  objected  that  it  necessarily  involves  a  denial  of  the 
independence  and  self-existence  of  the  Son.J  These  objections 
amount  to  the  same  thing,  that  this  doctrine  is  inconsistent  with 
the  proper  deity  of  the  Son  of  God.  Now  whether  this  is  so  or 
not,  it  should  be  recollected  that  the  uncaused,  self-existent,  inde- 
pendent divinity  of  Christ,  is  as  strongly  asserted  by  the  advocates 
of  this  doctrine,  as  it  is  by  any  class  of  theologians  whatever. 
It  is  true  that  some  of  the  Fathers  used  language  apparently  in- 
consistent with  this  statement.  But  even  Bishop  Bull  objects  to 
calling  the  Son  and  Spirit  (ainarovs)  caused.  Although  he  says  he 
can  conceive  of  a  sense,  in  which  the  Son  may  be  called  an  eter- 
nal and  infinite  effect  of  an  eternal  and  infinite  cause.     Such  lan- 

*  Vel  Pater  totam  Filio  dedissetvitam,  quando  ipse  eandem  amisisset;  vel  partem 
essentiae  divinae  tantuin,  quando  nee  Pater  nee  Filius  earn  possideret.  See  De 
Moor,  caput  v. 

t  Si  generatio  illi  tribuatur  qui  cum  conscientia  operatur,  ut  enti  mere  rationali, 
vel  ratione  saltern  praedito,  voluntarius  sit  oportet  generandi  actus.  Ex  quibus  aper- 
tum  est,  in  ejusmodi  proprie  dicta  generatione  generatum  esse  genito  priorem. 

J  Quis  non  hoc  per  se  intelligit, — id  omne  quod  et  quatenus  genitum  est,  eatenua 
dependere  a  generante,  tanquam  effectum  a  causa. 


* 


r  - 

THE   80N8HIP   OF   CHRIST.  35 

guage,  however,  has  never  been  adopted  by  the  great  mass  of  be- 
lievers in  the  eternal  generation  of  the  Son  of  God.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  express  in  stronger  language,  faith  in  the  uncaused,  self-ex- 
istent, and  independent  deity  of  Christ,  than  has  been  done  by 
these  men.  Calvin,  Beza,  Mark,  De  Moor,  and  as  far  as  we  know, 
Protestant  divines  generally,  teach  that  Christ  is  properly  called 
tLvrodeoi,  Deus  a  se,  and  prove  that  it  must  be  so,  from  the  verity, 
supremacy,  and  independence  of  his  Godhead.  De  Moor  says  (p. 
772),  Si  Filius  sit  verus  Deus,  est  Deus  independens :  nam  inde- 
pendentia  est  inter  attributa  Dei  facile  prima,  atque  ab  essentia 
Dei  inseparabilis.  See  also  Calvin's  Theological  Tracts,  torn.  7, 
of  his  works,  p.  672,  where  he  maintains  that  the  Son  and  Spirit 
not  less  than  the  Father  are  to  be  called  airoOeos.  They  further 
deny  any  kind  of  dependence  of  the  Son  on  the  Father,  in  refer- 
ence to  his  divine  nature,  but  maintain  that  the  several  persons  in 
the  Trinity  are  alike  independent,  of  equal  dignity  and  perfection. 
Omnis  igitur  ivepoxti'  Patri  supra  Filium  tributa,  spectat  non  ad 
naturalem  Patris  et  Filii  subsistendi  modum  in  se  consideratum, 
sed  ad  redemtionis  oeconomiam  et  munus  mediatorium  a  Deo 
Filio  voluntarie  susceptum.  (De  Moor,  p.  721.)  It  must  not  be 
supposed,  therefore,  that  it  is  the  exclusive  privilege  of  those  who 
deny  the  Sonship  of  Christ,  to  regard  their  Redeemer  as  self-ex- 
istent, uncaused,  and  independent, — nor  that  it  is  necessary  to  give 
up  the  self-existence  of  the  Logos  in  order  to  believe  that  he  is  the^ 
Son  of  God.  The  only  question  is,  whether  the  communication 
of  the  divine  essence  from  the  Father  to  the  Son,  be  consistent 
with  this  belief  in  the  self-existence  and  independence  of  the  lat- 
ter ?  We  find  the  advocates  of  this  definition,  almost  with  one 
voice,  asserting  that  it  is  ;  declaring  that  they  associate  no  ideas 
with  the  phrase  in  question,  inconsistent  with  these  divine  attri- 
butes ;  that  it  is  as  unreasonable  to  force  upon  them  a  meaning  of 
the  expression  which  they  disclaim,  as  it  is  for  Unitarians  to  assert 
that  we  are  necessarily  Tritheists  in  believing  that  there  are  three 
persons  in  the  Godhead  ;  that  there  is  no  more  necessity  for  using 
the  word  "communication,"  as  applied  to  God,  in  its  common 
sense,  than  there  is  for  using  the  word  person  in  the  same  sense 
when  applied  to  God,  as  when  applied  to  men  ;  that  the  w^to*  ipdios 
of  all  such  objections  lies  in  pressing  the  analogy  between  divine  and 
human  things  too  far,  and  thinking  and  speaking  of  God  as  though 
he  were  material,  or  at  least  altogether  such  an  one  as  ourselves.  It 
is  plain  that  if  it  be  permitted  to  apply  to  God  forms  of  expression  in 
the  same  sense  in  which  they  are  used  among  men,  there  is  no  one 
subject  on  which  we  may  not  be  involved  in  contradiction  and  absur- 
dity. We  say  that  the  Father  and  Son  have  the  same  numerical 
essence,  and  yet  we  say  that  the  Son  became  incarnate,  and  the 
Father  did  not,  that  is,  that  the  same  numerical  essence  did  and 
did  not  become  incarnate.  Is  it  not  something  worse  than  useless 
for  us  to  speculate  so  confidently  on  subjects  at  such  an  infinite 
remove  above  our  conceptions,  and  to  avail  ourselves  with  so 


A 


THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

much  confidence  of  the  most  dangerous  of  all  arguments,  the  re- 
ductio  ad  absurdum,  when  applied  to  subjects  like  the  present. 
We  are,  however,  no  advocates  for  the  definition  under  conside- 
ration, not  because  we  consider  the  a  priori  arguments  against  it 
as  just  and  conclusive,  but  because  we  cannot  find  that  it  is  founded 
on  the  clear  statements  of  the  word  of  God,  and  because  we  regard 
it  as  one  of  the  vain  attempts  to  bring  down  by  formulas  and  de- 
finitions, the  infinite  mysteries  of  the  Godhead,  within  the  grasp 
of  man's  infant  intellect.  Still  we  think  that  it  is  much  to  be  la- 
mented that  so  many  distinguished  men  should  have  been  influ- 
enced, either  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  reject  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
divine  Sonship,  by  objections,  which,  if  of  any  weight  at  all,  bear 
only  on  a  philosophical  formula  for  expressing  the  nature  of  the 
fact  on  which  the  doctrine  is  founded.  It  is  still  more  to  be  re- 
gretted that  they  should  have  been  led  to  use  such  harsh  language 
as  has  at  times  been  applied  to  this  doctrine.  That  it  is  an  "  infi- 
nite "  and  "  awful  absurdity,"  even  in  its  most  objectionable  form, 
would  require  stronger  arguments  than  any  which  we  have  yet 
seen,  to  induce  us  to  believe.  Nor  do  we  think,  after  all  that 
has  been  written  upon  the  subject,  and  the  express  denial  on  the 
part  of  its  advocates  of  all  ideas  of  derivation  and  dependence, 
that  exclamations  against  the  thought  of  "  a  derived  Deity "  are 
altogether  candid  or  courteous.  The  idea  that  "  this  strange  con- 
ceit" was  derived  from  the  Platonic  or  Gnostic  Philosophy,  is 
about  as  reasonable,  as  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  was  derived 
from  Plato,  because  the  terms  employed  to  set  it  forth,  were  bor- 
rowed from  the  new  Platonic  school.  We  have  no  objection  to 
the  rejection  of  all  such  terms,  but  do  not  let  us  reject  with  them 
the  great  Bible-fact  upon  which  the  whole  Gospel  rests.  Let  who 
will  reject  the  explanation  of  Origen,  Tertullian,  or  the  Nicene 
fathers,  of  the  divine  Sonship  of  Christ,  but  let  him  seek  some 
better  reason  than  the  faultiness  of  a  definition,  for  rejecting  the 
doctrine  itself.  We  do  not  mean  to  intimate  that  these  a  priori 
objections  are  the  only  ones  urged  against  the  doctrine  in  question, 
but  we  verily  believe  that  they  are  by  far  the  most  efficacious. 
For  that  any  man  can  believe  that  a  doctrine  is  "abhorrent  to 
reason,"  and  inconsistent  with  all  just  notions  of  the  spirituality  of 
God,  and  yet  go  with  a  perfectly  unbiassed  mind  to  see  whether  it 
be  taught  in  a  book  which  he  regards  as  infallible,  we  deem  a 
moral  impossibility.  And  should  he  find  it  there,  he  would  not 
and  could  not  believe  it.  No  man  can  believe  what  he  deems  to 
be  absurd.  He  must  either  renounce  his  faith  in  the  Scriptures, 
or  explain  away  the  passages  in  which  such  absurdity  is  taught. 

We  have  been  led  to  the  consideration  of  this  subject,  from 
observing  how  frequently  and  strongly  the  divine  Sonship  of  Christ 
is  denied,  and  from  noticing  that  the  main  objections  to  it  are  di- 
rected against  a  mode  of  presenting  it  neither  essential  to  the 
doctrine  itself,  nor  adopted  by  some  of  its  ablest  advocates.  The 
question  is  a  very  simple  one,  Why  is  Christ  called  the  Son  of 


THE    80NSHIP    OF    CHRIST.  37 

God  ?  Is  this  name  given  to  him  in  reference  to  his  divine  nature, 
and  founded  on  the  relation  which  as  God  he  sustains  to  the  first 
Person  in  the  Trinity,  or  are  his  incarnation,  resurrection,  exalta- 
tion, &c,  the  sole  reasons  for  his  being  so  called  ?  Our  object  in 
the  remainder  of  this  article,  is  to  show  that  there  are  passages  in 
which  the  name,  Son  of  God,  is  referred  to  the  divine  nature  of 
Christ,  or  in  which  it  necessarily  involves  the  assumption  or 
ascription  of  equality  with  God. 

Our  first  argument  is  an  a  priori  one,  that  such  has  always  been 
the  faith  of  the  church.     This  may  be  regarded  as  unworthy  of  a 
Protestant,  and  some  may  revolt  at  the  idea  of  an  appeal  to  the 
authority  of  men  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  of"  God.     We 
have,  however,  no  intention  of  calling  in  question  the  right  of 
private  judgment.     The   argument  is  only  one   of  presumption, 
and  as  such,  is  founded  on  the  very  first  principle  of  Protestant- 
ism, viz.  the  perspicuity  of  the  scriptures.     We  assume  the  fact 
(because  it  has  often  been  admitted,  and  cannot  with  any  plausi- 
bility be  denied),  that  in  all  ages,  the  mass  of  intelligent  readers 
of  the  Bible  have  believed  that  Christ,  in  his  divine  nature,  is  the 
Son  of  God,  that  the  names,  Father  and  Son,  are  applied  to  the 
first  and  second  Persons  in  the  Trinity,  as  expressive  of  their 
mutual  relation  as  such.     If  this  be  so,  then  it  affords  a  presump- 
tion, strong  as  proof,  that  such  must  be  the  obvious  meaning  of  the 
word  of  God.     For  how  is  the  supposition,  that  the  mass  of  read- 
ers have  always  mistaken  its  meaning,  to  be  reconciled  with  the 
favourite  principle  of  Protestants,  that  the  Bible  is  easy  to  be  un- 
derstood ?     We  are  unable  to  call  to  mind  any  one  doctrine  which 
has  been  thus  generally  received,  by  the  great  body  of  intelligent 
and  pious  Christians,  as  taught  in  the  scriptures,  which   the  scrip- 
tures do  not  really  teach.     The  explanation  of  these  doctrines 
may  vary  as  the  systems  of  philosophy  and  modes  of  thinking 
vary,  but  the  doctrines  themselves  are  retained  ;  nor  can  they  be 
rejected,  without  rejecting  what  we  have  the  strongest  of  all  rea- 
sons for  regarding  as  the  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  the  word 
of  God.     We  cannot  see  how  the  force  of  this  argument  is  to  be 
denied,  without  denying  that  the  obvious  meaning  of  scripture  is 
its  true  meaning,  which,  after  all  our  learning  and  laws  of  exege- 
sis, is  the  sheet  anchor  of  the  church.     By  obvious  meaning,  is 
not  to  be  understood,  the  import  which  at  first  view  an  individual 
would  be  disposed  to  assign  to  an  isolated  passage,  but  that  sense 
which  the  general  tenor  of  scripture,  the  logical   connection,  and 
constant  comparison  of  analogous  passages  would  naturally  lead, 
and  in  fact  have  led  the  mass  of  Christians  to  adopt.     This  is  the 
general  way  in  which  men  form  their  opinions  of  what  is  taught 
in  the  word  of  God ;  and  if  this  be  not  a  safe  and  proper  way, 
then  must  the  scriptures  be  but  little  adapted  for  general  instruc- 
tion, and  the  bulk  of  the  people  must  depend  on  what  the  learned 
shall   tell   them,  of  the   things   involving   their   eternal  interests. 
These  remarks,  of  course,  apply  only  to  those  doctrines  which  are 


THE    SONSHIP    OP    CHRIST. 

so  plainly  taught,  as  to  secure  the  assent  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
readers  of  the  Bible.  The  results  which  are  thus  obtained,  are  in 
the  great  majority  of  instances,  the  same  as  those  at  which  the 
learned  exegete  arrives  after  a  laborious  and  scientific  investiga- 
tion. And  when  they  differ,  the  presumption  is  in  favour  of  the 
multitude,  rather  than  of  the  learned  individual.  The  ground  of 
this  presumption  is,  that  the  causes  which  operate  upon  the  latter, 
to  produce  error  of  judgment,  are  peculiarly  numerous  and  pow- 
erful. It  is  rare  to  see  any  commentator,  even  if  his  general  the- 
ory of  interpretation  is  correct,  who  does  not  carry  some  one 
principle  to  an  inordinate  length,  or  who  is  not  unduly  swayed  by 
one  species  of  evidence,  to  the  neglect  of  others,  of  equal  impor- 
tance ;  giving,  for  example,  opinions  respecting  the  meaning  of 
particular  passages,  on  merely  philological  grounds,  contradicted 
by  the  whole  train  of  the  argument  and  drift  of  the  context.  The 
writings  of  J.  D.  Michaelis  afford  many  striking  illustrations  of 
this  remark.  A  whole  class  of  commentators,  whose  main  prin- 
ciples of  interpretation  are  perfectly  correct,  might  be  brought  as 
examples,  of  pressing  some  favourite  principle  unduly.  Thus,  be- 
cause the  apostles  were  Jews,  and  used  the  same  words  and 
phrases  which  were  common  among  their  countrymen,  these 
words  and  phrases  are  presumed  to  mean  exactly  as  much,  and 
no  more,  than  they  would  do  in  the  mouth  of  an  ordinary  Jew,  as 
though  there  were  no  modification  of  their  import  to  be  expected, 
when  used  to  express  the  peculiar  doctrines  and  feelings  of  Chris- 
tians. It  is  in  this  way  Paulus,  Rosenmiiller,  and  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, Morus,  have  rendered  flat  and  powerless  some  of  the  most 
spiritual  portions  of  the  word  of  God. 

We  are  clearly  of  the  opinion,  therefore,  that  far  more  respect 
is  due  to  the  clear  common-sense  view  of  scripture,  that  which 
commends  itself  to  the  judgment  and  pious  feelings  of  the  mass  of 
Christian  readers,  than  to  the  views  of  the  learned  few.  This  is 
the  ground  of  the  presumptive  argument,  which  we  have  stated  in 
favour  of  the  divine  Sonship  of  Christ.  If  it  be  a  fact,  that  the 
readers  of  the  scriptures  have,  as  a  body,  been  led  to  think  that 
the  name,  Son  of  God,  is  applied  to  Christ  in  reference  to  his  di- 
vine nature,  there  is  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  opinion,  that  the 
name  is  so  applied,  which  it  should  require  the  strongest  evidence 
to  induce  us  to  resist.  To  ascribe  the  prevalence  of  this  opinion 
to  the  influence  "  of  fathers,  doctors,  and  framers  of  systematic 
divinity,"  is  to  have  a  strange  notion  of  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  And  to  suppose  that  it  could  not  stand  a  day  before  the 
light  of  "  sacred  philosophy,"  without  this  adventitious  support, 
argues  a  forgetfulness  of  the  fact,  that  it  has  stood  its  ground, 
amid  the  wreck  of  the  whole  fabric  of  scholastic  terminology  and 
divinity.  That  such  men  as  Morus,  Knapp,  Flatt,  and  others, 
who  will  not  be  despised  as  deficient  in  philological  knowledge, 
nor  suspected  of  being  held  in  the  trammels  of  system,  have  re 


THE    80NSHIP    OF    CUEIST.  39 

tained  the  doctrine  in  question,  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  such  an 
assertion. 

But  we  proceed  now  to  the  examination  of  a  few  of  those  pas- 
sages, which  seem  to  us  clearly  to  teach  that  Jesus  Christ,  as  to 
his  divine  nature,  is  the  Son  of  God.  And  here  we  would  remark, 
that  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  a  name  or  title,  which  so  fre- 
quently occurs,  should  in  every  case  be  attended  with  circum- 
stances, which  enable  us  to  decide  with  certainty  what  is  the 
ground  of  its  application  ;  it  is  enough  if  some  few  passages  of 
this  kind  occur :  such  a  passage  we  consider  Romans  i.  3,  4. 

Paul  commences  this  Epistle  with  his  usual  assertion  of  his 
apostolical  authority.  He  had  been  divinely  appointed  to  preach 
the  Gospel  concerning  the  Son  of  God.  "  Who  was,  indeed,  born 
of  the  seed  of  David,  as  to  his  human  nature  ;  but  powerfully  ex- 
hibited as  the  Son  of  God,  as  to  his  divine  nature,  by  the  resur- 
rection from  the  dead.   rov  ytvouivov  U  cirepparos  Aav\6  Kara  oapica,  rou  bpiv- 

9ivroi  viov  rov  Osov  iv  ivvafiei,  Kara   irvcvp*  dyioxrvvtii,   l£  dvaaraaecag  vtKpwr.         That 

ycvojitm  u  antpnarot  AaviS,  means  born  of  the  race  of  David,  will  not 
be  questioned,  ytwaadat  and  yevivdai  being  used  precisely  in  the  same 
sense :  as  Gal.  iv.  4,  yevdnevos  Ik  ywauds  made  or  born  of  a  woman. 
The  first  point  to  be  established  in  justifying  the  interpretation 
given  of  this  passage,  is  to  fix  the  sense  of  Kara  vipxa.  It  need 
hardly  be  remarked,  that  the  word  eapt  is  used  in  such  a  variety 
of  significations  in  scripture,  that  we  must  depend,  in  a  great 
measure,  on  the  context  for  its  meaning  in  any  particular  passage. 
It  is  used  for  the  flesh  literally,  for  the  body,  for  the  body  and  soul 
united,  for  man,  mankind,  human  nature,  the  corrupt  principle  in 
man,  &c,  &c.  Hence  *<«-<*  aapxa  may  mean  according  to  the  flesh, 
in  any  one  of  these  senses,  which  the  context  demands.  The 
question  here  is,  in  what  sense  was  Christ  born  of  the  family  of 
David  ?  the  answer  is  Kara  eapK*  as  to  his  human  nature,  or,  in  so 
far  as  he  was  a  man.  The  word  is  used  in  this  sense,  Acts  ii.  30 
(according  to  the  received  text),  Rom.  ix.  5.  Philem.  16.,  &c. 
The  word  then  admits  this  sense,  and  the  context  would  seem  to 
require  it,  since  it  is  only  as  a  man,  or  as  to  his  human  nature,  that 
Christ  can  properly  be  said  to  be  the  Son  of  David.  A  compari- 
son of  this  passage  with  Rom.  ix.  5,  will  serve  to  confirm  this  in- 
terpretation. There,  the  apostle  says,  that  Christ  in  one  respect 
to  xara  aipxa  was  descended  from  the  Fathers,  while  in  another  he 
was  God  over  all,  blessed  for  ever.  That  Kara  <rapKa  here,  is  cor- 
rectly rendered — according  to  his  human  nature,  or,  as  a  man,  is 
generally  admitted,  and  the  similarity  of  the  passages  would  con- 
strain us  to  take  them  in  the  same  sense  in  both  cases. 

The  corresponding  clause  in  the  antithesis,  is  Kara  Mvpa  dy,<oov»r,s : 
as  to  his  human  nature,  Christ  is  the  son  of  David  ;  as  to  his  di- 
vine nature,  the  son  of  God.  The  grounds  for  this  interpretation 
of  this  latter  phrase  are  the  following.  1.  That  the  wor  1  nnp*  is 
the  proper  and  scriptural  designation  for  the  divine  Being,  or  na- 


40  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 


ture,  as  such.  The  word  ayiuavv^  which,  by  a  very  common  He- 
brew idiom,  qualifies  *«*«/*<»,  as  an  adjective,  is  used  in  the  LXX. 
Ps.  cxliv.  5,  for  Tin  decus,  majestas ;  in  Ps.  xcv.  6,  for  fs>  robur, 
and  in  Ps.  xcvi.  13,  for  eh'!?,  that  is,  it  is  a  general  term  for  that 
which  is  the  object  of  admiration  or  veneration,  and,  therefore, 
itvcvua  tyiucvvris  is  majestic,  glorious,  or  holy  Spirit.  The  idea  ex- 
pressed by  *vtvpa  is  by  the  addition  of  this  word  exalted.  It  can- 
not be  denied,  therefore,  that  the  proper  import  of  the  phrase  is 
suited  to  express  the  divine  nature.  But  2d,  the  higher  nature  of 
Christ  is  elsewhere  called  w«tya,  as  1  Peter  hi.  18,  OavaruMs  /.tv  aapK\, 
guonowee'is  ii  Trvtvpan,  which  is  thus  rendered,  in  Robinson's  Transla- 
tion of  WahPs  Lexicon,  "  subjected  to  calamity  and  death  in  his 
human  nature,  but  enjoying  perfect  happiness  and  glory  as  to  his 
spirifual  nature."  (See  article  xvivna.)  Wahl  makes  wevpa  as  spo- 
ken of  Christ,  equivalent  with  b  \6YoS  as  used  in  John  i.  1.  Per- 
haps 1  Tim.  iii.  16,  belongs  here  also.  In  1  Cor.  xv.  45,  Christ 
is  called  wffya  (uorotovv,  and  in  Heb.  ix.  14,  his  divine  nature 
nvevna  miwvtov.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  these  passages 
more  particularly  afterwards.  3d.  The  antithesis  requires  that 
Kara  TrveS/ia  ayiwaivm  should  answer  to  Kara  capita.  If  the  latter,  there- 
fore, be  understood  of  his  human  nature,  then  the  former  must  be 
understood  of  his  higher  or  divine  nature  ;  if  the  one  informs  us 
in  what  respect  he  was  the  son  of  David,  the  other  must  inform 
us  in  what  respect  he  was  the  son  of  God.  This  is  so  plain,  that 
few  critics  have  felt  themselves  authorized  to  interpret  one  of  these 
phrases,  in  a  way  which  destroys  its  correspondence  with  the 
other.  Hence,  the  sense  put  upon  eatf  determines  that  which  is 
given  to  Met?*.  Those  who  make  the  former  mean  a  low  condi- 
tion, make  the  latter  mean  an  exalted  one.  To  this  it  may  be  ob- 
jected, that  this  sense  of  the  word  capf,  does  not  so  well  suit  the 
context,  nor  the  form  of  expression  (Kara,  cdpica),  as  to  the  flesh : 
since  it  was  not  as  to  a  state  that  Christ  was  the  son  of  David. 
The  use  of  the  phrase  also  in  Acts  ii.  30,  and  Rom.  ix.  5,  is  against 
this  interpretation,  and  finally  it  would  require  us  to  give  a  very 
unusual,  if  not,  an  entirely  unauthorized  sense  to  the  words  nO/m 
ayiwcivrn,  viz.  state  of  exaltation.  We  cannot  find  a  single  passage, 
either  in  the  Old  or  New  Testament,  where  imc9fi«  has  this  mean- 
ing. No  such  sense  is  assigned  to  it  by  Wahl,  or  Schleusner. 
Those  passages  which  are  adduced  by  the  author  of  the  article 
Vom  Wort  wapa,  wenn  es  von  Christo  gebraucht  wird  ;  in  Eich- 
horn's  Repertorium,  vol.  ii.,  p.  1 — 24,  are  to  us  entirely  unsatisfac- 
tory. The  first  is  1  Peter  iv.  6,  where  the  apostle  is  exhorting 
Christians  to  holiness,  in  view  of  a  future  judgment,  and  then  refers 
them  to  the  case  of  those  who  had  already  died,  to  whom  the 
Gospel  had  been  preached,  so  that  (h»)  though  they  might  be  con- 
demned of  men  (caPKi)  as  to  the  body,  yet  through  God  they  live 
(nvevpan)  as  to  the  spirit.  Here,  from  the  opposition  of  cdtf  and 
7rMi5/io,  the  latter  can  hardly  have  any  other  sense  than  the  soul. 


THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST.  41 

Though  their  bodies  be  dead,  their  spirits  live.  The  second  is  1 
Peter  iii.  18,  xp1*7"6'  Oa»arudt\s  <rap«i,  £coo7roiijfl«is  itmd'/ioti.  Here  the  word 
{uoxotiu,  after  the  Hebrew  rtttt  may  either  mean,  to  preserve  alive, 
continue  in  life,  or,  to  render  happy.  Wahl  takes  it  in  the  latter, 
Pott  in  the  former  sense.  According  to  the  first,  the  meaning  of 
the  passage  is,  Christ  indeed  was  put  to  death  as  to  the  body  (<raf>«; 
dative  as  before),  but  continued  in  life  as  to  the  spirit  (™iyior«). 
For  Wahl's  view  see  above.  The  sense  in  which  m^an  is  here 
taken,  depends  upon  the  view  adopted  of  the  following  verse,  t*  v 

U.  e.  rrwi/jart),  xai   rots  iv  0vXa*iji  Trvcifiaoi  iropevOcis,  iKiipv^cv  k.  r.  X.      The  Spirit, 

therefore,  here  spoken  of,  is  that  in  which  Christ  preached  to 
the  spirits  in  prison.  If  this  preaching  occurred  before  the 
flood,  then  is  wn^a  his  pre-existent  nature,  i.  e.,  his  divine  nature. 
If  it  occurred  immediately  after  his  death,  then  ^tyo  may  be  his 
human  soul :  but  in  neither  case  can  it  be  his  exalted  state. 
The  third  passage  is  1  Tim.  iii.  16,  where  Christ  is  said  to  have 
been  "  manifested  in  the  flesh,  justified  in  the  spirit,  &c."  That  is, 
he  was  proved  or  shown  to  be  just ;  to  be  all  that  he  claimed  to 
be,  the  Messiah,  the  Son  of  God.  This  was  done  b  7r»««>ar« ;  which 
may  mean  either,  by  the  influences  of  the  Spirit  miraculous  and 
ordinary,  by  which  the  claims  of  Christ  were  established ;  or  it 
may  mean  his  divine  nature,  the  wevpa  which  dwelt  in  him,  and 
which  was  manifested  in  all  his  life  and  in  all  his  works  ;  and  in 
and  through  which  he  was  justified.  To  render  nvetpa  here,  his  ex- 
alted state,  would  be  to  make  this  clause  tautological  with  foci^er, 
tv  So{ri.  Besides,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  natural  order  of  the  par- 
ticulars here  specified  by  the  apostle,  according  to  which,  the 
glorification  of  Christ  follows  his  justification.  In  the  passage,  as 
commonly  understood,  everything  is  natural.  The  incarnation  of 
Christ,  the  establishment  of  his  claims  as  Messiah,  his  being  seen 
and  served  of  angels,  preached  and  believed  upon  in  the 
world,  and  his  ascension  to  glory,  follow  each  in  natural  ar- 
rangement. We  have,  therefore,  no  reason,  and  consequently 
no  authority,  for  adopting  so  unusual  a  sense  of  the  word 
wmD/io  in  this  place.  The  only  other  passage  is  Heb.  ix.  14,  where 
Christ  is  said  6ia  xveinaros  atuvioi  to  have  offered  himself  unto  God. 
Though  Storr  in  his  Commentory  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews, 
p.  167,  renders  these  words  by  "in  dem  Zustande  einer  ewigen 
Herrlichkeit,"  in  the  state  of  eternal  glory  ;  and  although  Professor 
Stuart,  in  the  XVIIIth  Excursus  to  his  commentary  on  the  He- 
brews, inclines  to  the  same  view,  we  cannot  think  it  correct  for 
the  following  reasons.  1.  We  think  the  passages  adduced,  and 
which  have  been  noticed  above,  are  insufficient  to  prove  that  »►«>« 
is  ever  used  in  scripture,  for  the  exalted  or  glorified  state  of  Christ: 
and  if  not,  then  this  interpretation  of  the  word  here,  is  contrary  to 
the  usus  loquendi.  2.  The  sense  given  by  the  word  in  its  ordina- 
ry acceptation,  is  perfectly  good  and  suitable  to  the  context.  "  If," 
says  the  apostle,  "  the  blood  of  bulls  and  goats  purified how 


42  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

much  more  the  blood  of  Christ,  who  was  endowed  with  an  eternal 
spirit,"  i.  e.  was  a  divine  Being.  That  <J«i  may  be  taken  in  this 
sense,  is  admitted:  it  occurs  frequently  in  this  way,  particularly  in 
the  writings  of  Paul — Sta  ypannaros  having  the  written  law,  sra  itepironhs 
with  circumcision,  &c.  See  Wahl's  Lexicon  under  fa.  3.  The 
words  eavTtv  tcpoanvtyKtv  are  descriptive  of  what  occurred  on  earth, 
i.  e.  of  Christ's  sacrifice,  see  v.  25,  and  v.  28  of  this  chapter,  and 
not  of  what  was  done  in  heaven.  Besides,  the  point  of  the  compari- 
son is  not  between  the  different  places,  where  the  sacrifices  of  bulls 
and  that  of  Christ  were  offered,  but  between  the  sacrifices  them- 
selves, and  therefore  sea  irw^aros  aiwvtos  must  express  the  personal 
dignity  of  Christ ;  which  it  does  in  the  strongest  possible  language. 
If  the  blood  of  animals  was  of  the  least  value,  what  may  we  not 
expect  from  that,  of  a  Being  possesed  of  a  divine  nature  ? 

As  these  are  the  only  passages  adduced  to  show  that  the  word 
*m%*  may  be  rendered,  exalted  state,  if  these  are  insufficient,  it 
will  certainly  not  be  contended  that  we  are  at  liberty  to  give  it 
that  sense  in  the  passage  under  consideration.  To  make  it  mean, 
according  to  the  revelations  or  predictions  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  as  is 
done  by  Calvin,  and  more  recently  by  Michaelis  and  Ammon,  is 
so  directly  at  variance  with  the  structure  of  the  passage,  which 
requires  us  to  make  Kara,  vvevpa  ayiaovvrts  answer  to  Kara  Capua,  that  this 
interpretation  cannot  be  considered  sound,  and  has,  in  fact,  very 
few  advocates.  Nothing  but  the  exigency  of  the  case  can  author- 
ize us  to  do  violence  to  the  rule,  which  governs  the  interpretation 
of  antithetical  passages.  As  no  such  exigency  exists  here,  it  evi- 
dently should  not  be  departed  from,  especially  as  Paul,  perhaps 
more  than  any  other  of  the  sacred  writers,  abounds  in  such 
passages,  and  depends  most  on  his  readers  gathering  his  meaning 
by  the  aid  of  the  mutual  light  afforded  by  the  contrasted  terms. 

The  only  other  ground  for  the  interpretation  given  of  the 
phrase  in  question,  which  we  shall  present,  is  the  analogy  between 
this  passage  and  Rom.  ix.  5.  There  the  apostle,  as  before  re- 
marked, is  speaking  of  Christ  in  a  two-fold  respect.  According 
to  the  one,  he  is  descended  from  the  fathers,  according  to  the 
other,  he  is  God  over  all,  blessed  for  ever.  So  here,  in  one  re- 
spect, he  is  the  Son  of  David  ;  in  another,  the  Son  of  God.  As 
Son  of  David  is  equivalent  with  being  descended  from  the  Fathers, 
so  is  Son  of  God  equivalent  with  God  over  all,  blessed  for  ever. 

We  designedly  passed  over  the  word  bpicdevros,  that  we  might  be 
permitted  to  derive  an  argument  from  the  interpretation,  which 
we  have  endeavoured  to  show  must  be  given  to  the  words  Kara 
rvevna  'ayiutrvviis  in  favour  of  that  given  of  bpiguv.  This  word  is  pro- 
perly to  fix  the  limits  of  anything,  to  define,  &c,  in  the  New  Tes- 
tament, to  appoint,  constitute,  determine,  &c.  Accordingly,  the 
most  obvious  meaning  of  hpioQcvros  vlov  Qeov  is  constituted  the  Son  of 
God.  But  it  is  familiar  to  every  student  of  the  scriptures,  that  it 
is  very  common  to  say  of  any  person  (or  thing),  that  he  is  made 
that,  which  he  is  only  pronounced  or  declared  to  be.     Thus,  to 


THE    SONSHIP    OP    CHRIST.  43 

make  guilty,  is  to  pronounce  guilty  ;  to  make  just,  is  to  pronounce 
just ;  to  make  clean,  is  to  declare  clean  ;  and  so  in  cases  without 
number.  See  Storr's  Observationes  ad  Analogiam  Heb.,  p.  14. 
Hence  bptodi»ToS  vioa  eeos,  in  the  strictest  accordance  with  the  usage 
of  the  Hebrew-Greek,  may  be  rendered,  pronounced,  or  declared, 
the  Son  of  God.  That  it  must  be  so  rendered  is,  we  think,  clear 
from  the  following  considerations:  1.  Christ  cannot  be  said  to  be 
constituted  the  Son  of  God,  Kara  *vtvpa  ayiaovvn,  if  these  words  mean, 
as  shown  above,  the  divine  nature.  2.  It  cannot  be  said,  that  he 
was  constituted  the  Son  of  God,  by  or  after  his  resurrection,  as-  he 
was  the  Son  of  God  before  it.  If  this  title  is  equivalent  with  Mes- 
siah, or  king  of  Israel,  still  he  was  Messiah  and  king  of  Israel  be- 
fore his  resurrection.  And  hence,  even  those,  who  make  mtpa 
here  to  mean  exalted  state,  translate  bptaeen  by  declaratus.. 

There  is  another  process  by  which  the  same  sense  may  be  shown 
to  be  expressed  by  the  term,  without  having  recourse  to  the  fami- 
liar Hebraism  above  alluded  to.  Thus  Morus  says,  bpigu  in  com- 
muni  vita  est :  terminos  pono,  nam  &pos  est  terminus,  limes,  agro- 
rum  terminus.  lam  metonymice  bptgeiv  in  communi  vita  est,  con- 
ftrmo  aliquid,  facio  ut  sit  certum. — Ita  bpiadcts  v.'os  rot  Qeov  erit :  der 
bestatigte  Sohn  Gottes,  certo  confirmatum  est  eum  esse  viov  to*  Qeov. 
Yet  Morus  translates  Kara  ™etya  <sy.  quoad  statum  suum  excelsiorem. 
He  cannot,  therefore,  be  supposed  to  be  biassed  in  his  judgment  as 
to  the  force  of  the  word  bpigciv,  by  theological  prepossessions.  We 
shall  not  undertake  to  decide,  whether  the  passages  quoted  from 
the  common  Greek  authors,  in  support  of  this  sense  of  bpifriv  by 
Eisner,  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  point,  as  the  process  by  which 
Morus  explains  the  terrn  is  so  simple  and  satisfactory.  Does  not 
however  the  phrase  bpifriv  nva  6ed*  more  properly  mean  to  declare 
or  pronounce  that  one  is  a  God,  than  to  constitute  one  a  God  ? 

Both  Chrysostom  and  Theodoret  (if  further  confirmation  of  this 
point  be  necessary),  explain  bpiadevrot  by  anokix^vros.  The  Syriac 
gives  it  the  same  sense.  The  majority  of  modern  critics,  however 
they  may  differ  in  their  expositions  of  other  parts  of  this  passage, 
agree  here.  So  Koppe,  declaratus  per  resurrectionem  filius  Dei. 
Flatt,  fur  Gottes  Sohn  kraftig  erklart  wurde  ; — Tholuck — ist  nun 
offenbar  wurden  als  Gottes  Sohn.  And  to  the  same  effect,  many 
others. 

The  words  h  d*»a/i«  may  either  be  connected  adverbially  with 
bptodivTis,  or  adjectively  with  vios  Qcov.  In  the  former  case,  the  sense 
would  be,  was  powerfully  manifested  as  the  Son  of  God :  in  the 
other,  he  was  manifested  as  the  powerful  Son  of  God.  This  mani- 
festation was  cf  avaoraetZs  vacpuv,  either  by  the  resurrection  from  the 
dead  ;  or  after  the  resurrection,  as  «  admits  of  either  sense.  In 
both  cases  the  meaning  is  the  same,  it  was  the  resurrection  which 
was  the  great  decisive  evidence  that  Christ  was  all  that  he  claimed 
to  be,  the  Messiah,  the  Son  of  God,  and  Saviour  of  the  world.  It 
is  in  this  light  that  the  apostles  were  accustomed  to  speak  of  the 
resurrection  of  their  Master.     It  was  one  important  part  of  their 


44  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

official  duty  to  bear  testimony  to  this  fact.  Hence,  when  Judas 
fell,  they  said,  "  one  must  be  ordained  to  be  a  witness  with  us  of 
his  (Christ's)  resurrection."  It  is  recorded  of  them,  that  "  with 
great  power  gave  the  apostles  witness  of  the  resurrection  of  the 
Lord  Jesus."  Paul  tells  the  Jews  that  the  evidence  that  God  had 
fulfilled  the  promise  made  to  their  Fathers,  was  that  he  had  raised 
up  Jesus.  And  in  1  Cor.  xv.,  he  makes  all  our  hopes  as  Christians 
to  depend  upon  the  fact  that  Christ  has  risen  from  the  dead.  This 
was  the  final  proof  that  he  was  the  Son  of  God. 

We  have  now  given  the  grouuds,  on  which  we  are  constrained 
to  believe  that  the  passage  before  us  contains  an  explicit  declara- 
tion, that  Christ  in  his  divine  nature  is  the  Son  of  God.  The  view 
here  given,  is  not  only  that  which  Beza  and  the  older  commenta- 
tors had  presented,  but  which  such  men  as  Flatt,  Knapp,  and  others, 
who  cannot  be  considered  to  be  influenced  by  theological  prepos- 
sessions, have  adopted.  The  oftener  we  have  examined  the  pas- 
sage, the  more  thorough  has  been  our  conviction,  that  the  interpre- 
tation given  above  is  not  only  admissible,  but  that  it  is  the  only 
one  which  the  text  will  consistently  bear.  And,  therefore,  we  con- 
sider this  passage  decisive  on  the  point  at  issue.  For  all  that  we 
have  undertaken  to  prove,  is,  that  Christ,  as  Logos,  is  called  the 
Son  of  God  ;  not  that  this  title,  in  the  mouths  of  Jews,  Heathen, 
and  evil  Spirits,  or  even  of  the  apostles,  was  uniformly  used  in  a 
sense  involving  the  ascription  of  true  divinity. 

We  have  endeavoured  to  show  that  the  doctrine  of  the  divine 
and  eternal  Sonship  of  Christ  does  not  include  the  idea  of  deriva- 
tion of  the  Logos  from  the  Father ;  and,  consequently,  that  the 
objections  which  proceed  in  the  assumption,  even  admitting 
their  force,  are  not  conclusive.  We  remarked,  that  a  distinc- 
tion was  to  be  made  here,  as  in  many  other  instances,  between  the 
fact  as  revealed  in  scripture  and  the  explanations  of  its  nature,  as 
given  in  different  ages  and  by  different  men.  The  simple  point  we 
wish  to  establish  is,  that  the  Logos  is  the  Son  of  God.  In  support 
of  this  point,  we  referred  to  Romans  i.  3  &  4,  where,  we  think,  it 
is  expressly  asserted,  that  Christ,  as  to  his  human  nature,  is  the  Son 
of  David  ;  but,  as  to  his  divine  nature,  was  clearly  exhibited  to  be 
the  Son  of  God,  by  his  resurrection  from  the  dead.  Those  of  our 
readers  who  admit  the  correctness  of  the  interpretation  of  this  pas- 
sage as  here  given,  would  demand  no  other  proof  of  the  position 
which  we  have  assumed.  For  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is 
no  part  of  our  object  to  prove  that  the  name,  Son  of  God,  is  always 
used  in  direct  reference  to  Christ's  divine  nature  ;  or  that  it  is 
always  employed  in  a  sense  implying  equality  with  God.  Our 
object  is  merely  to  show  that  Christ  as  God  is  called  Son  ;  and  for 
this  purpose  we  will  now  advert  to  some  other  passages. 

These  are  principally  in  the  writings  of  the  Apostle  John.  And 
here  it  may  be  well  to  remark,  that  if  any  expression  be  suscepti- 
ble of  two  interpretations,  the  one  of  more,  the  other  of  less  depth 
and  tenderness  of  meaning,  the  presumption  is  greatly  in  favour  of 
the  former,  when  used  by  this  apostle.     There  is  something  in  the 


THE    S0N8HIP    OF    CHRIST  45 

whole  manner  in  which  the  beloved  disciple  speaks  of  his  divine 
Master  ;  of  his  relation  to  the  Father  as  his  Son  ;  of  the  intimate 
union  between  them  as  such,  and  in  his  use  of  the  phrase  Son  of 
God,  which  must  impress  every  unbiassed  reader  with  the  convic- 
tion that  it  is  a  mysterious  and  inscrutable  relation,  which  he  en- 
deavors to  shadow  forth  by  this  expression.     It  is  difficult  distinctly 
to  exhibit  this  kind  of  evidence,  consisting,  as  it  does,  in  the  general 
spirit  and  manner  of  an  author  ;  yet  every  one  will  probably  feel 
it.     We  are  sensible  that  the  full  meaning  of  the  apostle  is  not 
reached,  by  paraphrasing.  Son  of  God,  King  of  Israel,  or  the  man 
miraculously  begotten.     Such  expositions  substitute  a  distinct,  in- 
tellectual conception  for  a  vague  but  elevated  impression ;  and  we 
are  conscious  of  being  great  losers  by  the  exchange.     We  feel  this 
when  we  hear  the  unity,  which  John  makes  his  Master  assert  to 
exist  between  himself  and  hi^s  Father,  explained  as  mere  coinci- 
dence of  purpose  or  will.     If  we  could  not  prove  it  to  be  other- 
wise, we  should  still  believe  that  this  was  not  all  that  was  intended. 
The  characteristic  of  this  apostle,  to  which  we  are  now  alluding, 
has  been  felt  by  all  commentators  who  have  any  congeniality  of 
spirit  with  the  sacred  writer.     Those  of  a  different  description 
have  either  reduced  to  the  coldest  and  flattest  sense  everything  in 
this  Gospel,  or  questioned  its  genuineness  altogether.     There  is 
great  force  in  the  remark  made  (we  think)  by  Storr,  that  nothing 
betrays  such  an  utter  destitution  of  all  proper  feeling  for  the  true 
spirit  of  Christianity  as  these  sceptical  doubts  and  low  interpreta- 
tions of  the  writings  of  St.  John.     We  think  our  readers  will  admit 
that  there  is  at  least  a  presumption  in  favour  of  St.  John's  meaning 
something  more  by  Son  of  God,  than  King  of  Israel.     That  this 
is  really  the  case,  we  hope  the  following  passages  will  prove. 
The  first  is  in  these  words :    "  O  \oyos  <r«p|  lyhtro,  ko.\  cok^^ccv  iv  (jrf»  («a« 

cOcaaificOa  tiiv  ii^av  airov,  &&%a»  £>;  povoycvovs  ■naph.  irarpds),  tAi/mj  ftdpTos  *ai   uXijOti'aj. 

John  i.  14.  The  Logos,  full  of  grace  and  truth,  became  incarnate, 
and  dwelt  among  us,  and  we  beheld  his  glory,  a  glory  that  became 
the  only  begotten  of  the  Father. 

It  seems  natural,  as  xMpvs  is  in  the  nominative,  to  make  it 
the  predicate  x<jyo$,  and  to  consider  the  words  included  in  the 
brackets  as  parenthetical.  Grotius,  Tittmann,  and  others,  connect 
it  with  (Lovoycvovi ;  then  ^A^m  is  by  enallage  for  *\ipovs.  A  similar  in- 
stance may  be  seen  in  Revelations  i.  5  :  d*d  I^os  Xptaroi  b  /liprvs  b  mordt. 
Still,  as  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John,  such  departures  from  the  usual 
grammatical  construction  are  rare,  we  prefer  the  common  method 
of  explaining  the  passage.  \ 

The  is  before  povoytvovs  is  not  a  sign  of  comparison,  but  is  used  as 
the  5  veritatis,  in  Hebrew.  Hesychius  explains  i>s  by  aw**.  This 
interpretation  has  been  adopted  in  this  instance  by  almost  all  com- 
mentators from  the  time  of  Chrysostom.  "  We  saw  his  glory,  the 
glory  truly,  of  the  only  begotten  of  the  Father."  Or  it  is  equiva- 
lent with  ut  decet.  Tittmann  paraphrases  the  passage  thus:  Vidi- 
mus majestatem  ejus,  dignam  Filio  Dei.     Gloriam  talem  et  tantam, 


46  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

qualis  et  quanta  nonnisi  Filii  Dei  esse  potest.  He  gives  from  Chry- 
sostom,  as  an  illustration,  the  common  expression,  He  walks  as  a 
King ;  that  is,  as  becomes  a  King. 

The  word  Sofa  is  here  to  be  taken  for  all  the  perfections  of  the 
Logos ;  and  if  the  Logos  is  God,  as  John  asserts  in  the  first  verse, 
then  at*  is  the  sum  of  the  divine  excellence.  It  is  in  this  sense  that 
Tins  is  very  frequently  used  in  the  Old  Testament.  It  expresses 
all  God's  perfections  as  manifested  to  his  creatures.  The  word  is 
here,  therefore,  not  to  be  restricted  to  the  display  of  divine  power 
made  in  the  miracles  of  Christ,  or  to  the  exhibition  of  his  glory  in 
his  transfiguration ;  but  the  apostle  means  to  say,  that  he  had  seen 
a  fulness  of  excellence,  wisdom  and  power,  in  Christ,  that  could 
belong  to  no  creature. 

Movoyevovs  irapu  Trarpds.  It  seems  hardly  necessary  to  remark,  that 
vlov  is  to  be  supplied  after  the  first  word  in  this  phrase,  as  this  is  so 
evident  from  the  import  of  the  word  novoycv/u  itself,  and  from  the 
fact  that  John  so  frequently  uses  the  full  phrase,  "  only  begotten 
Son,"  as  chap.  iii.  16,  and  elsewhere.  As  no  part  of  our  argument 
from  this  passage  rests  on  the  meaning  of  the  word  iiovoytvfis  (if  vios 
be  supplied),  we  might  admit  that  it  may  be  translated  "  only"  or 
"  beloved."  We  would  remark,  however,  that  the  reasons  com- 
monly assigned  for  giving  it  the  second  sense  just  mentioned, 
appear  to  us  very  unsatisfactory.  It  very  often  happens,  it  is  true, 
that,  in  compounds,  their  strict  etymological  sense  is  in  common 
usage  neglected  or  considerably  modified.  And  this  is,  no  doubt,  so 
far  the  case  with  the  word  before  us,  that  the  idea  expressed  by 
the  first  part  of  the  word  is  sometimes  mainly  or  solely  retained, 
as  in  Psalm  xxv.  16,  where  it  is  used  for  povos;  hence  novoyevts  vios 
is,  in  the  scriptures  at  least,  an  only  son,  whether  an  only  surviv- 
ing or  only  begotten  son,  or  the  only  son  by  the  same  mother.  It 
is  in  this  sense  that  it  corresponds  to  the  Hebrew  word  T^W  alone, 
only.  That  this  Hebrew  word  is  sometimes  translated  in  the 
LXX.  by  hyairtirds,  does  not  prove  that  povoytvte  and  aya-nnrot  are  syno- 
nymous, but  merely  that  VWJ  is  sometimes  taken  in  the  sense  of 
the  one,  and  sometimes  in  that  of  the  other,  of  these  Greek  words. 
We  are  inclined,  therefore,  to  think  that  povoyevtu  as  applied  to 
Christ,  can  only,  with  propriety,  be  rendered  unigenitus  or  unicus ; 
i.  e.,  unus  in  suo  genere.*  It  matters  not,  however,  for  our  pur- 
pose, how  this  word  is  rendered.     Christ  is  the  novoytvfn  ™pa  irarp&s, 

*  As  to  the  classical  use  of  this  word,  which  is,  indeed,  of  less  weight  in  the  pre- 
sent instance,  it  may  be  well  to  quote  part  of  a  note  given  by  Liicke  in  his  Comment, 
page  422,  from  Prof.  Nake,  of  Bonn.  "  From  the  earliest  Grecian  poets,  in  philoso- 
phical language  (as  in  Plato's  Tirnaeus),  to  the  writers  in  the  time  of  the  Emperors, 
of  different  centuries,  after  Christ,  pivoytvris  retained  its  full  meaning;  fiovoi  yatpans 
or  uovoi  yeyovois;  for  example,  ptovoyevns  waij  (in  Hesiod  and  later  writers),  the  only 
son,  that  is,  the  only  son  born  to  its  parents,  so  that  the  only  surviving  son  of  two  or 
more  cannot  be  called  povoyevris.  The  only  departure  from  the  usual  sense  of  the 
word,  he  says,  is  found  in  its  application  to  Minerva,  born  of  only  one  parent." 
This,  however,  relates  to  the  first,  and  not  to  the  second,  part  of  the  compound. 


THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST.  47 

the  Son,  unus  in  suo  genere,  such  as  no  other  being  in  the  universe 
is  ;  and  is  so  called  in  distinction  from  the  vloi  rot  Qtov  or  rUva  rot  Qiov. 
He  is  the  only  son,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  apostle  uses  the  ex- 
pression. This,  of  course,  does  not  decide  in  what  sense  he  is  thus 
peculiarly  the  Son  of  God ;  and,  therefore,  we  lay  no  stress  on 
the  use  of  this  particular  word,  except  so  far  as  it  expresses  the 
idea  just  mentioned. 

Any  one,  who  will  throw  his  eyes  on  the  passage  under  consi- 
deration, will  see  that  the  words  napu  varpds  are  much  more  naturally 
connected  with  /tovoyevovs  than  with  H{av.  According  to  the  latter 
method  of  construction,  the  sense  would  be,  We  saw  his  glory,  a 
glory  (toOetcav)  given  by  the  Father  ;  so  Erasmus  and  Grotius.  This  is 
unnecessary  and  forced.  Those,  however,  who  connect  them  with 
novoyevovi,  explain  the  phrase  variously.  Beza  supplies  tffXMmf,  others 
i»r»  ;  but  neither  is  necessary.  Noesselt  (Opuscula  Fasciculus,  ii., 
p.  179)  translates  ™?a  sarpdj,  apud  Patrem ;  majestatem  tanquam 
unici  filii,  qui  erat  apud  Patrem.  This  gives  a  sense  well  suited 
to  the  analogous  passages,  v.  1,  and  v.  18  ;  but  it  would  seem  that 
™pa,  in  this  sense,  would  require  the  dative  or  accusative.  It  is 
better,  therefore,  to  take  ™Pd  narpds  for  the  simple  genitive,  as  may, 
with  strictest  propriety,  be  done  ;  see  Rom.  xi.  27.  h  ™p'  i/ioD  iiadw  for 

itaOiiKrj  jiov. 

The  whole  question  to  our  purpose,  as  it  regards  this  passage, 
is,  who  is  the  povoycvhs  napa  irarp6S  ?  We  think  the  A<5yo$  is  such.  This 
appears  clearly  from  the  passage  itself.  The  Logos  became  flesh, 
and  dwelt  among  us,  and  we  beheld  his  glory  ;  that  is,  the  glory 
of  the  Logos,  which  was  as  of  the  only  begotten  of  the  Father. 
The  meaning  is,  we  saw  a  glory  which  could  belong  to  no  other 
being  than  the  Logos,  who  is  God,  the  only  begotten  of  the  Father, 
full  of  grace  and  truth.  It  seems  evident  that  John  uses  the  words 
\tyos  and  fiovoycvhs  *apa  warpSf  in  the  same  sense,  exchanging  the  one 
expression  for  the  other ;  and,  if  this  is  the  case,  then  is  the  Logos 
the  Son  of  God. 

A  reference  to  the  context  will  make  this  still  more  obvious,  and 
will  show  that  no  relief  is  obtained  by  saying  that  it  is  only  the 
Logos  as  incarnate  that  is  called  the  Son  of  God.*  The  apostle's 
object  is,  to  set  forth  the  true  nature  of  Christ.     He,  therefore, 


*  If  this  were  the  case,  it  could  not  be  on  account  of  the  miraculous  conception  of 
the  human  nature  of  Christ  that  he  is  here  called  the  Son  of  God ;  for  the  incarnation 
of  the  Logos,  and  the  miraculous  production  of  Christ's  human  nature,  are  two  very 
different  things.  Another  reason,  therefore,  beyond  those  usually  assigned  for  the 
application  of  this  name,  must,  in  this  case,  be  assumed,  viz  ,  the  union  of  the  divine 
with  the  human  nature ;  or,  as  Storr,  in  his  note  on  Hebrews,  i.  5,  expresses  it, 
"  Because  he,  who,  before  all  things,  was  with  the  Father,  and  in  his  bosom,  became 
man ;  or,  because  he,  who,  before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  was  the  beloved  of 
the  Father,  God's  dear  Son,  has  united  himself  in  one  person,  with  the  miraculously- 
conceived  man  Jesus."  Weil  der,  am  Anfange  der  Dinge  bei  (John  i.  1),  dem  Vater 
(1  John,  i.  2),  iu  seinem  Schoos  war  (John  i.  18),  Mensch  worden  ist,  oder  weil  sich 
der  von  dem  Vater  (17,  i.  5),  vor  dem  Daseyn  der  Welt  Geliebte  (v.  24.)— der  liebe 
Sohn  Gottee — mit  dem  ubernaturlicher  Weise  empfangenen  Jesu  zu  Einer  Person 
verbunden  hat. 


48  THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

says,  that  the  Logos  was  in  the  beginning  with  God,  and  was  God, 
the  creator  of  all  things,  the  source  of  all  light,  and  the  fountain  of 
life.  This  divine  Being  became  man,  and  we  (the  apostles)  saw, 
even  under  this  veil,  the  glory  of  the  Godhead,  of  the  Logos,  for  it 
was  such  as  could  belong  to  none  other  than  the  only  begotten  of 
the  Father ;  i.  e.,  to  one  who  was  partaker  of  the  divine  nature  and 
attributes.  We  think  nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  John  inter- 
changes x<Syos  and  /tovoysviis  iraph  -narpoi,  and,  consequently,  calls  the 
Logos  the  Son  of  God,  which  is  all  that  we  are  contending  for. 
We  think  that  it  is  also  clear,  from  this  passage,  that  John  intends, 
by  the  name  Son  of  God  (or,  which  is  the  same,  only  begotten  of 
the  Father),  one  who  is  of  the  same  nature  with  the  Father ;  not 
one  who  is  derived  from  him,  nor  exalted  by  him,  but  one  who  is 
what  he  is,  knows  what  he  knows,  and  does  what  he  does ;  one 
who  stands  in  the  most  intimate  of  all  relations  to  him.  We  shall 
have  occasion  to  refer  to  some  passages,  in  which  Christ  evidently 
uses  this  name  in  the  same  sense. 

If  authority  was  of  any  weight  with  our  readers,  we  might,  quote 
the  opinions  of  critics  of  every  description  to  prove  that  the  Logos 
is  here  called  the  only  begotten  of  the  Father.  The  opinion  of  the 
older,  though  not  on  that  account  less  estimable,  commentators 
would  probably  be  set  down  to  the  score  of  theological  prejudice. 
We  shall,  therefore,  only  remark,  that  the  view  of  this  passage 
given  above  is  presented  by  almost  all  the  German  critics  of  any 
note  with  whom  we  are  acquainted.  Kuinoel,  on  this  verse,  after 
explaining  povoyevns  cui  nemo  par,  nee  Deo  carior,  remarks  :  "  Re- 
spexit  vero  etiam  Johannes  sublimiorem  Christi  naturam,  interio- 
rem  rov  Aoyot  a  Deo  prognati,  cum  Deo  conjunctionem."  Liicke, 
now  Professor  in  Gottingen,  after  speaking,  in  no  very  measured 
terms,  in  reference  to  the  modern  interpretations  of  the  word 
povoyevfc,  and  quoting  from  Hermann  a  cutting  reproach  against  the 
recent  theologians  for  their  numerous  perversions  of  the  language 
of  scripture,  says,  that  all  that  Paulus,  in  his  commentary,  has  said 
to  show  that  novoysvrn  means  unique  (einzig  in  seiner  Art),  at  most 
proves  that  it  can  be  so  rendered  ;  but  that  this  is  nothing  to  the 
purpose,  until  he  proves,  from  the  usage  of  the  New  Testament, 
that  "  when  applied  to  Christ,  to  the  Logos,  to  the  Son  of  God,"  it 
does  not  contain  the  idea  of  sonship.  See  his  Comment,  iiber  die 
Schriften  des  Evangelisten  Johannes,  vol.  i.,  p.  420,  et  seq. 
Tittmann,  in  his  remarks  on  this  verse,  after  stating  that  some 
would  refer  the  name,  Son  of  God,  to  the  office,  and  not  to  the 
nature  of  Christ ;  to  his  mission,  and  not  to  his  union  in  nature 
with  the  Father  ;  and  thus  make  it  equivalent  with  Messiah,  says : 
Verum  haec  interpretatio  est  haud  dubie  alienissima  a  mente  Apos- 
tolorum  et  Domini  ipsius.  And,  as  the  conclusion  of  his  argument 
on  this  subject,  adds,  Igitur  vlov  rov  Qeov,  isque  povoyMt,  est  Filius  Dei 
in  suo  genere  unus,  quatenus  talis  est,  qualis  est  Pater,  idem  est, 
qui  Pater,  eadem  habet,  quae  Pater,  eadem  facit  quae  Pater,  cui 
eadem  competunt,  quae  Patri.     See  his  Meletemata  Sacra,  p.  59, 


THE    80NSHIP    OP   CHRIST.  49 

seq.  Tholuck,  although  his  manner  of  speaking  on  this  particular 
passage  is  undecided,  yet,  on  John  ix.  35,  says  expressly,  that  the 
phrase,  Son  of  God,  is  used  in  a  higher  and  lower  sense  in  the  New 
Testament.  On  the  one  hand,  it  denotes  the  divine  nature  in 
Christ,  the  Logos  (einerseits  bezeichnet  es  das  Gottliche  in  Christo, 
den  Logos) ;  and,  in  the  other,  is  a  name  of  the  Messiah.  In  proof 
of  the  first  point,  he  refers  to  the  passage  before  us,  and,  of  course, 
understands  it  as  it  has  just  been  explained.  So  also  Knapp,  as 
before  quoted,  appeals  to  this  passage  to  prove  that  Christ,  in  his 
divine  nature,  is  the  Son  of  God.  And  even  Paulus,  who,  of  all 
commentators  with  whom  we  are  acquainted,  has  laboured  hardest 
to  remove  everything  miraculous  or  mysterious,  and,  in  fact, 
everything  elevated  and  characteristic  from  the  sacred  writings, 
considers  John  as  here  calling  the  Logos  the  povoyev>,s  *apa  ™rp&s.  The 
Logos,  he  says,  in  the  theology  of  the  Alexandrian  Jews,  was  a 
Spirit  sui  generis,  which  had  proceeded  from  the  Eternal  Father  ; 
and,  accordingly,  the  sense  of  this  passage  is  :  "  The  more  closely 
we  could  observe  Jesus,  the  more  did  we  see  that  all  his  excellent 
attributes  were  like  the  excellence  of  a  Spirit  sui  generis,  that  had 
proceeded  from  God."#  From  this,  it  is  clear  that  the  jH»oyev,',s  napd 
irarpds  is,  in  his  opinion,  the  Logos,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  his 
view  of  the  passage  in  other  respects.  Our  object  in  making  these 
quotations  is  merely  to  show  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 
the  divine  Sonship  of  Christ  is  an  antiquated  notion,  believed  only 
by  those  who  are  held  fast  in  the  trammels  of  obselete  systems. 

There  is  another  passage  in  this  chapter,  which  we  think  is 
equally  clear  in  prooi  of  our  position,  that  the  Logos  is  the  Son  of 
God,  and  that  is  the  18th  verse :  Bsdv  ovStis  lu>pa\t  ircZiror?  b  novoytvfo  vlds,  i 
w¥  tit  nv  k6\ko»  tov  rarpos,  Utlvos  i|iiyij<rare-  The  diversity  of  reading  which 
exists  as  to  the  second  clause  of  this  verse,  some  MSS.  having 
novoycrj'is  vidg,  others  iiopoytvfis  Otds  (and  so,  many  of  the  Fathers),  others 
Otov,  and  others  viot  rot  eeoa,  does  not  affect  the  force  of  the  passage, 
as  far  as  our  purpose  is  concerned  ;  since  ^ovoytvm  is  retained  in  all, 
and  vids,  if  not  expressed,  is  implied.  In  the  words  &  foeis  to-»k6\vo», 
the  accusative  with  ««'«  is  probably  to  be  taken  for  the  dative  with 
if,  as  is  frequently  the  case  in  the  New  Testament  Greek.  The 
&<i»  is  by  Erasmus,  Bengel,  Tittmann  and  many  others,  taken  for 
bs  i}i>,  "  who  was  in  the  bosom  of  the  Father,"  agreeably  to  the  frequent 
use  of  Hebrew  participles.  There  is,  however,  no  necessity  of  de- 
parting from  the  common  use  of  the  present,  either  here,  or  in  iii.  13 
(i  via*  roe  dv6p<o*ov,  b  &»»  i»  ™  oipavu).  The  intimate  relation  expressed  by 
the  figurative  expression,  "  in  the  bosom  of  the  Father,"  is  a  per- 
petual and  unchanging  relation.  The  Apostle  had  said,  v.  17,  that 
the  Law  came  by  Moses,  but  grace  and  truth  through  Jesus  Christ ; 


iter 

wir 


*  So  warder  Gott- Logos  in  der  jud.  alex.,  Theologie  ein  aus  dem  ewigenVat 
hervorgegangener,  ganz  eiziger  Geist  ohne  seinesgleichen.     Sinn :  je  genauer  wir 
Jesus  beobachten  konnten,  desto  mehr  war  uns  der  Unfang  all  seiner  vortrefflichen 
Eigenschaften  der  Vortrefflichkeit  eines  in  seiner  Art  einzigen,  von  Gott  herge- 
Jtommenen  Geistea  gleich.     See  Commentar  iiber  das  neue  Testament. 

4 


50  THE    SONSHIP    OP    CHRIST. 

and  then  in  the  18th,  states  how  it  is  that  the  most  precious  reve- 
lation of  the  divine  character  and  purpose,  came  to  be  made  by 
him.  No  other  has  ever  seen  God,  or  has  that  knowledge  of  his 
being  and  counsels,  which  was  possessed  by  Jesus  Christ.  The 
only  begotten  Son,  who  sustains  the  most  intimate  of  all  relations 
to  the  Father,  he  has  revealed  him  and  his  purposes.  Or  (as  others 
would  supply  after  ihyfoaro,  ti>  xty'v  •««  D>  dXfidctav),  has  revealed  his 
grace  and  truth.  The  Son  is  the  divine  Exegete  (Ifnyttfit)  of  the 
Father,  his  Word,  the  Logos. 

We  are  aware,  that  no  decisive  argument  can  be  derived  from 
this  passage,  taken  by  itself,  to  prove  that  the  Logos  is  called  the 
Son  of  God.  We  know,  that  even  if  the  words  povoytviu  v\6s  prima- 
rily and  properly  designated  the  human  nature  of  Christ,  they  might 
be  used  for  the  whole  person  of  the  Redeemer,  as  is  the  case  with 
the  name,  Son  of  man,  as  used  in  John  iii.  13,  just  quoted.  But 
still  we  think  that  the  context  affords  clear  evidence  that  John 
here  intended  to  designate,  by  these  words,  the  divine  nature  that 
became  incarnate.  For,  in  the  first  place,  his  object  renders  such 
an  interpretation  peculiarly  appropriate.  He  designs  to  tell  us, 
why  the  revelation  made  by  the  Redeemer  was  so  superior  to  any 
that  preceded  it.  No  man  had  ever  seen  God,  but  the  Son,  who 
now  and  ever  exists  in  the  most  intimate  union  with  him,  who 
knows  all  the  purposes  of  the  Father,  has  appeared  on  earth  in 
human  form,  and  made  them  clearly  known.  Secondly,  it  should 
be  recollected,  that  from  the  1st  to  the  18th  verse  inclusive,  is  one 
continued  discourse  on  the  dignity  of  Christ.  These  verses  con- 
stitute the  prologue  to  the  whole  Gospel,  and  are  intimately  con- 
nected. It  is  not  probable,  therefore,  that  the  same  expression 
should  occur  in  two  different  senses  in  so  short  a  passage.  Hence, 
if  John,  in  verse  14th,  calls  the  Logos  the  povoytvfc  vapa  xarpds,  we  may 
infer  with  confidence  that  the  Logos  is  intended  by  the  novoyevfn  vlds 
in  the  18th  verse.  No  man  hath  seen  God,  but  the  Logos,  the  only 
begotten  Son,  he  has  seen  him,  and  sustains  the  most  intimate  of 
all  relations  to  him.  He  therefore  can  reveal  his  purposes  fully. 
A  third  reason  for  this  interpretation  is,  the  striking  analogy  be- 
tween this  and  the  first  verse  of  this  chapter.  There  it  is  said, 
"  The  Logos  was  with  God,"  and  here,  "  The  only  begotten  Son, 
who  is  (or  was)  in  the  bosom  of  the  Father."  The  same  idea  is 
expressed  by  the  words,  "  with  God,"  as  is  intended  by  being  "  in 
the  bosom  of  the  Father."  They  both  express  intimate  relation- 
ship, or  union.  In  the  one  case,  this  union  is  said  to  be  between 
the  Logos  and  God  ;  in  the  other,  between  the  Son  and  Father. 
This  analogy  between  the  two  passages,  taken  in  connection  with 
the  14th  v.,  where  the  terms  Logos  and  only  begotten  of  the 
Father  are  evidently  interchanged,  we  think  prove  that  John 
intended  to  designate  the  divine  nature  of  Christ,  by  the  words 

■xovoycvns  vl6s. 

In  John  v.  17,  we  find  another  instance  in  which  Christ  is  called, 
Son  of  God,  in  reference  to  his  divine  nature ;  or,  what  amounts  to 


THE   SONSHIP   OP   CHRIST.  51 

the  same  thing,  in  which  he  calls  God  his  Father,  in  a  sense  which 
implies  participation  of  the  same  nature.  This  passage  is  the  more 
interesting,  as  it  contains  our  Saviour's  own  words,  and  gives  us 
his  own  exposition  of  what  is  to  be  understood  by  his  being  the 
Son  of  God. 

In  the  former  part  of  the  chapter,  the  Evangelist  relates  the  cir- 
cumstance of  Christ's  healing  a  man  on  the  sabbath,  whom  he 
commanded  to  take  up  his  bed  and  walk.  The  Jews  persecuted 
him  for  this  supposed  violation  of  the  sabbath.  The  word  is 
istuKtv,  and  may  mean,  "  they  prosecuted  "  him,  brought  him  before 
the  Sanhedrim.  Jesus  defended  himself  against  this  charge,  by 
saying,  v.  17,  "My  Father  worketh  hitherto,  and  I  work."  That 
is,  "  as  my  Father  is  constantly  active,  exercising  on  the  sabbath, 
as  on  other  days,  his  power  for  the  good  of  his  creatures,  so  I 
have  authority  to  dispense  blessings  on  this  as  on  any  other  day." 
If  this  be  the  meaning  of  this  passage,  then  it  is  plain  that  Christ 
calls  God  his  Father,  or  himself  the  Son  of  God,  in  a  sense  which 
implies  that  he  is  equal  with  God.  That  this  interpretation  is  cor- 
rect, and  consequently  that  the  argument  derived  from  it  is  valid, 
we  think  will  appear  from  the  following  considerations. 

First,  the  Jews  so  understood  the  declaration  of  Christ.  They 
were  therefore  not  content  with  what  they  had  already  done,  but 
they  moreover  sought  to  kill  him  ;  not  only  because  he  had  broken 
the  sabbath,  but  because  he  had  called  God  his  Father,  in  a  sense 
which  made  him  equal  with  God.  (<<xo»>  iavriv  xoiav  tS>  0*3 )  If  the 
meaning  thus  put  upon  his  words  was  not  correct,  it  would  seem 
that  Christ  would  not,  and  could  not  with  any  propriety,  suffer  so 
serious  a  perversion  of  them  to  pass  without  correction.  Does 
Christ,  then,  tell  the  Jews  that  they  had  misunderstood  him  ;  that 
he  did  not  intend  to  call  God  his  father,  in  any  sense  which  in- 
volved the  claim  of  equality  with  him  ?  By  no  means,  but  directly 
the  reverse ;  and  this  is  the  second  consideration  in  favour  of  the 
view  given  of  the  17th  verse. 

Instead  of  correcting  any  misapprehension  of  his  meaning,  he 
goes  on  to  declare,  that  the  union  between  the  Father  and  Son  was 
such,  that  all  the  Father  did,  he  did,  and  that  all  he  8id,  the  Father 
did ;  that  he  never  acted  nor  could  act  otherwise  than  in  union 
with  the  Father.  "  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  you,  the  Son  can  do 
nothing  of  himself,  but  what  he  seeth  the  Father  do :  for  what 
things  soever  he  doeth,  these  also  doeth  the  Son  likewise."*  The 
meaning  of  this  verse  becomes  perfectly  plain  from  what  follows ; 
for  Christ  immediately  proceeds  to  show,  that  he  has  the  same 
power  and  authority  with  the  Father,  and  consequently  is  entitled 
to  the  same  homage.  "  For  as  the  Father  raiseth  up  the  dead  and 
quickeneth  them ;  even  so  the  Son  quickeneth  whom  he  will.  For 
the  Father  judgeth  no  man,  but  hath  committed  all  judgment  to  the 

*  The  oh  iivarat  may  be  taken  here  in  its  strictest  sense.  Such  is  the  union  be- 
tween the  Father  and  Son,  that  the  Son  can  do  nothing  ty'  lavrov  of  himself  alone, 
out  of  connection  with  the  Father. 


52  THE    SONSHIP    OF   CHRIST. 

Son ;  that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the 
Father.  He  that  honoureth  not  the  Son,  honoureth  not  the  Father 
that  hath  sent  him."  Here  is  surely  a  claim  to  divine  power, 
authority,  and  homage.  So  far,  therefore,  is  our  blessed  Saviour 
from  correcting  the  interpretation  given  to  his  words  by  the  Jews, 
that  it  seems  to  be  his  very  object  to  prove  that  he  is,  in  a  proper 
sense,  the  Son  of  God ;  that  is,  in  such  a  sense,  that  he  has  the 
same  nature  with  the  Father.  The  plain  meaning  of  this  passage, 
therefore,  is,  "  I  have  a  right  to  labour  on  the  sabbath,  for  my  Father 
does  it.  He  has  not  remained  inactive  from  the  creation,  but 
works  until  now."  The  Jews  reply, "  Then  God  is  your  Father  in 
such  a  sense,  that  you  are  equal  with  God."  "  So  I  am.  I  act  in 
union  with  him,  what  he  does  I  do.  As  he  raises  the  dead,  so  do 
I,  and  execute  judgment,  and  am  entitled  to  equal  honour ;  so  that 
he  who  denies  me  this  honour,  does  thereby  refuse  to  honour  the 
Father.  For  (as  he  elsewhere  says),  I  and  the  Father  are  one. 
He  that  hath  seen  me,  hath  seen  the  Father  also."     See  c.  xii.,  45. 

We  think  that  it  is  clear,  from  this  passage,  that  Christ  calls 
God  his  Father,  not  because  he  had  miraculously  called  his  human 
nature  into  existence,  nor  because  he  had  sent  him  into  the  world, 
nor  because  he  had  made  him  his  Son  (or  a  king),  but  because  he 
was  partaker  of  the  same  divine  nature  and  attributes.  If  this  be 
so,  then  is  Christ  the  Son  of  God,  in  a  far  higher  sense  than  merely 
as  Mediatorial  King. 

It  is  not  at  all  necessary  to  our  argument,  that  we  should  prove 
that  the  term  Son,  throughout  this  interesting  passage,  is  applied 
exclusively  to  Christ's  divine  nature.  The  whole  argument  is 
founded  on  the  17th  v.,  as  explained  by  those  which  follow  it, 
God  is  the  Father  of  Christ.  In  what  sense  ?  In  a  sense  which 
includes  equality.  So  the  Jews  understood  our  Saviour,  and  so  he 
clearly  explained  his  meaning.  This  is  the  argument.  It  is  no 
objection  that  the  word  Son  is  used  immediately  after,  for  the  whole 
person  of  the  Redeemer ;  as  in  v.  20.  The  Father  loveth  the  Son ; 
i.  e.  that  complex  person,  who  is  his  Son,  and  who,  being  such, 
though  at  the  same  time  a  man,  has  the  right  and  ability  to  do 
whatever  the- Father  does.  This  person,  thus  constituted  (Son  of 
God  and  Son  of  man),  acts  in  obedience  to  the  Father.  He  does 
nothing  without  the  Father's  direction,  co-operation,  and  consent. 
Hence  the  Father  (™vra  ieiKVMv  ahrS)  exhibits  and  marks  out  all 
things  for  him.  Hence,  too,  it  is  said,  that  the  Father  hath  com- 
mitted all  judgment  to  the  Son,  i.  e.  to  that  individual  who  is  his 
Son.  Thus,  v.  26,  it  is  said,  the  Father  hath  given  the  Son  to 
have  life  in  himself.  Here  again,  Son,  is  the  name  of  the  whole 
person.  Life,  is  here  divine  power,  a  vital  life-giving  principle  ; 
and  the  meaning  is,  God  has  so  constituted  the  Redeemer's  person, 
that  he  possesses  all  the  divine  life-giving  power  of  the  Father. 
(Or,  as  the  same  idea  is  expressed  in  Colossians  i.  19.  It  pleased 
the  Father  that  in  him  should  all  fulness  (™v  t&  *Xfy&>/*a)  dwell.  What 
that  fulness  is,  we  learn  from  the  next  chapter,  it  is  na»  h  vMp<*p*  ttiS 


THE   S0N8HIP   OP   CHRIST.  53 

9t6mrot,  all  the  fulness  of  the  Godhead).  And  having  thus  consti- 
tuted his  person,  and  given  him  this  life,  he  has  given  him  (this 
person,  not  the  Son,  as  such)  authority  to  execute  judgment  (to 
hold  the  general  judgment),  because  he  is  the  Son  of  man,  i.  e.  the 
Messiah.  It  pleased  (rod,  that  the  Messiah  should  be  what  is  here 
described,  and  being  such,  should  exercise  all  the  prerogatives  of 
the  Godhead. 

Any  one,  therefore,  who  bears  in  mind  how  frequently  names 
derived  from  one  nature  of  Christ,  or  from  his  office,  are  applied 
to  him  as  one  individual  person,  will  find  no  difficulty  in  explain- 
ing those  passages  in  which  the  name,  Son  of  God,  is  used  for  the 
Messiah,  who,  as  such,  is  inferior  to  the  Father  and  dependent  upon 
him.  Whenever,  therefore,  the  Father  is  said  to  give  life,  author- 
ity, or  power  to  the  Son,  it  is  to  this  mysteriously  constituted  per- 
son ;  not  to  his  divine  nature  as  such.  When  the  Son  of  man  is 
said  to  be  in  heaven,  the  divine  person,  who  is  called  the  Son  of 
man,  is  declared  to  be  omnipresent,  not  the  human  nature  of  the 
Saviour,  in  itself  considered.  When  Christ  is  said  to  be  God  over 
all,  it  is  asserted  that  the  person  who  has  assumed  the  office  of  the 
Messiah,  is  truly  divine.  Passages,  therefore,  in  which  the  Son  is 
said  to  be  inferior  to  the  Father,  to  be  delivered  unto  death,  &c, 
afford  no  objection  to  the  opinion  that  the  name  is  given  in  virtue 
of  the  eternal  relation  which  he  sustains  to  the  first  Person  in  the 
Trinity.  This  obvious  remark  is  made  in  this  connection,  in  order 
that  it  may  be  present  to  our  readers'  minds,  when  they  turn  to  the 
passage  under  consideration  (John  v.  17,  et  seq.),  as  it  is  obvious, 
that  in  many  parts  of  this  chapter  the  word  Son  is  used  for  the 
whole  person  of  the  Redeemer. 

A  passage  very  similar  to  the  one  just  considered,  occurs  in 
John  x.  30 — 39.  In  verse  30,  Jesus  had  said,  "  I  and  the  Father 
are  one."  The  Jews  understood  this  as  a  declaration  that  he  was 
God,  and  accordingly  again  took  up  stones  to  stone  him,  as  they 
had  done  before,  c.  viii.  59.  Christ  demanded  why  they  did  this. 
He  had  performed  many  of  the  works  of  his  Father,*  for  which 
of  these  did  they  stone  him  ?  The  Jews  reply,  for  no  good  work, 
but  for  his  making  himself  God.  How  had  he  done  this?  Why, 
by  saying  eyo>  **t  b  «rar,;P  iv  Ufitv  v.  30.  According  to  the  interpreta- 
tion given  to  these  words  by  many  commentators,  Trinitarians  as 
well  as  others,  they  contain  no  claim  to  equality  with  the  Father. 
Erasmus,  Calvin,  Melancthon,  and  many  others  say,  that  they  ex- 
press nothing  more  than  unity  of  purpose  and  counsel  or  will.  It 
may  be  admitted  that  the  phrase  l»  thai  expresses  any  kind  of  union 
of  purpose,  affection,  spirit,  or  nature.     It  depends  entirely  upon 

*  Ik  too  narpos  jiov,  where  Ik  is  probably  a  mere  sign  of  the  Gen.,  see  v.  37,  where 
Ipya  row  irarpif  pov  stands  in  the  same  sense.  See  for  similar  examples  xviii.  3,  Rev. 
ii.  9,  Luke  ii.  35,  Acts  xix.  34,  John  iii.  25,  and  perhaps  Rom.  xi.  26,  Ik  T,ii>r  b 
fivoptvos  deliverer  of  Zion.  Or  if  Ik  expresses  the  efficient  cause,  "  works  which  I  do 
through  the  Father,"  then  is  this  passage  to  be  explained  by  a  reference  to  cap.  v. 
17,  19,  and  to  John  xiv.  10,  where  Christ  says  of  the  Father,  he  doeth  the  works. 


54  THE    SONSHIP    OF   CHRIST. 

the  connection  in  what  sense  it  is  to  be  taken  in  any  particular 
passage.  It  is  surely  a  presumption  in  favour  of  an  unity  of  power 
and  divinity  being  here  intended,  that  the  persons  to  whom  these 
words  were  addressed  so  understood  them.  The  whole  drift  of 
our  Saviour's  discourse  impressed  them  with  the  idea  that  he  meant 
to  make  himself  God  (irouTs  ceavrdr  eedv),  an  exposition  which  our 
Saviour  does  not  refute  but  confirms.  That  the  Jews  understood 
him  correctly,  will  appear  from  a  view  of  the  context.  Jesus  was 
walking  in  the  porch  of  the  Temple,  when  the  Jews  came  and 
demanded  that  he  should  tell  them  plainly  whether  he  were  the 
Christ  or  not.  This  he  would  not  do  ;  but  referred  them  to  his 
previous  declarations  and  to  his  miracles.  They  neither  believed 
the  one  nor  the  other,  because  they  were  not  of  his  sheep :  his 
sheep  did  hear  his  voice,  and  he  gave  to  them  eternal  life  (is  not 
this  claiming  to  be  God  ?)  and  they  shall  never  perish.  Why  ? 
because  "  none  can  pluck  them  out  of  my  hand."  But  how  is  it 
that  Christ  can  say  of  himself,  that  he  gives  eternal  life  and  can 
protect  his  sheep  against  all  their  enemies?  Because  he  and 
the  Father  are  one,  and  he  can  do  all  that  the  Father  does,  his- 
Father  is  greater  than  all.  There  is  surely  something  more  than 
unity  of  will  or  purpose  here  intended,  it  is  unity  of  power ;  and  if 
he  and  the  Father  are  one  in  power,  the  Jews  were  certainly  right 
in  concluding  that  they  must  be  one  in  nature.  Ei  bi  iv  Kara  ivvapiv, 
says  the  Greek  commentator  Euthymius,  iv  &pa  ko?  Kara  r,)v  Qadmra  «<u 
ovaUv  Kai  fiaiv.  Now  what  reply  does  our  Master  make  to  this  accu- 
sation of  the  Jews,  that  he  "  made  himself  God  ? "  He  in  the  first 
instance  makes  no  direct  reply  at  all.  He  neither  says  that  he 
was  or  was  not  God,  but  does  what  was  his  frequent  custom  when 
questions  were  proposed  to  him,  or  objections  started,  and  that  is, 
turns  the  attention  of  his  hearers  to  themselves,  that  they  may  no- 
tice the  disposition  whence  their  questions  or  objections  arose,  and 
then  so  turns  his  discourse,  that  all  who  had  ears  to  hear,  should 
find  in  what  he  said  an  answer  to  the  question  or  solution  of  the 
difficulty  proposed.  Christ  will  convince  the  Jews  of  their  stub- 
born unbelief,  and  perverse  opposition  to  everything  he  said. 
They  objected  to  the  fact,  that  he  had  called  himself  God.  Jesus 
does  not  explain  in  what  sense  he  had  done  so,  but  says,  in  effect, 
you  would  not  be  so  ready  to  accuse  me  of  blasphemy  for  this,  if 
you  were  not  bent  on  opposition  to  me  and  my  cause ;  for  your 
own  scriptures  call  kings  and  magistrates  gods,  and  if  the  title  can 
be  given  with  propriety  to  divinely  commissioned  men  (*p3s  bis  b  \6yos 
tov  Qeov  lylvero  either  to  those  who  received  commands  of  God  and 
acted  in  his  stead  ;  or  vpds  bis  Mark  xii.  12,  Luke  xii.  41,  for  *ept  &v 
concerning  whom  this  declaration  of  God  is  made),  surely  it  may 
be  given  in  the  same,  if  in  no  other  sense,  to  the  great  personage 
whom  God  has  selected,  and  set  apart  (sanctified),  and  sent  into 
*  the  world.  But  that  I  am  the  Son  of  God  in  a  far  higher  sense,  a 
sense  which  authorizes  me  to  say  "  that  I  and  the  Father  are  one," 
v.  30,  is  plain,  from  the  fact  that  I  do  the  works  of  my  Father  (the 


THE   S0N8HIP    OF    CHRIST.  55 

same  diyine  and  almighty  works,  raise  the  dead,  heal  the  sick,  exe- 
cute judgment,  see  v.  32,  and  37,  c.  xiv.  10),  if  you  will  not  believe 
me,  believe  these  works  and  know  that "  I  am  in  the  Father  and  the 
Father  in  me."  Were  the  Jews  satisfied  with  this  explanation  ?  Did 
they  imagine  that  he  assumed  the  name  Son  of  God  as  an  official 
title,  and  that  he  meant  no  more  by  it  than  when  applied  to  kings 
and  magistrates  1  By  no  means ;  they  saw  that  he  used  it  in  a 
sense,  which  involved  equality  with  God,  and  they  accordingly 
immediately  endeavoured  to  seize  him,  but  he  escaped  out  of  their 

ands. 

There  is  another  remark  to  be  made  on  this  passage,  and  that  is, 
it  is  perfectly  clear  that  Christ  uses  the  terms  God  and  Son  of  God, 
Otdt ,  and  o  »iaj  rov  Qeov,  in  exactly  the  same  sense.  The  Jews  said 
*oisTS  atavrbv  QsoV,  thou  makest  thyself  God  ;  Christ  replies,  is  it  blas- 
phemy to  make  myself  the  Son  of  God  ?  Where  it  is  evident,  that 
making  himself  God  and  making  himself  the  Son  of  God,  are  con- 
sidered as  precisely  the  same.  The  remark  of  Storr,  therefore,  on 
this  passage  is  well  founded,  that  God  and  Son  of  God  are,  as  to 
Christ's  meaning  here,  synonymous.* 

There  are  several  other  passages  which  might  be  adduced  in 
support  of  the  opinion  which  we  are  advocating,  as  Matt.  ii.  27, 
and  Heb.  1 ;  but  this  our  object  does  not  demand,  and  our  limits 
will  not  permit.  We  have  already  stated,  that  we  purposed  only 
to  endeavour  to  show,  that  Christ  is  called  Son  of  God,  in  reference 
to  his  divine  nature,  or  in  virtue  of  the  eternal  relation  between 
himself  and  Father.  If  any  one  can  prove  that  there  are  other 
reasons  for  his  being  so  called,  it  militates  nothing  against  the  posi- 
tion which  we  have  assumed.  As  the  term,  Son,  is  used  in  Scrip- 
ture to  express  such  a  variety  of  relations,  as  dependence,  deriva- 
tion, similarity,  community  of  nature,  &c,  there  is  no  antecedent 
improbability  in  Christ's  being  called  Son  of  God,  not  only  because 
he  is  of  the  same  nature  with  the  Father,  but  also  because  he 
is  the  object  of  his  peculiar  love ;  because,  as  man,  he  is  derived 
from  him  and  dependent  on  him.  And  if  kings  are  called  sons  of 
God  in  the  Old  Testament,  as  the  representatives  of  God,  why  then 
Christ,  as  the  great  Mediatorial  King,  may  pre-eminently  be  called 
the  Son  of  God.  We  say  there  is  no  antecedent  improbability 
that  this  is  the  case  ;  and  if  any  one  is  satisfied  that  such  is  actually 
the  fact,  we  should  not  be  disposed  to  dispute  the  point.  Still  we 
confess  ourselves  unable  to  see  the  conclusiveness  of  the  argument 
to  prove,  that  the  Redeemer  is  called  the  Son  of  God,  in  virtue  of 
his  exaltation  to  the  Mediatorial  throne.  This  opinion,  however,  is 
a  very  general  one,  and  is  adopted  by  many  who  still  believe  in 
his  being  the  Son  of  God  in  a  far  higher  sense.  For  ourselves, 
however,  seeing  that  this  name  is  peculiar,  in  the  New  Testament 

*  Dass  er  der  Sohn  Gottes,  order  Gott  sey — derm  beides  lief  nach  dem,  von  den 
Juden  wohl  gefassten  Sinn  Jesu  aufEines  hinaus.  See  Zweck  der  evang.  Ge- 
schichte,  p.  467. 


56  Wm     THE   SONSHIP   OF    CHRIST. 

at  least,  to  Christ  (with  the  exception  of  Luke  iii.  36,  where  the 
reason  of  its  being  applied  to  Adam  is  perfectly  obvious),  and  that 
it  is  used  by  Christ  and  his  apostles  in  many  instances,  in  direct 
reference  to  his  relation  as  God,  to  the  Father,  we  prefer  consider- 
ing this  relation  as  the  primary  and  most  important,  if  not  the 
sole  ground  of  its  application  to  him  by  inspired  men,  whenever 
they  intend  using  it  in  any  other  than  a  mere  historical  manner. 
Luke  i.  35,  may  be  an  exception  to  this  remark.  In  the  great  ma- 
jority of  instances,  the  phrase  occurs  merely  as  a  designation  of 
the  Messiah.  In  the  Old  Testament,  it  was  predicted  that  the 
Messiah  was  to  be  the  Son  of  God.  It  was  very  natural,  therefore, 
that  this  name  or  title  should  be  very  common  among  those  who 
were  waiting  for  his  appearance.  Hence,  when  Nathaniel  exclaim- 
ed, "  Thou  art  the  Son  of  God,"  he  doubtless  intended  to  say, 
Thou  art  the  Messiah,  and  so  in  a  multitude  of  cases.  These  pas- 
sages, however,  only  prove  that  the  Messiah  was  called  the  Son  of 
God  ;  not  why  he  was  so  called.  Our  Saviour  styling  himself  so 
frequently  the  Son  of  man,  informs  us  that  this  was  a  proper  ap- 
pellation for  the  great  Deliverer,  but  gives  us  no  information  of 
the  grounds  of  its  application.     This  is  a  very  distinct  question. 

The  arguments  which  are  commonly  adduced  to  show  that  Son 
of  God,  as  applied  to  Christ,  is  a  title  of  office,  and  equivalent  with 
Messiah,  are  principally  the  following.  It  is  said,  that  in  the  Old 
Testament,  kings  and  magistrates  are  called  Sons  of  God.  This  is 
exceedingly  rare.  The  passage  in  Ps.  Ixxxii.  6,  is  peculiar; 
Princes  are  here  called  b'vft&.as  being  objects  of  reverence,  and 
fi^s  h5?  /Sows  of  the  Highest,  in  the  corresponding  clause,  may, 
in  this  instance,  receive  the  same  meaning.  But  it  is  very  far  from 
being  the  common  usage  of  the  scriptures,  to  call  kings  the  Sons 
of  God.  And  even  if  it  were,  this  would  prove  very  little  as  to  the 
proper  meaning  of  the  phrase,  Son  of  God,  in  the  singular :  as  there 
is  such  a  marked  difference  in  the  use  of  these  expressions,  through- 
out the  word  of  God.  We  are  not  prepared  to  say,  that  the  term 
Son  of  God  is  never  applied  in  the  Old  Testament,  to  any  royal 
personage.  But  in  the  cases  in  which  it  is  so  applied,  it  does  not 
express  their  royal  dignity,  but  merely  their  being  the  objects  of 
God's  peculiar  care  and  love.  Thus,  if  2  Sam.  vii.  14,  be  referred 
to  Solomon  (in  any  sense),  "  I  will  be  to  him  a  Father,  and  he  shall 
be  to  me  a  Son,"  the  meaning  obviously  is,  I  will  regard  and  treat 
him  with  peculiar  favour.  He  shall  be  my  child,  and  I  will  treat 
him  accordingly.  We  should  be  at  a  loss  to  fix  on  any  one 
instance,  in  which  this  phrase  is  expressive  of  the  kingly  office.  Ps. 
lxxxix.  27, "  I  will  make  him  my  first-born,  higher  than  the  kings  of 
the  earth,"  can  hardly  be  considered  as  a  case  in  point.  For  the 
expression,  "  I  will  make  him  my  first-born,"  means  nothing  more, 
than  that  I  will  treat  him  as  "  my  first-born,"  that  is,  with  peculiar 
favour.  We  think,  therefore,  that  the  argument  from  the  Old  Tes- 
tament is  very  far  from  being  conclusive  on  this  point.     It  seems 


THE    S0N8HIP    OF    CHRIST.  57 

hardly  to  afford  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  opinion,  that  Christ 
is  called  Son  of  God,  on  account  of  his  dignity  as  Messiah. 

Another  argument  is  derived  from  the  second  Psalm,  v.  7, 
"  Thou  art  my  Son,  this  day  have  I  begotten  thee."  The  first  re- 
mark which  we  should  make  on  this  passage,  is,  that  the  second 
clause  probably  expresses  no  more  than  the  first.  Thou  art  my 
Son,  this  day,  now,  art  thou  my  Son  ;  now  more  clearly  than 
ever.  This  is  agreeable  to  a  common  characteristic  of  the  Hebrew. 
So  in  Jeremiah  ii.  27,  "  Saying  to  a  stock,  thou  art  my  father,  and 
to  a  stone,  thou  hast  begotten  me." — And  2  Sam.  vii.  14,  "I  will 
be  to  him  a  Father,  and  he  shall  be  to  me  a  Son."  See  also  Deut. 
xxxii.  6.  In  all  these  passages,  the  second  clause  is  synonymous 
with  the  first.  Secondly,  we  would  admit,  that  the  word  fin^n 
this  day,  refers  to  the  time  -contemplated  in  the  preceding  verse  ; 
i.  e.,  the  time  in  which  Christ,  the  subject  of  the  Psalm,  was  anoint- 
ed, or  inaugurated  as  king,  on  the  holy  hill  of  Zion  ;  that  is,  to  the 
timevin  which  he  was  clearly  set  forth  as  King  of  Israel.  The 
whole  question  is,  does  the  passage  declare  that  he  was  then  con- 
stituted the  Son  of  God,  or  was  then  clearly  proved  to  be  such  1 
We  prefer  the  latter  mode  of  interpretation.  First,  because  from 
the  connection,  these  words  do  not  appear  to  contain  the  inaugur- 
ating formula,  so  to  speak,  addressed  to  Christ ;  but  rather,  the 
ground  of  the  universal  dominion  which  is  committed  to  him. 
They  form  no  part  of  the  decree  giving  him  universal  dominion  ; 
they  are  merely  the  solemn  introductory  address.  The  sense  is, 
Thou  art  my  Son ;  therefore,  ask  of  me  and  I  will  give  thee  uni- 
versal dominion,  &c.  That  is,  these  introductory  words  of  the 
address  express  the  dignity  of  Christ's  person,  and  assign  the  rea- 
son, why  he  has  the  right  and  power  to  rule  over  all  nations,  and 
why  all  people  should  put  their  trust  in  him.  In  solemn  discourse, 
such  introductions  are  very  frequent ;  and  they  often  contain  the 
reason  or  ground  of  what  follows :  as,  "  I  am  the  Lord,  that  brought 
thee  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt ;  thou  shalt  have  no  other  gods 
before  me ;"  that  is,  because  I  am  the  Lord,  &c.  So  here,  because 
thou  art  my  Son.  This  is  agreeable  also  to  the  constant  manner 
of  the  sacred  writers,  presenting  the  personal  dignity  of  Christ  as 
the  ground  of  his  universal  power  and  authority.  Since  he  is  pos- 
sessed of  divine  perfections,  is  the  Son  of  God,  of  the  same  nature, 
therefore  he  is  made  universal  King. 

But  again,  if  peculiar  stress  be  laid  upon  the  second  clause,  "  I 
have  begotten  thee,"  it  must  be  admitted,  that  it  can  with  equal 
propriety  be  rendered,  I  have  made  thee  my  Son,  or  I  have  declar- 
ed thee  to  be  such.  In  other  words,  VB1"^  may  here  be  taken 
declaratively,  according  to  the  canonso  fully  illustrated  by  Glas- 
sius,  Phil.  Sacra,  lib.  iii.,  tr.  iii.,  can  15,  and  which  is  of  such 
frequent  application  in  Hebrew.  The  meaning  then  would  be, 
Thou  art  my  Son,  this  day  have  I  declared,  or  exhibited  thee,  as 
such.     This  view  of  the  passage  is  given  by  Venema,  by  Morus  in 


58  ,         THE    SONSHIP    OF    CHRIST. 

his  Com.  Exegeticus,  p.  260,  by  Anton  as  quoted  by  Rosenmiiller, 
p.  30  of  vol.  i.,  Part  iii.,  of  his  Scholia,  by  Kuinoel  on  Acts  xiii. 
32,  and  many  others.  We  think  the  proper  method  of  deciding 
which  view  of  the  passage  is  most  correct,  is  to  inquire  which  is 
favoured  by  the  analogy  of  scripture.  Is  Christ  said  to  be  constituted 
the  Son  of  God,  by  his  exaltation  or  resurrection  ;  or,  is  his  resur- 
rection and  exaltation  given  as  evidence  that  he  is  the  Son  of  God  ? 
Agreeably  to  the  remark  made  in  our  last  Number,  the  resurrection 
of  Christ  is  almost  uniformly  presented  as  the  great  decisive  evi- 
dence of  his  Sonship,  as  well  as  of  his  Messiahship.  See  Rom.  i. 
3,  4,  Acts  xiii.,  &c.  He  was  neither  made  Son  nor  Messiah  by 
his  resurrection,  but  was  thereby  proved  to  be  both  the  one  and  the 
other. 

We  think  it  clear,  therefore,  that  no  argument  can  be  derived 
from  this  passage  to  show  why  Christ  is  called  Son.  It  simply 
declares,  that  he  is  the  Son  of  God  ;  but  what  this  imports,  must 
we  learn  from  other  passages. 

The  words  in  2  Sam.  vii.  14,  "I  will  be  his  Father,  and  he  shall 
be  my  Son,"  are  adduced  as  an  argument  on  this  subject.  It  is 
said,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  how  a  thing  can  be  predicted 
as  future,  which  has  existed  from  all  eternity.  This  is  very  true. 
But  the  point  of  the  prediction  is  simply  this  ;  the  king  that  shall 
arise,  shall  be  my  Son.  So  it  is  predicted  that  the  Messiah  should 
be  the  "  Mighty  God ;"  not  that  he  was  to  become  such,  but  was 
to  be  such.  Whether  2  Sam.  vii.  14,  be  referred  to  Christ,  or  Solo- 
mon, it  is  of  no  weight  in  this  discussion.  It  simply  declares,  that 
the  king  that  was  to  arise,  should  stand  in  a  very  near  and  tender 
relation  to  God.  What  that  relation  is,  must  be  learned  else- 
where. 

Acts  xiii.  32,  33,  "  W,e  declare  unto  you  glad  tidings,  how  that 
the  promise  which  was  made  unto  the  fathers,  God  hath  fulfilled 
the  same  unto  us  their  children,  in  that  he  hath  raised  up  Jesus 
again ;"  as  it  is  written  in  the  second  Psalm,  "  Thou  art  my  Son, 
this  day  have  I  begotten  thee,"  is  considered  as  proving  that  Christ 
is  called  Son  of  God,  in  virtue  of  his  resurrection,  as  the  commence- 
ment of  his  elevation  to  supreme  dignity.  We  question  very 
much,  even  adopting  the  common  translation  of  this  passage, 
whether  this  be  its  proper  meaning.  According  to  our  version, 
the  point  to  be  proved  by  the  passage  from  the  second  Psalm,  is 
indeed,  that  Christ  has  been  raised  from  the  dead.  But  this  point 
is  fully  proved  by  this  Psalm,  according  to  our  interpretation  of  it. 
It  contains  a  prediction  that  God  would  clearly  set  forth  the  Mes- 
siah, as  his  Son.  How  was  this  done  ?  In  various  ways,  and 
among  others  with  peculiar  clearness,  by  his  resurrection  ;  as  Paul 
elsewhere  says,  Rom.  i.  3,  4.  This  passage,  therefore,  according 
to  our  view  of  it,  is  as  applicable  to  the  apostle's  purpose,  as  on  the 
opposite  one.  But  it  is  far  from  being  certain  that  there  is  any 
reference  in  this  passage  (Acts  xiii.  32,  33),  to  the  resurrection  at 
all.     The  words  avaaT^as  'I^sCy,  rendered,  "  having  raised  up  Jesus 


THE   SONSHIP   OF    CHRIST.  59 

again?  properly  mean,  "having  raised  up  Jesus,"  which  may- 
express  his  being  called  into  existence,  or  sent  forth  as  the  Messiah. 
The  grounds  for  preferring  this  view  of  the  passage  are  strong,  if 
not  conclusive.  In  the  first  place,  the  verb  ivum^t,  when  it  refers 
to  the  resurrection,  has  commonly  1«  vtKpwv,  or  some  equivalent 
expression  after  it.  2.  It  is  often  used  to  express  the  idea  of  call- 
ing into  existence :  as  Matt.  xxii.  24,  "  raise  up  seed."  Acts  iii. 
22,  "  A  prophet  like  unto  me  will  God  raise  up."  See  also,  Acts 
vii.  27.  The  verb  lyeipa  is  used  in  the  same  sense,  see  Acts  xiii. 
22  (and  according  to  the  common  text).  3.  The  context  favours 
this  interpretation.  Paul  is  here  endeavouring  to  prove  that  Jesus  is 
the  Christ.  In  verse  23,  he  asserts  that  of  the  seed  of  David,  God, 
according  to  his  promise,  hath  raised  unto  Israel  a  Saviour,  Jesus. 
That  Jesus  is  the  Saviour,  he  proves  first  by  the  testimony  of  John 
the  Baptist,  and  secondly  by  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  The  fact 
of  his  resurrection,  he  says,  31st  verse,  may  be  proved  by  those 
who  saw  him  many  days.  Having  thus  established  the  point  that 
Jesus  is  the  Christ,  he  says,  "  we  declare  unto  you  glad  tidings, 
how  the  promise  made  unto  the  fathers  (what  promise  ?  why,  tne 
promise  referred  to  in  the  23d  v.  that  God  would  raise  up  a 
Saviour),  God  hath  fulfilled  unto  us,  in  that  he  hath  raised  up  Jesus." 
There  is  no  allusion  here  to  the  resurrection,  for  the  promise  to 
which  the  apostle  had  reference,  was  not  that  Christ  should  rise 
from  the  dead,  but  that  a  Saviour  should  appear ;  and  of  this  the 
second  Psalm  is  a  clear  prediction.  The  34th  verse  makes  this 
still  plainer ;  for  Paul,  having  announced  to  the  Jews  the  glad  tid- 
ings that  the  Saviour  had  come,  turns  to  another  subject,  and 
says,  "  But  that  he  raised  him  from  the  dead  (as  he  had  asserted, 
v.  30), — he  said  on  this  wise,"  &c. ;  and  then  goes  on  to  prove 
that  his  resurrection  was  predicted  in  Ps.  xvi.  It  seems  clear, 
therefore,  that  verse  33  has  no  reference  to  Christ's  rising  from  the 
dead,  and  consequently  that  Ps.  ii.  7,  is  not  quoted  to  prove  that 
point.  If  this  be  the  correct  interpretation  of  this  passage,  it  of 
course  affords  no  argument  in  favour  of  the  opinion  that  Christ  is 
called  the  Son  of  God,  on  account  of  his  being  raised  from  the 
dead,  and  exalted  as  Messiah. 

Such  passages  as  Matt.  xvi.  15,  "  Thou  art  the  Christ,  the  Son 
of  the  living  God,"  John  i.  49,  "  Rabbi,  thou  art  the  Son  of  God, 
thou  art  the  King  of  Israel,"  do  not  prove  that  Son  of  God  and 
Christ  are  synonymous,  any  more  than  the  expression  "  Christ,  the 
Saviour  of  the  world,"  proves  that  the  word  Christ  means  Saviour. 
They  prove  simply,  what  no  one  denies,  that  Son  of  God  was  a 
very  common  appellation  for  the  Messiah  among  the  Jews  ;  but 
they  throw  no  light  on  its  import  or  the  ground  of  its  application. 
In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  it  is  used  very  much  as  a  proper 
name,  and  therefore,  such  cases  prove  nothing,  one  way  or  the 
other,  as  to  its  meaning. 


ESSAY    III. 


THE  DECREES  OF   GOD.* 


We  are  so  much  accustomed  to  receive  our  literature  from  Great 
Britain,  that  we  are  prone  to  overlook  valuable  compositions  pro- 
duced in  our  own  country ;  especially,  if  they  proceed  from  a  sec- 
tion of  the  United  States  not  famous  for  book  making ;  or  from  the 
pen  of  an  author  but  little  known.  Notwithstanding  the  national 
pride,  in  relation  to  American  literature,  so  disgustingly  displayed 
in  some  of  our  popular  journals,  it  is  a  fact,  that  our  booksellers  are 
in  the  habit  of  reprinting  British  works  on  particular  subjects,  much 
inferior  to  writings  of  home-production  which  lie  in  utter  neglect. 
Perhaps  the  eastern  States  ought  to  be  considered  as  an  exception 
from  this  remark ;  where,  from  the  first  settlement  of  the  country, 
authorship  has  not  been  uncommon ;  and  where  almost  every 
preacher,  at  some  time  in  his  life,  has  the  pleasure  of  seeing  some- 
thing of  his  own  composition,  in  print.  Still  it  may  be  observed, 
that  the  literature  of  New  England  circulates  freely  only  within  her 
own  limits.  Of  the  thousands  of  printed  sermons  which  run  the 
round  through  her  homogeneous  population,  very  few  copies  find 
their  way  into  the  other  States,  except  where  her  sons  form  the  mass  of 
the  population.  This  restriction,  however,  is  becoming  less  and  less 
every  year ;  and  as  the  population  of  other  parts  of  the  country 
acquire  a  taste  for  reading,  the  literary  wares  of  our  eastern 
brethren  get  into  wider  circulation,  and  find  a  readier  sale.  But 
leaving  out  of  the  account  large  towns  and*  cities,  there  is  but  a 
small  share  of  literature  in  the  greater  part  of  our  country.  There 
are  scattered  everywhere  through  the  land  well  informed  and  well 
educated  men  ;  but  very  few  of  them  ever  think  of  writing  anything 
more  than  a  paragraph  for  the  newspapers  ;  or,  at  most,  a  Fourth  of 
July  speech.  Even  in  the  oldest  of  the  United  States,  celebrated 
for  men  of  talents  and  extraordinary  political  and  legal  attainments, 
all  the  writings  of  a  theological  kind  which  have  ever  issued  from 
the  press,  might,  I  presume,  be  easily  compressed  within  the  nar- 
row limits  of  a  common  portmanteau.  When,  therefore,  anything 
in  the  shape  of  a  religious  book  proceeds  from  that  quarter,  it  should 
receive  particular  attention.     It  has  on  this  account,  as  well  as  on 

*  Originally  published  in  1831,  in  review  of  the  following  work  : 
The  Divine  Purpose  displayed  in  the  works  of  Providence  and  Grace.    By  Rev. 
John  Matthews,  D.D.,  (late  of)  Shepherdstown,  Virginia. 


THE   DECREES   OF   GOD.  01 

others,  seemed  to  us  proper  to  bring  more  conspicuously  before  the 
public  the  little  volume,  the  title  of  which  stands  at  the  hefll  of  this 
article.  These  Letters,  we  have  understood,  were  originally  pub- 
lished in  the  Evangelical  and  Literary  Magazine  of  Virginia. 
They  were  afterwards  collected  and  published  in  a  small  volume 
at  the  Franklin  press,  Richmond  ;  and  in  the  following  year,  were 
reprinted  at  Lexington,  Kentucky,  with  the  author's  name,  which 
did  not  appear  in  the  Richmond  edition.  This  then  may  be  reck- 
oned the  third  edition  of  these  Letters  ;  but  still  they  are  almost 
entirely  unknown  to  the  reading  population  of  the  middle  and 
northern  States.  Since  this  work  was  published,  the  worthy  author 
has  been  appointed  Professor  of  Theology  in  a  seminary  in  Indiana, 
and  has  entered  on  the  duties  of  his  office. 

The  object  of  the  writer  seems  to  have  been,  to  exhibit,  in  a  clear 
and  familiar  way,  some  of  the  strongest  arguments  for  the  scrip- 
tural doctrine  01  the  universality  and  particularity  of  the  divine  de- 
crees ;  and  to  remove  the  prejudices,  and  answer  the  objections  of 
many  serious  well-meaning  people,  who  are  shocked  at  the  mere 
mention  of  this  subject,  even  if  it  be  couched  in  the  very  language 
of  inspiration.  There  are  persons  of  some  mental  cultivation,  and 
of  a  serious  and  devout  character,  who  cannot  bear  to  read,  or 
hear  read,  the  eighth  and  ninth  chapters  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Ro- 
mans ;  or  the  first  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Ephesians. 

The  real  opinions  of  serious  people  cannot,  with  any  certainty, 
be  judged  of  by  the  doctrinal  standards  of  the  denominations  to 
which  they  have  attached  themselves.  This  is  especially  the  case 
in  the  south  and  the  west,  where  many  people  have  been  brought 
up  without  religious  education  of  any  kind  whatever.  Now,  where 
such  persons  become  serious  inquirers,  or  hopeful  converts,  they 
join  any  religious  society  among  whom  they  happen  to  have  re- 
ceived their  serious  impressions  :  or,  if  there  be  different  denomi- 
nations mingled  together,  they  commonly  attach  themselves  to  one 
or  the  other,  not  from  any  distinct  knowledge  of  the  system  of 
doctrines  which  they  hold,  but  from  a  preference  to  their  order  of 
worship  and  mode  of  preaching;  or,  from  an  opinion,  that  the 
members  of  one  society  are  more  intelligent,  consistent,  or  pious 
than  those  of  another.  Persons  thus  introduced  into  a  particular 
church,  are  often  much  perplexed  and  offended  at  some  of  the 
doctrines  which  they  sometimes  hear  preached,  and  which  they 
find  in  the  creed  of  the  society  to  which  they  have  attached  them- 
selves :  particularly,  they  are  apt  to  stumble  at  the  doctrine  of 
predestination  and  election,  as  held  by  Calvinists.  It  is  not  uncom- 
mon to  find  serious  people,  whose  feelings  are  so  affected  with  the 
mere  contemplation  of  these  doctrines,  that  they  are  thrown  into 
deep  distress,  and  even  agony,  whenever  they  occur  to  their  minds ; 
and  while  they  dare  not  totally  reject  them,  as  many  do,  they  are 
altogether  reluctant  to  receive  them,  and  are  afraid  of  the  light  by 
which  they  are  shown  to  be  a  part  of  divine  revelation.  We  have 
known  many  estimable  persons  to  continue  in  this  state  of  conflict, 


62  THE    DECREES    OF   GOD. 

between^ their  judgment  and  their  feelings,  many  years;  who 
could  never,  with  the  least  composure  or  patience,  hear  anything 
said  on  these  points.  Not  that  they  were  convinced  that  these 
doctrines  are  not  revealed  in  the  word  of  God,  but  because,  through 
some  prejudice  or  unhappy  association,  they  always  excited  in 
them  feelings  of  horror  and  distress.  To  meet  cases  of  this  sort, 
the  Letters  under  review,  seem  to  have  been  written :  and,  in  our 
opinion,  they  are  the  production  of  no  ordinary  mind.  In  the  dis- 
cussion, not  only  is  all  harsh  and  all  technical  language  avoided, 
but  there  is  a  sparing  use  even  of  scriptural  phrases,  until  the  au- 
thor has  proceeded  to  some  extent,  in  developing  the  true  nature  of 
the  doctrine. 

The  plan  adopted  is,  first,  to  deprecate  "  the  pernicious  effects  of 
party  spirit  in  the  church" — next,  to  show  "  the  importance  of  truth" 
—then  "  the  influence  of  prejudice" — the  true  doctrine  of  divine  de- 
crees, and  of  divine  providence — the  doctrine  of  a  particular  provi- 
dence, extending  to  all  events — that  free  agency  is  not  suspended,  or 
violated  by  the  divine  purpose — proof  of  the  extent  of  the  divine  plan 
from  the  promises  and  prophecies — the  purposes  of  God  and  moral 
agency  consistent,  but  incomprehensible — the  nature  of  moral  gov- 
ernment— salvation  by  grace — all  favours  bestowed  according  to 
God's  purpose,  good  pleasure  or  fore-ordination.  Therefore,  it  de- 
pends on  the  will  of  God,  who  shall  be  saved. — The  means  of  salvation 
suited  to  each  individual,  included  in  the  divine  purpose — providence 
subservient  to  the  purposes  of  grace — great  events  and  small  cannot 
be  separated,  in  the  plan  of  the  Almighty — the  former  are  made  up  of 
the  latter. — Man,  as  far  as  he  has  foresight  and  means,  is  apredesti- 
narian  in  all  his  own  important  schemes — the  architect,  the  farmer, 
<frc.,  determine  on  ends,  and  elect  means  to  accomplish  them. 

The  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  letters  are  on  the  subject  of  "  the 
final  perseverance  of  Christians ;"  and  in  the  last,  the  author  un- 
dertakes to  show,  that  these  views  are  adapted  to  excite  devotion  ; 
and,  consequently,  cannot  be  unfriendly  to  piety  and  morality. 

It  will  be  seen  by  the  above  syllabus,  that  in  this  little  volume, 
very  interesting  and  important  subjects  are  brought  into  discus- 
sion :  and  it  is  one  recommendation  of  this  work,  that  a  doctrine, 
most  commonly  handled  in  a  forbidding  and  polemical  style,  is 
here  treated  with  great  calmness,  and  brought  down  to  common 
apprehension,  by  means  of  familiar  and  appropriate  illustrations. 
There  is  not  a  harsh  or  censorious  word  in  the  whole  book.  It 
may,  therefore,  be  recommended  as  a  specimen  of  mildness  in  the 
discussion  of  a  subject,  which  commonly  produces  warmth  and 
hard  speeches.  It  would  afford  us  real  pleasure,  to  see  a  treatise 
on  the  other  side,  equally  characterized  by  the  spirit  of  candour 
and  kindness:  and  whatever  cause  may  be  promoted  by  fierce 
controversy  and  denunciatory  declamation,  we  are  sure  that  the 
cause  of  truth  gains  nothing  by  such  weapons.  The  pool  must  be 
calm  in  order  to  be  transparent ;  and  truth  is  rendered  invisible, 
or  undistinguishable,  in  the  perturbed  waters  of  wrathful  contro- 


THE    DECREES   OF   GOD.  63 

versy.     The  Christian  warrior  should  ever  remember,  that  the 
weapons  of  his  warfare,  though  "  mighty  to  the  pulling  down  of 
strong  holds,"  are  not  carnal  but  spiritual.     Though  he  must  con- 
tend for  the  faith,  he  may  hot  strive.    All  "  vain  janglings"  and 
"  logomachies"  are  strictly  forbidden  ;  and  all  discussions  that  tend 
rather  "  to  engender  strifes,  than  godly  edifying."     We   should, 
therefore,  be  desirous  of  giving  currency  to  this  unpretending  book, 
on  account  of  the  Christian  spirit  which  pervades  it  throughout. 
No  one,  however  he  may  differ  from  the  author,  need  be  afraid  of 
having  his  feelings  wounded  by  the  perusal  of  these  pages.     But 
this  is  not  the  only  recommendation  of  this  little  volume.     It  con- 
tains much  sound,  and  we  may  say,  profound  reasoning :  or,  to 
express  ourselves  more  correctly,  tne  result  of  profound  reasoning ; 
for  there  is  no  long  and  elaborate  chain  of  ratiocination — here 
everything  is  simple,  and  remarka'bly  adapted  to  the  capacity  iof 
common  readers  ;  but  no  man  could  render  such  a  subject  familiaA^ 
and  easily  intelligible,  who  had  not  deeply  and  maturely  ponderecv^ 
it,  and  viewed  it  in  all  its  important  aspects,  and  especially,  in  its  X^C : 
practical  bearings. 

The  fact  cannot  be  denied,  that  the  doctrine  of  absolute  decrees ; 
or  the  divine  purposes ;  or  predestination ;  or  election  ;  or  by 
whatever  terms  it  may  be  expressed,  is  viewed  by  most  men — and 
not  the  unlearned  only — as  an  absurd  and  unreasonable  doctrine. 
From  the  days  of  Lucian,  it  has  been  set  up  to  ridicule,  and  scur- 
rilous abuse  ;  and  they  who  hold  it,  are  considered  and  repre- 
sented, by  men  of  the  highest  order  of  intellect  and  greatest  learn- 
ing, as  denying  human  accountableness  ;  or  as  grossly  inconsistent, 
in  holding  that  all  things  are  decreed  in  the  eternal  purpose,  and 
yet  that  men  are  free  in  their  actions.  Seldom,  however,  are  we 
favoured  with  any  calm,  impartial  reasoning  on  this  subject.  It  is 
treated,  as  if  the  doctrine  was  self-evidently  false  and  absurd  ;  and 
as  if  there  was  no  need  of  argument ;  since  every  man's  reason 
must  teach  him,  that  he  cannot  be  justly  accountable  for  actions, 
which  by  no  possibility  he  could  avoid,  as  they  were  from  all  eter- 
nity, absolutely  decreed. 

This  strong  prejudice  against  the  doctrine  of  predestination,  is 
not  confined  to  the  men  of  the  world  ;  it  has  entered  the  church  ; 
and  by  a  large  majority  of  those  who  have  assumed  the  office  of 
interpreters  of  the  mind  of  God,  it  is  rejected  with  abhorrence  ; 
and  by  many  of  them  scouted  as  not  only  absurd,  but  subversive 
of  all  morality.  And,  which  is  somewhat  surprising,  ministers  of 
churches,  which  formerly  held  this  doctrine  firmly,*and  expressed 
it  strongly  in  their  formulas  of  faith,  do  strenuously  oppose  it ;  and 
contrary  to  all  common  usage  of  words,  and  correct  rules  of  inter- 
pretation, pretend,  that  it  is  not  contained  in  their  articles  of  reli- 
gion. If  a  thousand  impartial,  intelligent  men  could  be  brought  to 
peruse  the  seventeenth  Article  of  the  Church  of  England,  and  of  the 
American  Episcopal  Church,  whatever  might  be  their  own  belief, 
they  would,  as  we  suppose,  unanimously  declare,  that  the  doctrine 


w 


64  THE    DECREES    OP   GOD. 

of  predestination,  as  held  by  Calvinists,  is  clearly  and  strongly  ex- 
pressed in  that  Article  :  and  the  whole  history  of  the  reformation 
in  the  Church  of  England  goes  to  prove,  that  this  interpretation  is 
correct ;  for  in  the  early  days  of  that  reformed  church,  all  her  dis- 
tinguished ministers  were  predestinarians ;  just  as  much  as  were 
the  ministers  of  Geneva.  No  stronger  evidence  of  this  is  needed, 
than  the  fact,  that  the  institutes  of  John  Calvin — so  grossly 
calumniated  by  many  leading  men  of  that  church  now — was  the 
text  book,  enjoined  by  authority  in  both  the  universities.  But  our 
object  in  the  remarks  which  we  nre  about  to  make,  is,  to  inquire, 
whether  there  is  any  foundation,  in  truth  and  reason,  for  the  gene- 
ral aversion  to  this  doctrine. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  language  of  scripture,  in  many 
places,  is  favourable  to  the  doctrine.  All  things  seem  to  be  there 
ascribed  to  the  counsel  and  will  of  God ;  and  the  minutest  events, 
as  well  as  the  greatest,  to  be  under  the  government  of  his  provi- 
dence. Things,  to  our  apprehension,  most  casual  and  most  trivial, 
are  specified,  as  under  the  direction  of  God  :  for  what  is  more 
casual  than  the  drawing  of  a  lot,  but  the  whole  disposal  thereof  is 
of  the  Lord;  and  what  seems  more  trivial  than  the  falling  of  the 
hairs  of  your  head,  and  yet  this  event,  apparently  unimportant  as 
it  is,  never  takes  place,  without  our  Heavenly  Father. 

But  while  the  Bible,  throughout,  ascribes  the  occurrence  of  all 
events,  of  every  kind,  to  the  will  of  God  ;  yet,  it  as  uniformly  re- 
presents man  as  a  free,  accountable  agent  ;  yea,  it  represents 
him  as  acting  most  wickedly,  in  those  very  transactions  which 
are  most  expressly  declared  to  be  determined  by  the  counsel 
of  God.  It  would  seem  from  this,  that  the  inspired  writers  per- 
ceived no  inconsistency  between  a  purpose  of  God,  that  a  certain 
event  should  occur,  and  that  it  should  be  brought  about  by  the  free 
and  accountable  agency  of  man.  And  it  is  believed,  also,  that  men 
of  sound  minds,  who  have  never  heard  of  any  objections  to  this 
doctrine,  are  not  apt  to  be  perplexed  with  any  apparent  inconsis- 
tency between  these  two  things.  And,  we  are  persuaded,  that 
were  it  not  for  the  ambiguity  of  certain  words,  and  the  artful 
sophistry  with  which  truth  and  error  are  confounded  by  those  who 
oppose  the  doctrine,  very  few  persons  would  experience  any  diffi- 
culty on  this  subject.  If  a  man  of  plain  sense  should  be  informed 
by  prophecy,  that  he  would  certainly  kill  a  fellow  creature  the 
next  day  or  year,  and  that  in  perpetrating  this  act  he  would  be 
actuated  by  malice,  it  would  never  be  likely  to  enter  his  mind,  that 
he  should  not  be  guilty  of  any  crime,  because  the  action  was  cer- 
tain before  it  was  committed.  But  if  you  change  the  terms,  and 
say,  that  he  would  be  under  a  necessity  to  perform  this  act ;  that 
it  being  absolutely  certain,  he  could  not  possibly  avoid  it ;  imme- 
diately the  subject  becomes  perplexed,  and  involved  in  difficulty  ; 
for  every  man  of  common  sense  feels  that  he  cannot  justly  be  ac- 
countable for  what  he  could  not  possibly  avoid  ;  and  that  for  what 
he  does  from  absolute  necessity  he  cannot,,  in  the  nature  of  things, 


i4 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  65 


be  culpable.  Here,  the  whole  difficulty  is  produced  by  the  use  of 
ambiguous  and  improper  terms.  While  nothing  was  presented  to 
the  mind,  but  the  certainty  of  the  event,  coupled  with  voluntary 
action,  no  relief  from  responsibility  was  felt :  but  the  moment  we 
speak  of  the  act  as  produced  by  necessity,  and  as  being  unavoid- 
able, the  judgment  respecting  its  nature  is  changed.  These  terms 
include  the  idea  of  a  compulsory  power  acting  upon  us,  not  only 
without,  but  in  opposition  to  our  own  will.  A  necessary  event  is 
one  which  cannot  be  voluntary  or  free  ;  for  if  it  were  spontaneous, 
it  could  not  be  necessary  ;  these  two  things  being  diametrically 
opposite.  So,  an  unavoidable  action  is  one  which  takes  place 
against  our  wishes  and  will.  But  a  voluntary  action  may  be  as 
certain  as  any  other ;  and  by  one  who  knows  futurity,  may  be  as 
certainly  predicted.  Even  a  man  may  often  be  certain  before- 
hand, how  a  voluntary  agent  will  act  in  given  circumstances,  pro- 
vided he  knows  the  moral  character  of  the  agent.  As  if  a  being 
actuated  by  no  other  feeling  towards  another  but  malice,  should  be 
placed  in  such  circumstances,  that  he  has  the  choice  of  performing 
a  benevolent  action  towards  that  individual  or  omitting  it,  he  will 
most  certainly  neglect  to  do  it,  or,  if  he  may  with  impunity  in- 
jure such  an  one,  or  do  him  good,  he  will  most  certainly  choose  the 
former  ;  yet  is  such  a  malignant  agent  perfectly  free,  and  perfectly 
accountable.  These  things  are  agreeable  to  the  common  feelings 
of  all  men,  and  depend  on  no  metaphysical  niceties.  And  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  but  that  a  large  share  of  the  difficulty  which 
perplexes  honest  minds,  in  the  contemplation  of  the  divine  purpose, 
which  fixes  the  certainty  of  events,  arises  from  the  confounding  of 
things  totally  distinct,  by  the  use  of  ambiguous  terms. 

But  still  it  may  be  thought  by  some,  that  as  to  the  point  of  man's 
responsibility,  there  is  no  difference  between  certainty  and  necessi- 
ty ;  that  if  it  be  certainly  fixed,  that  a  man  shall  act  in  a  particular 
way,  it  is  impossible  that  he  should  do  otherwise,  and  therefore  he 
cannot  be  free.  To  which  we  would  reply,  that  the  whole  diffi- 
culty supposed  to  exist,  arises,  as  before,  from  confounding  ideas 
which  should  be  kept  distinct.  There  is  no  manner  of  inconsis- 
tency between  the  certainty  of  a  future  action  and  liberty  in  the 
performance  of  that  action.  A  voluntary  action  may  be  as  cer- 
tainly future  as  any  other ;  and  spontaneity  is  the  only  liberty 
which  can  be  predicated  of  the  will  itself.  If  an  action  is  volun- 
tary, it  is  free :  and  the  idea  of  a  necessary  volition  is  absurd  and 
contradictory.  When,  however,  we  speak  in  accordance  with 
common  sense  and  experience,  of  liberty,  as  being  essential  to  moral 
agency,  we  always  mean  liberty  of  action  ;  that  is,  the  liberty  of 
doing  what  we  will.  Now,  if  certainty  were  inconsistent  with  free- 
dom, it  would  seem  that  uncertainty  was  that  which  constituted 
the  liberty  of  an  action  ;  but  it  is  evident  that  an  action  produced 
by  compulsion  may  be  as  uncertain  as  a  voluntary  act ;  and,  as 
was  before  stated,  an  action  may  be  perfectly  voluntary  and  free,  and 
yet  certain.     If  we  know  what  we  will  do  the  next  hour,  surely 

5 


66  THE    DECREES    OF    GOD. 

this  knowledge  of  the  certainty  of  our  own  act  does  not  alter  the 
nature.  If,  when  considered  as  uncertain  and  unknown,  it  is  free 
and  voluntary,  if  the  same  action  and  produced  by  the  same  cause 
is  viewed  as  certain  or  as  known,  it  cannot  affect  the  nature  of  the 
action,  as  to  its  moral  quality.  And  if  it  were  the  fact,  that  the 
certainty  of  the  existence  of  a  future  act  destroyed  its  freedom, 
then  the  probability  of  its  occurrence  would  have  the  same  effect, 
so  far  as  the  event  was  probable.  And  according  to  this  doctrine, 
every  human  act,  or  nearly  every  one,  would  be  affected  as  to  its 
liberty  ;  for  what  action  ever  occurs,  of  the  existence  of  which  be- 
forehand, there  may  not  be  a  probability  in  the  view  of  some  one  1 
But  why  should  uncertainty  render  an  action  free  and  moral, 
which  would  not  otherwise  be  so  ?  Surely  this  is  no  self-evident 
truth.  So  far  from  it,  that  in  thinking  of  the  morality  of  an  act,  or 
responsibility  of  an  agent,  we  never  take  this  circumstance  into 
view,  whether  before  it  happened  it  was  certain  or  uncertain. 
And  if  certainty  affected  the  character  of  an  act  before  it  occurred, 
why  should  not  absolute  certainty  after  the  event,  have  the  same 
effect  ?  When  an  act  is  performed,  its  certainty  is  so  great,  that 
no  power  can  render  it  uncertain ;  and  no  good  reason  can  be 
assigned,  why  this  should  not  destroy  its  freedom,  as  much  as  pre- 
vious certainty.  But  the  truth  is,  that  the  moral  character  of  an 
action  is  not  in  the  least  affected  by  its  previous  certainty  or  un- 
certainty, but  is  determined  by  its  own  nature ; — its  conformity  or 
nonconformity,  to  a  moral  rule. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  consideration  of  the  decrees  of  God, 
or  the  Divine  purpose.  And  the  whole  subject  may  be  reduced  to 
these  two  points.  First,  did  God,  when  about  to  give  existence  to 
the  universe,  comprehend  in  his  infinite  mind  a  perfect  plan  of  his 
own  work  ?  And  secondly,  is  the  existing  state  of  things  accord- 
ant with  the  original  plan?  If  both  these  questions  are  answered 
in  the  affirmative,  then  the  dispute  about  the  decrees  of  God  is 
ended  ;  for  by  his  decrees  nothing  else  is  intended,  than  that  per- 
fect plan  which  originally  existed  in  the  mind  of  the  Great  Archi- 
tect :  and  if  creation  and  providence  answer  to  this  plan,  then  is  it 
true,  that  God  has  "fore-ordained  whatsoever  comes  to  pass."  If 
any  objection  is  felt  to  the  word  "  decrees,"  it  may  be  changed  for 
another  less  exceptionable  ;  especially  as  it  is  not  the  term  usually 
employed  in  the  scriptures  to  express  this  idea ;  and  also,  because 
it  is  in  relation  to  this  subject,  used  in  a  sense  considerably  different 
from  its  common  acceptation.  The  phrase,  "  Divine  purpose,"  em- 
ployed by  an  author,  is  both  scriptural  and  appropriate,  and  liable 
to  no  objection  which  occurs  to  us.  It  is  a  principle  with  us,  not 
to  contend-about  words,  where  there  is  an  agreement  in  ideas.  Let 
us  then  see  what  exception  can  be  taken  to  the  first  position  laid 
down  above,  viz.,  that  God,  when  about  to  produce  the  universe  of 
creatures,  had  in  his  mind  a  perfect  plan  of  the  whole  work.  This, 
of  course,  would  include  every  creature  and  every  action  and 
event,  with  the  nature  which  should  be  possessed  by  each,  and  the 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  07 

causes  and  qualities  of  every  action.  If  the  Supreme  Creator 
formed  any  plan  of  operation,  this  plan  would  certainly  include 
everything  which  should  ever  come  to  pass,  unless  there  are  some 
things  which  are  of  such  a  nature,  that  they  could  not  be  embraced 
in  any  pre-conceived  plan.  This  brings  us  up  to  the  very  gist  of 
the  objection.  It  is  alleged,  that  the  free  actions  of  moral  agents 
could  not  possibly  form  any  part  of  such  a  plan,  because,  if  fixed 
by  a  purpose  or  plan,  they  could  not  come  to  pass  as  free  actions, 
"  and  depending  for  their  existence  on  the  free  will "  of  voluntary 
agents,  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  fore-known.  This  is 
the  foundation  of  two  distinct  theories ;  both  of  which  must  be 
fairly  brought  into  view,  and  subjected  to  the  examination  of  reason. 
And  we  begin  with  that  one  which  is  most  remote  from  what  we 
believe  to  be  the  true  theory.  According  to  this,  God  neither  pro- 
posed anything  respecting  the  free  actions  of  moral  agents,  nor  was 
it  possible  for  him  to  know  what  they  would  be.  As  this  theory 
has,  at  first  view,  the  appearance  of  denying  the  omniscience  of 
God,  its  advocates  have  taken  great  pains  to  obviate  this  objection. 
They  allege,  that  as  it  is  no  disparagement  of  God's  omnipotence 
to  say,  that  there  are  impossible  things  which  his  power  cannot  ac- 
complish ;  so  in  regard  to  omniscience,  there  may  be  things  which 
cannot  be  known,  not  from  any  imperfection  in  this  attribute,  but 
because,  from  their  uncertain  nature,  they  are  not  capable  of  being 
known.  There  is  the  appearance  of  plausibility  in  this  represen- 
tation, but  it  is  only  an  appearance,  for  in  regard  to  the  perform- 
ance of  impossibilities,  the  thing  is  absurd  and  inconceivable,  as  for 
example,  to  cause  a  thing  to  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time. 
There  is  here  really  no  object  on  which  power  can  be  exerted. 
But  the  case  is  far  different  in  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  future 
contingencies.  The  defect  of  a  knowledge  of  these  argues  a  real 
imperfection  in  this  attribute.  We  cannot  conceive  of  a  being* 
possessing  an  increase  of  perfection  by  a  power  to  do  that  which 
is  impossible  ;  for,  as  was  said  before,  the  thing  is  wholly  incon- 
ceivable. But  we  can  conceive  of  knowledge  which  extends  to 
free  actions  of  moral  agents.  Man  himself  possesses  some  degree 
of  this  knowledge  ;  and  we  cannot  attribute  omniscience  to  the 
Deity  without  including  in  our  idea,  the  perfection  of  this  know- 
ledge. To  say  that  there  are  things  which  from  their  nature  can- 
not be  known,  is  only  to  say,  in  other  words,  that  there  is  no  om- 
niscient being  in  the  universe  ;  for  if  there  were,  there  would  be 
nothing  unknown  to  him.  Moreover,  it  should  be  well  considered 
before  this  theory  is  adopted,  that  this  ignorance  must  relate  to  all 
actions  of  this  class ;  for  if  one  can  be  certainly  known  as  future, 
without  destroying  its  freedom,  so  may  all.  And  it  matters  not  by 
what  means  the  knowledge  of  future  contingencies  may  be  acquired, 
it  must  equally,  in  all  cases,  affect  the  freedom  and  morality  of  the 
actions  known.  So  that,  if  the  governor  of  the  universe,  from  ob- 
serving the  conduct  of  creatures  in  time  past,  should  be  able  with 
certainty  to  foreknow  what  they  will  do  in  future,  such  knowledge 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  freedom  of  actions  thus  known. 


68  THE    DECREES    OF   GOD. 

And,  as  we  observed  in  another  part  of  this  review,  if  certain 
knowledge  is  thus  inconsistent  with  moral  agency,  no  reason  can 
be  assigned,  why  probable  knowledge,  in  proportion  to  its  approxi- 
mation to  certainty,  should  not  have  the  same  effect. 

But  what  idea  does  it  afford  of  the  government  of  the  universe 
to  suppose,  that  the  Supreme  Ruler  is  totally  ignorant  of  all  the 
future  volitions  of  his  creatures,  and  of  all  the  consequences  of 
these  volitions  ?  Dark,  indeed,  are  the  prospects  of  the  wise  Di- 
rector of  all  things,  on  this  theory ;  and  miserable  must  be  the  sus- 
pense and  anxiety  of  him  who  sits  at  the  helm,  if  every  future  vo- 
luntary act,  of  so  many  millions  of  free  agents,  is  utterly  unknown 
to  him.  No  provision  can  be  made  beforehand  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency. The  universe  must  be  governed  by  sudden  shifts  and  ex- 
pedients, adopted  as  the  exigence  may  demand.  And  on  this  prin- 
ciple, general  laws,  for  the  government  of  the  world,  would  be 
altogether  unwise,  because  they  could  not  be  so  arranged  as  to 
meet  the  cases  which  might,  in  the  course  of  events,  occur ;  these 
being  entirely  unknown.  Such  a  theory,  if  pursued,  must  lead 
inevitably  to  atheism.  Nothing  more  is  necessary  to  prove  the 
falsity  of  this  theory,  than  to  trace  it  to  consequences  so  absurd  and 
dreadful. 

The  theory  which  takes  from  the  Deity  all  certain  knowledge  of 
future  free  actions  of  moral  agents,  is  not  only  repugnant  to  right 
reason,  but  contrary  to  the  whole  tenor  of  scripture.  According 
to  it,  the  fall  of  our  first  parents  was  an  event  unknown  to  God  be- 
fore it  actually  took  place ;  and  no  provision,  therefore,  could  have 
been  made  to  meet  the  exigency.  No  plan  of  recovery  could  have 
been  devised.  All  which  is  expressly  contradictory  to  numerous 
plain  declarations  of  the  Bible.  That  evidence,  however,  which 
idemonstrably  proves  the  falsity  of  this  (heory,  is,  the  long  chain  of 
prophecy,  which  foretells  innumerable  events  which  are  dependent 
on  the  free  will  of  man.  Many  of  these  predictions  have  been  ex- 
actly fulfilled,  by  men  who  knew  not  God  ;  and  generally,  by  agents 
who  had  no  idea  that  they  were  executing  any  divine  purpose,  or 
accomplishing  any  divine  prediction:  and  the  responsibility  of  these 
agents,  and  the  morality  of  their  actions,  were  not  in  the  least  af- 
fected by  the  circumstance  that  they  were  fore-ordained,  and 
foretold  by  the  prophets.  The  illustration  of  this  position  from  the 
scriptures,  is  full,  and  could  easily  be  adduced;  but. this  has  often 
been  done  by  others,  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  narrow  limits 
allotted  to  this  review.  We  would  simply  refer  the  reader  to  the 
history  of  Adam,  of  Pharaoh,  of  Joseph,  of  Saul,  of  Nebuchad- 
nezzar, of  Cyrus,  of  Judas  who  betrayed  Christ,  and  of  the  Jews 
who  crucified  him.  If  the  scriptures  contain  one  word  of  truth, 
it  is  most  certain  that  the  free  actions  of  moral  agents  are  fore- 
known. 

To  evade  the  horrible  consequences  of  denying  foreknowledge 
to  the  Deity,  as  being  subversive  of  his  absolute  and  infinite  perfec- 
tion, some  speculative  men  have  invented  a  theory,  if  possible,  more 
•absurd ;  and    hat  is,  that  God  has  the  perfection  of  omniscience, 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  69 

/ 

but  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  exercise  it,  in  regard  to  all 
events.  They  suppose,  that  he  could  know  all  the  volitions  of  free 
agents  which  ever  will  exist,  but  that  he  does  not  choose  to  know 
them,  before  they  come  to  pass,  lest  he  should  infringe  the  liberty 
of  the  creature.  The  former  theory  attributed  the  ignorance  of 
the  Deity  of  future  contingencies  to  the  necessity  of  nature  ;  this 
ascribes  it  to  his  will.  But  according  to  both,  actual  knowledge 
of  such  events  is  not  possessed  ;  and  the  only  difference  in  regard 
to  the  divine  attributes  which  exists  between  them,  is,  that  accord- 
ing to  the  first,  God  is  supposed  to  be  necessarily  imperfect,  while 
by  the  second,  he  is  voluntarily  imperfect.  But  as  it  relates  to  the 
difficulty,  or  rather  impossibility,  of  governing  the  world  with  wis- 
dom, they  are  precisely  the  same.  God  remains  ignorant  of  every 
free  action,  of  every  moral  agent,  until  it  actually  takes  place.  To 
whom  the  world  is  indebted  for  this  extraordinary  hypothesis,  we 
cannot  tell,  but  the  Chevalier  Ramsay  was  the  first  writer,  known 
to  us,  who  published  it.  And  it  ought  to  have  died  with  him ;  but 
to  the  grief  of  many  of  his  brethren,  and  the  surprise  of  all  re- 
flecting theologians,  it  has  found  an  advocate  in  the  learned  Dr. 
Adam  Clarke.  But  there  is  so  little  danger  of  its  being  adopted 
by  any  considerate,  sensible  man,  that  we  may  safely  leave  it  to 
sink  by  its  own  absurdity.  We  are  not  a  little  astonished  to  find 
such  a  man  as  Dr.  Beattie,  in  his  Elements  of  Moral  Science,  se- 
riously proposing  the  first  mentioned  theory,  as  a  relief  from  the 
inevitable  consequences  of  the  doctrine  of  certain  foreknowledge. 
It  seems,  however,  to  show  how  heavily  these  consequences  press 
upon  the  Arminian  scheme. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  general  theory, 
mentioned  above.  According  to  this,  God,  it  is  admitted,  does  cer- 
tainly and  perfectly  foreknow  whatever  shall  come  to  pass,  without 
any  exceptions ;  but  in  regard  to  the  free  actions  of  moral  agents, 
he  has  formed  no  purpose,  nor  made  any  decree,  but  leaves  them 
fully  to  the  freedom  of  their  own  will.  And  to  support  this  theory, 
much  pains  is  taken  to  prove  that  mere  knowledge  cannot  affect 
the  freedom  or  morality  of  the  actions  which  are  its  objects ;  and 
it  is,  moreover,  attempted  to  be  shown,  that  a  purpose,  that  an 
action  shall  exist,  in  future,  must  render  it  necessary.  M)w,  in 
regard  to  the  first  position,  we  not  only  admit,  but  strongly  main- 
tain, that  the  foreknowledge  of  the  certain  existence  of  an  action 
does  not  render  it  a  necessary  action  ;  if  the  agent  be  free,  the 
action  is  free,  whether  we  suppose  it  to  be  foreknown  or  not.  And 
we  agree  also,  that  it  is  not  the  knowledge  of  a  future  action  which 
renders  it  certain :  it  must,  in  the  order  of  things,  be  certain  before 
it  can  be  foreknown.  But  if  an  event  be  certainly  foreknown,  it 
must  have  a  certain  future  existence,  and  for  that  certain  future 
existence,  there  must  be  some  reason  or  cause.  Now  that  cause 
is  either  the  purpose  of  God  that  it  should  be  so,  or  it  is  something 
else.  If  the  former,  then  it  is  decreed  ;  but  if  it  be  some  other 
cause,  whatever  that  may  be,  as  it  fixes  the  certainty  of  the  event, 


70  THE    DECREES    OF    GOD. 

it  must  be  as  inconsistent  with  freedom,  as  if  the  same  effect  was 
produced  by  the  divine  purpose.  If  another  cause  may  render,  an 
event  so  certain  that  it  may  be  infallibly  foreknown,  without  any 
interference  with  moral  agency,  then  the  purpose  of  God  may  ren- 
der an  event  certain,  without  any  violation  of  the  freedom  of  the 
creature.  But  if  it  be  alleged,  that  there  is  no  other  cause  of  the 
event  necessary  to  be  supposed,  than  the  free  agency  of  the  crea- 
ture ;  we  reply  that,  in  one  sense,  this  is  true.  It  is  true,  as  it 
relates  to  the  proximate  efficient  cause.  But,  if  God  knows  how 
such  a  creature  will  act,  there  must  be  some  foundation  on  which 
this  knowledge  rests  ;  that  is,  there  must  be  some  reason  why  the 
free  creature  should  act  as  it  is  foreseen  that  he  will  act.  For,  as 
every  free  agent  has  the  liberty  of  acting,  or  not ;  or  of  performing 
a  different  action  from  the  one  which  he  eventually  performs  ;  if 
there  existed  no  reason  why  the  one  took  place  and  not  the  other, 
all  knowledge  of  the  action  before  it  occurs  is  necessarily  excluded. 
It  would  be  to  suppose  knowledge,  without  the  least  foundation  for 
that  knowledge  in  the  object.  In  answer  it  is  sometimes  alleged,  that 
God's  knowledge  is  not  like  ours  ;  nor  can  we  judge  of  his  man- 
ner of  knowing  things,  by  wThat  takes  place  among  creatures. 
While  we  readily  admit  the  general  truth,  we  deny  that  it  can  have 
any  application  to  the  case  before  us.  God  cannot  know  that 
something  exists  where  there  is  nothing.  God  cannot  know  that 
an  event  is  certainly  future,  where  there  is,  by  the  hypothesis, 
nothing  seen  by  him  which  can  be  the  cause  of  this  certainty ; 
or,  in  other  words,  God  cannot  see  that  an  effect,  yet  future,  will 
certainly  be  produced,  if  he  does  not  know  any  cause  of  its  exist- 
ence. This  mode  of  knowing  things  is  indeed  incomprehensible, 
but  it  does  not  involve  a  palpable  impossibility. 

But  waiving  this  discussion,  let  us  resume  only  what  is  granted, 
that  if  a  future  event  be  infallibly  foreknown,  it  must  be  infallibly 
certain ;  as  certain  as  any  decree  can  make  it.  In  this  point  the 
two  theories  are  perfectly  the  same.  The  event  is  as  certain  as  it 
can  be ;  for  it  will  be  perceived  by  all,  and  must  be  admitted, 
that  it  is  as  impossible,  that  an  event  foreseen  by  omniscience  can 
fail,  as  that  a  decreed  event  can  fail.  If  mere  certainty  of  exist- 
ence, therefore,  is  inconsistent  with  free  agency,  the  theory  of  fore- 
knowledge is  as  subversive  of  freedom  as  a  fixed  purpose.  But  it 
is  alleged,  that  the  purpose  influences  the  action,  and,  therefore, 
there  is  a  wide  difference.  We  answer,  that  if  the  divine  purpose 
— as  we  maintain — has  no  other  influence  on  the  action  than  to 
render  it  certain  there  is  no  difference  at  all ;  for  on  some  account, 
and  for  some  reason,  it  matters  not  what — the  thing  is  as  certain 
as  it  can  be,  on  the  theory  of  mere  foreknowledge.  But  it  will  be 
asked,  how  can  an  event  be  rendered  absolutely  certain,  by  a  divine 
purpose,  without  rendering  that  event  necessary  ?  If  an  end  is 
purposed  and  rendered  certain,  the  means  must  be  also  put  into 
operation,  and  made  as  certain  as  the  end ;  therefore,  he  who  pur- 
poses that  a  thing  shall  be,  must  be  its  proper  and  efficient  cause ; 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  71 

for  how  can  he  otherwise  give  effect  to  his  own  purposes,  than  by 
putting  into  operation  such  causes  as  will  produce  the  pre-de- 
termined  end  ?  And  therefore  that  being  who  decrees  an  event, 
and  provides  for  its  accomplishment,  must,  in  all  reason,  be  con- 
sidered the  proper  cause  of  it,  which,  when  the  object  of  the 
decree  is  a  sinful  action,  must  lead  to  the  blasphemous  consequence, 
that  God  is  the  author  of  sin.  A  mere  purpose  without  efficient 
action  cannot  possibly  secure  the  certainty  of  any  event ;  there- 
fore a  decree  which  shall  secure  the  certain  futurition  of  any- 
thing, must  be  followed  by  an  actual  agency,  which  will  be 
sufficient  to  accomplish  the  end.  And  if  God  decrees  that  an 
intelligent,  voluntary  being  shall  certainly  perform  an  action,  it 
is  necessary  to  suppose  that,  directly  or  indirectly,  he  should  exert 
a  power  to  influence  the  actions  of  this  voluntary  agent,  in  which 
case,  the  being  thus  influenced  by  the  controlling  power  of  another, 
cannot  be  free  and  accountable. 

Here  we  have  the  whole  strength  of  the  objection  to  absolute 
decrees.  This  is  the  gordian  knot,  which  it  has  been  found  so 
difficult  to  unloose,  that  most  men  are  disposed  to  cut  it.  And  it 
must  be  confessed,  that  there  seems  to  be  something  incompre- 
hensible to  us,  in  this  thing  ;  and  perhaps,  the  common  method  of 
acknowledging,  that  human  minds  cannot  reconcile  the  fixed  pur- 
poses of  God  with  the  free  agency  of  man,  is  best ;  yet  it  would 
be  easy  to  show  that  the  difficulty  is  fully  as  great,  and  even 
greater,  on  the  Arminian,  than  the  Calvinistic  theory.  The  former, 
indeed,  talks  of  conditional  decrees  or  purposes  of  God,  which 
are  mere  hypothetical  things  ;  a  purpose  to  do  this  or  that,  if  some 
other  event  should  occur ;  but  if  this  should  not  occur,  to  act  dif- 
ferently. This,  indeed,  is  to  make  the  great  omniscient  God  like 
ourselves.  It  is  to  represent  him  as  dependent  for  his  eternal 
purposes  on  creatures  not  in  existence.  But,  really,  this  theory  can 
afford  no  manner  of  relief:  for,  as  God,  from  the  beginning,  knew 
what  the  actions  of  free  creatures  would  be,  his  own  purposes 
were  as  much  fixed  as  they  could  be,  on  any  other  hypothesis.  If 
a  ruler  determines  to  punish  his  subjects  if  they  commit  certain 
crimes,  and  is  at  the  same  time  assured  that  they  will  commit 
them,  his  purpose  to  punish  is  as  certainly  fixed  as  it  can  be. 

But  before  we  dismiss  this  subject  as  incomprehensible,  let  us 
examine  whether  there  is  not  a  theory  on  which  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge and  purpose  may  be  reconciled,  and  on  which  Calvin- 
ists  and  Arminians  may  become  united  in  their  views. 

Whatever  plan  the  Almighty  determined  on  from  the  beginning, 
or  whatever  purpose  he  formed  in  regard  to  the  universe  of  crea- 
tures, all  was  done  under  the  guidance  of  infinite  wisdom.  That 
God  decreed,  in  wisdom,  everything  which  he  did  purpose,  is 
admitted  by  all.  To  form  a  plan  for  the  creation,  arrangement, 
and  government  of  the  world,  supposes  that  out  of  all  possible 
plans,  that  was  selected  which  seemed  best  to  infinite  wisdom. 
In  the  order  of  nature,  therefore,  the  whole  congeries  of  creatures 


72  THE    DECREES    OF    GOD. 

and  events,  which  compose  the  universe,  must  have  been  present 
to  the  Divine  Mind  before  his  purpose  was  formed ;  or  to  speak 
more  correctly,  all  creatures,  with  all  their  relations  and  actions, 
were  in  the  view  of  God's  infinite  understanding,  when  he  decreed 
their  future  existence ;  and  the  whole  was  viewed  as  one  con- 
nected plan  or  system,  and  was  contemplated  at  one  comprehen- 
sive glance,  and  all  future  existence  was  decreed  by  one  single 
act.  Now,  whatever  the  nature  and  qualities  of  acts  were  view- 
ed to  be  in  the  divine  purpose,  the  same  must  they  be  in  the 
event.  If  God  determined  that  free  agents  should  exist,  and  that 
their  actions  should  be  free,  when  this  part  of  his  plan  is  executed, 
free  agents  with  their  free  actions  will  exist ;  and  the  decree,  so 
far  from  being  inconsistent  with  their  freedom,  is  the  very  thing 
which  renders  it  certain  that  such  free  agents  and  voluntary  acts 
will  ever  have  a  being.  Could  not  God  from  all  eternity  decree, 
that  creatures  endued  with  liberty  should  exist,  and  if  this  was  his 
purpose,  will  not  the  event  answer  to  it  ?  And  if  such  creatures  exist 
and  act,  will  not  their  actions  be  free  ?  If,  then,  the  plan  of  the  uni- 
verse adopted  by  infinite  wisdom,  included  the  existence  of  free  moral 
agents  and  their  free  actions,  such  creatures  and  such  actions  must 
come  into  being,  in  consequence  of  the  decree ;  human  liberty, 
therefore,  instead  of  being  destroyed  by  the  decree,  is  established 
upon  an  immutable  basis.  If  God  is  omnipotent,  and  wills  the  exist- 
ence of  a  free  agent,  the  next  moment,  such  a  being  would  instantly 
start  into  being ;  if  he  wills  that  such  a  creature  should  exist  six  thou- 
sand years  after  the  creation,  the  effect  will  as  certainly  follow,  and 
will  as  exactly  answer  to  the  purpose  of  the  divine  mind.  It  would  be 
very  strange,  indeed,  if  the  Almighty  could  not  effectually  will  the 
existence  of  a  free,  voluntary  act :  to  suppose  the  contrary,  would 
be  to  deny  his  omnipotence.  Now,  if  he  can  decree  the  future 
existence  of  such  an  act,  it  will  surely  come  to  pass,  agreeably  to 
the  design  ;  that  is,  it  will  exist  as  a  free  act.  Now  whether  we 
can  tell  how  God  can  secure  the  freedom  of  such  an  act  or  not,  we 
ought  not  to  hesitate  to  believe  that  a  being  of  infinite  perfection 
can  accomplish  it.  To  say,  then,  that  the  decree  by  which  the 
certainty  of  a  free  act  is  secured,  violate's  free  agency,  seems  very 
much  like  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

The  objection,  that  the  doctrine  of  absolute  decrees  necessarily 
makes  God  the  author  of  sin,  derives  its  whole  force  from  over- 
looking the  important  fact,  that  there  may  be  created  agents,  who 
are  endued  with  the  power  of  originating  action  by  the  very  con- 
stitution of  their  nature  ;  and  who,  although  dependent  on  God  for 
their  existence  and  faculties,  yet  being  supported  in  being,  are 
capable  of  acting,  and  of  acting  freely.  If  such  creatures  did  not 
exist,  there  neither  would  be,  nor  could  be,  any  such  thing  as  moral 
agency  ;  and  consequently,  no  such  thing  as  praise  or  blame.  But 
if  God  accomplishes  his  purposes  by  creating  such  agents,  who  are 
free  and  voluntary  in  their  actions,  and  capable  of  doing  right  or 
wrong,  it  is  not  sound  logic  to  infer,  that  the  moral  qualities  of 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  73 

their  actions  must  be  ascribed  to  him.  The^  are  answerable  for 
their  own  acts.  If  such  active,  accountable  beings  be  created — and 
why  should  we  doubt  it — their  actions  ought  not  to  be  ascribed  to 
the  Creator. 

But  still  the  difficulty  occurs,  that  if  God  positively  decrees  that 
such  creatures  shall  perform  certain  acts ;  to  execute  this  purpose, 
it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that  he  exerts  an  influence,  mediately  or 
immediately,  on  their  minds :  and  if  a  superior  being  causes  one 
dependent  on  him  to  perform  certain  actions,  the  latter,  it  is  thought, 
cannot  be  accountable  for  such  acts. 

There  are  two  methods  of  answering  this  objection.  We  first 
admit  the  fact,  that  God  does  exert  his  power  in  the  production  of 
all  the  acts  of  creatures,  by  such  a  concurrence  with  them,  that  the 
physical  part  of  the  act  is  the  effect  of  his  agency,  but  so  far  as  it 
is  of  a  sinful  nature  it  is  their  own.  Thus  it  is  acknowledged  that 
God  is  the  efficient  cause  of  our  free  acts,  considered  merely  as 
acts  of  intellect  or  will ;  but  at  the  same  time  the  act  of  the 
creature  determines  the  moral  quality  of  the  thing  done.  This  is 
the  distinction  invented  by  the  schoolmen,  and  adopted  by  most 
Calvinistic  theologians  of  former  days  ;  and  which  they  attempt  to 
illustrate  by  various  comparisons.  It  is,  however,  a  distinction  not 
easily  understood ;  and  has  never  been  so  explained  as  to  remove 
the  darkness  and  perplexity  in  which  the  subject  is  involved.  For, 
if  God  is  the  efficient  cause  of  the  action,  as  it  is  an  act  of  the  mind, 
and  if  he  determines  its  physical  nature,  it  does  not  appear  that  any- 
thing is  left  for  the  creature,  but  to  yield :  the  physical  part  of  an 
act  is  the  substance  of  that  act,  and  its  morality  is  the  relation 
which  it  bears  to  something  else.  Now,  although  we  may  con- 
ceive of  an  act  as  purely  a  mental  energy,  without  taking  into  view 
any  of  its  relations  ;  yet  when  such  an  act  is  produced  in  the  mind 
of  man,  who  stands  in  certain  relations  to  God  and  his  fellow 
creatures  ;  and  is  under  a  moral  law,  which  measures  and  esti- 
mates the  moral  character  of  every  act ;  it  does  not  appear  how  we 
can  admit  that  it  is  as  to  its  substance  the  effect  of  divine  power, 
and  yet  as  to  its  morality  the  act  of  the  creature. 

Others  come  up  directly  to  the  difficulty,  and  maintain  that  God 
is  the  author  of  sin,  or  the  efficient  cause  of  sin,  but  that  there  is 
nothing  of  the  nature  of  sin  in  him.  They  allege,  that  there  is  no 
necessity  that  what  God  makes  should  be  like  himself;  or  that  he 
should  possess  the  qualities  and  attributes  of  his  creatures.  God 
creates  matter,  but  he  is  not  therefore  material.  He  creates 
poisonous  reptiles,  but  who  would  think  of  inferring  that,  on  this 
account,  he  possesses  properties  answering  to  this  ?  So  God  may 
be  the  author  of  sinful  acts  in  creatures,  and  not  be,  in  any  degree, 
a  partaker  of  sin.  It  is,  moreover,  alleged,  that  we  are  so  con- 
stituted, that  we  judge  of  the  morality  of  actions  without  any  refer- 
ence to  their  cause.  If  a  man  is  conscious  of  a  voluntary  exercise, 
forbidden  by  the  law  of  God,  conscience  immediately  pronounces 
sentence  of  condemnation,  without  the  least  regard  to  the  cause. 


74  THE    DECREES    OF    GOD. 

We  feel  guilty  on  account  of  a  wrong  choice,  however  that  voli- 
tion may  have  been  produced  in  our  minds.  Free  agency,  accord- 
ing to  this  theory,  consists  in  voluntary  action  alone ;  and  for  all 
such  exercises  we  are  accountable.  There  is,  therefore,  no  incon 
sistency  whatever  between  the  divine  purpose  and  free  agency. 
This  theory  has  many  advocates  in  our  country,  and  is  considered 
an  improvement  of  the  old  Calvinistic  theology.  But  it  is  repug- 
nant to  common  sense  ;  and  the  arguments  employed  in  its  defence 
are  sophistical. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  reasoning  from  the  effect  to  the  cause  is 
one  of  the  most  clear  and  logical  methods  of  demonstrating  truth 
which  we  possess,  and  if  it  were  abolished,  almost  all  useful  reason- 
ing would  be  at  an  end.  By  the  works  of  creation  we  prove  con- 
clusively, that  God  is  wise,  and  powerful,  and  benevolent,  because 
we  can  see  manifest  indications  of  these  attributes  in  the  creatures. 
We  do  not,  indeed,  conclude  from  such  reasoning,  that  there  is  a 
perfect  resemblance  in  the  thing  made  to  the  Creator,  which  is 
impossible ;  but  we  legitimately  infer  from  effects  which  could  not  be 
such  as  they  are,  unless  their  cause  was  powerful,  wise,  and  be- 
nevolent. There  must  be  in  the  cause  that  which  will  account  for 
the  effect :  and  when  a  free  intelligent  agent  is  the  cause,  his 
character  may  be  known  as  far  as  his  design  in  the  effect  is  mani- 
fest. If  these  principles  are  not  admitted,  and  it  should  be  denied 
that  the  nature  of  a  cause  can  be  determined  from  its  effects,  then 
it  would  follow  that  an  evil  being  may  have  created  this  world ; 
and  that  a  superior  excellence  to  any  that  existed  in  the  cause, 
might  be  in  an  effect.  Now,  if  the  evidence  of  goodness  in  the 
constitution  of  creatures  proves  that  God  is  good  ;  if  he  is  the 
author  of  sin  the  conclusion  would  be  as  legitimate,  that  evil  exists 
in  him,  which  is  blasphemous.  But  it  is  said,  that  though  sin  in 
itself  be  evil,  yet  God  in  producing  it  has  a  good  end  in  view  ;  and 
then  we  establish  the  principle,  that  it  is  consistent  with  infinite 
purity  to  do  evil,  that  good  may  come ;  and  if  this  is  consistent 
with  divine  perfection,  it  is  also  with  human  virtue  ;  but  such  a  prin- 
ciple is  severely  reprehended  in  the  word  of  God. 

By  some  writers,  the  difficulty  is  got  over  by  what  may  properly 
be  called  a  metaphysical  quibble.  They  reason  thus.  There  can 
be  no  sin  before  the  first  sin ;  he,  therefore,  who  is  the  author  of 
sin,  cannot  be  sinful,  for  that  would  be  to  suppose  that  sin  existed 
before  it  did  exist ;  that  is,  sin  before  the  first  sin.  Now,  if  such 
sophistry  deserves  an  answer,  it  may  be  briefly  given  thus.  When 
we  speak  of  God  as  the  author  of  sin,  the  meaning  is,  sin  in  the 
creature  ;  and  when  of  the  first  sin,  we  mean  the  first  sin  of  man ; 
but  if  it  be  true  that  God,  by  an  immediate  agency,  produces  this 
sin  in  man,  the  consequence  would  be,  that  moral  evil  in  man  or 
any  other  creature,  is  not  the  only  or  the  first  evil,  of  that  kind, 
since  it  must  have  had  a  previous  existence  in  the  cause  of  these 
sinful  acts  of  the  creature.  A  parallel  case  is  this :  God  is  the 
author  of  holiness,  but  if  holiness  be  produced  by  God,  then  it  did 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  75 

not  exist  before  it  was  produced ;  and  thus  we  come  to  the  impious 
conclusion,  that  because  God  is  the  author  of  holiness,  there  is  no 
holiness  in  him,  otherwise,  holiness  existed  before  it  was  produced, 
that  is,  before  it  did  exist. 

Again,  if  God  produces,  by  his  Almighty  power,  all  the  evil 
thoughts  and  purposes  which  arise  in  the  mind  of  the  sinner,  they 
are  not  properly  the  acts  of  the  sinner,  but  of  him  who  produces 
them.  It  is,  indeed,  said,  that  God  acts  upon  us  to  cause  us  to  act, 
and  that  the  act  is  properly  our  own,  if  it  be  our  feeling  or  volition, 
and  it  matters  not  how  it  was  produced.  The  judgment  of  con- 
science is,  that  the  man  is  guilty  of  whatever  he  wills  improperly, 
•however  that  will  may  have  been  produced  in  him.  As  was  men- 
tioned before,  they  insist  that  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  cause 
of  an  act,  in  judging  of  its  moral  nature.  If,  on  our  part,  it  is 
voluntary,  that  is  enough :  the  sin  is  as  much  our  own  as  it  can 
be  ;  and  the  appeal  is  made  to  our  own  consciousness  of  what 
passes  within  our  minds,  when  we  pass  sentence  of  condemnation 
upon  ourselves.  Now,  there  is  some  truth  in  this  statement,  which 
gives  plausibility  to  the  whole.  It  is  true,  that  when  we  are  con- 
scious of  an  evil  purpose,  we  immediately  experience  a  sense  of 
guilt,  without  any  inquiry  after  the  origin  of  this  volition  ;  but  why 
is  this,  but  because  we  take  it  for  granted,  in  all  our  judgments 
respecting  our  sins,  that  they  are  our  own  acts.  And  if  men  could 
be  convinced  that  God  was  the  author  of  all  their  sinful  acts,  they 
would  cease  to  feel  that  they  were  accountable  for  them.  Men, 
commonly,  do  not  believe  in  their  own  existence  more  fairly,  than 
in  the  fact,  that  their  thoughts  are  the  actions  of  their  own  souls, 
and  that  they  originate  in  the  activity  of  their  own  minds.  We  do 
not  deny  the  power  of  God  to  produce  what  he  pleases  in  any 
mind,  but  if  he  produces  evil,  the  creature  is  excusable,  for  who 
can  resist  omnipotence  ?  Who  can  think  anything  else,  upon  this 
hypothesis,  than  what  is  created  within  him  ?  But  an  attempt  has 
been  made  to  show  that  God  may  produce  sin  in  the  creature,  and 
the  acts  remain  sinful,  because  it  is  admitted,  by  all  who  believe  in 
the  operations  of  grace,  that  he  works  in  all  his  people,  both  "  to 
will  and  to  do."  If  then  the  holy  exercises  of  the  pious  are  pro- 
duced by  the  agency  of  God,  and  yet  these  are  holy  exercises,  and 
are  felt  by  the  saints  to  be  their  own ;  then  there  is  no  reason  why 
he  may  not  work  in  sinners  all  their  sinful  exercises,  and  yet  they 
be  their  own  sins.  To  which  we  would  reply,  that  sin  is  sin  by 
whomsoever  produced.  As  was  said  before,  we  do  not  deny  the 
power  of  God  to  produce  evil  in  the  sinner's  mind  ;  but  we  deny 
that  it  is  consistent  with  his  holiness.  The  question  now,  however, 
is,  whether  the  sinner  can  be  justly  punished  for  evil  thoughts 
wrought  in  his  heart  by  Almighty  power.  And  we  are  willing  to 
admit  the  parallel  brought  for  illustration,  and  when  extended  to 
its  proper  length,  it  will  overthrow  the  cause  which  it  was  brought 
to  support.  When  God  works  in  his  people  to  make  them  willing 
to  love  and  obey  him,  is  the  praise  of  their  exercises  of  grace  due 


76 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD. 


to  them  ?  Do  they  not  universally  ascribe  all  the  praise  to  God, 
saying,  Not  unto  us.  &c.  ?  They  feel  that  if  such  acts  are  rewarded, 
it  is  a  mere  matter  of  favour.  Look,  then,  at  the  other  side  of  the 
parallel.  When  God  works  in  the  hearts  of  the  wicked  to  do  evil, 
the  blame  is  not  to  be  ascribed  to  them,  but  to  him  who  is  the  true 
author  of  their  exercises  ;  and  they  deserve  no  punishment  for  such 
acts,  unless  God  should  choose,  gratuitously  or  arbitrarily,  to  inflict 
punishment  on  them. 

And  if  God  can  create  an  active  being,  we  mean  one  essentially 
active,  capable  of  originating  action,  why  have  recourse  to  other 
efficient  causes  to  account  for  the  existence  of  the  free  actions  of 
such  creatures  ?  Some  writers  assume  it  as  a  maxim,  that  no 
creature  can  act  without  the  physical  efficient  energy  of  God 
co-operating,  to  give  him  the  ability  to  put  forth  the  act ;  or  as  it 
is  more  simply  expressed  by  the  abettors  of  the  last-mentioned 
theory,  no  creature  can  act  but  as  it  is  acted  on.  But  we  deny 
that  this  is  a  self-evident  truth ;  and  we  are  sure  it  never  can  be 
demonstrated.  It  is  freely  admitted  that  every  creature  is  conti- 
nually sustained  in  existence,  and  in  the  possession  of  its  faculties, 
by  the  power  of  God  ;  but  if  that  creature  be  in  its  very  essence 
active,  it  is  evident  from  the  premises,  that  nothing  more  is  neces- 
sary to  cause  it  to  act,  than  to  continue  its  existence.  According 
to  our  theory,  therefore,  the  efficient  cause  of  free  actions  is  to  be 
looked  for  nowhere  else  but  in  the  free  agents  themselves ;  except 
in  special  cases  where  God  may  choose,  for  wise  and  good  ends, 
supernaturally  to  operate  on  their  minds.  And  if  there  be  no 
necessity  of  introducing  other  causes  of  free  and  voluntary  actions, 
why  should  we  encumber  the  subject  more  deeply  with  the  doc- 
trine of  divine  efficiency  or  concourse  in  the  performance  of  sinful 
acts.  No  distinctions,  however  nice,  will  ever  be  sufficient  to 
guard  that  system  from  the  shocking  consequence  of  making  God 
the  author  of  sin. 

But  it  is  feared,  that  the  theory  which  we  defend  will  make  the 
creature  independent  of  the  Creator ;  there  is  no  reason  for  appre- 
hension, as  we  not  only  admit  that  the  power  of  God  is,  every 
moment,  necessary  for  the  sustenance  of  the  creature,  but  we 
maintain  that  every  action  of  the  creature  will  be  accordant  with 
his  eternal  purpose.  To  obtain  a  distinct  view  of  this  subject,  it  is 
requisite  to  recall  to  mind  a  few  undeniable  principles.  The  first 
is,  that  in  the  production  of  creatures,  God  acts  wisely,  or  as  a 
being  of  intelligence ;  like  finite  beings,  God  has  no  need  to  delibe- 
rate, compare,  and  reason,  but  he  perceives  instinctively  all  pos- 
sible things  with  all  their  possible  relations.  In  wisdom  he  made 
all  things  that  are  made.  Every  minute  part  of  every  animal 
and  of  every  vegetable  was  wisely  ordained  to  occupy  its  ap- 
propriate place,  and  suited  to  answer  its  appropriate  end.  The 
whole  system,  in  the  various  relations  of  one  part  to  another, 
was  arranged  and  adjusted  in  infinite  wisdom.  This  supposes 
that  the   whole    existed  in    idea  before   the   infinite  mind  when 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  77 

his  purpose  was  formed  to  give  it  existence.  In  this  plan  free 
agents  formed  a  part ;  these,  with  all  their  actions,  also,  were 
contemplated  previously  (in  the  order  of  nature)  to  the  decree 
which  determined  their  future  existence  to  be  certain. 

Again,  in  selecting  his  plan,  the  great  Creator  acted  with  perfect 
freedom.  He  was  under  no  necessity  to  create  anything.  He  is 
independent  of  all  creatures,  and  stands  in  need  of  nothing.  Not 
only  was  he  at  perfect  liberty  to  create  or  not,  but  he  was  free  to 
adopt  any  system  which  pleased  him.  If  there  had  been  anything 
in  the  existing  plan  which  did  not  please  him,  or  would  not  answer 
his  purpose  perfectly,  he  was  at  liberty  to  reject  the  whole,  and 
would  have  done  so.  When  he  purposed  to  create  the  progenitor 
of  the  human  family,  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  have  given  existence 
to  another  of  the  same  species :  he  might,  for  example,  have  made 
the  last  man  first;  or  have  formed  a  person  distinct  from  any  who 
ever  shall  actually  exist.  Now  this  being  the  case,  the  inquiry 
arises,  could  not  God  have  placed  at  the  head  of  the  human  family, 
on  whom  the  destiny  of  the  rest  should  depend,  one  who  would  not 
have  sinned  ?  If  he  could  not :  if  every  creature  that  could  have 
been  created  of  the  human  species  would  certainly  have  sinned  as 
well  as  Adam,  then  it  follows  eventually  that  sin  could  not  be 
avoided  if  man  existed  ;  and  the  conclusion  is,  that  a  determination 
to  create  man  involved  in  it  the  purpose  to  permit  the  existence  of 
sin.  But  if  the  alternative  be  taken,  and  it  be  said,  that  God  could 
have  created,  in  the  place  of  Adam,  one  who  would  not  have 
sinned,  still  the  same  conclusion  forces  itself  upon  us ;  for  if,  when  • 
he  might  have  formed  a  creature  who  would  not  have  transgressed, 
he  chose  to  form  one  whom  he  knew  would,  it  is  as  evident  as  any- 
thing can  be,  that  by  this  selection  he  did  determine  to  permit  the 
existence  of  sin. 

Let  us  now,  for  a  moment,  examine  the  theory  which  supposes 
that  the  plan  of  the  Almighty,  as  it  originally  existed  in  the  eternal 
mind,  is  not  the  one  which  is  actually  in  existence ;  but  that  while 
it  was  his  purpose  that  evil  should  have  no  place  in  the  universe, 
contrary  to  his  will  and  plan,  it  has  come  in  through  the  transgres- 
sion of  free  agents ;  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  a  new  plan 
has  been  adopted,  accommodated  to  the  exigence  of  the  case.     If 
we  understand  the  Arminian  theory,  this  is  the  point  by  which  it 
stands  distinguished  from  the  theory  which  we  believe.     The  mere 
statement  of  this  opinion  seems  to  us  to  carry  with  it  a  confutation. 
For,  when  the  original  plan  was  formed  and  adopted,  according  to 
the  premises,  it  was  certainly  known  that  it  would  utterly  fail ;  and 
was  it  ever  heard  of  among  creatures,  that  any  intelligent  being 
seriously  formed  a  purpose  which  he  knew  at  the  time  could  not 
and  would  not  be  accomplished  ?    To  suppose,  then,  that  God,  with 
a  perfect  prescience  of  all  future  events,  resolved  upon  a  plan  of 
the  universe  entirely  different  from  what  he  knew  would  come  to 
pass,  is  a  scheme  so  unreasonable,  that  we  know  not  how  any  one, 
after  distinctly  considering  it,  can  adopt  it :  and  we  seem  to  our- 


78  THE    DECREES    OP    GOD. 

selves  now  to  perceive  the  reason  why  some  speculative  Arminians 
have  been  driven  to  the  theory  mentioned  above,  that  God  did  not 
choose  to  know  what  would  really  take  place. 

But  passing  by  the  inconsistency  of  this  theory  on  account  of 
these  reasons,  let  us  see  to  what  consequences  it  will  lead  us.  The 
hypothesis  is,  that  the  present  state  of  the  world  does  not  accord 
with  the  original  plan  of  the  Almighty ;  but  that  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  sin  against  his  will,  the  whole  state  of  the  moral  world  is 
changed,  and  of  course  the  government  of  the  world  by  providence 
must  be  entirely  different  from  what  it  would  have  been  if  man 
had  not  sinned.  One  undeniable  consequence  is,  that  the  end  which 
God  had  in  view  in  the  creation  is  Jost,  unless  we  suppose  that  his 
glory  can  be  promoted  as  well  by  a  state  of  things  which  pros- 
trates his  own  plan,  as  by  its  execution.  But  if  the  ruler  of  the 
universe  was  frustrated  in  his  purpose  by  the  first  sin,  so  he  must 
be  by  every  subsequent  transgression  ;  and,  therefore,  the  existence 
of  creatures,  instead  of  answering  his  original  purpose,  whether 
that  was  to  make  them  happy  or  to  promote  his  own  glory,  has 
entirely  failed  of  its  complete  accomplishment.  And  if  this  has 
occurred  by  the  actual  course  of  events  in  time  past,  what  security 
is  there,  that  the  same  will  not  be  the  fact  in  time  to  come  ?  yea, 
what  security  is  there,  that  things  will  not  continue  to  grow 
worse  and  worse,  until  all  nature  shall  rush  to  some  dreadful  cata- 
strophe, in  which  everything  good  in  the  creation  shall  be  utterly 
lost  in  everlasting  darkness  and  confusion  ? 

It  will  not  be  satisfactory  to  answer,  that  God  has  wisdom  and 
power  sufficient  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe  ;  for  his  wisdom  and 
power,  according  to  the  hypothesis,  are  not  adequate  to  the  pre- 
vention of  sin  and  its  consequences  ;  and  if  these  may  arise  and 
spread  and  increase,  how  can  the  consequence  supposed  be  pre- 
vented ?  If  the  plan  of  the  Almighty  Ruler  of  the  universe  may 
be  thwarted  in  one  instance,  it  may  in  all.  No  security  for  the 
final  well-being  of  the  universe  can  be  found  anywhere.  Now  is 
it  reasonable  to  think  that,  on  these  principles,  a  God  of  infinite 
wisdom  would  ever  have  made  creatures  capable  of  frustrating  all 
his  plans,  and  disappointing  all  his  most  benevolent  purposes  ? 

But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  God,  foreseeing  the  evil  which  would 
arise  from  the  abuse  of  free  will,  determined  to  provide  against  it, 
and  accordingly  has  done  so,  by  sending  his  son  into  the  world  to 
repair  the  ruins  which  sin  has  made  ;  and  thus,  although  God  will 
not  be  glorified  according  to  his  original  design,  he  will,  neverthe- 
less, be  honoured  by  the  new  remedial  scheme.  The  ground  of 
the  objection,  however,  still  remains.  If  God's  first  plan  was 
entirely  frustrated  by  the  sin  of  his  creatures,  what  security  is  there 
that  the  same  will  not  happen  in  relation  to  this  new  plan  ?  As  the 
will  of  man  is  still  free,  and  as  the  success  of  the  mediatorial 
scheme  depends  on  the  choice  of  man,  why  may  it  not  happen 
that  the  end  aimed  at  in  the  second  will  also  be  frustrated  ?  Indeed, 
according  to  this  theory,  the  fact  has  already  occurred  ;  for  the 


THE    DECREES    OF    GOD.  79 

design  of  God  in  sending  his  Son  was  to  save  all  men,  but  it  is 
acknowledged,  that  only  a  small  part  of  the  human  race  has  been 
brought  to  salvation  hitherto.  And  there  is  no  better  hope  for  the 
future,  for  men  are  not  better  now  than  formerly,  and  judging  from 
the  past,  we  may  conjecture,  that  the  greater  number  will  continue 
to  neglect  this  great  salvation.  Hence  it  appears,  that  the  great 
God  has  been  disconcerted  and  disappointed  in  all  his  designs  :  not 
only  was  his  original  plan  of  a  universe  without  sin  frustrated,  but 
his  remedial  plan,  which  was  to  save  all  men  from  sin,  has  also 
failed.  These  are  consequences  which  inevitably  flow  from  the 
hypothesis,  that  the  cause  of  events  in  the  world  is  not  in  accord- 
ance with  the  original  plan  of  the  Creator.  But  it  is  impossible, 
after  an  impartial  view  of  the  divine  attributes,  to  believe  in  these 
conclusions.  They  are  repugnant  to  reason.  They  are  dishonour- 
able to  the  divine  perfections. 

It  may  be,  however,  that  the  sober  Arminian  will  be  disposed  to 
take  different  ground,  and  to  maintain  that  God  did,  with  the  pre- 
science of  all  his  sins,  determine  to  create  man ;  and  that  the 
existing  state  of  things  he  did  resolve  to  permit ;  but  that  he 
decreed  nothing  respecting  these  actions,  but  left  them  free  ;  so 
that  when  the  creature  sins,  he  is  not  under  any  necessity  of  doing 
wrong  from  any  divine  purpose.  Now,  here  it  is  evident,  again, 
that  there  is  an  idea  attached  to  the  doctrine  of  decrees  which  does 
not  belong  to  it,  and  which  we  have  heretofore  laboured  to  separate 
from  it.  It  is,  that  if  their  sinful  actions  are  decreed,  they  cannot 
be  free,  and  must  come  to  pass  by  an  unavoidable  necessity.  To 
remove  all  difficulty,  however,  on  this  account,  we  will  agree  to 
meet  the  Arminian  on  the  ground  last  selected.  And  we  do  aver, 
that  in  this  theory  he  comes  substantially  into  the  very  doctrine 
which  we  maintain.  For  if  God  formed  man  with  the  full  cer- 
tainty of  all  his  sins,  then  the  purpose  to  create  such  a  being  with 
a  foresight  of  such  acts,  is  virtually  decreeing  the  future  existence 
of  such  acts.  If,  when  the  purpose  was  formed  to  create  Adam, 
his  fall  was  distinctly  foreseen,  then  the  determination  to  give  Adam 
existence  involved  the  purpose  that  such  an  act  as  his  transgression 
should  also  exist.  Not  that  God  intended  or  needed  to  do  anything 
to  cause  man  to  sin  ;  this  we  reject,  as  much  as  the  Arminian  : 
but  he  resolved  to  permit  this  event.  And  here  is  the  true  ground 
of  distinction  between  effective  and  permissive  decrees  ;  in  the 
execution  of  the  first,  God  acts  himself;  but  in  the  execution  of  the 
last,  other  agents  act,  and  act  freely,  and  without  constraint. 

It  does  appear,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  ground  on  which  the 
sober  Arminian  and  moderate  Calvinist  can  meet ;  and  on  which 
even  their  views  of  the  divine  decrees  can  be  made  to  harmonize. 


THE  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  PELAGIANISM, 


PUBLISHED    IN    1830. 


With  propriety  the  term  militant  has  been  applied  to  the  church 
upon  earth.  No  sooner  was  the  light  of  truth  sent  down  from 
heaven,  than  it  fell  into  interminable  conflict  with  the  darkness  of 
error.  And  not  only  was  it  necessary  to  contend  with  the  powers 
of  darkness  without  the  kingdom  of  Christ,  but  hideous  forms  of 
error  were  generated  within  the  bosom  of  the  church ;  according 
to  the  prophetic  warning  of  our  Saviour,  "  Beware  of  false 
prophets  which  come  to  you  in  sheep's  clothing  ;"  and  that  of  the 
apostle  Paul,  in  his  solemn  valedictory  to  the  elders  of  Ephesus, 
"  For  I  know  this,  that  after  my  departing  shall  grievous  wolves 
enter  in  among  you,  not  sparing  the  flock.  Also  of  your  own  selves 
shall  men  arise,  speaking  perverse  things,  to  draw  away  disciples 
after  them."  Even  while  Paul  lived,  the  churches  were  exceed- 
ingly d.sturbed  and  distracted  by  false  teachers,  who  brought  in 
"  another  gospel,"  and  endeavoured  to  overthrow  from  the  founda- 
tion the  doctrine  of  gratuitous  justification  by  faith  without  works  ; 
and  to  substitute  a  legal  system,  according  to  which  justification 
before  God  could  be  expected  only  from  obedience  to  the  ceremo- 
nial law  of  Moses.  A  large  portion  of  the  inspired  writings  of  this 
apostle  have  direct  reference  to  the  opinions  of  these  Judaizing 
heretics.  Others  arose  in  the  church  who  denied  the  resurrection 
of  the  body,  and  maintained  that  all  the  resurrection  to  be  expected 
was  already  past.  They  seem  to  have  explained  all  that  our  Lord 
had  said  respecting  the  resurrection  spiritually,  or  as  relating  to  the 
purification  or  revivification  of  the  soul.  As  the  former  errorists 
manifestly  came  out  from  the  sect  of  the  Pharisees,  the  latter  might 
have  derived  their  origin  from  the  Sadducees,  or  from  some  of  the 
schools  of  heathen  philosophy.  From  these  facts  in  the  history  of 
the  apostolic  church,  we  learn,  that  when  converts  were  made  to 
the  society  of  Christians,  many  of  them  retained  something  of  the 
leaven  of  their  old  errors,  and  endeavoured  to  modify  and  corrupt 
the  pure  doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  by  accommodating  them  to  their 
preconceived  opinions.  And  as  all  the  first  Christians  had  been 
brought  up  in  another  religion,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  errors 
abounded  among  those  professing  Christianity,  even  in  the  times  of 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  81 

the  apostles.  This  is,  indeed,  contrary  to  the  vulgar  opinion, 
which  considers  the  primitive  church  as  being  in  all  respects  near 
perfection.  This  opinion,  however,  is  not  founded  on  any  informa- 
tion given  to  us  in  the  apostolic  writings ;  for,  in  addition  to  what 
has  already  been  observed,  we  may  refer  to  the  epistles  of  our 
Lord  to  the  seven  churches  of  Asia,  for  further  proof  of  the  exist- 
ence and  prevalence  of  error  in  the  days  of  the  apostles.  And  to- 
wards the  close  of  that  age,  the  impudence  and  licentiousness  of  the 
propagators  of  error  may  be  learned  from  the  catholic  epistles  of 
John,  the  second  of  Peter,  and  the  epistle  of  Jude  ;  all  of  which  are 
filled  with  descriptions  of  false  teachers,  and  warnings  against  thei; 
pestiferous  influence. 

Of  the  age  immediately  succeeding  that  of  the  apostles,  our  in- 
formation is  very  imperfect ;  either  because  there  were  few  who 
had  leisure  or  inclination  for  writing  ;  or  because  their  works  have 
perished ;  which  we  know  to  have  been  the  fact  in  regard  to  some 
important  records.  But  from  all  the  authentic  history  which  has 
reached  our  times,  we  learn  that  swarms  of  heretics  infested  the 
church,  even  while  she  was  struggling  under  the  direful  strokes  of 
sanguinary  persecution.  No  age  has  produced  more  monstrous 
errors  than  the  second  century,  of  which  Irenaeus  has  given  us  a 
detailed  account :  and  all  this  congeries  of  extravagant  opinions 
originated  in  the  false  philosophy  of  those  who  professed  to  em- 
brace Christianity,  The  loathsome  spawn  of  Gnosticism  was  cast 
upon  the  church  from  the  corrupt  but  fertile  source  of  the  oriental 
philosophy.  The  original  fountain  of  this  extraordinary  inundation 
of  absurd  heresy,  was  a  fanciful  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  God.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  pursue  this  subject,  but  we  are  admonished 
by  the  narrowness  of  our  limits  to  forbear. 

It  does  not  appear,  however,  that,  amidst  the  multifarious  errors 
which  were  broached  in  the  first  four  centuries,  any  controversy 
arose  respecting  the  doctrines  of  sin  and  grace.  In  regard  to  the 
person  of  the  Mediator,  error  had  assumed  almost  every  possible 
shape,  both  as  it  related  to  his  humanity  and  divinity,  and  the  na- 
ture and  effects  of  the  union  between  them.  Council  after  council 
had  been  convened  to  discuss  and  decide  on  points  connected  with 
this  important  subject ;  and  theologians  of  the  first  learning  and 
highest  reputation  employed  their  pens  in  defence  of  the  catholic 
doctrine. 

But  early  in  the  fifth  century,  a  new  doctrine  began  to  be  pub- 
lished by  Pelagius,  a  British  monk,  on  the  subject  of  man's  natural 
condition,  and  the  connection  which  subsisted  between  Adam  and 
his  posterity.  That  the  doctrine  of  Pelagius  was  new,  and  different 
from  the  opinions  which  had  commonly  been  received  in  the 
church,  needs  no  other  proof  than  the  impression  which  it  made  on 
the  minds  of  the  great  majority  of  learned  theologians  who  lived  at 
that  time.  And  that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  then  received  by 
the  church,  was  the  same  which  had  been  always  held  from  the 
times  of  the  apostles,  is  exceedingly  probable,  from  the  fact  that  the 

6 


82  EARLY    HISTORY    OP    PELAGIANISM. 

subject  never  underwent  any  public  discussion  ;  while  it  is  rarely 
the  case  that  a  doctrine  entirely  new  can  be  introduced  and  propa- 
gated everywhere,  without  giving  rise  to  much  controversy,  and 
exciting  much  public  attention.  Pelagius  did,  indeed,  in  his  contro- 
versy with  Augustine,  allege,  that  this  father  had  invented  the  doc- 
trine of  original  sin,  which  was  unknown  to  preceding  ages  ;  but 
in  answer  to  this  charge,  Augustine  appealed  to  many  writers  of 
the  first  ages,  to  show  that  they  entertained  the  same  views  as  those 
which  he  now  advocated.  These  testimonies  are  not  so  explicit  as 
could  be  collected  from  the  writings  of  those  who  lived  after  the 
discussion  of  this  subject  took  place.  But  this  is  always  the  case. 
When  any  point  of  doctrine  is  undisputed  and  received  by  all, 
while  it  is  everywhere  tacitly  admitted  or  incidentally  referred  to, 
it  is  never  made  the  subject  of  accurate  definition ;  nor  is  it  ex- 
pounded with  that  fulness  and  caution  which  become  necessary 
after  it  has  been  called  in  question  or  opposed.  When  Augustine 
was  urged  to  bring  forward  proofs  from  the  fathers  who  preceded 
him,  he  answered  the  demand  in  the  following  sensible  manner : 
"  Quid  igitur  opus  est  ut  eorum  scrutemur  opuscula,  qui  priusquam 
ipsa  haeresis  oiiretur,  non  habuerunt  necessitatem  in  hac  difficili  ad 
solvendum  quaestione  versari,  quod  proculdubio  facerent  si  respon- 
dere  talibus  cogerentur?"  That  is,  "  What  occasion  is  there  that 
we  should  search  the  works  of  those,  who,  living  before  this  heresy 
arose,  had  no  necessity  of  handling  this  difficult  question,  which 
doubtless  they  would  have  done,  if  they  had  been  obliged  to  an- 
swer such  men  as  we  have  to  deal  with  ?" 

Jerome,  in  several  places  in  his  works,  ascribes  the  new  opi- 
nions propagated  by  Pelagius  to  Rufin,  who,  he  alleges,  borrowed 
them  from  Origen  :  but  as  Jerome  is  known  to  have  cherished  an 
implacable  hostility  to  Rufin,  and  also  to  the  memory  of  Origen, 
his  testimony  on  this  subject  ought  to  be  received  with  caution. 
And  we  cannot  find  that  he  brings  forward  any  passages  from  the 
writings  of  Rufin  which  are  sufficient  to  gain  credit  to  the  allega- 
tion against  him. 

Pelagius  is  admitted,  by  his  keenest  opposers,  to  have  been  a 
man  of  learning,  and  of  estimable  character.  And  on  other  points, 
especially  on  the  warmly-contested  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  he  not 
only  was  orthodox,  but  wrote  three  books  in  defence  of  the  catholic 
opinion,  in  which  he  gave  deserved  praise  to  Athanasius  for  his 
great  constancy  and  soundness  in  the  faith,  and  did  not  hesitate  to 
pronounce  the  opinions  of  Arius  impious.  He,  moreover,  published 
fourteen  books,  containing  an  exposition  of  the  epistles  of  Paul ; 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  several  learned  men,  are  still  extant  in  the 
commentaries  subjoined  to  those  of  Jerome  on  Paul's  epistles.  One 
thing  is  certain  in  relation  to  these  commentaries  ;  they  do  not  con- 
tain the  opinions  of  Jerome  on  the  subject  of  original  sin,  but  pre- 
cisely those  of  Pelagius.  Besides  the  books  already  mentioned,  he 
wrote  many  letters  to  distinguished  individuals,  most  of  which  are 
lost ;  and  also  a  book,  De  Natura,  in  which  he  extols  the  powers 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  83 

and  virtues  of  human  nature ;  and  a  small  book  addressed  to  Pope 
Innocent,  containing  a  confession  of  the  catholic  faith,  as  he  had 
received  it.  But  it  was  a  complaint  against  him  by  some  of  his 
contemporaries,  that  he  left  it  to  his  disciples  principally  to  write, 
so  that  he  might  have  the  opportunity,  when  he  judged  it  expedient, 
of  denying  that  the  opinions  published  by  them  were  his  own.  Yet, 
on  the  whole,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  reputation  of  Pelagius 
stood  high  in  the  church  before  he  began  to  propagate  his  heretical 
opinions.  Jerome,  who  was  never  inclined  to  spare  his  adversa- 
ries, seems  to  have  respected  him,  for  in  his  first  piece  against  his 
opinions  he  refrains  from  mentioning  his  name,  but  speaks  of  him- 
self under  the  fictitious  name  of  Atticus,  and  of  his  adversary  by 
the  name  of  Clitobulus.  Another  writer  of  that  age,  who  seemed 
solicitous  to  speak  evil  of  Pelagius,  found  nothing  to  hold  up  to  cen- 
sure or  ridicule  but  his  bodily  defects.  Augustine  acknowledges 
that  he  was  a  man  of  chaste  and  unblemished  character  ;  andChry- 
sostom  laments  that  a  man  of  so  great  probity  should  have  fallen 
into  heresy. 

But,  although  Pelagius  was  the  author  of  the  system  which  has 
been  denominated  from  him,  yet  some  of  his  disciples  were  much 
more  distinguished  in  the  defence  and  propagation  of  these  opi- 
nions. Among  these,  the  most  celebrated  was  Ccelestius.  Augus- 
tine admits  that  he  was  a  man  of  most  penetrating  genius.  Before 
he  became  a  follower  of  Pelagius,  he  published  three  small  treatises, 
addressed  to  his  parents,  in  the  form  of  epistles,  which  contained 
nothing  erroneous,  but  were  full  of  incitements  to  a  virtuous  life. 
What  he  wrote  afterwards,  we  know  only  from  the  citations  and 
references  of  Augustine,  and  others  of  his  opponents.  When  he 
was  condemned  by  the  council  of  Carthage,  he  travelled  into  Asia, 
where,  it  is  said,  he  was  ordained  a  presbyter,  and  afterwards  took 
up  his  residence  in  Sicily,  where  he  continued  by  his  discourses 
and  writings  to  propagate  the  doctrines  of  Pelagius. 

Julian,  an  Italian  bishop,  the  son  of  Memorius,  bishop  of  Capua, 
was,  however,  the  most  zealous  and  able  writer  in  favour  of  the 
opinions  of  Pelagius.  When  quite  a  young  man  he  was  known  to 
Augustine  and  greatly  beloved  by  him,  as  appears  from  a  letter 
which  he  addressed  to  the  father  of  Julian.  This  young  man  was 
so  rich  in  mental  endowments,  and  possessed  of  an  eloquence  so 
commanding  and  persuasive,  that  he  received  the  appellation  of 
the  Roman  Demosthenes.  And  from  what  remains  of  his  contro- 
versial works,  it  is  manifest  that  he  had  a  mind  of  uncommon  vi- 
gour and  penetration.  The  character  given  of  him  by  Gennadius 
of  Marseilles,  is,  "That  he  was  a  man  of  a  penetrating  genius, 
learned  in  the  scriptures,  and  an  accurate  scholar  both  in  the  Greek 
and  Latin  languages."  Before  he  embraced  the  impious  doctrine 
of  Pelagius,  he  was  distinguished  among  the  doctors  of  the  church. 
Afterwards,  he  undertook  the  defence  of  the  Pelagian  errors 
against  Augustine ;  first  in  a  work  consisting  of  four  books,  and 
then  in  another  work  of  eight  books.     He  is  said  also  to  have  writ- 


84  EARLY    HISTORY    OF   PELAGMN1SM. 

ten  a  work  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue,  in  which  the  parties  in  this 
controversy  are  introduced  as  defending  their  respective  opinions. 
But  Gennadius,  and  others  who  followed  him,  are  entirely  mistaken 
in  ascribing  this  dialogue,  or  disputation,  to  Julian.  It  is  the  pro- 
duction of  Augustine,  who  selects  from  the  eight  books  of  Julian 
the  arguments  which  are  there  used  in  favour  of  Pelagianism,  and 
then  answers  them  in  his  own  name.  The  title  of  this  disputation 
is  Altercatio  Amborum.  The  occasion  of  writing  this  book  Augus- 
tine himself  has  informed  us  of  in  his  own  preface,  where  he  says 
that  an  illustrious  man  sent  him  certain  extracts  which  some  per- 
son had  made  from  the  books  of  Julian,  the  Pelagian  heretic,  and 
requested  that  he  would  give  an  answer,  "  To  these,"  says  he,  "  I 
now  return  an  answer,  first  setting  down  the  very  words  of  Julian 
and  then  subjoining  my  answers  to  each  particular  in  order." 

Julian  also  indited  two  letters,  which  were  published  ;  the  one 
addressed  to  Zosimus,  bishop  of  Rome,  the  other,  in  the  name  of 
eighteen  bishops  who  united  with  him,  to  Rufus,  bishop  of  Thessa- 
lonica.  The  venerable  Bede,  in  his  commentary  on  the  Song  of 
Solomon,  mentions  and  refutes  a  work  of  Julian  on  the  same  sub- 
ject. Julian  prefixed  to  his  exposition  of  the  Canticles  a  work  en- 
titled De  Amove,  in  which  he  labours  to  prove  that  there  is  implant- 
ed in  all  men,  a  natural  principle  of  love,  which  continues  from  in- 
fancy to  old  age,  and  is  preserved,  without  loss  of  vigour,  by  mere 
human  exertion. 

He  wrote,  moreover,  a  book  concerning  the  virtue  of  constancy, 
and  an  epistle  to  Demetrius  ;  in  both  of  which,  according  to  Bede, 
he  defended  the  Pelagian  doctrine  of  free-will. 

Pelagius  came  to  Rome  about  A.D.  410,  when  Innocent,  the 
bishop,  was  absent  in  consequence  of  the  capture  of  the  city  by 
Alaric,  and  there  began  to  scatter  the  seeds  of  his  doctrine,  under 
the  specious  veil  of  certain  interrogatories  which  he  proposed  for 
consideration  and  discussion.  Ccelestius,  in  Sicily,  pursued  the 
same  policy  and  about  the  same  time.  Not  long  after  this,  both 
Pelagius  and  Ccelestius  passed  over  to  Africa,  but  Pelagius  did  not 
long  continue  there,  but  travelled  on  to  Asia  Minor.  By  this  time 
the  rumour  of  his  heresy  was  spread  abroad  ;  Jerome  in  the  east, 
and  Augustine  in  the  west,  had  taken  up  their  pens  against  what 
they  considered  a  pestiferous  doctrine.  A^counjft  was  therefore 
called  at  Diospolis,  or  Lydda,  in  Palestine,  and  fourteen  bishops 
met  to  investigate  the  doctrines  of  Pelagius.  Everything  here 
was  as  favourable  to  him  as  he  could  have  wished  ;  for  neither  of 
the  two  bishops  who  were  his  accusers  were  present ;  and  as  the 
writings  of  Pelagius  were  in  the  Latin  language,  his  judges  were 
totally  incompetent  to  form  an  accurate  judgment  of  his  doctrines, 
for  want  of  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  Latin  tongue.  Moreover, 
John,  bishop  of  Jerusalem,  warmly  espoused  the  cause  of  Pelagius, 
and  he  was  without  difficulty  acquitted  of  the  charge  of  heresy, 
and  received  by  the  assembled  bishops  as  an  orthodox  brother. 

The  presbyter  Orosius,  coming  to   Carthage   from   Palestine, 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANI8M.  85 

brought  with  him  the  accusation  preferred  against  Pelagius  by  He- 
rus  and  Lazarus,  and  communicated  this  document  to  a  council 
then  sitting  at  Carthage,  on  the  affairs  of  the  church.  The  bishops 
there  assembled  before  they  heard  of  the  decision  of  the  council  of 
Diospolis  were  much  alarmed,  and  wrote  to  Innocent,  of  Rome, 
their  view  of  the  opinions  of  Pelagius ;  adding,  that  if  he  and  his 
partisans  did  not  unequivocally  reject  these  errors  they  ought  to 
be  immediately  excommunicated.  These  resolutions  were  signed 
by  sixty-eight  bishops.  Another  synod  met  shortly  afterwards  at 
Milevum,  in  Numidia,  and  addressed  letters  on  the  same  subject  to 
the  bishop  of  Rome.  The  result  of  the  eastern  council  being  now 
known  in  Africa,  Augustine,  Alypius,  and  Aurelius,  with  two  other 
bishops,  wrote  a  more  full  and  particular  account  of  the  whole  con 
troversy  to  Innocent,  and  explained  how  the  council  of  Diospolis 
had  most  probably  been  imposed  on  by  the  subtil ty  of  Pelagius. 
Innocent  entered  fully  into  the  views  of  the  African  bishops,  and  in 
his  answer  expressed  the  same  conditional  condemnation  of  the  au- 
thors of  the  heresy.  But  as  Pelagius  had  diffused  his  doctrine  ex- 
tensively, and  put  on  it  a  fair  face,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should 
be  met  with  argument,  as  well  as  decisions  of  councils :  and  no 
man  in  the  church  wa%  so  well  qualified  for  this  work  as  Augustine, 
who  did  not  shrink  from  the  arduous  task,  but  entered  into  this  field 
of  controversy,  in  which  he  was  occupied  for  twenty  years. 

Pelagius  gloried  greatly  in  his  acquittal ;  on  which  occasion  he 
wrote  to  a  friend,  that  fourteen  bishops  had  agreed  with  him  that 
man  might  live  without  sin,  and  easily  keep  the  commandments  of 
God  if  he  would.  He  also  wrote  to  Augustine  an  account  of  his 
acquittal ;  and  immediately  proceeded  to  publish  his  opinions  more 
boldly,  in  four  books  which  he  wrote  on  the  subject  of  free-will, 
and  in  which  he  entirely  denied  the  doctrine  of  original  sin. 

The  first  thing  which  Augustine  wrote  expressly  against  the 
opinions  of  Pelagius,  was  three  books  addressed  to  Marcellinus, 
Concerning  the  demerit  and  remission  of  sins,  and  the  baptism  of 
children.  In  these,  Pelagius  is  treated  very  respectfully,  because 
Augustine  still  believed  him  to  be  a  pious  man,  and  because  his  re- 
putation in  the  church  was  very  high.  In  these  books,  Augustine 
said  that  it  was  possible  for  a  man,  by  the  aids  of  divine  grace,  to 
live  without  sin,  but  that  no  one  had  ever  yet  attained  to  that  per- 
fection, or  ever  would  in  time  to  come.  At  this  opinion,  Marcelli- 
nus expressed  some  surprise  ;  which  gave  occasion  to  Augustine 
to  write  another  book,  Concerning  the  Letter  and  Spirit,  in  which  he 
keenly  contends  with  the  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of  grace. 

As  Pelagius  had  now,  by  means  of  his  letter  to  Demetrius,  made 
known  his  opinions,  and  spread  them  abroad,  Augustine  did  not 
any  longer  consider  it  necessary  to  forbear  mentioning  his  name  ; 
he  therefore  provided  an  antidote  to  the  aforesaid  letter,  in  an  epis- 
tle addressed  to  Juliana,  the  mother  of  Demetrius,  wnich  is  num- 
bered 143  in  the  Collection  of  his  epistles. 

In  the  year  414  he  seems  to  have  written  his  famous  work,  De 


86  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISiM. 

Natura  et  Gratia,  which  he  dedicated  to  two  young  gentlemen,  Tir 
masius  and  Jacobus,  who  had  recently  been  converted,  from  being 
disciples  of  Pelagius,  to  the  catholic  faith.  These  two  young  men 
had  been  induced  by  the  persuasions  of  Pelagius  to  devote  them- 
selves to  a  monastic  life,  and  at  the  same  time  draik  in  his  self- 
righteous  spirit ;  but  by  the  exertions  of  Augustine  they  were 
brought  back  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  truth. 

In  the  following  year,  415,  Augustine  wrote  a  particular  account 
of  the  proceedings  in  relation  to  Pelagius  which  had  taken  place 
in  the  council  of  Palestine,  and  addressed  it  to  Aurelius,  bishop  of 
Carthage. 

In  the  year  416  the  council  of  Carthage  met  and  addressed  a 
letter  to  Innocent ;  and  Augustine,  in  addition,  wrote  one  in  his 
own  name  and  that  of  several  of  his  friends,  Aurelius,  Alypius, 
Euodeus  and  Possidius.  As  Augustine  had  already  commenced 
writing  against  Pelagius,  a  request  was  made  by  this  council  that 
he  should  go  on  with  the  controversy  ;  in  consequence  of  which  he 
published  this  year  two  books ;  the  one  Concerning  the  Grace  of 
Christ,  the  other  Concerning  Original  Sin. 

About  this  time,  also,  it  is  supposed  that  his  letter  to  Dardanus 
was  written,  which  is  numbered  fifty-seven* in  the  collection  of 
his  epistles,  and,  moreover,  his  book  against  Coelestius,  addressed 
to  the  Bishops  Eutropius  and  Paulus,  Concerning  the  Perfection  of 
Righteousness. 

In  the  year  417,  Augustine,  having  heard  that  there  were  some 
persons  at  Nola  who  had  imbibed  the  doctrine  of  Pelagius,  wrote 
to  Paulinus,  bishop  of  that  place,  Concerning  the  Pelagian  heresy, 
which  letter  is  the  one  hundred  and  sixth  in  the  collection. 

In  418  he  wrote  two  epistles  to  the  Roman  presbyter,  Sixtus, 
one  of  which  was  intended  as  an  express  refutation  of  the  Pelagian 
heresy. 

Thus  it  appears  hpw  indefatigable  this  father  was  in  opposing 
the  heresy  of  Pelagius.  Almost  every  one  of  the  above  works  is 
particularly  mentioned  in  The  Retractations  of  Augustine. 

Innocent,  bishop  of  Rome,  dying  about  this  time,  was  succeeded 
by  Zosimus,  to  whom  both  Pelagius  and  Coelestius  addressed  epis- 
tles, in  which  they  gave  such  a  complexion  to  their  system,  and 
spoke  in  language  so  plausible  and  ambiguous,  that  Zosimus  was 
completely  deceived  by  their  fair  speeches.  He  accordingly  wrote 
to  the  bishops  of  Africa  that  he  considered  Pelagius  an  orthodox 
man.  But  they  showed  in  their  answer  that  it  was  not  enough  for 
these  men  to  acknowledge  the  truth  in  general  terms  ;  but  that  they 
should  explicitly  confess  that  we  need  the  grace  of  Jesus  Christ  in 
every  act.  Zosimus  did  not  remain  obstinate,  but  upon  receiving 
accurate  information  from  Augustine  of  the  true  nature  of  the  opi- 
nions of  these  men,  issued  a  sentence  of  condemnation  against  them. 

Upon  this,  the  Emperor  Honorius  also  passed  a  sentence  of  ban- 
ishment from  Rome  against  the  Pelagians.  This  was  in  the  year 
418.      Ccelestius,  on  being  condemned,  went  to  Constantinople 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  87 

where  he  met  with  determined  opposition  from  Atticus,  the  bishop 
of  that  city  ;  so  that  his  designs  of  propagating  his  opinions  there 
were  disappointed. 

Pelagius  still  continued  in  Palestine,  and  complained  grievously 
of  the  hard  treatment  which  he  received  by  the  decisions  and  acts 
respecting  him  at  Rome,  and  by  the  books  written  against  him ; 
and  again  succeeded  in  imposing  on  some  respectable  persons  who 
held  a  conference  with  him,  by  leading  them  to  think  that  his  doc- 
trine did  not  materially  differ  from  the  common  belief.  These  per- 
sons, on  whom  he  made  this  impression,  were  so  much  interested 
in  his  favour  that  they  wrote  to  Augustine  stating  their  favourable 
views  of  the  doctrine  of  Pelagius.  This  communication  seems  to 
have  been  the  occasion  of  Augustine's  writing  his  books  Concern- 
ing Grace  and  Original  Sin. 

Julian,  of  whom  we  have  already  spoken,  having  published  se- 
vere animadversions  on  the  conduct  of  Zosimus  and  his  clergy, 
Boniface,  the  successor  of  Zosimus,  sent  them  to  Augustine,  for  the 
purpose  of  having  them  refuted ;  which  he  did  in  four  books,  in- 
scribed to  Boniface.  And  Count  Valerius,  having  received  another 
of  Julian's  writings,  in  which  he  charges  the  Catholics  with  con- 
demning marriage,  deriving  this  as  an  inference  from  their  doctrine 
of  original  sin,  caused  this  work  to  be  sent  to  Augustine,  who  soon 
published  an  answer  in  his  work  De  Nuptiis  et  Concupiscent  Pa. 

To  this  work  Julian  replied  in  four  books.  To  these  Augustine 
opposed  six  books ;  in  the  first  three  of  which  he  answers  what  is 
contained  in  Julian's  first  book ;  but  the  fourth,  fifth  and  sixth,  are 
employed  in  refuting  the  second,  third  and  fourth  of  Julian  ;  the  one 
answering  to  the  other  jn  order.  Julian  was  not  a  man  to  be 
easily  silenced,  for  he  now  came  out  with  eight  books  against  the 
six  of  Augustine.  These  the  venerable  polemic  was  preparing  to 
answer,  when  he  was  called  away  from  all  his  earthly  labours. 
Only  two  books  of  this  last  work  were  completed ;  these  have 
come  down  to  us  with  his  other  works. 

The  death  of  Augustine  occurred,  according  to  the  testimony  of 
Prosper,  in  his  Chronicon,  A.  D.  430  ;  the  latter  was  the  friend  and 
correspondent  of  Augustine,  from  whom  this  father  received  par- 
ticular information  of  the  progress  of  Pelagianism,  or  rather  Semi- 
Pelagianism,  at  Marseilles,  where  these  opinions  took  deep  root, 
and  continued  long  to  flourish. 

It  may  be  satisfactory  now  to  give  a  more  particular  account  of 
the  decisions  of  the  several  councils  which  met  for  the  considera- 
tion of  this  subject,  in  their  chronological  order. 

The  first  was  the  council  of  Carthage,  convened,  A.D.  407,  on 
account  of  the  dissemination  by  Ccelestius  of  the  opinions  of  Pela- 
gius, which  also  he  pertinaciously  defended.  Of  the  proceedings 
of  this  council  no  fragment  remains  but  one  preserved  in  Augus- 
tine's work  on  original  sin.  Mention  is  made  of  this  council,  how- 
ever, in  the  letter  of  the  fathers  of  the  second  council  of  Carthage, 
addressed  to  Innocent.     From  the  fragment  preserved  by  Augus- 


88  EARLY    HISTORY    OP    PELAGIANISM. 

tine,  we  learn  that  the  accusation  against  Coelestius  was,  that  he 
had  taught* "  that  the  sin  of  Adam  hurt  himself  alone."  Coelestius 
acknowledged  that  he  had  doubted  concerning  the  communication 
of  sin  by  descent  from  Adam,  but  professed  his  willingness  to  be 
better  instructed  by  those  to  whom  God  had  given  greater  wisdom  ; 
yet  observed  that  he  had  heard  from  presbyters  of  the  church  a 
doctrine  different  from  that  which  was  held  by  the  council.  And 
being  called  upon  to  name  one  from  whom  he  had  heard  such  an 
opinion,  he  mentioned  Rufin,  a  holy  presbyter  of  Rome.  On  being 
asked  whether  he  had  not  asserted  that  infants  are  born  in  the 
same  state  in  which  Adam  was  before  transgression,  he  would 
make  no  other  reply  but  "  that  infants  needed  baptism,  and  ought 
to  be  baptized." 

The  council  of  Diospolis,  in  Palestine,  consisted,  as  has  been 
mentioned  before,  of  only  fourteen  bishops.  The  accusers  of  Pela- 
gius  were  not  able  to  attend  ;  one  of  them  being  prevented  by  sick- 
ness, and  the  other  by  some  other  cause. 

Augustine  mentions  this  council  in  several  of  his  works,  and  as- 
cribes the  acquittal  of  Pelagius  to  his  artful  use  of  equivocal  terms, 
by  which  his  judges  were  deceived,  and  were  induced  to  pronounce 
him  innocent. 

Jerome,  in  his  seventy-ninth  epistle,  calls  this  "  a  miserable  syn- 
od ;"  and  says,  that  although  they  did  not  err  in  doctrine,  they 
were  deceived  in  the  man,  who  deceitfully  seemed  to  condemn  his 
own  opinions.  Photius,  in  his  Bibliotheca,  gives  a  more  particular 
account  of  this  council ;  but  his  information  seems  to  have  been 
derived  from  the  works  of  Augustine,  already  referred  to. 

A.  D.  416.  Another  council  met  at  Carthage,  which  has  already 
been  noticed  ;  not  convened,  indeed,  to  attend  to  this  controversy, 
but  Prosius,  having  brought  intelligence  respecting  the  proceedings 
instituted  against  Pelagius  in  Palestine,  the  fathers  of  this  council 
took  up  the  business,  and  wrote  a  letter  to  Innocent,  in  which  they 
expressed  their  opinion  freely  and  fully,  relative  to  the  heresy  of 
the  opinions  of  which  Pelagius  was  accused,  and  of  the  course 
which  ought  to  be  pursued  in  regard  to  him,  if  he  did  not 
explicitly  abjure  them.  Sixty-seven  pastors  were  present  at  this 
synod. 

About  the  same  time,  or  a  little  later,  a  synod  met  at  Milevum, 
in  Numidia,  consisting  of  sixty  bishops,  or  pastors,  who  took  up  the 
subject  of  the  errors  of  Pelagius  and  Coelestius,  and,  in  imitation  of 
the  council  of  Carthage,  addressed  a  letter  to  Innocent,  bishop  of 
Rome. 

It  appears  from  several  notices  in  the  writings  of  Augustine, 
that  another  full  synod  met  in  Africa,  and  addressed  letters  on  this 
subject  to  Zosimus,  the  successor  of  Innocent;  but  all  traces  of  the 
acts  and  proceedings  of  this  council,  except  the  short  notices  refer- 
red to  above,  have  disappeared.  This  synod  is  said  to  have  con- 
sisted of  two  hundred  and  twenty-four  bishops,  and  is  supposed  to 


w 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  89 

have  been  held,  A.  D.  417  or  418.     But  great  obscurity  rests  upon 
the  whole  matter. 

A.  D.  428.  When  Ccelestinus  was  bishop  of  Rome,  a  council 
was  held  in  Gaul,  occasioned  by  a  deputation  from  Britain,  who 
represented  that  the  poison  of  Pelagianism  had  been  imported  into 
that  country  by  one  Agricola,  the  son  of  Jenerianus,  a  bishop ;  and 
that  they  greatly  needed  aid  to  prevent  its  diffusion  among  the  peo- 
ple. On  this  occasion  a  large  council  convened,  and  two  eminent 
men,  Germanus  and  Lupus,  were  sent  on  a  mission  to  Britain 
to  check  the  progress  of  Pelagianism.  By  their  exertions  the 
catholic  doctrine  appeared  to  be  everywhere  restored ;  but  no 
sooner  had  they  taken  their  departure  than  heresy  began  again  to 
germinate  ;  so  that  the  request  to  the  Gallican  church  for  help  was 
repeated,  and  Germanus  was  again  sent,  and  was  accompanied  by 
Severus,  a  disciple  of  Lupus,  his  former  colleague.  The  witnesses 
for  these  facts  are  Constantius,  in  his  life  of  Germanus,  and  Bede, 
in  his  History  of  the  British  Churches, 

The  next  council  in  which  the  subject  of  Pelagianism  was 
brought  up  for  consideration,  was  that  of  Ephesus,  A.D.  431. 
This  is  called  an  oecumenical  council.  It  was  convened,  not  on 
account  of  the  heresy  of  Pelagius,  but  to  condemn  Nestorianism  ; 
but  as  the  followers  of  Pelagius  would  not  join  in  the  censure  of 
Nestorius,  the  council  expressed  their  disapprobation  of  that  heresy 
also,  which  they  denominate  the  wicked  doctrine  of  Ccelestius.  And 
in  their  synodical  epistle  to  Ccelestinus,  bishop  of  Rome,  they  ap- 
prove of  the  sentence  of  condemnation  which  had  been  passed 
on  Pelagius,  Ccelestius,  Julian,  and  their  abettors,  whom  they  call 
impious  men. 

The  Pelagian  doctrine  was  next  condemned  in  a  council  which 
met  at  Aries,  in  France  ;  the  exact  year  is  not  settled.  This  synod 
denounced  an  anathema  against  the  impious  doctrines  of  Pelagius  ; 
and  especially  against  the  opinion  that  man  was  born  without  sin  ; 
and  that  he  could  be  saved  by  his  own  exertions.  They  considered 
it  a  presumption  worthy  to  be  condemned  for  any  man  to  believe 
that  he  could  be  saved  without  grace. 

The  council  of  Lyons  met  soon  after  that  of  Aries,  and  approved 
its  decrees ;  but  some  other  doctrines  were  also  brought  under 
consideration  and  subjected  to  censure. 

A.D.  494.  Gelasius,  bishop  of  Rome,  convened  a  council  of 
seventy  bishops  in  that  city,  by  whom  the  writings  of  Augustine 
and  Prosper  were  approved  and  recommended  ;  while  those  of  the 
semi-Pelagians,  Cassian  and  Faustus,  were  censured. 

Other  councils  were  held  in  after  ages,  which  condemned  the 
Pelagian  heresy  ;  but  our  object  now  is  to  give  a  view  of  this  con- 
troversy in  its  first  rise  in  the  fifth  century. 

Before  we  proceed  to  give  a  view  of  the  opinions  entertained 
and  propagated  by  Pelagius  and  his  followers,  it  will  be  satis- 
factory to  ascertain  what  were  the  opinions  of  the  church  on  this 
subject. 


90  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 

The  doctrine  of  the  church,  then,  on  the  subject  of  original  sin, 
may  be  thus  stated.  It  has  ever  been  the  judgment  of  the  catholic 
church,  that  the  first  sin  of  Adam  was  imputed  to  all  his  posterity 
by  the  righteous  appointment  of  God,  and  that  its  effects  are 
transmitted  to  all  his  children ;  which  effects,  the  church  always 
believed  were,  that  they  were  born  destitute  of  original  righteous- 
ness, subject  to  the  sentence  of  death,  and  obnoxious  to  eternal 
separation  from  God. 

Man  being  created  in  the  image  of  God  and  being  fully  endued 
with  all  powers  necessary  for  obedience ;  and,  moreover,  being 
blessed  with  everything  requisite  for  his  comfort,  did  transgress 
the  law  of  his  Maker  by  disobeying  that  commandment  which  was 
given  as  a  test  of  his  whole  obedience. 

This  first  act  of  transgression,  it  is  true,  was  the  criminal  act  of 
Adam  as  an  individual ;  but  as  he  was  the  root  and  principle  of 
our  whole  nature,  it  may  be  considered  the  sin  of  the  human  race  : 
so  that  his  voluntary  act,  in  opposition  to  the  will  of  his  Creator, 
may  be  reckoned  that  of  his  descendants ;  not  indeed  strictly  and 
properly  (for  those  not  yet  born  could  not  perform  an  act),  but  in- 
terpretatively  or  by  imputation ;  for  this  act  was  not  only  imputed 
to  Adam  to  condemnation,  but  to  all  his  posterity. 

That  the  above  is  a  correct  statement  of  the  commonly  received 
doctrine  of  the  church,  at  the  period  of  which  we  treat,  will  appear 
from  many  explicit  declarations,  not  only  of  Augustine  and  other 
individuals,  but  from  the  decrees  and  letters  of  councils,  consisting  of 
numerous  bishops,  living  in  every  region  of  the  earth' to  which  the 
universal  church  extended. 

Augustine,  in  book  xvi.  of  his  work  De  Civitate  Dei,  has  these 
words,  "  Nascuntur,  non  proprie,  sed  originaliter,  peccatores." 
"Men  are  born,  not  properly,  but  originally,  sinners."  And  in 
book  i.,  c.  15  of  his  Retractations,  he  says,  "  Peccatum  eos  ex  Adam 
dicimus  originaliter  trahere  ;  id  est,  reatu  eos  implicatos,  et  ob  hoc 
poenae  obnoxios  detineri."  We  affirm  that  they  derive  sin  origi- 
nally from  Adam ;  that  is,  they  are  involved  in  guilt,  and  on  this 
account  are  held  liable  to  punishment. 

In  his  work  concerning  the  demerit  and  remission  of  sin,  he  says, 
that  to  impute  and  to  remit  are  opposites  ;  therefore  he  asserts,  to 
impute  is  to  subject  one  to  guilt ;  to  remit  is,  not  to  impute  to  con- 
demnation. Here  it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  that  by  imputation 
Augustine  meant,  not  a  transfer  of  moral  acts  or  moral  character, 
but  the  opposite  of  remission  ;  to  impute  a  sin,  therefore,  according 
.  to  him,  is  to  hold  the  person  bound  to  suffer  its  punishment.  And 
by  the  word  reatus,  or  guilt,  he  understood  an  obligation  to  suffer 
the  punishment  of  sin,  or  a  subjection  to  the  penalty  of  the  law.  It 
is  necessary  to  understand  accurately  the  meaning  of  these  terms 
as  used  by  theologians,  or  we  shall  be  involved  in  perpetual  per- 
plexity in  relation  to  their  opinions.  Most  of  the  objections  now 
made  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation  and  to  the  transfer  of  guilt, 
proceed  from  a  misapprehension  of  the  true  import  of  these  terms. 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  91 

We,  therefore,  hear  a  great  deal  of  declamation  respecting  the  im- 
possibility of  making  a  transfer  of  moral  character,  and  respect- 
ing the  impossibility  of  ever  removing  the  guilt  of  a  sinner  ;  but  if 
the  exact  meaning  of  these  terms  was  apprehended,  the  supposed 
difficulty  or  absurdity  would  vanish.  For,  although  personal  acts 
cannot  be  transferred,  the  consequences  or  legal  penalties  of  those 
acts  may  be  transferred ;  and  although  the  ill-desert  of  one  man 
cannot  be  transferred  to  another,  the  punishment  due  to  one  can  be 
inflicted  on  another. 

But  to  return,  Augustine  says  again,  book  xiv.,  c.  1 1,  De  Civitate 
Dei :  "  A  duobus  primis  transmissum  est  tarn  grande  peccatum,  ut 
in  deterius  eo  natura  mutaretur  humana,  etiam  in  posteros  obliga- 
tione  peccati,  et  mortis  necessitate  transmissa."  Which  may  be 
thus  rendered  into  English  :  "  From  th»  first  pair  so  great  a  sin  has 
been  transmitted,  that  by  it  human  nature  is  changed  for  the  worse ; 
also  the  bond  of  iniquity  and  the  necessity  of  death  are  transmitted 
to  their  posterity." 

And  this  manner  of  speaking  of  original  sin  was  not  peculiar  to 
Augustine ;  for  we  find  the  same  sort  of  language  in  Bernard. 
When  speaking  of  the  first  sin,  he  has  the  following  words: 
"  Aliena  est  quia  in  Adam  omnes  nescientes  peccavimus  ;  nostra, 
quia,  etsi  in  alio,  nos  tamen  peccavimus,  et  nobis  justo  Dei  judicio 
imputatur."  The  meaning  of  which  is,  "  That  this  first  sin,  of 
which  he  is  here  treating,  was  another's,  inasmuch  as  in  Adam  we 
sinned  ;  being  unconscious  of  it,  our  own,  inasmuch  as.  although  by 
another,  yet  we  ourselves  have  sinned,  and  in  the  just  judgment  of 
God  it  is  imputed  to  us." 

Nicolas  Lyra,  who  lived  about  four  hundred  years  ago,  speaks 
the  same  language  when  explaining  the  fifth  of  Romans.  "  Pec- 
catum Adse  imputatur  omnibus  ab  eo  descendentibus,  secundum 
vim  generativam,  quod  sic  sunt  membra  ejus,  propter  quod  vocatur 
peccatum  originale."  A  literal  translation  of  which  is,  "  The  sin 
of  Adam  is  imputed  to  all  descending  from  him  by  natural  genera- 
tion, because  they  are  his  members,  on  which  account  it  is  called 
original  sin." 

And  the  later  writers,  until  the  council  of  Trent,  do  not  deviate 
from  this  language  of  the  ancient  church.  Cajetan,  commenting 
on  the  same  (Romans  v.),  says,  "  The  punishment  of  death  is  in- 
flicted on  him  with  his  whole  posterity  ;  by  which  it  is  proved  that 
the  sin  of  which  death  is  the  punishment  is  imputed  to  him  and  to 
his  whole  posterity." 

And  even  Bellarmine  uses  as  strong  language  on  the  subject  of 
imputation  as  any  who  went  before  him.  "  Adam,"  says  he,  "  alone 
committed  that  (sin)  by  actual  volition,  but  it  is  communicated  to 
us  by  generation,  in  that  mode  in  which  it  was  possible  for  that 
which  is  past  to  be  communicated,  viz.  by  imputation." 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  adduce  testimonies  from  early  Pro- 
testant writers ;  for  it  is  known  to  all  in  the  least  acquainted  with 
the  opinions  of  the  reformers,  that  with  one  consent  they  held  that 


92  EARLY    HISTORY    OP    PELAGIANISM. 

the  sin  of  Adam  was  imputed  to  his  posterity;  and. that  in  conse- 
quence of  this  imputation  a  corrupt  nature  was  communicated  to 
all  his  natural  descendants.  We  could  fill  volumes  with  citations 
in  proof  of  this  fact,  but  it  is  unnecessary.  Indeed,  until  JSocinus 
arose,  no  one  connected  with  the  reformation  ever  intimated  a 
doubt  concerning  the  imputation  of  Adam's  first  sin  to  his  posterity. 
This  ingenious  but  heretical  man  utterly  denied,  as  all  his  followers 
do,  the  whole  doctrine  of  original  sin.  His  words  are,  "  Although 
all  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  liable  to  eternal  death,  this  is  not  be- 
cause the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  them,  but  because  they  are 
his  natural  descendants  ;  so  that  their  doom  to  death  does  not 
arise  from  imputation,  but  from  the  propagation  of  the  human 
race." 

It  is  now,  by  many  who  would  be  esteemed  orthodox,  and  Cal- 
vinistic  too,  considered  so  absurd  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  the  im- 
putation of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity,  that  they  will  not  even  con- 
descend to  argue  the  point  and  demonstrate  its  falsehood.  If  these 
be  correct  in  their  views  of  the  subject,  it  must  create  some  sur- 
prise that  all  theologians,  from  the  days  of  Augustine,  who  were 
not  acknowledged  heretics,  believed  firmly  in  this  doctrine,  and 
considered  it  as  fundamental  in  the  Christian  system.  Is  it  certainly 
the  fact  that  these  modern  impugners  of  the  ancient  doctrine  of  the 
church  understand  the  scriptures  better  than  all  who  have  gone 
before  them  ?  Or  is  it  undoubted  that  they  are  endowed  with  a 
perspicacity  so  much  superior  to  that  of  Augustine,  Calvin,  Owen 
and  Edwards,  that  what  these  thought  after  profound  considera- 
tion might  be  defended  as  reasonable,  is  so  absurd  as  not  to  merit 
a  refutation  ?  Now  we  confess  ourselves  to  be  of  the  number  of 
those  who  believe,  whatever  reproach  it  may  bring  upon  us  from 
a  certain  quarter,  that  if  the  doctrine  of  imputation  be  given  up  the 
whole  doctrine  of  original  sin  must  be  abandoned.  And  if  this  doc- 
trine be  relinquished,  then  the  whole  doctrine  of  redemption  must 
fall,  and  what  may  then  be  left  of  Christianity  they  may  contend 
for  that  will ;  but  for  ourselves,  we  shall  be  of  opinion  that  what 
remains  will  not  be  worth  a  serious  struggle. 

But  we  must  return  to  our  proper  subject.  It  will  next  be  satis- 
factory to  know  by  what  sort  of  arguments  the  ancient  theologians 
defended  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  And  although  we  will  not 
vouch  for  the  soundness  of  every  interpretation  of  scripture  which 
the  ancient  expositors  gave,  yet  it  cannot  but  be  satisfactory  to  the 
advocates  of  this  doctrine  now,  that  as  far  back  as  we  can  trace 
the  history  of  opinions,  the  same  views  were  entertained  of  the 
meaning  of  the  principal  texts  which  bear  on  this  point  as  are  now 
maintained. 

The  fathers,  then,  supported  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  by  such 
texts  as  Gen.  vi.  5. — xiii.  21.  "  And  God  saw  that  the  wickedness 
of  man  was  great  on  the  earth,  and  that  every  imagination  of  the 
thoughts  of  his  heart  was  only  evil  continually.  For  the  imagina- 
tion of  man's  heart  is  evil  from  his  youth."     Ambrose,  in  his  re- 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF   PELAGIANISM.  93 

marks  on  this  text,  does  not  confine  it  to  the  antediluvians,  but  con- 
siders it  a  description  of  human  nature  in  every  age,  and  extends 
it  to  persons  in  every  period  of  human  life  :  for  he  says,  "  Even 
the  child  of  a  day  old  is  not  without  sin,  for  infancy  cannot  be  ex- 
empt from  sin  on  account  of  the  infirmity  of  the  body." 

Another  text  which  they  adduced  in  proof  of  original  sin  wasGen. 
xvii.  14.  "  And  the  uncircumcised  man  child,  whose  flesh  of  his 
foreskin  is  not  circumcised,  that  soul  shall  be  cut  off  from  his  peo- 
ple :  he  hath  broken  my  covenant."  On  this  text  Augustine  re- 
marks, "  That  the  soul  which  is  not  regenerated  shall  perish,  since 
he,  with  all  others,  sinned  in  Adam."  It  seems  that  they  interpreted 
the  breach  of  the  covenant  to  have  reference  to  the  covenant  made 
with  Adam,  and  not  the  covenant  of  circumcision.  For  thus  we 
find  Bede  commenting  on  this  text,  "  Not  the  covenant  of  circum- 
cision, which  an  infant  that  could  neither  will  good  nor  evil  could 
not  break,  though  his  parents  might ;  but  that  covenant  is  signified 
which  God  entered  into  with  the  first  man,  and  which  every  one 
who  has  only  lived  a  day  upon  earth  has  violated,  and  so  stands  in 
need  of  a  saving  remedy." 

Job  xiv.  4.  "  Who  can  bring  a  clean  thing  out  of  an  unclean  1 
not  one,"  is  another  text  on  which  the  ancient  theologians  re- 
lied for  the  proof  of  original  sin.  As  they  followed  the  Seventy, 
however,  they  found  more  to  their  purpose  in  this  text  than  is  con- 
tained in  the  Hebrew.     For  in  the  Greek  version  the  text  reads  thus, 

Tij  yap  KaBapt's  carat  dno  piirov ;    uXX'  ovBels,  tiiv  xai  pia  lifispa  6  (liog  airov  tnl  mi  yi\$. 

Which  literally  translated  is,  "  For  who  is  clean  from  filth  ?  not 
one,  if  even  his  life  has  been  but  of  one  day  on  the  earth."  Hence, 
we  find  Augustine,  in  reference  to  this  text,  saying,  "  The  stain  of 
the  vitiated  root  is  diffused  through  the  branches,  being  transmitted 
by  natural  generation ;  so  that  there  is  not  an  infant  of  one  day  old 
free  from  the  guilt  of  sin,  unless  saved  by  unmerited  grace.  For 
he  who  has  no  sin  properly  of  his  own,  has  derived  to  him  the  sin 
of  another,  concerning  which  the  apostle  speaks  where  he  says,  by 
one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  &c." 

The  next  argument  the  fathers  derived  from  Psalm  li.  5. 
"  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity,  and  in  sin  did  my  mother  con- 
ceive me."  It  was  left  for  modern  critics  to  discover  that  David 
was  here  bewailing  the  sinfulness  of  his  mother ;  such  an  idea 
never  seems  to  have  entered  the  mind  of  any  of  the  ancient  com- 
mentators. They  argue  thus  from  the  text.  If  David,  that  most 
holy  king,  and  born  of  pious  parents,  contracted  pollution  in  his 
conception,  then  certainly  the  same  must  be  true  of  all  other  men. 
Thus  reasoned  Origen,  Basil  the  Great,  Theodoret,  Rufin,  Cassio- 
dorus,  Euthymius  and  Remigius,  in  their  scholia  on  this  text. 
Likewise  Hilary,  Ambrose,  Chrysostom,  Faustus,  Isychius, Gregory 
the  Great,  Alcuin,  Bede,  and  every  other  orthodox  commentator 
for  seventeen  centuries  after  Christ.  They  who  still  believe  that 
the  Psalmist  is  here  speaking  of  the  sin  of  his  birth,  notwithstanding 
the  learned  criticisms  which  have  recently  appeared  on  this  text, 


94  EARLY    HISTORY    OF   PELAGIANISM. 

have  the  comfort  of  knowing  that  they  are  supported  by  the  opi- 
nions of  all  the  ancients  and  all  the  moderns  whose  opinions  carry 
weight  in  matters  of  this  kind. 

Another  text  adduced  by  the  ancient  advocates  of  this  doctrine 
is  7s.  xliii.  3.  "  And  wast  called  a  transgressor  from  the  womb." 
On  which  Cyril,  on  Hosea,  makes  several  remarks,  tending  to  show 
the  original  depravity  of  man. 

But  let  us  now  come  to  the  New  Testament ;  and  here  the  first 
text  which  the  fathers  urge  in  proof  of  original  sin  is  John  iii.  3,  6. 
"  Verily,  verily  I  say  unto  you,  that  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is 
flesh,  and  that  which  is  born  of  the  spirit  is  spirit."  From  which 
it  was  argued,  that  whatever  was  carnally  propagated  could  only 
savour  of  carnal  things,  which  in  order  to  become  spiritual  must 
be  born  of  the  spirit;  without  spiritual  regeneration  it  was  impos- 
sible to  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  Augustine  often  makes 
use  of  this  text  in  his  controversy  with  the  Pelagians ;  and  it  is 
used  in  the  same  manner  by  Prosper,  and  by  Gregory  the  Great. 

But  the  passage  of  scripture  on  which  they  depended  above  all 
for  the  support  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  was  the  fifth  of  Ro- 
mans, from  the  twelfth  verse  to  the  end  of  the  chapter.  "  As  by 
one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  death  by  sin,  so  death 
passed  on  all  men,  because  that  (or  in  whom)  all  have  sinned." 

Ver.  14.  "Nevertheless,  death  reigned  from  Adam  to  Moses, 
even  over  them  that  had  not  sinned  after  the  similitude  of  Adam's 
transgression." 

Ver.  18.  "  Therefore  as  by  the  offence  of  one,  judgment  came 
upon  all  men  to  condemnation." 

Ver.  19.  "  For  as  by  the  disobedience  of  one  many  were  made 
sinners." 

From  these  passages  they  reasoned  in  the  following  manner :  That 
sin  which  the  apostle  so  describes  as  that  which  has  brought  death 
on  all  men ; — that  by  it  all  men  have  sinned  ; — and  by  it  have  been 
constituted  sinners,  even  those  who  have  not  sinned  after  the  simili- 
tude of  Adam's  transgression  (that  is,  have  not  committed  actual 
sin)  ; — and  in  consequence  of  this  sin  all  are  become  subject  to 
death  and  condemnation ;  therefore,  this  sin,  although  committed 
by  Adam  alone,  as  it  was  a  personal  act,  yet  may  be  considered  as 
the  sin  of  human  nature,  since  he  stood  as  the  representative  of  us 
all,  who  were  then  included  in  his  loins ;  and  are  all  therefore  laid 
under  an  obligation  to  suffer  the  punishment  of  his  sin. 

The  fathers  also  were  particular  in  noticing  that  Adam  was  here 
called  the  type  of  Christ,  whence  they  inferred,  that  as  we  are  jus- 
tified by  the  imputation  and  not  the  imitation  of  Christ's  obedience, 
so  the  disobedience  of  Adam  becomes  ours,  not  by  imitation  but 
by  imputation.  They,  moreover,  remarked,  that  the  particles  i$'  & 
(in  whom)  teach  us  that  the  posterity  of  Adam  sinned  in  him :  or 
if  you  prefer  rendering  these  words,  because  that,  or  inasmuch,  as, 
all  have  sinned,  they  must  contain  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  death 
of  all,  infants  as  well  as  others  ;  and  therefore  the  word  all  must 


EARLY    HISTORY    OP   PELAGIANI8M.  95 

be  considered  as  including  infants ;  when  it  is  said,  therefore,  all 
have  sinned,  it  will  follow  that  infants  also  have  sinned.  This 
method  of  reasoning  is  pursued  by  Augustine  in  many  different 
parts  of  his  works ;  and  the  same  method  of  reasoning  from  this 
passage  is  followed  by  Theodoret,  by  Prosper,  by  Faustus,  by 
Gennadius,  and  also  by  the  Carthaginian  and  Arausicanian  coun- 
cils. 

Another  passage  of  scripture  which  the  ancient  theologians  con- 
sidered conclusive,  on  the  subject  of  original  sin,  was  Rom.  vii., 
where  Paul  speaks  of  "  a  law  in  his  members  warring  against  the 
law  of  his  mind.  For  I  know  that  in  me,  that  is,  in  my  flesh,  there 
dwelleth  no  good  thing.  For  to  will  is  present  with  me,  but  to  per- 
form that  which  is  good  I  find  not."  The  necessity  of  the  aids  of 
divine  grace  is  argued  from  this  passage  by  Irenaeus,  Tertullian 
and  Augustine,  in  more  places  than  one.  This  father,  indeed,  gives 
us  two  distinct  expositions  of  the  apostle's  meaning  in  the  afore- 
cited words.  According  to  the  first  of  these,  the  conflict  here  de- 
scribed is  between  conscience  and  sinful  desires  drawing  the  soul 
to  evil ;  but  according  to  the  latter,  the  struggle  is  between  the 
sinful  nature  which  remains  in  the  regenerate,  and  the  new  man  or 
principle  of  grace,  implanted  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  in  either 
sense  it  furnishes  strong  proof  of  the  natural  proclivity  of  man  to 
evil :  but  especially  in  the  latter  sense,  in  which  a  remaining  leaven 
of  iniquity  is  found  in  the  regenerate,  continually  hindering  his 
holy  exercises,  it  furnishes  an  undoubted  proof  of  the  depravity  of 
our  nature. 

They  also  appealed  to  1  Cor.  xv.  22,  "  For  as  in  Adam  all  die, 
so  in  Christ  shall  all  be  made  alive."  On  this  text  the  writer  of 
certain  ancient  commentaries,  which  have  been  ascribed  to  Am- 
brose, says,  "  Paul  says  this  because  as  Adam  by  sinning  found 
death,  so  he  subjected  all  his  posterity  to  the  same  punishment ;  so 
also  Christ  by  not  sinning,  overcame  death  and  acquired  life  for  all 
those  who  are  of  his  body  ;  that  is,  the  resurrection."  And  again, 
"  As  all  die  in  Adam,  whether  they  be  just  or  unjust,  so  also  all, 
whether  believers  or  unbelievers,  shall  be  raised  from  the  dead  by 
Christ ;  but  they  who  believe  not,  to  punishment." 

Augustine  expresses  his  views  of  the  import  of  this  passage  thus : 
"  The  opinion  of  the  apostle  is  here  clearly  exhibited,  that  none  are 
subject  to  death  but  through  Adam,  and  that  none  enter  into  eternal 
life  unless  by  Christ.  For  by  the  word  all  repeated  in  this  verse, 
we  are  to  understand  in  the  first  instance,  all  who  are  naturally  de- 
scended from  Adam,  and  in  the  second,  all  who  are  united  to  C  hrist 
by  a  spiritual  regeneration  :  so  then  it  is  declared  that  none  die  ex- 
cept by  their  connection  with  Adam,  and  none  are  made  alive  but 
those  who  are  quickened  in  Christ."  The  argument  is  simply  this, 
as  all  are  vivified  in  Christ,  in  like  manner  all  die  in  Adam ;  but 
Christ  vivifies  those  for  whom  he  has  merited  the  forgiveness  of 
sin,  and  on  whom  he  bestows  a  new  life  by  regeneration  :  there- 
fore Adam,  in  like  manner,  by  his  sin,  has  merited  death  for  all  his 


96  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 

posterity,  and  transmitted  to  them  a  corrupt  nature  by  ordinary 
generation.  # 

The  last  text  of  scripture  which  we  will  mention,  as  furnishing 
satisfactory  proof  to  the  fathers  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  .is 
Ephes.  ii.  3.  "  And  were  by  nature  the  children  of  wrath,  even 
as  others."  On  this  many  ancient  writers  comment,  and  all  agree 
in  the. opinion  that  it  means  that  when  born  we  are  under  con- 
demnation, from  which  Christ  came  to  deliver  us. 

Four  of  the  texts  above  cited,  as  teaching  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin,  Jerome  applies  to  the  same  purpose  in  a  single  paragraph  of 
his  commentary  on  Ezekiel.  Of  his  remarks,  however,  we  shall 
only  cite  that  which  relates  to  the  famous  text  in  the  fifty-first 
Psalm.  "  David  says,  I  was  conceived  in  iniquity,  and  in  sin  did 
my  mother  bring  me  forth:  not  in  the  iniquity  of  his  mother,  or 
his  own  personal  sin,  but  in  the  sin  of  human  nature.  Whence, 
the  apostle  says,  death  reigned  from  Adam  to  Moses,  even  over 
those  who  had  not  sinned  after  the  similitude  of  Adam's  trans- 
gression." 

From  this  remark  we  learn,  not  only  what  Jerome  thought  was 
the  meaning  of  being  conceived  in  sin,  but  also  that  he  understood 
the  apostle  to  mean  infants,  where  he  speaks  of  those  who  had  not 
sinned  after  the  similitude  of  Adam's  transgression.  And  we 
believe  that  in  regard  to  both  these  texts  he  speaks  the  language  of 
all  antiquity. 

Among  the  reasons  by  which  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  as  held 
by  the  ancients,  was  supported,  the  sufferings  and  death  of  infants 
were  believed  to  hold  the  first  place,  because  it  was  considered  that 
it  would  be  altogether  unjust  that  they  should  be  thus  punished, 
unless  they  were  charged  with  the  guilt  of  some  sin.  Hence, 
Augustine,  in  his  fourth  book  against  the  two  letters  of  Pelagius, 
says,  "  But  how  is  it  that  the  Pelagians  hold  that  death  only  is 
derived  to  us  from  Adam  ?  According  to  them,  we  die  because  he 
died  ;  but  he  died  because  he  had  sinned.  They  hold,  therefore, 
that  punishment  passes  upon  us  without  any  fault :  innocent  infants 
then  are  punished  by  an  unjust  sentence  ;  suffering  death  without 
having  merited  this  punishment."  And  again,  in  his  sixth  book 
against  Julian,  he  says,  "  The  sins  of  parents,  in  one  respect,  are 
not  ours,  but  in  another  respect  they  are  ours.  They  are  not  ours 
as  it  relates  to  the  personal  act,  but  they  are  ours  by  the  contagion 
of  our  descent ;  which,  if  it  were  not  true,  a  grievous  yoke  would 
be  upon  the  children  of  Adam  from  the  day  of  their  birth,  which 
could  by  no  means  be  reconciled  with  justice."  And  in  his  last 
answer  to  Julian  he  says,  "  This  judgment  (viz.  death)  on  infants 
would  be  altogether  unjust  if  there  were  no  original  sin."  And 
again,  "  Why  are  little  children  so  grievously  afflicted  if  they  have 
no  sin  at  all.  Could  not  an  omnipotent  and  just  God  prevent  these 
unjust  punishments  from  falling  on  infants  ?" 

The  writer  of  the  book  entitled  Hypognosticon  argues  in  a  simi- 
lar manner.     "  If  the  sin  of  our  first  parents  hurt  no  one  but  them- 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF   PELAGIANISM.  97 

selves,  how  does  it  happen  that  the  punishment  of  their  fault  falls 
upon  us  ?  unless  you  maintain  that  God  is  unjust,  who  suffers  those 
who  are  free  from  all  sin  to  be  held  bound  under  the  chain  of  pun- 
ishment." 

Prosper  reasons  in  the  same  manner.  In  his  book  against  Col- 
lator he  says,  "  Unless  you  choose  to  affirm  what  is  evidently 
false,  that  punishment,  not  sin,  has  been  transmitted  to  the  posterity 
of  Adam  ;  for  it  is  too  impious  to  think  this  of  the  justice  of  God, 
that  it  is  his  will  to  condemn  those  who  are  free  from  sin  to  the 
same  punishment  as  the  guilty.  But  wherever  punishment  is  mani- 
fest, there  is  complete  evidence  of  the  existence  of  sin  ;  for  sin  and 
punishment  are  indissolubly  united  ;  therefore  human  misery  is  not 
from  the  constitution  of  the  Creator,  but  from  the  retribution  of  the 
Judge." 

It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  some  among  the  orthodox 
of  that  age  held  that  God,  as  a  sovereign,  might  punish  his  crea- 
tures, and  even  doom  them  to  eternal  death,  although  they  had 
never  sinned.  Of  this  opinion  was  Macarius  the  Egyptian.  The 
opinion  of  Augustine  and  Prosper,  however,  has  commonly  been 
entertained  by  sound  theologians  in  all  ages.  Some  indeed  think 
that  the  two  opinions  may  be  reconciled,  by  supposing  that  the  one 
party  speak  of  the  punishment  of  loss  merely,  while  the  others 
speak  of  the  punishment  of  sense.  But  this  is  not  very  satisfac- 
tory ;  and  the  opinion  of  Macarius,  which  has  been  received  by 
some  since  the  reformation,  is  dishonourable  to  God.  And  so  it 
was  esteemed  by  the  council  of  Arausicanum ;  for  in  their  second 
canon  they  declare,  "  That  to  say  that  God  inflicts  death,  which  is 
the  punishment  of  sin,  where  no  sin  exists,  is  to  charge  him  with 
injustice."  The  same  opinion  is  given  by  Anselm,  who  says,  "  It 
is  repugnant  both  to  wisdom  and  justice,  that  they  whom  God  hath 
fitted  for  eternal  happiness  should,  without  being  chargeable  with 
sin,  be  forced  to  suffer  punishment." 

The  fathers  also  relied  on  this  argument,  "  That  if  infants  were 
not  involved  in  the  guilt  of  sin,  Christ  cannot  be  their  Saviour."  On 
this  subject  Augustine  says,  in  his  first  book  against  the  two  letters 
of  Pelagius,  "  They  contend  that  infants  are  in  a  safe  state  already, 
so  that  they*  dare  deny  that  they  owe  their  salvation  to  the  Sa- 
viour." And  again,  in  book  second,  "  The  Pelagians  assert  that 
God  is  not  the  Purifier,  Saviour,  and  Deliverer  of  men  of  all  ages." 
And  in  his  answer  to  Julian,  ch.  xxxi.,  "  The  multitude  whom  you 
despise,  that  acknowledge  the  catholic  faith,  confess  that  infants 
are  redeemed  by  the  Saviour;  and ' therefore  they  detest  the  error 
of  the  Pelagians  who  deny  this."  The  same  sentiments  are  found 
in  many  other  passages  of  the  writings  of  this  father. 

But  scarcely  any  argument  was  more  frequently  resorted  to  by 
the  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  than  that  derived  from 
the  baptism  of  infants.  This  argument  is  handled  by  Augustine  in 
the  following  manner :  "  The  church  borrows  for  them  (infants) 
the  feet  of  others  that  they  may  come,  the  heart  of  others  that  they 

7 


gL 


98  EARLY    HISTORY    OF   PELAGIANISM, 

may  believe,  the  tongue  of  others  that  they  may  confess.  For 
being  sick,  they  are  oppressed  with  the  sin  of  another ;  so,  when 
made  whole,  they  are  saved  through  the  confession  of  another  for 
them.  This  practice  the  church  always  had ;  always  held.  Let 
no  one,  therefore,  whisper  in  your  ears  a  contrary  doctrine.  The 
church  received  it  from  the  faith  of  our  ancestors,  and  perse- 
veringly  holds  it  fast,  even  to  the  end.  For  where  there  are  none 
sick,  there  is  no  need  of  a  physician.  What  need,  therefore,  can 
infants  have  of  Christ  if  they  are  not  sick  1  If  they  are  well,  why 
seek  a  physician  to  take  care  of  them  ?  If  they  are  infected  with 
no  sin  when  they  are  brought  to  Christ,  why  is  it  not  said  to  those 
who  bring  them  into  the  church,  '  Carry  these  innocents  hence  ; 
they  that  be  whole  need  not  a  physician,  but  the  sick.'  '  Christ  came 
not  to  call  the  righteous,  but  sinners.' " 

So  also  the  council  of  Milevum,  or  rather  of  Carthage,  de- 
nounced such  as  denied  that  infants  should  be  baptized  for  the 
remission  of  original  sin.  Can.  17.  f  For  in  no  other  sense  can 
that  be  understood  which  was  spoken  by  the  apostle — that  by  one 
man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  death  by  sin  5  and  so  death 
hath  passed  upon  all  men,  in  whom  all  have  sinned — than  in  that 
adopted  by  the  universal  church  everywhere  diffused.  For  by 
reason  of  this  rule  of  faith,  even  infants,  who  were  never  capable 
of  committing  any  sin  themselves,  are  nevertheless  baptized  accord- 
ing to  truth  for  the  remission  of  sins  :  so  that  the  pollution  con- 
tracted by  them  in  their  birth  might  be  cleansed  by  their  regene- 
ration." 

But  that  which  was  thought  to  give  peculiar  force  to  this  argu- 
ment was,  that  Ccelestius  himself,  in  a  book  which  he  edited  at 
Rome,  was  constrained  to  confess,  "  That  infants  are  baptized  for* 
the  remission  of  sins,  according  to  the  rule  of  the  universal  church, 
and  according  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Gospel."  It  seems,  then,  that 
from  this  argument  the  Pelagians  were  never  able  to  extricate 
themselves  ;  but  of  this  more  hereafter. 

The  view  which  has  been  given  of  the  opinions  of  the  universal 
church,  on  the  subject  of  original  sin,  relate  only  to  the  age  of  the 
Pelagian  controversy.  It  may  still  be  a  matter  of  nroper  and 
important  inquiry,  what  opinions  were  commonly  entertained  on 
this  point  before  the  commencement  of  the  fifth  century  ?  From 
the  almost  universal  concurrence  of  theologians  in  Africa,  Asia, 
and  Europe,  in  the  belief  of  this  doctrine,  we  may  infer  that  it  did 
not  originate  in  this  age.  We  may  be  sure,  from  this  considera- 
tion, that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  was  not  invented  by  Au- 
gustine, as  some  have  pretended.  Jerome  was  more  learned, 
and  at  this  time  much  more  known  than  Augustine,  and  he  held 
the  same  doctrine,  and  commenced  writing  against  the  heresy  of 
Pelagius  before  Augustine  took  up  his  pen  ;  and  these  distinguished 
fathers  lived  in  parts  of  the  church  widely  separated  from  each 
other ;  the  one  in  Africa,  the  other  in  Palestine.  But  in  every 
council,  except  the  little  one  of  Diospolis,  the  doctrine  of  Pelagius 


EAELY    HISTORY    OP   PELAGIANISM.  99 

was  condemned,  and  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  affirmed ;  and 
commonly  without  a  dissenting  voice.  At  some  of  these  coun- 
cils there  were  present  several  hundreds  of  theologians.  Even 
in  the  council  of  Diospolis,  which  acquitted  Pelagius,  there  was 
nothing  determined  inconsistent  with  the  catholic  doctrines ;  but 
the  case  was,  that  Pelagius,  by  artfully  concealing  his  true  opinions 
under  plausible  but  ambiguous  terms,  deceived  the  fathers  who  sat 
in  that  council,  as  Augustine  has  shown.  If  it  be  a  fact  then  that 
at  the  commencement  of  the  fifth  century  all  the  theologians  in  the 
world,  except  a  few  who  were  soon  rejected  as  heretics,  agreed  in 
maintaining  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  how  shall  we  account  for 
the  universal  prevalence  of  such  a  doctrine,  but  by  supposing  that 
it  was  handed  down  from  the  first  planting  of  the  Christian  church  ? 
For  if  it  had  been  an  error  introduced  by  some  particular  doctor, 
or  by  some  section  of  the  church,  it  would  not  have  been  universal 
in  its  diffusion,  nor  would  it  have  united  the  suffrages  of  all  the 
faithful  ministers  of  the  Gospel,  as  we  see  it  did.  And  again,  sup- 
posing that  by  extraordinary  efforts  this  doctrine,  so  repugnant  to 
the  natural  feelings  of  men,  could  have  been  everywhere  propa- 
gated by  the  commencement  of  the  fifth  century,  would  there  be 
no  trace  of  such  an  universal  change  of  opinion,  and  no  record  of 
the  extraordinary  efforts  necessary  to  bring  it  about  ?  Among  all 
the  writers  who  have  touched  on  this  subject,  is  it  not  strange  that 
not  one  is  found  who  gives  the  least  hint  of  any  such  thing  ? 
Surely  a  change  in  relation  to  a  doctrine  so  radical  must  have 
occasioned  controversy.  All  would  not  have  adopted  a  new  and 
distasteful  doctrine  upon  its  first  proposal.  These  are  things  which 
can  never  be  cleared  up  on  the  hypothesis  that  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin  was  not  the  doctrine  of  the  apostolic  churches. 

Here  we  might  gather  up,  from  the  writings  of  almost  all  the 
fathers  who  preceded  Augustine,  testimonies  incidentally  given, 
which  would  serve  to  show  that  they  all  believed  in  the  same  doc- 
trine of  original  sin,  which  was  so  strenuously  defended  by  the 
whole  Christian  church  in  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  century :  and 
it  would  be  easy  to  pursue  this  course,  because  Augustine  has 
travelled  over  the  same  ground  before  us,  and  has  adduced  testi- 
monies on  this  subject  from  Ignatius,  from  the  work  under  the 
name  of  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  from  Justin  Martyr,  Irenaeus, 
Origen,  Basil,  Gregory  Nazianzen,  Chrysostom,  and  others,  who, 
although  they  do  not  enter  into  any  discussion  on  this  subject  (for 
it  was  not  a  matter  of  dispute),  yet  drop  such  expressions  incident- 
ally, when  treating  other  subjects,  as  are  sufficient  to  prove  that 
there  was  from  the  beginning  one  uniform  faith  on  this  fundamental 
point.  The  reader  who  is  desirous  of  further  information  on  this 
subject  is  referred  to  the  various  treatises  of  Augustine  on  original 
sin.  But  our  limits  and  our  plan  require  that  we  should  now 
exhibit  a  brief  but  impartial  view  of  the  real  opinions  of  Pelagius 
and  his  followers,  which  shall,  as  far  as  possible,  be  given  in  their 
own  words ;   which   testimonies,  however,   are   taken   from   the 


100  EARLY   HISTORY    OF   PELAGIANISM. 

writings  of  Augustine  and  others,  their  own  works  having  for  the 
most  part  perished.  , 

Pelagius,  in  his  book  De  Natura,  as  quoted  by  Augustine,  says,* 
"  When  it  is  declared  that  all  have  sinned  in  Adam,  it  should  not 
be  understood  of  any  original  sin  contracted  by  their  birth,  but  of 
imitation."  Again,f  "  How  can  a  man  be  considered  guilty  by 
God  of  that  sin  which  he  knows  not  to  be  his  own  ?  for  if  it  is 
necessary,  it  is  not  his  own ;  but  if  it  is  his  own,  it  is  voluntary  ; 
and  if  voluntary,  it  can  be  avoided."  In  his  exposition  of  the 
epistle  to  the  Romans  he  says,J  "  The  opposers  of  the  propagation 
of  sin  thus  endeavour  to  impugn  the  doctrine.  The  sin  of  Adam 
has  not  injured  those  not  sinning,  just  as  the  righteousness  of  Christ 
does  not  profit  those  not  believing :  for  it  is  said,  that  in  like  man- 
ner, yea  much  more,  is  salvation  by  one,  than  perdition  by  one. 
And  if  baptism  cleanses  that  ancient  sin,  then  they  who  are  born 
of  two  baptized  persons  must  be  free  from  that  sin  ;  for  they  could 
not  transmit  that  to  posterity  which  they  no  longer  possessed  them- 
selves. Moreover,  they  say  that  if  the  soul  is  not  by  traduction, 
but  the  flesh  only,  then  the  flesh  only  is  concerned  in  the  propaga- 
tion of  sin,  and  it  alone  deserves  to  be  punished ;  for  they  allege 
that  it  would  be  altogether  unjust  that  a  soul  just  bom  should  be 
obliged  to  bear  that  ancient  sin  of  Adam,  from  whom  it  has  not 
derived  its  origin.  For  they  allege  that  it  can  by  no  means  be 
conceded  that  God,  who  pardons  our  own  sins,  should  impute  to 
us  the  sin  of  another  person."  Pelagius  does  not  speak  here  in 
his  own  name,  but  as  personating  others,  whose  opinions  and  argu- 
ments he  exhibits  ;  for  at  this  time  he  durst  not  openly  declare  his 
real  sentiments.  In  like  manner  Ccelestius  disseminated  the  same 
doctrine,  as  will  be  shown  below,  and  also  pursued  the  same  insidi- 
ous policy  in  propagating  his  opinions. 

Julian,  also,  in  his  last  work  against  Augustine,  charges  this 
father  with  holding,  "  that  infants  were  oppressed  with  the  guilt  of 
no  sin  of  their  own,  but  only  with  that  of  another  person."  Again 
he  says,  "  whoever  is  accused  of  a  crime,  the  charge  is  made 
against  his  conduct,  and  not  against  his  birth."  And  in  the  con- 
clusion, where  he  recapitulates  what  he  had  written,  he  says, 
"  Therefore  we  conclude  that  the  triune  God  should  be  adored  as 

*  "  In  Adamo  peccasse  omnes,  non  propter  peccatum  nascendi  origine  attractum, 
sed  propter  imitationem  dictum  est." 

f  "  Quomodo  Deo  pro  illius  peccati  reatu  subditus  esse  poterit,  quod  suum  non 
esse  cognoverit  ?  Suum  enim  non  est,  si  necessarium  est.  Aut  suum  si  est,  volunta- 
rium  est.     Et  si  voluntarium  est,  vitari  potest." 

%  "  Hi  qui  contra  traducem  peccati  sunt,  ita  ilium  impugnare  nituntur.  Si  Adae, 
inquiunt,  peccatum  etiam  non  peccantibus  nocuit,  ergo  et  Christi  justitia  etiam  non 
credentibus  prodest :  quia  similiter,  imo  et  magis  dieit,  per  unum  salvari,  quam  per 
unum  ante  perierunt.  Si  baptismus  mundat  antiquum  illud  delictum,  qui  de  duobus 
baptizatis  nati  fuerint,  debent  hoc  carere  peccato :  non  enim  potuerunt  ad  posteros 
transmittere,  quod  ipsi  minime  habuerunt.  Illud  quoque  accedit,  quia  si  anima  non 
est  ex  traduce,  sed  sola  caro,  ipsa  tantum  habet  traducem  peccati,  et  ipsa  sola  poenam 
meretur ;  injustum  esse  dicentes,  ut  hodie  nata  anima  non  ex  massa  Adae,  tam  anti- 
quum peccatum  portet  alienum.  Dicunt  etiam,  nulla  ratione  concedi  ut  Deus  qui 
propria  peccata  remittit,  imputet  aliena." 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANI3M.  101 

most  just ;  and  it  has  been  made  to  appear  most  irrefragably,  that 
the  sin  of  another  never  can  be  imputed  by  him  to  little  children."* 
And  a  little  afterwards,  "  Hence  that  is  evident,  which  we  defend 
as  most  reasonable,  that  no  one  is  born  in  sin,  and  that  God  never 
judges  men  to  be  guilty  on  account  of  their  birth."f  Again, 
"Children,  inasmuch  as  they  are  children,  never  can  be  guilty, 
until  they  have  done  something  by  their  own  proper  will."  And 
as  the  ground  on  which  the  doctrine  of  communicated  guilt  was 
held  was  a  certain  natural  conjunction  of  the  parties,  by  reason  of 
which  Paul  declares  that  we  sinned  in  Adam,  therefore  they  used 
their  utmost  exertion  to  elude  the  force  of  this  argument.  Julian 
reasons  thus,  "  If  there  was  no  such  thing  as  one  man  imitating 
another,  and  the  apostle  had  declared  that  all  had  sinned  in  Adam, 
yet  this  mode  of  speaking  might  be  defended  by  scripture  use  :  for 
Christ  called  the  devil  a  father,  although  he  is  incapable  of  genera- 
tion ;  so  the  apostle,  in  describing  how  the  first  man  was  imitated 
by  those  who  came  after  him,  might  without  impropriety  use  such 
language  as  that  before  cited."  And  again,  "  The  apostle  Paul 
gave  no  occasion  to  error,  and  said  nothing  improper,  when  he 
declared  that  the  first  man  was  a  sinner,  and  that  his  example  was 
imitated  by  those  who  followed  him."  "  By  one  man  sin  entered 
into  the  world ;  but  one  man  was  sufficient  to  furnish  an  example 
which  all  might  imitate."  "  He  speaks  of  one,  that  he  might  teach 
that  the  communication  of  sin  was  by  imitation,  not  by  generation." 
"  Which  sin,  although  it  did  not  become  a  part  of  our  nature,  was, 
however,  the  pattern  of  all  sin ;  and  hence,  although  it  is  not 
chargeable  on  men  in  consequence  of  their  birth,  it  is  by  reason  of 
their  imitation  of  it."  Prosper,  in  his  epistle  to  Demetrius,  ex- 
presses the  opinion  thus,  "  The  sin  of  Adam  hurts  his  posterity  by 
its  example,  but  not  by  natural  communication." 

These  opinions  were  rejected  and  firmly  opposed  by  the  ortho- 
dox. Jerome,  at  the  close  of  his  third  book  against  the  Pelagians, 
writes  thus,  "  If  it  be  objected  that  it  is  said  there  are  some  who 
have  not  sinned,  it  is  to  be  understood  that  they  did  not  actually 
commit  the  sin  of  which  Adam  was  guilty  by  transgressing  the 
commandment  of  God  in  Paradise,  but  all  men  are  held  to  be  guilty, 
either  in  consequence  of  the  sin  of  Adam,  their  ancient  progenitor, 
or  by  their  own  personal  act.  The  infant,  by  the  engagement  of 
his  parent  in  baptism,  is  released  :  and  he  who  has  arrived  at  years 
of  understanding  is  delivered,  both  by  another's  engagement  and 
his  own,  namely,  by  the  blood  of  Christ.  And  let  it  not  be  sup- 
posed that  I  understand  this  in  a  heretical  sense,  for  the  blessed 
martyr  Cyprian,  in  the  letter  which  he  wrote  to  Tidus  the  bishop 
concerning  the  baptism  of  infants,  says,  •  how  much  more  ought 
infants  not  to  be  debarred  from  baptism,  who  being  recently  born 

*  "  Conclusum  est,  nos  Deum  aequissimum  in  trinitate  venerari  ;  et  irrefutabiliter 
apparuit,  non  posse  ab  eo  peccatum  alienum  parvulis  imputari." 

t  "  Ex  quibus  necessano  conficitur,  nos  rectissime  defendere,  neminem  cum  pec- 
cato  nasci,  et  Deum  reos  non  posse  judicare  nascentes." 


102  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 

have  committed  no  sin,  unless  that  by  their  carnal  birth  from 
Adam  they  have  contracted  the  contagion  of  that  ancient  death  in 
their  first  nativity.  They  ought,  therefore,  more  readily  to  be 
admitted  to  receive  the  remission  of  sins,  since  that  which  is  for- 
given them  is  not  their  own  sin,  but  that  of  another."  Augustine 
also  strenuously  opposed  this  opinion  of  the  Pelagians  in  all  his 
writings,  "For,"  says  he,  "  we  were  all  in  that  one  man,  when  he, 
being  one,  corrupted  us  all."  De  Civ.  Dei,  lib.  xiii.,  c.  14.  And  in 
lib.  i.,  c.  10  of  his  Retractations,  he  says,  "  The  opinion  which  I  de- 
livered, that  sin  injures  no  nature  but  that  in  which  it  is  committed, 
the  Pelagians  apply  to  the  support  of  their  own  doctrine,  that  little 
children  cannot  be  hurt  by  the  sin  of  another,  but  only  by  their 
own  ;  not  considering  that,  as  they  belong  to  human  nature,  which 
has  contracted  original  sin,  for  human  nature  sinned  in  our  first 
parents,  it  is  true,  therefore,  that  no  sins  hurt  human  nature  but  its 
own."  Orosius,  in  his  Apology  for  Free  Will,  says,  "  All  have  sinned 
and  come  short  of  the  glory  of  God,  either  in  Adam  or  in  their  own 
proper  persons  :  the  universal  mass,  therefore,  is  obnoxious  to  pun- 
ishment. And  if  the  punishment  of  condemnation  due  to  all 
should  be  inflicted,  certainly  it  is  not  unjustly  inflicted."  In  like 
manner,  the  writer  of  the  book  entitled  Hypognosticon  says, 
"  Truly  then  the  sin  of  Adam  hurt  him  alone  while  he  was  alone, 
and  Eve  his  wife :  but  in  them  we  were  all  included,  because  they 
were  the  nature  of  the  whole  human  race,  which  is  one  in  all  of 
us,  for  we  partake  of  their  nature." 

What  has  been  brought  forward  relates  to  the  imputation  of  the 
first  sin ;  let  us  next  inquire  what  was  the  Pelagian  doctrine  re- 
specting the  communication  of  its  stain  or  pollution.  Pelagius,  in 
his  book  De  Natura,  says,  "  First  it  is  disputed  concerning  this, 
whether  our  nature  is  debilitated  and  deteriorated  by  sin.  And 
here,  in  my  opinion,  the  first  inquiry  ought  to  be,  what  is  sin  ?  Is 
it  a  substance,  or  is  it  a  mere  name,  devoid  of  substance  ;  not  a 
thing,  not  an  existence,  not  a  body,  nor  anything  else  (which  has  a 
separate  existence)  but  an  act :  and  if  this  is  its  nature,  as  I  believe 
it  is,  how  could  that  which  is  devoid  of  substance  debilitate  or 
change  human  nature  ?"  And  in  his  book  Concerning  Free  Will, 
"  Everything,  good  or  evil,  praiseworthy  or  censurable,  which  we 
possess,  did  not  originate  with  us,  but  is  done  by  us  ;  for  we  are 
born  capable  both  of  good  and  evil,  but  not  in  possession  of  these 
qualities  ;  for  in  our  birth  we  are  equally  destitute  of  virtue  and 
vice ;  and  previously  to  moral  agency,  there  is  nothing  in  man  but 
that  which  God  created  in  him." 

Ccelestius  held  precisely  the  same  doctrine.  Augustine  testifies 
that  he  held  and  taught  "  That  the  sin  of  Adam  hurt  himself  alone, 
and  that  infants  are  born  in  that  state  in  which  Adam  was  before 
he  sinned."  Julian  maintained  the  same  doctrine,  which  he  repeat- 
edly expresses  and  pertinaciously  defends ;  "  Human  nature,"  says 
he,  "  in  the  time  of  our  being  born,  is  rich  in  the  gift  of  innocence." 
Again,  "  Even  if  the  devil  should  create  men,  they  would  be  free 


EARLY    HISTORY    OP    PELAGIANIBM.  103 

from  all  evil  in  their  origin  ;  and  so  now  they  cannot  be  born  in  sin 
because  no  one  can  help  being  born,  nor  can  it  be  just  to  demand 
from  any  one,  what  is  to  him  altogether  impossible."  The  same 
says,  "  There  is  no  sin  in  the  condition  of  our  nature."  And,  "  No- 
body is  born  with  sin  ;  but  our  free  will  is  so  entirely  unimpaired, 
that  before  the  exercise  of  our  own  proper  will,  nature  in  every  one 
is  free  from  every  taint."  Hence  Prosper,  in  his  Chronicon  for  the 
year  414,  has  this  remark,  "About  this  time  Pelagius,  the  Briton, 
published  his  doctrine,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  injured  himself  alone, 
and  did  not  affect  his  posterity ;  and  that  all  infants  are  born  as 
free  from  sin  as  Adam  was  before  his  transgression."  It  cannot  be 
a  matter  of  surprise  that  the  Pelagians  held  that  Adam's  posterity 
inherited  from  him  a  corrupt  nature,  when  they  did  not  believe  that 
his  own  nature  was  deteriorated  by  sinning.  Julian,  therefore, 
says,  "  A  man's  natural  state  is  not  changed  by  sinning,  but  he  be- 
comes guilty  and  the  subject  of  demerit ;  for  it  is  of  the  very  es- 
sence of  free  will  that  the  man  should  have  it  in  his  power  as  much 
to  cease  from  sinning,  as  to  deviate  from  the  path  of  rectitude." 

In  opposition  to  these  opinions,  the  doctors  of  the  catholic  church 
held,  that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  were  now  destitute  of  original 
righteousness,  with  which  he  was  endowed,  and  hence  proceeds  an 
inordinate  exercise  of  all  the  powers  of  the  mind,  which  is  called 
the  fuel  of  sin,  the  law  in  the  members,  concupiscence,  &c. 

Augustine  is  full  and  explicit  on  this  subject.  Lib.  xxi.,  c.  3,  De 
Civitate  Dei,  he  says,  "  On  account  of  the  greatness  of  the  crime, 
the  nature  of  man  was  changed  in  its  punishment ;  so  that  what 
was  inflicted  as  a  punishment  on  our  sinning  first  parents,  comes 
naturally  on  others  born  of  them."  Again,  lib.  xiv.,  c  12,  "Hu- 
man nature  was  changed  by  the  sin  of  the  first  pair  ;  so  that  a  silent 
corruption  pervades  it,  such  as  we  see  and  feel,  and  by  reason  of 
which  we  are  subjected  to  death,  and  to  so  many  and  great  evils, 
and  are  disturbed  and  agitated  with  so  many  contrary  and  con- 
flicting passions,  such  as  had  no  existence  in  Paradise  before  man 
sinned,  although  he  was  there  invested  with  an  animal  body." 
Also,  "  How  else  shall  we  account  for  that  horrible  depth  of  igno- 
rance, from  which  all  error  originates,  by  which  all  the  sons  of 
Adam  are  involved  in  a  certain  dark  gulf,  from  which  they  cannot 
be  delivered  without  labour,  sorrow  and  fear  V  Speaking  again  of 
the  many  kinds  of  vices  to  which  men  are  subject,  he  adds,  "  All 
these  sins  of  wicked  men  proceed  from  the  same  root  of  error  and 
perverse  love  with  which  every  child  of  Adam  is  born." 

Prosper  also  expresses  himself  strongly  on  this  subject.  "  By 
the  wound  of  original  sin  the  nature  of  all  men  is  corrupted  and 
mortified  in  Adam,  whence  the  disease  of  all  manner  of  concupis- 
cence hath  sprung  up."  The  same  writer  says,  in  another  place, 
"  Whence  is  it,  that  if  what  Adam  lost  his  posterity  did  not  lose, 
he  himself  is  not  alone  the  sufferer  by  his  sin,  and  not  his  posterity  ? 
but  the  truth  is,  all  have  sinned  in  one,  and  every  branch  from  this 


104  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 

» 

corrupt  root  is  justly  condemned.  What  Adam  lost,  then,  by  the 
fall,  all  have  likewise  lost." 

The  writer  concerning  the  Vocation  of  the  Gentiles,  lib.  i.,  c.  6, 
has  these  words :  "  Human  nature  was  vitiated  by  the  transgression 
of  the  first  man ;  so  that  even  in  the  reception  of  blessings,  and  in 
the  midst  of  helps  and  divine  precepts,  there  is  a  continual  procli- 
vity of  the  will  to  evil ;  in  which,  as  often  as  we  confide,  we  are  de- 
ceived." Again,  "All  men  were  created  in  the  first  man  without 
fault,  and  we  all  have  lost  the  integrity  of  our  nature  by  his 
transgression."  "  Adam  was  by  nature  free  from  sin,  but  by  the 
disobedience  of  his  will  he  contracted  many  evils,  and  transmitted 
them  to  be  multiplied  more  and  more  by  his  posterity." 

Vincentius  Lyra  asks,  "  Who,  before  Ccelestius,  that  monstrous 
disciple  of  Pelagius,  ever  denied  that  the  whole  human  race  was 
held  guilty  of  Adam's  sin  ?" 

Peter,  the  deacon,  in  his  book  concerning  the  Incarnation,  says, 
"  Therefore,  seduced  by  the  cunning  of  the  serpent,  of  his  own  ac- 
cord he  became  a  transgressor  of  the  divine  law  ;  and  so,  agreea- 
bly to  the  threatening,  he  was  in  the  just  judgment  of  God  con- 
demned to  the  punishment  of  death  ;  that  is,  both  body  and  mind 
were  changed  for  the  worse,  and  having  lost  liberty,  he  was  en- 
slaved under  the  servitude  of  sin  ;  hence  it  is  that  no  man  is  born 
who  is  not  bound  by  the  bond  of  this  sin,  with  the  exception  of 
Him  who  was  born  by  a  new  mode  of  generation,  that  he  might 
lose  the  bond  of  sin ;  even  the  Mediator  between  God  and  man, 
the  man  Christ  Jesus." 

It  was  also  a  doctrine  of  the  Pelagians,  that  temporal  death  was 
by  the  necessity  of  nature,  and  did  not  fall  on  the  human  race  in 
consequence  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parents.  They  alleged  that 
Adam  would  have  died,  although  he  had  never  sinned.  Very  far, 
then,  were  they  from  acknowledging  that  we  had  incurred  eternal 
death  by  the  sin  of  Adam.  Augustine  relates,  that  it  was  one  of 
the  charges  against  Pelagius,  in  Palestine,  that  he  held  the  doctrine 
of  Ccelestius,  "that  neither  by  the  death  nor  transgression  of  Adam 
do  the  whole  human  race  die,  nor  do  the  whole  human  race  rise 
from  the  dead  in  virtue  of  Christ's  resurrection."  "  Death,"  said  he, 
"  passed  to  the  posterity  of  Adam  by  imitation  of  his  sin,  not  by  ge- 
neration." Augustine,  in  his  last  answer  to  Julian,  addresses  him 
thus,  "  You  will  not  agree  that  by  reason  of  original  sin  death 
passes  on  the  human  race,  for  then  you  would  be  forced  to  ac- 
knowledge that  sin  had  been  propagated  through  ail  our  race.  For 
you  cannot  but  perceive  how  unjust  it  would  be  to  inflict  punish- 
ment where  there  is  no  guilt." 

Orosius,  against  Pelagius,  has  these  words,  "  Your  followers, 
who  have  sucked  the  poison  abundantly  from  your  breast,  assert, 
that  man  was  made  mortal,  and  that  he  incurred  no  loss  from  the 
transgression  of  the  precept."  And  the  writer  of  the  Hypognosti- 
con  says,  speaking  of  the  Pelagians,  "  They  tell  us,  that  whether 
Adam  had  sinned  or  not,  he  would  have  died," 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM.  105 

On  the  other  hand,  the  orthodox  maintained,  "  That  death,  tem- 
poral and  eternal,  together  with  all  pains  and  diseases  connected 
with  the  death  of  the  body,  flow  from  the  first  sin ;  and  that  unless 
Adam  had  sinned,  he  never  would  have  died." 

Augustine  fully  expresses  the  opinion  of  the  church  catholic  in 
his  book  De  Peccat.  Mer.  et  Remiss.  "  Although,  as  to  his  body, 
he  was  of  the  earth,  and  partook  of  an  animal  nature,  yet  if  he  had 
not  sinned,  his  body  would  have  been  changed  into  a  spiritual  body, 
and  into  that  incorruptibility  which  is  promised  to  the  saints  at  the 
resurrection."  Again,  "  If  Adam  had  not  sinned,  he  never  would 
have  been  divested  of  his  body,  but  would  have  been  clothed  with 
immortality  and  incorruption  ;  so  that  mortality  would  have  been 
swallowed  up  of  life  ; .  that  is,  there  would  have  been  a  transition 
from  animal  to  spiritual  life."  "  According  to  my  judgment,  he 
had  a  resource  in  the  fruits  of  the  trees  of  the  garden  against  the 
decays  of  nature,  and  in  the  tree  of  life  against  old  age."  "  So 
great  a  sin  was  committed  by  the  first  two  of  our  race,  that  human 
nature  underwent  a  change  for  the  worse :  also  the  obligation  of 
their  sin  and  the  necessity  of  dying  have  been  transmitted  to  pos- 
terity. And  the  reign  of  death  over  men  will  prevail  until  due 
punishment  shall  precipitate  into  the  second  death  which  has  no 
end,  all  except  those  whom  the  unmerited  grace  of  God  shall  bring 
into  a  state  of  salvation." 

From  this  last  question  arose  another.  Why  are  infants  baptiz- 
ed ;  and  if  they  should  depart  without  baptism,  in  what  state  do 
they  deserve  to  be  placed  ?  Pelagius,  lest  he  should  be  obliged  to 
confess  that  they  were  under  the  bond  of  original  sin,  and  by  their 
birth  exposed  to  eternal  death,  denied  that  they  received  baptism 
for  the  remission  of  the  guilt  of  the  first  sin,  or  that  they  might  be 
translated  from  the  power  of  darkness  into  the  kingdom  of  God. 
Thus  Augustine  declares,  "  That  the  Pelagians  will  not  believe  that 
original  sin  is  removed  by  baptism,  for  they  contend  that  no  such 
thing  exists  in  those  just  born."  Hence  many  inferred  that  they  did 
not  believe  that  infants  were  redeemed  by  Christ :  and  some  affirm- 
ed that  they  denied  the  propriety  of  the  baptism  of  infants  alto- 
gether. But  Pelagius,  in  the  book  which  he  addressed  to  Innocent, 
bishop  of  Rome,  clears  himself  from  imputations  of  this  kind. 
"  Who  was  ever  so  impious,"  says  he,  "  as  to  wish  to  interdict  in- 
fants from  a  share  in  the  common  redemption  of  the  human  race  ?" 
And  the  council  of  Carthage  acknowledges  that  Coclestius  admitted 
the  redemption  of  infants.  Augustine  also,  in  his  89th  epistle,  ad- 
dressed to  Hilary,  among  other  things  says,  "  He  was  forced  to 
confess,  on  account  of  the  baptism  of  infants,  that  redemption  was 
necessary  for  them  also.  Where,  although  he  was  unwilling  to 
speak  explicitly  concerning  original  sin,  yet  by  the  very  naming  of 
redemption  he  involved  himself  in  difficulty  ;  for  from  what  should 
they  be  redeemed  but  from  the  power  of  the  devil,  under  which 
they  could  not  be  unless  they  were  under  the  guilt  of  original  sin  ? 
Or  with  what  price  are  they  redeemed,  unless  with  the  blood  of 


106  EARLY    HISTORY    OP    PELAGIANISM. 

Christ,  concerning  which  it  is  most  manifestly  declared,  that  it  was 
shed  for  the  remission  of  sins  ?"  But  Pelagius  put  another  meaning 
on  the  word  redemption,  concerning  which  Augustine  speaks  in 
another  place.  Hilary  expresses  their  opinion  thus  :  "That  an  in- 
fant dying  unbaptized,  cannot  justly  perish,  since  it  is  born  without 
sin."  And  Augustine  describes  it  in  these  words,  "  Nor  do  little 
children  need  the  grace  of  the  Saviour,  by  which,  through  baptism, 
they  may  be  delivered  from  perdition,  because  they  have  contract- 
ed no  guilt  from  their  connection  with  Adam."  The  Pelagians, 
however  inconsistent  it  may  appear,  not  only  retained  the  baptism 
of  infants,  but  also  the  very  form  which  had  been  long  in  use,  ac- 
cording to  which  it  was  said  to  be  for  the  remission  of  sins.  On 
which  subject  Augustine  remarks,  "  Of  what  advantage  is  it  that 
you  make  use  of  the  same  words  in  the  baptism  of  infants  as  adults, 
when  you  take  away  the  thing  signified  in  this  sacrament  1"  And 
the  author  of  the  Hypognosticon  addresses  them  with  severity  re- 
specting the  same  thing ;  "  Who  is  not  shocked  at  the  mere  nam- 
ing of  your  practice,  in  which  you  make  the  faithful  word  of  God  in 
part  true  and  in  part  a  lie ;  that  is,  true  as  it  relates  to  adults,  for 
you  admit  that  they  are  indeed  baptized  for  the  remission  of  sins : 
but  false  as  it  relates  to  infants,  who  are  not,  according  to  you,  bap- 
tized for  the  remission  of  sins,  although  you  use  in  their  baptism, 
this  very  form  of  words."  To  these  things  the  Pelagians  had  no- 
thing to  reply,  except  that  although  infants  were  free  from  sin,  they 
were  the  subjects  of  the  same  sacrament,  which,  when  applied  to 
adults,  was  for  the  remission  of  sins.  But  when  urged  to  state  why 
they  were  at  all  baptized,  they  offered  two  reasons ;  the  one  was, 
that  by  baptism  they  were  adopted  into  the  number  of  sons  ;  the 
other,  that  by  it  they  received  the  promise  of  the  kingdom  of  hea- 
ven. This  made  it  necessary  for  Pelagius  to  feign  some  interme- 
diate place  between  heaven  and  hell,  to  which  unbaptized  infants 
might  be  sent  after  death.  But  he  was  cautious  about  what  he 
said  on  this  point.  We  learn  from  Augustine  that  he  was  wont  to 
say,  "  Whither  infants  do  not  go  I  know,  but  whither  they  do  go,  I 
know  not."  This  same  father,  therefore,  in  writing  against  Julian, 
adverts  to  this  opinion  in  the  following  words  :  "  You  make  two 
places  of  everlasting  happiness  ;  the  one  within,  and  the  other 
without  the  kingdom  of  God."  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evi- 
dent what  were  the  opinions  of  the  Pelagians  respecting  the  future 
state  of  infants,  and  the  reasons  of  their  baptism.  The  opinions  of 
the  orthodox  on  these  points  were  far  different,  for  although  they 
disputed  among  themselves  what  kind  of  punishment  was  due  to 
infants,  on  account  of  original  sin,  whether  of  loss  or  of  sense,  yet 
there  was  an  almost  universal  consent  among  them,  that  in  conse- 
quence of  original  sin,  we  are  children  of  wrath,  and  obnoxious  to 
eternal  punishment ;  and,  moreover,  that  baptism  was  for  the  re- 
mission of  sins  ;  and  that  by  baptism  infants  were  regenerated,  and 
thus  made  partakers  of  life  and  eternal  felicity. 

Augustine  often  brings  up  this  subject,  and  may  be  considered  as 


EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 


107 


speaking  the  sentiments  of  the  whole  church  in  his  time.  "  I  do 
not  affirm,"  says  he,  "  that  infants  dying  without  baptism  will  be  in 
a  worse  condition  than  if  they  had  never  been  born,  for  our  Lord 
uses  this  expression  respecting  sinners  of  the  most  abandoned 
character  :  for  from  what  he  says  about  Sodom,  and  does  not  re- 
strict to  the  wicked  inhabitants  of  that  city,  that  it  will  be  more 
tolerable  for  them  than  some  others  in  the  day  of  judgment,  the  in- 
ference is  clear  that  there  will  be  a  difference  in  the  future  punish- 
ment of  men  ;  who  then  can  doubt  but  that  unbaptized  infants,  who 
are  chargeable  with  the  guilt  of  original  sin  only,  which  has  not 
been  aggravated  by  any  actual  transgressions  of  their  own,  will 
fall  under  the  lightest  punishment  of  all  ?  But  what  will  be  the 
nature  or  ttie  degree  of  their  punishment,  although  we  cannot  de- 
fine, yet  I  should  not  dare  say,  that  it  would  have  been  better  for 
them  never  to  have  been  born,  than  to  exist  in  the  state  which  will 
be  allotted  to  them."  Again,  "  It  may  be  truly  said,  that  unbap- 
tized infants,  leaving  the  body  without  baptism,  will  suffer  the  very 
mildest  punishment ;  yet  he  who  says  that  they  will  fall  under  no 
degree  of  condemnation,  both  deceives  others  and  is  deceived  him- 
self ;  for  the  apostle  has  said  that  the  condemnation  is  of  one  sin ; 
and  that  by  one  offence  condemnation  hath  come  upon  all  men." 
"  We  say  that  little  children  should  be  baptized  ;  and  of  this  no  one 
doubts,  for  even  they  who  differ  from  us  in  other  points,  all  concur 
in  this  ;  we  maintain,  however,  that  this  is  that  they  may  be  saved, 
and  may  inherit  eternal  life,  which  they  cannot  possess  unless  they 
are  baptized  in  Christ ;  but  they  say,  it  is  not  for  salvation,  not  for 
eternal  life,  but  for  the  kingdom  of  God." 

Jerome  also,  in  book  iii.  against  the  Pelagians,  says,  "  This  one 
thing  I  say,  and  will  then  conclude :  either  you  should  have  another 
creed,  which  after  the  words  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  should 
contain  a  clause,  that  ye  shall  baptize  infants  for  the  kingdom  of 
heaven  ;  or  if  you  use  the  same  baptism  for  infants  and  adults,  you 
should  confess  that  the  former  as  well  as  the  latter  are  baptized  for 
the  remission  of  sins." 

Paullinus,  in  his  book  addressed  to  Zosimus,  after  the  condemna- 
tion of  Pelagius  and  Ccelestius,  says,  "  They  strive  against  the  apos- 
tolical doctrine  of  original  sin,  which  hath  passed  on  all  men,  for 
our  race  will  possess  that  inheritance  received  from  Adam,  even 
unto  the  end  of  the  world,  and  which  is  only  by  the  sacrament  of 
baptism  removed  from  infants  ;  who  cannot  inherit  eternal  life  nor 
obtain  the  kingdom  of  God  by  any  other  means."  A  multitude  of 
testimonies  might  be  adduced  of  the  same  import,  but  it  is  unne- 
cessary. The  reader  will  perceive  from  those  above  cited,  what 
is  exceedingly  evident  to  every  one  in  the  least  conversant  with 
ecclesiastical  history,  that  the  fathers  of  this  period  seem  universally 
to  have  fallen  into  the  mistake  of  confounding  baptism  with  regene- 
ration. From  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  John  iii.  5,  they  con- 
cluded that  there  was  no  salvation  without  external  baptism ;  and 
the  next  step  was  that  the  internal  grace  of  regeneration  uniformly 


108  EARLY    HISTORY    OF    PELAGIANISM. 

accompanied  the  external  rite  ;  and  this  notion  had  taken  such  full 
possession  of  their  minds,  that  they  commonly  gave  the  name  re- 
generation to  baptism.  We  have  not  kept  back  the  evidence  of 
this  fact,  whatever  may  be  its  operation ;  for  we  now  have  to  act 
the  part  of  faithful  historians,  and  to  exhibit  fairly  to  the  view  of 
our  readers  the  opinions  of  the  ancient  church  on  an  important 
point  of  doctrine,  which  may  be  considered  as  lying  at  the  founda- 
tion of  the  Christian  system. 

The  cardinal  point  of  the  Pelagian  system  was  the  denial  of  ori- 
ginal sin  ;  this  was  their  *pZ>tov  ipevSos,  their  radical  error,  from  which 
all  the  rest  naturally  germinated.  The  controversy  did,  however, 
include  many  other  distinct  points  of  no  small  interest,  concerning 
which  our  limits  do  not  permit  us  to  say  anything  at  present.  Pro- 
bably, in  some  future  number  we  shall  resume  the  subject,  and  ex- 
hibit a  view  of  other  controversies  which  have  arisen  in  the  church 
respecting  original  sin.  It  is  attended  with  many  advantages  to 
bring  into  view  ancient  heresies ;  for  often  what  modern  innova- 
tors consider  a  new  discovery,  and  wish  to  pass  off  as  a  scheme 
suited  to  remove  all  difficulties,  is  found  upon  examination  to  be 
nothing  else  than  some  ancient  heresy  clothed  in  a  new  dress. 
That  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  involved  in  many  difficulties, 
which  no  mortal  has  the  wisdom  to  explain,  we  are  ready  to  admit : 
but  the  question  with  us  is, — is  it  taught  in  the  Bible  ?  And  if  any 
one  choose  to  move  a  previous  question,  it  will  be, — can  that  book 
be  divinely  inspired  which  contains  such  a  doctrine  ?  And  here, 
if  we  could  get  clear  of  the  thing  by  rejecting  the  scriptures, 
something  would  be  gained ;  but  the  evidence  of  original  sin  is 
deeply  recorded  in  the  acknowledged  depravity  of  our  race,  and  in 
the  dispensations  of  God  towards  us.  To  account  for  the  facts 
which  experience  teaches  beyond  all  possibility  of  contradiction, 
we  need  the  testimony  which  the  Bible  contains,  which  if  we  re- 
ject we  may  escape  one  set  of  difficulties,  but  shall  assuredly 
plunge  into  others  more  formidable  and  unmanageable,  although 
they  may  be  more  out  of  sight. 

It  is  our  opinion,  therefore,  after  looking  on  all  sides,  and  con- 
templating the  bearing  and  consequences  of  all  theories  on  this 
subject,  that  no  one  is  on  the  whole  so  consistent  with  facts,  with 
the  scriptures,  and  with  itself,  as  the  old  doctrine  of  the  ancient 
church,  which  traces  all  the  sins  and  evils  in  the  world  to  the  im- 
putation of  the  first  sin  of  Adam  ;  and  that  no  other  theory  of  ori- 
ginal sin  is  capable  of  standing  the  test  of  an  impartial  scrutiny. 


ESSAY    V 

ORIGINAL    SIN. 

PUBLISHED    IN     1830. 


Although,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  former  Essay,  the  Pelagian 
doctrines  respecting  original  sin  were  condemned  by  councils  and 
by  popes,  the  heresy  was  not  soon  extinguished  ;  but  was  in  whole 
or  in  part  adopted  by  many  learned  and  ingenious  men.  To  many, 
the  opinions  of  Augustine  appeared  harsh,  and  hardly  reconcilable 
with  moral  agency  and  human  accountableness.  They,  therefore, 
endeavoured  to  strike  out  a  middle  course  between  the  rigid  doc- 
trines of  Augustine  and  the  unscriptural  opinions  of  Pelagius.  This 
led  to  the  adoption  of  an  intermediate  system,  which  obtained  the 
denomination  of  Semi-Pelagianism ;  and  as  these  views  seem  to 
have  been  generally  received  about  Marseilles,  in  the  south  of 
France,  the  abettors  of  this  theory  were  very  commonly  called 
Massilienses.  Augustine  entered  also  into  this  controversy,  and 
carried  on  a  correspondence  on  the  subject  with  Prosper  and  Hilary, 
two  learned  men  of  that  region  ;  the  former  of  whom  ardently  op- 
posed the  Semi-Pelagians,  while  the  latter  was  inclined  to  favour 
them.  By  degrees,  however,  the  public  attention  was  called  off 
from  this  subject.  The  darkness  and  confusion  produced  by  the 
incursion  of  the  northern  barbarians  took  away  all  opportunity  and 
disposition  to  discuss  those  abstruse  matters.  Ages  of  ignorance 
succeeded,  which  have  emphatically  been  called  "  the  dark  ages." 
Superstition  advanced,  indeed,  with  rapid  strides,  but  doctrinal  in- 
vestigation was  neglected  ;  or  degenerated  into  mere  logomachies, 
or  useless  thorny  disputations. 

We  shall  therefore  pass  over  this  long  dark  period  with  this  slight 
notice,  and  will  proceed  to  take  a  survey  of  the  period  antecedent 
to  the  Reformation  ;  and  endeavour  to  ascertain  the  opinions  of 
some  of  those  acute  and  metaphysical  men,  denominated  schoolmen. 
It  has  become  customary  for  almost  all  classes  of  modern  writers 
to  treat  the  scholastic  theology  with  sovereign  contempt ;  and  this 
often  without  any  adequate  knowledge  of  the  system  which  they 
contemn.  It  is  true,  these  ingenious  men  often  exhausted  their 
energies  and  lost  their  labour  by  a  vain  attempt  to  fathom  an  abyss : 
but  it  would  surprise  some  modern  metaphysicians  and  theologians 
to  learn  how  exactly  they  themselves  are  running  in  the  track,  and 
pursuing  the  very  footsteps  of  these  despised  schoolmen. 


110  ORIGINAL    SIN. 

Our  first  object,  therefore,  will  be  to  lay  before  the  reader  a  brief 
abstract  of  the  discussions  of  the  angelical  doctor,  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas,  on  the  subject  of  original  sin.  The  subject  is  treated  in 
the  eighty-second  question  of  his  second  book. 

On  this  subject  he  starts  four  queries.  1.  "  Whether  original 
sin  is  a  habit?  2.  Whether  original  sin  is  one,  in  man  ?  3.  Whether 
it  consists  in  concupiscence  ?  4.  Whether  it  exists  in  an  equal  de- 
gree in  all  ?" 

This  author,  in  his  vast  work,  entitled  Summa  Theologiae,  inva- 
riably commences  his  discussion  by  briefly  stating  some  arguments 
on  each  side  of  the  question. 

On  the  first  question  proposed  above,  he  brings  forward  the  fol- 
lowing objections  to  the  affirmative.  1.  "  Original  sin  consists  in 
the  privation  of  original  righteousness,  as  is  declared  by  Anselm; 
but  a  privation  is  not  a  habit,  therefore  original  sin  is  not  a  habit." 
2.  "  Actual  sin  is  more  deserving  of  blame  than  original  sin,  be- 
cause it  possesses  more  of  a  voluntary  nature ;  but  a  mere  habit 
of  actual  sin  is  not  chargeable  with  guilt ;  for  if  it  were,  then  a  man 
would  be  guilty  of  sin  all  the  time  he  was  asleep.  Original  sin 
therefore  is  not  a  habit."  3.  "  Besides,  in  evil,  the  act  always  pre- 
cedes the  habit ;  for  no  evil  habit  is  ever  infused,  but  always  ac- 
quired :  but  no  act  precedes  original  sin  ;  therefore  original  sin  is 
not  a  habit. 

" But, onthe  other  hand,  Augustine  declares  that  infants  are  the 
subjects  of  concupiscence  ;  but  they  are  not  so  in  regard  to  the  act ; 
therefore  original  sin  in  them  must  be  a  habit." 

The  conclusion  which  he  draws  from  a  view  of  both  sides  of  the 
question,  is  the  following  :     "  Original  sin  is  a  habit,  but  not  in  the 
same  way  as  knowledge  is  a  habit ;  but  it  is  a  certain  inordinate 
condition  of  nature,  and  a  debility  consequent  on  the  privation  of 
original  righteousness,"  which  proposition  he  proceeds  to  explain 
as  follows  :  "  The  word  habit  is  taken  in  a  two-fold  sense  ;  in  the 
first,  it  signifies  a  power  by  which  one  is  inclined  to  act ;  in  this 
sense,  knowledge  and  virtue  are  called  habits :  but  in  the  other 
sense,  habit  is  a  disposition  or  state  of  nature  composed  of  many 
particulars,  according  to  which  nature  is  in  a  condition  favourable 
or  unfavourable  for  any  given  exercise.     Now,  according  to  the 
first  sense  of  the  word,  original  sin  is  not  a  habit,  but  according  to 
the  second  it  is  ;  just  as  we  speak  of  health  as  a  good  habit  or  state 
of  the  body ;  and  sickness  as  the  contrary.     Original  sin,  may, 
therefore,  be  described  to  be  a  certain   inordinate  condition  or 
disposition  proceeding  from  the  loss  of  harmony  in  the  exercise  of 
the  moral  powers,  in  which  harmony  original  righteousness  con- 
sisted :  just  as  sickness  is  a  certain  disordered  state  of  the  body  and 
its  functions,  arising  from  the  loss  of  that  equal  temperament  in 
which  health  consists.     On  account  of  this  analogy,  original  sin  is 
often  called  '  a  disease  of  the  mind.'      And  as  in  bodily  sickness, 
there  is  not  a  mere  privation  of  that  regular  state  and  action  in 
which  health  consists,  but  also  an  inordinate  disposition,  so  also, 


ORIGINAL    SIN.  Ill 

original  sin  includes  both  a  privation  of  original  righteousness,  and 
a  disorder  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind  :  it  is  not,  therefore,  merely 
a  privation,  but  is  also  a  corrupt  habit." 

"  Again,  as  actual  sin  consists  in  the  irregularity  of  our  moral 
exercises,  and  original  sin  in  the  inordinate  disposition  of  our  na- 
ture, original  sin  may  have  the  true  nature  and  ill-desert  of  sin  ; 
but  such  an  inordinate  condition  of  the  soul  has  not  the  nature  of 
an  act,  but  of  a  habit ;  therefore,  original  and  actual  sin  are  distinct, 
although  both  are  connected  with  ill-desert." 

But  in  regard  to  the  third  objection,  stated  above,  in  which  it 
was  alleged,  that  in  evil,  acts  must  precede  the  habit,  as  there  can 
be  no  iniiision  of  evil  habits,  "  I  would  observe,"  says  he,  "  that  it 
has  already  been  stated,  that  original  sin  does  not  consist  in  that 
kind  of  a  habit  in  which  there  is  a  power  inclining  us  to  act ;  for 
although  from  original  sin  there  does  follow  an  inclination  to 
inordinate  action,  yet  not  directly,  but  indirectly :  namely,  by  the 
removal  of  original  righteousness,  by  which  these  inordinate  mo- 
tions were  restrained,  and  everything  preserved  in  its  regular  con- 
dition :  just  as  in  the  case  of  bodily  sickness  there  follows  indirectly 
an  inclination  to  irregular  bodily  motions.  Original  sin,  therefore, 
ought  not  to  be  considered  '  an  infused  habit,'  nor  a  habit  acquired 
by  repeated  acts,  but  an  innate  disposition  derived  from  the  volun- 
tary transgression  of  the  first  man." 

The  above  will  serve  as  a  specimen  of  the  manner  in  which  this 
subject  was  discussed  in  the  thirteenth  century.  It  is  not  to  our 
purpose  to  take  any  notice  of  the  author's  answers  to  the  other 
questions  stated  above. 

It  is  now  time  to  bring  distinctly  into  view  the  opinions  of  the 
Reformers  on  the  subject  of  original  sin.  And  here  it  may  be  ob- 
served in  the  general,  that  while  these  distinguished  and  holy  men 
appealed  to  the  Bible  for  the  proof  of  their  doctrines,  and  would 
agree  to  submit  to  no  other  judge  in  matters  of  faith,  yet  they  were 
all  much  in  the  habit  of  studying  the  writings  of  Augustine,  whose 
views  of  doctrine  appeared  to  them  to  be  remarkably  accordant 
with  the  sacred  scriptures.  From  a  knowledge  of  this  fact,  it  might 
readily  be  inferred  that  the  reformers  agreed  with  the  father  be- 
fore-mentioned in  his  views  of  original  sin.  There  is  no  occasion, 
however,  to  have  recourse  to  reasoning  on  this  point :  the  confes- 
sions, catechisms,  and  treatises  of  these  men,  are  as  explicit  as  we 
could  wish  them  to  be  ;  and  although  they  fell  into  deplorable  di- 
visions about  other  matters,  yet  in  regard  to  doctrine,  it  is  remarka- 
ble, they  were  all  of  one  mind.  This  unanimity  is  not  a  conclu- 
sion merely  inferred  from  their  writings  ;  but  at  the  famous  con- 
ference between  Luther  and  Zwingle,  and  their  respective  friends 
and  adherents  at  Marpurg,  where  they  were  unable  to  come  to  any 
agreement  respecting  the  eucharist,  it  was  ascertained  by  a  par- 
ticular comparison  ol  ideas  on  all  the  important  doctrines  of  reli- 
gion, that  no  difference  of  opinion  existed'  among  them  on  these 
points.     And  that  this  conference,  from  which  the  friends  of  peace 


112  ORIGINAL    SIN. 

had  expected  so  much,  might  not  be  altogether  without  fruit,  a 
paper,  or  confession,  consisting  of  fourteen  articles,  was  prepared 
and  signed  by  all  the  theologians  present.  The  fourth  of  these 
articles  related  to  original  sin,  and  was  in  the  following  words  : 
"  Quarto. — Credimus,  quod  peccatum  originale  sit  nobis  innatum,  et 
ab  Adamo  in  nos  propagatum.  Et  quod  sit  tale  peccatum,  quod 
omnes  homines  damnationi  obnoxios  faciat.  Ita,  quidem,  ut  nisi 
Jesum  Christum  nobis  sua  morte  et  vita  subvenisset,  omnes  homi- 
nes propter  originale  peccatum  damnati  fuissent,  nee  in  regnum  Dei, 
et  ad  aeternam  felicitatem  pervenire  potuissent." 

These  doctrinal  articles  were  subscribed  by  Luther,  Melancthon, 
Jonas,  Osiander,  Brentius,  Agricola,  Oecolampadius,  Zwingle,  Bucer 
and  Hedio. 

It  is  true,  however,  that  Zwingle  fell,  for  a  while,  under  some 
suspicion  of  error,  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin ;  be- 
cause he  maintained  that  infants,  the  offspring  of  believing  parents, 
would  not  finally  perish  for  want  of  baptism :  and  it  has  been  al- 
leged, that  in  some  of  his  writings  he  spake  of  original  sin  rather 
as  our  disease  and  curse  than  as  our  sin.  On  this  account  Rhegius 
addressed  an  admonitory  letter  to  him,  to  which  Zwingle  replied 
explicitly  and  fully,  so  as  to  give  full  satisfaction  to  Rhegius  and  to 
others ;  and  now,  A.D.  1529,  at  Marpurg,  he  and  his  followers 
were  as  ready  to  subscribe  this  doctrine  as  Luther  himself.  After 
the  breach  was  found  to  be  irreconcilable  on  the  subject  of  the  sa- 
crament of  the  Lord's  supper,  the  Lutherans  indulged  great  bitter- 
ness of  spirit  towards  this  noble  reformer,  and  often  spoke  of  him 
and  his  adherents  as  pelagianising :  although,  in  fact,  they  were  as 
orthodox  on  this  point  as  the  Lutherans  themselves. 

As  it  appears  that  no  diversity  of  opinion  existed  among  the  re- 
formed on  this  subject,  it  will  be  sufficient,  in  addition  to  what  has 
been  said  already,  merely  to  exhibit  the  words  of  the  famous  con- 
fession of  Augsburg,  sometimes  called  the  Augustan  confession. 
"  Peccatum  originis  habet  privationem  originalis  justitiae,  et  cum 
hoc  inordinatam  dispositionem  partium  animae  ;  unde  non  est  priva- 
tio,  sed  quidam  habitus  corruptus."  "  Original  sin  consists  in  the 
want  of  original  righteousness,  and  in  an  inordinate  disposition  of 
the  faculties  of  the  soul :  so  that  it  is  not  merely  a  privation,  but  a 
certain  corrupt  habit." 

The  perfect  agreement  of  all  the  reformers  on  the  subject  of  the 
imputation  of  the  first  sin  of  Adam  to  all  his  posterity,  must  be  well 
known  to  all  who  are  conversant  with  their  writings.  Their  opi- 
nions on  this  subject  have,  however,  been  collected  by  the  very 
learned  Andrew  Rivet,  in  his  work  on  Original  Sin,  which  is  con- 
tained in  the  third  volume  of  the  folio  edition  of  his  works.  It  will 
be  unnecessary,  therefore,  at  present  to  exhibit  their  testimony  on 
this  point. 

The  far-famed  council  of  Trent  formed  several  canons  on  the 
subject  of  original  sin,  but  they  were  expressed  in  the  most  ambi- 
guous terms.     Their  object  was,  in  general  terms,  to  recognise  the 


ORIGINAL   SIN.  113 

ancient  doctrine  of  the  church  on  this  point,  but  not  to  censure  any 
of  their  own  doctors,  who  differed  exceedingly  from  one  another 
in  their  views  of  the  subject.  That  this  was  indeed  the  motive 
which  actuated  them,  is  explicitly  declared  by  one  of  their  most 
learned  members,  Andradius,  who  became  also  the  principal  de- 
fender of  the  canons  and  proceedings  of  that  body.  He  informs  us 
that  the  decrees  of  the  council  on  this  subject  were  not  intended  to 
condemn  even  the  opinions  which  had  been  published  by  Albert 
Pighius,  who  confined  original  sin  entirely  to  the  imputation  of  the 
sin  of  Adam,  and  asserted  that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  inherent, 
hereditary  depravity ;  for,  he  says,  it  was  their  purpose  to  leave  all 
men  at  liberty  to  form  what  opinions  they  pleased  respecting  the 
nature  of  original  sin. 

Andradius  himself,  in  treating  this  subject,  makes  a  free  use  of 
this  liberty,  and  discourses  in  the  following  manner :  "  Man,  in  his 
original  creation,  received  a  constitution,  in  which  were  implanted 
a  number  of  appetites,  desires,  and  affections,  between  which,  con- 
sidered in  themselves,  there  was  not  a  perfect  concord,  for  the  flesh 
naturally  lusted  against  the  mind,  and  vice  versa :  but  over  these 
purely  natural  affections  there  was  superinduced  a  moral  charac- 
ter, called  '  original  righteousness,'  by  which  all  the  irregular  ten- 
dencies of  the  nature  of  man  were  restrained  within  proper  bounds, 
and  the  exercise  of  the  whole  rendered  harmonious."  "  The  pro- 
pension  of  these  natural  inclinations,"  he  says,  "  is  not  in  itself  sin- 
ful, but  when  original  righteousness  is  removed,  then  it  becomes 
sinful  by  its  disorder  and  extravagance.  The  very  essence  of  ori- 
ginal sin  therefore  consists  in  the  absence  of  original  righteousness, 
from  which  defect  all  sinful  concupiscence  proceeds.  These  natu- 
ral inclinations,  therefore,  called  '  concupiscence,'  are  not  evil  per 
se,  but  only  by  irregularity  and  excess  ;  therefore,  when  the  mind 
is  renewed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  they  are  again  restrained  within 
their  proper  limits,  they  cease  to  be  sinful."  But  as  all  sin  sup- 
poses the  transgression  of  a  law,  Andradius  asks,  "  whether  the 
loss  of  original  righteousness  is  repugnant  to  any  law ;"  and  an- 
swers, "  that  there  is,  indeed,  no  express  law  to  which  it  is  op- 
posed," but  says,  "  it  is  contrary  to  the  general  law  of  our  nature, 
which  requires  everything  essential  to  our  moral  perfection."  But 
here  our  ingenious  author  falls  into  a  difficulty,  for  he  lays  it  down 
as  a  principle,  "  that  all  sin  is  the  act  of  an  intelligent  and  volun- 
tary agent  in  violation  of  the  law  of  God  ;"  but  the  loss  of  original 
righteousness  was  owing  to  the  personal  fault  of  Adam,  who  was 
the  only  voluntary  agent  concerned  in  the  transaction.  His  an- 
swer is  subtle,  though  unsatisfactory ;  but  it  is  borrowed  from 
Augustine.  "  As  all  men  were  then  included  in  Adam,  so  our  wills 
were  included  in  his  will,  and  thus  original  sin  may  be  said  to  be 
voluntary  in  us."  But  whereas  there  was  but  an  obscure  exercise 
of  our  will  in  the  commission  of  the  first  sin,  he  maintains,  and  it  is 
accordant  with  the  common  opinion  of  popish  theologians,  "  that  of 
■all  sins,  original  sin  is  the  least ;"  but  as  this  is  directly  contrary  to 

8 


I 


114  ORIGINAL   SIN. 

the  declaration  of  the  fathers,  they  say  that  the  reason  why  it  had 
been  called  great  by  them  was  on  account  of  its  wide  diffusion  and 
universal  propagation. 

It  is  very  evident,  therefore,  from  the  explicit  declarations  of  this 
great  defender  of  the  council  of  Trent,  how  much  they  obscured 
and  misrepresented  this  fundamental  doctrine  of  scripture  :  and, 
accordingly,  he  finds  great  fault  with  a  writer  of  his  own  church 
who  had  taught  that  from  the  soul  infected  with  original  sin  no 
good  thing  could  naturally  proceed  ;  asserting  that  human  nature 
was  not  so  entirely  depraved,  but  that  from  it,  by  proper  discipline, 
some  good  thing  might  proceed  without  the  aid  of  grace  ;  and  this 
good  he  does  not  confine  to  external  acts,  but  extends  to  spiritual 
exercises ;  therefore,  according  to  him,  the  seeds  of  genuine  piety 
must  exist  in  our  corrupt  nature  previous  to  regeneration. 

Chemnicius,  from  whose  Examen  the  preceding  account  is  taken, 
gives  his  own  views  and  those  of  his  brethren  on  this  subject ;  an 
abstract  of  which  we  will  here  insert,  and  which  may  be  consider- 
ed as  expressive  of  the  opinions  of  all  the  reformers,  as  this  defence 
of  their  opinions  met  with  universal  approbation. 

He  utterly  denies  the  truth  of  the  principle  asserted  by  Andra- 
dius,  that  in  the  original  constitution  of  man,  there  existed  a  ten- 
dency to  disorder,  which  was  only  restrained  by  the  superadded 
gift  of  righteousness  ;  and  maintains,  that  man  in  his  state  of  ori- 
ginal integrity  possessed  perfectly  the  image  of  God,  which  con- 
sisted in  a  conformity  to  his  law  ;  so  that  with  his  whole  heart  and 
mind,  with  all  the  faculties  of  the  soul,  and  all  the  appetites  and 
members  of  the  body,  there  was  perfect  strength,  and  no  tendency 
to  excess  or  evil.  The  law  of  God  which  required  him  to  love 
his  Creator  with  all  his  soul,  and  mind,  and  strength,  was  fully 
written  in  his  heart,  to  which  there  was  a  perfect  conformity  in 
every  thought  and  desire.  There  existed,  therefore,  in  man  thus 
pure  and  holy,  nothing  of  that  struggling  of  carnal  appetites  and 
desires  against  spiritual  exercises  which  is  now  experienced  by  the 
regenerate,  and  which  is  called  concupiscence.  Now  the  law  of 
God  requires  a  complete  conformity  to  its  precepts  in  our  acts,  and 
in  the  whole  frame  and  state  of  our  minds,  and  where  this  is  not 
found  condemns  us  as  sinners.  Experience,  as  well  as  the  word  of 
God,  teaches  that  man's  mind  in  its  unrenewed  condition,  instead 
of  being  illumined  with  the  rays  of  truth,  is  replete  with  horrible 
darkness ;  that  his  will  is  turned  in  aversion  from  God,  and  indulges 
enmity  towards  him  ;  that  the  affections  are  perverse  ;  and  that  in 
all  the  powers  there  is  a  horrible  ara^a  and  depravation,  so  far  as 
relates  to  spiritual  things.  Then  this  able  polemic  goes  on  to  ad- 
duce the  texts  of  scripture  which  bear  on  this  point,  which  we  shall 
at  present  omit ;  and  only  remark,  that  no  modern  author  has  in- 
sisted more  strenuously  on  the  depth  of  original  sin,  and  the  total 
depravity  of  the  human  heart  in  all  ages  and  in  all  persons.  As  to 
the  seat  of  depravity,  he  says  that  the  scriptures  refer  it  to  the 


ORIGINAL   SIN.  115 

mind,  the  will,  and  the  heart ;  it  has  infested  all  our  faculties,  and 
commences  with  our  very  being. 

"  Nor,"  says  he,  "  need  we  fear,  as  does  Andradius,  lest  we 
should  exaggerate  the  evil  and  extent  of  our  innate  corruption ;  for 
if  we  attend  to  the  language  of  scripture,  we  shall  be  convinced 
that  the  depth  of  the  disease  exceeds  all  conception ;  as  says  David, 
'who  can  understand  his  errors?'  And  Jeremiah,  'the  heart 
is  deceitful  above  all  things,  and  desperately  wicked,  who  can 
know  it?'  The  papists  acknowledge  that  original  sin  exists,  but 
pretend  that  it  is  not  safe  to  define  what  it  is  ;  and  allege  that  the 
ancient  church  never  defined  it.  But  let  the  impartial  reader  only 
compare  the  awful  descriptions  "of  this  evil  in  the  word  of  God 
with  the  frigid,  mitigating  discourses  of  the  papists,  and  their  ab- 
surd philosophising  respecting  puris  naturalibus,  and  he  will  be 
convinced  that  their  doctrine  is  not  that  of  the  Bible.  And  as  to 
the  pretence  of  Andradius,  that  the  council  of  Trent  did  not  think 
proper  to  give  any  definition  of  original  sin,  we  oppose  to  it  the 
explicit  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit  repeatedly  given  in  the  scrip- 
tures, in  which  the  nature  01  this  fountain  of  all  iniquity  is  clearly 
exhibited.  And  in  regard  to  the  fathers,  they  certainly  call  it  the 
vice  of  our  nature,  pollution,  inbred  corruption,  fyc"  And  he  con- 
cludes his  proofs  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  with  the  following 
weighty  sentence  :  "  Et  quando  Domini  os  loquitur  omnis  caro  de- 
bet silere,  coelum  et  terra  auscultare  :  Andradius  vero  mavult  cum 
concilio  Tridentino  opinari,  quam  cum  scriptura  credere." 

The  doctrine  of  total  depravity,  derived  as  an  inheritance  from 
our  first  father,  is  not  inculcated  more  strongly  by  any  writer  than 
by  Luther,  in  his  work,  entitled  "  De  Servo  Arbitrio,"  written 
against  the  celebrated  Erasmus.  It  was  our  first  purpose  to  have 
given  an  abridgment  of  this  treatise  of  the  great  reformer ;  but 
Luther's  style  and  manner  are  so  peculiar,  that  his  writings  do  not 
bear  to  be  abridged  without  much  loss ;  and  having  met  with  a 
treatise  on  the  subject  of  original  sin,  by  a  celebrated  professor  of 
the  Lutheran  church,  D.  G.  Sohnnius,  who  lived  and  wrote  in  the 
sixteenth  century,  we  have  concluded  to  lay  before  our  readers  an 
abstract  of  this  discourse,  from  which  may  be  learned  what  views 
were  entertained  on  this  subject,  in  the  age  immediately  after  that 
of  Luther  and  Calvin.  This  theologian  received  the  first  part  of 
his  education  at  Marpurg,  but  when  he  was  only  fifteen  years  of 
age  his  residence  was  transferred  to  Wittenberg,  a.  d.  1589,  where 
his  progress  in  learning  was  astonishing.  At  first  his  extraordinary 
talents  were  most  assiduously  devoted  to  the  study  of  the  civil 
law :  but,  in  the  twenty-first  year  of  his  age,  he  seems  to  have 
been  led,  by  a  remarkable  divine  influence  on  his  mind,  to  relin- 
quish the  profession  which  he  had  chosen,  and  devote  himself  to 
theology,  which  he  pursued  with  unremitting  ardour  at  Marpurg 
for  two  years,  when  his  proficiency  was  so  remarkable,  that 
although  no  more  than  twenty-three  years  of  age,  he  was  made 
theological  professor,  and  continued  in  this  office  to  give  instructions 


► 


116  ORIGINAL   SIN, 

to  candidates  for  the  ministry  with  extraordinary  diligence  and 
conspicuous  success  for  ten  years.  But  differing  in  opinion  with 
some  of  his  older  brethren,  respecting  the  doctrine  of  the  ubiquity 
of  Christ's  body,  which  he  streYiuously  opposed,  and  also  in  some 
other  points  of  theology ;  for  the  sake  of  a  good  conscience  he 
resigned  his  office  at  Marpurg ;  but  after  a  very  short  interval, 
such  was  his  celebrity,  he  received  two  invitations,  the  one  from 
Prince  Casimir  to  become  professor  of  theology  at  Heidelberg,  and 
the  other  to  a  similar  station  at  Herborn.  He  accepted  the  first, 
and  was  inaugurated  July  18, 1584.  In  this  situation  he  conducted 
himself  with  consummate  wisdom  and  incessant  diligence,  in  pro- 
moting the  cause  of  truth,  and  by  giving  his  aid  and  influence  to 
every  enterprise  for  the  benefit  of  learning  and  religion  ;  and  a.  d. 
1588,  he  was  chosen  one  of  the  ecclesiastical  counsellors  and  sena- 
tors, but  without  any  interference  with  "his  office  as  professor.  But 
this  extraordinary  young  man  soon  finished  his  work  upon  earth. 
While  in  the  midst  of  his  useful  labours,  and  when  the  influence  of 
his  peaceful  and  pious  example  had  become  extensive,  he  was  unex- 
pectedly taken  out  of  the  world  by  a  pleurisy,  in  the  thirty-seventh 
year  of  his  age.  His  theological  writings,  in  Latin,  were  published 
soon  after  his  decease,  including  something  like  a  system  of  the- 
ology ;  and  are  remarkable  for  profound  research  and  accurate 
discrimination,  as  we  think  will  be  acknowledged  by  all  who  im- 
partially peruse  the  following  translation,  or  rather  abstract,  of  his 
treatise  on  original  sin.  But  our  object  in  bringing  forward  this 
work  is  not  so  much  for  the  sake  of  its  explanations  and  argu- 
ments, in  all  of  which  we  do  not  concur,  as  to  furnish  the  inquisi- 
tive reader  with  a  full  view  of  the  opinions  of  Protestants  on  this 
point,  in  the  period  immediately  succeeding  the  reformation.  And 
no  one  acquainted  with  ecclesiastical  history  will  suppose  that  the 
doctrines  here  inculcated  were  peculiar  to  this  author :  the  very 
same  are  found  in  the  works  of  every  Protestant  writer  of  credit 
m  that  age. 

The  first  part  of  the  treatise  of  Sohnnius,  in  which  he  discusses 
the  nature  of  sin  and  its  various  distinctions,  we  omit,  as  not  being 
now  to  our  purpose  :  we  shall  therefore  commence  with  his  answer 
to  the  objections  urged  in  his  day  against  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin,  from  which  it  will  clearly  be  understood  what  opinions  were 
then  commonly  entertained  on  this  subject. 

"  Having  given  some  account  of  the  nature  and  divisions  of  sin, 
our  next  object  will  be  to  refute  some  of  those  errors  which  relate 
to  original  sin.  The  first  question  then  is  whether  there  is  any 
such  thing  ;  and  this  inquiry  is  the  more  necessary,  because  many 
of  the  papists  so  extenuate  original  sin,  that  they  will  scarcely 
admit  that  it  partakes  of  the  nature  of  sin.  And  the  Anabaptists 
have  gone  to  the  impudent  length  of  asserting  that  original  sin  is 
a  mere  figment  of  Augustine.  In  opposition  to  this  error  of  the 
Anabaptists  and  of  some  of  the  Romanists,  we  assert,  that  their 
doctrine  is  not  countenanced  by  scripture,  and  therefore  cannot  be 


ORIGINAL    SIN.  117 

true.  They  appeal,  indeed,  to  Ezek.  xviii.  20,  where  it  is  said, 
"  The  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father ;  but  the  soul 
that  sinneth  it  shall  die."  From  which  they  infer,  that  the  posterity 
of  Adam  cannot  be  guilty  in  consequence  of  his  fall.  To  which  it 
may  be  replied,  that  Ezekiel  is  not  speaking  of  the  sin  of  our  first 
father  and  federal  head,  which  was  the  sin  of  the  whole  species, 
but  of  the  sins  of  individuals  of  the  Jewish  nation.  In  this  sense, 
it  is  true  that  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  punishment  of  his  father's 
sin,  unless  by  imitation  he  is  led  to  do  the  same  ;  but  the  sin  of 
Adam  was  not  the  sin  of  an  individual,  but  of  the  whole  race,  for 
he  represented  the  whole  species.  The  first  man  stood  in  a  situa- 
tion in  regard  to  his  posterity  which  no  other  man  ever  did,  and 
his  first  sin  was  theirs  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  of  his  sins 
could  be  ;  for  his  after  sins  were  personal,  and  he  alone  was  an- 
swerable for  them ;  but  his  first  sin  was  public,  and  that  which 
brought  death  upon  all  his  posterity.  The  gifts  with  which  Adam 
was  endowed,  if  they  had  been  retained,  would  have  been  for  the 
benefit  of  all  his  posterity,  but  being  lost,  they  were  not  only  for- 
feited for  himself  but  for  them.  For  as  Levi  paid  tithes  while  in 
the  loins  of  his  progenitor  Abraham,  so  the  whole  human  race 
were  included  in  Adam,  to  stand  or  fall  with  him.  Hence  Paul,  in 
Rom.  v.,  says,  that  Adam,  was  a  type  of  Christ ;  so  that  "  as  by 
the  disobedience  of  the  first  Adam  many  were  constituted  sinners, 
by  the  obedience  of  the  second  Adam  many  were  constituted 
righteous."  In  this  passage  it  is  clearly  signified,  that  the  integrity 
which  was  given  to  our  first  father  would  have  been  available  for 
our  benefit  if  he  had  stood  firmly  in  innocence :  but  that  it  was 
also  committed  to  him  to  forfeit  and  lose  all  blessings  for  his  pos- 
terity as  well  as  for  himself,  if  he  should  prove  disobedient.  This 
was  the  event,  and  accordingly  the  precious  deposit  with  which 
he  was  intrusted  for  the  whole  human  race,  was  lost.  Now,  this 
being  the  state  of  the  case,  it  is  manifest  that  no  son  bears  the  sins 
of  any  other  father  as  he  does  those  of  Adam  ;  but  the  soul  that 
sinneth  in  the  common  administration  of  God's  government,  dies : 
but  surely  this  general  principle  in  relation  to  sin  and  punishment, 
does  not  in  the  least  affect  our  condition  as  fallen  in  the  fall  of  our 
federal  head  and  representative.  The  son  does  not  bear,  com- 
monly, the  sins  of  his  other  progenitors  with  which  he  has  nothing 
to  do,  but  he  does  and  must  bear  the  first  sin  of  Adam,  which  was 
his  own ;  for  though  not  guilty  of  the  act  in  his  own  person,  he 
did  commit  it  by  his  representative. 

2.  Another  argument  brought  against  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin  is,  that  what  is  not  voluntary  cannot  be  sinful,  because  nothing 
can  have  the  nature  of  sin  which  does  not  proceed  from  the  exer- 
cise of  understanding  and  choice ;  but  what  is  called  original  sin, 
especially  in  infants,  is  not  voluntary,  therefore  it  cannot  possess 
the  nature  of  sin. 

The  maxim  on  which  this  argument  rests  is  acknowledged  in 
courts  of  justice  among  men  ;  but  it  ought  not  to  be  transferred 


118  ORIGINAL    SIN. 

to  the  church,  so  as  to  affect  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  which 
she  always  held  and  believed.  Moreover,  this  maxim  has  relation 
altogether  to  actual  sins,  but  not  to  original  sin  :  and  it  is  repug- 
nant to  the  declaration  of  Paul,  Rom.  vii.,  What  I  will  that  I  do  not, 
but  what  I  hate  that  I  do.  And  Gal.  v.,  The  spirit  lusteth  against 
thejlesh,  so  that  ye  cannot  do  the  things  that  ye  would.  Augustine, 
in  his  Retractations,  lib.  i.,  c.  13,  declares, "  that  this  political  maxim 
ought  to  have  no  place  in  relation  to  this  pqint."  And  in  his  book 
against  Julian  he  says,  "  Frustra  putas  ideo  in  parvulis  nullum  esse 
delictum,  quia  sine  voluntate,  quae  in  illis  nulla  est,  esse  non  potest." 
That  is,  "  In  vain  do  you  pretend  that  there  can  be  no  sin  in  infants, 
because  they  are  not  and  cannot  be  the  subjects  of  voluntary  exer- 
cise." The  maxim  is  true  enough  in  regard  to  our  own  proper 
acts,  but  can  by  no  means  be  admitted  in  relation  to  the  contagion 
of  original  sin ;  which,  however,  had  its  origin  in  the  voluntary  act 
of  the  first  man. 

3.  A  third  argument  against  original  sin  is  that  all  sin  consists  in 
acts,  but  infants  are  capable  of  no  acts,  therefore  they  cannot  be 
the  subjects  of  sin ;  for,  to  sin  is  an  active  verb,  and  signifies  to  do 
something  actively  ;  original  sin,  therefore,  cannot  exist. 

To  which  it  may  be  answered,  that  in  the  Hebrew  language  the 
words  which  signify  "  to  sin,"  express  not  only  acts,  but  habits ; 
not  only  positive  actions,  but  defects  and  inherent  pravity  which  is 
born  with  us. 

4.  It  is  again  argued  that  that  which  is  the  property  of  an  indi- 
vidual cannot  be  propagated  through  a  whole  race,  but  the  sin  of 
our  first  parents  was  the  property  of  those  individuals,  and  cannot 
be  communicated  to  their  posterity. 

It  is  true  that  the  qualities  or  properties  of  individuals  are  not 
universally  propagated  through  the  whole  species,  except  such  as 
are  of  the  nature  of  diwaniat  or  imperfections ;  for  these  are  con- 
stantly propagated  through  the  whole  race.  For  example,  that 
corruption  of  human  nature  which  is  the  cause  of  death,  whatever 
it  may  be,  is  universally  propagated,  for  all  the  descendants  of 
Adam  are  mortal ;  so  also  original  sin  is  hdwa/iia,  or  a  natural  impo- 
tency,  or  a  defect,  or  a  depraved  inclination,  or  «ra|<<i — a  disorder  of 
the  affections  of  the  mind.  Besides,  the  proposition  on  which  the 
argument  is  founded  is  only  true  of  separable  qualities,  but  does  not 
apply  at  all  to  such  as  are  inseparable  and  which  perpetually  in- 
here in  the  subject,  so  that  they  cannot  even  in  thought  be  se- 
vered from  it.  We  do  in  fact  witness  many  evils  which  are  propa- 
gated from  both  parents.  Moreover,  the  proposition  stated  above 
is  only  true  of  those  qualities  which  are  only  found  in  some  indi- 
viduals, but  not  to  those  which  are  common  to  the  whole  species ; 
but  original  sin  is  not  a  quality  of  a  few  individuals,  but  of  the 
whole  race  ;  for  Adam  was  the  representative  of  the  whole  race, 
and  forfeited  that  depositum  with  which  he  was  intrusted  as  the 
head  of  the  whole  family. 

5.  It  is  again  alleged  that  punishments  are  not  sins,  but  those 


ORIGINAL   BIN.  119 

defects  and  irregular  inclinations  which  belong  to  human  nature 
are  the  punishment  of  the  sin  of  the  first  man,  and  cannot  be  of  the 
nature  of  sin. 

Here  again  there  is  an  application  of  a  political  maxim  to  a  sub- 
ject to  which  it  does  not  belong  ;  for  it  is  a  fact  clearly  established 
in  the  divine  government,  that  the  privation  of  the  divine  image 
and  favour  is  both  a  sin  and  a  punishment,  but  in  different  respects. 
In  respect  to  God  inflicting  it,  it  is  a  punishment,  for  he  in  just 
judgment  may  deprive  his  creatures  of  his  grace  ;  but  in  respect  to 
man,  this  privation  is  a  sin  which  by  his  own  fault  he  has  brought 
upon  himself  and  admitted  into  his  own  soul. 

6.  It  is  again  objected,  that  nature  being  from  God  must  be  good : 
therefore  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  original  sin  or  a  vitiated 
nature. 

To  which  it  may  be  replied  that  nature  was  good  before  the  fall, 
and  before  sin  entered  to  corrupt  it ;  and  nature  still,  so  far  as  it  is 
the  work  of  God,  is  good  ;  that  is,  the  substance  of  the  soul,  the 
faculties  and  the  natural  principle  of  rational  action  are  good  ;  but 
nature,  as  it  is  depraved,  is  not  the  work  of  God,  but  something 
added  to  his  work,  namely,  ira|fa,  or  disorder  and  corruption  in  the 
faculties  which  God  created  in  a  state  of  order  and  integrity.  God 
is  the  creator  and  preserver  of  the  faculties,  but  not  of  the  sin. 

7.  The  Anabaptists  argue  that  Adam  having  been  received  into 
favour,  was  in  a  state  of  grace  when  his  children  were  procreated  ; 
and  therefore,  upon  the  principle  that  everything  begets  its  like,  he 
could  not  propagate  offspring  infected  with  original  sin. 

Answer.  There  is  more  in  the  conclusion  than  in  the  premises  ; 
for  the  procreation  of  offspring  is  not  according  to  grace,  but  ac- 
cording to  nature,  so  that  whatever  the  nature  of  man  is  since  the 
fall,  that  only  can  be  propagated.  Adam  obtained  freedom  from 
guilt,  not  from  nature  but  from  grace ;  but  grace  cannot  be  propa- 
gated. Man,  therefore,  cannot  propagate  anything  but  that  cor- 
rupt nature  derived  from  the  fall. 

Moreover,  the  regenerate  are  not  perfectly  delivered  from  the 
evil  nature  of  sin,  which  still  dwells  in  them,  and  renders  imperfect 
all  that  they  do.  So  far  as  the  regenerate  act  from  nature,  they  act 
sinfully :  all  the  good  which  is  in  them  is  from  the  spirit  of  God, 
to  whom  they  are  indebted  for  every  good  thought :  it  is  evident, 
therefore,  that  grace,  for  every  motion  of  which  we  are  dependent 
on  another  agent,  cannot  be  propagated  :  but  sin,  consisting  in  a  de- 
fect or  disorder  of  our.  nature,  and  having  its  origin  and  proper 
seat  in  our  own  nature,  may  be  propagated.  "  In  me,  that  is,  in 
my  flesh,"  says  Paul,  "there  dwelleth  no  good  thing."  "That 
which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh."  And  we  never  hear  of  a  man 
being  regenerated  by  a  natural  birth  from  pious  parents,  but  the  re- 
generate are  "  born  of  the  Spirit — born  of  God."  They  further  al- 
lege, indeed,  that  men  cannot  propagate  what  they  do  not  possess ; 
and  therefore  the  regenerate  cannot  communicate  original  sin  to 
their  offspring,  for  the  guilt  of  all  their  sins  is  removed  by  a  full 


120  ORIGINAL    SIN. 

pardon.  To  which  we  reply  as  before,  that  though  it  is  true  that 
a  man  cannot  propagate  what  he  has  not,  yet  as  far  as  nature  pre- 
vails, all  men  are  sinful,  and  it  is  that  which  properly  belongs  to 
our  nature  which  is  capable  of  being  propagated ;  therefore,  when 
a  sinful  nature  is  communicated  to  posterity,  it  is  the  communica- 
tion of  what  a  man  does  possess ;  for  neither  remission  of  sins 
nor  the  infusion  of  grace  do  in  the  least  affect  the  laws  by  which 
the  propagation  of  the  human  species  is  regulated,  for  reasons  al- 
ready stated. 

8.  But  the  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  even  appeal  to 
scripture  for  support  to  their  opinion.  They  allege  Rom.  xi.  6,  and 
1  Cor.  vii.  14,  as  texts  which  declare  in  favour  of  the  children  of 
the  saints  being  born  free  from  original  sin.  In  the  former,  Paul 
asserts,  "  That  if  the  root  be  holy,  so  are  the  branches."  But  they 
are  deceived  by  the  mere  sound  of  a  word,  for  "holiness"  in  this 
place  does  not  refer  to  internal  moral  qualities,  but  to  external  con- 
secration :  whatever  is  devoted  solemnly  to  the  service  of  God,  or 
has  a  relation  to  his  worship,  is  called  holy.  Thus  the  tabernacle, 
the  altar,  the  ark,  the  sacrifices,  the  priests,  and  even  Jerusalem  it- 
self, were  holy.  The  whole  nation  of  Israel,  as  being  in  covenant 
with  God,  are  continually  spoken  of  as  "  a  holy  people  ;"  and  as  the 
promises  of  God's  covenant  with  Abraham  have  respect  to  his  pos- 
terity even  to  the  end  of  the  world ;  so,  in  a  certain  sense,  these 
branches  which  are  now  broken  off,  are  holy,  as  they  stand  in  a 
peculiar  relation  to  God,  which  other  people  do  not.  And  in  the 
latter  passage,  the  children  of  believers  are  called  "  holy"  on  ac- 
count of  their  relation  to  the  Christian  church,  as  being  connected 
with  the  visible  church  by  baptism,  or  as  being  capable  of  such 
connection  in  consequence  of  their  relation  to  parents  who  are  mem- 
bers of  the  church.  For  God  makes  the  same  promise  to  each  be- 
liever which  he  formerly  made  to  Abraham,  I  will  be  a  God  to  thee 
and  to  thy  seed  after  thee,  But  this  text  by  no  means  signifies  that 
the  children  of  believers  are  born  in  a  state  free  from  all  pollution. 

9.  It  is  again  objected  that  the  phrase  "  original  sin,"  never  oc- 
curs in  scripture,  and  never  should  have  been  introduced  into  the 
church. 

Answer.  Many  words  are  conveniently  used  in  theology  which 
are  not  found  in  scripture ;  and  this  must  be  the  case  where  the 
truth  is  denied  and  error  introduced :  and  appropriate  words  and 
phrases,  expressing  a  clear  and  definite  meaning,  save  us  the  ne- 
cessity of  much  circumlocution.  Now  the  truth  is,  that  the  scrip- 
tures use  various  words  to  express  what  is  usually  denominated 
"  sin,"  without  entering  into  the  distinction  between  original  and 
actual  sin ;  but  the  idea  conveyed  by  the  phrase,  "  original  sin," 
can  be  logically  inferred  from  numerous  passages  of  scripture,  as 
we  shall  show  presently.  When  the  Pelagians  denied  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin,  which  the  church  had  before  held  without  dispute, 
the  orthodox  fathers  invented  this  name  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  all 
ambiguity,  and  that  the  matter  in  dispute  might  be  clearly  and  dis- 


ORIGINAL   SIN.  121 

tinctly  exhibited ;  for  the  Pelagians  strenuously  maintained  that  all 
sins  were  actual,  or  consisted  in  acts ;  but  the  orthodox  maintained, 
that  besides  the  acts  of  sin,  there  existed  a  corruption  of  nature, — 
an  inherent  moral  disorder  in  the  faculties,  which,  for  convenience, 
they  denominated  "  original  sin." 

Having  shown  that  the  doctrine  of  those  who  oppose  original 
sin  is  not  contained  in  scripture,  nor  can  be  proved  from  it ;  we 
now  proceed  to  demonstrate,  that  it  is  absolutely  repugnant  to  the 
testimony  of  God,  in  his  word ;  and  therefore  is  a  false  doctrine, 
which  should  be  exterminated  from  the  church. 

The  first  testimony  which  we  adduce  is  from  Genesis  v.  5,  "  And 
God  saw  that  the  wickedness  of  man  was  great  in  the  earth,  and 
that  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart  was  only  evil 
continually;"  and  Gen.  viii.  21,  "For  the  imagination  of  man's 
heart  is  evil  from  his  youth."  The  objection  to  this  testimony  is, 
"  that  this  is  only  spoken  of  adults,  and  only  shows  that  there  is  in 
man  a  proneness  to  go  astray ;  but  nothing  is  here  said  respecting 
a  hereditary  corruption  of  the  human  heart."  But  is  it  not  evident 
that  if  all  the  thoughts  and  imaginations  of  the  heart  are  constantly 
evil  from  youth  upwards,  the  nature  of  man  must  be  corrupt? 
What  stronger  evidence  could  there  be  of  a  corruption  of  nature 
than  the  fact  that  all  men  sin  and  do  nothing  else  but  sin,  from  the 
moment  that  they  are  capable  of  actual  transgression  ?  An  effect 
so  universal  can  never  be  accounted  for  by  imitation,  for  children 
begin  to  sin  before  they  have  much  opportunity  of  imitating  the 
sins  of  others,  and  even  when  the  examples  before  them  are  pious 
and  good.  If  from  the  fruits  of  holiness  we  may  infer  that  the  tree 
is  good,  then  certainly  on  the  same  principle,  from  a  production  of 
bad  fruit  it  is  fairly  concluded  that  the  nature  is  evil.  "  A  good 
man  out  of  the  good  treasure  of  his  heart  bringeth  forth  that  which 
is  good ;  but  an  evil  man,  out  of  the  evil  treasure  of  his  heart,  that 
which  is  evil."  "  Out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart  the  mouth 
speaketh."  Our  next  testimony  we  take  from  Rom.  iii.  10.  "  There 
is  none  righteous,  no  not  one."  Now  if  man's  nature  be  not  cor- 
rupt, how  can  it  be  accounted  for  on  any  rational  principles,  that 
all  men,  without  the  exception  of  one,  should  be  unrighteous  ?  To 
this  proof,  indeed,  Albert  righius  excepts  that  it  relates  to  the  Jew- 
ish nation,  and  not  to  the  whole  race  of  man.  But  this  is  contrary 
to  the  express  design  of  the  apostle  in  this  passage,  which  was  to 
prove  that  both  Jews  and  Gentiles  were  all  under  sin  and  wrath, 
and  all  stood  in  absolute  need  of  salvation  by  faith  in  Christ.  And 
in  the  preceding  verse  he  explicitly  declares  that  he  had  "  proved 
both  Jews  and  Gentiles,  that  they  are  all  under  sin."  And  his  gene- 
ral conclusion  is,  "  That  all  the  world  may  become  guilty  before 
God,"  Indeed,  if  the  nation  of  the  Jews  only  was  referred  to  in 
this  passage,  yet  it  might  be  fairly  inferred  that  all  other  nations 
were  in  the  same  corrupt  condition ;  for  why  should  it  be  supposed 
that  universal  depravity  should  be  confined  to  this  one  people  ? 
And  history  confirms  the  sentence  of  the  apostle,  for  it  represents 


122  ORIGINAL    SIN. 

other  nations  as  wicked  as  the  Jews.  The  apostle  must,  therefore, 
be  considered  as  describing  the  moral  condition,  not  of  one  nation 
or  one  age,  but  of  human  nature  in  all  countries  and  at  all  times ; 
so  far  as  it  is  not  restored  by  Christ. 

A  third  testimony  for  original  sin  is  found  in  Rom.  vii.,  where 
Paul,  in  strong  language,  describes  the  powrer  and  depth  of  indwell- 
ing sin,  as  experienced  by  himself,  now  in  his  renewed  state.  He 
calls  it  "  a  law  of  sin  and  death,"  as  working  in  him  "  all  manner  of 
concupiscence  ;"  as  "  deceiving  him."  And  he  speaks  of  it  as  an 
abiding  principle — "sin  that  dwelleth  in  me."  As  an  evil  ever 
present  with  him  in  all  his  exertions  to  do  good  ;  "  as  a  law  in  his 
members  warring  against  the  law  of  his  mind  ;"  so  that  he  exclaim- 
ed, "  O  wretched  man  that  I  am,  who  shall  deliver  me  from  the 
body  of  this  death  ?"  The  Pelagians,  it  is  true,  will  not  agree  that 
Paul  is  here  speaking  in  his  own  person,  but  pretend  that  he  per- 
sonates a  Jew  under  conviction  of  the  duty  which  the  law  requires, 
but  sensible  of  his  inability  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  the  law. 
But  that  the  apostle  is  here  giving  us  his  own  experience  is  evident 
from  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  which  opinion  is  not  only 
held  by  Augustine  in  his  controversy  with  Julian,  but  was  maintained 
by  the  fathers  who  preceded  him,  particularly  Cyprian  and  Hilary. 

Other  testimonies  not  less  direct  and  conclusive  are,  Job  xv.  14, 
"  What  is  man  that  he  should  be  clean  ?  and  he  which  is  born  of  a 
woman,  that  he  should  be  righteous  ?" 

Psalm  li.  5,  "  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity ;  and  in  sin  did  my 
mother  conceive  me." 

John  iii.  3,  "  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh." 

Rom.  v.  12,  "As  by  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world, — and 
so  death  passed  upon  all  men,  because  that  all  have  sinned."  On 
this  text  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  it  is  not  only  asserted  that  the 
punishment  of  death  hath  passed  upon  all  men,  but  the  reason  is 
added,  namely,  "  because  all  have  sinned  ;"  so  that  the  fault  and  pun- 
ishment, the  guilt  and  pollution,  are  by  the  apostle  joined  together. 

Rom.  v.  19,  "For  as  by  one  man's  disobedience  many  were 
made  sinners." 

Rom.  viii.  7,  "  Because  the  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God,  for 
it  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be." 

Ephes.  ii.  3,  "  And  were  by  nature  the  children  of  wrath,  even 
as  others." 

And  as  infants  die,  as  universal  experience  teaches,  it  is  evident 
that  they  must  be.  chargeable  with  sin ;  for  Paul  clearly  represents 
sin  as  the  cause  of  death — of  the  death  of  all  men.  "  And  the  wa- 
ges of  sin  is  death." 

It  would  be  tedious  to  enumerate  all  the  objections  which  Pela- 
gians and  others  make  to  the  interpretation  of  these  texts.  The 
specimen  given  above  may  be  taken  as  an  evidence  that  they  never 
can  succeed  in  proving  that  their  doctrine  is  consonant  with  the 
testimony  of  God  in  the  holy  scriptures. 

Hitherto  we  have  disputed  with  those  of  the  Papists  and  Ana- 


ORIGINAL    SIN.  123 

baptists  who  deny  the  existence  of  original  sin  altogether;  but  now 
we  come  to  consider  the  opinion  of  those  who  acknowledge  origi- 
nal sin,  but  insist  that  it  is  not  anything  inherent  in  man  at  his  birth, 
but  only  the  guilt  of  another's  sin  imputed.  This  opinion  is  main- 
tained by  some  of  the  papists,  who  think  that  original  sin  is  nothing 
else  than  the  debt  of  punishment  contracted  from  the  sin  of  Adam, 
but  that  nothing  of  the  pollution  of  sin  is  propagated  by  natural 

feneration.  A.D.  1542,  Pighius,  after  the  conference  which  was 
eld  at  Worms,  expressed  his  opinion  in  writing  as  follows:  "Ori- 
ginal sin  does  not  consist  in  any  defect,  nor  in  any  vice,  nor  depra- 
vation of  nature ;  not  in  any  corrupt  quality  nor  inherent  vicious 
habit  in  us,  but  solely  in  our  subjection  to  the  punishment  of  the 
first  sin ;  that  is,  in  contracted  guilt,  without  anything  of  depravity 
in  our  nature." 

It  is  a  sufficient  refutation  of  this  doctrine  that  it  is  nowhere 
found  in  scripture,  and  nothing  should  be  received  as  an  article  of 
faith  which  cannot  be  proved  from  this  source.  Its  abettors  do  in- 
deed endeavour  to  establish  it  by  an  appeal  to  the  Bible,  but  they 
are  obliged  to  beg  the  very  point  in  dispute,  as  will  soon  be  made 
to  appear. 

Pighius,  the  chief  advocate  for  this  opinion,  brings  forward  Rom. 
v.  12, "  By  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  death  by  sin." 
Rom.  v.  15,  "By  the  offence  of  one,  many  are  dead."  Rom.  v.  16, 
"  For  the  judgment  was  by  one  to  condemnation."  Rom.  v.  17, 
"  For  by  one  man's  offence  death  reigned  by  one."  Rom.  v.  18, 
"  Therefore,  as  by  the  offence  of  one  judgment  came  upon  all  men 
to  condemnation."  In  all  these  texts,  says  Pighius,  the  apostle  at- 
tributes condemnation  to  the  sin  of  Adam,  and  nothing  else.  To 
which  it  may  be  replied,  that  when  the  apostle  declares  that  u  sin 
had  entered  into  the  world,"  he  does  not  mean,  merely,  that  Adam 
had  become  a  sinner,  but  that  it  had  come  upon  all  his  descendants  ; 
that  is,  upon  all  men  in  the  world  ;  for  he  does  not  say  in  this  place 
that  guilt  had  entered,  but  that  sin  had  entered  into  the  world. 
And  this  is  not  left  to  be  inferred,  but  is  expressly  asserted  in  the 
same  verse :  "  in  whom  all  have  sinned  ;"  or,  "for  that  all  have 
sinned."  Moreover,  when  he  declares  that  all  are  subject  to  death 
and  condemnation  by  the  sin  of  one,  it  is  a  just  inference  that  they 
are  all  partakers  of  his  sin,  and  are  born  in  a  state-  of  moral  pollu- 
tion. In  the  19th  verse  it  is  said,  "By  the  disobedience  of  one 
many  are  constituted  sinners ;"  now  to  be  constituted  sinners,  in- 
cludes the  idea  not  only  of  being  made  subject  to  the  penaltyjdbut 
partaking  of  the  nature  of  sin  ;  for  they  who  are  entirely  free  from 
the  stain  of  sin,  cannot  with  propriety  be  called  "  sinners."  Again, 
the  apostle  in  this  chapter  teaches,  that  "  while  we  were  yet  sin- 
ners Christ  died  for  us,  to  deliver  us  from  death  and  reconcile  us 
to  God  ;"  certainly  he  died  for  none  but  sinners :  but  if  infants  are 
not  sinners  then  Christ  did  not  die  for  them,  nor  do  they  belong  to 
him  as  their  Saviour  ;  which  is  most  absurd. 
"  But,"  says  Pighius,  "  infants  being  neither  endued  with  the 


124  ORIGINAL   SIN. 

knowledge  of  the  law,  nor  with  freedom  of  will,  are  not  moral 
agents,  and  are  therefore  incapable  of  obedience  or  disobedience ; 
they  cannot  therefore  be  the  subjects  of  sin,  and  cannot  be  bound  to 
endure  the  penalty  of  the  law  on  any  other  account  than  for  the 
sin  of  another." 

Answer.  Although  infants  have  not  the  exercise  of  free-will, 
and  are  not  moral  agents,  yet  they  possess  a  nature  not  conforma- 
ble to  the  law  of  God :  they  are  not  such  as  the  law  demands  that 
human  beings  should  be,  but  are  depraved ;  "  children  of  wrath," 
and  guilty  on  account  of  their  own  personal  depravity :  for  the 
authorized  definition  of  sin  is  avojiia,  that  is,  whatever  is  repugnant 
to  the  law  of  God. 

But  they  insist  further,  M  that  God  being  the  author  of  nature,  if 
that  be  depraved,  he  must  be  the  author  of  sin." 

To  which  we  reply  in  the  words  of  Augustine  :  "  Both  are  pro- 
pagated together,  nature  and  the  depravity  of  nature ;  one  of 
which  is  good,  the  other  evil :  the  first  is  derived  from  the  bounty 
of  our  Creator,  the  latter  must  be  attributed  to  our  original  con- 
demnation. The  first  has  for  its  cause  the  good  pleasure  of  God, 
the  latter  the  perverse  will  of  the  first  man  :  that  exhibits  God  as 
the  former  of  the  creatures,  this  as  the  punisher  of  disobedience. 
Finally,  the  same  Christ  for  the  creation  of  our  nature,  is  the 
maker  of  man ;  but  for  the  healing  of  the  disease  of  this  nature 
became  man." 

Again,  this  doctrine  may  be  refuted  by  express  testimonies  from 
scripture  ;  and  ought  therefore  to  be  rejected  as  unsound.  Gen.  v. 
3,  "  Adam  begat  Seth  in  his  own  image."  Job  xiv.  4,  "  Who  can 
bring  a  clean  thing  out  of  an  unclean  ? — not  one."  Psalm  li.  5, 
"  For  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity,  and  in  sin  did  my  mother  conceive 
me."  Rom.  v.  19,  "By  the  disobedience  of  one  man,  many  were 
made  sinners."  Ephes.  iii.  2,  "  And  were  by  nature  the  children 
of  wrath,  even  as  others  ;"  that  is,  we  were  born  subject  to  con- 
demnation, because  born  in  a  corrupt  state.  From  all  which  pas- 
sages it  appears  that  original  sin  does  not  consist  merely  in  guilt 
or  liableness  to  punishment,  but  in  a  moral  depravation  of  the  whole 
nature ;  and  that  it  is  not  contracted  by  imitation,  but  by  genera- 
tion. Paul  often  speaks  of  that  which  we  call  "  original  sin"  under 
the  general  name  of  "  sin."  In  Rom.  vi.  8,  he  speaks  of  the  "  old 
man"  being  crucified  ;  of  the  "  body  of  sin"  being  destroyed ;  and 
in  chap.  vii.  he  speaks  of  being  "  sold  under  sin,"  of  no  good  thing 
dwelling  in  his  flesh ;  of  evil  being  present  with  him  when  he  would 
do  good  ;  and  of  being  led  captive  by  "  the  law  of  sin"  in  his  mem- 
bers. 

Another  cogent  proof  of  the  heterodoxy  of  this  doctrine  may  be 
derived  from  the  baptism  of  infants,  which  certainly  supposes  that 
they  are  conceived  and  born  in  sin. 

It  is  also  worthy  of  observation  that  spiritual  regeneration  is,  in 
scripture,  continually  put  in  contrast  with  "  the  flesh,"  and  with  our 


ORIGINAL   SIN.  125 

fleshly  birth.     But  where  is  the  propriety  of  this,  if  the  flesh  is  natu- 
rally free  from  stain  ? 

And  finally,  the  catholic  church  has  ever  held  an  opinion  con- 
trary to  the  one  which  is  now  opposed.  Augustine,  in  his  second 
book  against  Pelagius  and  Ccelestius,  expresses  most  explicitly  what 
we  maintain :  "  Whosoever,"  says  he,  "  contends  that  human  na- 
ture, in  any  age,  does  not  need  the  second  Adam  as  a  physician, 
on  the  ground  that  it  has  not  been  vitiated  in  the  first  Adam,  does 
not  fall  into  an  error  which  may  be  held  without  injury  to  the  rule 
of  faith  ;  but  by  that  very  rule  by  which  we  are  constituted  Chris- 
tians, is  convicted  of  being  an  enemy  to  the  grace  of  God." 

It  is  again  disputed,  whether  concupiscence,  or  that  disease  of 
our  nature  which  renders  us  prone  to  sin,  is  itself  of  the  nature  of 
sin.     This  the  papists  deny ;  we  affirm. 

They  allege  that  whatever  exists  in  us  necessarily,  and  is  not 
from  ourselves,  but  from  another,  cannot  be  of  the  nature  of  sin ; 
but  this  is  the  fact  in  regard  to  concupiscence,  ergo,  &c. 

Answer.  In  a  merely  political  judgment  this  may  be  correct, 
but  not  in  that  which  is  divine.  And  if  the  principle  here  asserted 
was  sound,  it  would  prove  too  much  :  it  would  prove  that  even 
the  acts  of  concupiscence  are  not  sinful :  for  there  is  a  sort  of  ne- 
cessity for  these,  supposing  the  principle  of  concupiscence  to  exist 
in  the  soul. 

It  is  next  objected,  that  that  which  is  wholly  the  work  of  God, 
as  is  the  whole  nature  of  man,  cannot  be  corrupt,  and  therefore 
whatever  belongs  to  this  nature  as  it  comes  from  the  hand  of  God, 
cannot  be  otherwise  than  free  from  sin. 

If  there  were  any  force  in  this  argument,  it  would  prove  that 
there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  sin  in  the  universe,  for  all  creatures 
are  not  only  dependent  on  God  for  existence  at  first,  but  for  con- 
tinuance in  being  every  moment ;  and  if  the  power  of  God  could 
not,  consistently  with  its  purity,  be  exerted  to  bring  into  existence 
the  children  of  a  corrupt  parent,  in  a  state  of  moral  corruption, 
neither  could  it  be  to  continue  their  being,  which  equally  requires 
the  exertion  of  omnipotence.  But  the  truth  is,  so  far  as  human 
nature  or  human  actions  are  the  effect  of  divine  power,  the  work 
is  good :  the  essential  faculties  of  the  mind  and  members  of  the 
body  are  good,  and  the  entity  of  every  human  act  is  good  ;  but 
the  evil  of  our  nature  is  received  by  natural  generation,  and  is  the 
consequence  of  the  fall  of  our  first  parent,  and  the  sinfulness  of  our 
acts  must  not  be  ascribed  to  God,  "  in  whom  we  live  and  move," 
but  to  the  perversity  of  our  own  wills. 

But  they  allege  that  God  inflicts  this  depravity  on  the  race  of 
men,  and  therefore  it  cannot  partake  of  the  nature  of  sin,  without 
making  God  its  author. 

To  which  it  may  be  replied  that  God  inflicts  it,  as  it  is  a  punish- 
ment, but  not  as  it  is  sin  ;  that  is,  he  withdraws  all  divine  influence, 
and  all  the  gifts  of  innocence  with  which  the  creature  was  origi- 
nally endued  in  just  judgment.     Does  not  God  in  just  displeasure 


126  ORIGINAL   SIN. 

for  obstinate  continuance  in  sin,  often  send  blindness  of  mind  as  a 
judgment :  in  the  same  manner  he  can  inflict  that  pravity  of  nature 
which  we  bring  into  the  world  with  us  as  a  punishment  for  the  sin 
of  our  first  parents :  that  is,  he  withholds  all  those  gifts  and  all  that 
influence  which  are  necessary  to  a  state  of  moral  purity.  The 
texts  of  scripture  which  might  be  adduced  to  establish  the  doctrine 
which  has  been  advanced,  have  already  been  cited,  and  need  not 
now  be  repeated.  But  Albert  Pighius  asserts,  that  the  divine  law 
only  prohibits  vicious  acts,  not  the  latent  qualities  of  the  mind :  the 
command  says,  "  Thou  shalt  not  covet,"  but  it  does  not  say  thou 
shalt  not  have  a  disease  which  may  induce  you  to  covet.  It  is 
true  the  act  only  is  mentioned  in  this  prohibition,  but  the  disposi- 
tion is  doubtless  included :  as  in  the  sixth  commandment  it  is  only 
said,  "thou  shalt  not  kill;"  and  in  the  seventh,  "thou  shalt  not 
commit  adultery ;"  but  we  know  from  high  authority,  that  in  the 
one  case  the  law  is  violated  by  sinful  anger,  and  in  the  other  by  a 
wanton  desire  ;  so  in  the  eighth  commandment  the  act  of  theft 
only  is  forbidden  expressly,  but  we  know  that  to  covet  our  neigh- 
bour's goods  is  sin ;  and  in  like  manner,  although  the  tenth  com- 
mandment only  prohibits  expressly  the  act  of  concupiscence,  yet 
undoubtedly  the  disease,  or  corrupt  disposition  from  which  the  act 
proceeds,  is  included  by  implication  in  the  prohibition.  And  this 
will  appear  very  clearly  by  considering  the  preceptive  part  of  the 
law :  this  requires  that  we  should  love  God  with  all  our  heart,  and 
mind,  and  strength ;  and  of  course  whatever  in  us  that  is  opposed 
to  a  compliance  with  this  command  is  forbidden,  but  such  an  ob- 
stacle is  this  disease  of  concupiscence,  therefore  this  being  forbid- 
den by  the  holy  law  of  God  is  sinful.  Infants,  therefore,  are  chil- 
dren of  wrath,  because  they  have  in  them  a  disease  of  irregular 
propensity,  although  it  has  not  yet  been  exerted. 

Pighius  still  urges  the  objection  already  refuted  in  another  form, 
that  no  law  can  prohibit  equitably  what  it  is  impossible  for  the 
creature  to  avoid  ;  but  the  infant  can  no  more  avoid  being  born 
with  a  proneness  to  irregular  indulgence,  than  it  could  avoid  coming 
into  the  world  with  the  sense  of  touch  or  taste  ;  he  concludes, 
therefore,  that  concupiscence  is  not  prohibited  in  the  tenth  com- 
mandment. 

#Now  we  answer,  as  before,  that  if  it  is  true  that  nothing  is  for- 
bidden which  cannot  be  avoided,  then  sinful  acts  are  not  forbidden, 
for  with  a  nature  labouring  under  the  disease  of  concupiscence,  sin- 
ful acts  cannot  be  avoided  ;  and  so  the  argument  is  not  sound,  since 
it  proves  too  much  ;  nay,  the  renewed  themselves  cannot  avoid  sin 
in  this  life,  as  Paul  abundantly  teaches  in  the  7th  of  Romans  ;  there- 
fore God  does  prohibit  what  we  cannot  avoid,  and  does  command 
what  we  cannot  perform. 

The  author  then  proceeds  to  refut^  the  opinion  of  the  Flaccians, 
that  original  sin  corrupted  the  substance  of  the  soul ;  an  opinion 
industriously  propagated  by  Flaccius  Illyricus,  one  of  the  most 
learned  of  the  reformers ;  and  which  was  embraced  and  pertina- 


ORIGINAL   8IN.  127 

ciously  maintained  in  several  places  in  Germany.  But  as  this 
error  is  not  now  maintained  by  any  with  whom  we  are  acquainted, 
we  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  exhibit  the  elaborate  and  conclusive 
arguments  by  which  Sohnnius  refutes  it. 

As  we  stated  before,  our  object  in  giving  an  abstract  of  this 
treatise,  is  not  so  much  to  defend  the  doctrine  of  hereditary  depra- 
vity, as  to  give  a  correct  view  of  the  state  of  opinion  on  this  sub- 
ject at  the  time  of  the  reformation  and  afterwards.  And  it  cannot 
fail  to  occur  to  the  intelligent  reader,  that  none  of  the  objections 
now  made  to  this  doctrine  are  new,  or  supported  by  any  new  ar- 
guments. The  whole  ground  of  controversy  now  occupied  by  the 
various  discordant  opinions  has  been  gone  over  before.  And  the 
result  will  probably  be  as  before,  that  while  those  who  adhere 
strictly  to  evangelical  doctrine  will  continue  to  maintain  the  old 
doctrine,  its  opposers  will  deviate  further  and  further  from  ortho-* 
doxy.  There  has  never  yet  been  an  instance  in  the  history  of  the 
church  of  the  rejection  of  any  doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  where  the 
opposers  of  the  truth  have  been  contented  to  stop  at  the  first  step 
of  departure  from  sound  doctrine.     If  they  who  first  adopt  and 

f>ropagate  an  error  are  sometimes  restrained  by  habit,  and  by  a 
urking  respect  for  the  opinions  of  the  wise  and  good,  as  also  by  a 
fear  of  incurring  the  censure  of  heresy,  from  going  the  full  length 
which  their  principles  require  ;  yet  those  who  follow  them  in  their 
error  will  not  be  kept  back  by  such  considerations.  Indeed,  the  princi- 
ples of  self-defence  require,  that  men  who  undertake  to  defend  their 
opinions  by  argument,  should  endeavour  to  be  consistent  with 
themselves :  and  thus  it  commonly  happens  that  what  was  origi- 
nally a  single  error,  soon  draws  after  it  the  whole  system  of  which 
it  is  a  part.  On  this  account  it  is  incumbent  on  the  friends  of  truth 
to  oppose  error  in  its  commencement,  and  to  endeavour  to  point 
out  the  consequences  likely  to  result  from  its  adoption ;  and  to  us 
it  appears  that  nothing  is  better  calculated  to  show  what  will  be 
the  effect  of  a  particular  error,  than  to  trace  its  former  progress  by 
the  lights  of  ecclesiastical  history. 


,*, ft 


ESSAY    VI. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION,* 


In  a  previous  Essay  (No.  IV.)  we  presented  our  readers  with 
a  condensed  view  of  the  early  history  of  Pelagianism.  In  the  course 
of  that  article  it  fell  in  our  way  to  express  our  belief  in  the  doctrine 
of  Imputation,  our  conviction  of  its  importance,  and  of  its  being 
generally  received  among  orthodox  Christians.  This  doctrine,  our 
readers  are  aware,  has  long  been,  nominally  at  least,  rejected  by 
many  of  our  New  England  brethren.  Without  much  argument  on 
the  subject,  it  has  been  discarded  as  intrinsically  absurd ;  and  it  has 
not  unfrequently  been  presented  as  an  unanswerable  argument 
against  other  doctrines,  that  they  lead  to  all  the  absurdities  of  this 
exploded  dogma.  We  have  long  been  convinced  that  the  leading 
objections  to  this  doctrine  arose  from  an  entire,  and  to  us,  an  un- 
accountable misapprehension  of  its  nature  as  held  among  Calvin- 
ists.  We  therefore  thought  it  proper,  and  adapted  to  remove 
prejudices,  to  state  the  common  views  on  this  subject,  that  our 
brethren  might  see  that  they  did  not  involve  the  absurdities  which 
they  imagined.  Unfortunately,  as  far  as  the  author  fof  the 
article  under  review  is  concerned,  our  object  has  not  been  an- 
swered. The  writer,  who  signs  himself  A  Protestant,  is  evident- 
ly much  dissatisfied  with  our  opinions.  His  object,  in  his  com- 
munication to  the  Spectator,  is  to  impugn  several  of  our  state- 
ments, and  to  present  his  difficulties  with  regard  to  the  doctrine 
itself.  To  our  surprise,  these  difficulties  are  almost  all  founded  on 
the  very  misapprehension  which  it  was  our  object  to  correct.  Al- 
though our  readers,  we  think,  will  sympathize  with  us  in  our  regret 
at  many  of  the  statements  of  this  author,  and  feel  hurt  that  he  should 
have  allowed  himself  to  make  the  unguarded  imputations  contained 
in  his  piece,  we  are  not  sorry  that  we  are  called  upon,  by  this  di- 
rect appeal,  to  state  more  fully  our  views  on  this  subject,  and  the 
grounds  on  which  they  rest. 

*  Published  in  1830,  in  review  of  an  article  in  the  June  number  of  the  Christian 
Spectator,  entitled,  "  Inquiries  respecting  the  Doctrine  of  Imputation." 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  129 

Before  proceeding  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation  and  of  the  Pro- 
testant's difficulties,  there  are  one  or  two  subjects  on  which  we 
would  make  a  passing  remark.  This  writer  attributes  to  us  great 
subserviency  to  the  opinions  of  the  fathers.  Such  expressions  as 
the  following  clearly  convey  this  imputation.  "  Can  any  one  inform 
me  to  what  age  this  '  orthodoxy'  belongs ;  and  where  the  history^' 
of  it  is  to  be  found  among  the  fathers  whose  authority  is  so  mucu 
relied  on  by  this  historian  ?"  P.  340.  "  Can  the  historian  honest 
say,  with  all  his  attachment  to  the  fathers,  &c."  "Last  of  all, 
would  particularly  request,  if  any  writer  should  favour  me  with  an 
answer  to  these  inquiries,  that  reasons,  and  not  names,  may  be 
given  in  support  of  his  statements.  If  it  be  suggested  that  none  but 
a  heretic  could  ask  such  questions,  I  would  reply  that  there  are 
minds  in  our  country  which  are  not  satisfied  that  calling  hard 
names  is  argument;  or  that  the  argumentum  ad  invidiam  is  the 
happiest  weapon  which  a  meek  and  humble  Christian  can  use. 
Men  are  apt  to  suspect  that  such  arguments  would  not  be  em- 
ployed, if  better  ones  were  at  hand  in  their  stead.  I  only  add  that 
I  am  A  Protestant"  And  so  are  we,  however  unworthy  that  gen- 
tleman may  think  us  of  the  title.  We  would  not  knowingly  call 
any  man  master  upon  earth.  We  profess  to  believe,  with  him, 
that  the  Bible  is  the  religion  of  Protestants  ;  and  that  it  matters  lit- 
tle what  men  have  taught,  if  the  word  of  God  does  not  support 
their  doctrines.  As  we  agree  with  him  in  these  leading  principles, 
we  hope  that  he  will  agree  with  us  in  certain  others.  While  we 
hold  that  the  opinions  of  men  are  of  no  authority  as  to  matters  of 
faith,  we  at  the  same  time  believe  that  much  respect  is  due  to  uni- 
form opinions  of  the  people  of  God ;  that  there  is  a  strong  pre- 
sumption in  favour  of  any  doctrine  being  taught  in  the  Bible,  if  the 
great  body  of  the  pious  readers  of  the  Bible  have  from  the  begin- 
ning believed  and  loved  it.  We  are  free  to  confess,  that  it  would 
startle  us  to  hear  that  there  was  no  antecedent  probability  that  the 
doctrines  of  the  deity  of  Christ,  atonement,  native  depravity,  are 
really  taught  in  the  word  of  God,  if  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that 
the  church,  in  all  ages,  has  believed  these  doctrines.  And  we  think 
that  a  man  places  himself  in  a  very  unenviable  situation,  who  un- 
dertakes to  prove  to  the  men  of  his  generation,  that  the  great  body 
of  the  good  and  pious  before  him  were  utterly  mistaken,  and  that 
he  alone  is  right.  Here  is  a  phenomenon,  which  any  man  who 
assumes  this  position  is  bound  at  the  outset  to  account  for,  that  the 
Bible,  a  plain  book  as  Protestants  call  it,  should  have  been  utterly 
misunderstood  for  more  than  a  thousand  years,  by  its  most  careful 
and  competent  readers.  It  will  not  meet  this  case,  to  tell  us  that 
this  man  or  that  man  has  held  this  or  that  absurdity  ;  or  that  whole 
ages  or  communities  of  men,  who  neither  read  nor  loved  the  scrip- 
tures, believed  this  or  that  heresy.  This  is  not  the  question.  It  is 
simply  this,  is  it  not  probable  that  what  the  vast  majority  of  the 
most  competent  readers  of  a  plain  book,  take  to  be  its  plain  mean- 
ing, really  is  its  meaning  ?     We  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  Pro- 

9 


130  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

testant  would  answer  this  question  in  the  affirmative ;  and  that,  if 
arguing  with  Unitarians,  he  would  not  scruple  to  appeal  to  the  fact, 
that  the  unprejudiced  and  pious  en  masse  of  every  age  have  un- 
derstood the  Bible  as  teaching  the  divinity  of  Christ,  as  a  presump- 
tive argument  in  its  favour.  We  suspect  that  he  would  go  further, 
and  that  in  giving  the  exposition  of  any  passage  he  would  fortify 
his  own  conclusions,  by  stating  that  he  did  not  stand  alone,  but 
that  others  of  the  accurate  and  the  learned  had  arrived  at  the  same 
results.  Now  we  think  that  a  man  who  would  do  this,  ought  not 
to  sneer  at  us  on  this  very  account.  We  know  that  it  is  easy  to 
ring  the  changes,  on  want  of  independence,  subserviency  to  the 
fathers,  slavery  to  a  system,  and  so  on ;  but  what  effect  does  all  this 
produce  ?  It  may  excite  prejudice,  and  lead  the  superficial  to  join 
in  a  sneer  against  men  whom  they  suppose  to  a  pitiable  extent  in- 
ferior to  themselves ;  but  does  it  convince  anybody  ?  Does  it 
weaken  the  legitimate  force  of  the  argument  from  the  concurrence 
of  the  pious  in  any  doctrine  ?  Does  it  produce  any  favourable  im- 
pression on  that  class  of  readers  whose  approbation  a  writer  should 
value  ? 

We  say,  then,  that  the  opinion  of  the  church  is  entitled  to  respect, 
if  for  no  other  reason,  at  least  as  a  presumptive  argument  for  any 
doctrine,  in  favour  of  which  this  concurrent  testimony  can  be  cited. 
Whether  the  church  has,  with  any  important  uniformity,  held  the 
doctrine  of  imputation,  is  a  mere  question  of  fact,  and  must  be  de- 
cided accordingly.  If  it  can  be  fairly  proved,  let  it  pass  for  what 
it  is  worth.  It  binds  no  man's  conscience  ;  yet  the  Protestant  him- 
self would  hardly  say,  that  it  was  to  him  or  others  a  matter  of  in- 
difference. He  greatly  mistakes  if  he  supposes  that  the  opinion  of 
a  man  who  lived  a  thousand  years  ago,  has  any  more  weight  with 
us  than  that  of  an  equally  pious  and  able  man  who  may  be  still 
living.  His  telling  us,  therefore,  that  some  of  the  men  who  are 
called  fathers,  held  sundry  very  extravagant  opinions,  is  really  say- 
ing very  little  in  answer  to  the  argument  from  the  consent  of  the 
good  and  great  as  to  the  plain  meaning  of  a  plain  book.  We  are 
not  now  assuming  the  fact,  that  the  church  has,  with  perfect  una- 
nimity, gathered  the  doctrine  of  imputation  from  the  word  of  God ; 
but  exhibiting  the  ground  and  nature  of  the  respect  due  to  the  uni- 
form opinion  of  God's  people. 

There  is  another  point  of  view  in  which,  we  presume,  the  Pro- 
testant will  agree  with  us  in  thinking  this  opinion  entitled  to  respect. 
Truth  and  piety  are  intimately  related.  A  man's  moral  and  reli- 
gious opinions  are  the  expression  of  his  moral  and  religious  feel- 
ings. Hence  there  are  certain  opinions  which  we  view  with  ab- 
horrence, because  they  express  the  greatest  depravity.  Now  we 
say,  and  the  Protestant  doubtless  will  join  us  in  saying,  that  it  is  no 
very  desirable  thing  for  a  man  to  throw  himself  out  of  communion 
with  the  great  body  of  the  pious  in  every  age,  and  place  himself  in 
communion  of  language  and  opinion  with  the  opposers  of  vital  god- 
liness.    We  think  that  any  man,  who  had  any  proper  sense  of  the 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  131 

deceitfulness  of  his  own  heart,  the  weakness  of  his  understanding, 
and  of  the  vital  connection  between  truth  and  piety,  would  hesitate 
long  before  he  avowed  himself  opposed  to  the  views  which  have 
for  ages  been  found  in  connection  with  true  religion,  and  became 
the  advocate  of  doctrines  which  the  opposers  of  piety  have  been 
the  foremost  in  defending. 

These  are  mainly  the  grounds  on  which  our  respect  for  the  opi- 
nions of  the  church  rests,  and  these  remarks  show  the  extent  of  that 
respect.  So  far  the  Protestant  would  go  with  us ;  further  we  have 
not  gone.  If  we  have  cited  the  concurrent  opinion  of  the  church 
improperly  ;  if  we  have  supposed  the  great  body  of  the  people  of 
God  to  have  believed,  what  they  did  not  believe — let  the  Protestant 
set  us  right,  and  we  shall  be  thankful.  But  do  not  let  him  join 
men,  with  whom  he  would  scorn  to  be  associated,  in  running  over 
the  common-places  of  free  inquiry,  minds  that  think,  &c,  &c. 

A  word  as  to  the  argumentum  ad  invidiam.  We  are  of  the  num- 
ber of  those  who  agree  with  this  writer  in  thinking  that  "  this  is 
not  the  happiest  weapon  which  a  meek  and  lowly  Christian  can 
use,"  nay,  that  it  is  utterly  unworthy  of  his  character  to  use  it  at 
all.  We  think,  too,  that  the  charge  of  having  used  it  should  not  be 
lightly  made.  Unless  we  are  mistaken  as  to  the  nature  of  this  ar- 
gument, the  charge,  in  the  present  instance,  is  unfounded.  We  un- 
derstand an  argumentum  ad  invidiam  to  be  one,  which  is  designed, 
not  to  prove  the  incorrectness  of  any  opinion,  but  to  cast  unmerited 
odium  upon  those  who  hold  it.  Such  was  not  the  design  of  the 
article  to  which  the  Protestant  objects.  Every  one  knows,  that 
within  a  few  years,  there  has  been  more  or  less  discussion  in  this 
country  respecting  sin  and  grace.  We  thought  it  would  be  useful, 
to  present  our  readers  with  a  short  historical  view  of  the  various 
controversies  which  have  existed  in  the  church  on  these  subjects. 
We  commenced  with  the  earliest  and  one  of  the  most  important ; 
and  gave,  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  an  account  of  the  Pelagian  con- 
troversy. We  called  no  man  a  Pelagian,  and  designed  to  prove 
no  man  such,  and  therefore  made  little  application  of  the  history  to 
present  discussions.  So  far  as  the  modern  opinions  differ  from  the 
ancient,  there  was  no  ground  for  such  application,  and  none  such 
was  intended.  So  far  as  they  agree,  it  is  no  more  an  argumentum 
ad  invidiam  to  exhibit  the  agreement,  than  it  is  to  call  Belsham  a 
Socinian,  or  Whitby  an  anti-Calvinist.  If  no  man  agrees  with 
Pelagius  in  confining  morality  to  acts  of  choice ;  in  maintaining 
that  men  are  not  morally  depraved,  before  they  voluntarily  violate 
a  known  law,  and  that  God  cannot  prevent  sin  in  a  moral  system ; 
then  is  no  man  affected  by  the  exhibition  of  the  Pelagian  system. 
But  if  there  are  those  who  assume  this  ground,  and  proclaim  it,  it 
does  them  no  injustice  to  say  that  they  do  so.  So  long,  however, 
as  these  brethren  hold  to  a  moral  certainty  that  all  men  will  sin 
the  moment  they  become  moral  agents ;  that  the  first  sin  leads  to 
entire  moral  depravity ;  and  that  an  immediate  influence  of  the 
Spirit  is  necessary  in  conversion,  they  differ  from  that  system  in. 


132  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

these  important  points.  Wherein  they  agree  and  wherein  they 
differ,  should  be  known  in  justice  to  them,  as  well  as  for  the  benefit 
of  others.  How  far  the  assumption  of  the  fundamental  principles 
of  a  system  has  a  tendency  to  lead  to  its  thorough  adoption,  every 
man  must  judge  for  himself.  For  ourselves,  we  fear  the  worst: 
because,  we  think  consistency  requires  an  advance,  and  because 
history  informs  us,  that  when  men  have  taken  the  first  step,  they 
or  their  followers  soon  take  the  second.  Now,  we  ask,  what  is 
there  invidious  in  this  history  of  opinions,  or  in  this  expression  of 
apprehension?  apprehension  of  what?  of  injury  to  the  cause  of 
vital  piety.  Is  there  any  sin  in  expressing  this  apprehension,  when 
conscientiously  entertained  ?  Suppose  we  had  gone  further  than 
we  did,  and  exhibited,  what  we  supposed  our  readers  capable  of 
observing,  the  exact  points  of  agreement  and  disagreement  between 
the  two  systems,  would  there  have  been  the  least  injustice  in  such 
a  proceeding  ?  We  think  not,  and  therefore  think  the  charge  of 
using  the  argumentum  ad  invidiam  out  of  place.  Let  us  now  re- 
quest our  author  to  review  his  own  piece,  and  ask  himself,  what  is 
its  whole  spirit  and  tendency  (we  do  not  say  design).  Is  it  not  to 
•cast  on  us  the  odium  of  being  opposed  to  free  investigation,  of  "  call- 
ing hard  names  for  argument,"  of  being  held  in  bondage  to  a  system, 
of  relying  on  names  instead  of  reasons ;  in  short,  of  being  anti-pro- 
testants  ?  Would  not  a  little  reflection  have  prevented  his  casting 
this  stone  ? 

There  is  a  sensitiveness  about  some  of  our  New  England  brethren, 
that  has  often  surprised  us.  If  any  one  in  this  quarter  ventures  to 
question  the  tendency  of  their  opinions,  or  express  apprehension  as 
to  their  results,  all  of  love  and  Catholicism  that  there  is  within 
them,  is  shocked  at  the  suggestion,  and  we  are  borne  down  with 
the  cry,  "  you  are  breaking  the  bonds  of  charity,"  "  you  argue  ad 
invidiam,"  &c. ;  and  yet  these  same  brethren  can  find  it  in  their 
hearts  to  say,  that  we  are  setting  "  in  motion  all  the  enemies  of  re- 
ligion ;"*  that  our  doctrines  (though  known  to  be  held  by  a  de- 
cided majority  of  evangelical  Christendom)  are  exploded  absurdi- 
ties ;f  that  we  believe  in  physical  depravity  and  physical  regene- 
raton  ;  and  teach,  "  that  God  first  creates  a  wrong  essence,  and 
then  creates  a  right  one  ;  first  plunges  into  the  fire  and  then  pulls 
out  again"J  (a  misrepresentation  as  gross  as  the  language  is  irreve- 
rent). They  do  all  this,  without  appearing  to  dream  that  there  is 
aught  in  it  to  justify  complaint,  or  to  trouble  the  waters  of  peace. 
However,  let  this  pass.  We  love  peace,  and  shall  try  to  promote 
it.  Our  readers  will  soon  see  that  we  need  our  full  share  of  self- 
command  and  forbearance. 

The  Protestant  quotes  on  p.  339,  the  following  passage  from  our 
former  article:  "Now  we  confess  ourselves  to  be  of  the  number 
of  those  who  believe,  whatever  reproach  it  may  bring  upon  us  from 

*  Prof.  Stuart's  Examination  of  the  Review  of  the  A.  E.  Society,  p.  93. 

f  Review  of  Harvey  and  Taylor  on  Human  Depravity,  in  the  Christian  Spectator. 

%  Fitch's  Inquiry  and  Reply,  p.  89. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  133 

acertain  quarter,  that  if  the  doctrine  of  imputation  be  given  up,  the 
whole  doctrine  of  original  sin  must  be  abandoned.  And  if  this  doc- 
trine be  relinquished,  then  the  whole  doctrine  of  redemption  must 
fall ;  and  what  may  then  be  left  of  Christianity,  they  may  contend 
for  that  will ;  but  lor  ourselves,  we  shall  be  of  opinion  that  what 
remains  will  not  be  worth  a  serious  struggle."  He  then  proceeds, 
"  Here  then  permit  me  to  inquire,  have  men  no  sins  of  their  own 
from  which  they  need  to  be  redeemed  ?  Or  is  it  true,  as  the  his- 
torian's position  seems  plainly  to  imply,  that  the  whole  object  of 
Christ's  death  was  to  redeem  men  from  a  sin  which  is  not  their 
own  ?  And  is  this  sin,  then,  which  (to  use  the  writer's  own  words) 
is  not '  strictly  and  properly  theirs,  for  those  not  yet  born  could  not 
perform  an  act'  (p.  90)  ;  is  this  sin  so  much  greater  than  all  the 
sins  that  men  have  themselves  committed  in  their  own  persons,  that 
the  death  of  Christ,  or  the  redemption  wrought  by  him,  is  not  even 
to  be  named  as  having  respect  to  these  transgressions,  and  nothing 
of  Christianity  is  left,  unless  you  assume  the  position  that  redeeming 
blood  is  designed  simply  to  expiate  original  sin  ?  Can  any  one  in- 
form me  to  what  age  this  '  orthodoxy'  belongs  ;  and  where  the  his- 
tory of  it  is  to  be  found  among  the  fathers,  whose  authority  is  so 
much  relied  on  by  this  historian?"  Again;  on  p.  341,  he  quotes 
Rom.  iv.  15,  as  an  argument  against  imputation,  "Where  no  law 
is,  there  is  no  transgression,"  and  then  inquires,  "  But  how  can  this 
be,  where  there  is  not  only  original  sin  prior  to  all  knowledge  of 
law,  but  original  sin  so  great  as  to  absorb  the  whole  of  the  re- 
demption of  Christ ;  so  that  the  redemption  is  annulled,  if  we  con- 
sider it  as  expiating  the  guilt  of  actual  violations  of  known  law,  and 
there  is  nothing  left  in  the  Gospel  worth  contending  for." 

We  must  now  be  permitted  to  take  our  turn  as  interrogators. 
We  seriously,  then,  put  it  to  that  gentleman's  conscience  to  say 
whether  he  really  believes  that  the  conductors  of  this  work,  or  our 
historian,  which  is  the  same  thing,  actually  hold  that  "  the  whole 
object  of  Christ's  death  was  to  redeem  men  from  a  sin  which  is  not 
their  own,"  and  has  no  reference  to  "actual  violations  of  known 
law  ?"  If  he  does,  we  can  only  express  our  astonishment  at  the 
readiness  with  which  he  can  believe  his  brethren  capable  of  hold- 
ing and  advancing  the  most  monstrous  opinions,  in  the  face  of  their 
open  and  repeated  declarations  of  adherence  to  a  confession  which 
notoriously  teaches  the  very  reverse.  We  cannot,  however,  think 
that  the  writer,  whoever  he  may  be,  seriously  entertains  this  idea. 
Our  complaint  is,  that  he  should  have  been  so  heedless  as  to  seize 
on  the  first  impression  which  an  isolated  passage  made  on  his  mind, 
and  without  stopping  to  inquire  whether  he  apprehended  its  mean- 
ing aright,  or  whether  his  interpretation  was  at  all  consistent  with 
the  known  opinions  of  the  conductors  of  this  work,  should  at  once 
proceed  to  hold  up  and  denounce  this  first  and  false  impression  as 
the  "  orthodoxy"  of  the  Biblical  Repertory.  The  gentleman,  on 
the  slightest  reflection,  will  perceive,  that  just  so  far  as  confidence 
is  reposed  in  his  discrimination  and  judgment,  the  readers  of  the 


134  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

Spectator  will  be  led  to  believe  that  we  hold,  "  that  redeeming 
blood  is  designed  simply  to  expiate  original  sin,"  "  that  the  redemp- 
tion is  annulled  if  we  consider  it  as  expiating  the  guilt  of  actual  vio- 
lations of  known  law  and  there  is  nothing  left  in  the  Gospel  worth 
contending  for."  He  must  know,  too,  that  those  who  adopt  this 
idea  on  the  faith  of  his  assertion,  must  be  filled  with  astonishment 
and  contempt  for  men  who,  they  suppose,  hold  this  opinion ;  and 
moreover,  that  the  Spectator  will  go  into  many  hands  where  a  cor- 
rection from  us  of  this  marvellous  misapprehension  can  never  come. 
He  may  hence  judge  how  serious  an  injury  may  be  done,  in  one 
inconsiderate  moment,  by  ascribing,  on  utterly  insufficient  grounds, 
obnoxious  opinions  to  his  brethren.  Let  us  now  see  what  reason 
the  gentleman  has  for  this  wonderful  statement.  We  had  ventured 
to  agree  with  the  Christian  Spectator,  No.  2,  p.  349,  that  the  doc- 
trine of  original  sin  could  not  be  consistently  held,  if  that  of  impu- 
tation were  abandoned.  And  we  had  made  bold  to  say,  with  Presi- 
dent Edwards,*  that  the  rejection  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin 
rendered  redemption  unnecessary.  Why?  Because  actual  sins 
need  no  redemption,  as  the  author  most  amazingly  supposes  ?  No. 
But  because,  as  Edwards  supposed  and  as  we  suppose,  the  salva- 
tion of  men  could  have  been  effected  without  it,  by  merely  preserv- 
ing pure  and  unfallen  children  from  sinning,  and  thus  needing  a 
Saviour.  Had  our  author  attempted  to  show  that  God  could  not 
do  this,  or  that  these  doctrines  are  not  thus  intimately  related,  we 
should  not  have  had  a  word  to  object  as  to  the  propriety  of  such  a 
course,  whatever  we  might  have  thought  of  his  arguments.  But 
that  a  paragraph,  which  expresses  nothing  more  than  he  might  find 
in  any  and  every  Calvinistic  book  he  ever  condescended  to  look 
into,  should  be  so  interpreted  as  to  make  us  teach  an  almost  un- 
heard of  doctrine,  is  indeed  passing  strange.  Why  has  he  not  dis- 
covered and  long  ago  denounced  this  palpable  absurdity  of  Calvin- 
ism ?  for  surely  we  have  said  nothing  new  upon  the  subject.  We 
hope,  indeed,  that  the  readers  of  the  Spectator  will  have  discrimi- 
nation enough  to  see,  what  that  gentleman's  rapidity  of  mind  pre- 
vented his  discovering,  that  the  paragraph  in  question  contains  no- 
thing but  a  common  and  very  harmless  opinion,  which  the  majority 
of  them,  we  trust,  have  heard  from  the  nursery  and  pulpit  from 
their  earliest  years.  We  shall  not  be  expected  to  say  much  in  re- 
ply to  the  "  inquiry,"  "  to  what  age  this  orthodoxy  (making  the  death 
of  Christ  refer  only  to  original  sin)  belongs  ?"  As  it  is  the  poles 
apart  from  any  doctrine  we  have  ever  believed  or  taught,  we  feel 
no  special  interest  in  the  investigation.  We  must,  therefore,  leave 
to  the  discoverer  of  the  heresy  the  task  of  tracing  its  history.  Our 
present  concern  is  with  the  doctrine  of  imputation. 

It  has  struck  us  as  somewhat  surprising,  that  while  the  Protest- 

*  "  It  will  follow,"  says  Edwards,  "  on  our  author's  principles  (that  is,  on  the  de- 
nial of  original  sin  and  the  assertion  of  sufficient  power  to  do  our  duty),  not  only  with 
respect  to  infants,  but  even  adult  persons,  that  redemption  is  needless,  and  Christ  is 
dead  in  vain." — On  Original  Sin,  vol.  ii.,p.  515. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  135 

ant  represents  us  as  teaching  a  doctrine  involving  the  greatest  ab- 
surdities, the  editors  of  the  Spectator  regard  the  matter  in  a  very 
different  light.  They  think  we  have  renounced  the  old  doctrine, 
and  are  now  teaching  one  which  is  substantially  their  own.  They 
say: — 

"  We  have  inserted  the  above  communication  (the  Protestant's)  at  the  particu- 
lar request  of  a  respected  correspondent,  whose  familiarity  with  the  subject  entitles 
his  inquiries  to  a  serious  consideration.  We  cannot  but  think,  however,  that  the 
question  respecting  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  descendants,  has  become, 
in  this  country  at  least,  chiefly  a  dispute  about  words.  The  historian,  if  we  under- 
stand his  statements,  has  abandoned  the  ground  of  Edwards  and  other  standard 
writers  on  this  subject.  He  states  unequivocally,  that  Adam's  '  first  act  of  trans- 
gression,' was  '  not  strictly  and  properly  that  of  his  descendants  (for  those  not  yet 
born  could  not  perform  an  act),-  but  interpretatively,  or  by  imputation.'  P.  90. 
Now  Edwards  affirms  the  direct  contrary.  '  The  sin  of  the  apostasy  is  not  theirs 
merely  because  God  imputes  it  to  them,  but  it  is  truly  and  properly  theirs,  and  on 
that  ground  God  imputes  it  to  them.' — Orig.  Sin,  p.  4,  chap.  3.  Stapfer  too  lays 
down  the  doctrine  of  imputation  in  the  same  way."  Again ;  "  We  are  glad  likewise 
to  see  him  proceed  one  step  farther.  He  not  only  denies  that  we  had  any  share  in 
the  act,  but  even  in  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin,  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  that 
term.  He  tells  us  'that  the  ill-desert  of  one  man  cannot  be  transferred  to  an- 
other ;'  that '  imputation  does  not  imply  a  transfer  of  moral  acts  or  moral  charac- 
ter, but  the  opposite  of  remission.'  To  impute,  according  to  this  explanation  of 
the  term,  is  simply  to  hold  the  descendants  of  Adam  subject  to  the  '  consequences' 
of  his  fall,  though  not  sharing  in  the  act  nor  its  criminality."  "  Now  in  this  state- 
ment all  who  bear  the  name  of  Calvinists  will  unite,  and  they  all  regard  it  as  ex- 
hibiting a  cardinal  doctrine  of  the  Gospel.  And  we  cannot  but  think  that  most  of 
the  disputes  on  this  subject,  result  simply  from  a  diversity  in  the  use  of  terms." — 
Pp.  342,  343. 

We  presume  the  Protestant  will  consider  these  remarks  of  the 
editors  as  reflecting  rather  severely  on  his  want  of  discrimination. 
Certain  it  is,  that  one  or  the  other  must  be  under  a  great  mistake. 
For  if  our  statement  is  substantially  one  in  which  "  all  who  bear 
the  name  of  Calvinists  will  unite,"  and  which  "  they  all  regard  as 
exhibiting  a  cardinal  doctrine  of  the  Gospel,"  then  it  is  very  strange 
that  the  Protestant  should  hold  us  up  as  teaching  so  many  absurdi- 
ties, and  so  unceremoniously  sneer  at  our  orthodoxy.  In  this 
difference  between  the  editors  and  their  correspondent,  we  very 
naturally  take  sides  with  the  former,  and  wish  to  be  considered  as 
teaching  nothing  but  plain  common  Calvinistic  doctrine.  There  is 
a  question  at  issue,  however,  between  the  editors  and  ourselves. 
Have  we  abandoned  the  old  doctrine,  as  they  affirm,  or  have  they 
been  labouring  under  a  misapprehension  as  to  its  nature?  Here 
then  we  have  a  question  of  fact,  and  with  the  Protestant's  permis- 
sion, we  shall  appeal  to  names  for  its  decision. 

We  would  say  in  the  out-set,  that  the  views  which  we  have  ex- 
pressed are  those  which  we  have  always  entertained,  and  which 
we  have  always  understood  our  brethren,  who  believe  the  doctrine 
of  imputation,  to  hold.  If  there  is  any  departure,  therefore,  in 
them  from  the  opinions  of  "  standard  writers  on  the  subject,"  it  is  a 
departure  of  long  standing,  and  widely  extended.   We  are  persuad- 


136  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

ded,  however,  that  the  Spectator  is  mistaken  as  to  this  point,  and 
that  the  view  which  we  have  presented  of  imputation,  is  that  held 
by  Calvinists  and  the  Reformed  churches  generally. 

As  we  are  not  prepared  to  adopt  the  Spectator's  exposition  of 
our  opinions,  we  proceed  to  state  how  we  hold  the  doctrine  in 
question.  In  imputation,  there  is,  first,  an  ascription  of  something 
to  those  concerned ;  and  secondly,  a  determination  to  deal  with 
them  accordingly.  Sometimes  one,  and  sometimes  the  other  idea 
predominates.  Thus,  in  common  life,  to  impute  good  or  bad  mo- 
tives to  a  man,  is  to  ascribe  such  motives  to  him.  Here  the  first 
idea  alone  is  retained.  But  when  Shimei  prayed  David,  "  Let  not 
my  lord  impute  iniquity  unto  me,"  he  prayed  that  the  king  would 
not  lay  his  sin  to  his  charge,  and  punish  him  for  it.  Here  the  se- 
cond predominates.  Henoe.  not  to  impute  is  to  remit.  "  Blessed 
is  the  man  to  whom  the  Lord  imputeth  not  iniquity  ;"  that  is,  blessed 
is  the  man  whose  iniquity  is  pardoned.  To  impute  sin,  therefore, 
"  is  to  lay  it  to  the  charge  of  any,  and  to  deal  with  them  according 
to  its  desert." — Owen.  If  the  thing  imputed  be  antecedently  ours, 
then  there  is  merely  a  recognizing  it  as  such,  and  treating  us  ac- 
cordingly. If  it  be  not  ours,  there  is  necessarily  an  ascription  of  it 
to  us  on  some  ground  or  other,  and  a  determination  to  deal  with  us 
according  to  the  merit  of  the  thing  imputed.  When  Paul  begged 
Philemon  to  impute  to  him  the  debt  or  offence  of  Onesimus,  he 
begged  him  to  regard  him  as  the  debtor  or  offender,  and  exact  of 
him  whatever  compensation  he  required.  When  our  sins  are  said 
to  be  imputed  to  Christ,  it  is  meant  that  he  is  treated  as  a  sinner  on 
account  of  our  sins.  And  when  Adam's  sin  is  said  to  be  imputed 
to  his  posterity,  it  is  intended  that  his  sin  is  laid  to  their  charge  and 
they  are  punished  for  it,  or  are  treated  as  sinners  on  that  account. 
In  all  such  cases  there  must  be  some  ground  for  this  imputation; 
that  is,  for  this  laying  the  conduct  of  one  to  the  charge  of  another, 
and  dealing  with  him  accordingly.  In  the  case  of  Paul  it  was  the 
voluntary  assumption  of  the  responsibility  of  Onesimus ;  so  it  was 
in  the  case  of  Christ.  The  ground  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin 
to  his  posterity,  is  the  union  between  them,  which  is  two-fold  ;  a 
natural  union,  as  between  a  father  and  his  children,  and  the  union 
of  representation,  which  is  the  main  idea  here  insisted  upon.  A 
relation  admitted  on  all  hands.  The  Spectator  affirms  it  when  he 
says  "  that  Adam  was  not  on  trial  for  himself  alone,"  but  for  his  pos- 
terity also,  as  is  clearly  implied  in  the  sentence. 

What  we  deny,  therefore,  is,  first,  that  this  doctrine  involves  any 
mysterious  union  with  Adam,  any  confusion  of  our  identity  with 
his,  so  that  his  act  was  personally  and  properly  our  act ;  and  se- 
condly, that  the  moral  turpitude  of  that  sin  was  transferred  from 
him  to  us ;  we  deny  the  possibility  of  any  such  transfer.  These 
are  the  two  ideas  which  the  Spectator  and  others  consider  as  ne- 
cessarily involved  in  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  and  for  rejecting 
which,  they  represent  us  as  having  abandoned  the  old  doctrine  on 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  137 

the  subject.     We  proceed  now  to  show  that  they  are  mistaken  on 
this  point. 

In  proof  of  this,  we  would  remark  in  the  first  place,  on  a  fact  that 
has  always  struck  us  as  rather  singular,  which  is,  that  while  those 
who  hold  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity,  do,  at  the 
same  time,  hokUthe  imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ,  and  of  Christ's 
righteousness  to  us,  we  seldom  or  never  hear  (from  Calvinists  at 
least),  the  same  objections  to  the  idea  of  imputation  in  the  two  lat- 
ter cases  as  in  the  first.  Is  there  any  one  who  has  the  hardihood 
to  charge  the  whole  Calvinistic  world  (who  taught  or  preach  the 
doctrine  of  imputation)  with  believing,  that  Christ  personally  and 
properly  committed  the  sins  which  are  said  to  be  imputed  to  him  ? 
or  that  the  moral  turpitude  of  these  sins  was  transferred  to  him  ? 
Now,  we  ask,  why  is  this  ?  Why,  if  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin 
to  his  posterity  supposes  that  they  were  the  personal  actors  of  his 
transgression,  the  imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ  does  not  make 
him  the  agent  of  our  acts  ?  Why,  since  at  every  turn  we  are  asked 
if  we  have  ever  repented  of  Adam's  sin,  is  it  not  demanded  of  us  if 
Christ  ever  repented  of  our  sins  ?  We  have  never  been  so  unhappy 
as  to  have  our  hearts  torn  by  being  told  that  we  believe  and  teach 
that  the  blessed  Saviour  was  morally  a  sinner ;  that  our  "  moral 
character"  was  transferred  to  him.  If  this  is  imputation,  if  this 
"  transfer  of  moral  character"  is  included  in  it,  we  have  not  words 
to  express  our  deep  abhorrence  of  the  doctrine.  We  would  hold 
no  communion  with  the  man  who  taught  it.  And  if  this  is  what 
our  brethren  mean  to  charge  us  with,  then  is  the  golden  cord  of 
charity  for  ever  broken  ;  for  what  fellowship  can  there  be  between 
parties,  where  one  accuses  the  other  of  blasphemy  ?  We  do  not 
harbour  the  idea,  however,  that  our  brethren  can  seriously  make 
such  a  charge.  Nor  can  they  imagine,  that  when  we  speak  of  the 
imputed  righteousness  of  Christ,  we  are  so  insane  as  to  mean  that 
we  personally  performed  the  acts  of  his  perfect  obedience,  and  in 
person  died  upon  the  cross.  Neither  can  they  suppose  that  we 
mean  to  assert  that  his  moral  excellence  was  transferred  to  us.* 
They  never  ask  us  whether  we  feel  self-approbation  and  compla- 
cency for  what  Christ  did  ;  why  then  ask  us  if  we  feel  remorse  and 
self-reproach  for  what  Adam  did  ?  We  say  then,  that  the  fact, 
that  Calvinists  speak  in  the  same  terms  of  the  imputation  of  our 
sins  to  Christ,  and  of  his  righteousness  to  us  that  they  use  of  the 
imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity,  and  illustrate  the  one  by 
the  other,  is  an  a  priori  argument,  we  should  hope,  of  conclusive 
force  to  prove  that  they  do  not  consider  either  the  idea  of  personal 
identification,  or  the  transfer  of  moral  character,  as  included  in  the 
doctrine  of  imputation. 

There  is  another  presumptive  argument  as  to  this  point,  drawn 

*  We  know  there  have  been  some  pitiable  instances  in  which  such  ideas  have  been 
advanced  by  certain  Antinomians  ;  but  we  are  not  speaking  of  the  Urpafiara  of  the 
human  head  and  heart,  but  of  a  common  doctrine  of  a  large  and  pious  portion  of  the 
Christian  world. 


138  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

from  the  common  technicalities  of  theology.  What  is  meant  by 
calling  Adam  a  public  person,  a  representative,  a  federal  head,  as 
is  so  constantly  done  by  those  who  teach  the  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion ?  Are  not  these  terms  intended  to  express  the  nature  of  the 
union  between  Adam  and  his  posterity  ?  A  union  of  representation 
is  not  a  union  of  identity.  If  Adam  and  his  race  were  one  and  the 
same,  he  was  not  their  representative,  for  a  thing  cannot  represent 
itself.  The  two  ideas  are  inconsistent.  Where  the  one  is  asserted, 
the  other  is  denied.  They  therefore  who  affirm  that  we  sinned  in 
Adam  as  a  representative,  do  thereby  deny  that  we  sinned  in  him 
personally.  When  our  formularies  say  that  Adam  was  "  a  public 
person,"  or  representative,  and  that  we  "sinned  in  him,"  it  is  to 
make  them  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing  in  the  same  breath,  to 
quote  them  as  teaching  that  we  were  personally  one  with  him  and 
personally  acted  in  him.  With  the  same  propriety  it  might  be  as- 
serted that  Alexander  of  Russia  personally  signed  the  treaty  with 
the  Turks,  because  he  did  it  in  his  minister. 

The  same  terms  are  used  in  reference  to  Christ,  who  is  called 
the  head,  representative  and  substitute  of  his  people,  and  they  all 
express  the  nature  of  the  relation  which  is  the  ground  of  imputa- 
tion, and  are  absolutely  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  personal  iden- 
tity and  consequent  transfer  of  moral  character.  When  the  Spec- 
tator, therefore,  congratulates  us  on  having  rejected  a  philosophy 
which  confounds  all  notions  of  personal  identity,  he  does  so  under 
a  wrong  impression.  The  fact  is,  there  is  no  philosophy  about  it. 
We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  no  man  has  ever  philosophized  on  this 
subject,  or  that  there  have  not  been  men  who  taught  a  mysterious 
union  of  the  race  with  Adam.  What  we  mean  to  deny  is,  that  such 
speculations  enter  at  all  into  the  essence  of  the  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion, or  are  necessary  to  it.  In  every  doctrine  there  are  certain 
ideas  which  constitute  its  formal  nature,  and  make  it  what  it  is  ;  so 
that  if  they  are  rejected,  the  doctrine  is  rejected.  It  would  be  the 
most  unreasonable  thing  in  the  world,  to  require  of  a  man  who 
undertakes  to  defend  any  doctrine,  to  make  good  all  the  explana- 
tions of  it  which  have  ever  been  given,  and  to  justify  all  the  modes 
of  expression  ever  employed  respecting  it.  What  a  task  would 
this  impose  on  the  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  of  the 
deity  of  Christ,  or  of  any  other  doctrine.  This  is  a  task  which  we 
would  never  undertake,  and  have  not  now  undertaken.  Our  busi- 
ness is  to  make  it  appear  that  the  notions  of  personal  oneness,  com- 
munity in  action,  transfer  of  moral  character,  are  no  part  of  the 
doctrine  of  imputation  ;  not  that  none  of  the  schoolmen  or  scholas- 
tic divines  ever  held  any  of  these  ideas.  For  what  have  they  not 
held  ?  We  know  that  it  is  often  asserted  that  Augustine  and  his 
followers  held  the  personal  unity  of  Adam  and  his  race.  Doderlein, 
Knapp,  and  Bretschneider  all  assert  it,  and  assert  it  one  after  the 
other,  on  the  same  grounds.  But  we  would  remark  in  the  first  place, 
that  we  are  not  prepared  to  believe  this  ;  first,  because  the  passages 
which  these  writers  produce  in  proof  of  their  assertion  do  not  make 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  139 

it  out.  The  same  forms  of  expression  occur  in  the  Bible,  and  in 
the  writings  of  men  who  expressly  reject  this  idea,  and  even  the 
doctrine  of  imputation  itself.  Dr.  Hopkins  uses  as  strong  language 
on  the  connection  of  Adam  aqd  his  posterity,  as  we  have  ever  seen 
quoted  from  Augustine.  And  secondly,  because  there  are  modes 
of  expression  adopted  by  Augustine  on  this  subject,  in  explanation 
of  the  ground  of  imputation,  inconsistent  with  this  idea.  Turrettin 
quotes  and  explains  Augustine  thus :  "  Quicunque,  inquit  August., 
ep.  106,  ex  illo  multi  in  seipsis  futuri  erunt,  in  Mo  uno,  unus  homo 
erant,  unitate  non  specifica,  vel  numerica,  sed  partim  unitaie  origi- 
nis,  quia  omnes  ex  uno  sunt  sanguine,  partim  unitate  repraesenta- 
tionis,  quia  unus  omnium  personam  repraesentabat  ex  ordine  Dei." 
— Tom.  i.,  p.  679.  According  to  this,  Augustine  taught  that  we 
were  one  in  Adam,  because  he  was  our  common  father  and  com- 
mon representative,  in  which  there  is  no  mysticism.  Let  it  be  ad- 
mitted, however,  that  Augustine  did  give  this  explanation  of  the 
ground  of  imputation.  Do  we  reject  the  doctrine  because  we  reject 
the  reason  which  he  gives  to  justify  and  explain  it  ?  It  might  with 
as  much  propriety  be  said  that  every  man  rejects  the  doctrine  of 
the  Trinity,  who  does  not  adopt  every  tittle  of  Athanasius's  expo- 
sition of  it.  It  is  therefore  no  special  concern  of  ours,  what  Augus- 
tine held  on  this  point.  What  we  affiirm  is,  that  this  idea  is  not 
essential  to  the  doctrine,  and  is  not  embraced  by  the  great  body  of 
its  defenders.  Any  man  who  holds  that  there  is  such  an  ascription 
of  the  sin  of  Adam  to  his  posterity,  as  to  be  the  ground  of  their 
bearing  the  punishment  of  that  sin,  holds  the  doctrine  of  imputation  ; 
whether  he  undertakes  to  justify  this  imputation  merely  on  the 
ground  that  we  are  the  children  of  Adam,  or  on  the  principle  of 
representation,  or  of  scientia  media  ;  or  whether  he  chooses  to  phi- 
losophize on  the  nature  of  unity  until  he  confounds  all  notions  of 
personal  identity,  as  President  Edwards  appears  to  have  done. 

As  it  is  in  vain  to  make  quotations  before  we  have  fixed  the 
meaning  of  the  terms  which  are  constantly  recurring  in  them,  we 
must  notice  the  allegation  of  the  Spectator,  as  to  our  incorrect  use 
of  certain  words,  before  we  proceed  to  bring  any  more  direct  testi- 
mony to  the  fact,  that  the  views  which  we  have  given  of  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  are  those  commonly  entertained  among  Calvin- 
ists  on  the  subject.  The  words  guilt  and  punishment  are  those 
particularly  referred  to.  The  former  we  had  defined  to  be,  liabili- 
ty, or  exposedness  to  punishment.  We  did  not  mean  to  say  that 
the  word  never  included  the  idea  of  moral  turpitude  or  criminality. 
We  were  speaking  of  its  theological  usage.  It  is  very  possible 
that  a  word  may  have  one  sense  in  common  life,  and  another, 
somewhat  modified,  in  particular  sciences.  A  legal  or  theological 
sense  of  a  term  may,  hence,  often  be  distinguished  from  its  ordinary 
acceptation.  It  is,  therefore,  not  much  to  the  purpose,  when  the 
question  relates  to  the  correct  theological  use  of  a  word,  to  quote 
Dr.  Webster's  Dictionary  as  an  authority  on  the  subject.  We  must 
appeal  to  usage.     Grotius,  who,  we  presume,  will  be  regarded  as 


140  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

a  competent  witness,  in  his  treatise  De  Satis facti one  Christi,  uses 
the  word  constantly  in  the  sense  which  we  have  given  it.  Thus  in 
the  phrase, "  De  auferendo  reatu  per  remissionis  impetrationem  apud 
Deum." — Opera  TheoL,  vol.  hi.,  p.  333,  On  p.  336,  "Sanguis  pe- 
cudum  tollebat  reatum  temporalem,  non  autem  reatum  sp  rltualem." 

A  little  after,  "  Hinc  Ka$api$etv  est  eum  reatum  tollere,  sive  efficere  , 
remissionem."  In  all  these  cases  guilt  is  that  which  is  removed  by 
pardon,  i.  e..  exposure  to  punishment.  Turrettin,  "Reatus  theolo- 
gice  dicitur  obligatio  ad  poenam  ex  peccato." — Tom.  i.,  p.  654. 
Owen,  "  Guilt  in  scripture  is  the  respect  of  sin  unto  the  sanction 
of  the  law,  whereby  the  s'nner  becomes  obnoxious  unto  punish- 
ment."— On  Justification,  p.  280.  On  the  same  page;  in  sin  there 
is,  "  Its  formal  nature,  as  it  is  a  transgression  of  the  law ;  and  the 
stain  or  the  filth  that  it  brings  upon  the  soul ;  but  the  guilt  of  it  is 
nothing  but  its  respect  unto  punishment  from  the  sanction  of  the 
law."  Again,  "  He  (Christ)  was  alienae  culpae  reus.  Perfectly  in- 
nocent in  himself;  but  took  our  guilt  upon  him,  or  our  obnoxious- 
ness  unto  punishment  for  sin."  Edwards  says,  "  From  this  it  will 
follow,  that  guilt,  or  exposedness  to  punishment,  &c." — Vol.  ii.,  p. 
543.  Ridgeley,  vol.  ii.,  p.  110,  "Guilt  is  an  obligation  or  liableness 
to  suffer  punishment  for  sin  committed."  If  there  is  anything  fixed 
in  theological  language,  it  is  this  sense  of  the  word  guilt.  And  if 
there  is  anything  in  which  Calvinists  are  agreed,  it  is  in  saying  that 
when  they  affirm  "  that  the  guilt  of  Adam's  sin  has  come  upon  us," 
they  mean,  exposure  to  punishment  on  account  of  that  sin.  It 
would  be  easy  to  multiply  quotations,  but  enough  has  been  pro- 
duced to  convince  the  Spectator  that  our  sense  of  the  word  is  not 
so  "  peculiar"  as  he  imagined. 

"  The  word  punishment,  too,"  he  says,  "  has  a  peculiar  sense 
in  the  vocabulary  of  the  historian." — P.  344.  Here  again  he  ap- 
peals to  Dr.  Webster,  and  here  again  we  must  dissent ;  not  so  much 
from  the  doctor's  definition,  as  from  the  Spectator's  exposition  of 
it.  The  Dr.  says  that  punishment  is  "  any  pain  or  suffering  inflict- 
ed on  a  person  for  a  crime  or  offence."  To  this  we  have  no  spe- 
cial objection.  But  that  the  crime  or  offence  must  necessarily 
belong  personally  to  the  individual  punished,  as  the  Spectator 
seems  to  take  for  granted,  we  are  very  far  from  admitting  ;  for  this 
is  the  very  turning  point  in  the  whole  discussion  respecting  impu- 
tation. Punishment,  according  to  our  views,  is  any  evil  inflicted 
on  a  person,  in  the  execution  of  a  judicial  sentence,  on  account  of 
sin.  That  the  word  is  used  in  this  sense,  for  evils  thus  inflicted  on 
one  person  for  the  offence  of  another,  cannot  be  denied.  It  would 
be  easy  to  fill  a  volume  with  examples  of  this  usage,  from  writers 
ancient  and  modern,  sacred  and  profane.  We  quote  a  few  instan- 
ces from  theologians,  as  this  is  a  theological  discussion.  Grotius 
(p.  313),  in  answering  the  objection  of  Socinus,  that  it  is  unjust  that 
our  sins  should  be  punished  in  Christ,  says,  "  Sed  ut  omnis  hie  er- 
ror dematur,  notandum  est,  esse  quidem  essentiale  poenae,  ut  infli- 
gatur  ob  peccatum,  sed  non  item  essentiale  ei  esse,  ut  infligatur  ipsi 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  141 

qui  peccavit."  On  the  same  pnge,  "  Puniri  alios  ob  aliorum  delicta 
non  audet  negare  Socinus."  It'  he  uses  the  word  once,  he  does,  we 
presume,  a  hundred  times  in  this  sense  in  this  single  treatise. 
Owen  says,  "  there  can  be  no  punishment  but  with  respect  to  the 
guilt  of  sin  personally  committed  or  imputed." — P.  287.  Storr  and 
other  modern  and"  moderate  theologians,  use  the  word  in  this  sense 
perpetually.  Storr  says,  "Jedes  durch  einen  richterlichen  Aus- 
spruch  um  der  Sunden  willen  verhangte  Leiden,  Strafe  heisst,"  that 
is,  "  Every  evil  judicially  inflicted  on  account  of  sin,  is  punishment." 
— Zweck  des  Todes  Jesu,  p.  585.  No  one  has  ever  denied  that  in 
its  most  strict  and  rigid  application,  punishment  has  reference  to 
personal  guilt ;  but  this  does  not  alter  the  case,  for  usage,  the  only 
law  in  such  matters,  has  sanctioned  its  application  in  the  manner 
in  which  we  have  used  it,  and  that  too  among  the  most  accurate  of 
theological  writers. 

Having  fixed  the  sense  in  which  these  terms  are  used  by  the 
writers  to  whom  we  shall  refer,  we  will  now  proceed  to  establish 
our  position,  that  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  as  taught  by  standard 
Calvinistic  authors,  does  not  involve,  either  the  idea  of  a  personal 
oneness  with  Adam,  so  that  his  act  is  strictly  and  properly  our  act, 
or  that  of  the  transfer  of  moral  character. 

Our  first  testimony  is  from  Knapp,  whom  we  quote,  not  as  a  Cal- 
vinist,  but  as  a  historian.  In  his  Christliche  Glaubenslehre,  section 
76,  he  says,  "  However  various  the  opinions  of  theologians  are  re- 
specting imputation,  when  they  come  to  explain  themselves  dis- 
tinctly on  the  subject,  yet  the  majority  agree  in  general  as  to  this 
point,  that  the  expression,  God  imputes  the  sin  of  our  first  parents 
to  their  descendants,  amounts  to  this,  God  punishes  the  descendants 
on  account  of  the  sin  of  their  first  parents."  This  testimony  is  no 
otherwise  valuable  than  as  the  opinion  of  an  impartial  man,  as  to 
the  substance  of  the  doctrine.  That  there  are  various  views,  ex- 
planations, and  modes  of  defending  ths  doctrine,  no  one  ever 
dreamed  of  denying,  and  it  would  stand  alone,  in  this  respect,  if 
there  were  not. 

Turrettin  (Quaest.  ix.,  p.  678)  thus  explains  his  views  of  this 
subject.  "  Imputation  is  either  of  something  foreign  to  us,  or  pro- 
perly ours.  Sometimes  that  is  imputed  to  us  which  is  personally 
ours,  in  which  sense  God  imputes  to  sinners  their  transgressions, 
whom  he  punishes  for  crimes  properly  their  own  ;  and  in  reference 
to  what  is  good,  the  zeal  of  Phineas  is  said  to  be  imputed  to  him 
for  righteousness. — Ps.  cvi.  31.  Sometimes  that  is  imputed  which 
is  without  us,  and  not  performed  by  ourselves  ;  thus  the  righteous- 
ness of  Christ  is  said  to  be  imputed  to  us,  and  our  sins  are  imputed 
to  him,  although  he  has  neither  sin  in  himself  nor  we  righteous- 
ness. Here  we  speak  of  the  latter  kind  of  imputation,  not  of  the 
former,  because  we  are  treating  of  a  sin  committed  by  Adam,  not 
by  us."  (Quia  agitur  de  peccato  ab  Adamo  commisso,  non  a 
nobis.)  We  have  here  precisely  the  two  ideas  excluded  from  the 
doctrine  which  we  have  rejected,  and  which  the  Spectator  seems 


142  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

to  think  essential  to  it.  For  Turrettin  says,  that  in  this  case  the 
thing  imputed  is  something  without  us  (extra  nos,  nee  a  nobis  prae- 
stitum),  and  secondly,  the  moral  turpitude  of  the  act  is  not  trans- 
ferred, for  it  is  analogous,  he  tells  us,  to  the  imputation  of  Christ's 
righteousness  to  us,  and  our  sins  to  him,  licet  nee  ipse  peccatum  in 
se  habeat,  nee  nos  justitiam.  That  there  must  be  some  ground  for 
this  imputation  is  self-evident,  and  this  can  only  be  some  relation 
or  union  in  which  the  parties  stand  to  each  other.  This  union, 
however,  according  to  Turrettin,  is  nothing  mysterious,  nothing 
which  involves  a  confusion  of  identity.  The  union  which  is  to 
serve  as  the  ground  of  imputation,  he  says,  may  be  threefold  :  "  1. 
Natural,  as  between  a  father  and  his  children ;  2.  Moral  and  poli- 
tical, as  between  a  king  and  his  subjects  ;  3.  Voluntary,  as  among 
friends,  and  between  the  guilty  and  his  substitute."  The  bond  be- 
tween Adam  and  his  posterity  is  twofold  :  "  1.  Natural,  as  he  is  the 
father,  and  we  are  his  children.  2.  Political  and  forensic,  as  he 
was  the  prince  and  representative  head  of  the  whole  human  race. 
The  foundation,  therefore,  of  imputation  is  not  only  the  natural  con- 
nection which  exists  between  us  and  Adam,  since,  in  that  case,  all 
his  sins  might  be  imputed  to  us,  but  mainly  the  moral  and  federal, 
in  virtue  of  which  God  entered  into  covenant  with  him  as  our 
head." 

All  the  arguments  which  Turrettin  urges  in  support  of  his  doc- 
trine, prove  that  he  viewed  the  subject  as  we  have  represented  it. 
He  appeals,  in  the  first  instance,  to  Rom.  v.  12 — 21.  The  scope  of 
the  passage  he  takes  to  be,  the  illustration  of  the  method  of  justifi- 
cation, by  comparing  it  to  the  manner  in  which  men  were  brought 
under  condemnation.  As  Adam  was  made  the  head  of  the  whole 
race,  so  that  the  guilt  of  his  sin  comes  on  all  to  condemnation,  so 
Christ  is  made  the  head  of  his  people,  and  his  obedience  comes  on 
all  of  them  to  justification.  On  page  681,  he  says,  "We  are  con- 
stituted sinners  in  Adam  in  the  same  way  (eadem  ratione)  in  which 
we  are  constituted  righteous  in  Christ ;  but  in  Christ  we  are  con- 
stituted righteous  by  the  imputation  of  righteousness.  Therefore 
we  are  made  sinners  in  Adam  by  the  imputation  of  his  sin,  other- 
wise the  comparison  is  destroyed."  Another  of  his  arguments  is 
derived  from  the  native  depravity  of  men,  which  he  says  is  a  great 
evil,  and  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  divine  character,  unless  we 
suppose  that  men  are  born  in  this  state  of  corruption  as  a  punish- 
ment. As  this  evil  has  the  nature  of  punishment,  it  necessarily 
supposes  some  antecedent  sin,  on  account  of  which  it  is  inflicted, 
for  there  is  no  punishment  but  on  account  of  sin.  "  It  cannot,  how- 
ever, be  a  sin  properly  and  personally  ours,  because  we  were  not 
yet  in  existence.  Therefore  it  is  the  sin  of  Adam  imputed  to  us." 
Non  potest  autem  esse  peccatum  nostrum  proprium  et  personale, 
auiA  nondum  fuimus  actu.  Almost  the  very  form  of  expression 
quoted  from  us  by  the  Spectator  to  prove  that  we  have  abandoned 
the  old  doctrine  of  imputation. 

In  order  to  evince  his  sense  of  the  importance  of  the  doctrine,  he 


THE    DOCTRINE    OP    IMPUTATION."  143 

remarks  on  its  connection  with  that  of  the  imputation  of  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ,  and  says  that  all  the  objections  urged  against 
the  one,  bear  against  the  other ;  so  that  if  the  one  be  rejected,  the 
other  cannot  stand.  We  shall  give  in  his  own  words  a  passage 
from  page  689,  which  appears  to  us  very  decisive  as  to  the  point 
in  hand.  "Voluntas  ergo  Adami  potest  dici  singularis  actus  pro- 
prietate,  universalis  repraesentationis  jure,  singularis  quia  ab  uno 
ex  individuis  humanis  profecta  est,  universalis  quia  individuum  illud 
universum  genus  humanum  repraesentabat.  Sic  justitia  Christi  est 
actus  unius,  et  bene  tamen  dicitur  omnium  fidelium  per  divinam 
imputationem  ;  ut  quod  unus  fecit,  omnes  censeantur  fecisse,  si  unus 
mortuus  est,  omnes  sunt  mortui." — 2  Cor.  v.  15.  Is  it  possible  to 
assert  in  clearer  language,  that  the  act  of  Adam  was  personally  his 
own  and  only  his,  and  that  it  is  only  on  the  principle  of  representa- 
tion that  it  can  be  said  to  be  ours? 

These  quotations  from  Turrettin  we  think  abundantly  sufficient 
to  establish  our  assertion,  that  the  doctrine  under  consideration  nei- 
ther involves  any  confusion  of  personal  identity,  nor  any  transfer 
of  the  moral  turpitude  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity.  As  Turrettin  is 
universally  regarded  as  having  adhered  strictly  to  the  common 
Calvinistic  system,  and  on  the  mere  question  of  fact  as  to  what  that 
system  is,  is  second  to  no  man  in  authority,  we  might  here  rest  our 
cause.  But  we  deem  this  a  matter  of  much  practical  importance,  and 
worthy  of  being  clearly  established.  Misconceptions  on  this  subject 
have  been,  and  still  are,  the  means  of  alienating  brethren.  They 
are  the  ground  of  many  hard  thoughts,  and  of  much  disrespectful 
language.  It  is  not  easy  to  feel  cordially  united  to  men  whom  we 
consider  as  teaching  mischievous  absurdities;  nor  is  it,  on  the  other 
hand,  adapted  to  call  forth  brotherly  love  to  have  oneself  held  up 
to  the  public  as  inculcating  opinions  which  shock  every  principle 
of  common  sense,  and  contradict  the  plainest  moral  judgments  of 
men.  We  hope,  therefore,  to  be  heard  patiently,  while  we  attempt 
still  further  to  prove  that  our  doctrine  is  such  as  has  been  so  often 
stated. 

We  refer  in  the  next  place  to  the  testimony  of  Tuckney,  not  only 
because  he  was  a  man  of  great  accuracy  and  learning,  but  also  be- 
cause he  stands  in  an  intimate  relation  to  our  church.  He  was  a 
member  of  the  Westminster  assembly  of  divines,  and  of  the  com- 
mittee which  drafted  our  confession  of  faith.*  He  is  said  also  to 
have  drawn  up  a  large  portion  of  the  larger  catechism.  He  is, 
therefore,  a  peculiarly  competent  witness  as  to  the  sense  in  which 
our  formularies  mean  to  teach  the  doctrine  of  imputation.  In  his 
Praelectiones  Theologicae,  read,  as  royal  professor,  in  the  univer- 
sity of  Cambridge,  and  published  in  1679,  there  is  a  long  and  learn- 
ed discourse  on  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness.  In  the  ex- 
planation and  defence  of  this  doctrine,  he  enters  into  an  accurate 

Reid's  Memoirs  of  the  Lives  and  Writings  of  the  Divines  of  the  Westminster 
Assembly, vol  ii.,  p.  187. 


- 

114  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

investigation  of  the  whole  subject  of  imputation.  This  discourse 
abounds  in  the  minute  scholastic  distinctions  of  the  day,  which  it  is 
not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to  detail.  It  will  be  sufficient  to 
show  that  his  view  of  the  subject  is  the  same  as  that  which  we 
have  presented.  In  reference  to  the  two  passages,  2  Cor.  v.  21, 
and  Rom.  v.  18,  he  says,  "  We  have  a  most  beautiful  twofold  ana- 
logy. We  are  made  the  righteousness  of  God  in  Christ  in  the  same 
way  that  he  was  made  sin  for  us.  That  is,  by  imputation.  This 
analogy  the  former  passage  exhibits.  But  the  other  (Rom.  v.  18) 
presents  one  equally  beautiful.  We  are  accounted  righteous 
through  Christ  in  the  same  manner  that  we  are  accounted  guilty 
through  Adam.  The  latter  is  by  imputation,  therefore  also  the  tbr- 
mer." — P.  234.  The  same  idea  is  repeatedly  and  variously  pre- 
sented. As,  therefore,  he  so  clearly  states,  that  in  all  these  cases 
imputation  is  of  the  same  nature,  if  we  can  show  (  f  indeed  it  needs 
showing)  that  he  does  not  teach  that  our  sins  are  so  imputed  to 
Christ  as  to  make  him  morally  a  sinner,  or  his  righteousness  to  us 
as  to  make  us  morally  righteous,  we  shall  have  proved  that  he 
does  not  teach  such  an  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  h'.s  posterity  as 
involves  a  transfer  of  its  moral  character.  The  cardinal  Bellarmin, 
it  seems,  in  arguing  against  the  doctrine  of  the  imputation  of  Christ's 
righteousness,  urged  the  same  objection  which  we  are  now  con- 
sidering, maintaining  that  if  Christ's  righteousness  is  imputed  to  us, 
then  are  we  really  inherently  righteous  in  the  sight  of  God.  To 
this  Tuckney  replies,  "  Who  of  us  has  ever  been  so  much  beside 
himself  as  to  pretend  that  he  was  inherently  righteous,  in  the  sense 
of  Bellarmin,  so  that  he  should  think  himself  pure  and  immacu- 
late ?" — P.  226.  The  same  sentiment  is  still  more  strongly  ex- 
pressed on  page  220.  "  We  are  not  so  foolish  or  blasphemous  as 
to  say,  or  even  think,  that  the  imputed  righteousness  of  Christ  ren- 
ders us  formally  and  subjectively  righteous.''  And  adds,  we  might 
as  well  be  made  wise  and  just  with  the  wisdom  and  integrity  of 
another.  "  The  righteousness  of  Christ  belongs  properly  to  him- 
self, and  is  as  inseparable  and  incommunicable  as  any  other  attri- 
bute of  a  thing,  or  its  essence  itself."  Bellarmin,  however,  as  so 
often  happens  in  controversies  of  this  nature,  admits  the  very  thing 
he  is  contending  against.  Tuckney  quotes  him  as  confessing, 
"  Christum  nobis  justitiam  factum  quoniam  satisfecit  Patri  pro  no- 
bis, et  earn  satisfactionem  ita  nobis  donat  et  communicat  cum  nos 
justificat,  ut  nostra  satisfactio  et  justitia  dici  possit,  atque  hoc  modo 
non  esse  absurdum  si  quis  diceret  nobis  imputari  Christi  justitiam  et 
merita  cum  nobis  donentur  et  applicentur  ac  si  nos  ipsi  Deo  satisfe- 
cissemus."  On  which  our  author  remarks,  that  neither  Luther  nor 
Calvin  could  more  appropriately  describe  justification  by  imputed 
righteousness. 

To  the  other  objection  of  Bellarmin  (which  proceeds  upon  the 
same  erroneous  supposition,  that  imputation  conveys  the  moral 
character  of  the  thing  imputed),  that  Christ  must  be  regarded  as 
morally  a  sinner,  if  our  sins  were  imputed  to  him,  Tuckney  replies, 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.  145 

"  Although  we  truly  say  that  our  sins  are  imputed  to  Christ,  yet 
who  of  us  was  ever  so  blasphemous  as  to  say,  that  they  were  so 
imputed  as  it'  he  had  actually  committed  them,  or  that  he  was  inhe- 
rently and  properly  a  sinner,  as  to  the  stain  and  pollution  of  sin." 
Bellarmin  admitted  that  our  sins  were  imputed  to  Christ,  quoad 
debitum  satisfaciendi,  and  his  righteousness  to  us,  quoad  satisfac- 
tionem,  and  the  Protestants  replied,  this  was  all  they  contended 
for. 

We  do  not  know  how  it  could  be  more  pointedly  or  variously 
denied,  that  the  transfer  of  moral  character  is  included  in  this  doc- 
trine. The  testimony  of  Tuckney  is  the  more  valuable,  as  he  not 
only  clearly  expresses  his  own  opinion,  but  utterly  denies  that  any 
of  his  fellow  Calvinists  ever  understood  or  taught  the  doctrine  in 
this  manner. 

The  same  views  are  presented  by  Owen,  who  carried  matters 
as  far  as  most  Calvinists  are  wont  to  do.  In  his  work  on  justifica- 
tion, this  subject  naturally  presents  itself,  and  is  discussed  at  length. 
A  few  quotations  will  suffice  for  our  purpose.  The  imputation  of 
that  unto  us  which  is  not  antecedently  our  own,  he  says,  may  be 
various.  "  Only  it  must  be  observed,  that  no  imputation  of  this 
kind  is  to  account  them  unto  whom  anything  is  imputed,  to 
have  done  ike  things  themselves  that  are  imputed  to  them.  That 
were  not  to  impute,  but  to  err  in  judgment,  and  indeed  to  over- 
throw the  whole  nature  of  gracious  imputation.  But  it  is  to  make 
that  to  be  ours  by  imputation  which  was  not  ours  before,  unto  all 
the  ends  and  purposes  whereunto  it  would  have  served  if  it  had 
been  our  own  without  any  such  imputation.  It  is  therefore  a  mani- 
fest mistake  of  their  own,  which  some  make  the  ground  of  a  charge 
on  the  doctrine  of  imputation.  For  they  say,  if  our  sins  were  im- 
puted unto  Christ,  then  must  he  be  esteemed  to  have  done  what  we 
have  done  amiss,  and  so  be  the  greatest  sinner  that  ever  was :  and 
on  the  other  side,  if  his  righteousness  be  imputed  unto  us,  then  are 
we  esteemed  to  have  done  what  he  did,  and  so  stand  in  no  need  of 
pardon.  But  this  is  contrary  unto  the  nature  of  imputation,  which 
proceeds  on  no  such  judgment,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  we  our- 
selves have  done  nothing  of  what  is  imputed  unto  us ;  nor  Christ 
anything  of  what  was  imputed  unto  him." — P.  236. 

Again,  on  the  same  page,  "  Things  that  are  not  our  own  origi- 
nally, personally,  inherently,  may  yet  be  imputed  unto  us,  ex  justi- 
tia,  by  the  rule  of  righteousness.  And  this  may  be  done  upon  a 
double  relation  unto  those  whose  they  are,  1,  federal;  2,  natural. 
Things  done  by  one  may  be  imputed  unto  others,  propter  relatio- 
nem  foederalem,  because  of  a  covenant  relation  between  them.  So 
the  sin  of  Adam  was,  and  is  imputed  unto  all  his  posterity,  as  we 
shall  afterwards  more  fully  declare.  And  the  ground  hereof  is,  that 
we  stood  in  the  same  covenant  with  him,  who  was  our  head  and 
representative." 

Here  then  it  is  asserted  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is  not  ours,  "  origi- 
nally, personally,  inherently,"  and  that  the  ground  of  imputation 

10 


146  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

is  not  a  mystic  oneness  of  person,  but  the  relation  of  representa- 
tion. 

.  On  page  242  he  says, "  This  imputation  (of  Christ's  righteousness) 
is  not  the  transmission  or  transfusion  of  the  righteousness  of  another 
into  them  that  are  to  be  justified,  that  they  should  become  perfect- 
ly and  inherently  righteous  thereby.  For  it  is  impossible  that  the 
righteousness  of  one  should  be  transfused  into  another,  to  become 
his  subjectively  and  inherently."  Neither  is  it  possible,  according 
to  Owen,  that  the  unrighteousness  of  one  should  be  transfused  into 
another.  For  these  two  cases  are  analogous,  as  he  over  and  over 
asserts ;  thus,  p.  307,  "  As  we  are  made  guilty  by  Adam's  actual 
sin,  which  is  not  inherent  in  us,  but  only  imputed  to  us  ;  so  are  we 
made  righteous  by  the  righteousness  of  Christ  which  is  not  inherent 
in  us,  but  only  imputed  to  us."  On  page  468  he  says,  "  Nothing  is 
intended  by  the  imputation  of  sin  unto  any,  but  the  rendering  them 
justly  obnoxious  unto  the  punishment  due  unto  that  sin.  As  the  not 
imputing  of  sin  is  the  freeing  of  men  from  being  subject  or  liable 
unto  punishment." 

It  would  be  easy  to.  multiply  quotations  to  almost  any  extent  on 
this  subject,  from  the  highest  authorities,  but  we  hope  that  enough 
has  been  said  to  convince  our  readers  that  the  doctrine  of  the  im- 
putation of  Adam's  sin  includes  neither  the  idea  of  any  mysterious 
union  of  the  human  race  with  him,  so  that  his  sin  is  strictly  and 
properly  theirs,  nor  that  of  a  transfer  of  moral  charcter.  This  we 
are  persuaded  is  the  common  Calvinistic  doctrine. 

It  is  proper  to  state,  however,  that  there  is  another  theory  on 
this  subject.  About  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  Pla- 
caeus,  professor  in  the  French  Protestant  school  at  Saumur,  reject- 
ed the  doctrine  of  imputation,  and  taught  that  original  sin  consisted 
solely  in  the  inherent  native  depravity  of  men.  Jn  consequence  of 
his  writings,  a  national  synod  was  called  in  1644-5,  in  which  this 
doctrine  was  condemned.  The  decree  of  the  synod,  as  given  by 
Turrettin  and  De  Moor,  is  in  these  words  ;  "Cum  relatum  esset  ad 
synodum,  scripta  quaedam  alia  typis  evulgata,  alia  manu  exarata 
prodiisse,  quae  totam  rationem  peccati  originalis  sola  corruptione 
haereditaria,  in  omnibus  hominibus  inhaerente  definiunt,  et  primi 
peccati  Adami  imputationem  negant:  Damnavit  Synodus  doctri- 
nam  ejusmodi,  quatenus  peccati  originalis  naturam  ad  corruptionem 
haereditariam  posterorum  Adae  ita  restringit,  ut  imputationem  ex- 
cludat  primi  illius  peccati,  quo  lapsus  est  Adam :  Adeoque  censuris 
omnibus  ecclesiasticis  subjiciendos  censuit,  Pastores,  Professores, 
et  quoscunque  alios,  qui  in  hujus  quaestionis  disceptatione  a  com- 
muni  sententia  recesserint  ecclesiarum  Protestantium,  quae  omnes 
hactenus  et  corruptionem  illam,  etimputationem  hanc  in  omnes  Ada- 
mi  posteros  descendentem  agnoverunt,  &c." — Tur.,  p.  677. 

In  order  to  evade  the  force  of  this  decision,  Placaeus  proposed 
the  distinction  between  mediate  and  immediate  imputation.  Ac- 
cording to  the  latter  (which  is  the  common  view),  the  sin  of  Adam 
is  imputed  to  all  his  posterity,  as  the  ground  of  punishment  antece- 
dently to  inherent  corruption,  which  in  fact  results  from  the  penal 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.  147 

withholding  of  divine  influences ;  but  according  to  the  former,  the 
imputation  is  subsequent  to  the  view  of  inherent  depravity,  and  is 
founded  upon  it  as  the  ground  of  our  being  associated  with  Adam 
in  his  punishment.  This  distinction,  which  Turrettin  says  was  ex- 
cogitated ad  fucum  faciendum,  merely  retains  the  name,  while  the 
doctrine  of  imputation  is  really  rejected.  "  For  if  the  sin  of  Adam 
is  only  said  to  be  imputed  to  us  mediately,  because  we  are  rendered 
guilty  in  the  sight  of  God,  and  obnoxious  to  punishment  on  account 
of  the  inherent  corruption  which  we  derive  from  Adam,  there  is 
properly  no  imputation  of  Adam's  sin,  but  only  of  inherent  corrup- 
tion."—P.  677. 

Our  readers  may  find  a  long  account  of  the  controversy  which 
arose  on  this  question  in  De  Moor's  Commentary  on  Mark's  Com- 
pend,  vol.  iii.,  p.  262,  et  seq.  One  of  the  most  interesting  works 
which  appeared  at  this  time,  was  the  tract  by  the  celebrated  Rivet, 
intended  to  prove  that  all  the  Protestant  churches  and  leading  di- 
vines held  the  doctrine  of  imputation  as  it  was  presented  by  the 
national  synod  of  France,  in  opposition  to  Placaeus.  In  a  com- 
mendation of  this  work,  the  professors  of  theology  at  Leyden  ex- 
press their  grief,  that  among  other  doctrines  recently  agitated  in 
France,  that  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  had  been  called  in 
question,  "  Cum  tamen  eo  negato,  nee  justa  esse  possit  originalis 
naturae  humanae  corruptio,  et  facilis  inde  via  sit  ad  negationem 
imputationis  justitiae  secundi  Adami."  While  they  rejoiced  in  the 
unanimous  decision  of  the  French  synod,  they  deeply  regretted  that 
any  should  disregard  it,  and  endeavour  to  disseminate  a  doctrine 
"  contrarium  communi  omnium  ferme  Christianorum  consensui,  so- 
lis  Pelagii  et  Socini  discipulis  exceptis."  They  recommend  strong- 
ly the  work  of  their  colleague,  Rivet,  who,  they  say,  had  endea- 
voured, "  Synodi  nationalis  decretum  tueri,  dogma  vere  Catholicum 
stabilire,  bene  sentientes  in  veritate  confirmare,  aberrantes  in  viam 
reducere  auctoritatibus  gravibus,  et  universal!  totius  orbis  Christi- 
anorum consensu" — Opera  Riveti,  torn,  iii.,  p.  223,  or  De  Moor, 
torn,  iii.,  p.  274. 

Instead  of  writing  an  article,  we  should  be  obliged  to  write  a 
volume,  if  we  were  to  take  up  and  fully  discuss  all  the  subjects,  re- 
levant and  irrelevant,  presented  in  the  Protestant's  inquiries.  We 
have  followed  our  own  judgment  in  the  selection  of  topics,  and 
touched  on  those  points  which  we  thought  most  likely  to  be  inte- 
resting and  useful.  We  feel,  therefore,  perfectly  authorized  to  dis- 
miss, at  least  for  the  present,  the  history  of  this  doctrine.  Turret- 
tin,  the  French  synod,  the  professors  of  Leyden,  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  assert  as  strongly  as  we  have  done,  its  general  preva- 
lence among  orthodox  Christians.  The  second  article  of  the 
Augsburg  Confession  runs  thus  ;  "  Item  docent,  quod  post  lapsum 
Adae,  omnes  homines  naturali  modo  propagati  nascentes  habcant 
peccatum  originis.  Intelligimus  autem  peccatum  originis,  quod  sic 
vocant  Sancti  Patres,  et  omnes  orthodoxi  et  pie  eruditi  in  Ecclesia, 
videlicet  reatum,  quo  nascentes  propter  Adae  lapsum  rei  sunt  irae 


148  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

Dei  et  mortis  aeternae,  et  ipsam  corruptionem  humanae  naturae 
propagatam  ab  Adamo."  These  quotations  will  at  least  satisfy 
our  readers  that  we  have  not  been  more  rash  in  our  assertions  than 
many  others  before  us,  and  is  as  much,  we  think,  as  the  Protes- 
tant's inquiry  on  this  point  calls  for.  Our  principal  concern  is  with 
the  editors  of  the  Spectator,  who  have  presented  the  most  interest- 
ing subject  of  investigation.  We  revert,  therefore,  to  their  state- 
ment, that  Edwards,  Stapfer,  and  "  other  standard  writers  on  the 
subject,"  taught  the  doctrine  of  imputation  differently  from  what  we 
have  done.  That  this  is  not  correct,  as  relates  to  the  great  body 
of  the  Reformed  Theologians,  we  have,  we  think,  sufficiently  proved. 
How  the  case  stands  with  Edwards  and  Stapfer  we  shall  now  pro- 
ceed to  inquire. 

As  Edwards  appears  to  have  borrowed,  in  some  measure,  his 
views  on  this  subject  from  Stapfer,  we  shall  begin  with  the  latter. 
We  must,  in  the  outset,  dissent  from  the  remark  of  the  Spectator, 
that  Stapfer  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  "  standard  writer"  on  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation.  So  far  from  it,  the  synod  of  Berne  refused  to 
sanction  his  views  on  the  subject,  as  inconsistent  with  the  doctrines 
of  the  reformed  churches.*  And  in  his  work,  as  now  printed,  he 
apologizes  for  his  statements  on  this  point,  and  endeavours  to  make 
it  appear  that  they  do  not  involve  a  departure  from  the  common 
doctrine  (Theol.  Pol.,  vol.  iv.,  p.  562),  with  how  much  success  the 
reader  may  judge.  On  page  156,  in  answer  to  the  common  objection 
that  imputation  is  inconsistent  with  justice,  he  says,  in  substance,  no 
one  could  accuse  God  of  injustice,  if  in  virtue  of  a  divine  constitution, 
had  Adam  remained  holy,  his  posterity  had  been  holy  also ;  and 
therefore  no  one  should  complain,  if  in  virtue  of  the  same  constitu- 
tion, they  are  born  in  the  image  of  their  unholy  progenitor.  He 
then  says  expressly,  this  is  the  whole  amount  of  imputation,  "  Pec- 
cati  autem  primi  imputatio  in  nulla  alia  re  consistit  quam  quod  pos- 
teri  ejus  et  eodem  loco  habentur  et  similes  sunt  parenti."  And 
plainer  still  a  little  afterwards,  "  dum  Adamo  similem  dare  sobolem, 
et  peccatum  ejus  imputare  unum  idemque."  This,  as  we  under- 
stand it,  is  precisely  Dr.  Hopkins's  doctrine  ;  that  in  virtue  of  a  di- 
vine constitution  the  posterity  of  Adam  were  to  have  the  same 
moral  character  that  he  had.  This  too  is  the  Spectator's  doctrine  ; 
he  says,  "  That  Adam  was  not  on  trial  for  himself  alone,  but  by  a 
divine  constitution,  all  his  descendants  were  to  have  in  their  natural 
state,  the  same  character  and  state  with  their  progenitor." — P.  348. 
And  yet  these  brethren  denounce  in  no  very  measured  terms  the 
old  doctrine  of  imputation.  It  is  rather  singular,  therefore,  that 
they  should  quote  Stapfer  as  a  "  standard  writer"  on  that  doctrine, 
who  asserts  their  own  view  nearly  totidem  verbis.  As  to  the  pas- 
sage which  the  Spectator  produces  to  prove  that  he  held  the  old 

*  This  statement  is  made  confidently,  although  from  memory.  In  the  first  copy  of 
his  work  which  fell  into  our  hands  this  fact  is  stated,  and  our  impression  of  its  cor- 
rectness is  confirmed  by  the  nature  of  his  opinions  as  now  presented,  and  his  apology 
for  them. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  149 

doctrine  as  they  understand  it  (that  is,  as  including  personal  union 
and  transfer  of  character),  it  amounts  to  very  little.  The  passage 
is  this  :  "  God  in  imputing  this  sin  (Adam's)  finds  this  whole  moral 
person  (the  human  race)  already  a  sinner,  and  not  merely  con- 
stitutes it  such."  He  says,  indeed,  that  Adam  and  his  race  form 
one  moral  person,  and  so  would  Turrettin  and  Tuckney,  and  so 
would  we,  and  yet  one  and  all  deny  that  there  was  any  personal 
union.  The  very  epithet  moral,  shows  that  no  such  idea  is  intend- 
ed. When  lawyers  call  a  corporation  of  a  hundred  men  a  legal 
person,  we  do  not  hear  that  philosophy  is  called  in  to  explain  how 
this  can  be.  And  there  is  no  need  of  her  aid  to  explain  how  Adam 
and  his  race  are  one,  in  the  sense  of  common  Calvinists.  But  he 
says,  God  finds  "  this  whole  moral  person  already  a  sinner  !"  yes, 
he  denies  antecedent  and  immediate  imputation,  and  teaches  that  it 
is  from  the  view  and  on  the  ground  of  inherent  hereditary  depravity 
imputation  takes  place.  This  is  mediate  imputation,  "quae  hae- 
reditariae  corruptionis  in  nos  ab  Adamo  derivatae  intuitum  conse- 
quitur,  eaque  mediante  fit ;"  and  which  Turrettin  says  is  no  impu- 
tation at  all,  "nomen  imputationis  retinendo,  rem  ipsam  de  facto 
tollit."  Though  we  do  not  believe  that  Stapfer  held  either  of  the 
ideas  which  the  Spectator  attributes  to  him,  identity  or  transfer,  it 
is  of  little  account  to  us  what  his  views  on  those  points  were,  as  we 
think  it  clear  that  he  rejected  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  as  held  by 
the  Reformed  generally.  He  appeals  indeed  to  Vitringa  and 
Lampe  to  bear  out  his  statements.  How  it  was  with  the  former  we 
do  not  pretend  to  say,  but  as  to  Lampe,  the  very  passage  which 
Stapfer  quotes  contradicts  his  theory.  Lampe  says,  "  Gott  hatte 
die  Nackkommen  Adams  nicht  in  Siinden  lassen  gebohren  werden, 
wenn  seine  Schuld  nicht  auf  seine  Nachkommcn  ware  iibergegan- 
gen ;"  i.  e.,  "  God  would  not  have  permitted  the  descendants  of 
Adam  to  be  born  in  sin,  if  his  guilt  had  not  come  upon  them." 
Here  the  guilt  of  Adam  (exposure  to  punishment  on  account  of  his 
sin)  is  represented  as  antecedent  to  corruption  and  assumed  to  jus- 
tify it,  and  not  consequent  on  the  view  of  it,  This  is  the  old  doc- 
trine. That  this  is  the  fact,  is  plain  from  the  quotations  which  we 
have  already  made.  "Imputation  being  denied,"  say  the  Leyden 
divines,  "  inherent  corruption  cannot  be  just."  So  Turrettin  and 
Calvinists  generally  argue ;  of  course  imputation  is  antecedent  to 
corruption.  The  Spectator  must  have  seen  that  Stapfer's  state- 
ment was  inconsistent  with  the  old  doctrine,  had  he  recollected  how 
often  it  is  objected  to  that  doctrine, "  that  sin  cannot  be  the  punish- 
ment of  sin."* 

We  are  inclined  to  think  that  president  Edwards  agreed  with 
Stapfer  in  his  views  of  this  subject ;  because  he  quotes  from  him 
with  approbation  the  very  passage  which  we  have  just  produced ; 
and  because  his  own  statements  amount  to  very  much  the  same 

*  We  do  not  teach,  however,  "  that  sin  is  the  punishment  of  sin."  The  punish- 
ment we  suffer  for  Adam's  sin  is  abandonment  on  the  part  of  God,  the  withholding  of 
divine  influences  ;  corruption  is  consequent  on  this  abandonment. 


150  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

thing.  In  vol.  ii.,  p.  544,  he  says,  "  The  first  being  of  an  evil  dis- 
position in  a  child  of  Adam,  whereby  he  is  disposed  to  approve  the 
sin  of  his  first  father,  so  far  as  to  imply  a  full  and  perfect  consent 
of  heart  to  it,  I  think,  is  not  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  consequence  of 
the  imputation  of  that  first  sin,  any  more  than  the  full  consent  of 
Adam's  own  heart  in  the  act  of  sinning ;  which  was  not  consequent 
on  the  imputation,  but  rather  prior  to  it  in  the  order  of  nature.  In- 
deed the  derivation  of  the  evil  disposition  to  Adam's  posterity,  or 
rather,  the  co-existence  of  the  evil  disposition  implied  in  Adam's 
first  rebellion,  in  the  root  and  branches,  is  a  consequence  of  the 
union  that  the  wise  Author  of  the  world  has  established  between 
Adam  and  his  posterity  ;  but  not  properly  a  consequence  of  the  im- 
putation of  his  sin ;  nay,  it  is  rather  antecedent  to  it,  as  it  was  in 
Adam  himself.  The  first  depravity  of  heart,  and  the  imputation  of 
that  sin,  are  both  the  consequence  of  that  established  union  ;  but 
yet  in  such  order,  that  the  evil  disposition  is  first,  and  the  charge  of 
guilt  consequent,  as  it  was  in  the  case  of  Adam  himself.'*  We  think 
that  Edwards  here  clearly  asserts  the  doctrine  of  mediate  imputa- 
tion ;  that  is,  that  the  charge  of  the  guilt  of  Adam's  sin  is  conse- 
quent on  depravity  of  heart.  According  to  the  common  doctrine, 
however,  imputation  is  antecedent  to  this  depravity,  and  is  assumed 
to  account  for  it,  that  is,  to  reconcile  its  existence  with  God's  jus- 
tice. The  doctrine  of  Edwards  is  precisely  that  which  was  so  for- 
mally rejected  when  presented  by  Placaeus.  Turrettin  in  the  very 
statement  of  the  question  says,  "  It  is  not  inquired  whether  the  sin 
of  Adam  may  be  said  to  be  imputed  to  us,  because,  on  account  of 
original  sin  inherent  in  us  (depravity  of  heart),  we  deserve  to  be 
viewed  as  in  the  same  place  with  him,  as  though  we  had  actually 
committed  his  sin,"  p.  678,  "  but  the  question  is,  whether  his  sin  is 
imputed  to  his  posterity,  with  an  imputation,  not  mediate  and  con- 
sequent, but  immediate  and  antecedent."  It  is  of  the  latter  he  says, 
"  nos  cum  orthodoxis  affirmamus."  The  imputation  consequent  on 
depravity  of  heart  is  precisely  that  which  the  old  Calvinists  declared 
was  no  imputation  at  all  of  Adam's  sin,  and  which  they  almost  with 
one  voice  rejected.  It  is  on  the  ground  of  this  theory  that  Edwards 
says,  as  Stapfer  had  done,  that  "  the  sin  of  the  apostasy  is  not  theirs 
(mankind's)  merely  because  God  imputes  it  to  them  ;  but  it  is  truly 
and  properly  theirs,  and  on  that  ground  God  imputes  it  to  them." 
P.  559.  That  is,  imputation,  instead  of  being  antecedent,  is  conse- 
quent, and  founded  on  the  view  of  inherent  depravity.  When  the 
Spectator,  therefore,  quotes  this  sentence  as  contradicting  our  state- 
ment, we  readily  admit  the  fact.  It  not  only  contradicts  us,  how- 
ever, but  is,  as  we  have  shown,  utterly  inconsistent  with  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  as  taught  in  the  Reformed  churches.  To  say, 
either  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  us,  because  it  is  inherent 
in  us  (or  is  truly  and  properly  ours),  or  that  it  becomes  thus  in- 
herent, or  thus  ours,  by  being  imputed,  is,  as  Owen,  Turrettin,  Rivet 
and  others  over  and  over  affirm,  to  overthrow  the  whole  nature  of 
imputation.     It  might  with  as  much  justice  be  asserted,  that  the 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  151 

righteousness  of  Christ  is  first  inherently  and  subjectively  ours,  and 
on  that  ground  is  imputed  to  us  :  or  that  our  sins  were  subjectively 
tlje  sins  of  Christ,  and  on  that  ground  were  imputed  to  him.  Tur- 
rettin,  in  so  many  words,  asserts  the  very  reverse  of  what  Edwards 
maintains.  The  latter  says,  "  the  sin  is  truly  and  properly  ours  ;" 
the  former,  "  non  potest  esse  peccatum  nostrum  proprium  et  per- 
sonale." 

The  fact  is,  that  Edwards's  whole  discourse  on  this  subject  was 
intended  more  to  vindicate  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity  than 
that  of  imputation.  It  is  for  this  purpose  that  he  enters  into  his 
long  and  ingenious,  though  unsatisfactory  argument  on  the  nature 
of  unity,  and  the  divinely  constituted  oneness  of  Adam  and  his  race. 
He  hoped,  in  this  way,  the  more  readily  to  account  for  the  exist- 
ence of  moral  corruption,  and  this  he  makes  the  ground  of  imputa- 
tion. We  are  surely,  therefore,  not  to  be  burdened  with  the  de- 
fence of  Edwards's  theory  on  this  subject,  which,  we  think,  we  have 
abundantly  shown  is  not  the  doctrine  commonly  received  among 
Calvinists,  but  utterly  inconsistent  with  it.  As  he  had  rejected  all 
of  imputation  but  the  name,  it  is  no  matter  of  surprise  that  his  fol- 
lowers soon  discarded  the  term  itself,  and  contented  themselves 
with  expressing  the  substance  of  his  doctrine  in  much  fewer  words, 
viz.  that  God,  agreeably  to  a  general  constitution,  determined  that 
Adam's  posterity  should  be  like  himself;  born  in  his  moral  image, 
whether  that  was  good  or  bad.  This  is  Stapfer's  doctrine,  almost 
in  so  many  words ;  and  Edwards  quotes  and  adopts  his  lan- 
guage. 

We  are  bound  in  candour,  however,  to  state  that  we  are  not  able 
to  reconcile  the  view  here  given  of  Edwards's  doctrine,  with  seve- 
ral passages  which  occur  in  his  work  on  Original  Sin.  Thus,  in  p. 
540,  he  says,  "  I  desire  it  may  be  noted,  that  I  do  not  suppose  the 
natural  depravity  of  the  posterity  of  Adam  is  owing  to  the  course 
of  nature  only :  it  is  also  owing  to  the  just  judgment  of  God."  And 
in  the  same  paragraph,  "  God,  in  righteous  judgment,  continued  to 
absent  himself  from  Adam  after  he  became  a  rebel ;  and  withheld 
from  him  now  those  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit  which  he  before 
had.  And  just  thus  I  suppose  it  to  be  with  every  natural  branch  of 
mankind  :  all  are  looked  upon  as  sinning  in  and  with  their  common 
root ;  and  God  righteously  withholds  special  influences  and  spiritual 
communications  from  all,  for  this  sin."  But  how  is  this  1  If  these 
special  influences  are  withheld  **  for  this  sin,"  and  as  a  "  righteous 
judgment,"  then  assuredly  the  sin  for  which  this  righteous  judgment 
is  inflicted,  must  be  considered  as  already  theirs,  and  not  first  im- 
puted after  the  existence  of  the  depravity  resulting  from  these  in- 
fluences being  withheld.  According  to  Edwards,  depravity  results 
from  withholding  special  divine  influences,  and  according  to  this 
passage,  the  withholding  these  influences  is  a  just  judgment  for 
Adam's  sin  ;  then  of  course  this  sin  is  punished  before  the  depravity 
exists  ;  but  it  cannot  be  punished  before  it  is  imputed  ;  the  imputa- 
tion, therefore,  according  to  this  passage,  is  antecedent  to  the  de- 


152  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

pravity.  But  according  to  the  other  passage  quoted  above,  the  de- 
pravity is  first  and  the  imputation  subsequent.  We  are  unable  to 
reconcile  these  two  statements.  The  one  teaches  immediate  and 
antecedent  imputation,  which  is  the  old  doctrine  ;  the  other  mediate 
and  consequent,  which  the  old  writers  considered  as  a  virtual  de- 
nial of  that  doctrine.  However  this  reconciliation  is  to  be  affected, 
we  have  said  enough  to  show  that  neither  Stapfer  nor  Edwards 
can  be  considered  ''standard  writers  on  this  subject,"  and  that  old 
Calvinists  are  under  no  obligations  to  defend  their  statements. 

We  hope  our  readers  are  now  convinced  that  we  have  made 
good  our  position,  that  neither  the  personal  identity  of  Adam  and 
his  posterity,  community  in  act,  nor  transfer  of  moral  character,  form 
any  part  of  the  doctrine  of  imputation  as  taught  by  standard  Cal- 
vinistic  writers. 

We  have  left  ourselves  very  little  room  to  notice  the  Protestant's 
difficulties.  As  they  are  almost  all  founded  upon  misapprehension, 
they  are  already  answered  by  the  mere  statement  of  the  doctrine. 
.  On  p.  340  he  has  the  following  sentences  :  "  The  writer  in  question 
holds,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  was  imputed  to  all  his  posterity,  to  their 
guilt,  condemnation  and  ruin,  without  any  act  on  their  part."  P.  90. 
Of  course,  then,  from  the  moment  they  began  to  exist,  that  moment 
they  were  involved  in  this  imputation.  This  he  does  not  expressly 
affirm,  by  adopting,  on  p.  94,  the  statement  of  "  ancient  commenta- 
tors," that  David  "  contracted  pollution  in  his  conception."  Here 
are  two  great  mistakes.  First,  the  writer  does  not  discriminate  be- 
tween imputation  and  inherent  depravity.  He  grounds  his  asser- 
tion, that  weteach  that  all  men  are  involved  in  the  imputation  of 
Adam's  sin  from  the  first  moment  of  their  existence,  because  we 
said  that  David  was  conceived  in  sin  ;  as  though  these  two  things 
were  one  and  the  same.  He  should  have  remembered  that  Dr. 
Dwight,  and  a  multitude  of  others,  hold  one  of  these  doctrines  and 
reject  the  other.  The  Spectator,  who  understands  the  subject  bet- 
ter, says,  that  we  teach  that  "  native  depravity  is  a  punishment  in- 
flicted on  us  for  the  sin  of  Adam."  We  hardly  teach,  however, 
that  the  punishment  is  the  thing  punished.  This  confusion  of  the 
imputation  of  Adam's  sin  and  inherent  depravity  runs  through  this 
writer's  whole  piece,  and  vitiates  all  his  arguments.  The  second 
mistake  here  is,  that  imputation  makes  the  thing  imputed  subjective- 
ly ours  ;  which  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  or  as  Owen  says,  is  "to 
overthrow  that  which  is  affirmed."  "  To  be  alienae  culpae  reus, 
makes  no  man  a  sinner."  The  same  mistake  is  the  ground  of  his 
inquiry,  how  Paul  could  say  of  Jacob  and  Esau,  before  their  birth, 
that  they  had  done  neither  good  nor  evil,  if  the  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion is  correct  ?  This  doctrine  does  not  affirm  that  they  had  done 
either  good  or  evil.  When  it  is  affirmed  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is 
imputed  to  them,  it  is  thereby  said  that  they  did  not  commit  it,  and 
that  it  is  not  subjectively  theirs. 

Most  of  the  other  difficulties  of  the  Protestant  are  founded  on  the 
principle  that  "  a  knowledge  of  law  and  duty  is  necessary,  in  order 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  153 

that  sin  should  exist."  Supposing  we  should  admit  this,  'what 
has  it  to  do  with  imputation*  There  have  been  men  who  adopted 
this  principle  and  built  their  theology  upon  it,  who  still  hold  this 
doctrine.  The  whole  difficulty  results  from  the  Protestant  not  dis- 
criminating between  two  very  different  things,  the  imputation  of 
Adam's  sin,  and  native  depravity.  All  his  queries  founded  on  this 
principle,  go  to  show  that  children  cannot  be  morally  depraved  be- 
fore they  are  moral  agents,  but  have  nothing  to  do  with  imputation. 
This  is  not  the  time  or  place  to  answer  these  inquiries,  but  we 
would  ask  in  our  turn,  how  Adam  could  be  holy  before  he  volunta- 
rily obeyed  the  law,  as  the  Protestant  perhaps  still  holds,  if  a  child 
may  not  be  unholy  before  he  voluntarily  transgresses  it? 

The  true  question  appears  to  have  glimmered  for  a  moment  on 
the  Protestant  when  he  asked :  "  Is  it  a  scripture  doctrine  that  the 
guilt  of  others  is  imputed  to  men  as  their  own  ?"  What  does  this 
mean  ?  Does  he  intend  to  ask  whether  the  (moral)  guilt  of  one 
man  is  ever  transferred  or  transfused  into  others  ?  We  apprehend 
not.  The  question  here  must  be  tantamount  to  this :  Is  the  sin  of 
one  man  ever  punished  in  another  ?  for  he  asks,  how  is  this  impu- 
tation of  guilt  to  be  reconciled  with  Ezek.  xviii.  20  ?  "  The  son 
shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father ;  neither  shall  the  father 
bear  the  iniquity  of  the  son,  &c."  The  Protestant  will  hardly 
maintain  that  the  Israelites,  to  whose  murmurs  the  prophet  gave 
this  reply,  believed  that  the  sins  of  their  fathers  were  infused  into 
them,  their  "  moral  character"  transferred  to  them.  Their  com- 
plaint was  ;  "  The  fathers  have  eaten  sour  grapes  and  the  children's 
teeth  are  set  on  edge,"  that  is,  our  fathers  sinned  and  we  are  pun- 
ished for  it.  To  be  punished  for  the  sin  of  another,  then,  is,  ac- 
cording to  the  Protestant's  doctrine,  for  this  once  at  least,  to  have 
the  guilt  of  that  sin  imputed.  This  is  our  doctrine  too.  Now,  does 
the  gentleman  mean  to  ask  whether  it  is  a  scripture  doctrine  that 
one  man  ever  bears  the  iniquity  of  another  ?  If  he  does,  it  is  easily 
answered.  God  says  of  himself  that  he  is  a  jealous  God, "  visiting 
the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  upon  their  children,"  a  solemn  and  often 
repeated  declaration. — Ex.  xx.  25,  xxxiv.  37 ;  Num.  xiv.  18.  Job 
says  from  his  observation  of  divine  providence,  "  How  oft  is  the 
candle  of  the  wicked  put  out  ?  God  layeth  up  his  iniquity  for  his 
children." — xx.  19.  Jeremiah  says,  "  Thou  recompensest  the  ini- 
quities of  the  fathers  into  the  bosoms  of  their  children  after  them." 
— xxxii.  18.  Lament  v.  7,  he  says,  "  Our  fathers  sinned  and  are 
not ;  and  we  have  borne  their  iniquities."  Surely  the  gentleman's 
question  is  answered  in  the  only  sense  it  can  possibly  bear  in  the 
connection  in  which  it  stands.  If  it  be  said  that  these  expressions 
are  to  be  taken  in  a  general  and  popular  sense,  and  not  as  affirming 
the  doctrine  of  imputation ;  very  well — then  why  quote  them  on 
the  subject  1  The  one  form  affirms  precisely  what  the  other,  in  a 
given  case,  denies.  As  to  the  question,  how  the  assertion  that  one 
man  ever  bears  the  iniquities  of  another  (i.  e.  the  doctrine  of  impu- 
tation), is  to  be  reconciled  with  Ezekiel,  it  is  no  special  concern  of 


154  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    LMPUTATION. 

ours.  That  is,  it  is  as  much  obligatory  on  the  Protestant  as  on  us,  to 
say  how  two  passages,  one  of  which  affirms  and  another  denies  the 
same  thing,  are  to  be  brought  into  harmony.  One  thing  however 
is  certain,  that  Ezekiel  cannot  be  so  construed  as  to  assert  that  no 
man  ever  has,  nor  ever  shall  bear  the  iniquity  of  another ;  for  this 
would  make  him  contradict  positively  what  is  more  than  once  as- 
serted in  the  word  of  God.  The  context,  it  is  presumed,  will  show 
the  meaning  of  the  prophet,  and  the  extent  to  which  his  declaration 
is  to  be  carried.  The  Jews  complained  that  they  had  been  driven 
into  exile,  not  for  their  own  sins,  but  for  those  of  their  fathers.  The 
prophet  tells  them  they  had  no  need  to  look  further  than  to  them- 
selves, but  should  repent  and  turn  unto  God  ;  and  assures  them  that 
they  should  have  no  more  any  occasion  to  use  that  proverb, "  The 
fathers  have  eaten  sour  grapes  and  the  children's  teeth  are  set  on 
edge ;"  but  that  the  principle  on  which  God  would  administer  his 
government  towards  them  would  be,  that  every  man  should  bear 
his  own  burden.  Is  anything  more  asserted  in  this  passage  than  a 
general  purpose  of  God  as  to  his  dealings  with  his  people  ?  And  is 
there  anything  inconsistent  in  this  general  declaration,  with  those 
other  passages  in  which  one  man  is  said,  under  peculiar  circum- 
stances, to  bear  the  iniquity  of  another  ?  And  can  such  a  passage,  con- 
taining nothing  more  than  a  general  principle,  from  which,  even  as 
it  regards  temporal  affairs,  there  are  many  solemn  departures  record- 
ed in  the  word  of  God,  be  brought  up  in  contradiction  to  other  solemn 
declarations,  in  which  God  declares  he  would  act  upon  a  different 
principle  ?  This  passage  asserts  nothing  in  opposition  to  any  doc- 
trine of  ours.  We  admit,  in  its  full  force,  that  it  is  a  general  prin- 
ciple in  the  divine  government,  that  every  man  shall  bear  his  own 
burden ;  but  we  do  not  admit  that  because  this  is  the  case,  there 
can  be  no  such  connection  between  one  man  and  another,  that  one 
may  not  justly  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  other.  A  declaration,  there- 
fore, which,  at  most,  has  reference  only  to  the  private  and  personal 
sins  of  individuals,  bound  together  by  no  other  tie  than  consan- 
guinity, and  which,  even  there,  is  only  true  as  a  general  principle, 
can  never  with  any  propriety  be  made  the  ground  of  an  argument 
in  reference  to  cases  entirely  dissimilar.  The  Protestant,  however, 
may  be  much  better  qualified  than  we  are,  to  reconcile  the  declara- 
tion of  Ezekiel  with  those  quoted  from  Moses  and  Jeremiah,  and 
with  the  obvious  departures  from  the  principle  it  contains,  recorded 
in  the  word  of  God  and  observed  in  his  providence,  and  it  is  surely 
as  much  his  concern  to  do  this  as  ours. 

The  concession  which  the  gentleman  has  here  unintentionally 
made,  is,  however,  important.  According  to  him,  for  one  man  to 
bear  the  iniquity  of  another,  is  to  have  his  guilt  imputed  to  him. 
This  is  our  doctrine,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Reformed  churches. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  imputation,  and  nothing  more  nor  less. 
That  this  is  the  case  is  evident,  not  only  from  the  numerous  quota- 
tions already  made,  but  also  from  the  fact  that  Calvinists  constant- 
ly appeal  to  those  passages  in  which  Christ  is  said  to  have  borne 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  155 

our  sins,  as  teaching  this  doctrine.  He  is  said  to  bear  our  iniqui- 
ties, precisely  in  the  sense  in  which  in  Ezekiel  it  is  declared  that 
"  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquities  of  the  father."  If,  therefore, 
as  the  Protestant  thinks,  the  passage  in  Ezekiel  denies  the  doctrine, 
the  other  passages  must  assert  it  in  reference  to  Christ.  Now  let  it 
be  remembered,  that  these  Calvinists  affirm  that  we  bear  the  sin  of 
Adam,  in  the  same  sense  (eadem  ratione,  eadem  modo)  in  which 
Christ  bore  our  sins,  and  what  becomes  of  all  his  objections  1 

Our  wonder  is,  that  when  the  Protestant  had  caught  the  glimpse 
of  the  doctrine  which  is  betrayed  in  this  paragraph,  he  should  in 
the  very  next  entirely  lose  sight  of  it,  and  ask,  "  Whether  the  first 
principles  of  moral  consciousness  do  not  decide,  that  sin,  in  its  pro- 
per sense,  is  the  result  of  what  we  have  done  ourselves ;  not  of 
what  was  done  for  us  without  our  knowledge  or  consent  ?  I  ask, 
in  what  part  of  the  Bible  are  we  called  upon  to  repent  of  Adam's 
sin  ?  And  finally,  whether  the  historian  would  honestly  say,  with 
all  his  attachment  to  the  opinions  of  the  fathers,  that  he  has  ever  so 
appropriated  Adam's  sin  to  himself  as  truly  to  recognise  it  as  his  own, 
and  to  repent,  of  it  as  such  ?" — P.  342.  That  is,  imputed  sin  be- 
comes personal  sin.  The  old  mistake.  Just  before,  to  impute  the 
sin  of  one  man  to  another,  was  not  to  render  that  sin  personally  his, 
but  merely  to  cause  the  one  "  to  bear  the  iniquity"  of  the  other,  in 
the  Hebrew  sense  of  that  phrase.  He  never  could  have  imagined 
that  when  Ezekiel  declared  "  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of 
the  father,"  he  meant  to  say,  that  the  son  shall  not  have  his  father's 
sin  made  personally  and  subjectively  his ;  when  he  quoted  the 
prophet,  therefore,  he  must  have  seen  that  to  impute  sin,  meant  to 
cause  those  to  whom  it  is  imputed  to  bear  the  punishment  of  it.  We 
regret  that  our  author  did  not  arrive  at  this  idea  sooner,  and  that 
he  did  not  retain  it  longer,  as  it  would  have  saved  him  the  trouble 
of  asking  all  these  questions,  and  us  the  trouble  of  answering 
them. 

We  have  frequently  been  asked  by  young  men  if  we  have  ever 
repented  of  Adam's  sin,  and  have  uniformly,  to  their  obvious  dis- 
comfort, answered  in  the  negative.  Knowing  the  sense  in  which 
the  question  was  put,  it  would  have  confirmed  their  misconceptions 
to  have  answered  otherwise.  We  have  never  so  appropriated  that 
sin  as  to  recognise  it  as  properly  and  personally  our  own,  or  as  the 
ground  of  personal  remorse.  We  have  always  considered  this 
question  as  unreasonable  as  it  would  be  to  ask  us,  if  we  have  ever 
felt  self-approbation  and  complacency  for  the  imputed  righteous- 
ness of  Christ.  That  there  is  a  very  just  and  proper  sense  in  which 
we  should  repent  of  the  sin  of  Adam,  we  readily  admit ;  and  are 
perfectly  aware  that  old  writers  insist  much  upon  the  duty.  Not 
however  on  the  principle  that  his  sin  is  personally  ours;  or  that  its 
moral  turpitude  is  transferred  from  him  to  us ;  but  on  the  principle 
that  a  child  is  humbled  and  grieved  at  the  misconduct  of  a  father ; 
or  that  we  are  called  upon  to  repent  of  the  sins  of  our  rulers,  or  of 


156  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

our  nation,  or  of  our  church  (as  was  the  case  with  the  Corinthians)  ;* 
not  as  personally  guilty  of  their  sins,  but  in  virtue  of  the  relation  in 
which  we  stand  to  them.  It  is  just  and  proper,  too,  that  we  should 
recognize  the  justice  of  that  constitution  by  which  we  bear  the  sin 
of  our  first  father,  remembering  "  that  he  was  not  on  trial  for  himself 
alone,"  but  also  for  us,  and  consequently  that  we  fell  when  he  fell, 
and  should,  therefore,  bow  before  God  as  members  of  an  apostate 
and  condemned  race. 

We  have  now  gone  over  those  inquiries  of  the  Protestant  which 
we  consider  it  important  to  notice,  and  answered  them  to  the  best 
of  our  ability.  If  there  is  anything  in  our  reply  adapted  to  disturb 
Christian  harmony  and  brotherhood,  we  shall  deeply  regret  it. 
Some  apology,  however,  will  be  found  in  the  fact,  that  we  have 
been  held  up  by  the  Protestant  to  the  contempt  and  reprobation"of  the 
public  for  doctrines  which  we  never  held,  and  which  we  never,  even 
in  appearance,  advanced.  As  this  has  been  done  ignorantly,  we  feel 
no  manner  of  unkindness  towards  the  writer,  whoever  he  may  be, 
although  we  think  he  was  bound  to  understand  what  our  doctrines 
were,  before  he  thus  unqualifiedly  denounced  them.  There  is  not 
here  a  mere  misapprehension  of  our  meaning,  which  might  be  as 
much  attributable  to  our  want  of  perspicuity  as  to  his  want  of  dis- 
crimination ;  but  there  is  an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  whole 
doctrine  of  imputation,  as  held  by  common  Calvinists.  We  are 
aware  that  some  excuse  for  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  manner 
in  which  President  Edwards  has  presented  the  subject.  But 
a  man  who  undertakes  to  write  on  any  doctrine,  and  especially  se- 
verely to  censure  his  brethren,  ought  to  extend  his  views  beyond 
one  solitary  writer,  who,  as  in  the  case  before  us.  may  prove  to  be 
no  fair  representative  of  its  advocates. 

Our  main  object  has  been  attained  if  we  have  succeeded  in  disa- 
busing the  minds  of  those  brethren  who  have  been  accustomed  to 
reject  and  contemn  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  under  the  impression 
that  it  teaches  a  "  oneness  with  Adam  in  action,"  and  a  "  transfer 
of  moral  acts  or  moral  character"  from  him  to  us.  That  this  is 
not  the  doctrine,  we  hope  we  have  abundantly  proved.  Nothing 
more  is  meant  by  the  imputation  of  sin,  than  to  cause  one  man  to 
bear  the  iniquity  of  another.  If,  therefore,  we  bear  the  punishment 
of  Adam's  sin,  that  sin  is  imputed  to  us  ;  if  Christ  bore  the  punish- 
ment of  our  sins,  those  sins  were  imputed  to  him ;  and  if  we  are 
justified  on  the  ground  of  Christ's  righteousness,  that  righteousness 
is  imputed  to  us.  The  question  here  arises,  is  this  scriptural  doc- 
trine ?  As  this,  after  all,  is  the  main  point,  we  regret  that  our  limits 
absolutely  forbid  a  full  and  satisfactory  answer.  As  the  decision 
of  this  question  turns  on  principles  which  it  would  require  much 
time  and  space  fully  to  discuss,  it  would  be  in  vain  to  argue  about 
details  while  these  principles  remain  unsettled.     The  difference  of 

*  This  is  one  of  the  cases  to  which  old  writers  refer  for  illustration.  See  Good- 
win's Works,  vol.  iii.,p.  372. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  157 

opinion  on  this  subject,  although  manifested  here,  does  not  com- 
mence at  this  point,  its  origin  lies  further  back,  in  diversity  of  views 
on  the  divine  character  and  government. 

Let  us  see,  however,  what  the  difference  between  our  brethren 
and  us  as  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation  really  is.  They  agree 
with  us  in  saying  that  Adam  was  the  federal  head  and  representa- 
tive of  his  race.  Many  of  them  use  this  precise  language  ;  and  the 
Spectator  employs  a  mode  of  expression  perfectly  tantamount  to  it 
when  he  says,  "  Adam  was  not  on  trial  for  himself  alone,"  but  for 
his  posterity.  They  agree  with  us  also  in  saying  that  the  des- 
cendants ol  Adam  suffer  the  consequences  of  his  fall.  What  these 
consequences  are,  is  a  subject  on  which  there  is  great  diversity  of 
opinion.  Many  maintain  that  the  only  direct  consequence  of  the 
fall  is  mortality,  or  liability  to  temporal  death ;  others,  as  Dr. 
Dwight  (who  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of  a  large  class),  say 
that  depravity  or  corruption  of  nature  is  this  consequence  ;*  others, 
as  the  Spectator,  "  that  by  a  divine  constitution,  all  his  descendants 
were  to  have  in  their  natural  state  the  same  character  and  condition 
with  their  progenitor;  the  universality  and  certainty  of  sin,  there- 
fore, are  not  the  result  of  imitation  or  accidental  circumstances,  but 
of  a  divine  constitution"  (p.  343)  ;  others  again,  as  the  old  Calvin- 
ists,  say  that  the  consequence  of  the  fall  was,  that  the  same  penalty 
which  Adam  incurred,  came  upon  his  posterity.  Now  it  is  evident 
that  there  is  one  difficulty,  and  it  is  the  main  one,  which  presses  all 
these  schemes  in  common,  viz.,  that  all  mankind  are  made  subject 
"  to  those  consequences  which  Adam  brought  upon  himself  person- 
ally by  his  fall." — Spectator,  p.  343.  It  is  therefore  evidently  un- 
candid,  though  very  common,  for  those  who  deny  the  doctrine  of 
imputation,  to  represent  this  difficulty  as  bearing  exclusively  on  that 
doctrine.  They  ask,  with  the  utmost  confidence,  how  it  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  justice  or  goodness  of  God,  that  millions  of  in- 
nocent beings  should  suffer  for  a  crime  which  they  never  commit- 
ted ?  as  though  this  difficulty  did  not  press  their  own  theory  with 
equal  (and  we  think  tenfold  greater)  force.  For  what  greater  evil 
for  moral  and  immortal  beings  can  there  be,  than  to  be  born  "  con- 
taminated in  their  moral  nature,"  as  Dr.  Dwight  teaches  ;  or  under 
a  divine  constitution,  as  the  Spectator  says,  which  secures  "  the 
universality  and  certainty  of  sin,"  and  that  too  with  undeviating 
and  remorseless  effect.  It  is,  as  Coleridge  well  says,  "  an  outrage  on 
common  sense,"  to  affirm  that  it  is  no  evil  for  men  to  be  placed  on 
their  probation  under  such   circumstances,  that  not  one   of  ten 

•  See  his  Sermon  on  Human  Depravity  derived  from  Adam.     His  doctrine  is  that 
"  human  corruption"  is  the  consequence  of  Adam's  sin.     By  corruption  he  means  de- 

Sravity  of  heart,  or  nature,  antecedent  to  actual  transgressions,  or  to  moral  agency, 
ecause,  he  says,  "  Infants  are  contaminated  in  their  moral  nature,  and  born  in  the 
likeness  of  apostate  Adam."  This  is  irresistibly  proved,  he  says,  "  by  the  depraved 
moral  conduct  of  every  infant  who  lives  so  long  at  to  be  capable  of  moral  action."-— 
P.  486,  vol.  i.  Again,  on  p.  485,  he  says  this  depravity  is  proved  by  the  death  of  in- 
fants. "  A  great  part  of  mankind  die  in  infancy,  before  they  are  or  can  be  capable  of 
moral  action,  in  the  usual  meaning  of  that  phrase." 


158  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

thousand  millions  ever  escaped  sin  and  condemnation  to  eternal 
death.  It  is  therefore  idle  to  assert  that  there  is  no  evil  inflicted  on 
us  in  consequence  of  Adam's  sin,  antecedent  to  our  own  personal 
transgressions.  It  matters  not  what  this  evil  is,  whether  temporal 
death,  corruption  of  nature,  "  certainty  of  sin,"  or  death  in  its  more 
extended  sense  ;  if  the  ground  of  the  evil's  coming  on  us  is  Adam's 
sin,  the  principle  is  the  same. 

The  question  then  is,  is  this  evil  of  the  nature  of  punishment  ?  If 
it  is,  then  the  doctrine  of  imputation  is  admitted  ;  if  not,  it  is  denied. 
The  Spectator  thinks  this  a  mere  dispute  about  words.  We  think 
very  differently.  A  principle  is  involved  in  the  decision  of  this 
question,  which  affects  very  deeply  our  views,  not  only  of  the  na- 
ture of  our  relation  to  Adam,  and  of  original  sin,  but  also  of  the 
doctrines  of  atonement  and  justification  ;  the  most  vital  doctrines  of 
the  Christian  system.  The  distinction  on  which  so  much  stress  is 
laid  by  many  who  deny  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  between  mere 
natural  consequences  and  penal  evils,  though  it  may  be  correct  in 
itself,  is  not  applicable  to  the  case  before  us.  An  evil  does  not 
cease  to  be  penal,  because  it  is  a  natural  consequence.  Almost  all 
the  punishment  of  sin  is  the  natural  consequence  of  sin  :  it  is  accord- 
ing to  the  established  course  of  nature  (i.  e.,  the  will  of  God,  the 
moral  governor  of  the  world),  that  excess  produces  suffering,  and 
the  suffering,  under  the  divine  government,  is  the  punishment  of  the 
excess.  Sin  produces,  and  is  punished  by  remorse.  The  fire  that 
"  is  not  quenched,"  and  "  the  worm  that  never  dies,"  may,  for  what 
we  know,  be  the  natural  effect  of  sin.  It  matters  not,  therefore, 
whether  mortality  in  Adam  and  his  descendants  be  a  natural  con- 
sequence of  eating  the  forbidden  fruit  (from  its  poisonous  nature), 
which  is  a  very  popular  theory,  or  whether  death  is  a  direct  and  posi- 
tive infliction.  Nor  would  it  alter  the  case  if  native  depravity  was 
a  natural  result,  as  many  suppose,  of  the  same  forbidden  fruit,  by 
giving  undue  excitability  and  power  to  the  lower  passions  ;  because 
these  effects  result  from  the  appointment  of  God,  who  is  the  author 
of  the  course  of  nature,  and  were  designed  by  him  to  be  the  pun- 
ishment of  sin.  We  think  the  position  of  Storr  is  perfectly  correct, 
that  the  consequences  of  punishment  are  themselves  punishment,  in 
so  far  as  they  were  taken  into  view  by  the  judge  in  passing  sen- 
tence, and  came  within  the  scope  of  his  design. — Zweck  des  Todes 
Jesu,  p.  585. 

But,  admitting  the  correctness  of  this  distinction,  we  do  not  see 
how  it  is  applicable  to  the  present  case,  that  is,  how  Dr.  Dwight, 
and  those  who  think  with  him,  would  make  it  appear  that  the 
moral  corruption  of  the  whole  human  race  was  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  Adam's  sin ;  much  less  how  the  Spectator  can  make  it 
out,  that  "  the  universality  and  certainty  of  sin"  is  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  that  offence.  Indeed,  he  appears  to  abandon  that 
ground  when  he  says  that  this  certainty  is  by  "  divine  constitution." 
Here  then  is  an  evil,  not  even  a  natural  consequence,  our  being 
born  under  a  constitution  which  secures  the  certainty  of  our  being 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  159 

sinners,  and  tho  ground  or  reason  of  this  evil  is  of  course  not  our 
own  sin,  but  the  sin  of  Adam.  Is  this  evil  a  penalty  ?  According 
to  our  view,  it  unquestionably  is.  It  is  an  evil  judicially  inflicted  on 
account  of  sin ;  it  comes  from  God  as  the  moral  governor  of  the 
world.  The  Spectator,  however,  and  many  others,  deny  that  the 
evils  we  suffer  on  account  of  Adam's  sin  are  of  the  nature  of  pun- 
ishment. The  ground  on  which  .they  do  this,  is,  that  it  is  utterly 
unjust  that  the  punishment  due  to  one,  should,  under  any  circum- 
stances, be  inflicted  upon  another.  The  assumption  of  this  princi- 
ple, without  removing  any  difficulty,  greatly  aggravates  the  case, 
by  representing  that  as  a  matter  of  sovereignty,  which  we  regard 
as  a  matter  of  justice.  The  difficulty  is  not  removed,  for  the  diffi- 
culty is,  that  we  should  suffer  for  a  crime  which  we  never  com- 
mitted ;  but  this  the  Spectator  admits.  The  evil  may  be  material- 
iter  precisely  the  same,  the  question  is  now  merely  as  to  its  formal 
nature.  Is  it  then  more  congenial  with  the  unsophisticated  moral 
feelings  of  men,  that  God  should,  out  of  his  mere  sovereignty,  de- 
termine that  because  one  man  sinned  all  men  should  sin ;  that  be- 
cause one  man  forfeited  his  favour,  all  men  should  incur  his  curse ; 
or  because  one  man  sinned,  all  men  should  be  born  with  a  contami- 
nated moral  nature  ;  than,  that  in  virtue  of  a  most  benevolent  con- 
stitution, by  which  one  was  made  the  representative  of  the  whole 
race,  the  punishment  of  the  one  should  come  upon  all  ?  We  know 
that  a  man's  feelings  are  very  much  modified  by  his  modes  of 
thinking,  and  consequently,  what  shocks  one  person  may  appear 
right  and  proper  to  another  ;  and,  therefore,  these  feelings  can  be 
no  certain  criterion  in  such  a  case  as  this.  For  ourselves,  how- 
ever, we  are  free  to  confess  that  we  instinctively  shrink  from  the 
idea,  that  God  in  mere  sovereignty  inflicts  the  most  tremendous 
evils  upon  his  creatures,  while  we  bow  submissively  at  the  thought 
of  their  being  penal  inflictions  for  a  sin  committed  by  our  natural 
head  and  representative,  and  in  violation  of  a  covenant,  in  which, 
by  a  benevolent  appointment  of  God,  we  were  included.  Besides, 
is  it  not  necessary  that  a  moral  being  should  have  a  probation  be- 
fore his  fate  is  decided?  When  had  men  this  probation  ?  Not,  ac- 
cording to  Dr.  Dwight,  in  their  own  persons,  for  they  are  born  de- 
praved, and  consequently  under  condemnation.  Not  in  Adam — 
for  this  supposes  that  his  sin  forfeited  for  us  the  divine  favour,  or 
is  the  ground  of  our  condemnation ;  but  this  is  imputation.  Is  it 
then  more  unjust  to  condemn  mankind  for  the  act  of  their  natural 
representative,  in  whom  they  had  a  fair  and  favourable  probation, 
than  to  condemn  them  without  any  such  probation  ?  Determine, 
out  of  mere  sovereignty,  to  call  them  into  existence  depraved,  and 
then  condemn  them  for  this  depravity  ?  Nor  does  the  Spectator's 
view  much  relieve  the  difficulty.  For  a  probation  to  be  fair,  must 
afford  as  favourable  a  prospect  of  a  happy  as  of  an  unhappy  con- 
clusion. But  men  are  brought  up  to  their  trial,  under  a  "  divine 
constitution,"  which  secures  the  certainty  of  their  sinning ;  and  this 
is  done  because  an  individual  sinned  thousands  of  years  before  the 


160  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

vast  majority  of  them  were  born.  Is  this  a  fair  trial  ?  Would  not 
any  man  in  his  senses  prefer  to  have  his  fate  decided  by  the  act  of 
his  first  father,  in  the  full  perfection  of  his  powers,  intellectual  and 
moral,  than  to  have  it  suspended  on  his  own  first  faltering  moral 
act  of  infancy,  performed  under  a  constitution  which  secures  its 
being  sinful  ?  According  to  the  Spectator,  therefore,  the  probation 
of  man  is  the  most  unfavourable  possible  for  that  portion  of  the 
race  which  arrives  at  moral  agency ;  and  those  who  die  before  it 
never  have  any,  at  least  not  in  this  world.  The  race  as  such  is  not 
fallen ;  for  this  implies  the  loss  of  original  righteousness  and  of  the 
divine  favour.  The  former,  however,  was  never  possessed ;  the 
latter,  by  one  half  mankind,  never  forfeited,  and  for  them  no  Sa- 
viour can  be  needed. 

The  principle  which  the  Spectator  so  confidently  lays  down,  is, 
in  our  apprehension,  decidedly  anti-scriptural,  subversive  of  impor- 
tant doctrines,  and  requires  a  mode  of  interpretation  to  reconcile  it 
with  the  word  of  God,  which  opens  the  door  to  the  utmost  latitudi- 
narianism.  This  expression  of  opinion  is  not  intended  ad  invidiam ; 
very  far  from  it.  If  there  is  no  foundation  for  this  apprehension,  the 
expression  of  it  will  pass  unheeded  ;  and  if  there  is,  it  deserves  seri- 
ous consideration.  The  Spectator  will  agree  with  us  in  saying,  that 
any  objection  brought  against  a  doctrine  taught  in  the  Bible,  or  sup- 
posed to  be  taught  there,  is  answered,  if  it  can  be  shown  to  bear 
against  the  providence  of  God.  If,  therefore,  the  assertion,  that  it 
is  unjust  that  one  man  should,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  suffer 
the  penalty  due  to  another,  can  be  shown  to  militate  with  facts  in 
the  dispensation  of  the  divine  government,  it  is  thereby  answered. 
Is  it  then  a  fact  that  the  punishment  due  to  one  man  has  ever,  in 
the  providence  of  God,  been  inflicted  on  others  ?  We  think  no 
plainer  case  can  be  cited,  or  well  conceived,  than  that  of  the  fall 
itself.  God  threatened  our  first  parent  with  certain  evils  in  case 
of  disobedience ;  he  did  disobey  ;  the  evil  is  inflicted  not  only  on 
him,  but  on  his  posterity.  If  any  part  of  this  evil  is  antecedent  to 
personal  sinfulness,  then  the  ground  of  it  is  Adam's  sin.  But  it  is 
admitted  on  almost  all  hands,  that  some  evil  is  inflicted  antecedent- 
ly to  personal  ill  desert ;  some  say  it  is  temporal  death,  others  cor- 
ruption of  nature,  the  Spectator  certainty  of  sinning  (an  awful  in- 
fliction !) ;  it  matters  not  what  it  is,  it  is  evil  inflicted  by  a  judge  in 
the  execution  of  a  sentence — and  that  is  punishment.  We  think, 
therefore,  that  it  is  arguing  against  an  admitted  fact,  to"  maintain 
that  one  man  can  never  bear  the  iniquity  of  another. 

Although  one  instance,  if  fully  established,  is  as  good  as  a  thou- 
sand to  show  that  the  principle  of  the  Spectator  is  untenable,  we 
may  refer  to  others  recorded  in  the  scriptures.  The  case  of  Achan 
is  one  of  these.  The  father  committed  the  offence,  and  his  whole 
family  were  put  to  death  by  the  command  of  God.  Was  not  the 
death  of  the  children,  in  this  instance,  of  the  nature  of  punish- 
ment? It  was  evil,  not  a  natural  consequence,  but  a  posi- 
tive infliction,  solemnly  imposed  on  moral  agents  by  divine  com- 


THE    DOCTRINE    OP    IMPUTATION.  161 

mand,  for  a  specific  offence.  It  is  on  the  ground  of  this  and  simi- 
lar examples  ;  as  the  punishment  of  Canaan  for  the  act  of  Ham  ;  of 
the  sons  of  Saul  for  the  conduct  of  their  father,  2  Sam.  xxi.  8,  14 ; 
of  the  children  of  Israel  for  the  sin  of  David,  2  Sam.  xxiv.  15  and 
17 :  that  Grotius,  the  jurist  and  theologian,  says,  "  Non  esse  simpli- 
citer  injustum  aut  contra  naturam  poenae,  ut  quis  puniatur  ob  alie- 
na  peccata." — De  Satisfactione,  p.  312. 

The  objection,  therefore,  of  the  Spectator,  founded  on  the  supposed 
injustice  of  one  man  ever  being  punished  for  the  sin  of  another,  we 
consider  as  answered  ;  first,  because  it  bears  with  equal,  if  not  with 
accumulated  force  against  his  own  doctrine  of  evil  consequences ; 
and  secondly,  because  we  think  it  militates  with  facts  in  the  provi- 
dence of  God,  and  if  valid,  is  valid  against  the  divine  administra- 
tion. 

We  have  other  reasons,  however,  for  the  opinion  which  we  ven- 
tured to  express,  that  the  Spectator's  principle  was  anti-scriptural. 
It  contradicts  the  positive  assertions  of  scripture,  as  we  understand 
them.     We  can  only  refer  to  two  instances  of  this  kind.     In  the 
fifth  chapter  of  the  epistle  to  the  Romans,  from  the  twelfth  verse 
to  the  twenty-first,  we  consider  the  apostle  as  not  only  asserting, 
but  arguing  on  the  principle  that  one  man  may  bear  the  iniquity  of 
another.     His  object  is  to  illustrate  the  method  of  justification.     As 
we  have  been  condemned  for  a  sin  which  is  not  our  own,  so  we 
are  justified  for  a  righteousness  which  is  not  our  own.     That  we 
have  been  thus  brought  under  condemnation,  he  proves  from  the 
universality  of  death,  the  penalty  of  the  law.     This  penalty  was 
not  incurred  by  the  violation  of  the  law  of  Moses,  because  it  was 
inflicted  long  before  that  law  was  given  ;  neither  is  it  incurred  in 
all  cases  by  the  actual  violations  of  a  law  which  threatens  death, 
because  it  comes  on  those  who  have  never  actually  violated  any 
such  law  ;  therefore  it  is  for  the  one  offence  of  one  man  that  the  con- 
demnatory sentence  (the  *p<>a  in  KaraKp^a)    has  passed  on  all  men. 
The  disobedience  of  one  man  is  no  more  simply  the  occasion  of  all 
men  being  sinners,  than  the  obedience  of  one  is  merely  the  occa- 
sion of  all  becoming  righteous.     But  the  disobedience  of  the  one  is 
the  ground  of  our  being  treated  as  sinners ;  and  the  obedience  of 
the  other  is  the  ground  of  our  being  treated  as  righteous.     This 
view  of  the  passage,  as  to  its  main  feature,  is  adopted  by  every 
class  of  commentators.     Knapp,  in  his  Theology,  quoted  above, 
sect.  76,  in  speaking  of  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  says,  "  That  in 
the  Mosaic  history  of  the  fall,  although  the  word  is  not  used,  the 
doctrine  is  involved  in  the  account."     In  the  writings  of  the  Jews, 
in  the  paraphrases  of  the  Old  Testament,  in  the  TaTmuds  and  rab- 
binical works,  the  sentence,  "  the  descendants  of  Adam  suffer  the 
punishment  of  death  on  account  of  his  first  sin,"  frequently  occurs, 
in  so  many  words.     This  doctrine  of  imputation  was  very  common 
among  them,  he  says,  in  the  times  of  the  apostles.     "  Paul  teaches 
it  plainly,  Rom.  v.  12 — 14,  and  there  brings  it  into  connection  with 
the  Christian  doctrines.     He  uses  respecting  it  precisely  the  same 

11 


162  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

expressions  which  we  find  in  the  writings  of  the  rabbins."  On  the 
following  page,  in  reference  to  the  passage  in  Rom.  v.  12 — 14,  he 
says  that  the  doctrine  of  imputation  is  here  more  clearly  advanced 
than  in  any  other  portion  of  the  New  Testament.  "  The  modern 
philosophers  and  theologians,"  he  remarks,  "  found  here  much  that 
was  inconsistent  with  their  philosophical  systems.  They,  therefore, 
explained  and  refined  so  long  on  the  passage,  that  they  at  length 
forced  out  a  sense  from  which  imputation  was  excluded  ;  as  even 
Doederlein  has  done  in  his  system  of  theology.  They  did  not  con- 
sider, however,  that  Paul  uses  precisely  the  same  modes  of  expres- 
sion which  were  current  among  the  Jews  of  that  age  respecting 
imputation ;  and  that  his  cotemporary  readers  could  not  have  un- 
derstood them  otherwise  than  as  teaching  that  doctrine  ;  and  that 
Paul,  in  another  passage,  Heb.  vii.  9,  10,  reasons  in  the  same  man- 
ner. Paul  shows,  in  substance,  that  all  men  are  regarded  and 
punished  by  God  as  sinners,  and  that  the  ground  of  this  lies  in  the 
act  of  one  man ;  as,  on  the  other  hand,  deliverance  from  punishment 
depends  on  one  man,  Jesus  Christ."  He  immediately  afterwards 
says,  that  unless  force  is  done  to  the  apostle's  words,  it  must  be  ac- 
knowledged that  he  argues  to  prove  that  the  ground  on  which  men 
are  subject  to  death,  is  not  their  personal  sinfulness,  but  "  the  impu- 
tation of  Adam's  sin."# 

Zachariae,  of  Goettingen,  understands  the  apostle  in  the  same 
manner.  In  his  Biblische  Theologie,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  394,  395,  he  says, 
"  Imputation  with  Paul,  is  the  actual  infliction  on  a  person  of  the 
punishment  of  sin ;  consequently  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  all 
men,  if  there  is  any  punishment  inflicted  on  them  on  account  of  that 
sin.  His  whole  reasoning,  Rom.  v.  13,  14,  brings  this  idea  with  it. 
Sin  is  not  imputed  according  to  a  law,  so  long  as  that  law  is  not 
yet  given ;  yet  punishment  was  inflicted  long  before  the  time  of 
Moses.  His  conclusion,  therefore,  is,  where  God  punishes  sin, 
there  he  imputes  it ;  and  where  there  is  no  punishment  of  a  sin, 
there  it  is  not  imputed."  "  If  God,  therefore,  allows  the  punishment 
which  Adam  incurred  to  come  on  all  his  descendants,  he  imputes  his 
sin  to  them  all.  And  in  this  sense  Paul  maintains  that  the  sin  of 
Adam  is  imputed  to  all,  because  the  punishment  of  the  one  offence 
of  Adam  has  come  upon  all."  On  page  386  he  gives  the  sense  of 
Rom.  v.  18,  thus,  "  The  judicial  sentence  of  God,  condemning  all 
men  to  death,  has  passed  on  all  men,  on  account  of  the  one  offence 
of  Adam."  This  is  precisely  our  doctrine.  It  matters  not,  as 
far  as  the  principle  is  concerned,  how  the  eavam  in  this  passage 
is  explained. 

Whitby  has  the  same  view.  He  insists  upon  rendering  i<?  ci,  "  in 
whom,"  because,  he  says,  "  It  is  not  true  that  death  came  upon  all 

*  Knapp  does  not  himself  admit  the  doctrine  of  imputation  ;  at  least,  not  without 
much  qualification.  He  does  not  deny  the  apostle's  plain  assertion  of  the  doctrine, 
however,  but  gets  over  it  by  saying  that  he  is  not  to  be  interpreted  strictly,  but  as 
speaking  in  a  general  and  popular  sense. 


<* 


THE    DOCTBINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  103 

men,  for  that,  or  because,  all  have  sinned.  For  the  apostle  directly 
here  asserts  the  contrary,  viz. :  That  the  death  and  condemnation 
to  it  which  befell  all  men,  was  for  the  sin  of  Adam  only."  "  There- 
fore the  apostle  doth  expressly  teach  us  that  this  death,  this  con- 
demnation to  it,  came  not  upon  us  for  the  sin  of  all,  but  only  for  the 
sin  of  one,  i.  e.,  of  that  one  Adam,  in  whom  all  men  die." — 1  Cor. 
xv.  22. 

We  refer  to  these  authors  merely  to  make  it  appear,  that  even 
in  the  opinion  of  the  most  liberalized  writers,  the  plain  sense  of 
scripture  contradicts  the  principle  of  the  Spectator,  that  one  man 
can  never  be  punished  for  the  sin  of  another.  This  sense,  we  are 
persuaded,  cannot  be  gotten  rid  of,  without  adopting  a  principle  of 
interpretation  which  would  enable  us  to  explain  away  any  doctrine 
of  the  word  of  God.  The  older  Calvinists,  as  we  have  seen,  con- 
sidered the  denial  of  imputation,  or  in  other  words,  the  assumption 
of  the  principle  of  the  Spectator,  as  leading  to  the  denial  of  original 
sin  or  native  depravity.  They  were,  therefore,  alarmed  when  some 
of  their  French  brethren  rejected  the  former  doctrine,  though  they 
at  that  time  continued  to  hold  the  latter.  Their  apprehensions 
were  not  unfounded.  Those  who  made  this  first  departure  from 
the  faith  of  their  fathers,  very  soon  gave  up  the  other  doctrine,  and 
before  long  relapsed  into  that  state  from  which,  after  so  long  a  de- 
clension, they  are  now  struggling  to  rise.  Without  any  intention 
of  either  casting  unmerited  odium  on  any  of  our  brethren,  or  of  ex- 
citing unnecessary  apprehensions,  we  would  seriously  ask,  if  there 
is  no  evidence  of  a  similar  tendency  in  the  opinions  of  some  brethren 
in  this  country.  The  doctrine  of  imputation  has  long,  been  reject- 
ed by  many,  both  within  and  without  the  bounds  of  our  own  eccle- 
siastical connection,  who  still  hold,  with  Dr.  Dwight,  to  native  de- 
pravity, or  that  men  are  born  "contaminated  in  their  moral  nature." 
How  this  can  be  just,  or  consistent  with  the  divine  perfections,  if 
not  a  penal  infliction,  it  is  difficult  to  perceive.  We  are,  therefore, 
not  surprised  to  find  that  some  of  the  most  distinguished  theologians 
of  this  school,  now  deny  that. there  is  any  such  contamination  of 
nature ;  or  that  men  are  morally  depraved  before  they  are  moral 
agents,  and  have  knowingly  and  voluntarily  violated  the  laws  of 
God.  These  gentlemen,  however,  still  maintain  that  it  is  certain 
that  the  first  moral  act  in  every  case  will  be  sinful.  But  this  seems 
very  hard  :  that  men  should  be  brought  up  to  their  probation,  under 
"  a  divine  constitution"  which  secures  the  certainty  of  their  sin- 
ning. How  this  is  to  be  reconciled  with  God's  justice  and  good- 
ness any  better  than  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Dwight,  we  are  unable  to 
discover ;  and  therefore  apprehend  that  it  will  not  long  be  retained. 
The  further  step  must,  we  apprehend,  be  taken,  of  denying  any 
such  constitution,  and  any  such  dire  certainty  of  sinning.  And  then 
the  universality  of  sin  will  be  left  to  be  explained  by  imitation  and 
circumstances.  This,  as  it  appears  to  us,  is  the  natural  tendency 
of  these  opinions ;  this  has  been  their  actual  course  in  other  coun- 
tries, and  to  a  certain  extent,  also,  among  ourselves.    If  our  brethren 


164  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

will  call  this  arguing  ad  invidiam,  we  are  sorry  for  it.  They  do 
not  hesitate,  however,  to  say,  that  our  opinions  make  God  the  au- 
thor of  sin,  destroy  the  sinner's  responsibility,  weaken  the  influence 
of  the  Gospel,  and  thus  ruin  the  souls  of  men. 

But  if  the  Spectator's  principle,  that  one  man  can  never  suffer  the 
punishment  of  the  sins  of  another,  is  correct,  what  becomes  of  the 
doctrine  of  atonement  ?  According  to  the  scriptural  view  of  this 
subject,  Christ  saves  us  by  bearing  the  punishment  of  our  sins. 
This,  as  we  understand,  is  admitted.  That  is,  it  is  admitted  that 
this  is  the  scriptural  mode  of  representing  this  subject.  Our  brethren 
do  not  deny  that  the  phrase,  "  to  bear  the  iniquity  of  any  one," 
means  to  bear  the  punishment  of  that  iniquity,  as  in  the  passage  in 
Ezekiel,  "  The  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,"  and  in 
a  multitude  of  similar  cases.  Where,  therefore,  the  Bible  says,  that 
*•  Christ  bore  our  sins,"  it  means,  that  he  bore  the  punishment  of  our 
sins  ;  or  rather,  as  Grotius  says,  it  cannot  mean  anything  else. 
"  Peccata  ferre  patiendo,  atque  ita  ut  inde  liberentur  alii,  aliud  in- 
dicare  non  potest,  quam  poenae  alienae  susceptionem." — P.  300. 
And  not  only  the  scriptures  but  even  the  Greek  and  Latin  authors 
who  use  this  phrase,  he  says,  "  semper  imputationem  includunt." 
This,  however,  on  the  Spectator's  principle,  must  be  explained 
away ;  and  the  ground  be  assumed,  that  the  scriptures  mean  to 
teach  us  only  the  fact  that  Christ's  death  saves  us,  but  not  that  it 
does  so  by  being  a  punishment  of  our  sins.  But  if  this  ground  be 
taken,  what  shall  we  have  to  say  to  the  Socinians  who  admit  the 
fact  as  fully  as  we  do  ?  They  say,  it  is  by  the  moral  impression  it 
produces  on  us  ;  our  brethren  say,  it  is  by  the  moral  impression  it 
produces  on  the  intelligent  universe.  If  we  desert  the  Bible  repre- 
sentation, have  they  not  as  much  right  to  their  theory  as  we  have 
to  ours  ?  This  is  a  subject  we  cannot  now  enter  upon.  Our  ob- 
ject is,  to  show  that  this  is  no  dispute  about  words  ;  that  the  denial 
of  the  doctrine  of  imputation  not  only  renders  that  of  original  sin 
untenable  ;  but  involves,  either  the  rejection  or  serious  modification 
of  those  of  atonement  and  justification. 


jp 


fe 


ESSAY    VII. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.* 


We  would  remind  our  readers  that  in  the  history  of  Pelagianism, 
which  called  forth  this  discussion,  we  stated,  "  That  Adam's  first 
transgression  was  not  strictly  and  properly  that  of  his  descendants 
(for  those  not  yet  born  could  not  perform  an  act),  but  interpreta- 
tively  or  by  imputation;"  and  secondly,  that  imputation  does  not 
imply  "  the  transfer  of  moral  acts  or  moral  character."  The 
mere  declaration  of  our  belief  of  this  doctrine,  and  conviction  of 
its  importance,  led  to  the  first  communication  of  the  Protestant  on 
the  subject.  He  made  no  objection  to  the  correctness  of  our 
exhibition  of  the  subject ;  his  inquiries  were  directed  against  the 
doctrine  itself.  His  article  was  written,  as  he  now  informs  us, 
"  to  lead  the  author  of  that  piece  (the  history  of  Pelagianism)  to 
see  and  feel,  that  one  who  undertook  the  office  of  a  corrector  with 
severity,  should  weigh  well  whether  he  had  any  faux  pas  of  his 
own  to  correct."  This  accounts  for  the  schooling  manner  so  obvi- 
ous in  his  communication,  and  which  seems  to  have  escaped  his 
observation.  We  think  it  right  to  turn  his  attention  to  this  subject, 
because  he  is  abundant  in  the  expression  of  his  dissatisfaction 
"  with  the  spirit  and  manner"  of  our  articles.  We  acknowledge 
that  we  are  as  blind  to  the  bad  spirit  of  what  we  have  written,  as 
he  appears  to  be  to  the  character  of  his  inquiries.  This  proves 
how  incompetent  a  judge  a  man  is  in  his  own  case,  and  should 
teach  him  and  us  how  easy  it  is  to  slip  into  the  very  fault  we  con- 
demn in  others,  and  to  mistake  mere  dissent  from  our  opinions  for 
disrespect  to  our  persons.  We  are  prepared  to  make  every  proper 
acknowledgment  for  any  impropriety  of  manner  with  which  Chris- 
tian brethren  may  think  us  chargeable,  although  our  sincere  en- 
deavour to  avoid  an  improper  spirit,  while  penning  the  articles  in 
question,  must  prevent  any  other  confession  than  that  of  sorrow 
at  our  want  of  success. 

We  were  much  surprised  to  find  that  we  had'mistaken  the  main 
object  of  the  Protestant's  first  communication.  He  now  says, 
"  The  writer  in  the  Repertory  has  chosen  his  own  ground  ;  and, 

*  The  remarks  which  follow  were  called  forth  by  two  articles  in  the  Christian 
Spectator  of  March,  1831. 


166  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

passing  over  my  main  points  and  at  least  nine  tenths  of  all  I  had 
said,  has  selected  the  topic  of  imputation,  which  was  only  a  very 
subordinate  one  with  me,  and  occupied  no  less  than  forty-eight 
pages  in  descanting  on  this." — P.  156.  The  editors  of  the  Specta- 
tor were  no  less  unfortunate  in  their  apprehension  of  his  object,  for 
they  head  his  communication,  "  Inquiries  respecting  the  Doctrine 
of  Imputation."  Indeed  the  Protestant  himself  seems  to  have  la- 
boured under  the  same  mistake.  For,  p.  339  (vol.  1830),  he  says  it 
was  his  object  "  to  submit  a  few  inquiries  and  difficulties  in  respect 
to  some  statements  which  he  (the  historian  in  the  Repertory)  had 
made."  He  then  quotes  our  statement  respecting  "  the  imputation 
of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity,"  and  no  other.  On  p.  340,  he  adds, 
"  For  the  present,  I  neither  affirm  nor  deny  the  doctrine  of  impu- 
tation. But  I  frankly  confess  I  have  difficulties."  He  then  states 
these  difficulties  in  order,  introducing  them  after  the  first,  by 
"  Again,"  "  Again,"  "  Once  more,"  "  Finally,"  "  Last  of  all,"  to 
the  close  of  the  piece.  We  inferred  from  all  this  that  the  doctrine 
of  imputation,  so  far  from  being  "  a  very  subordinate  point"  with 
him,  was  the  main  point,  and  indeed  the  only  one.  This  is  a  very 
small  matter ;  we  notice  it  merely  to  let  him  see  on  what  slight 
grounds  he  sometimes  expresses  dissatisfaction. 

To  these  inquiries  communicated  by  the  Protestant,  the  editors 
,  of  the  Spectator  appended  a  series  of  remarks,  intended  to  show 
that  we  had  abandoned  the  views  of  the  older  Calvinists  on  this 
subject.  In  these  remarks  they  hold  the  following  language : 
"  Adam's  first  act  of  transgression  was  not  strictly  and  properly 
that  of  his  descendants,  says  the  historian.  The  sin  of  the  apos- 
tasy is  truly  and  properly  theirs,  say  Edwards  and  the  rest." 
Again,  "  We  are  glad,  likewise,  to  see  him  proceed  one  step  far- 
ther." This  farther  step,  they  tell  us,  is  the  denial  of  "  any  trans- 
fer of  moral  acts  or  moral  character."  That  both  the  Protestant 
and  editors  considered  the  doctrine  as  involving  these  two  ideas, 
is  also  evident  from  the  nature  of  their  objections.  The  former 
inquires  of  us,  whether  we  have  ever  repented  of  Adam's  sin,  and 
founds  most  of  his  difficulties  on  the  principle  that  there  can  be  no 
sin  where  there  is  no  knowledge  of  law,  and  as  there  can  be  no 
knowledge  of  law  at  the  first  moment  when  men  begin  to  exist, 
he  infers  there  can  be  no  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  at  that  period. 
See  p.  341.  And  the  Spectator  says,  "No  one  who  does  not 
totally  confound  all  notions  of  personal  identity,  can  hesitate  to 
admit,  that  the  historian  has  done  right  in  rejecting  the  old  state- 
ments on  this  subject." — P.  343. 

In  our  reply  to  the  above  mentioned  articles,  we  undertook  to 
prove  that  these  gentlemen  had  misapprehended  the  views  of  old 
Calvinists  on  the  nature  of  imputation ;  and  maintained  that  this 
doctrine  does  not  involve  "  any  mysterious  union  with  Adam,  so 
that  his  act  was  personally  and  properly  our  act,  or  that  the  moral 
turpitude  of  his  sin  was  transferred  from  him  to  us."  This  state- 
ment was  repeated  so  often  and  so  explicitly,  that  no  one  could 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  1G7 

fail  to  see  it  was  our  object  to  prove  "  that  neither  the  idea  of  per- 
sona] identification,  nor  transfer  of  moral  character,  is  included  in 
the  doctrine  of  imputation."*  This,  therefore,  is  the  real  point  in 
debate  ;  and  it  is  one  of  importance.  For  if  the  doctrine  does, 
when  properly  explained,  include  these  ideas,  then  have  its  oppo- 
nents done  well  in  rejecting  it ;  and  its  advocates,  instead  of  wast- 
ing time  in  its  defence,  would  serve  the  cause  of  truth  by  at  once 
following  their  example.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  these  ideas 
form  no  part  of  the  doctrine,  then  do  all  the  objections  founded  on 
them  fall  to  the  ground.  And  as  these  objections  are  the  main  and 
indeed  almost  the  only  ones,  to  establish  the  point  at  which  we 
aim  is  to  redeem  an  important  truth  from  a  load  of  aspersions,  and 
vindicate  it  even  in  the  eyes  of  its  opposers.  The  question  then 
is,  are  we  correct  in  the  ground  which  we  have  assumed.  If  the 
Protestant  and  editors  have  done  anything  to  the  purpose  in  their 
reply,  it  must  be  in  proving  that  old  Calvinists  taught  that  "  Adam's 
act  was  strictly  and  properly  our  act,  and  that  its  moral  character 
was  transferred  from  him  to  us."  If  they  have  accomplished  this 
object,  we  owe  them  many  acknowledgments  for  having  opened 
our  eyes  to  a  doctrine  we  have  professed,  without  understanding, 
the  greater  part  of  our  life.  And  this  obligation  will  not  be  con- 
fined to  us.  For  we  may  state,  without  intending  to  compliment 
ourselves,  that  we  have  heard  from  many  old  Calvinists  ot  differ- 
ent denominations,  in  various  parts  of  our  country,  and  no  whisper 
has  reached  us  of  the  exhibition  of  the  doctrine  made  in  the  Reper- 
tory being  a  departure  from  the  faith.  Without  an  exception, 
those  who  have  spoken  on  the  subject  at  all  have  said,  as  far  as  we 
know,  "  So  we  hold  the  doctrine,  and  so  we  have  always  under- 
stood old  Calvinists  to  teach  it."  As  they  who  profess  to  receive 
any  doctrine,  and  to  incorporate  it  in  their  system  of  faith,  may  be 
supposed  to  feel  a  deeper  interest  in  it  than  those  who  have  always 
been  taught  to  reject  it,  we  may,  without  arrogance,  presume  that 
the  probability  is  in  favour  of  old  Calvinists  understanding  their 
own  opinions,  and  our  brethren  being  mistaken  in  their  apprehen- 
sions of  the  subject.     Let  us,  however,  see  how  the  matter  stands. 

It  may  facilitate  the  proper  understanding  of  this  subject  to 
state,  in  a  few  words,  the  distinct  theories  which  have  been  adopted 
respecting  the  connexion  between  the  sinfulness  of  men,  and  the 
fall  of  their  first  parent. 

1.  Some  hold,  that  in  virtue  of  a  covenant  entered  into  by  God 
with  Adam,  not  only  for  himself  but  for  all  his  posterity,  he  was 
constituted  their  head  and  representative.  And  in  consequence  of 
this  relation,  his  act  (as  every  other  of  a  public  person  acting  as 
such)  was  considered  the  act  of  all  those  whom  he  represented. 
When  he  sinned,  therefore,  they  sinned,  not  actually  but  virtually  ; 
when  he  fell  they  fell.  Hence  the  penalty  which  he  incurred 
comes  on  them.     God  regards  and  treats  them  as  covenant-break- 

•  See  Biblical  Repertory  for  July,  1830,  p.  436,  et  passim. 


168  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

ers,  withholds  from  them  those  communications  which  produced 
his  image  on  the  soul  of  Adam  at  his  first  creation ;  so  that  the 
result  is  the  destitution  of  original  righteousness  and  corruption  of 
nature.  According  to  this  view,  hereditary  depravity  follows  as  a 
penal  evil  from  Adam's  sin,  and  is  not  the  ground  of  its  imputation 
to  men.  This,  according  to  our  understanding  of  it,  is  essentially 
the  old  Calvinistic  doctrine.  This  is  our  doctrine,  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  standards  of  our  church.  For  they  make  original  sin  to 
consist,  1st,  in  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin ;  2dly,  the  want  of 
original  righteousness  ;  and  3dly,  the  corruption  of  our  whole  na- 
ture. This,  too,  is  President  Edwards's  doctrine  throughout  two 
thirds  of  his  book  on  original  sin.  We  never  meant  to  say  any- 
thing inconsistent  with  this  assertion,  with  regard  to  this  great 
man.  We  stated  that  in  the  portion  of  his  work  from  which  the 
Spectator  quoted,  he  had  abandoned  the  old  ground,  and  adopted 
for  the  sake  of  answering  a  particular  difficulty  the  theory  of 
Stapfer,  which,  however,  contradicted  the  general  tenor  and  expli- 
cit statements  of  the  former  part  of  his  work. 

2.  Others  exclude  the  idea  of  imputation  of  Adam's  sin,  but 
admit  that  all  men  derive  by  ordinary  generation  from  our  first 
parents  a  corrupt  nature,  which  is  the  ground,  even  prior  to  actual 
transgressions,  of  their  exposure  to  condemnation.  This  is  essen- 
tially the  view  of  Placaeus,  against  which,  as  we  endeavoured  to 
show,  the  Calvinistic  world  of  his  time  protested.  This  is  the 
view,  in  the  main,  of  Stapfer,  and  in  one  place  of  Edwards.  This 
is  Dr.  Dwight's  doctrine,  and  that  of  many  others.  Most  of  the 
older  advocates  of  this  opinion  retained  at  least  the  name  of  im- 
putation, but  made  the  inherent  corruption  of  men  the  ground 
of  it. 

3.  Others  again  on  the  same  principle  involved  in  the  former 
theory,  viz.,  that  the  descendants  should  be  like  their  progenitor, 
suppose  that  the  nature  of  Adam  having  become  weakened  and 
disordered,  a  disease  or  infirmity,  not  a  moral  corruption,  was  en- 
tailed on  all  his  posterity.  So  that  original  sin,  according  to  this 
view,  is  not  vere  peccatum,  but  a  malady.  This  is  the  view  of 
many  of  the  Remonstrants,  of  Curcellaeus,  of  Limborch,  of  many 
Arminians  and  Lutherans.  Many  refer  this  disorder  of  human  na- 
ture to  the  physical  effect  of  the  forbidden  fruit. 

4.  There  are  those,  who  rejecting  the  ideas  of  imputation  of 
Adam's  sin,  of  moral  innate  depravity,  or  of  an  entailed  imbecility 
of  nature,  and  adopting  the  idea  that  all  sin  consists  in  acts,  main- 
tain that  men  come  into  the  world  in  puris  naturalibus,  neither 
holy  nor  unholy  (as  was  the  case  with  Adam  at  the  time  of  his 
creation) ;  and  that  they  remain  in  this  neutral  state  until  they 
attain  a  knowledge  of  law  and  duty.  They  account  for  all  men 
sinning,  either  from  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed,  or 
from  a  divine  constitution. 

The  view  taken  by  the  true  Hopkinsians,  who  adopt  what  is 
called  the  "  exercise  scheme,"  is  somewhat  different  from  all  these, 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  109 

as  they  suppose  the  moral  exercises  of  the  soul  to  commence  with 
its  being ;  and  that  these  in  every  case  should  be  sinful,  was  de- 
cided by  the  fall  of  Adam. 

These,  as  far  as  we  know,  are  all  the  radical  views  of  this  sub- 
ject. There  are,  of  course,  various  modifications  of  these  several 
systems.  Thus,  some  retain  the  idea  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's 
sin,  but  reject  that  of  inherent  hereditary  depravity.  This  was  the 
case  with  many  of  the  most  distinguished  catholic  theologians  of  the 
age  of  the  Reformation.  Others  again,  uniting  part  of  the  first  and 
third  view,  teach  that  original  sin  consists  in  the  imputation  of 
Adam's  first  transgression,  and  an  enfeebled,  disordered  constitu- 
tion, but  not  a  moral  corruption. 

This  enumeration  of  the  various  opinions  on  original  sin,  and  of 
our  relation  to  Adam,  is  given,  not  because  we  suppose  our  readers 
ignorant  on  the  subject,  but  because  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  un- 
derstand the  language  of  the  old  authors  and  confessions,  to  bear 
in  mind  the  opinions  which  they  meant  to  oppose  or  condemn. 
Had  the  Protestant  done  this  it  would  have  preserved  him  from  the 
strange  oversight  of  quoting  from  the  old  confessions  the  declara- 
tion that  original  sin  is  vere  peccatum,  as  having  any  bearing  on  a 
discussion  on  the  nature  of  imputation.  Of  this,  however,  in  the 
sequel.  In  order  to  the  correct  interpretation  of  particular  modes 
of  expression  occurring  in  any  author  it  is,  however,  not  only 
necessary  that  we  bear  in  mind  the  nature  of  the  opinions  which 
he  may  be  opposing,  but  most  especially  the  nature  of  his  own 
system,  whether  of  philosophy,  theology,  or  of  whatever  else  may 
be  the  subject  of  discourse.  Here,  as  we  think,  is  most  obviously 
the  great  source  of  error  in  the  gentlemen  of  the  Spectator.  They 
seem  entirely  to  overlook  the  distinctive  theological  system  of  the 
old  Calvinists,  and  detaching  particular  modes  of  expression  from 
their  connexion  in  that  system,  put  upon  them  a  sense  which  the 
words  themselves  will  indeed  bear,  but  which  is  demonstrably 
foreign  to  that  in  which  these  writers  employed  them,  and  directly 
contradictory  of  their  repeated  and  explicit  statement  of  their 
meaning.  These  gentlemen  err  precisely  as  the  early  opponents 
of  the  Reformers  and  Calvinists  did,  by  insisting  on  taking  in  a 
moral  sense,  modes  of  expression  which  were  used,  and  meant  to  be 
understood,  in  a  judicial  or  forensic  sense.  This  is  the  xpurop  x(,evSos 
of  our  New  Haven  brethren  on  this  subject,  and  it  runs  through 
all  their  exhibition  of  the  views  of  the  old  Calvinistic  doctrine.  In 
this  respect  they  are  treading,  as  just  remarked,  in  the  footsteps  of 
all  the  early  opposers  of  these  doctrines.  When  the  reformers 
taught  that  we  were  rendered  righteous  or  just  by  the  imputation 
of  Christ's  righteousness,  their  opponents  at  once  asked,  How  can 
the  righteousness  of  one  man  be  transferred  to  another  ?  If  this 
doctrine  be  true,  then  are  believers  as  just  as  Christ  himself — they 
have  his  moral  excellence.  They  further  asserted,  that  the  reform- 
ers made  Christ  the  greatest  sinner  in  the  world — because  they 
taught  that  the  sins  of  all  men  were  imputed  to  him.     To  these 


170  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

objections  the  reformers  answered,  that  imputation  rendered  no 
man  inherently  either  just  or  unjust — that  they  did  not  mean  that 
believers  were  made  morally  righteous  by  the  righteousness  of 
Christ,  but  merely  forensically,  or  in  the  eye  of  the  law — and  that 
it  was  mere  confusion  of  ideas  on  the  part  of  their  adversaries 
which  led  to  all  these  objections.  We  take  it,  this  is  precisely  the 
case  with  our  brethren  of  the  Spectator.  We  find  them  making 
the  identical  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation  which  were 
urged  by  some  of  the  Catholics,  and  afterwards  by  the  Remon- 
strants ;  and  we  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  copy  the  answer  of  the 
old  Calvinists,  which  is  a  simple  disclaimer  of  the  interpretation 
put  on  their  mode  of  expression.  They  say  they  never  intended 
that  the  moral  character  of  our  sins  was  conveyed  to  Christ,  nor 
of  his  righteousness  to  us,  nor  yet  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity — 
but  that  all  these  cases  are  judicial  or  forensic  transactions  ;  that 
in  virtue  of  the  representative  character  which  Christ  sustained, 
he  was  in  the  eye  of  the  law  (not  morally)  made  sin  for  us,  and 
we  righteousness  in  him;  and  in  virtue  of  the  representative 
character  of  Adam  we  are  made  sinners  in  him,  not  morally,  but 
in  the  eye  of  the  law.  A  moment's  attention  to  the  old  Calvinistic 
system  will  convince,  we  hope,  the  impartial  reader  that  this  repre- 
sentation is  correct. 

In  reference  to  the  two  great  subjects  of  the  fall  and  redemp- 
tion, they  were  accustomed  to  speak  of  the  two  covenants  of  works 
and  grace.  The  former  was  formed  with  Adam,  not  for  himself 
alone  but  for  all  his  posterity ;  so  that  he  acted  in  their  name  and 
in  their  behalf.  His  disobedience,  therefore,  was  their  disobe- 
dience, not  on  the  ground  of  a  mysterious  identification  or  transfer 
of  its  moral  character,  but  on  the  ground  of  this  federal  relation. 
When  Adam  fell,  the  penalty  came  on  all  his  race,  and  hence  the 
corruption  of  nature  which  we  all  derive  from  him  is  regarded  by 
old  Calvinists  as  a  penal  evil.  The  second  covenant  they  repre- 
sent as  formed  between  God  and  believers  in  Jesus  Christ,  in 
virtue  of  which  Christ  stands  as  the  representative  of  his  people. 
Their  sins  were  imputed  to  him,  or  he  assumed  their  responsibili- 
ties, acted  and  suffered  in  their  name  and  in  their  behalf.  Hence, 
on  the  condition  of  faith  his  righteousness  is  imputed  to  them,  that 
is,  is  made  the  ground  of  their  being  judicially  justified.  No  one 
at  all  familiar  with  the  writings  of  the  older  Calvinists,  can  fail  to 
have  remarked  that  this  whole  scheme  is  founded  on  the  idea  of 
representation,  and  that  it  involves  the  assumption  of  the  transfer 
of  legal  obligation  but  not  of  moral  character — two  things  which 
the  Spectator  perpetually  confounds.  And  here  is  their  radical 
misconception,  as  we  have  already  remarked.  Nothing  is  more 
common  than  to  illustrate  this  idea  by  a  reference  to  transfer  of 
pecuniary  obligations,  which  is  a  matter  of  every  day  occurrence. 
But,  as  the  cases  are  not  in  all  respects  analogous,  the  old  Calvin- 
ists are  very  careful  in  stating  the  difference,  and  in  asserting  the 
justice  and  propriety  (under  certain  circumstances)  of  the  transfer 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF   IMPUTATION.  171 

of  legal  obligation  even  in  cases  of  crime.  And  although  this, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  can  rarely  occur  in  human  govern- 
ments, as  no  man  has  a  right  to  dispose  of  life  or  limb,  yet  it  is  not 
without  example. 

It  is  on  this  idea  of  representation,  of  one  acting  for  another, 
that  they  maintained  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity, 
of  our  sins  to  Christ,  and  of  his  righteousness  to  us.  The  nature 
of  this  imputation  is  in  all  these  cases  the  same.  They  are  all 
considered  as  forensic  transactions.  The  obligation  to  punishment 
in  the  two  former  cases,  and  the  title  to  pardon  and  acceptance  in 
the  last,  arising  not  out  of  the  moral  character  but  the  legal  stand- 
ing of  those  concerned.  Christ's  obligation  to  suffer  arose  not 
from  the  moral  transfer  of  our  sins,  but  from  his  voluntary  assump- 
tion of  our  law-place,  if  modern  ears  will  endure  the  phrase.  And 
our  obligation  to  suffer  for  Adam's  sin,  so  far  as  that  sin  is  con- 
cerned,* arises  solely  from  his  being  our  representative,  and  not 
from  our  participation  in  its  moral  turpitude.  And  so  finally  they 
taught  that  the  believer's  title  to  pardon  and  heaven  is  not  in  him- 
self. Christ's  righteousness  is  his,  not  morally,  but  judicially. 
Hence  the  distinction  between  imputed  and  inherent  righteousness  ; 
and  between  imputed  and  inherent  sin.  The  former  is  laid  to  our 
account  on  the  ground  of  its  being  the  act  of  our  representative, 
but  is  not  us,  nor  morally  appertaining  to  us  ;  it  affects  our  stand- 
ing in  the  eye  of  the  law,  but  not  our  moral  character :  the  latter 
is  ours  in  a  moral  sense.f 

We  have  stated  that  the  imputation  spoken  of  in  all  these  cases 
is  in  nature  the  same,  and  therefore,  that  what  is  said  of  the  impu- 
tation of  our  sins  to  Christ,  and  of  his  righteousness  to  us,  is  pro- 
perly appealed  to  in  illustration  of  the  nature  of  imputation,  when 
spoken  of  in  reference  to  Adam's  sin.  To  this  the  Protestant 
strongly  objects.  "  I  cannot  but  notice  one  thing  more,"  he  says, 
"  the  reviewer  everywhere  in  his  piece  appeals  to  the  imputation 
of  Christ's   righteousness,  as  decisive  of  the  manner  in  which 

*  These  are  points  taught  to  children  in  their  catechism  ; 

Q.  How  is  original  sin  usually  distinguished  ? 

A.  Into  original  sin  imputed,  and  original  sin  inherent. 

Q.  What  is  original  sin  imputed  ? 

A.  The  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin. 

Q.  What  is  original  sin  inherent  ? 

A.  The  want  of  original  righteousness,  and  the  corruption  of  the  whole  nature. 

Q.  What  do  you  understand  by  the  guilt  of  sin  ? 

A.  An  obligation  to  punishment  on  account  of  sin.  Rom.  vii.  23.  [Of  course 
the  guilt  of  Adam's  sin  which  rests  on  us,  is  an  obligation  to  punishment  for  that 
sin,  not  its  moral  turpitude.] 

Q.  How  are  all  mankind  guilty  of  Adam's  first  sin  ? 

A.  By  imputation  [not  inherently].  Rom.  v.  19,  "  By  one  man's  disobedience 
many  were  made  sinners." 

Q.  Upon  what  account  is  Adam's  first  sin  imputed  to  his  posterity  ? 

A.  On  account  of  the  legal  union  betwixt  him  and  them,  he  being  their  legal  head 
and  representative,  and  the  covenant  being  made  with  him,  not  for  himself  only,  but 
for  his  posterity  ;  likewise,  1  Cor.  xv.  22,  "  In  Adam  all  die." — See  Fisher's  Cate- 
chism. 

t  Our  exposure  to  punishment  for  our  own  inherent  depravity  is  a  different  affair. 


172  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

Adam's  sin  is  imputed  to  us.  Now  this  is  the  very  point  which 
Calvin  in  so  many  words  denies,"  &c,  p.  161.  Again,  on  the  next 
page,  "  As  the  reviewer  so  often  refers  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation 
as  triumphantly  established  in  Christ's  sufferings  and  merits,  and 
seems  to  think  that  nothing  more  is  necessary  than  merely  to  make 
the  appeal  in  this  way,  in  order  to  justify  such  a  putative  scheme 
as  he  defends  ;  I  add  one  more  question  for  his  solution,  viz :  '  Is 
the  righteousness  of  Christ  ever  imputed  to  sinners,  without  any 
actual  repentance  and  faith  ?  If  not,  then  how  can  the  analogy 
prove  that  Adam's  sin  is  imputed  to  us  without  any  act  on  our 
part,  and  that  we  are  condemned  before  any  actual  sin  at  all  V  He 
does  not  appear  once  to  have  thought  that  here  is  a  difficulty, 
which  no  part  of  his  explanations  has  even  glanced  at.  Nay,  he 
does  not  even  suppose  it  possible  to  make  any  difficulty."  He  is 
mistaken  as  to  both  points.  The  idea  is  one  of  the  most  familiar 
connected  with  the  whole  subject;  and  in  our  former  article, 
the  distinction  to  which  it  refers  is  clearly  stated,  and  abun- 
dantly implied  elsewhere.  The  Protestant's  difficulty  evidently 
arises  from  his  allowing  his  mind  to  turn  from  the  nature  to  the  jus- 
tice of  imputation  in  these  several  cases.  Now  although  there  is  a 
great  and  obvious  difference  between  the  appointment  of  a  person 
as  a  representative,  with  the  consent  of  those  for  whom  he  acts, 
and  his  being  so  constituted  without  that  consent,  yet  the  difference 
does  not  refer  to  the  nature  of  representation,  but  to  the  justice  of 
the  case.  Thus  a  child  may  either  choose  its  own  guardian,  or  he 
may  be  appointed  by  a  competent  authority,  without  the  child's 
knowledge  or  consent.  In  either  case  the  appointment  is  valid  ; 
and  the  guardian  is  the  legal  representative  of  the  child,  and  his 
acts  are  binding  as  such.  Any  objection,  therefore,  to  the  justice 
of  such  an  appointment,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  nature  of  the 
relation  between  a  guardian  and  his  ward.  Nor  has  an  objection 
to  the  justice  of  Adam's  being  appointed  our  representative  without 
our  consent,  any  bearing  on  the  nature  of  the  relation  which  old 
Calvinists  supposed  to  exist  between  him  and  us.  If  they  believe 
that  this  was  the  relation  of  representation  ;*  and  if  this  were  as- 

*  This  opinion  is  not  confined  to  old  Calvinists.  "  In  this  transaction  between 
God  the  Creator  and  Governor,  and  man  the  creature,  in  which  the  law,  with  the 
promises  and  threatenings  of  it,  was  declared  and  established  in  the  form  of  a  cove- 
nant between  God  and  man,  Adam  was  considered  and  treated  as  comprehending  all 
mankind.  He  being  by  divine  constitution  the  natural  head  and  father  of  the  whole 
race,  they  were  included  and  created  in  him  [this  goes  beyond  us]  as  one  whole, 
which  could  not  be  separated ;  and  therefore  he  is  treated  as  a  whole  in  this  transac- 
tion. The  covenant  made  with  him  was  made  with  all  mankind,  and  he  was  consti- 
tuted the  public  and  confederating  head  of  the  whole  race  of  men,  and  acted  in  this 
capacity,  as  being  the  whole  ;  and  his  obedience  was  considered  as  the  obedience  of 
mankind  ;  and  as  by  this  Adam  was  to  obtain  eternal  life  had  he  performed  it,  this 
comprehended  and  insured  the  eternal  life  of  all  his  posterity.  And  on  the  contrary, 
his  disobedience  was  the  disobedience  of  the  whole  of  all  mankind;  and  the  threatened 
penalty  did  not  respect  Adam  personally,  or  as  a  single  individual;  but  his  whole 
posterity,  included  in  him  and  represented  by  him.  Therefore  the  transgression, 
being  the  transgression  of  the  whole,  brought  the  threatened  punishment  on  all  man- 
kind." We  are  glad  that  this  is  not  the  language  of  an  old  Calvinist,  bu  t  of  Dr. 
Hopkins. — See  System  of  Doctrines,  vol.  i.,  p.  245,  aud  abundantly  more  to  the  same 
purpose  in  the  following  chapter. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  173 

sumed  as  the  ground  of  imputation  in  all  the  cases  specified,  there 
is  the  most  obvious  propriety  in  appealing  "  to  the  imputation  of 
Christ's  righteousness  as  decisive  of  the  manner  in  which  Adam's 
sin  is  imputed  to  us ;"  according  to  the  opinion  of  old  Calvinists, 
especially  as  they  state  with  the  most  abundant  frequency,  that 
they  mean  by  imputation  in  the  one  case  precisely  what  they  mean 
by  it  in  the  other. 

This  analogy  is  asserted  by  almost  every  old  Calvinist  that  ever 
wrote.  "We  are  constituted  sinners  in  Adam,  in  the  same  way 
that  we  are  constituted  righteous  in  Christ ;  but  in  Christ  we  are 
constituted  righteous  by  imputation  of  righteousness  ;  therefore  we 
are  made  sinners  in  Adam  by  the  imputation  of  his  sin,  otherwise 
the  comparison  fails." — Turrettin.  "  We  are  accounted  righteous 
through  Christ,  in  the  same  manner  that  we  are  accounted  guilty 
through  Adam." — Tuckney.  "  As  we  are  made  guilty  of  Adam's 
sin,  which  is  not  inherent  in  us,  but  only  imputed  to  us ;  so  are  we 
made  righteous  by  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  which  is  not  inhe- 
rent in  us,  but  only  imputed  to  us." — Owen.  We  might  go  on  for 
a  month  making  such  quotations.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that 
these  men  considered  these  cases  as  perfectly  parallel  as  to  the 
point  in  hand,  viz.,  the  nature  of  imputation.  And  consequently  if 
they  taught,  as  the  Protestant  and  Spectator  imagine,  that  the  moral 
turpitude  of  Adam's  sin  was  transferred  to  us,  then  they  taught 
that  Christ's  moral  excellence  was  thus  transferred  ;  that  we  are 
made  inherently  and  subjectively  holy,  and  Christ  morally  a  sinner, 
by  imputation ;  the  very  assertion  which  they  constantly  cast  back 
as  the  slanderous  calumny  of  Papists  and  Remonstrants.  Why  then 
will  our  brethren  persist  in  making  the  same  representation  ? 

But  if  these  cases  are  thus  parallel,  how  is  it  that  Calvin,  Turret- 
tin,  Owen  say  they  differ  ?  asks  the  Protestant.  It  might  as  well 
be  asked,  how  can  cases  agree  in  one  point,  which  differ  in  another  ? 
Because  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness  is,  as  to  its  nature, 
analogous  to  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin — does  it  hence  follow 
that  our  justification  can  in  no  respect  differ  from  our  condemna- 
tion ?  or,  in  other  words,  must  our  relation  to  Christ  and  its  conse- 
quences be,  in  all  respects,  analogous  to  our  relation  to  Adam  and 
its  consequences?  Paul  tells  us,  and  all  the  old  Calvinists  tell  us, 
"  As  by  the  offence  of  one,  judgment  came  upon  all  men  to  con- 
demnation; even  so  by  the  righteousness  of  one,  the  free  gift  came 
upon  all  men  to  the  justification  of  life,"  and  yet,  that  these  cases 
differ.  The  judgment  was  for  one  offence,  the  "  free  gift"  had 
reference  to  many ;  one  is  received  by  voluntary  assent  on  our 
part,  the  other  comes  in  virtue  of  a  covenant  or  constitution  (if  any 
man  prefers  that  word),  which,  though  most  righteous  and  benevo- 
lent, was  formed  without  our  individual  concurrence.  And  be- 
sides, we  are  exposed  to  condemnation  not  on  account  of  Adam's 
sin  only,  but  also  on  account  of  our  own  inherent  hereditary  de- 
pravity ;  whereas  the  righteousness  of  Christ  is  the  sole  ground  of 
our  justification,  our  inherent  righteousness,  or  personal  holiness 


174  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

being  entirely  excluded.  And  this  is  the  precise  point  of  difference 
referred  to  by  Calvin  in  the  passage  quoted  by  the  Protestant, 
which  he  not  only  misunderstands,  but  mistranslates.  After  saying 
there  are  two  points  of  difference  between  Christ  and  Adam,  which 
the  apostle  passes  over  because  they  were  not  to  his  purpose,  he 
adds.  "  Prior  est,  quod,  peccato  Adae,  non  per  solam  imputationem 
damnamur,  acsi  alieni  peccati  exigeretur  a  nobis  poena ;  sed  ideo 
poenam  ejus  sustinemus  quia  et  culpae  sumus  rei  quatenus  scilicet 
natura  nostra  in  ipso  vitiata,  iniquitatis  reatu  obstringitur  apud 
Deum."  The  plain  meaning  of  which  is,  that  we  are  not  con- 
demned on  the  ground  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  solely,  but 
also  on  account  of  our  own  depraved  nature ;  whereas,  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ  is  the  sole  ground  of  our  justification,  our  sancti- 
fication  having  nothing  to  do  with  it.  This  is  the  difference  to 
which  he  refers.  Precisely  the  doctrine  of  our  standards,  which 
makes  original  sin  to  consist  not  only  in  the  guilt  of  Adam's  sin,  but 
also  in  corruption  of  nature.  Two  very  different  things.  The  rea- 
son of  Calvin's  insisting  so  much  on  this  point  was,  that  many  of 
the  leading  Catholics  of  his  day,  with  whom  he  was  in  perpetual 
controversy,  maintained  that  original  sin  consisted  solely  in  the  im- 
putation of  Adam's  sin;  that  there  was  no  corruption  of  nature,  or 
hereditary  depravity.  Hence  Calvin  says,  it  is  not  solely  on  the 
former  ground,  but  also  on  the  latter  that  we  are  liable  to  condem- 
nation. And  hence,  too,  in  all  his  writings  he  insists  mainly  on  the 
idea  of  inherent  depravity,  saying  little  of  imputation ;  the  former 
being  denied,  the  latter  admitted  by  his  immediate  opponents. 
This  is  so  strikingly  the  case,  that  instead  of  being  quoted  as  hold- 
ing the  doctrine  of  imputation  in  a  stronger  sense  than  that  in 
which  we  have  presented  it,  he  is  commonly  appealed  to  by  its  ad- 
versaries as  not  holding  it  at  all. 

The  Protestant  need  only  throw  his  eye  a  second  time  upon  the 
above  passage,  to  see  that  he  has  misapprehended  its  meaning  and 
erred  in  his  translation.  He  makes  Calvin  say,  "  We  are  con- 
demned, not  by  imputation  merely,  as  if  punishment  were  exacted 
of  us  for  another's  sin,  but  we  undergo  its  punishment  (viz :  the 
punishment  of  Adam's  sin),  because  we  are  chargeable  with  its 
criminality  (viz :  the  criminality  of  Adam's  sin)  [directly  against 
the  reviewer  again]."  Yes,  and  against  Calvin  too  ;  for  there  is 
nothing  in  the  original  to  answer  to  the  word  its,  and  the  insertion 
entirely  alters  the  sense.  Calvin  does  not  say  that  we  are  charge- 
able with  the  criminality  of  Adam's  sin,  but  just  the  reverse :  "  non 
per  solam  imputationem  damnamur,  acsi  alieni  peccati  exigeretur 
a  nobis  poena ;  sed  ideo  poenam  ejus  sustinemus,  quia  et  culpae  su- 
mus rei,  quatenus  scilicet  natura  nostra  in  ipso  vitiata,  iniquitatis 
reatu  obstringitur  apud  Deum."  "  We  are  condemned  not  on  the 
ground  of  imputation  solely,  as  though  the  punishment  of  another's 
sin  was  exacted  of  us  ;  but  we  endure  its  punishment  because  we 
are  also  ourselves  culpable  (how  ?  of  Adam's  sin  ?  by  no  means, 
but  we  are  culpable),  inasmuch  as,  viz:  our  nature  having  been 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  175 

vitiated  in  him,  is  morally  guilty  before  God"  (iniquitatis  reatu  ob- 
strintntur  apud  Deum).  Here  is  a  precise  statement  of  the  sense  in 
whicn  we  are  morally  guilty,  not  by  imputation,  but  on  account  of 
our  own  inherent  depravity.  Two  things  which  the  Protestant 
seems  fated  never  to  discriminate. 

Besides,  the  Protestant,  after  making  Calvin  say,  "  we  are  charge- 
able with  its  criminality"  (viz  :  the  criminality  of  Adam's  sin),  thus 
renders  and  expounds  the  immediately  succeeding  and  explanatory 
clause,  beginning,  "  quatenus  scilicet,"  &c. :  "  Since  our  nature  be- 
ing in  fact  vitiated  in  him,  stands  chargeable  before  God  with  crimi- 
nality, i.  e.,  with  sin  of  the  same  nature  with  his."     Now  it  certainly 
is  one  thing  to  say  we  are  chargeable  with  Adam's  sin,  and  another 
that  we  are  chargeable  with  sin  of  the  same  nature  with  his.    Hun- 
dreds who  admit  the  latter,  deny  the  former.     Yet  the  Protestant 
makes  Calvin  in  one  and  the  same  sentence  say,  we  are  chargeable 
with  the  one,  since  we  are  chargeable  with  the  other.     That  is,  we 
are  guilty  of  Adam's  sin,  because  guilty  of  one  like  it.     This,  in  our 
opinion,  is  giving  the  great  Reformer  credit  for  very  little  sense. 
We  make  these  criticisms  with  perfect  candour.     Of  their  correct- 
ness let  the  reader  judge.     This  "  egregious  mistake"  of  the  Pro- 
testant (we  use  his  own  language,  p.  158)  doubtless  arose  from  his 
not  having  thought  it  his  "  duty  to  launch  into  the  dispute  about 
imputation,"  nor,  as  we  presume,  to  examine  it.     To  the  same 
cause  is  probably  to  be  traced  the  character  of  the  following  para- 
graph  ;  which  strikes  us  as  being  peculiarly  out  of  taste  and  unfor- 
tunate :     "  This  (the  passage  quoted  from  Calvin)  settles  the  whole 
controversy  at  a  single  stroke — not  as  to  what  is  truth — but  as  to 
what  is  old  Calvinism.     If  Calvin  be  not  permitted  to  speak  for 
himself,  this  is  one  thing ;   but  if  he  be,  then  Tuckney,  and  De 
Moor,  and  the  reviewer's  notable  French  synod,  would  have  done 
well  to  read  Calvin  instead  of  arguing  d  priori  in  order  to  prove 
what  he  has  said."     It  settles  nothing  at  all,  except  that  Calvin  ad- 
mitted both  doctrines,  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  and  inherent 
depravity.     It  is  true,  if  the  clause,  "  acsi  alieni  peccati  exigeretur 
a  nobis  poena  "  be  cut  to  the  quick,  and  taken  apart  from  its  con- 
nection, it  does  deny  our  doctrine  and  Calvin's  own  assertion.    For 
in  saying  that  Adam's  sin  is  not  the  sole  ground,  it  admits  that  it  is 
one  ground  of  our  condemnation.     If  I  say  a  man  is  condemned, 
not  for  piracy  merely,  but  also  for  murder,  do  I  not  assert  that  both 
are  the  ground  of  his  condemnation  ?     If  the  clause  in  question  be 
viewed  historically,  in  the  light  thrown  upon  it  by  the  opinions  of 
those  with  whom  Calvin  was  contending,  and  in  connection  with 
other  declarations  in  his  works,  its  consistency  with  the  common 
Calvinistic  theory  will  be  apparent.     He  meant  to  say,  in  opposi- 
tion to  Pighius  and  other  Catholics,  that  men  were  not  condemned 
on  the  ground  of  the  act  of  another,  solely,  without  having  a  de- 
praved moral  character;  but  being  inherently  corrupt,  were  in 
themselves  deserving  of  death. 

This  is  a  distinction  which  he  often  makes.     In  his  creed  written 


176  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

for  the  school  at  Geneva,  he  says,  "  Quo  fit,  ut  singuli  nascuntur  ori- 
ginali  peccato  infecti,  et  ab  ipso  maledicti,  et  a  Deo  damnati,  non 
propter  alienum  delictum  duntaxat,  sed  propter  improbitatem,  quae 
intra  eos  est."  Whence  it  is  clear  that  according  to  Calvin,  men 
are  condemned  both  propter  alienum  peccatum,  and  their  own  de- 
pravity. The  same  sentiment  occurs  frequently.  But  supposing 
we  should  admit,  not  that  Calvin  taught  that  Adam's  sin  was 
morally  our  sin,  for  of  this  the  passage  contains  not  a  shadow  of 
proof,  but  that  he  denied  the  doctrine  of  imputation  altogether,  nul- 
lius  addicti  jurare  in  verba  magistri,  it  would  not  much  concern  us. 
We  have  not  undertaken  to  prove  that  Calvin  taught  this  or  that 
doctrine,  but  that  Calvinists,  as  a  class,  never  believed  that  fmputa- 
tion  involved  a  transfer  of  moral  character. 

It  is,  moreover,  a  novel  idea  to  us,  that  a  sentence  from  Calvin 
can  settle  at  a  single  stroke  a  controversy  as  to  what  Calvinists  as 
a  body  have  believed.  We  have  not  been  accustomed  to  suppose 
that  they  squared  their  faith  by  such  a  rule,  or  considered  either 
his  Institutes  or  Commentaries  the  ultimate  and  sole  standard  of 
orthodoxy.  Tried  by  this  rule,  the  synod  of  Dort,  the  Westmin- 
ster divines,  the  old  Puritans,  and  even  Beza  and  Turrettin  were  no 
Calvinists.  Sure  it  is,  we  are  not.  There  is  much  in  Calvin  which 
we  do  not  believe  and  never  have.  We  do  not  believe  that  Christ 
descended  ad  inferos  and  suffered  the  pains  of  the  lost.  Yet  Calvin 
not  only  taught  this,  but  that  it  was  of  great  importance  to  believe 
it.  A  controversy  of  this  kind  is  not  so  easily  settled.  The  only 
proper  standard  by  which  to  decide  what  Calvinism  is,  is  the 
confessions  of  the  Reformed  churches  and  the  current  writings 
of  standard  Calvinistic  authors.  We  make  these  remarks 
merely  in  reference  to  the  Protestant's  short  and  easy  method  of 
dispatching  the  business  ;  not  at  all  as  admitting  that  Calvin  reject- 
ed the  doctrine  of  imputation.  Controversy  seems  to  have  had  in 
him,  in  a  measure,  its  natural  effect.  As  his  opponents  went  to 
one  extreme,  he  may  have  verged  towards  the  other.  As  they,  in 
regard  to  original  sin,  made  too  much  of  imputation,  he  was  under 
a  strong  bias  to  make  too  little  of  it.  As  they  denied  entirely  the 
corruption  of  nature,  he  was  inclined  to  give  it  an  overshadowing 
importance.  Yet,  as  we  have  just  seen,  his  works  contain  explicit 
declarations  of  his  having  held  both  points,  as  the  great  body  of 
Calvinists  has  ever  done. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression.  The  point  of  difference  be- 
tween "  Christ  and  Adam,"  to  which  Calvin  refers,  does  not,  there- 
fore, pertain  to  the  nature  of  imputation,  which  is  the  matter  now 
in  debate,  but  to  the  fact,  that  although  inherent  sin  enters  into  the 
ground  of  our  condemnation,  inherent  righteousness  is  no  part  of 
the  ground  of  our  justification.  It  is  stated  very  nearly  in  the  same 
terms  by  Turrettin  and  others,  who,  notwithstanding,  uniformly 
maintain  that  we  are  constituted  sinners  in  Adam  (eodem  modo,  ea- 
dem  ratione),  in  the  same  manner  that  we  are  constituted  righteous 
in  Christ.     Turrettin,  vol.  ii.,  p.  703,  in  refuting  the  Catholic  doc- 


THE    DOCTRINE    OP   IMPUTATION.  177 

trine  of  justification,  says,  "  Christus  per  obedientiam  suam  recte 
dicitur  nos  justos  constituere  non  per  inhaerentem  justitiam,  sed 
per  imputatam,  ut  Rom.  iv.  6  docetur,  et  ex  oppositione  anteceden- 
ts condemnationis,  cap.  v.  19,  colligitur.  Justi  enim  non  minus 
constituuntur  coram  Deo,  qui  propter  obedientiam  Christi  ipsis  im- 
putatam absolvuntur  a  meritis  poenis,  quam  ii  qui  propter  Adami 
inobedientiam  injusti  constituuntur,  i.  e.,  rei  sunt  mortis  et  condem- 
nationis." Here  then  it  is  expressly  stated,  the  obedience  by  which 
we  are  constituted  just  in  the  sight  of  God  is  not  inherent  (that 
which  affects  or  forms  our  own  moral  character),  but  imputed  (i.  e. 
laid  to  our  account),  exactly  as  the  disobedience  of  Adam  by  which 
we  are  constituted  unjust,  i.  e.,  exposed  to  death  and  condemnation, 
is  not  inherent  in  us.  So  far  the  cases  are  parallel — that  is,  so  far 
as  imputation  is  concerned.  But  after  this  the  parallel  does  not 
hold ;  because  we  derive  from  Adam  a  corrupt  nature  (inherent 
depravity)  which  is  also  a  ground  of  exposure  to  death,  whereas 
the  internal  holiness  which  is  the  fruit  of  Christ's  Spirit  is  no  part 
of  the  ground  of  our  justification.  "  Nee  si  Adamus  nos  etiam  in- 
justos  constituit  effective  per  propagationem  vitiositatis  inhaerentis, 
propter  quam  etiam  rei  mortis  sumus  coram  Deo,  sequitur  pariter 
Christum  nos  justos  constituere  per  justificationem  forensem  judicii 
Dei  per  justitiam  inhaerentem  nobis  ab  ipso  datam."  The  precise 
doctrine  of  Calvin,  and  our  standards,  and  of  the  Repertory. 

This  seems  the  proper  place  to  correct  another  mistake  of  the  J 
Protestant.  After  quoting  from  the  Gallic  Confession,  1 566,  the  de- 
claration, "  Original  sin,  is  vere  peccatum,  by  which  all  men,  even  I 
infants  in  the  womb,  are  subject  to  eternal  death,"  he  says,  "  Now  / 
the  old  Calvinists  did  not  make  two  sins,  first  Adam's,  and  second-  / 
ly  original  sin  as  resulting  from  it.  All  was  one  sin  (peccatum  ori-l 
ginis),  reaching  throughout  the  whole  race,  even  to  infants  in  the 
womb.  It  must  then  be  in  their  union  to  Adam,  that  infants  in  the 
womb  have  vere  peccatum,  i.  e.,  what  is  really  and  truly  sin.  But 
the  reviewer  says  their  sinning  in  Adam  was  merely  putative — 
that  to  make  it  really  and  truly  their  sin,  destroys  the  very  idea  of 
imputation.  It  is  perfectly  clear,  therefore,  that  his  view  of  the 
subject  is  diametrically  opposed  to  that  of  the  Gallican  churches." 
It  need  hardly  be  remarked  that  we  have  here  again  the  pervading 
misapprehension  to  which  we  have  so  often  referred.  Old  Calvin- 
ists did  make  two  sins,  first  the  sin  of  Adam,  and  secondly  inherent 
depravity  resulting  from  it.  The  former  is  ours  forensically,  in  the 
eye  of  the  law  ;  the  latter  morally.  The  former  is  never  said  to  be 
in  us  vere  peccatum;  the  latter,  by  Calvinists,  always.  This  is  a 
distinction  which  Calvin  makes  in  the  very  passage  quoted  by  the 
Protestant.  It  is  made  totidem  verbis  by  Turrettin,  as  we  have 
just  stated.  It  is  made  in  the  very  catechisms  of  the  church.  Ori- 
ginal sin  consists  "  in  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin,"  "  and  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  whole  nature."  See  also  the  passage  quoted  above 
from  Fisher.  "  Original  sin  is  usually  distinguished  into  original 
sin  imputed,  and  original  sin  inherent?     The  Augsburg  Confession, 

12 


178  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

in  a  formal  definition  of  original  sin,  makes  the  same  distinction. 
"  Intelligimus  autem  peccatum  originis,  quod  sic  vocant  Sancti  Pa- 
tres,  et  omnes  orthodoxi  et  pie  eruditi  in  ecclesia,  videlicet  reatum 
quo  nascentes  propter  Adae  lapsum  rei  sunt  irae  Dei  et  mortis 
aeternae,  et  ipsam  corruptionem  humanae  naturae  propagatam  ab 
Adamo."  Turrettin,  in  speaking  of  the  adversaries  of  the  doctrine 
of  imputation,  includes  those  who  do  not  make  the  distinction  in 
question.  Thus  of  Placaeus,  he  says, "  Adversariorum  commentum 
adoptavit,  et  dum  totam  rationem  labis  originalis  constituit  in  ha- 
bituali,  subjectiva  et  inhaerenti  corruptione,  quae  ad  singulos  per 
generationem  ordinariam  propagatur,  imputationem  istam  rejicit." 
Our  French  synod,  for  which  the  Protestant  seems  to  have  so  little  re- 
spect, but  who  in  charity  may  be  supposed  to  have  known  what  were 
their  own  doctrines,  formally  condemned  the  view  which  he  asserts 
was  the  common  doctrine  of  Calvinists.  "  Synodus  damnavit  doctri- 
nam  ejusmodi,  quatenus  peccati  originalis  naturam  ad  corruptionem 
haereditariam  posterorum  Adae  ita  restringit,  ut  imputationem  ex- 
cludat  primi  illius  peccati,  quo  lapsus  est  Adam."  The  Westmin- 
ster Assembly,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  their  catechism  assume 
the  very  same  ground.  Burgess,  one  of  the  leading  members  of 
that  Assembly,  in  his  work  on  Original  Sin,  p.  32,  says,  "  As  in  and 
by  Christ  there  is  an  imputed  righteousness,  which  is  that  properly 
which  justifieth,  and  as  an  effect  of  this  we  have  also  an  inhe- 
rent righteousness,  which  in  heaven  will  be  completed  and  perfect- 
ed ;  thus  by  Adam  we  have  imputed  sin  with  the  guilt  of  it,  and 
inherent  sin  the  effect  of  it."  Again,  p.  35,  "  The  apostle  distin- 
guished Adam's  imputed  sin  and  inherent  sin,  as  two  sins"  ("  di- 
rectly in  the  very  teeth  of  the"  Protestant,  if  we  may  be  permitted 
to  borrow  one  of  his  own  forcible  expressions).  "  By  imputed  sin 
we  are  said  to  sin  in  him  actually,  as  it  were,  because  his  will  was 
our  will  (jure  repraesentationis),  but  by  inherent  sin  we  are  made 
sinners  by  intrinsical  pollution."  We  sin  in  Adam  as  we  obey  and 
suffer  in  Christ,  the  disobedience  of  the  one  is  ours,  in  the  same 
way  and  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  obedience  of  the  other  is 
ours.  In  neither  case  is  the  moral  character  of  the  act  of  one  per- 
son transferred  to  another,  which  is  a  glaring  absurdity.  We  hope 
there  is  not  a  single  reader  who  does  not  perceive  how  surprisingly 
the  Protestant  has  erred  in  his  appeal  to  the  old  confessions.  The 
passages  which  he  quotes  have  nothing  at  all  to  do  with  the  subject 
of  imputation,  but  were  intended  to  define  the  nature  of  that  here- 
ditarium  vitium  which  is  diffused  through  the  race.  As  the  term 
original  sin  is  used  sometimes  in  a  broader,  and  sometimes  in  a 
more  restricted  sense,  sometimes  as  including  both  imputed  and 
inherent  sin,  and  sometimes  only  the  latter,  the  Protestant  has 
strangely  confounded  the  two  things.  The  early  Reformed 
churches  were  anxious  to  guard,  on  the  one  hand,  against  the  doc- 
trine of  some  of  the  Catholics,  that  original  sin  consisted  solely  in 
imputation,  without  any  corruption  of  nature ;  and  on  the  other, 
against  the  idea  that  the  hereditary  evil  of  which  they  spoke  was  a 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF   IMPUTATION.  179 

mere  disease,  and  not  a  moral  corruption.  Hence  we  find  the  as- 
sertion reiterated,  that  this  hereditarium  vitium  is  vere  peccatum. 
But  never  that  imputed  sin  is  vere  peccatum.  One  might  as  well 
assert,  that  as  the  sanctification  of  the  heart,  or  inherent  righteous- 
ness wrought  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  is  truly  of  a  moral  character, 
therefore  Christ's  imputed  righteousness  is  so  too. 

In  danger  of  utterly  wearying  the  patience  of  our  readers,  and 
proving  to  them  the  same  thing  for  the  twentieth  time,  we  must  be 
allowed  to  make  a  few  more  quotations  in  support  of  the  position 
which  we  have  assumed.  That  is,  to  prove  that  imputation  does 
not  include  the  transfer  of  moral  character ;  that  in  the  case  of 
Adam  there  is  a  sin,  which,  by  being  imputed  to  us,  renders  us  fo- 
rensically  guilty,  but  not  morally  ;  as  in  the  case  of  Christ,  there  is 
a  righteousness,  which,  by  being  imputed  to  us,  renders  us  judi- 
cially, but  not  morally  righteous.  One  would  think  that  enough 
had  been  presented,  in  our  former  article,  abundantly  to  establish 
this  point.  The  declaration  of  Owen,  however,  that,  "  To  be 
alienae  culpae  reus,  makes  no  man  a  sinner,"  passes  for  nothing. 
His  affirming  that,  "Nothing  more  is  intended  by  the  imputation 
of  sin  unto  any,  than  the  rendering  them  justly  obnoxious  unto  the 
punishment  due  unto  that  sin  ;  as  the  not  imputing  of  sin  is  the 
freeing  of  men  from  being  subject  or  liable  to  punishment;"  pro- 
duces no  effect.  In  vain,  too,  does  Tuckney  say,  in  one  breath, 
that  it  is  blasphemous  to  assert  that  the  imputation  of  our  sins  to 
Christ,  or  his  righteousness  to  us,  conveys  the  moral  character  of 
either,  and  in  the  other,  that  we  are  accounted  righteous  through 
Christ  in  the  same  manner  that  we  are  accounted  guilty  through 
Adam. 

Let  us  see,  therefore,  whether  we  can  find  anything  still  plainer 
on  the  subject. 

Turrettin,  vol.  ii.,  p.  707,  after  stating  that  imputation  is  of  two 
kinds,  1st,  where  something  is  laid  to  a  man's  charge  which  he  him- 
self performed,  and  2d,  where  one  is  regarded  as  having  done  what, 
in  fact,  he  did  not  perform,  infers  from  this,  that  to  impute  "  is  a 
forensic  term,  which  is  not  to  be  understood  physically  of  infusion 
of  righteousness  (or  unrighteousness)  but  judicially  and  relative- 
ly." "  Unde  colligitur  vocem  hanc  esse  forensem,  quae  non  est 
intelligenda  physice  de  infusione  justitiae,  sed  judicialiter  et  rela- 
tive." 

Immediately  after,  in  answer  to  the  objection  that  if  a  thing  is 
only  putative,  it  is  fictitious,  he  says,  the  conclusion  is  not  valid  : 
"  Cum  sit  res  non  minus  realis  in  suo  ordine  scilicet  juridico  et  fo- 
rensi,  quam  infusio  in  genere  morali  seu  physico."  Again,  p.  715,* 
"  Justitia  inhaerens  et  justitia  imputata,  non  sunt  sub  eodem  genere. 
Ilia  quidem  in  genere  relationis,  Ista  vero  sub  genere  qualitatis  :" 
Whence  he  says,  the  same  individual  may  be  denominated  just  or 

*  Having  already  shown  that,  according  to  Turrettin  and  other  Calvinists,  the  na- 
ture of  imputation  is  the  same,  whether  spoken  of  in  reference  to  sin  or  righteous- 
ness, such  passages  are  perfectly  ad  rem. 


180  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

unjust,  sub  diversa  axiatl-  "  F°r  when  reference  is  had  to  the  in- 
herent quality,  he  is  called  a  sinner  and  impious,  but  when  the  ex- 
ternal and  forensic  relation  is  regarded,  he  is  pronounced  just  m 
Christ.  It  is  true,  indeed,  no  one  can  be  called  inherently  just  by 
the  righteousness  of  another,  because  if  it  be  inherent  it  is  no  longer 
another's.  Yet  he  can,  by  imputation,  be  declared  justified." 
Again,  same  page,  "  When  God  justifies  us  on  account  of  the  im- 
puted righteousness  of  Christ,  his  judgment  is  still  according  to 
truth,  because  he  does  not  pronounce  us  just  in  ourselves  subjective- 
ly, which  would  be  false,  but  in  another  imputatively  and  relative- 
ly, which  is,  in  the  strictest  sense,  true." 

Now,  in  all  these  cases,  if  language  be  capable  of  expressing 
ideas,  it  is  most  distinctly  asserted  that  imputation  is  a  forensic 
term  ;  that  the  act  which  it  expresses  does  not  affect  the  moral 
character,  but  the  legal  relation  of  those  concerned  :  that  imputed 
sin  and  imputed  righteousness  do  not  come  sub  genere  qualitatis, 
but  sub  genere  relationis.  Hence  Turrettin  says,  p.  715,  "  Christus 
propter  imputatum  ipsi  nostrum  peccatum,  non  potest  dici  pecca- 
tor,  quod  importat  corruptionem  inhaerentem." 

On  p.  716,  the  following  passage  occurs :  "  Ut  inobedientia 
Adami  vere  nos  peccatores  constituit  per  imputationem*  (a  decla- 
ration which  will  be  seized  upon  with  both  hands ;  but  hear  the 
whole).  Ita  et  justitia  Christi  vere  nos  justificat  imputative.  Ita 
imputatum  bene  opponitur  inhaerenti,  sed  non  vero,  quia  non  fingi- 
mus  imputationem,  quae  consistat  in  mera  opinione  et  juris  fictione, 
sed  quae  maxime  realis  est  et  vera,  sed  ista  Veritas  est  imputa- 
tionis,  non  infusionis,  juridica,  non  moralis."  We  shall  for  ever 
despair  of  proving  anything,  if  this  does  not  prove  that  imputation, 
according  to  Turrettin  at  least,  does  not  involve  the  transfer  of 
moral  character.  The  imputation  of  the  disobedience  of  Adam 
constitutes  us  sinners,  and  the  imputation  of  the  obedience  of  Christ 
constitutes  us  righteous.  Now  in  what  sense  ?  Ans.  Juridical- 
ly, NOT  MORALLY. 

There  are  many  passages  in  the  old  authors  which  distinctly  as- 
sert the  absurdity  and  impossibility  of  such  a  transfer  of  moral  cha- 
racter, as  the  ancient  and  modern  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of  im- 
putation charge  them  with  believing.  Turrettin,  p.  71 1,  in  proving 
that  we  are  justified  by  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  which  is  ours, 
"non  utique  per  inhaesionem,  sed  per  imputationem," gives,  among 
others,  the  following  reasons,  1.  "  Quia  actus  unius  non  potest  fieri 

*  Some  may  say  here  is  a  direct  contradiction.  Imputation  constitutes  one  truly  a 
sinner,  yet  just  before,  our  sin  being  imputed  to  Christ  does  not  render  him  a  sinner. 
And  so  there  is  a  point-blank  contradiction.  Exactly  such  an  one  as  the  Protestant 
says  he  has  a  thousand  times  charged  on  old  Calvinists,  and  which  he,  or  any  one 
else,  may  charge  on  any  author  in  the  world,  if  you  take  his  words  out  from  their  con- 
nection, and  force  on  them  a  sense  which  they  by  themselves  may  bear,  but  which 
was  never  intended.  To  any  man  who  thinks  a  moment  on  the  subject,  there  is  no 
contradiction.  Imputation  of  sin  constitutes  us  sinners  in  one  sense,  but  not  in  ano- 
ther ;  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  but  not  morally.  Thus  Paul  says  that  Christ,  though  he 
knew  no  sin,  was  made  sin  (i.  e.,  a  sinner).  As  much  of  a  contradiction,  as  in  the 
passages  before  us. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  181 

plurium,  nisi  per  imputationem."  (It  cannot  become  theirs  by 
transfer,  or  infusion,  it  can 'only,  on  some  ground  of  union,  be  laid 
to  their  account.)  2.  "  Quia  ««ni«/>c/««  (Rom.  v.  18),  cui  opponitur 
liMhmf  (ms,  non  est  actus  physicus,  sed  forensis  et  judicialis."  That 
is,  as  the  act  by  which  we  are  constituted,  or  declared  guilty  on 
account  of  Adam's  sin,  is  not  a  physical  act  rendering  us  morally 

guilty ;  so  our  justification,  on  account  of  the  righteousness  of 
hrist,  is  not  a  rendering  us  formally  or  subjectively  righteous.  In 
each  case  the  process  is  forensic  and  judicial.  And  immediately 
after  he  quotes  the  following  passage  from  Bellarmin,  as  containing 
a  full  admission  of  the  doctrine  of  imputation :  "  Peccatum  Adami 
communicatur  nobis  eo  modo,  quo  communicari  potest  quod  transit, 
nimirum  per  imputationem."  Sin,  therefore,  cannot  pass  by  trans- 
fer. To  this  passage  from  the  Catholic  Cardinal,  Turrettin  sub- 
joins the  remark,  that  it  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  fact,  that  we 
are  also  rendered  sinners  and  liable  to  condemnation  by  the  corrupt 
nature  which  we  inherit  from  Adam,  we  are  also  justified  by  our 
inherent  righteousness  communicated  by  Christ  in  regeneration ; 
because  the  apostle  did  not  mean  to  teach  that  the  cases  are  paral- 
lel throughout,  though  they  are,  as  far  as  imputation  is  concerned. 
This  is  the  point  of  difference  to  which  we  have  already  referred. 
On  the  same  page  we  have  the  declaration,  "  Quod  est  inhaerens 
opponitur  imputato."  And  on  the  opposite,  Christ  is  our  righteous- 
ness before  God,  "  non  utique  inhaerenter,  quia  justitia  unius  ad 
alium  non  potest  transire,  sed  imputative."  It  follows  too,  he  says, 
from  2  Cor.  v.  21.  "  Eo  modo  nos  effici  justitiam  Dei  in  ipso,  quo 
modo  factus  est  pro  nobis  peccatum.  At  Christus  factus  est  pro 
nobis  peccatum,  non  inhaerenter  aut  subjective,  quia  non  novit  pec- 
catum, sed  imputative,  quia  Deus  ei  imputavit  peccata  nostra." 

In  every  variety  of  form,  therefore,  is  the  idea  of  transfer  of 
moral  character  denied  and  rejected  as  impossible  and  absurd,  and 
the  assertion  that  it  belongs  to  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion treated  as  a  calumny.  Turrettin,  towards  the  close  of  his 
chapter  on  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin,  in  speaking  of  some,  who 
on  certain  points  agreed  with  Placaeus,  says,  that  as  to  this,  they 
do  not  depart  from  the  common  opinion.  This,  he  states,  was  the 
case  with  Amyraldus,  "  qui  fuse  probat  peccatum  alicnum  posse 
juste  imputari  iis  qui  cum  authore  aliquo  vinculo  juncti  sunt,  licet 
culpam  non  participarint"  Here  then  is  a  distinct  assertion,  that 
imputation  does  not  imply  a  participation  of  the  criminality  of  the 
sin  imputed.  In  this  case  the  word  culpa  is  used  in  its  moral 
sense.  In  proof  of  his  assertion,  Turrettin  quotes  such  passages  as 
the  following : — "  Ex  eo  clarum  esse  potest,  quomodo  Apostolus 
intelligat  doctrmam  justifications,  nempe  quod  ut  condemnatio  qua 
condemnamur  in  Adamo,  non  significat  qualitatem  inhaerentem  sed 
vel  obligationem  ad  poenam,  vel  obligations  illius  declarationem  a 
potestate  superiore  ;  Ita  justitia  qua  justificamur  in  Christo,  non  sit 
etiam  qualitas  inhaerens,  sed  vel  jus  obtinendae  in  judicio  divino 
absolutionis,  vel  absolutio  ipsa  a  judice." 


182  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

We  have  taken  our  extracts  principally  from  Turrettin,  because 
we  thought  a  clearer  view  would  be  presented,  by  a  comparison  of 
various  statements  from  the  same  author,  than  by  disjointed  decla- 
rations from  several.  We  have  pursued  this  course,  the  rather, 
because  the  Spectator  does  not  pretend  that  Turrettin  differs  from 
common  Calvinists  in  his  views  on  this  subject.  They  themselves 
quote  him  as  holding,  what  they  consider  the  old  Calvinistic  scheme, 
and  endeavour  to  show  from  his  writings,  that  we  have  erred  in 
our  understanding  and  exposition  of  the  point  under  discussion. 
He  is  an  authority,  therefore,  to  which,  as  to  the  question  of  fact,  they 
will  cheerfully  bow.  It  would  be  easy,  however,  to  multiply  quo- 
tations to  almost  any'  extent  from  the  whole  range  of  standard  Cal- 
vinistic writers  in  support  of  the  views  which  we  have  presented. 
A  very  few,  by  way  of  example,  will  suffice.  Mark,  who  has  ever 
been  considered  as  one  of  the  most  thorough  and  consistent  theo- 
logians of  the  old  school,  in  his  Historia  Paradisi  Ulustrata,  has  a 
chapter  on  imputation,  in  which,  as  well  as  in  his  System  of  The- 
ology, the  doctrine  is  presented  precisely  as  we  have  exhibited  it. 
According  to  him,  the  union,  which  is  the  ground  of  the  imputa- 
tion of  Adam's  sin — is  that  of  representation,  he  being  the  common 
father  and  representative  of  the  race.  In  his  introductory  para- 
graph he  says,  he  proposes  to  speak,  "  de  omnium  naturalium  pos- 
terorum  repraesentatione  in  Adamo  ut  communi  parente  et  foederis 
capite." — P.  753.  In  Rom.  v.  12,  he  says,  we  are  taught  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  because  all  men  are  said  "  to  have  sinned  in 
Adam."  This  sinning  in  Adam,  however,  according  to  him,  is  as- 
serted, not  on  the  ground  of  a  mysterious  personal  union — but 
"  Peccatum  omnibus  tribui  actuale  in  eo  uno  homine  Adamo,  eos 
repraesentante."  (The  same  doctrine  is  taught  in  the  passage,  he 
says,  though  £#'  «  be  rendered  eo  quod,  or  quandoquidem.) 

The  analogy  between  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness 
and  the  sin  of  Adam  is  repeatedly  and  strongly  asserted.  An  ana- 
logy so  strict,  as  far  as  imputation  is  concerned,  that  all  the  diffi- 
culties, "  turn  exceptiones,  turn  objectiones,"  which  are  urged 
against  the  one,  bear  against  the  other  ;  whether  they  be  derived 
"  a  Dei  justitia  et  veritate,  ab  actus  et  personae  Adamicae  singu- 
laritate,  ex  sceleris  longe  ante  nos  praeterito  tempore,  ex  postero- 
rum  nulla  scientia  vel  consensione  in  illiud,  ex  non  imputatis  aliis 
omnibus  factis  et  fatis  Adami,"  or  from  any  other  source.  Hence, 
he  says,  there  is  the  greatest  ground  of  apprehension  ("  metus  jus- 
tissimus  sit"),  if  the  one  be  rejected,  the  other  will  be  discarded 
also.  And,  therefore,  "mirandum  aeque  quam  dolendum  est,'* 
that  some  (Placaeus  and  his  followers)  bearing  the  name  of  Re- 
formed Theologians,  should,  "  sub  specie  curatioris  attentionis  et 
majoris  cujusdam  sapientiae,"  revive  these  very  objections,  which, 
in  his  apprehension,  the  orthodox  had  answered  "  tam  solide  et 
late,"  against  the  Socinians  and  Remonstrants.  "  Quod  ne  serpat 
latius  ad  ecclesiae  patriaeque  totius  novam  turbationem  et  Pela- 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  IMPUTATION.  183 

gianismi  importunam  reductionem,  faxit  pro  sapientia  et  bonitate 
sua  Deus  !"* 

In  direct  opposition  to  the  Protestant's  assertion,  that  "  Old  Cal- 
vinists  did  not  make  two  sins,  first  Adam's  sin,  and  secondly  origi- 
nal sin  (depravity)  as  resulting  from  it,"  he,  in  common  with  all  the 
Reformers,  almost  without  exception,  and  the  whole  body  of  the 
reformed,  constantly  make  the  distinction  between  imputed  sin  and 
inherent  corruption,  maintaining  that  the  latter  could  not  be  recon- 
ciled with  God's  justice,  without  the  admission  of  the  former. 
"  Whatever  is  said,"  he  remarks,  "  of  a  natural  law,  according  to 
which  corrupted  Adam  should  beget  a  corrupt  posterity,  as  a 
wolf  begets  a  wolf,  and  a  diseased  man  diseased  children ;  and  of 
no  one  being  able  to  communicate  to  another  what  he  has  not  him- 
self, &c,  it  is  all  utterly  vain,  unless  the  judicial  imputation  of 
Adam's  act  be  admitted."  "  Id  omne,  absque  admissa  judiciali  im- 
putatione  Adamici  facti,  vanissimum  est." — P.  756.  And  on  the  pre- 
ceding page,  he  complains  of  Placaeus  as  "  not  admitting  imputa- 
tion as  the  antecedent  and  cause  of  native  corruption  flowing  from 
it."  And  adds,  "  Enim  vero  si  ipsa  Adami  transgressio  prima  nos 
non  constituit  damnabiles,  nee  corruptio  nativa  pro  poena  illius  in 
nobis  debet  haberi,  sed  ob  Adami  peccaminosam  similitudinem  tan- 
tum  rei  coram  Deo  simus  aut  fiamus,  jam  revera  imputatio  ilia  tol- 
litur."  The  idea,  therefore,  that  we  are  guilty,  i.  e.,  exposed  to 
condemnation,  because  of  our  sinful  likeness  to  Adam  merely, 
which  the  Protestant  represents  as  the  true  Calvinistic  doctrine,  is 
expressly  rejected.  This  view  of  the  judicial  imputation  of  Adam's 
sin,  as  the  cause  and  ground  of  innate  corruption,  is  not  a  later  ad- 
dition to  Calvinism,  as  has  been  inconsiderately  asserted,  but  was 
taught  by  Calvin  himself,  and  almost  all  his  brother  reformers. 
Calvin  says,  "  Deum  justo  judicio  nobis  in  Adamo  maledixisse  ac 
voluisse  nos  ob  illius  peccatum  corruptos  nasci,  peccasse  unum, 
omnes  ad  poenam  trahi,"  &c.  It  is  by  the  just  judgment  of  God, 
therefore,  according  to  Calvin,  and  as  a  punishment  for  Adam's  sin, 
that  we  are  born  corrupt.  To  the  same  effect  Beza  speaks  of  the 
"  corruptio,  quae  est  poena  istius  culpae  imposita  tarn  Adamo  quam 
posteris."  And  Martyr  strongly  asserts,  "  profecto  neminem  esse 
qui  ambigat,  peccatum  originale  nobis  infligi  in  ultionem  et  poenam 
primi  lapsus." 

This  view,  as  already  stated,  is  not  confined  to  Calvinists.  The 
Augsburg  confession,  as  quoted  above,  clearly  expresses  it.  And 
further,  the  standards  of  the  Lutheran  Church  assert  that,  "  Justo 
Dei  judicio  (in  poenam  hominum)  justitia  concreata  sou  originalis 
amissa  esset,"  by  which  defect,  privation,  or  spoliation,  human  na- 
ture is  corrupted.     See  Bretschneider,  vol.  ii.,  p,  33.     This  writer 

"  We  presume  our  brethren  will  consider  this  as  another  specimen  of  the  ad  in- 
vidiam argument.  Though  we  question  whether  the  idea  entered  their  minds,  that 
their  making  Owen  assert  that  those  who  held  our  doctrine  were  pretty  near  Soci- 
nianism,  was  anything  of  the  like  nature.  We  do  not  object  to  their  remark,  for  we 
are  not,  as  we  think,  quite  so  sensitive  as  they  are. 


184  THE    DOCTRINE    OF   IMPUTATION. 

immediately  adds,  the  same  sentiment  is  contained  in  the  assertion 
of  the  Apology  L,  p.  58.  "  Defectus  et  concupiscentia  sunt  poenae 
(des  Adamischen  Vergehens,  von  dem  die  Rede  ist).  Melancthon 
held  the  same  doctrine.  "  Melancthon  betrachtete  auch  den  Ver- 
lust  des  Ebenbildes  und  des  Enstehen  der  concupiscentia  als  Strafe 
fur  Adam's  Vergehen."  And  in  the  next  page  he  quotes  from  his 
Loci  Theolog.  the  following  passage,  "  Revera  autem  perpetua 
Ecclesiae  sententia  est,  prophetarum,  apostolorum  et  scriptorum 
veterum :  peccatum  originis  non  tantwm  esse  imputationem,  sed  in 
ipsa  hominem  natura  caliginem  et  pravitatem."*  Here  we  have 
the  common  view  to  which  we  have  so  often  referred,  original  sin 
includes  both  imputation  of  Adam's  sin,  and  inherent  depravity. 
Bretschneider  himself  says  expressly,  that  according  to  the  Schmal- 
kald  Articles  and  the  Form  of  Concord,  "  Beides,  das  Vergehens 
Adams  sowohl  als  das  dadurch  enstandene  Verderben  selbst  Ursa- 
che  der  Strafe  sey."  "  Both  Adam's  transgression,  and  the  corrup- 
tion thereby  occasioned,  is  the  ground  of  punishment."  Here 
"  are  two  sins — first  Adam's,  and  secondly  depravity  resulting 
from  it." 

We  refer  to  this  expression  of  opinion  by  the  early  Reformers, 
to  show  that  not  merely  Calvinists,  but  Lutherans  also,  held  the 
doctrine  of  imputation  as  we  have  exhibited  it.  That  they  held  the 
doctrine  cannot  be  denied,  and  the  way  in  which  they  understood 
it,  is  plain,  from  their  calling  imputation  a  forensic  or  judicial  act, 
a  declaration  of  one  as  a  sinner  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  in  opposition 
to  his  being  rendered  so  in  a  moral  sense  ;  precisely  as  justification 
is  a  rendering  just  legally,  not  morally.  The  same  thing  is  plain 
from  the  illustrations  of  the  subject,  with  which  their  works  abound 
— illustrations  borrowed  from  the  imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ, 
of  his  righteousness  to  us,  of  parents'  sins  to  their  children,  &c,  and 
finally  from  the  constant  representation  of  inherent,  innate  depra- 
vity, as  a  penal  evil.  If  penal,  of  what  is  it  the  punishment  ?  Of 
Adam's  sin.  Then,  if  this  sin  be  morally  ours,  they  taught  that 
men  are  punished  with  moral  depravity  for  being  morally  depraved 
— they  assumed  the  existence  of  corruption,  to  account  for  its  exist- 
ence !  All  becomes  plain,  if  you  will  allow  these  men  to  mean 
what  they  say  they  meant,  viz.,  that  in  virtue  of  our  union  with 
Adam  as  our  common  father  and  representative,  his  offence  is  ju- 
dicially regarded  (not  physically  rendered)  ours,  and  on  the  ground 
of  its  imputation  to  us  (i.  e.,  of  its  being  judicially  laid  to  our  ac- 
count), the  penalty  came  on  us  as  well  as  on  him  ;  hence  the  loss 
of  original  righteousness  and  corruption  of  nature  are  penal  evils. 

This,  we  are  persuaded,  is  the  common  Calvinistic  doctrine  on 
this  subject.  The  Protestant  blames  us  for  being  so  confident  as 
to  this  matter.  We  are  confident,  and  to  such  a  degree,  that  we 
are  willing  to  submit  to  all  the  mortification  arising  from  the  ex- 
posure of  ignorance,  where  ignorance  is  most  disgraceful,  viz.,  of 

*  Loci  Theologici,  p.  86.  Detzer's  edition,  1828. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.  185 

one's  own  long-cherished  opinions,  if  either  the  Protestant  or 
Spectator  will  accomplish  the  task  as  to  the  point  in  debate.  Let 
it  be  recollected  what  that  point  is  :  Does  the  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion, as  taught  by  old  Calvinists  as  a  body,  include  the  ideas  of 
"  literal  oneness"  and  transfer  of  moral  acts  or  moral  character  ? 
Prove  the  affirmative  of  this,  and  we  stand  ready  to  confess  igno- 
rance, and  to  renounce  old  Calvinism.  As  both  the  Protestant  and 
Spectator  have  made  the  attempt  and  repeated  it  without  in  our 
judgment,  with  modesty  be  it  spoken,  throwing  the  weight  of  a 
straw's  shadow  into  the  opposite  scale,  our  confidence,  to  say  the 
least,  is  not  weakened.  We  make  this  remark  in  no  overweening 
spirit ;  but  having  been  thus  taught  the  doctrine  in  question  on  our 
mother's  knees— naving  heard  it  thus  explained  from  the  catechism 
and  pulpit  all  our  lives, — to  have  it  now  asserted,  "  you  know 
nothing  of  the  matter ;  the  true  doctrine  includes  impossibilities 
and  absurdities  (and  blasphemies  too)  of  the  most  monstrous  kind," 
takes  us  not  a  little  by  surprise,  and  finds  us  not  a  little  incredulous. 

Let  us,  however,  for  a  moment  see  what  are  the  most  plausible 
grounds  on  which  their  allegations  rest.  The  Protestant,  indeed, 
tells  us,  M  he  has  not  thought  it  his  duty  to  launch  into  the  dispute 
itself  about  imputation,"  but  intended  to  make  only  "  a  few  obser- 
vations." In  these  observations  he  does  not  deny  that  the  exhibi- 
tion given  in  the  Repertory  of  the  views  of  Turrettin,  Owen,  &c, 
is  correct.  He  says,  indeed,  these  writers  contradict  themselves, 
but  that  they  taught  as  we  have  represented  them  to  do  he  admits ; 
for  he  has  not  said  a  word  to  rebut  the  positive  declarations  which 
we  adduced  from  their  writings,  but  questions  their  competency 
as  witnesses  as  to  what  Calvinism  is.  If,  therefore,  we  had  no 
other  opponent  in  this  discussion,  we  assuredly  should  not  have 
thought  it  necessary  to  say  another  word  on  the  subject,  until  he 
had  so  far  condescended  as  to  show  either  that  Turrettin,  Owen, 
De  Moor,  Tuckney,  and  the  French  Synod  of  1645,  were  not  Cal- 
vinists, or  that  we  had  misapprehended  or  misstated  their  views. 

He  expresses  great  surprise  at  our  appealing  to  such  authorities. 
"  I  confess,"  he  says,  "  this  mode  of  establishing  the  reviewer's 
opinions  struck  me  with  not  a  little  surprise.  What  ?  A  Presby- 
terian, and  leave  the  Westminster  confession  out  of  view?"  Again, 
"  But  why  did  he  not  go  to  the  standards  of  the  Calvinistic  churches 
instead  of  Turrettin  and  Owen  ?  As  he  has  not  done  it  I  must  do 
it  for  him." — P.  159.  The  answer  to  all  this  is  very  easy.  The 
point  in  debate  is  not,  whether  Calvinists  held  the  doctrine  of  impu- 
tation, for  this  is  not  denied,  but  how  did  they  understand  it  ?  This 
question  is  not  to  be  decided  by  appealing  to  the  old  confessions, 
because  in  them  we  find  the  mere  assertion  of  the  doctrine,  not  its 
explication.  They  tell  us  that  "  original  sin  includes  the  guilt  of 
Adam's  first  sin;"  the  question  is,  what  does  this  mean?  The 
Protestant  and  Spectator  say  it  means  one  thing  ;  we  say  it  means 
another.  Who  is  to  decide  ?  One  would  think  the  original  framers, 
adopters,  and  expounders  of  these  confessions — the  very  persons 


186  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

to  whom  we  appealed — and  whose  testimony  the  Protestant  so 
disrespectfully  rejects.  But  if  the  framers  of  an  instrument  are 
not  to  be  permitted  to  tell  us  in  what  sense  they  meant  it  to  be  under- 
stood, we  know  not  where  to  go  for  information.  We  were  very 
much  surprised  to  find  even  the  Spectator  saying,  that  from  our 
silence  with  regard  to  their  reference  to  the  Westminster  cate- 
chism, they  supposed  we  meant  tacitly  to  admit  our  dissent  from 
the  doctrine  of  imputation  as  taught  by  the  Westminster  divines, 
p.  163.  This  remark  is  the  more  singular,  as  the  very  point  in 
dispute  was,  in  what  sense  those  divines  and  Calvinists  generally 
held  the  doctrine.  It  would  have  been  strange  indeed  to  admit 
our  dissent  from  the  very  men  with  whom  we  were  labouring  to 
prove  we  agreed.  Besides,  in  introducing  the  testimony  of  Tuck- 
ney,  p.  445,  we  stated  that  he  was  a  member  of  the  Westminster 
Assembly,  and  of  the  committee  to  draft  the  confession  of  faith, 
and  the  author  of  a  large  part  of  the  catechism,  and  therefore,  "  a 
peculiarly  competent  witness  as  to  the  sense  in  which  our  formula- 
ries mean  to  teach  the  doctrine  of  imputation."* 

But  the  Protestant  thinks  we  had  very  good  reasons  for  not  ap- 
pealing to  the  old  confessions.  "  What  ?  A  Presbyterian  and 
leave  the  Westminster  confession  out  of  view  ?  Why  this  ?  was 
the  spontaneous  question  !  For  a  reason  plain  enough.  The  re- 
viewer recollected  the  answer  he  used  to  give,  when  a  child,  to  a 
catechetical  question,  viz.,  Sinned  in  him  and  fell  with  him  in  his 
first  trans'gression.  Indeed  ?  Sinned  in  him  ?  Then  there  is 
something  more  than  putative  sin ;  for  here  Adam's  sin  is  our  sin, 
and  his  guilt  is  our  guilt,"  and  so  on,  p.  159.  We  shall  endeavour 
to  answer  this  seriously.  What  do  our  standards  and  old  Cal- 
vinists generally  mean  when  they  say,  "All  mankind  sinned  in 
Adam  r  The  expression  obviously  admits  of  two  interpretations  ; 
the  one,  that  which  the  Protestant  and  Spectator  would  put  upon 
it,  viz.,  that  in  virtue  of  a  "  literal  oneness,"  all  mankind  really 
acted  in  him — his  act  was  literally  our  act ;  the  other  proceeds  on 
the  principle  of  representation — we  acted  in  him  as  our  representa- 
tive. This  latter  interpretation  is  at  least  possible.  First,  because 
it  is  a  very  familiar  mode  of  expression.  Nothing  more  common. 
Every  monarch  is  said  to  do  what  his  representatives  do.  "  The 
good  people  of  the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled."     Were 

*  On  the  same  page  the  Spectator  says  of  us,  that  notwithstanding  our  tacit  ac- 
knowledgment of  dissent  from  Calvin  and  the  Westminster  divines,  "  Still  they 
maintain  that  the  doctrine,  as  they  hold  it,  was  the  real  doctrine  of  the  reformed 
churches,  though  they  acknowledge  that  Doederlein,  Bretschneider,  and  other  distin- 
guished writers  on  theology,  are  against  them  on  this  point."  If  the  Spectator  will 
turn  to  the  passage,  p.  438,  to  which  he  refers,  he  will  find  that  we  make  no  such 
acknowledgment.  We  were  speaking,  not  of  the  "  reformed  churches,"  but  of  "  Au- 
gustine and  his  followers."  It  was  to  the  latter,  we  stated,  these  writers  attributed 
the  idea  of  literal  and  personal  oneness,  between  Adam  and  his  posterity — not  to  the 
reformed  churches.  So  far  from  it,  they  expressly  distinguish  the  theory  of  Augustine 
from  that  of  federal  union,  which  they  say  prevailed  among  the  reformed.  We  know 
of  no  "  distinguished  writer  on  theology"  who  maintains  the  ground  assumed  in  the 
Spectator,  in  reference  to  the  opinions  of  the  great  body  of  Calvinists. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  187 

they  ever  thus  actually  assembled  ?  Are  not  the  people  said  to  do 
everything  that  is  done  in  their  name  ?  Good,  says  the  Protestant, 
but  we  never  appointed  Adam  our  representative.  True.  But 
this  bears  on  the  justice  of  his  being  so  constituted  and  so  acting ; 
not  on  the  propriety  of  saying  "  We  sinned  in  him,"  on  the  sup- 
position of  his  being  our  representative,  which  is  the  only  point 
now  at  issue.  Common  usage,  then,  bears  out  this  interpretation. 
Secondly,  biblical  and  theological  usage  does  'the  same.  The 
apostle  says,  "  Levi  paid  tithes  in  Abraham."  Again,  Paul  says, 
in  reference  to  this  subject,  'e<p'  $  xavrss  fyaprov,  which  a  multitude  of 
commentators,  Pelagian,  as  well  as  others,  render  "  in  whom  all 
sinned."  Do  they  all  hold  the  doctrine  of  literal  oneness  with  Adam  ? 
Does  Whitby,  who  maintains  the  words  will  admit  of  no  other  ren- 
dering, understand  them  as  expressing  this  idea  ?  Besides,  when  the 
Bible  says  we  died  with,  or  in  Christ — are  raised  in  him — do  they 
mean  we  actually  died  when  he  died,  and  rose  when  he  rose  ? 

The  interpretation,  therefore,  which  we  put  on  the  phrase  in 
question  is  possible.  But,  further,  it  is  the  only  interpretation 
which,  with  a  shadow  of  reason,  can  be  put  upon  it  in  our  stan- 
dards. First,  because,  times  without  number,  their  authors,  and 
the  theological  school  to  which  they  belonged,  expressly  declare 
this  to  be  their  meaning — and  secondly,  because  their  illustrations 
prove  it.  Yet  the  Spectator,  p.  168,  says,  "  The  oneness  described 
by  Turrettin  is  a  literal  oneness,  not  something  resulting  from  stipu- 
lation or  contract."  We  are  filled  with  wonder  that  such  a  decla- 
ration should  come  from  such  a  source.  They  had  before  attributed 
the  same  doctrine  to  our  standards.  Had  they  been  Presbyterians , 
and  learnt  the  catechism,  they  never  could  have  made  such  an 
assertion.  "  The  covenant  being  made  with  Adam,  as  a  public 
person,  not  for  him  only  but  for  his  posterity,  all  mankind  descended 
from  him  by  ordinary  generation  sinned  in  him  and  fell  with  him 
in  his  first  transgression."*  If  English  be  any  longer  English,  this 
means  that  it  was  our  representative — as  a  public  person  we  sinned 
in  him — in  virtue  of  a  union  resulting  from  a  covenant  or  contract. 
Let  it  be  noted  that  this  is  the  only  union  here  mentioned.  The 
bond  arising  from  our  natural  relation  to  him,  as  our  common  pa- 
rent, is  not  even  referred  to.  It  is  neglected  because  of  its  second- 
ary importance,  representation  being  the  main  ground  of  imputation ; 
so  that  when  representation  ceases  imputation  ceases,  although  the 
natural  bond  continues.  Let  us  now  hear  Turrettin,  who  holds 
"  this  literal  oneness."  "  Adamus  duplici  isto  vinculo  nobiscum 
junctus  est:  1.  Naturali  quatenus  Pater  est,  et  nos  ejus  filii ;  2. 
Politico  ac  forensi  quatenus  fuit  princeps  et  caput  repraesentati- 
vum  totius  generis  humani."  This  is  a  formal,  precise  definition 
of  the  nature  of  the  union.  Is  there  anything  mysterious  in  the 
bond  between  parent  and  child,  the  representative  and  those  for 
whom  he  acts  ?     "  The  foundation,  therefore,"  he  continues,  "  of 

*  Larger  Catechism. 


188  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

imputation,  is  not  merely  the  natural  connexion  which  exists  be- 
tween us  and  Adam,  for  were  this  the  case  all  his  sins  would  be 
imputed  to  us — but  principally  the  moral  (not  physical ;  just  above 
it  was  called  political)  and  federal,  on  the  ground  of  which  God 
entered  into  covenant  with  him  as  our  head.  Hence  in  that  sin 
Adam  acted  not  as  a  private  but  a  public  person  and  representa- 
tive, &c." — P.  679.  Here,  as  before,  it  is  a  "  oneness"  resulting 
from  contract  which  is  made  the  ground  of  imputation — the  natu- 
ral union  is  frequently  not  mentioned  at  all.  Thus,  p.  689,  in 
stating  in  what  sense  we  acted  in  Adam,  or  how  his  act  was  ours, 
he  says  it  is  "  repraesentationis  jure."  Again,  p.  690,  "  Although, 
after  his  first  sin,  Adam  did  not  cease  to  be  our  head  ratione  ori- 
ginis,  yet  he  did  cease  to  be  our  representative  head  relatione  foe- 
deris" And  therefore  the  ground  of  imputation  no  longer  existed. 
Thus  Marck  says,  as  quoted  above,  "  All  men  sinned  in  Adam, 
eos  repraesentante."  Again,  in  his  Medulla,  p.  159,  "  Justissima 
est  autem  haec  imputatio,  cum  Adam  omnium  fuerit  parens,  coll. 
.Exod.  20,  5,  '  visitans  iniquitatem  patrum  super  nilios,'  &c,  et 
praeterea  foederaliter  omnes  repraesentaverit."  The  natural  con- 
nexion with  Adam  is,  therefore,  the  relation  between  parent  and 
child.  All  mankind,  says  Fisher,  in  his  exposition  of  the  cate- 
chism, "  descended  from  Adam  by  ordinary  generation,  were 
represented  by  him  as  their  covenant  head,  and  therefore  sinned 
in  him."  "  Qui  enim  actu  nondum  fuimus,  cum  Adamus  peccaret, 
actu  quoque  peccare  non  potuimus." — Wendeline  (a  strict  Calvin- 
istic  Hollander),  Christiana  Theologia,  p.  258.  It  is  just,  however, 
he  says,  that  Adam's  sin  should  be  imputed  to  us,  i.  e.,  considered 
ours ;  "  Quia  Adam  totum  quoque  humanum  genus  repraesen- 
tavit." 

Now  for  some  of  the  illustrations  of  the  nature  of  this  union. 
First,  we  were  in  Adam,  as  we  were  in  Christ,  the  act  of  the  one 
is  ours,  as  the  act  of  the  other  is.  So  Turrettin  repeatedly,  p.  689. 
As  the  act  of  Adam  is  ours,  repraesentationis  jure,  sic  justitia 
Christi  est  actus  unius,  and  yet  ours,  on  the  same  principle.  Again, 
Quamvis  non  fuerimus  (in  Adamo)  actu — yet  being  in  him  as  a 
father  and  representative,  his  act  was  ours — Ita  quamvis  non 
fuerimus  actu  in  Christo,  still,  since  he  died  for  us,  his  death  is  vir- 
tually our  death.  "  Ergo  ut  in  Christo  satisfecimus,  ita  et  in  Ada- 
mo peccavimus."*  Again,  we  were  in  Adam  as  Levi  was  in 
Abraham,  p.  687.     Was  this  literally? 

It  is  surely  unnecessary  to  dwell  longer  on  this  point.  The 
Spectator,  indeed,  tells  us  that,  according  to  the  old  writers, 
"  Adam's  posterity,  '  were  in  him  as  branches  in  a  root,'  '  as  the 
members  are  in  the  head.' "  Well,  what  does  this  mean  ?  Literal 
oneness  ?  Surely  not.  Does  every  writer  who  speaks  of  a  father 
as  the  root  of  his  family,  hold  to  the  idea  of  a  "  literal  oneness"  be- 
tween them.      You  may  make  as  little  or  as  much  as  you  please 

*  Zanch.  Epist,  quoted  and  approved  by  Leydecker,  Fax  Veritatis,  p.  444. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP  IMPUTATION.  189 

out  of  such  figurative  expressions,  taken  by  themselves.  But  by 
what  rule  of  interpretation  they  are  to  be  made  to  mean  directly 
the  reverse  of  what  those  who  employ  them  tell  us  they  intend  by 
them,  we  are  at  a  loss  to  divine.  It  must  be  a  strange  "  literal 
oneness"  which  is  founded  on  the  common  relation  of  parent  and 
child,  or  of  representation.  Yet  these  are  the  only  bonds  between 
us  and  Adam  which  Turrettin  acknowledges,  and  of  these  the  for- 
mer is  comparatively  of  so  little  importance,  as  very  commonly  to 
be  left  out  of  view  entirely,  when  speaking  on  the  subject. 

But  we  must  hasten  to  another  point.     The  main  dependence  of 
the  Spectator,  in  his  attempt  to  prove  our  departure  from  the  old 
Calvinistic  system,  is  on  the  use  of  the  word  "ill-desert."     But 
words,  he  tells  us,  p.  321,  are  nothing.     Let  us  have  ideas.     We 
said,  the  ill-desert  of  one  man  cannot  be  transferred  to  another. 
Turrettin  says,  "  The  ill-desert  of  Adam  is  transferred  to  his  pos- 
terity."    Admitted,  freely.     Is  not  this  a  direct  contradiction  ?     Not 
at  all.     Turrettin  says,  on  one  page,  "  Imputation  of  sin  does  not 
constitute  one   a   sinner,"*  on  the  very  next,   "  The  imputation 
of  Adam's  sin  does  constitute  all  men  sinners."     Is    there   any 
contradiction  here?      So   the   Protestant  would   say:    but  there 
is  none.     Let  language  be  interpreted,  not  by  the  tinkling  of  the 
words,  but  by  the  fair  and  universal  rules  of  construction.     Im- 
putation does  render  a  man  a  sinner,  in  one  sense,  and  not  in 
another — judicially,  not  morally.     So  justification  renders  a  man 
just  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  but  not  inherently.     How  often  may  the 
same  verbal  proposition  be,  with  equal  propriety,  affirmed  or  de- 
nied !     How  obvious  is  it,  that  the  same  man  may,  at  the  same 
time,  be  pronounced  both  just  and  unjust,  sub  diversa  oxtaci-     This 
is  an  evil — an  ambiguity  in  the  sense  of  terms,  which  pervades  all 
language,  and  which  subjects  every  writer  to  the  charge  of  con- 
tradicting himself  and  everybody  else,  any  one  may  take  a  fancy 
to  place  in  opposition  to  him.     The  word  guilt  is  as  ambiguous  as 
the  word  sinner.     It  is  sometimes  used  in  a  moral,  at  others  in  a 
legal  sense  ;  and  so  is  the  word  ill-desert.      We  used  it  in  the  for- 
mer, Turrettin  in  the  latter.     These  are  points  to  be  proved.     As 
to  the  first,  viz.,  that  we  used  the  word  ill-desert  in  its  moral  sense, 
it  is  plain,  if  from  no  other  fact,  at  least  from  this,  that  the  Specta- 
tor so  understood  it,  so  understands,  and  so  urges  it.     He,  there- 
fore, at  least,  must  be  satisfied.      It  is  plain,  too,  from  this  fact,  that 
we  (in  the  history  of  Pelagianism)  interchanged  it  with  the  phrases 
"moral  acts"  and  "moral  character,"  in  a  way  clearly  to  evince 
that  we  employed  them  as  equivalent  expressions.     And  the  Spec- 
tator quotes  them,  as  meaning  precisely  the  same  thing.     That  this 
was  our  meaning  is  still  plainer,  if  possible,  from  the  fact,  that  in 
the  long  discussion  of  the  nature  of  imputation,  the  word  ill- desert 
does  not  occur  at  all.     Seeing  the  confusion  of  ideas  which  pre- 
vailed, we  endeavour  to  prevent  all  cause  of  stumbling,  by  avoid- 

*  So  Owen,  •«  To  be  culpae  alienae  reus  makes  no  man  a  sinner." 


190  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

ing  an  ambiguous  word,  and  by  repeating,  we  fear  to  weariness, 
that  it  was  "  moral  acts,"  "  moral  character,"  "  moral  turpitude," 
the  transfer  of  which  we  denied  ;  and  so  again  the  Spectator  un- 
derstood us.  The  difficulty  is,  not  that  they  have  mistaken  our 
meaning,  but  that  they  misunderstand  Turrettin.  All  we  have  to 
prove  is,  that  they  consider  Turrettin  to  use  the  word  ill-desert  in 
a  moral  sense,  as  equivalent  to  moral  turpitude,  or  moral  charac- 
ter ;  and  secondly,  that  in  this  they  commit  an  obvious  mistake.  If 
we  establish  these  two  points,  we  shall  be  in  clear  day  again.  As 
to  the  first,  it  hardly  needs  proof,  for  it  is  the  very  point  they  have 
from  the  beginning  been  labouring  to  establish — viz.,  that  imputa- 
tion conveys  the  moral  character  of  the  act  imputed.  On  p.  165, 
they  ask,  "  What  then  was  our  sin  in  Adam  ?  It  was,  as  Turret- 
tin  tell  us,  in  a  passage  quoted  above  (commune  peccatum,  commu- 
nis culpa),  '  a  sin,  a  criminality  common  to  Adam  and  his  whole 
race.'     But  they  all  affirm,  that  it  was  '  vere  peccatum,'  '  truly  sin,' 

AS  TRULY  SO  AS  ARE  ANY  OF  OUR  PERSONAL,  i.  C,  ACTUAL  TRANSGRES- 
SIONS."* 

Now  as  to  the  second  point,  viz.,  that  Turrettin  and  other  Cal- 
vinists  do  not  use  the  words  guilt,  demerit,  ill-desert,  &c,  as  the 
Spectator  understands  them,  in  a  moral  sense,  we  have  already 
proved  it,  and  might  abundantly  prove  it  again,  because  they  ex- 
pressly, repeatedly  and  pointedly  affirm  the  contrary.  Thus,  when 
he  says,  "  We  are  constituted  truly  sinners  by  the  imputation  of 
Adam's  sin,"  he  tells  us  as  plainly  as  language  permits,  in  what 
sense,  "  Ista  Veritas  est  imputationis,  non  infusionis,  juridica, 
non  moralis."  The  sin  of  Adam  is  a  common  sin.  In  the  Specta- 
tor's sense  or  ours  ?  Let  Turrettin  answer.  "  The  act  of  Adam  is 
universal  (or  common)  repraesentationisjure — quiaindividuumillud 
universum  genus  humanum  repraesentavit.  Sic  Justitia  Christi," 
is  common  on  the  same  ground  and  in  the  same  way,  p.  689. 
Again,  to  impute  is  a  forensic  term,  meaning  to  set  to  one's  ac- 
count, "  non  est  actus  physicus,  sed  forensis  et  judicialis  ;"  it  is  to 
render  one  a  sinner  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  not  morally — as  the  im- 
putation of  righteousness  renders  legally,  and  not  inherently  just. 
Alas  !  how  often  must  this  be  said  ?  Again.  Imputed  sin  is  con- 
stantly opposed  to  inherent.  The  one  comes  under  the  category 
of  relation,  the  other  under  that  of  quality — one  affects  our  legal 
standing,  and  the  other  our  moral  character.     See  above. 

We  might  prove  the  point  in  hand,  2dly,  from  the  illustrations 
which  he  gives  of  the  subject.  These  illustrations  are  drawn  from 
the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness  to  us,  of  our  sins  to  Him — 
of  those  parental  sins,  which  are  visited  on  children,  &c.  Take 
two  passages  in  addition  to  those  already  quoted.  "  As  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ,  which  is  one,  can  yet  be  communicated  by  im- 
putation, to  an  innumerable  multitude ;  and  as  the  guilt  of  those 
sins  of  parents  which  are  imputed  to  their  descendants,  is  one  and 

*  These  capitals  are  ours. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  191 

the  same,  which  passes  upon  all ;  so  nothing  prevents  the  guilt 
of  Adam's  sin  being  one  and  equal,  which  passes  on  all  men." — P. 
690.  The  guilt  of  Adam  passes,  therefore,  as  the  righteousness  of 
Christ  does,  and  as  the  guilt  of  those  parental  sins  which  are  im- 
puted to  their  children.  Now,  if  any  sane  man  will  maintain  that 
the  righteousness  of  Christ,  according  to  Turrettin,  is  rendered  mo- 
rally ours  ;  or,  more  monstrous  still,  that  the  moral  turpitude  of  pa- 
rents is  transferred  to  their  children — then  we  shall  leave  him  in 
undisturbed  possession  of  his  opinion.  Again,  to  the  same  effect, 
p.  689.  "  It  is  inconsistent  with  divine  justice  that  any  should  be 
punished  for  a  sin  foreign  to  him,  foreign  in  every  sense  of  the 
word  ;  but  not  for  a  sin,  which,  although  it  be  foreign  ratione  per- 
sonae,  is  yet  common  in  virtue  of  representation  or  some  bond  of 
union,  by  which  its  guilt  may  involve  many — for,  that  this  may 
justly  happen,  the  threatenings  of  the  law,  and  the  judgments  by 
which  they  are  executed,  and  the  example  of  Christ,  to  whom  our 
sins  were  truly  imputed,  demonstrate."  Here,  then,  notice,  first,  in 
what  sense  Adam's  siri  is  a  common  sin,  viz.,  in  virtue  of  union  with 
him  as  our  representative  and  parent ;  and  secondly,  that  as  his 
guilt  involves  us,  so  the  guilt  of  parents  involves  their  children  (when 
their  sins  are  imputed  to  them),  and  so  our  guilt  involves  Christ. 
Now  will  not  the  Spectator  frankly  admit  that  the  guilt,  the  de- 
merit, the  ill-desert  of  which  Turrettin  speaks  as  being  transferred 
— is  not  moral  character  or  turpitude — but  legal  responsibility — 
such  as  exists  between  a  sponsor  and  him  for  whom  he  acts — a 
surety  and  debtor — Christ  and  his  people — an  obligation  to  suffer — 
a  dignitas  poenae  arising  out  of  the  legal  relations,  and  not  out  of 
the  moral  character  of  those  concerned  ?  Will  they,  or  can  they, 
charge  the  greatest  and  holiest  men  of  the  church  with  holding  the 
blasphemous  doctrine,  that  Christ  was  rendered  morally  a  sinner, 
by  the  transfer  of  our  sins  ? 

We  should  have  to  go  over  the  whole  ground  anew,  were  we  to 
exhibit  all  the  evidence,  which  we  might  adduce,  to  prove  that  Tur- 
rettin and  old  Calvinists  generally,  do  not  use  the  words  guilt,  de- 
merit, ill-desert  in  a  moral  sense.  If  they  do,  then  they  neld  the 
transfer  of  moral  character  ;  admit  the  validity  of  all  the  objections 
of  their  opponents  ;  acknowledge  as  true,  what  they  pronounce  to 
be  as  absurd  and  impossible,  as  to  be  wise  with  another's  wisdom, 
honest  with  another's  integrity,  or  comely  with  another's  beauty ; 
they  maintain  the  communication  of  that  which  they  declare  to  be 
"  as  inseparable  and  incommunicable  as  any  other  attribute  of  a 
thing  or  its  essence  itself."  Into  such  a  maze  of  endless  self-con- 
tradiction and  absurdity  do  we  necessarily  involve  them,  when  we 
insist  on  interpreting  their  language,  out  of  its  connection,  accord- 
ing to  our  own  preconceived  notions — insisting  upon  it,  that  be- 
cause we  are  accustomed  to  attach  the  idea  of  moral  pollution  to 
the  words  guilt,  sinner,  demerit,  they  must  have  done  so  too. 
Accordingly  the  Protestant  has  nerve  enough  to  say,  for  the  thou- 
sandth time — that  all  these  men  are  travelling  a  perpetual  round 


192  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

of  self-contradiction — affirming  and  denying,  ki  rapid  succession, 
precisely  the  same  thing.     But  what,  let  us  ask,  is  the  use  of  the 
"  new  exegesis"  (sensus  communis  redivivus),  if  all  its  principles 
are  to  be  trampled  under  foot — if  a  writer,  instead  of  having  his 
language  explained  agreeably  to  the  usus  loquendi  of  his  age  and 
school — to  his  own  definitions,  explanations,  and  arguments,  and  in 
accordance  with  his  own  system  and  the  nature  of  the  subject — is 
to  be  made,  without  the  slightest  necessity,  to'use  terms  in  the  sense 
in  which  we  may  happen  to  be  accustomed  to  employ  them  ?   What 
kind  of  reasoning,  for  example,  is  this,  To  be  truly  a  sinner,  is  to 
have  a  sinful  moral  character.     Turrettin  says,  we  are  rendered 
truly  sinners  by  imputation  of  sin — ergo,  Turrettin  taught  that 
imputation  of  sin  conveys  a  sinful  moral  character.     Q.  E.  D.? 
Or  this  :  To  be  truly  righteous,  is  to  have  a  righteous  moral  cha- 
racter (i.  e.,  a  moral  character  conformed  to  the  law).     Calvinists 
say,  we  are  constituted  truly  righteous  by  the  imputation  of  right- 
eousness— ergo,  imputation  conveys  moral  character.  Q.  E.  D.  ? 
Yet  here  is  the  concentrated  essence  of  sixty  pages  of  argumenta- 
tion.    And  what  does  it  amount  to  ?    To  a  very  ingenious  specimen 
of  that  kind  of  syllogism  in  which  the  major  proposition  includes  a 
petitio  principii.     In  assuming  that  the  terms  "  sinner"  and  "  right- 
eous" are  used  in  a  moral  sense,  the  very  thing  to  be  proved  is 
taken  for  granted.     Against  this  assumption  old  Calvinists  con- 
stantly protest,  and  state  with  tiresome  frequency,  that  they  use 
these  words  as  they  occur  in  the  Bible,  in  courts  of  law,  and  a 
thousand  times  in  common  life,  not  in  a  moral,  but  in  a  legal  or  fo- 
rensic sense  ;  that  to  be  legally  a  sinner  is  one  thing,  and  morally 
so,  another — to  be  legally  righteous  is  one  thing,  and  morally  so,  ano- 
ther.    If  our  brethren,  however,  will  have  it,  that  because  the  terms, 
in  their  opinion,  should  always  include  the  idea  of  moral  character, 
therefore  old  Calvinists  do  in  fact  so  employ  them,  we  venture  to 
predict  they  will  stand  very  much  alone  in  their  opinion.* 

*  The  passages  quoted  from  Calvin  by  the  Spectator,  p.  165,  are  of  a  different  char- 
acter, though  quite  as  little  to  the  purpose.  When  Calvin  uses  the  expression,  "  acsi 
nulla  nostra  culpa  periremus,"  the  Spectator  understands  him  as  saying  that  Adam's 
sin  was  properly  our  sin.  They  ask,  "  What  then  was  our  sin  in  Adam  ?"  and  an- 
swer, "  They  (i.  e.,  old  Calvinists)  all  affirm  it  was  truly  sin — as  truly  so  as  are  any 
of  our  personal,  i.  e.,  actual  transgressions.  It  is  "  nostra  culpa,"  "  our  criminality," 
says  Calvin."  Now  Calvin  says  no  such  thing.  He  does  not  say  that  Adam's  sin  was 
our  sin  :  "  Sunt  qui  contendunt,"  he  says,  "  nos  ita  peccato  Adae  perditos  esse,  acsi 
nulla  nostra  culpa  periremus,  ideo  tantum  quasi  ille  nobis  peccasset."  "  There  are 
some  who  contend  that  we  are  so  destroyed  by  the  sin  of  Adam,  as  that  we  perish 
without  any  criminality  of  our  own— as  though  he  only  sinned  for  us."  These 
"  some"  were  the  Catholic  divines  with  whom  he  was  in  constant  opposition,  who 
taught  that  original  sin  consisted  in  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  solely;  that  there 
was  no  depravity  of  nature.  This  it  is  he  denies — we  do  not  perish  on  account  of 
that  sin  solely,  without  being  personally  depraved.  This  too  he  thinks  the  apostle  de- 
nies when  he  says,  Rom.  v.  ]  2,  "  Since  all  have  sinned"  i.  e.,  all  are  corrupt.  "  Istud 
peccare,  est  corruptos  esse  et  vitiatos  Ilia  enim  naturalis  pravitas  quam  e  matris 
utero  afferimus,  peccatum  est."  Calvin  therefore  is  speaking  of  one  subject,  and  the 
Spectator  applies  his  words  to  another.  We  have  adverted  to  this  point  already,  and 
clearly  shown  that  Calvin  taught  we  are  condemned,  both  propter  peccatum  alienum, 
and  propter  improbitatem,  which  is  in  our  own  hearts.     So  in  Ezek.  xviii.  20,  he 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.  193 

But  it  is  high  time  to  draw  this  article  to  a  close.  There  are 
properly  two  questions  involved  in  this  discussion.  The  one  re- 
lates to  the  nature  of  imputation  :  Does  it  include  the  ideas  of  lite- 
ral oneness  and  transfer  of  moral  character  ?  The  other :  Sup- 
posing these  ideas  not  to  belong  to  the  doctrine,  how  far  is  there 
any  real  difference  of  opinion  between  those  who  hold  the  doctrine 
and  those  who  reject  it?  The  Spectator  says  the  difference  is 
merely  verbal :  we  think  it  real  and  important.  There  is,  however, 
a  measure  of  truth  in  their  assertion.  For  it  has  happened  here, 
as  it  is  wont  to  happen  in  such  cases,  men  often  violently  denounce 
a  doctrine  in  one  breath,  and  in  the  next  assert  radically  the  same 
idea.  Thus  Bellarmine  denies  with  singular  vehemence  the  impu- 
tation of  Christ's  righteousness,  and  yet  comes  out  with  the  doc- 
trine so  fully  and  plainly,  that  Tuckney  affirms,  neither  Luther  nor 
Calvin  could  have  presented  it  with  more  precision  and  distinctness. 
And  Turrettin  quotes  him  as  stating  the  doctrine  of  the  imputation 
of  Adam's  sin,  to  his  entire  satisfaction.  Such  things  still  happen. 
We  question  whether  any  man,  since  the  days  of  Augustine,  has 
stated  the  latter  doctrine  in  stronger  terms  than  Dr.  Hopkins,  in 
the  passage  quoted  above ;  yet  he  rejects  the  doctrine.  That 
Adam  is  our  federal  head  and  representative,  and  his  disobedience 
is  our  disobedience,  he  admits,  and  this  is  the  whole  doctrine.  So 
too  our  New  Haven  brethren  revolt  at  the  idea  of  representation, 
and  of  our  being  included  in  the  same  covenant  with  Adam,  and 
yet  tell  us,  "  Adam  was  not  on  trial  for  himself  alone,"  but  also  for 
his  posterity.  How  one  man  can  be  on  trial  for  another,  without 
that  other  standing  his  probation  in  him — falling  if  he  fall,  and  stand- 
ing if  he  stand — we  cannot  conceive,  and  happily,  it  is  not  for  us  to 
explain.  Though  the  opposers  of  such  doctrines,  driven  by  the 
stress  of  truth,  do  thus  occasionally  come  out  with  the  admission  of 
what  they  are  denying,  still,  we  cannot  thence  infer  that  there  is 
no  real  difference,  even  as  to  these  very  points,  between  them  and 
those  whom  they  oppose.  We  should  err  very  much  if  we  were 
to  conclude  from  the  fact  that  Bellarmin  states  so  clearly  the  doc- 
trine of  the  imputation  of  righteousness,  that  he  agreed  with  Luther 
and  Calvin  on  the  subject  of  justification.  The  case  was  far  other- 
wise. He  retained  his  idea  of  inherent  righteousness  and  moral 
justification,  and  sapped  the  foundation  of  the  cardinal  doctrine  of 
the  Christian  system — justification  on  the  ground  of  Christ's  merits, 
to  the  exclusion  of  everything  subjective  and  personal.  And  the 
evils  of  this  theory,  notwithstanding  his  admission,  by  turning  the 
confidence  of  men  from  Christ  to  themselves,  were  not  the  less  fatal 
to  truth  and  holiness.  This  is  no  unusual  occurrence.  It  is  a 
common  saying,  that  every  Arminian  is  a  Calvinist  in  prayer,  yet 
we   cannot  thence   infer,   he   is   really   a   Calvinist   in  doctrine. 

says,  "  Si  quaeratur  causa  maledictionis,  quae  incumbit  omnibus  posteris  Adae,  dici- 
tur  essy  alienum  peccatutn,  et  cujusque  propriutn."  The  ground  of  our  condemna- 
tion is  peccatum  alienum,  as  well  as  peccatum  cujusque  proprium.  Two  sins — im- 
puted and  inherent. 

13 


194  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

Though  we  are  ready  to  admit,  therefore,  that  at  times  the  Spec- 
tator comes  near  admitting  all  we  ask,  there  is  still,  we  fear,  a  hia- 
tus valde  deflendus  which  continues  to  separate  us.  What  the  dif- 
ference is,  we  distinctly  stated  in  our  previous  article.  They  deny 
the  transfer  or  assumption  of  legal  obligation  or  responsibility,  and 
therefore  maintain  that  the  punishment  of  one  man  can  never,  un- 
der any  circumstances,  come  upon  another.  We  use  the  word 
punishment  precisely  as  they  do ;  it  is  evil  inflicted  on  a  person  by 
a  judge  in  execution  of  a  sentence,  and  with  a  view  to  support  the 
authority  of  the  law.  This  is  the  principle  which  they  reject.  A 
principle  which,  entering,  as  it  does,  into  the  view  of  original  sin  as 
entertained  by  all  the  Reformed  churches  (for  all  held  that  the  loss 
of  original  righteousness  and  corruption  of  nature  were  penal 
evils),  essential  as  it  is  to  the  doctrine  of  substitution,  and,  as  we 
think,  to  all  correct  views  of  atonement  and  justification,  we  deem 
of  the  highest  consequence  to  the  cause  of  evangelical  truth  and 
piety.  This  is  a  part  of  the  subject  on  which  we  have  not  time  to 
enter,  and  which  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  task  which  we  origi- 
nally assumed  ;  which  was  to  vindicate  ourselves  from  the  charge 
of  having  abandoned  the  common  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion, by  proving  that  the  doctrine  was  held  by  old  Calvinists  pre- 
cisely as  we  have  presented  it.  If  after  this  proof  and  this  exhibi- 
tion, our  New  Haven  brethren  can  intelligently  say  they  agree 
with  us,  we  shall  heartily  rejoice. 


ESSAY    VIII. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.* 


Joshua  Placaeus,  Professor  of  Theology  in  the  celebrated  school 
at  Saumur,  published,  towards  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, the  doctrine,  that  original  sin  consists  merely  in  the  heredi- 
tary corruption  of  our  nature,  without  any  direct  imputation  of  the 
first  sin  of  Adam  to  his  posterity.  The  case  was  brought  before 
the  National  Synod  of  the  French  Reformed  Churches,  which  met 
at  Charenton,  near  Paris,  in  1645.  The  name  of  Placaeus  was  not 
mentioned,  but  the  doctrine  which  he  taught  was  examined  and  con- 
demned.    The  decree  of  the  Synod  was  as  follows : — 

"  Whereas  a  report  has  been  made  to  the  Synod  of  certain 
writings,  printed  and  manuscript,  by  which  the  nature  of  original 
sin  is  made  to  consist  solely  in  the  hereditary  corruption,  original- 
ly residing  in  all  men,  but  the  imputation  of  the  first  sin  of  Adam 
is  denied ;  the  Synod  condemns  the  aforesaid  doctrine,  so  far  as  it 
restricts  the  nature  of  original  sin  to  the  mere  hereditary  corruption  of 
Adam's  posterity,  excluding  the  imputation  of  the  first  sin  by  which 
he  fell ;  and,  under  the  penalty  of  censures  of  all  kinds,  forbids  all 
pastors,  professors,  and  others,  who  may  treat  this  subject,  to  de- 
part from  the  common  opinion  of  all  Protestant  churches,  which, 
besides  corruption,  have  always  acknowledged  the  aforesaid  im- 
putation to  the  whole  posterity  of  Adam.  And  (the  National  Sy- 
nod) commands  all  synods  and  classes,  in  taking  steps  for  the  re- 
ception of  students  into  the  sacred  ministry,  to  require  of  them  sub- 
scription to  this  statute." — (Act.  Syn.  Char.,  c.  19,  art.  1.) 

Placaeus  now  contended  that  he  was  not  touched  by  this  de- 
cree, because,  he  said,  he  did  not  absolutely  deny  imputation  of 
every  kind,  but  only  that  which  was  immediate  and  antecedent. 
He  invented  a  distinction  between  mediate  and  immediate  imputa- 
tion ;  immediate  imputation  being  that  which,  in  the  order  of  na- 
ture, precedes  inherent  corruption  ;  mediate  imputation  that  which, 
in  the  order  of  nature,  is  consequent  and  dependent  on  corruption. 

Placaeus,  though  an  able  man  and  learned  theologian,  had,  at 

•  Published  in  1839,  with  some  reference  to  the  following  work: — 
'^Decretum  Synodi  Nationalis  Ecclesiarum  Reformatarum  Galliae  initio  Anni  1645,. 
de  imputatione  primi  peccati  omnibus  Adami  posteris,  cum  Ecclesiarum  et  Doctorum 
Protestantium  consensu,  ex  scriptis  eorum,  ab  Andrea  Riveto  collecto." 


196  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

that  time,  few  followers.  His  doctrine  was  repudiated  by  the  Pro- 
testant theologians  of  the  day,  with  almost  unanimous  consent. 
Nevertheless,  many  treatises  were  written,  to  refute  this  new  form 
of  error.  And  as  he  claimed  some  of  the  earlier  divines,  and  even 
the  reformers,  as  agreeing  with  him,  Andrew  Rivet,  the  greatest 
theologian  of  the  age,  to  show  that  such  pretensions  were  unfound- 
ed, and  to  vindicate  the  decree  of  the  synod,  which  declared  that 
the  imputation, of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity  was  the  doctrine  of 
all  the  Protestant  churches,  undertook  the  labour  of  collecting  tes- 
timonies from  the  formulas  of  churches,  and  the  writings  of  the 
most  distinguished  theologians  on  the  subject.  As  these  testimo- 
nies are  highly  interesting  at  the  present  time,  and  as  the  volume 
which  contains  them  is  accessible  to  few,  we  propose  to  lay  some 
of  them  before  our  readers,  in  a  literal  translation.  In  making  the 
selection,  we  shall  omit  some  testimonies,  which,  however  clear 
and  satisfactory  as  to  the  question  in  dispute,  have  now  less  interest 
than  they  had  at  first,  because  the  writers  are  at  present  little 
known.  The  churches  or  theologians  bearing  testimony,  will  be 
indicated  by  the  titles  of  the  paragraphs. 

First  Helvetic  Confession,  1538. 

Since  man  was  made  holy  by  God,  and  fell  into  sin  by  his  own 
fault,  he  drew  with  himself  into  the  same  ruin  the  human  race,  and 
rendered  them  obnoxious  to  the  same  calamity.  And  this  defile- 
ment, which  is  called  original,  has  so  pervaded  the  whole  race, 
that  the  child  of  wrath  and  enemy  of  God  can  be  cured  by  no  help 
but  that  of  God  through  Christ. 

Latter  Helvetic  Confession,  1566. 

Such  as  Adam  became  after  the  fall,  such  are  all  those  descend- 
ed from  him  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  are  equally  obnoxious  to  sin, 
death,  and  all  sorts  of  calamities. 

Confession  of  Basle. 

We  acknowledge  that  man  was  originally  created  in  the  image 
of  God,  in  righteousness  and  holiness ;  but  that  of  his  own  accord 
he  fell  into  sin :  by  which  fall  the  whole  human  race  was  render- 
ed corrupt,  and  made  obnoxious  to  condemnation. 

Confession  of  the  Bohemians  or  Waldenses. 

The  first,  the  greatest,  and  most  grievous  of  all  sins,  was  un- 
doubtedly the  sin  of  Adam,  which  the  Apostle  calls  "  the  diso- 
bedience ;"  by  which  death  reigns  over  all,  even  over  those  who 
did  not  sin  by  a  transgression  of  the  same  kind  as  that  of  Adam. 
The  second  sin  is  the  sin  of  our  origin,  which  is  innate  and  heredi- 
tary. Th,e  virulence  of  this  hereditary  pollution  may  be  ascer- 
tained and  estimated  from  its  guilt  and  blameworthiness. — (De  reatu 
et  culpa.) 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  197 

French  Confession. 

We  believe  that  the  whole  offspring  of  Adam  was  infected  with 
this  contagion  which  we  call  original  sin ;  namely,  a  fault  flowing 
from  our  propagation,  &c.  Let  it  suffice  (to  observe)  that  those 
things  with  which  Adam  was  endowed,  were  not  given  to  himself 
alone,  but  to  his  posterity  also. 

Articles  of  the  Church  of  England. 

Original  sin  standeth  not  in  the  following  of  Adam  (as  the  Pela- 
gians do  vainly  talk),  but  it  is  the  fault  and  corruption  of  the  nature 
of  every  man  that  naturally  is  engendered  of  the  offspring  of  Adam  ; 
whereby  man  is  very  far  gone  from  original  righteousness,  and  is 
of  his  own  nature  inclined  to  evil ;  so  that  the  flesh  lusteth  always 
contrary  to  the  spirit ;  and  therefore  in  every  person  born  into  this 
world,  it  deserveth  God's  wrath  and  damnation  ;  and  this  infection 
of  nature  doth  remain,  yea  in  them  that  are  regenerated,  &c. 

Old  Scottish  Confession. 

By  the  transgression  of  Adam,  which  is  commonly  called  "  ori- 
ginal sin,"  the  image  of  God  in  man  is  altogether  defaced,  and  he 
and  his  posterity  are  by  nature  the  enemies  of  God,  bond-slaves  of 
Satan,  and  the  servants  of  sin ;  and  so  we,  in  his  person,  were  de- 
spoiled of  all  those  gifts,  and  fell  into  all  this  misery  and  curse. 
These  things  cannot  be  said  without  imputation.  Haec  sine  imputa- 
tione  did  non  possunl. 

Belgic  Confession. 

We  believe,  that  by  the  disobedience  of  Adam,  the  sin  which  is 
called  original,  is  spread  and  diffused  through  the  whole  human 
race :  but  original  sin  is  the  corruption  and  hereditary  vice  of  our 
whole  nature,  by  which  infants  themselves,  in  the  womb  of  their 
mother,  are  polluted:  and  which,  as  some  noxious  root, germinates 
every  kind  of  sin  in  man. — (Art.  15.) 

Saxon  Confession. 

Original  sin  exists  ;  and  on  account  of  the  fall  of  our  first  parents, 
and  in  consequence  of  the  depravation  which  followed  their  fall, 
they  that  are  born  are  liable  to  the  wrath  of  God,  and  deserving 
eternal  damnation,  unless  remission  be  obtained  through  the  Me- 
diator.— (Art.  ii.) 

Augsburg  Confession. 

The  doctrine  is,  that  after  the  fall  of  Adam,  all  men,  propagated 
in  a  natural  way,  have  original  sin.  But  we  understand  that  ori- 
ginal sin  (as  it  is  called  by  the  holy  fathers,  and  all  the  orthodox 
and  pious  men  of  learning  in  the  church)  consists  of  the  guilt  in 
which  we  are  involved  by  the  fall  of  Adam,  and  by  which  we  are 


198  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

exposed  to  the  wrath  of  God  and  eternal  death ;  and  that  corrup- 
tion of  human  nature  propagated  from  Adam. — (Art.  ii.) 

Articles  of  Smalcald,  written  by  Martin  Luther 

Here,  it  must  be  confessed  by  us,  that  Paul,  in  the  5th  of  the  Ro- 
mans, affirms  that  sin  sprang  from  one  man,  Adam,  and  entered 
into  the  world,  by  whose  disobedience  all  men  were  made  sinners, 
subjected  to  death  and  the  devil.  This  is  called  original,  heredi- 
tary, principal,  or  radical  sin. 

Confession  of  Wittenberg. 

We  believe  and  confess  that  man  was  by  God  made  just  and 
wise  originally,  endowed  with  free  will,  and  adorned  by  the  Holy 
Spirit ;  but  afterwards,  in  consequence  of  disobedience,  was  de- 
prived of  the  Holy  Spirit,  made  the  slave  of  Satan,  and  rendered 
obnoxious  to  corporeal,  as  well  as  eternal  damnation  ;  and  this  evil 
not  only  seized  upon  Adam,  but  was  propagated  to  all  his  pos- 
terity. 

To  these  citations  we  may  add,  that  the  theologians  who  met  at 
Marpurg,  to  endeavour  to  settle  the  differences  between  the  Lu- 
therans and  Zwinglians,  about  the  presence  of  Christ  in  the  sacra- 
ment, though  unable  to  agree  on  this  point,  nevertheless  drew  up 
and  subscribed  a  doctrinal  confession,  one  article  of  which  related 
to  original  sin,  and  is  as  follows :  "  In  the  fourth  place,  we  believe 
that  original  sin  is  innate  in  us,  and  was  propagated  to  us  from 
Adam  ;  and  it  is  such  a  sin  that  it  exposes  all  men  to  condemna- 
tion ;  so  that  unless  Jesus  Christ  had  interposed  for  us  by  his  death 
and  life,  all  men  on  account  of  original  sin  would  have  been  con- 
demned ;  nor  could  they  have  come  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  and 
to  eternal  happiness."  These  articles  were  subscribed  by  Luther, 
Melancthon,  Jonas,  Osiander,  Brentius,  Agricola,  CEcolampadius, 
Zwingle,  Bucer  and  Hedio. 

Rivet  then  gives  the  testimonies  and  explanations  of  certain  theo- 
logians, from  different  countries,  who  had  subscribed  the  confessions 
before  cited,  beginning  with  those  of  Switzerland. 

Wolfgang  Mnsculus. 

Let  no  one  here  allege,  that  as  the  universality  expressed  in  the 
latter  clause  is  restricted  to  the  elect  only,  when  it  is  said  that  the 
free  gift  came  upon  all  men  to  justification  of  life  ;  so  in  the  former 
clause,  when  it  is  said,  the  condemnation  comes  upon  all  men,  it 
may  be  referred  to  the  reprobate  only ;  for  the  comparison  insti- 
tuted between  Adam  and  Christ  will  not  admit  of  it,  since  accord- 
ing to  this  the  evil  propagated  from  Adam  is  imputed  to  all  those 
descended  from  him ;  and  in  like  manner  the  good  to  all  those  who 
are  justified  by  Christ. — (Loc.  Comm.  cap.  de  Electione.) 

Again,  more  expressly,  in  his  exposition  of  Rom.  v.  12  : — "  Some 
expound  the  words  have  sinned  (nfaprov)  on  account  of  sin  are  con- 


THB  DOCTRINE  OP  IMPUTATION.  199 

demned,  or  virtually  are  constituted  sinners ;  which,  indeed,  is  true ; 
but  there  is  no  reason  why  you  should  not  understand  by  it,  the  actual 
sin  of  Adam,  in  whom  all  that  existed  in  his  loins  have  sinned.  For 
since  we  receive  from  Christ  not  only  this  benefit  that  we  should 
be  virtually  justified  by  his  obedience ;  but  this  also,  that  by  the 
very  actual  obedience  of  Christ,  we  obey  the  Father,  as  we  are 
Christ's  ;  so  we  are  not  only  virtually  made  sinners  in  Adam,  but 
are  condemned  for  this  very  sin  of  Adam.  Whence  the  apostle 
declares,  that  by  the  offence  of  one,  or  the  one  offence,  judgment 
came  upon  all  men  to  condemnation. — (Comm.  on  Romans,  ch.  5.) 

Peter  Viret,  Pastor  at  Lausanne. 

God  permitted  the  fall  and  corruption  of  the  whole  human  race, 
and  of  the  whole  nature  of  man,  in  the  man  first  formed.  (Instit. 
Christ.,  Dial.  1.) 

Amandus  Polanus,  Professor  at  Basle. 

The  parts  of  original  sin  are  two,  "  the  crime  of  disobedience, 
or  defection  from  God,  while  in  the  loins  of  Adam ;  and  the  corrup- 
tion consequent  upon  the  lapse  of  Adam,  in  the  whole  human  na- 
ture. The  fault  of  disobedience  or  defection  from  God  while  in  the 
loins  of  Adam,"  is  the  first  part  of  original  sin,  which  is  iniquity,  or 
a  stain  from  a  blot  contracted  from  that  first  sin,  namely,  a  privation 
of  the  due  honour  which  should  be  present,  of  the  nature  of  a  bond 
obliging  to  punishment,  and  binding  us  in  punishment.  So  that  the 
sin  was  not  that  of  Adam  alone,  but  also  ours,  because  not  only  did 
Adam  sin,  but  we  also,  as  in  Adam  the  root  of  the  whole  human 
race  sinned,  and  transgressed  the  law.  Rom.  v.  5,  12,  19. — (Syn- 
tag.  Theol.,  lib.  vi.,  cap.  3.) 

Although  after  the  fall,  Adam  committed  other  sins,  yet  none  of 
them  are  imputed,  but  only  the  first,  by  which  corruption  and  death 
were  spread  through  all  human  nature,  and  were  decreed  upon  us. 
This  Paul  teaches,  Rom.  v.  12.  "  By  one  man  sin  entered  into  the 
world,  and  death  by  sin,"  where  he  speaks  of  sin  in  the  singular 
number,  not  of  sins.  So  also,  in  the  16th  verse,  guilt  (judgment) 
was  of  one  offence  unto  condemnation.  And  in  ver.  17,  "By  one 
offence,  death  reigned  by  one,"  and  in  the  18th  v.,  "  By  one  of- 
fence guilt  (judgment)  came  upon  all  men  to  condemnation." — 
(Ibid.) 

Henry  Bullinger,  Pastor  and  Professor  at  Zurich. 

Sin  is  called  original,  or  the  sin  of  our  birth,  because  it  comes 
from  our  first  origin,  or  is  derived  from  our  first  parent  upon  all, 
by  propagation  or  traduction.  It  derives  its  origin  from  the  first 
formed  man,  and  hence  it  is  termed,  the  hereditary  depravity  and 
corruption  of  our  nature.  Moreover,  this  evil  flowed  from  our  first 
parents  to  all  their  posterity. — (Decad.  III.,  Serm.  10.) 

After  men  became  obnoxious  to  punishment,  so  far  were  we  from 
having  any  power  by  which  we  could  deliver  ourselves,  that,  by 


200  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

reason  of  our  native  and  inherent  depravity,  we  rather  increase  the 
same. — (Compend.  Relig.  Christ.,  v.  5.) 

Peter  Martyr,  Professor  at  Zurich. 

After  discussing  the  import  of  the  phrase  if  &  in  the  person  of 
Photius,  maintaining  the  Latin  interpretation  in  whom,  that  is,  in 
Adam  all  have  sinned,  he  proceeds  to  observe : — But  I  am  not 
disposed  keenly  to  contend  for  this  interpretation,  for  I  admit  that 
if  w  is  a  causal  particle,  so  that  the  sense  may  be,  that  death  has 
passed  upon  all  men  because  that  all  have  sinned.  For  Chrysos- 
tom  says,  by  the  fall  of  Adam,  Paul  has  determined  that  other  mor- 
tals who  did  not  eat  of  the  tree  are  infected ;  and  as  a  prudent 
physician,  when  about  to  administer  for  a  particular  disease,  does 
not  delay  in  the  mere  circumstances  or  sequences,  but  has  recourse 
to  the  head  and  primary  cause :  thus,  all  die  because  all  sinned. 
Nor  should  we  in  this  place  take  the  word  sinned  in  such  a  sense 
as  would  render  it  inapplicable  to  infants;  but  as  though  he  had 
said,  they  are  held  in  sin  and  are  esteemed  guilty  (Rei),  for  he  was 
able  from  explanations  given  in  the  Epist.  to  Hebrews,  to  de- 
clare, "  How  we  sinned  in  the  fall  of  Adam  ;"  for  there  we  read 
that  Levi  paid  tithes  while  in  the  loins  of  Abraham.  By  the  same 
reason  it  may  here  be  understood  that  we  were  contaminated  in 
the  loins,  in  the  mass  of  Adam  (Comm.  on  Rom.,  ch.  v.).  A  little 
after,  he  says,  "  For  as  by  the  disobedience  of  one  man  sin  entered 
into  the  world"  the  apostle  declares  what  sin  it  was,  which  by  one 
man  entered  into  the  world,  and  by  which  death  passed  upon  all 
men :  it  was  the  disobedience  of  the  first  man,  which  he  signifies 
was  communicated  to  all,  when  he  says,  "  by  it  many  were  consti- 
tuted sinners."     (lb.) 

Original  sin  is  a  depravation  of  the  whole  nature  of  man,  derived 
from  the  fall  of  our  first  parents  to  their  posterity  by  generation ; 
which,  unless  the  benefit  of  Christ's  mediation  prevents,  will  subject 
all  who  are  born  into  the  world,  to  infinite  evils  and  to  eternal 
damnation. — (lb.) 

The  efficient  cause  is  the  sinning  will  of  Adam.  When,  there- 
fore, he  seems  to  assert  that  the  sin  for  which  we  are  condemned 
is  not  another's,  but  our  own,  he  means  that  the  sin  of  Adam  was 
not  so  the  sin  of  another  but  that  it  was  ours  also;  besides,  he  had 
respect  to  that  error  of  Pighius,  that  original  sin  consists  in  nothing 
else  but  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin  ;  for  he  did  not  acknowledge 
innate  depravity,  or  denied  that  it  partook  of  the  nature  of  sin. — 
(Ibid.) 

In  the  fifth  chapter  of  Romans  it  is  written,  "In  whom  all  sinned ;n 
which  refers  to  Adam :  for  these  words,  if  sJ,  cannot  refer  to  the 
word  sin,  for  according  to  the  syntax  of  the  Greek  language,  the 
pronoun  in  that  case  must  have  been  in  the  feminine  gender,  and 
the  apostle  should  have  said  if  y ;  the  true  sense  then  is  that  we 
sinned  in  the  fall  of  Adam.  And  we  have  the  same  mode  of  speak- 
ing in  his  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  where  he  declares  that  Levi  paid 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  201 

tithes  while  yet  in  the  loins  of  Abraham,  who,  according  to  the 
genealogy,  was  the  fourth  from  him  in  the  line  of  descent.  Now, 
as  it  is  said  that  while  in  the  loins  of  Abraham  he  paid  tithes  to 
Melchisedek  ;  by  the  same  reason  all  men  were  contained  in  Adam 
when  he  sinned,  &c. — (Comm.  on  1  Cor.,  ch.  xv.) 

Stephen  Fabritius,  of  Berne. 

*•  Since  Adam  representatively  bore  the  person  of  the  whole  hu- 
man race,  whatever  of  good  or  evil  he  received  of  God,  he  receiv- 
ed for  himself  and  for  others. — 1  Cor.  xv.  22.  Besides,  when 
Adam  sinned,  his  posterity  were  in  his  loins,  and  to  be  propagated 
from  him  by  the  laws  of  nature,  and  thus  they  inherit  guilt  from 
him.     Heb.  vii.  9. — (Concion.  in  Psalm  li.) 

John  Wollebius,  Professor  at  Basle. 

The  proximate  cause  of  original  sin  is  the  guilt  of  the  first  sin,  in 
regard  to  which  the  punishment  of  God  is  most  just ;  namely,  a  part 
of  that  death  which  God  threatened  to  man. 

Although  the  soul  of  man  is  immediately  breathed  into  us  by 
God ;  yet  united  to  the  body  it  is  truly  guilty  of  the  first  sin  which 
is  imputed  to  the  whole  man,  and  so  it  is  infected  with  that  original 
stain. — (Christ.  Theol.,  lib.  i.,  cap  10.) 

John  Calvin. 

Although  Calvin  dwells  chiefly  on  the  description  and  proof  of  the 
natural  corruption  of  all  men,  he  shows  also  that  this  was  the  pun- 
ishment of  the  first  sin.  "  After  the  divine  image  was  obliterated, 
he  did  not  bear  this  punishment  alone ;  as  in  the  place  of  wisdom, 
virtue,  sanctity,  truth,  justice  (in  which  ornaments  he  had  been 
clothed),  the  basest  plagues  succeeded,  blindness,  impotency,  impu- 
rity, &c. ;  but  he  also  involved  and  immersed  his  posterity  in  the 
same  miseries.  This  is  that  hereditary  corruption  which  the  an- 
cients called  original  sin ;  understanding  by  the  word  sin,  the  de- 
pravation of  a  nature  before  good  and  pure.  Concerning  which  thing 
there  was  much  contention  among  them,  for  nothing  can  be  more 
remote  from  common  sense  than  that  all  should  become  guilty  by 
the  sin  of  one.  That  certainly  cannot  be  done  without  the  imputa- 
tion of  that  one  sin. — (Inst.,  lib.  ii.,  cap.  1.) 

And  again,  so  undoubtedly  it  must  be  held,  that  Adam  was  not 
only  the  progenitor  of  human  nature,  but,  as  it  were,  the  radix  ; 
and  so,  in  his  deserved  corruption,  the  race  of  man  was  vitiated. — 
(lb.,  66.) 

The  words  are  not  obscure,  that  by  the  obedience  of  Christ 
many  are  justified,  so  by  the  disobedience  of  Adam  many  were 
constituted  sinners.  Therefore,  between  these  two,  this  is  the  re- 
lation, that  the  one  destroyed  us,  involving  us  in  his  own  ruin  with 
himself;  the  other  restores  us  by  his  grace  to  salvation. — (Ibid.) 

It  is  not  lawful  to  interpret  otherwise  what  is  said,  "  that  in  Adam 


202  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

all  die,"  than  that  he  by  sinning  brought  so  great  destruction  and 
ruin,  not  only  upon  himself,  but  precipitated  our  nature  also  into 
the  same  destruction. — (lb.) 

With  this  we  should  be  content,  that  whatever  endowments  the 
Lord  was  pleased  to  bestow  upon  human  nature,  were  deposited 
with  Adam,  so  that  when  he  lost  what  he  had  received,  the  loss 
was  not  his  only,  but  that  of  us  all. — (lb.) 

Nor  did  it  happen  merely  in  a  natural  way,  that  all  should  fall 
by  the  sin  of  one  parent :  the  scriptures  openly  declare,  that  all  men 
were  bound  over  to  eternal  death  in  the  person  of  this  one  man. — 
(Lib.  hi.,  cap.  23,  sect.  7.) 

Adam,  the  common  father  of  all,  by  his  rebellion  alienated  him- 
self from  God  ;  and  the  fountain  of  life  and  all  good  being  forsaken, 
he  rendered  himself  obnoxious  to  all  miseries.  Whence  it  comes 
to  pass  that  every  one  of  us  is  born  infected  with  original  sin,  and 
from  the  very  womb  of  our  mother  we  are  under  the  curse  of  God, 
and  condemned  not  only  on  account  of  the  crime  of  another,  but  on 
account  of  the  depravity  which  is  then  within  us,  though  it  does 
not  yet  appear. — (Confession  of  Faith.) 

In  regard  to  man,  we  perceive,  in  passing  over  the  scriptures, 
that  the  thing  is  thus :  that  the  whole  human  race  has  become  cor- 
rupt by  the  fall  of  Adam,  so  that  we  have  all  become  obnoxious  to 
destruction  and  damnation,  not  only  because  Adam  himself  sinned, 
but  because  we  ourselves  are  sinners  from  the  womb. — (Confession 
of  the  French  churches,  submitted  to  the  Diet  at  Frankfort.) 

But  if  it  is  proposed  by  you  to  subject  God  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
will  you  condemn  him  for  injustice,  because  for  the  sin  of  one  man 
we  are  all  held  implicated  in  the  guilt  of  eternal  death  ?  One  sin- 
ned ;  all  are  led  to  punishment ;  nor  is  that  all,  but  from  the  sin  of 
this  one,  all  have  contracted  contagion ;  so  that  they  are  born  cor- 
rupt, and  infected  with  a  death-bringing  pollution. — (Reply  to  one 
of  his  Calumniators.) 

It  should  be  remarked  how  God,  in  the  person  of  Adam,  created 
the  whole  human  race  after  his  own  image :  so  Adam,  by  sin,  was 
not  only  despoiled  of  the  gifts  conferred,  but  was  banished  from 
God  ;  and  in  consequence  all  his  posterity.  How  was  this  ?  Be- 
cause according  to  the  will  of  God  we  were  all  included  in  his  per- 
son.— (Comm.  on  Job,  ch.  xiv.) 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  there  are  two  differences  between 
Christ  and  Adam,  concerning  which  the  apostle  was  silent,  not  be- 
cause he  thought  they  might  be  neglected,  but  because  it  did  not 
pertain  to  his  present  argument  to  enumerate  them.  The  first  is, 
that  by  the  sin  of  Adam  we  are  not  condemned  by  imputation 
alone,  as  though  the  punishment  of  another's  sin  was  exacted  of  us ; 
but  we  so  bear  his  punishment  because  we  also  are  guilty  of  his 
fault ;  for  because  our  nature  was  vitiated  in  him,  it  is  with  God 
bound  by  the  guilt  of  iniquity.  Here  then  we  have  the  two  things, 
not  only  the  imputation  of  the  first  sin ;  but  also  our  own  fault,  since 
our  nature  is  corrupted. — (Comm.  on  Rom.  v.  17.) 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  203 

Theodore  Beza. 

Two  things  should  be  considered  in  original  sin,  namely,  guilt 
and  corruption ;  which,  although  they  cannot  be  separated,  yet 
ought  to  be  distinguished  accurately.  For  as  Adam,  by  the  com- 
mission of  sin,  first  was  made  guilty  of  the  wrath  of  God,  then  as 
being  guilty,  he  underwent  as  the  punishment  of  his  sin,  the  cor- 
ruption of  soul  and  body.  So  also  he  transmitted  to  posterity  a 
nature,  in  the  first  place  guilty,  next,  corrupted.  Concerning  the 
propagation  of  guilt,  the  apostle  is  properly  treating  in  this  passage, 
in  contrast  with  which  the  imputation  of  the  obedience  of  Christ  is 
set  forth.  Hence  it  follows,  that  that  guilt  which  precedes  corrup- 
tion, is  by  the  imputation  of  Adam's  disobedience  ;  as  the  remission 
of  sins  and  the  abolition  of  guilt,  is  by  the  imputation  of  the  obedi- 
ence of  Christ.     Nothing  can  be  plainer. — (Note  on  Rom.  v.  12.) 

Lambert  Danaeus  Aurelius,  S.  Theol.  D.  and  Professor  in  the  Academy  of  Geneva, 

Leyden,  &c. 

Original  sin  flows  from  parents  to  their  children  by  the  ordina- 
tion of  God,  constituting  and  placing  Adam  for  the  whole  human 
species,  as  he  constituted  and  substituted  Christ  as  the  second  Adam 
for  all  the  elect.  "  That  first  sin  rendered  them  guilty  before 
God,  then  the  corruption  (which  followed  guilt  in  Adam)  was 
transferred  into  us  ;  on  the  account  of  this  inhering  in  us  we  are  now 
guilty,  as  infected  with  our  own  depravity — vile,  and  spotted,  and 
hateful  to  God,  not  only  in  Adam,  or  as  we  are  viewed  in  him  as 
the  fountain  and  root  of  the  human  race,  but  as  we  are  considered 
in  ourselves  and  from  ourselves  corrupted." 

Again.  The  guilt  and  punishment  of  the  sin  of  Adam  have 
passed  upon  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  and  Eve,  Christ  excepted. 

All  men,  the  posterity  of  Adam,  are  by  nature  guilty  before 
God,  involved  in  that  sin,  and  are  children  of  wrath.  Hence,  both 
in  mind  and  body  we  bear  the  punishment  which  we  before  de- 
scribed ;  for  the  opinion  is  false,  that  punishment  alone  flowed  to 
us  on  account  of  this  sin,  and  not  the  guilt  and  fault,  for  in  that 
case  we  should  be  punished  as  undeserving ;  but  first  the  sin,  then 
the  punishment  passes  over  and  is  laid  upon  us.  Therefore,  by 
one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  that  is  guilt,  and  that  indeed 
first  in  order,  and  by  sin,  death  ;  and  so  the  penalty,  both  in  soul 
and  body,  afterwards  pervaded  all  men  also.  For  in  one  Adam 
they  sinned  and  are  constituted  guilty  before  God.  But  why  was 
this  ?  Because  Adam  not  only  was  the  propagator,  but  also  the 
fountain  and  root  of  the  whole  human  race,  from  which  the  pollu- 
tion and  vitiosity  descended,  as  into  the  branches  propagated  from 
this  root,  not  only  by  imitation  but  by  the  actual  communication  of 
the  first  sin,  first  of  the  fault  (culpae)  then  of  the  corruption  and 
vitiosity  both  in  mind  and  body. 

Original  sin  then  does  not  consist  merely  in  imitation,  nor  solely 
in  imputation,  but  in  inhesion,  propagation,  communication,  and 
installation  of  that  corruption  and  depravity  which  Adam  himself 


204  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

had  contracted.  And  the  same  descends  to  us,  and  dwells  in  us. 
Therefore,  when  he  sinned,  Adam  instilled  his  pollution  into  us  all. 
(Apologia  pro  Justif.  per  imputationem.) 

There  are  three  things  which  constitute  a  man  guilty  before 
God.  1.  The  sin  flowing  from  this  that  we  have  all  sinned  in  the 
first  man,  Rom.  v.  12.  2.  Corruption,  which  is  the  punishment  of 
this  sin,  which  fell  upon  Adam  and  all  his  posterity,  Heb.  ix.  27. 
3.  The  (actual)  sins  which  adult  men  commit,  and  which  are  fruits 
which  this  root  of  corruption  brings  forth,  of  which  we  are  guilty 
before  the  judgment  of  God. 

Anthony  Fay,  Pastor  and  Professor  at  Geneva. 

All  sinned  in  Adam,  and  by  the  sin  of  Adam  death  passed  on  all 
men,  because  that  sin  had  passed  unto  all.  We  sinned  in  him 
sinning  ;  we  died  in  his  dying.  Ef  Z  Theodoret  takes  as  a  causal 
particle,  as  if  a  reason  should  be  rendered  why  death  has  passed 
upon  all.  Chrysostom  understands  If  <3  in  the  same  sense,  namely, 
that  all  had  become  sinners  ;  but  it  is  better  to  take  the  preposition 
if  for  tv  as  in  Heb.  ix.  10,  so  that  it  may  be  interpreted  to  relate  to 
Adam,  whose  sin  was  common  to  all,  as  the  penalty  or  death  is 
common  to  all. — (On  Rom.  v.  12.) 

We  believe  that  the  sin  of  Adam,  whilst  it  was  the  act  of  an 
individual,  was  common  to  the  whole  species,  inasmuch  as  Adam 
was  not  made  a  private  person,  but  was  constituted  by  God  the 
fountain  of  the  whole  race.  For  the  human  race  lying  hid  in  the 
loins  of  Adam,  was  adorned  by  God  with  original  righteousness 
and  grace ;  but  by  the  sin  of  Adam  was  despoiled  of  both.  For 
as  a  murder  perpetrated  by  the  hand  is  not  imputed  to  the  hand 
only,  but  to  the  whole  body,  not  to  Adam  alone,  who  was  but  a 
member  of  the  body  of  men,  but  to  the  whole  race  of  men  ;  there- 
fore it  is  not  of  another's  sin  that  we  are  reckoned  guilty,  but  of 
our  own  ;  since  in  Adam  we  all  eat  of  the  forbidden  fruit. — (En- 
chirid.  Theologic,  disp.  37,  thes.  15 — 18.) 

A  double  disease  pervaded  the  whole  human  race  by  the  sin  of 
Adam.  The  first  is  guilt,  by  which  all  men  are  subjected  to  eter- 
nal death ;  the  other  is  the  corruption  of  the  whole  man  and  of  all 
his  faculties  of  mind  and  body :  by  reason  of  which  he  is  neither 
willing  nor  able  to  be  subject  to  the  divine  law. — (Disp.  60,  thes.  13.) 

John  Deodati,  Professor  and  Pastor  at  Geneva. 

This  is  the  general  conclusion  of  the  preceding  treatise  concern- 
ing justification  by  faith,  in  which  the  apostle,  after  briefly  repeating 
what  had  been  said,  at  the  same  time  declares  their  foundation, 
namely,  that  God  out  of  his  own  good  pleasure  had  constituted 
Christ  the  head  of  grace  and  fountain  of  righteousness  and  life  to 
all  his  elect,  by  the  imputation  of  whose  righteousness  they  return 
into  favour  with  God,  and  consequently  are  sanctified  and  glorified. 
For  as  Adam  was  constituted  the  head  and  root  of  the  whole  hu- 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF   IMPUTATION.  205 

man  race,  so  that  by  the  imputation  of  his  sin  to  all  his  posterity, 
they  became  obnoxious  to  the  divine  curse,  are  deprived  of  origi- 
nal righteousness,  corrupted  in  their  whole  nature,  and  liable  to 
death.— (On  Rom.  v.  12.) 

Benedict  Turrettin,  Pastor  and  Professor  at  Geneva. 

Our  confessions  include  under  original  sin,  the  communion 
which  we  have  in  the  first  sin,  and  the  loss  of  original  righteous- 
ness and  purity  which  we  have  sustained,  and  the  inherent  corrup- 
tion of  the  soul. — (On  Rom.  v.  12.) 

Ohrysostom,  who  well  understood  the  import  of  the  Greek  word 
(KaraaTa9,',9ovrai),  explains  it.  by  the  fault  and  guilt  into  which  we  have 
fallen  in  Adam  ;  by  this  first  sin  having  become  guilty  in  the  judg- 
ment of  God. — (On  Rom.  v.  18.) 

Philip  Mornay,  Professor  at  Saurcur. 

We  know  whence  proceeded  the  corruption  of  the  human  race, 
namely,  from  our  grievous  sin  and  the  punishment  which  followed 
it.  We  were  all  in  the  first  man  when  he  sinned. — (De  Veritat. 
Relig.  Christ.,  cap.  16,  17.) 

Since  the  whole  human  race  was  lost  in  Adam,  and  every  one 
in  himself,  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  the  son  of  his  love 
as  a  price  of  redemption  for  the  sins  of  all  those  whom  out  of  mere 
grace  he  gave  to  believe  on  him. — (In  his  Will.) 

Francis  Junius,  Professor  at  Heidelberg  and  Leyden. 

In  the  first  Adam  the  whole  species  was,  by  God,  naturally  de- 
posited ;  in  whom  all  sinned,  and  became  guilty,  and  the  children 
of  wrath,  and  of  an  eternal  malediction. — (De  Pecc.  Orig.,  thes.  4.) 

The  efficient  cause  is  Adam  and  Eve,  our  first  parents  ;  for  since 
Adam  was  constituted  by  God  the  instrumental  principle  in  nature, 
of  the  whole  human  race,  and  indeed  a  voluntary  instrument,  it  is 
necessary  to  suppose  that  this  evil  was  effected  by  God,  by  nature, 
or  by  this  particular  instrument:  not  by  God,  who  left  the  volun- 
tary instrument  to  pursue  his  own  course,  and  taught  him  what 
was  right ;  not  from  nature,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  voluntary 
instrument,  but  does  not  govern  it  ;  then  it  must  proceed  from  the 
instrumental  principle. — (lb.,  thes.  G.) 

God,  as  in  the  order  of  his  creation,  placed  the  whole  human 
race  in  Adam  by  nature  ;  so,  in  the  dispensation  of  his  righteous- 
ness, he  said  to  the  whole  human  race  in  Adam,  in  whom  we 
have  sinned,  "In  the  day  thou  eatest  thereof  thou  shalt  die." — (lb., 
thes.  7.) 

They  who  pronounce  that  sin  to  be  simply  involuntary,  are  very 
much  deceived,  since  the  same  thing  may  be  said  to  be  voluntary 
and  involuntary  in  different  respects,  whether  you  respect  its  gene- 
ration or  its  constitution  ;  for  the  whole  race  was  voluntary  in 
sinning  in  Adam  (although  in  respect  to  its  particular  origin  it  was 


206  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

to  us  involuntary),  in  whom  we  have  a  common  origin,  and  as  it 
proceeds  from  the  fault  of  our  nature  it  is  voluntary,  though  not 
by  a  particular  act  of  the  will  of  each  individual. — (lb.,thes.  8.) 

Hence  it  comes  to  pass  (namely,  by  the  transgression  of  Adam), 
that  all  of  us  who  are  born  bear  the  stigma  and  brand  of  our 
rebellion  ;  so  that  before  we  enjoy  the  light  we  partake  of  the 
injury  of  our  origin.  For,  indeed,  we  all  sinned  in  him  in  whom 
we  all.  were  one  man. — (lb.,  thes.  2.) 

Our  nature  was  deprived  of  the  gift  of  righteousness  in  Adam  ; 
and  the  nature  of  Adam  having  become  destitute,  makes  all  per- 
sons procreated  from  it  subject  to  the  same  destitution,  sinners  and 
unrighteous  ;  and  so  the  personal  sin  of  Adam  has  passed  upon  all, 
who  according  to  nature  are  personally  propagated  from  him. — (lb., 
thes.  8). 

Ef  o>  should  be  interpreted  in  whom,  namely,  Adam.  In  this 
chapter  the  apostle  openly  declares  that  all  have  sinned  in  Adam ; 
that  by  the  fall  of  one,  Adam,  many  are  become  dead ;  that  guilt 
is  from  one  offence  to  condemnation  ;  by  one  offence  death  reigned ; 
by  one  man — by  one  offence  guilt  came  upon  all  men  to  condem- 
nation— and  finally,  by  the  disobedience  of  one  man  many  were 
constituted  sinners. — (De  Nat.  and  Grat.  rat.,  71.) 

Peter  Molinaeus,  Professor  at  Sedan. 

In  this  argument  the  declaration  of  the  apostle  is  most  express, 
where  he  says,  "  by  one  man,"  &c.  Yea,  infants  he  subjects  in  a  pe- 
culiar manner  to  this  necessity,  saying,  "  death  reigned  over  those 
who  had  not  sinned  after  the  similitude  of  Adam's  transgression," 
that  is,  who  had  not  sinned  actually,  but  only  originally.  And  lest 
any  should  refer  to  this  imputation  alone,  in  the  7th  chapter  he  con- 
fesses his  own  proclivity  to  sinning.  (Molinaeus  denies,  indeed, 
that  imputation  is  alone,  but  acknowledges  and  proves  that  this  is 
joined  with  corruption,  which  the  synod  also  does.)  "  We,"  says 
he,  "  sinned  in  Adam,  and  in  him  willed  this  depravation." 

"Nor  indeed  would  God  impute  the  sin  of  Adam  to  his  posteri- 
ty, unless  they  had  in  themselves  something  which  was  truly  of  the 
nature  of  sin,  and  unless  they  were  evil  by  nature." 

It  is  evident  that  he  acknowledges  imputation,  with  inherent  de- 
pravity conjoined  ;  but  in  his  Anatomy  of  Arminianism,  he  asserts 
the  doctrine  of  imputation,  professedly,  and  spends  one  whole  chap- 
ter in  its  defence. 

Daniel  Chamier,  Professor  of  Theology  at  Montauban. 

After  bringing  forward  the  various  opinions  of  the  Papists,  he 
reduces  them  all  to  two.  First,  those  of  the  Catholics  who  agree 
with  the  Reformed  on  this  point.  Second,  those  who  acknowledge 
nothing  inherent  which  can  be  called  sin.  In  the  first  class  he 
places  Bellarmin,  Peltanus,  Delphinus,  Alvaresius,  Vasquez,  &c. 
Against  these  he  alleges  nothing  which  need  be  made  a  subject  of 


THB    DOCTRINE   OF    IMPUTATION.  207 

controversy.  He  then  proceeds  to  dispute  against  those  who  made 
original  sin  to  consist  altogether  in  the  imputation  of  the  first  sin  ; 
but  his  arguments  do  not  strike  those,  such  as  Bellarmin,  who  join 
depravity  proceeding  from  the  first  man,  to  the  imputation  of  his 
sin. 

*'  For  Bellarmin,"  says  he,  "  considers  in  sin,  the  act  itself,  and 
that  which  from  the  act  formally  remains  in  the  soul ;  and  these 
two  things  may  be  distinguished,  as  heat,  and  causing  heat.  In 
Adam  both  really  existed ;  in  us,  not  the  act  of  Adam,  except  by 
imputation,  but  the  quality  from  the  act  really.  Wherefore,  in  the 
first  sense,  original  sin  is  the  first  transgression  of  Adam,  committed 
by  him,  as  representing  the  whole  human  race,  in  whom  all  sinned. 
But  in  the  second  sense,  it  is  the  destitution  of  original  righteous- 
ness, with  an  habitual  aversion  to  God,  and  perverseness  of  will, 
resulting  in  a  peculiar  manner  from  the  actual  disobedience  of  the 
first  parent." — (Panstratria,  Fam  hi.,  lib.  i.,  c.  2,  sect.  9.) 

"  We  grant  that  by  the  disobedience  of  Adam,  all  were  truly  and 
in  fact  rendered  unrighteous  by  inherent  depravity ;  but  that  the 
unrighteousness  of  Adam  was  not  imputed  we  declare  to  be  false. 
On  the  contrary,  we  deny  that  we  could  be  made  inherently  un- 
righteous by  one  man,  unless  the  unrighteousness  of  this  one  man 
were  imputed  to  us.  Wherefore  it  is  false  that  the  disobedience 
of  Adam  was  not  imputed  to  us." — (lb.,  lib.  xxi.,  c.  2,  sec.  9.) 

Again.  "  We  grant  that  the  disobedience  of  Adam  and  the  obe- 
dience of  Christ  do  efficiently  and  meritoriously  constitute  us  un- 
righteous and  righteous ;  for  this  we  never  denied  ;  for  we  deny 
that  they  could  render  us  righteous  or  unrighteous,  unless  they 
were  first  imputed,  for  if  not  imputed,  in  no  way  are  they  ours ; 
for  they  are  the  acts  of  individuals,  and  therefore  personal.  But 
for  personal  acts  to  be  common  to  others,  is  absurd  and  contradic- 
tory. Therefore  it  behoves  that  they  should  be  imputed.  For 
this  kind  of  communication  is  no  how  inconsistent  with  the  proper 
personality  of  acts ;  it  proceeds  on  an  entirely  different  principle. 
Therefore  the  very  sin  of  Adam,  I  say  his  own  personal  disobedi- 
ence, must  be  imputed  to  his  posterity.  And  so  also  in  regard  to 
the  obedience  of  Christ :  because  the  whole  human  race  was  consi- 
dered as  in  Adam  by  nature ;  and  because  the  whole  multitude  of 
believers  were  in  Christ,  by  grace.  Hence  it  comes  to  pass  that 
we  are  not  only  made  sinners  by  Adam,  but  are  declared  to  have 
sinned  in  him,  which  is  a  very  different  thing." 

I  say  then  that  it  is  certain  that  all  men  are  really  constituted 
unrighteous  by  Adam,  and  that  all  believers  are  really  constituted 
righteous  by  Christ.  But  I  deny  that  that  is  the  point  which  the 
apostle  had  under  consideration;  for  his  inquiry  here  is  into  the 
grounds  of  our  condemnation  and  justification  ;  for  although  he  con- 
siders Karitpiiia  as  in  Adam,  yet  not  peculiar  to  him,  but  pertaining 
to  the  whole  human  race ;  for  the  meaning  is,  then,  when  Adam 
sinned,  the  whole  human  race  was  condemned,  or  made  guilty  of 
disobedience  to  God ;  whence  also  this  by  Augustine  was  called 


208  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

original  sin,  the  punishment  of  the  first  sin ;  but  how  could  it  be 
punishment,  unless  that  very  first  sin  were  imputed  ? 

John  Mistrezatius,  Pastor  of  the  Church  at  Paris. 

It  is  necessary  that  that  which  is  past  should  become  ours  by 
imputation  only,  but  that  which  resides  in  another,  should  be  deriv- 
ed to  us  by  inheritance.  For  as  Cardinal  Bellarmin  very  well 
says,  concerning  the  act  of  sin  committed  by  Adam  ;  "  It  is  com- 
municated to  us  in  the  only  way  in  which  a  thing  past  can  be, 
namely  by  imputation."  So  the  obedience  of  the  second  Adam, 
as  it  has  been  past  now  more  than  sixteen  hundred  years,  is  com- 
municated to  us  by  imputation.  But  in  regard  to  his  spirit,  it  flows 
into  us  by  regeneration,  just  as  the  inherent  corruption  of  Adam  is 
derived  to  us  by  natural  generation. — (Haec  Ule,  p.  37.) 

If  the  doctors  of  the  Roman  church  agree  that  the  disobedience 
of  Adam  is  imputed  to  us,  because  he  was  considered  the  head  of 
his  posterity,  with  what  reason  can  they  deny  that  the  obedience 
of  the  second  Adam  is  imputed  to  us  ?  But  you  will  say,  the  cor- 
ruption of  Adam  has  descended  to  us  really,  and  inheres  in  us.  So 
it  does ;  but  I  say  that  the  imputation  of  his  disobedience  precedes, 
and  corruption  is  derived  to  us  by  generation,  because  we  sinned 
in  Adam  as  in  our  head ;  God  abandoning  the  posterity  of  Adam 
to  the  corruption  of  their  father,  on  account  of  his  s'.n. — (lb.,  p.  43.) 

Charles  Drelincourt,  Pastor  of  the  Churcrrat  Paris. 

As  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  us  because  we  all  sinned  in 
Adam,  so  in  like  manner  the  righteousness  of  Christ  is  imputed  to 
us,  since  in  the  person  of  Christ,  our  head,  we  have  fulfilled  all 
righteousness. — (On  Rom.  v.  19.) 

John  Sharp  Sestus,  S.  T.  Professor. 

Original  sin  is  two-fold,  imputed  and  inherent.  Imputed  sin  is 
the  defection  of  Adam,  which  imputed  to  all  his  posterity  that  were 
in  his  loins ;  which  sin  was  actually  in  Adam,  but  only  in  us  by 
imputation.  It  is  imputed  to  us  because  we  were  in  Adam,  as  in 
our  root  and  stock. — (Theol.  Comm.,  Loc.  xi.,  De  Peccato.) 

Again,  concerning  justification  : — 

It  is  objected,  that  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  any  one  can  be  right- 
eous, with  a  righteousness  without  him  ;  for  this  would  be  the 
same  as  if  I  should  say  that  the  wall  is  white  by  the  whiteness 
which  is  not  its  own.  To  which  I  answer :  In  things  strictly  of  a 
personal  nature,  no  one  can  be  denominated,  except  the  person  in 
whom  the  thing  exists  ;  but  in  regard  to  the  righteousness  of  Christ 
it  is  otherwise,  because  it  is  not  personally  peculiar  to  Christ,  but, 
by  the  covenant  of  grace,  is  communicated  to  all  believers  ;  for  as 
the  sin  of  Adam  was  not  personal,  but  imputed  to  every  individual 
of  the  whole  human  race  ;  so  also  the  righteousness  of  Christ. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  209 

John  Dartesius. 

By  one  man,  namely  Adam,  sin  entered  into  the  world,  by  impu 
tation  and  propagation :  therefore  in  the  same  manner  the  thing 
takes  place  with  us,  in  regard  to  the  righteousness  of  Christ. — (Cla- 
vis  Praedestinationis,  part  i.,  c.  5.) 

John  Crayus  Occitanus,  Pastor. 

Adam  was  a  public  person,  representing  the  whole  of  his  poste" 
rity,  and  he  sinned,  not  only  for  himself,  but  for  all  men  descending 
from  him.  As  the  descendants  who  were  yet  to  descend  from 
Abraham,  paid  tithes  in  the  person  of  their  father,  who  afterwards 
received  tithes  from  their  brethren,  as  the  apostle  teaches  us,  Heb. 
vii.  7 — 9,  so  also  men,  who  by  natural  generation  from  Adam  have 
their  descent,  become  guilty,  and  are  condemned  to  undergo  pun- 
ishment on  account  of  the  action  of  their  parent,  in  whose  loins 
they  at  the  time  existed ;  for  his  fall  was  the  fall  of  the  whole  hu- 
man race,  who  in  the  loss  sustained  by  their  first  parent,  lost  all 
their  riches,  with  which  it  behoved  them  to  be  endowed.  "  By  one 
offence  many  were  constituted  sinners." — Rom.  v.  19.  [From 
these  things  the  imputation  of  the  first  sin  may  manifestly  be  in- 
ferred.]— (On  the  10th  article  of  the  Confession  of  the  Gallican 
church.) 

There  is  no  Christian  who  does  not  confess  that  the  rebellion  of 
Adam  was  imputed  to  his  posterity,  but  if  any  one  can  be  found 
bold  enough  to  make  such  a  denial,  he  will  be  compelled  to  ac- 
knowledge it  from  the  words  of  Paul.  For  truly  guilt  could  not 
come  upon  all  men  to  condemnation  by  one  sin,  unless  by  the  im- 
putation of  that  sin.  And  death  could  not  have  reigned  over  those 
who  had  not  sinned  after  the  similitude  of  Adam's  transgression, 
unless  by  the  imputation  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parent. — (On  the 
18th  article  of  the  Confession.) 

John  Chenet,  V.  D.  M. 

Although  actually  and  in  very  fact  we  did  not  eat  the  forbidden 
fruit,  as  did  Adam,  nevertheless  we  all  sinned  in  Adam,  Rom.  v.  12. 
And,  as  Augustine  teaches,  Epist.  xxiii.,  to  Boniface,  we  subsequent- 
ly contracted  from  him  an  obligation  to  punishment,  since  we  were 
one  with  Adam  when  he  sinned. — (Exam,  of  the  Principal  Art.  of 
Religion,  lib.  xi.,  c.  28.) 

Original  sin  is  the  imputation  of  the  transgression  of  Adam,  and 
then  a  real  vitiosity,  as  well  of  body  as  mind,  which  we  have  re- 
ceived from  Adam. 

Quest.  Why  do  you  extend  this  sin  to  the  imputation  of  the 
transgression  of  Adam  ? 

Ans.  Because  as  we  are  not  otherwise  reformed  and  regenerated 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  as  we  are  pardoned  and  justified  by  the 
gratuitous  imputation  of  the  merit  of  Christ ;  so  original  sin  does 
not  consist  merely  in  that  depravity  which  is  the  opposite  of  that 

14 


210  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

renovation  which  is  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  also  in  the  imputation 
of  the  sin  of  Adam,  which  is  the  opposite  to  the  payment  made  by 
Christ,  and  to  his  perfect  obedience  for  us,  even  to  the  death  of  the 
cross.— (Exam,  of  the  Principal  Art.  of  Religion,  chap.  21.) 

Abraham  Collignon,  V.  D.  M. 

Quest.  Why,  on  account  of  the  sin  of  Adam,  do  all  his  posterity 
lie  in  a  state  of  misery  ? 

Ans.  Because  Adam  represented  the  whole  human  race :  for,  as 
the  promises  of  good  made  to  him  would  not  only  have  been  ful- 
filled to  him,  but  to  his  posterity,  if  he  had  continued  in  obedience  ; 
so  in  like  manner  the  threatenings  of  evil  came  upon  them  as  well 
as  on  him. — (Institutes  of  the  Principal  Articles  of  Faith,  sec.  iii.) 

fPaul  Ferrius,  Pastor. 

All  we  were  in  the  loins  of  Adam,  and  sinned  in  him  and  with 
him. — (Orthodox.  Specimina.) 

Daniel  Tilenus,  Prof.  Sedan.,  Disp.  xv. 

Original  sin  is  that  hereditary  corruption  of  human  nature,  by 
which  all  who  by  natural  generation  are  propagated  from  Adam, 
are  infected  ;  and  so  in  the  loins  of  this  first  parent,  they  sinned  to- 
gether with  him,  and  incurred  the  guilt  of  both  temporal  and  eter- 
nal punishment. 

William    Whittaker,  Doctor    and    Professor  of   Theology  in    the    University   of 

Cambridge. 

[Wm.  Whittaker  wrote  a  particular  tract  on  Original  Sin, 
against  Stapleton  and  other  papists  ;  in  the  first  book  of  which  he 
treats  of  the  first  sin  of  Adam.] 

"  Although,"  says  he,  "  that  act  was  of  Adam  alone,  nor  could 
inhere  in  his  posterity  or  in  Adam  himself,  yet  by  imputation  it  is 
the  act  of  all  of  us.  But  does  the  word  imputation,  in  this  case, 
give  offence  ?  Then  hear  what  Lyra,  on  the  fifth  chapter  of  the 
Romans,  says  ;  '  The  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  all  descending  from 
him,  according  to  the  law  of  generation ;  for  they  are  his  members, 
whence  this  is  called  original  sinJ  But  if  you  think  that  this  testi- 
mony is  out  of  date,  I  will  refer  you  to  two  of  the  firmest  pillars  of 
the  Roman  church,  Cajetan  and  Bellarmin.  Cajetan,  on  this  pas- 
sage, says,  *  The  punishment  of  death  on  account  of  it  is  inflicted 
on  all  his  posterity ;  and  it  is  proved  that  the  sin  is  imputed  to  him 
and  all  his  posterity,  because  the  punishment  of  it  is  endured  by 
them  all.'  So  Bellarmin,  torn  iii.,  lib.  v.,  c.  17. — 'Adam  alone 
committed  that  by  his  actual  volition  ;  but  it  is  communicated  to  us 
by  generation,  in  the  only  way  in  which  it  can  be  transmitted, 
namely,  by  imputation.' " 

Original  sin  is  inherent  and  native  depravity,  but  the  actual  and 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  211 

free  transgression  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  us.  For  we  should  nei- 
ther be  held  under  the  guilt  or  depravity  thence  contracted,  unless 
that  act  by  which  Adam  violated  the  divine  precept  was  ascribed 
to  us  by  imputation.  But  in  regard  that  some  scholastic  theolo- 
gians place  original  sin  in  imputation  alone  ;  in  this  they  basely 
and  nefariously  err. 

John  Junius,  Preacher  at  Delft. 

In  the  sum  of  the  matter,  all  the  Reformed  churches  agree,  and 
teach  with  unanimous  consent,  in  accordance  with  the  sacred  scrip- 
tures and  the  universal  agreement  of  antiquity ;  first,  that  the  sin 
of  Adam  was  not  a  personal  sin,  but  of  the  whole  human  race,  in- 
asmuch as  they  were  all  included  in  the  loins  of  Adam,  and  in 
Adam,  the  first  parent  of  us  all  and  root  of  the  whole  human  race, 
they  sinned.  Secondly,  there  was  transfused  a  principle  contrary 
to  original  righteousness,  contracted  from  Adam  in  the  first  tran- 
sient act  of  his  sin,  and  propagated  by  means  of  generation  to  all 
his  posterity ;  so  that  all  men  by  nature  are  guilty  of  death,  and 
averse  from  the  love  which  they  owe  to  God  and  divine  things, 
and  turned  or  inclined  to  evil. — (Antapologia  Posthuma,  c.  vii.,  p. 
152. 

G.  S.  Frisius. 

Nor  is  it  merely  the  imputation  of  the  sin  of  another,  as  if  all  on> 
account  of  the  first  sin  of  their  parents  were  only  made  obnoxious 
to  death ;  as  if  this  evil  would  not  have  the  nature  of  their  own 
proper  sin,  unless  their  consent  was  added  ;  but  it  is  the  real  sin  of 
the  whole  human  race,  through  the  fall  of  Adam,  in  whom  all  have 
sinned,  Rom.  v.  12,  and  are  all  by  nature  under  an  obligation,  from 
the  just  judgment  of  God,  to  endure  the  punishment  of  eternal 
death. 

Again,  as  from  the  merit  of  Christ  a  double  benefit  is  decreed  to 
us,  the  imputation  of  gratuitous  righteousness,  and  the  regeneration, 
of  our  corrupt  nature,  so  a  double  evil  has  been  transmitted  to  us 
from  the  sin  of  Adam,  namely,  guilt,  on  account  of  the  sin  com- 
mitted by  him  and  in  him  (Rom  v.  12),  and  the  depravation  of  na- 
ture, propagated  from  him  to  us.  The  individual  person  of  Adam 
is  not  here  considered,  but  the  nature  common  to  all  his  posterity, 
in  respect  to  which  all  are  propagated  from  him  corrupt,  as  being 
members  of  the  one  same  nature. — (De  Peccato  Originali.) 

John  G.  Vossius. 

There  are  two  questions ;  whether  the  sin  of  our  first  parents 
was  imputed  to  all  their  posterity,  and  how  far  imputed.  The 
Catholic  church  has  once  judged  that  that  first  sin  is  imputed  to 
all ;  that  is,  by  the  just  judgment  of  God,  all  its  effects  are  trans- 
mitted to  all  the  children  of  Adam ;  but  these  effects  were  believed 
to  be,  that  we  are  born  destitute  of  original  righteousness,  subject 


212  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

to  the  necessity  of  death,  and.  liable  to  an  eternal  separation  from 
God. — (Hist.  Pol.,  lib.  ii.,  p.  1.)  The  above  he  confirms  by  many 
testimonies  from  the  sacred  scriptures,  and  from  the  ancients. 

J.  Lorentius. 

The  true  and  genuine  exposition  of  these  words  is,  that  all  men 
sinned  in  Adam,  as  in  their  common  stock  and  mass,  and  so  in  him 
and  by  him.  It  is  altogether  a  different  thing  to  sin  in  Adam,  and 
to  derive  sin  from  him.  And  we  should  carefully  distinguish  the 
sin  which  all  committed  in  Adam,  from  original  sin;  namely,  as 
the  cause  from  the  effect.  For  all  sinned  in  Adam  at  the  time  that 
he  sinned  by  eating  the  forbidden  fruit,  as  then  naturally  existing  in 
his  loins.  This  first  sin  of  Adam  is  the  cause  of  original  sin,  which 
is  the  effect ;  therefore  it  is  falsely  asserted  by  Catharinus  and  Pi- 
ghius,  "  That  original  sin  is  nothing  else  but  this  first  sin." 

Again,  Augustine  in  his  39th  Epist.  speaks  of  both  these  kinds  of 
sin,  but  distinguishes  them,  as  also  in  several  parts  of  his  works. — 
(In  Epist.  ad  Rom.,  C.  V.  v.,  12.) 

Nic.  Videlius,  Professor  of  Theology  in  the  University  of  Franequer. 

The  reason  why  God  imputes  the  sin  of  Adam  to  his  posterity 
is  his  justice,  and  not  mere  will,  as  the  Arminians  teach. 

The  imputation  of  the  first  sin  is  such,  that  in  fact  the  whole  pos- 
terity of  Adam  is  made  liable  to  eternal  condemnation,  contrary  to 
what  the  Arminians  hold. — (Theod.,  Disp.  xx.,  thes.  5  and  6.) 

13.  Lubbertus,  S.  Theology,  Dr.  and  Professor  at  Franequer,  and  a  member  of  the 

Synod  at  Dort. 

When  Faustus  Socinus,  the  Photinian,  that  he  might  invalidate 
the  doctrine  of  the  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  in  his 
work,  De  Christo  Servatore,  lib.  iv.,  c.  4,  had  objected  to  Covetus 
and  others  of  the  orthodox,  that  we  thus  conclude ;  "  That  as  by 
the  crime  and  disobedience  of  Adam  men  are  condemned  and  dead, 
because  that  crime  and  disobedience  were  imputed  to  them  ;  so  by 
the  righteousness  and  obedience  of  Christ  they  are  absolved  and 
live,  because  that  righteousness  and  obedience  are  imputed  to  them. 
To  which  Socinus  answered,  that  it  was  false  that  the  crime  and 
disobedience  of  Adam  were  imputed."  At  these  words,  Lubbert 
wrote  in  the  margin,  that  we  cannot  be  guilty  of  the  sin  of  another 
unless  that  sin  is  imputed  to  us. 

But  in  his  answer  he  uses  the  following  arguments  :  It  is  agreed 
between  us  and  our  opponent,  that  we  are  constituted  sinners  by 
the  disobedience  of  Adam,  and  are  constituted  righteous  by  the 
obedience  of  Christ ;  the  only  question  is  respecting  the  mode  in 
which  this  takes  place.  How  are  we  constituted  sinners  by  the 
disobedience  of  Adam?  and  how  are  we  constituted  righteous  by 
the  obedience  of  Christ?  We  say  that  in  both  cases  the  effect 
takes  place  by  imputation. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  213 

For  by  the  sin  of  Adam  imputed  to  us  we  are  constituted  guilty. 
When  the  apostle  says  that  all  have  sinned  in  Adam,  he  means  that 
the  sin  of  Adam,  as  our  head,  was  imputed  to  us  when  we  were  yet 
in  his  loins,  and  on  that  account  we  are  reckoned  guilty :  and  at 
the  same  time  it  is  the  will  of  God,  that  as  Adam  by  his  transgres- 
sion was  rendered  averse  to  God,  that  is,  corrupt  and  depraved,  so 
we  by  the  same  transgression  imputed  to  us,  as  I  said,  are  born 
averse  to  God,  corrupt  and  depraved.  Therefore  the  sin  of  Adam 
is  imputed  to  us,  and  that  corruption  and  depravity  in  which  we 
are  born,  we  call  original  sin. 

When  Adam,  by  his  total  apostasy  from  God,  became  guilty  of 
death,  all  his  posterity  were  implicated  in  the  same  guilt ;  no  other- 
wise than  if  they  had  all  sinned  against  God,  by  perpetrating  the 
crime  of  murder. 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  the  same  guilt  is  imputed  ;  or 
which  is  the  same  thing,  the  same  crime  by  which  guilt  was  con- 
tracted. 

John  Maccovius,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Franequer,  and  also  a  member  of  the 

Synod  of  Dort. 

It  is  called  original  sin,  because  man  derives  it  from  his  first 
origin,  and  it  is  imputed  or  inherent.  The  imputed  sin  of  our  ori- 
gin, is  the  defection  or  first  transgression  of  Adam  and  Eve,  com- 
mitted by  eating  the  forbidden  fruit ;  and  afterwards  imputed  to 
the  whole  human  race,  naturally  propagated  from  these  two  per- 
sons.— (Loc.  Com.,  disp.  xiv.) 

John  C.  Emdan,  of  the  same  University. 

Concerning  all  the  posterity  of  Adam,  we  affirm  that  as  well  on 
account  of  the  fall  of  Adam,  as  by  their  own  proper  sins,  they 
are  cast  into  a  state  of  misery,  in  this  following  the  scriptures 
which  teach  that  the  first  origin  of  death  was  from  Adam  ;  so  that, 
in  truth,  his  posterity  are  reckoned  to  have  sinned  in  him,  and  so 
on  account  of  the  sin  of  Adam,  which  he  committed  by  eating  the 
forbidden  fruit,  not  as  if  this  sin  was  altogether  another's,  but  as 
being  in  some  sort  their  own,  they  are  adjudged  to  death. — (Rom. 
v.  12.) 

Agreeably  to  the  scriptures  it  is  said,  that  all  who  are  born  of 
Adam  sinned  in  his  loins,  because  it  was  so  appointed  by  God  that 
that  sin  which  Adam  first  committed  should  not  be  reckoned  only 
the  sin  of  Adam,  but  should  be  imputed  to  his  posterity. 

The  meaning  of  the  scripture  is  evident,  since  it  pronounces  that 
men  are  constituted  sinners  by  the  disobedience  of  Adam,  for  it 
clearly  teaches  that  men  are  so  constituted  sinners  by  the  sin  of 
Adam,  that  according  to  the  divine  ordination  sin  is  imputed  to  his 
posterity  ;  and  on  this  account  they  are  equally  reckoned  sinners, 
as  if  in  their  own  proper  person  they  had  committed  it. — (Idea 
Theologica.) 


214  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION. 

Thomas  Strackius. 

As  Martin  Becan,  the  Jesuit,  in  his  book  concerning  God,  says, 
"  That  by  original  sin  these  two  things  are  understood  :  1.  The 
actual  sin  of  Adam,  by  which  he  destroyed  himself  and  the  whole 
human  race.  2.  Habitual  sin,  which  is  contracted  by  his  posterity 
from  the  actual  sin  of  Adam  ;  that  is  the  corruption  and  vitiosity 
of  human  nature  ;  hence  that  sin  is  truly  described  to  be  an  actual 
defection  of  the  descendants  of  Adam,  who,  while  in  his  loins, 
made  a  defection  from  God  to  the  devil.  And  this  corruption  or 
vitiosity  of  nature  is  inflicted  on  man  by  God,  as  a  just  judge,  on 
account  of  the  aforesaid  defection,  by  both  of  which  man  is  ren- 
dered miserable  and  made  obnoxious  to  eternal  damnation,  until  by 
Christ  he  is  liberated  from  that  misery.  Paul,  in  the  epistle  to  the 
Romans,  v.  12,  speaks  concerning  this  first  sin. — (Vindication  of 
the  Catechism  of  the  Palatinate,  quest,  vii.) 

James  Arminius,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Leyden. 

Since  the  condition  of  the  covenant  first  entered  into  by  God 
with  the  first  man  was,  that  if  they  would  remain  in  his  favour 
and  grace  by  the  observance  of  this  precept,  and  others,  the  gifts 
conferred  on  him,  with  the  same  grace,  would  be  transmitted  to  his 
posterity  ;  but  if  they  (our  first  parents)  should  render  themselves 
unworthy  of  these  blessings  by  their  disobedience,  their  posterity 
also  should  be  destitute  of  them,  and  should  be  obnoxious  to  the 
contrary  evils :  hence  it  has  happened,  that  all  men  naturally  pro- 
pagated from  them  should  be  subjected  to  death,  temporal  and 
eternal,  and  should  be  destitute  of  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and 
of  original  righteousness  ;  which  punishment,  the  privation  of  the 
image  of  God,  is  wont  to  be  called  original  sin.  From  these  things 
the  imputation  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parents  is  necessarily  inferred; 
for  wherever  there  is  the  punishment  of  sin  there  is  the  imputation 
of  the  same. — (Disp.  31,  thes.  9.) 

Neustadian  Admonition  of  the  Professors  of  the  Palatinate. 

We  acknowledge  original  sin  to  be  not  only  guilt,  but  the  heredi- 
tary depravity  of  human  nature,  which  is  repugnant  to  the  law  of 
God  and  deserving  eternal  punishment. 

Hieronymus  Zanchius,  Professor  of  Theology. 

Because  the  whole  human  race  which  is  propagated  by  natural 
generation  from  Adam  were  in  his  loins,  hence  the  precept,  with 
its  penalty,  was  not  addressed  to  the  person  of  Adam  alone,  but 
also  pertained  to  the  whole  human  race.  Therefore,  we  believe 
and  confess  with  the  apostle,  that  in  Adam  sinning  all  men  sinned ; 
so  that  that  disobedience  was  not  peculiar  to  Adam,  but  was  the 
common  [disobedience]  of  the  whole  human  race  ;  since  his  guilt 
has  involved  all  men  naturally  descended  from  his  loins,  as  the 
apostle  Paul  to  the  Romans  hath  manifestly  taught.     And  as  an 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    IMPUTATION.  215 

antithesis  to  the  disobedience  of  Adam,  he  has  firmly  established 
the  obedience  of  Christ.  For  if  the  obedience  of  Christ  is  no  less 
ours  by  imputation  than  Christ's' by  his  own  proper  action,  because 
we  are  born  again  by  his  incorruptible  seed  and  from  his  spirit,  it 
follows  that  the  disobedience  of  Adam  also  is  imputed  to  us,  and 
we  are  held  by  his  guilt,  who  have  been  born  from  his  corrupt 
seed,  who  is  the  father  of  us  all. 

That  sin  which  by  the  first  man  entered  into  the  world,  was  not 
only  the  privation  of  original  righteousness,  and  the  total  corrup- 
tion of  human  nature,  but  also  the  disobedience  of  Adam  itself, 
which  was  not  ours  in  the  act,  nevertheless,  in  its  fault  and  guilt 
has  come  upon  us  by  imputation.  And  by  way  of  explication  he 
says,  "  We  therefore  say  that  that  disobedience  of  Adam,  which 
was  not  ours  in  act,  yet  as  to  the  fault  and  guilt,  became  ours  by 
imputation  ;  since  God  most  justly  imputes  that  sin  of  Adam,  as 
being  the  head,  to  us  the  members. — (Treatise  on  Redemption, 
thes.  i.) 

For  this  the  reason  why  all  men  have  sinned  in  Adam,  that  is, 
were  made  guilty,  because  Adam  first  sinned  by  his  own  actual 
disobedience  ;  so  we  also  in  him  as  in  our  origin  are  made  guilty  ; 
and  his  sin  becomes  ours  by  imputation.  Thus  also  the  apostle 
expresses  it,  when  he  says,  "  By  the  disobedience  of  one,  namely, 
Adam,  we  are  all  constituted  sinners.  This  is  our  dve^u,  the  impu- 
tation of  Adam's  sin,  which  has  become  ours  because  we  are  his 
members.     And  this  is  the  principal  thing  in  original  sin." 

Zachariah  Ursinus. 

Original  sin  is  the  guilt  of  the  whole  human  race,  on  account  of 
the  fall  of  our  first  parents,  and  the  privation  of  the  knowledge  of 
God,  &c.  Two  things  are  included  in  it:  1.  The  guilt  of  eternal 
damnation  on  account  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parents.  2.  The  de- 
pravation of  our  whole  nature  since  the  fall.  Concerning  both 
these  Paul  speaks,  Rom.  v.  12,  By  one  man,  &c.  Some,  while 
they  admit  that  we  are  guilty  in  consequence  of  this  first  sin,  deny 
that  there  is  in  all  an  innate  depravity  which  deserves  damnation  and 
wrath.  For  they  allege  that  the  concupiscence  in  which  we  are 
born  cannot  be  of  the  nature  of  sin. 

Against  such  it  must  be  held,  first,  that  the  whole  human  race 
is  guilty  of  the  eternal  wrath  of  God,  on  account  of  the  disobe- 
dience of  our  first  parents,  unless  they  are  delivered  from  this 
guilt  by  the  grace  of  the  Mediator ;  secondly,  there  is  in  us,  be- 
sides this  guilt,  a  defect,  and  inclinations  contrary  to  the  law  of 
God  as  soon  as  we  are  born.  These  defects  and  evil  inclinations 
are  sins  deserving  the  eternal  wrath  of  God. 

Paul  clearly  teaches,  that  by  one  man's  disobedience  we  were 
all  rendered  guilty,  and  made  obnoxious  to  damnation.  And  he 
compares  this  condemnation  of  all,  on  account  of  the  sin  of  one, 
to  the  justification  of  many  on  account  of  the  satisfaction  of  one. 
As  then,  by  Christ,  there  is  a  two-fold  grace,  namely,  the  imputa- 


216  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION. 

tion  of  righteousness,  and  the  regeneration  or  restoration  of  cor- 
rupt nature,  so  also  the  evil  flowing  from  the  sin  of  Adam  is  double ; 
first,  guilt,  on  account  of  the  sin  committed  by  him,  and  depravity 
of  nature  contracted  from  him  and  propagated  to  us. — (Explic.  of 
the  Catechism,  par.  i.,  quest.  7.) 

George  Sohnius,  the  colleague  of  Ursinus  at  Heidelberg. 

Original  sin,  as  well  in  Adam  as  in  his  posterity,  includes  three 
deadly  evils,  the  demerit,  the  guilt  or  liableness  to  punishment,  and 
the  depravity  or  corruption  of  nature.  All  these  concur  in  the 
parent  and  in  his  posterity  in  relation  to  the  first  sin,  with  this  dif- 
ference only,  that  Adam  sinning  was  the  principal  agent  committing 
the  fault,  deserving  the  guilt,  and  casting  off  the  image  of  God, 
and  rendering  himself  depraved.  Of  all  these  do  his  posterity 
partake  by  imputation  and  by  generation  from  a  corrupted  parent. 
Then  it  is  in  vain  disputed  by  the  sophists,  whether  the  demerit,  the 
guilt,  or  the  depravity  is  contracted  by  the  fall,  for  all  these  do 
actually  exist ;  so  that  taking  the  words  in  a  wide  sense,  you  may 
say  that  the  fall  and  disobedience  of  our  first  parents,  and  in  them 
of  the  whole  human  race,  by  which  all  of  them  in  like  manner 
lost  the  image  of  God,  depraved  their  nature,  became  the  enemies 
of  God,  and  contracted  the  guilt  of  temporal  and  eternal  death ; 
unless  deliverance  and  reconciliation  should  take  place  by  the  Son 
of  God,  the  Mediator. 

Again,  "  all  are  dead  by  the  offence  of  one  man :"  therefore  his 
offence  was  the  offence  of  all,  but  theirs  by  participation  and  impu- 
tation, otherwise  they  could  not  be  said  to  be  dead  by  the  offence 
of  one,  but  by  many  offences. 

Although  it  is  truly  said  that  the  first  sin  was  committed  by 
Adam,  yet  not  as  a  single  person  but  as  the  father  of  the  whole 
human  race,  however  it  is  not  correct  to  say  that  original  sin 
existed  in  Adam,  or  that  Adam  had  original  sin,  for  then  the  cause 
and  effect,  actual  and  original  sin,  would  be  manifestly  confounded. 
The  first  sin  of  Adam,  therefore,  as  we  said  before,  must  be  viewed 
in  a  double  aspect.  In  one  respect  it  was  the  sin  of  Adam,  and 
was  not  original  sin,  but  actual,  originating,  that  is,  giving  origin 
to  the  original  sin  of  his  posterity  ;  in  another  respect  it  was  the 
sin  of  his  posterity,  who  were  in  his  loins ;  so  that  in  mass  they 
committed  the  same  sin,  and  hence  it  is  imputed  to  them  all. 
Thus  this  our  fall  pertains  to  our  original  sin. 

Bellarmin's  first  proposition  is,  "  that  the  first  transgression  of 
Adam,  which  is  the  transgression  of  the  whole  human  race,  is  ori- 
ginal sin,  if  by  sin  be  meant  an  action."  This  is  correct,  if  it  only 
be  added,  If  sin  be  taken  for  an  action  not  of  Adam  alone,  but  of 
his  posterity,  who,  in  mass,  sinned  in  Adam.  For  thus  this  action 
was  ours,  pertaining  in  the  first  place  to  our  original  sin. 

We  here  close  our  extracts  from  these  witnesses  to  the  doctrine 
of  imputation,  as  held  by  the  Reformers.     The  careful  reader  can- 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  IMPUTATION.  217 

not  but  be  struck  by  the  distinctness  and  uniformity  of  their  views. 
At  this  time,  when  the  doctrine  itself  is  perverted,  and  the  opinions 
of  the  Reformers  and  others  are  shamefully  misrepresented,  we 
should  be  glad  to  see  the  whole  collection  of  testimony  made  by 
Rivet,  translated  and  published  in  a  volume. 


♦ 


ESSAY    IX. 

MELANCTHON  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  SIN, 


Reflecting  men  have  always  wondered,  that  as  there  is  in  most 
things  in  the  universe  so  beautiful  an  order,  there  should  exist  so 
great  confusion,  so  many  crimes  and  calamities,  together  with  dis- 
eases and  death,  in  the  human  race.  The  philosophers,  in  attempt- 
ing to  account  for  these  phenomena,  have  ascribed  them  partly  to 
matter,  partly  to  the  will  of  man,  and  partly  to  fate,  which  they  say 
is  the  necessary  connection  of  the  first  cause  with  all  second  causes, 
whether  physical  or  voluntary.  The  Manicheans,  adopting  a  cor- 
rupt philosophy,  professed  certain  insane  opinions,  equally  dishon- 
ourable to  God  and  injurious  to  morality ;  maintaining,  that  there 
were  two  eternal  and  independent  principles,  the  one  good  and  the 
other  evil,  and  also  the  doctrine  of  necessity  ;  by  which  opinions, 
the  church  in  ancient  times  was  very  much  agitated.  It  is  the  part 
of  a  pious  mind  to  think  and  speak  with  reverence  concerning  God ; 
and  to  embrace  and  hold  fast  those  sentiments  which  are  true,  and 
friendly  to  piety  and  good  morals,  and  which  have  been  approved 
by  the  deliberate  judgment  of  the  judicious  and  pious  in  the  church  ; 
and  not  to  indulge  vain  curiosity,  or  a  fondness  for  useless  specula- 
tions, nor  to  enter  into  infinite  labyrinths  of  disputation. 

We  ought,  however,  in  the  commencement,  to  lay  it  down  as  a 
certain  principle,  from  which  nothing  should  induce  us  to  depart, 
that  God  is  not  the  author  of  sin,  that  he  does  not  will  sin,  nor  ap- 
prove of  sin,  nor  impel  the  wills  of  others  to  choose  sin :  but  that 
he  is  truly  and  awfully  opposed  to  sin,  which  he  has  declared,  not 
only  by  his  word,  in  which  eternal  misery  is  threatened,  but  also 
by  the  unceasing  manifestations  of  his  wrath  against  it,  in  the  dis- 
pensations of  his  Providence.  And  the  Son  of  God,  by  becoming 
a  victim  for  sin  to  appease  the  anger  of  his  Father,  has  demonstrated 
in  the  most  striking  manner,  by  his  death,  that  not  God,  but  the 
devil,  is  the  author  of  sin.  Let  it  then  be  received  as  an  undoubted 
truth,  that  sin  was  not  created,  nor  ordained  by  God  ;  but  that  it  is 
a  dreadful  destruction  of  the  divine  work  and  order ;  and  that  the 
true  cause  of  sin  is  the  will  of  the  devil,  and  the  will  of  man,  which 

*  This  translation,  from  the  "  Common-Places"  of  Melancthon,  was  published  in 
1833. 


PHILIP  MELANCTHON  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  SIN.       219 

freely  apostatized  from  God,  who  neither  willed  nor  approved  their 
disobedience.  Ingenious  men  have,  on  this  subject,  stated  many 
inextricable  questions ;  but  omitting  purposely  these  abstruse  dis- 
quisitions, we  declare  that  doctrine  which  is  true,  and  confirmed  by 
the  testimonies  of  divine  revelation,  and  which  we  embrace  with 
all  our  hearts ;  although  we  do  not  undertake  to  answer  all  the 
subtle  objections  which  may  be  brought  up  rjy  disputatious  men. 

Now,  that  God  is  not  the  cause  or  approver  of  sin,  is  made  evi- 
dent by  the  following  testimonies  of  scripture  :  "  And  God  saw 
everything  that  he  had  made,  and  behold  it  was  very  good."  Gen. 
L  81.  That  is,  everything  was  pleasing  to  God,  regular,  and  ac- 
cordant with  the  plan  of  the  divine  mind  ;  and  so  formed  as  to  be 
profitable  to  man. 

In  Psalm  v.  5,  it  is  said,  "  Thou  hatest  all  workers  of  iniquity." 
And  in  John  viii.  44,  it  is  said  of  Satan,  "  When  he  speaketh  a  lie, 
he  speaketh  of  his  own  :  for  he  is  a  liar  and  the  father  of  it." 

In  the  words  of  our  Saviour  just  cited,  a  distinction  is  clearly  im- 
plied between  the  substance  of  the  evil  spirit  and  his  moral  quali- 
ties. Satan  himself,  as  to  his  substance,  was  the  work  of  God,  by 
whom  all  the  angels  of  heaven  were  created,  some  of  whom  fell 
into  sin  ;  but  a  lie  he  has  of  himself,  which  he  produced  by  the 
exercise  of  his  own  free  will.  And  between  these  things  there  is 
no  repugnance ;  for  while  the  substance  is  upheld  by  God,  the  free 
agent  may  be  the  cause  of  his  own  sins,  by  abusing  his  liberty  and 
apostatizing  from  God. 

Another  testimony  may  be  found  in  Zech.  viii.  17,  "And  let 
none  of  you  imagine  evil  in  your  hearts  against  his  neighbour, 
and  love  no  false  oath,  for  all  these  are  things  that  I  hate,  saith  the 
Lord." 

Now  God  is  sincere  in  his  professed  hatred  of  sin :  it  cannot, 
therefore,  be  thought  that  he  wills  sin. 

Again,  1  John  xxii.  16,  "  The  lust  of  the  flesh  is  not  of  the  Father, 
but  of  the  world."  And  1  John  iii.  8,  "  He  who  committeth  sin  is 
of  the  devil,  for  the  devil  sinneth  from  the  beginning ;"  that  is,  the 
devil  is  the  original  author  of  sin.  And  in  regard  to  the  human 
race,  we  read  in  Rom.  v.  12,  "By  man  sin  entered  into  the  world ;" 
that  is,  sin  is  not  a  thing  created  by  God  ;  but  man,  in  the  exercise 
of  his  own  liberty,  has  turned  away  from  God,  and  wasted  the 
gifts  of  God,  and  has  propagated  this  his  ruin  to  posterity. 

Nor  do  those  words  of  scripture,  where  it  is  said,  "  I  will  harden 
the  heart  of  Pharaoh,"  and  other  similar  expressions,  militate  with 
the  sentiments  expressed  above ;  for  to  those  acquainted  with  the 
Hebrew  idiom,  it  is  well  known  that  such  expressions  signify  per- 
mission only,  and  not  an  efficacious  will ;  as  when  we  pray,  "  Lead 
us  not  into  temptation,"  the  meaning  is,  do  not  suffer  us  to  fall  into 
emptation  ;  or  do  not  permit  us  to  fall  or  to  be  overthrown  by 
temptation. 

It  is  here  important,  that  we  should  have  fixed  in  our  minds,  the 
true  idea  of  sin,  that  we  may  be  able  clearly  to  distingu  ish  be- 


220  PHILIP    MELANCTHON    ON    THE    NATURE    OF    SIN. 

tween  it  and  what  is  produced  by  God.  Sin  is  the  disturbance  or 
confusion  of  the  divine  order ;  sin,  therefore,  in  the  simplest  notion 
of  it,  is  not  a  substance,  nor  anything  positive,  but  a  delect,  or  pri- 
vation. Sin,  as  it  exists  in  the  mind,  is  darkness  ;  that  is,  we  have 
not  the  clear  knowledge  of  divine  things,  nor  do  we  yield  a  firm 
assent  to  the  divine  threatenings  and  promises.  But  sin,  in  the 
will,  is  aversion ;  that  is,  the  heart  is  destitute  of  the  fear  of  God, 
of  confidence,  and  love  towards  him,  and  of  that  obedience  of  heart 
which  the  law  of  his  nature  demands,  but  is  carried  away  with 
wandering  desires  which  are  opposed  to  God.  Now,  that  those 
evils  are  properly  defects,  and  not  things  created  by  God,  is  evi- 
dent  enough.  Instead  of  being  his  work,  sin  is  the  abominable  de- 
stroyer of  the  order  of  his  work.  It  does  not  follow  that  he  is  the 
author  of  sin,  because  he  preserves  in  being  the  creature  in  whom 
it  exists ;  but  he  is  exceedingly  displeased  with  sin,  and  sent  his 
Son  to  appease  his  wrath,  and  to  heal  the  wound  made  in  our  na- 
ture. Let  it  be  kept  in  mind,  therefore,  that  God  is  not  the  cause 
of  that  vitiosity  with  which  we  are  born ;  nor  can  he  will  that 
which  is  evil,  or  at  all  approve  it.  But  here  a  cavil,  not  uncom- 
monly made,  must  be  noticed.  It  is  asked,  if  sin  be  nothing  posi- 
tive, but  only  a  defect,  is  God  angry  at  nothing  ?  To  which  we 
would  answer,  that  there  is  a  great  difference  between  a  privation 
and  a  negation  (inter  nihil  privativum  et  nihil  negativum).  A  pri- 
vation requires  a  subject,  and  is  a  destruction  of  something  which 
properly  belongs  to  that  subject,  and  on  account  of  which  it  is  re- 
jected as  worthless.  Thus  the  ruin  of  an  edifice  is  a  destruction 
of  its  frame,  or  a  dissipation  of  its  parts.  So  the  depravity  of  our 
origin  is  a  pollution  and  disorder  of  our  faculties,  which  defect  in 
our  nature  is  the  object  of  the  divine  hatred,  and  on  account  of 
which  he  is  displeased  with  the  being  in  whom  it  exists.  The  na- 
ture of  privation  may  be  illustrated  by  a  bodily  disease,  in  which 
the  subject  remains,  but  in  a  disordered  state.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  negation  is  that  which  requires  no  subject,  as  the  house  of  Alex- 
ander is  now  nothing — a  mere  negation,  for  it  has  no  existence. 
This  simple  illustration  may  be  sufficient  to  shed  more  light  on  this 
subject  to  learners,  without  involving  them  in  subtle  disputations  or 
inextricable  labyrinths.  Geometrical  truths,  by  means  of  diagrams, 
may  be  presented  to  the  eye  ;  but  it  is  not  so  with  these  metaphysi- 
cal truths,  which  can  only  be  understood  by  a  gradual  and  atten- 
tive consideration.  A  man  who  is  wounded,  when  beholding  his 
wound,  is  certain  that  it  is  not  a  mere  negation,  but  that  the  parts 
are  really  lacerated.  So  Paul,  beholding  the  wickedness  and  vices 
of  a  Nero,  grieves,  and  does  not  consider  these  things  as  mere  ne- 
gations, but  as  a  most  abominable  ruin  of  a  divine  work.  When  in 
this  light  we  view  evil  as  a  defect  or  privation,  we  never  can  think 
that  sin  is  a  thing  which  should  be  extenuated.  As  in  man,  con- 
sidered as  the  workmanship  of  God,  order  is  a  part,  and  is  the  pro- 
duction of  his  power,  and  is  pleasing  to  him,  and  conducive  to  the 
beauty  and  happiness  of  man,  and  is  called  an  excellent  thing,  a 


PHILIP    MELANCTHON    ON    THE    NATURE    OP    SIN.  221 

great  good  ;  so,  on  the  contrary,  the  disorder  in  which  consists  the 
ruin  ot  this  good  work  must  not  be  ascribed  to  God,  but  to  the 
devil,  and  to  the  free  will  of  man,  and  is  hated  of  God,  and  brings 
destruction  upon  the  beings  who  are  the  subjects  of  it,  and  is  called 
evil ;  that  is,  a  thing  not  agreeable  to  the  divine  mind,  but  alto- 
gether displeasing  to  God,  and  destructive  to  men  and  devils. 

This  statement  will  in  some  degree  illustrate  the  nature  of  actual 
sin,  concerning  which  there  are  so  many  intricate  questions  :  it  will 
not  be  difficult  to  understand  how  it  is  merely  a  defect,  if  you  will 
look,  not  only  at  the  external  action,  but  at  the  state  of  the  mind 
which  governs  the  action.  Eve,  for  example,  in  eating  the  for- 
bidden fruit,  was  not  governed  by  the  light  of  God  ;  but  not  to  be 
governed  by  the  light  of  God,  is  to  have  the  will  opposed  to  God, 
and  that  this  is  a  defect  of  a  right  will,  it  is  easy  to  perceive.  Ori- 
ginally, then,  her  sin  was  of  a  privative  nature,  although  it  was 
followed  immediately  by  external  acts,  which  are,  it  is  acknow- 
ledged, of  a  positive  nature.  First,  it  was  an  internal  disorder  ;  the 
motions  of  the  soul  wandering  from  their  right  course,  just  as  a  ship 
without  sails  and  rudder  tossed  by  the  winds  and  waves.  This 
figure  will  very  well  serve  to  show  that  the  evil  consists  in  defect; 
for  as  long  as  the  ship  remains  on  the  bosom  of  the  deep,  it  will 
have  some  motion ;  so  man,  while  he  exists,  will  have  some  sort  of 
action,  however  irregular  and  confused  it  may  be.  Neither  be- 
cause God  sustains  man  in  being,  is  he  the  author  of  sin,  for  those 
defects  in  the  exercises  of  the  mind  are  not  produced  by  Him.  In 
the  case  of  Eve,  just  mentioned,  the  cause  was  her  own  free  will. 
Her  actions  were  her  own,  and  she  spontaneously  turned  herself 
away  from  God. 

Let  it  then  be  admitted  as  an  undoubted  principle,  that  God  is 
not  the  author  of  sin,  nor  wills  sin,  and  it  will  follow  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  contingency ;  that  is,  that  all  things  do  not  happen 
by  necessity.  For  sin  proceeds  from  the  will  of  men  or  devils,  and 
not  from  the  will  of  God.  Contingency  supposes  that  the  actions 
of  men  proceed  from  free  will,  and  that  they  have  the  power  to  sin 
and  to  refrain  from  sinning.  The  contingency  concerning  which 
we  here  speak,  relates  to  human  actions,  and  not  to  the  motions  of 
other  things,  concerning  which  it  is  common  to  treat  when  physical 
causes  are  under  consideration. 

Moreover,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  scriptures  attribute  to 
man,  in  his  fallen  state,  some  liberty  of  choosing  those  things  which 
are  proposed  to  him  as  a  rational  creature,  and  of  doing  those  ex- 
ternal works  which  are  commanded  by  the  law  of  God  :  for  on  this 
account  the  righteousness  which  they  render  to  the  law  is  called 
the  righteousness  of  the  flesh ;  because,  as  Paul  teaches,  it  is  com- 
petent to  the  strength  of  nature  to  perform  it.  "  The  law  is  not 
made  for  a  righteous  man,"  that  is,  not  to  coerce  the  renewed,  but 
to  punish  the  impenitent.  Likewise,  "  the  law  is  a  schoolmaster ;" 
and  unless  some  sort  of  liberty  remained  to  fallen  man,  there  would 
be  no  manner  of  utility  in  laws  and  commandments  ;  and,  indeed, 


222        PHILIP  MELANCTHON  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  SIN. 

the  whole  apparatus  of  civil  government  would  be  useless.  It  is 
certain,  therefore,  that  liberty,  which  is  the  source  of  contingency, 
does  exist,  as  I  before  said.  But  as  God  is  said  to  determine  con- 
tingencies, we  must  be  careful  to  distinguish  between  his  determina- 
tion of  those  things  which  are  agreeable  to  his  will,  and  those  which 
are  not ;  or,  between  those  events  which  depend  entirely  on  his 
will,  and  those  which  are  brought  about  by  human  agency,  though 
not  to  the  exclusion  of  divine  agency.  God  foresaw  the  crimes  of 
Saul,  but  he  did  not  will  them  ;  nor  did  he  impel  his  will,  but  per- 
mitted him  to  act  according  to  his  own  inclination,  without  inter- 
posing any  obstacle  to  his  freedom.  But  in  the  view  of  Saul's  mis- 
conduct, which  he  clearly  foresees,  he  resolves  to  remove  him  from 
the  high  office  to  which,  by  divine  direction,  he  had  been  advanced. 
This  foreknowledge  did  not  cause  Saul  to  act  by  necessity  ;  nor 
did  it  at  all  affect  the  free  agency  of  man ;  nor  take  away  that 
liberty  which  belongs  to  man,  even  in  his  fallen  state.  Neither 
does  the  fact  that  God  sustains  human  beings  in  existence,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  their  powers,  interfere  with  the  contingency  and  liberty 
of  their  free  actions.  When  Eve  sinned,  the  cause  cannot  be 
ascribed  to  the  upholding  power  of  God,  but  her  own  will  was  the 
real  cause  of  her  act ;  for  when  human  nature  was  constituted,  it 
was  endowed  with  liberty,  and  the  continuance  of  human  nature 
by  the  same  power  which  created  it,  does  not  destroy  that  freedom 
which  was  thus  conferred  on  man  in  his  first  creation.  Thus,  al- 
though God  preserved  Saul  in  being  and  in  the  exercise  of  his  fa- 
culties, the  cause  of  his  sin  was  not  at  all  this  divine  sustentation, 
but  his  own  free  will. 

To  the  representation  above  made,  the  words  of  the  prophet 
Jeremiah  are  sometimes  objected,  where  he  says,  "  O  Lord,  I  know 
that  the  way  of  man  is  not  in  himself:  it  is  not  in  man  that  walketh 
to  direct  his  steps."  On  which  I  would  briefly  remark  that  it  is 
one  thing  to  speak  of  the  choice  of  the  will,  and  another  of  the 
event,  or  accomplishment  of  what  we  will.  Pompey  willed  to 
make  war  upon  Caesar,  and  freely  willed  it,  but  the  event  was 
governed  by  many  other  causes  besides  the  will  of  Pompey.  This 
declaration  of  Jeremiah  is  a  delightful  doctrine,  and  contains  the 
sweetest  consolation.  We  are  here  taught,  that  "the  way  of  a 
man,"  which  includes  the  regulation  of  his  private  affairs,  and  the 
success  of  his  public  vocations,  cannot  be  sustained  and  secured  by 
human  wisdom  and  strength.  The  minds  of  the  best  men  are  not 
sufficiently  perspicacious  to  foresee  all  dangers,  or  to  guard  against 
them,  but  human  judgment  is  liable  to  be  misled  by  errors,  as  was 
that  of  king  Josiah,  when  he  judged  it  expedient  to  make  war  on 
the  Egyptians.  Many  sad  errors  from  this  cause  might  be  enu- 
merated ;  which  led  Cicero  to  complain,  that  no  man  was  at  all 
times  wise.  Often,  human  counsels  are  involved  in  inextricable 
difficulties  by  mistakes  which  are  incident  to  all.  How  many  dis- 
asters to  the  house  of  David  arose  from  one  false  step  !  But  even 
when  human  counsels  are  wise,  and  the  cause  good,  the  event  may 


PHILIP    MELANCTIION    ON    THE    NATURE    OF    SIN.  223 

not  correspond  with  the  hopes  entertained.  Great  calamities, 
which  suddenly  cast  down  the  most  sagacious  and  exalted  of  mor- 
tals, do,  in  the  providence  of  God,  take  place,  when  human  pru- 
dence and  human  power  are  of  no  avail  to  prevent  the  disaster,  ac- 
cording to  that  true  saying  of  the  poet, 

"  Omnia  sunt  hominum  tenui  pendentia  filo  : 
Et  subito  casu  quae  valuere  ruunt." 

It  was  concerning  these  various  obstructions,  and  in  relation  to 
human  weakness,  and  the  instability  of  human  affairs,  that  Jeremiah 
was  speaking  in  the  passage  cited  above.  His  object  was  to  show 
us,  that  the  event  of  things  depended  on  many  secret  causes,  un- 
known to  us,  and  that,  therefore,  we  ought  to  fly  to  God,  and  ask 
and  expect  direction,  and  the  regulation  of  our  affairs  from  his  aid. 
Here  we  see  the  benefit  of  those  gracious  promises,  "  I  will  not 
leave  you  comfortless."  "  It  is  God  that  worketh  in  you  both  to 
will  and  to  do."  "  The  steps  of  a  good  man  are  ordered  of  the 
Lord  ;  and  he  delighteth  in  his  way."  By  such  promises  as  these, 
we  are  warranted  and  encouraged  to  trust  in  the  Lord  for  help, 
in  time  of  need ;  and  we  should  be  ever  ready  to  acknowledge, 
that  nothing  spiritually  good,  or  of  a  saving  nature,  can  be  accom- 
plished by  us,  without  God  helping  us  ;  as  Christ  declares,  "  With- 
out me  ye  can  do  nothing."  And  John  the  Baptist  says,  "  A  man 
can  receive  nothing  except  it  be  given  him  from  heaven."  Pom- 
pey,  Brutus,  Antony,  and  others,  attempted  great  things,  but  it 
pleased  providence  to  disappoint  their  expectations,  and  to  advance 
other  men  to  the  supreme  power.  Although  it  is  evident  that  the 
help  of  God  is  needed  in  all  actions  which  are  connected  with  sal- 
vation, yet  it  must  not  be  hence  concluded,  that  man  possesses  no 
liberty  of  any  kind,  much  less  that  all  good  and  evil  are  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  divine  efficiency :  the  true  meaning  of  the  passage 
from  Jeremiah,  therefore,  is,  that  salvation  cannot  be  obtained  by 
human  counsels  and  human  ability.  Let  us  therefore  learn,  that 
we  are  indebted  to  divine  aid,  when  we  are  made  instruments  of 
saving  benefit  to  ourselves  or  others  ;  and  also,  we  owe  it  to  the 
same  cause,  that  we  are  not  the  pests  of  the  human  race,  like  Pha- 
raoh, Nero,  Manes,  and  other  similar  characters.  We  ought,  there- 
fore, under  the  deep  conviction  that  we  can  do  nothing  ourselves, 
most  earnestly  apply  to  God  by  prayer  and  supplication,  that  we 
may  be  directed  and  governed  by  our  heavenly  Father.  But  it  is 
most  evident  that  this,  our  dependence  on  God,  does  not  make  him 
the  efficient  cause  of  our  sin.  The  church  of  God,  entertaining 
correct  views  of  this  matter,  while  she  acknowledges  God  as  the 
author  of  all  good,  holds  in  utter  abomination  the  crimes  of  Nero, 
and  will  neither  say  that  such  actions  take  place  by  necessity,  or 
that  they  come  to  pass  by  God's  willing  them. 

Another  text  which  has  been  made  the  occasion  of  objection,  is 
that  of  Paul,  where  he  calls  the  Ephesian  Christians,  "  Elect  ac- 


224       PHILIP  MELANCTHON  ON  THE  NATURE  OP  SIN. 

cording  to  the  purpose  of  him  who  worketh  all  things  according  to 
the  purpose  of  His  will."  And  again,  where  he  says  to  the  Corin- 
thians, "  But  it  is  the  same  God  who  worketh  all  in  all."  Now  it 
is  perfectly  manifest  that  these  passages,  taken  in  the  connexion  in 
which  they  stand,  relate  only  to  the  church,  and  to  those  saving 
acts  which  God  is  pleased  to  excite  and  regulate  in  the  members 
of  the  church ;  but  are  not  intended  to  be  applied  to  the  universal 
sustentation  of  all  things,  nor  to  all  the  particular  motions  of  ani- 
mals. Let  these  texts  then  be  interpreted  according  to  their  true 
intention,  and  let  them  not  be  forced  into  a  signification  foreign  to 
their  genuine  sense. 

Paul  admonishes  us  that  the  church  is  saved  and  governed,  not 
by  human  wisdom  or  power,  but  by  the  wonderful  operations  of 
God.  The  preservation  of  Noah  from  the  deluge,  the  protection 
of  Israel  in  Egypt  and  in  the  desert,  the  achievements  of  Moses, 
Joshua,  Samuel,  David,  and  other  pious  and  distinguished  persons, 
are  to  be  ascribed  to  the  power  of  God  which  stirred  up  and 
enabled  them  to  lend  effectual  aid  to  the  church,  and  the  propaga- 
tion of  the  true  doctrine  •,  wherefore  the  declarations  of  holy  scrip- 
ture referred  to  above,  are  intended  for  the  consolation  of  believ- 
ers, that  they  may  be  assured  of  the  presence  of  God  with  his 
church  to  afford  her  aid  in  all  her  dangers  and  afflictions.  It  was 
God  that  helped  David  in  his  wars,  and  made  him  victorious  over 
his  enemies.  It  was  God  also  who  gave  assistance  to  the  dying 
Lawrence,  so  that  he  was  preserved  from  making  shipwreck  of 
faith  through  fear  of  death.  By  such  declarations  and  promises 
our  souls  are  consumed,  and  encouraged  to  pray  in  the  words  of 
the  Psalmist,  "  Direct  me  in  thy  truth  and  teach  me."  As,  O  Lord, 
thou  bringest  salvation  to  thy  church,  so  make  me  a  subject  of  thy 
grace  and  a  vessel  of  mercy.  And  this  explication  of  those  texts 
of  sacred  scripture  will  equally  serve  to  cast  light  on  many  similar 
passages.  But  it  should,  in  the  last  place,  be  added,  as  a  thing 
requisite  to"  the  right  understanding  of  this  subject,  that  there  is  a 
twofold  necessity.  The  one  is  absolute,  as  when  a  proposition  or 
thing  is  simply  necessary,  so  that  the  contrary  is  plainly  and  alto- 
gether impossible.  Such  propositions  are  said  to  be  necessary 
with  an  absolute  necessity.  Such  is  the  proposition,  that  there  is 
a  God — that  he  is  intelligent,  eternal,  possessed  of  power,  wisdom, 
justice,  and  goodness ;  and  that  he  wills  only  what  is  just  and  good, 
and  cannot  will  anything  which  is  repugnant  to  his  own  most  holy 
nature.  He  cannot  be  delighted  with,  or  will  injustice,  cruelty, 
lust,  or  any  wickedness.  But  there  is  another  necessity  which  is 
denominated  the  necessity  of  consequence,  that  is,  such  propositions 
or  things,  the  opposite  of  which  are  not  in  their  nature  impossible, 
and  are  only  rendered  necessary  by  preceding  causes,  or  because 
they  are  foreordained.  And  between  things  of  this  kind  there  is  a 
great  difference.  In  regard  to  events  of  one  class,  which  are  in 
their  own  nature  good,  God  not  only  wills  and  foreordains  them, 
but  foretells  them.     Such,  for  example,  is  this,  that  on  a  certain 


PHILIP    MELANCTHON    ON    THE    NATURE    OF    SIN.  225 

day,  the  dead  will  be  raised  up.  This  event  is  not  necessary  sim- 
ply and  absolutely,  but  by  consequence.  But  in  regard  to  those 
things  which  are  evil,  as  wicked  acts  of  every  sort,  God  docs  not 
will  them,  but  appoints  bounds  over  which  he  will  not  permit  the 
wicked  to  pass.  These  events,  however,  may  be  said  to  be  neces- 
sary in  the  second  sense  given  of  that  term.  Pharaoh  persecuted 
and  oppressed  the  Israelites :  this,  in  its  own  nature,  was  not  ne- 
cessary, but  altogether  contingent  ;  for  the  opposite  was  not  a 
thing  impossible,  DUt  because  it  so  occurred  from  causes  which 
existed,  it  is  said  to  be  necessary  by  consequence. 

Here  also  seems  to  be  the  proper  place  to  speak  of  physical 
necessity.  Thus  we  say  the  fire  burns  by  necessity,  the  sun  is 
moved  ;  but  according  to  the  doctrine  of  the  church,  this  physical 
necessity  falls  under  the  head  of  that  necessity  of  consequence 
which  we  have  just  described.  Fire  burns  because  God  has  given 
to  it  this  nature  ;  the  sun  is  moved  by  the  same  power  which  cre- 
ated it,  and  we  see  in  the  history  of  Joshua  and  Hezekiah,  that 
motion  is  not  essential  to  the  sun. 

We  have  now  gone  over  all  the  principal  questions  which  are  to 
be  agitated  on  this  subject,  which  if  they  be  carefully  considered, 
we  snail  be  able  to  form  a  correct  judgment  concerning  all  these 
controversies  ;  and  it  will  be  evident  that  it  is  far  from  our  purpose 
to  bring  in  a  stoical  necessity.  How  can  any  one  pray  to  God 
with  the  least  confidence,  who  believes  that  all  things  are  governed 
by  a  fatal  necessity?  The  saying  which  is  found  in  the  tragedy, 
that  the  blame  of  our  bad  conduct  is  to  be  charged  to  fate,  is  highly 
injurious  to  good  morals.  Every  one  is  acquainted  with  the  anec- 
dote of  the  servant  of  Zeno  who,  when  he  was  about  to  be  punished 
by  his  master  for  some  misconduct,  excused  himself  by  saying, 
that  it  would  be  unjust  to  punish  him,  since  he  was  forced  by  fate 
to  sin.  But  fate  never  made  any  man  a  sinner.  The  sentiments 
of  Plato,  in  the  second  book  of  his  Commonwealth,  are  correct 
and  good.  "  If,"  says  he,  "  we  would  have  the  state  well  governed, 
we  must  contend  with  all  our  might  that  no  one,  old  or  young,  in 
poetry  or  prose,  should  ever  utter  the  opinion,  or  be  permitted  to 
hear  it,  that  God  is  the  cause  of  the  crimes  of  any  one ;  for  as 
such  an  opinion  is  dishonourable  to  the  Deity,  so  it  is  injurious  to 
the  state  and  repugnant  to  sound  reason."  There  is  a  common 
argument  on  this  subject  which  not  a  little  disturbs  the  minds  of 
the  pious,  and  which  it  may  be  useful  to  explain.  It  is  said  that 
second  causes  cannot  act  without  the  concurrence  of  the  first, 
therefore,  as  the  second  cause  (as,  for  example,  the  disobedience 
of  Eve)  is  sinful,  the  first  must  be  so  also.  I  have  known  some 
persons  who  were  by  this  objection  driven  to  great  confusion  of 
mind,  and  to  the  adoption  of  horrible  conclusions.  There  is  a 
subtle  metaphysical  answer  which  is  sometimes  given  to  this  ob- 
jection, but  I  prefer  resorting  to  one  which  is  better  suited  to  com- 
mon apprehension.  It  is  this  :  God  is  present  with  and  concurs 
with  his  creatures,  not  like  the  God  of  the  Stoics,  as  if  bound  to. 

15 


226        PHILIP  MELANCTHON  ON  THE  NATURE  OP  SIN. 

second  causes,  so  that  he  is  able  to  act  only  as  they  act ;  but  as  a 
perfectly  free  agent,  sustaining  them  in  existence,  and  with  con- 
summate wisdom  accommodating  his  agency  to  the  nature  of  the 
case,  not  only  giving  efficacy  to  second  causes,  but  also,  when  he 
chooses,  counteracting  them.  Thus,  though  he  upholds  the  laws 
of  nature  by  which  corporeal  things  are  governed,  yet  we  find  him 
ordering  the  sun  to  become  retrograde,  and  the  clouds  to  withhold 
the  rain  for  three  years,  and  then  suddenly  sent  plentiful  showers. 
And  we  know  that  although  God  sustains  second  causes,  He  is  not 
confined  to  them,  for  every  day  events  occur  which  are  out  of  the 
sphere  of  their  operation.  In  the  midst  of  battle,  and  on  the  seas, 
and  in  diseases,  many  are  delivered  from  various  dangers  when 
second  causes  can  be  of  no  avail. 

We  ought  not,  therefore,  to  entertain  the  opinion  of  the  Stoics, 
that  God  is  confined  to  second  causes  so  as  never  to  act  independ- 
ently of  them,  but  we  should  believe  that  he  is  always  present 
with  the  work  of  his  hands,  sustaining  all  things  by  his  power,  and 
governing  all  events  by  his  own  most  perfect  freedom  ;  so  that 
there  is  good  ground  for  praying  for  his  aid  and  interposition  in 
any  emergency.  Thus  God  not  only  sustains,  but  willingly  helps 
those  who  act  in  an  orderly  manner ;  but  in  regard  to  those  who 
act  disorderly,  although  he  upholds  these  also,  yet  he  cannot  be 
said  to  aid  them  in  doing  wrong.  Eve  was  so  constituted  and  en- 
dowed with  free  will,  that  she  had  it  in  her  power  either  to  obey 
or  to  transgress,  and  the  existence  of  divine  favour,  as  the  first 
cause,  did  not  make  God  the  author  of  her  sin.  It  is  indeed  uni- 
versally true,  that  the  second  cause  cannot  act  without  the  sustain- 
ing power  of  the  first ;  but,  as  was  before  observed,  this  upholding 
providence  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  that  exercise  of 
power  which  assists  in  the  production  of  the  sinful  act ;  for  that 
effect  which  God  does  not  will,  he  never  aids  the  creature  to  bring 
into  being.  If  any  one  inquire,  therefore,  what  was  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  sin  of  Eve  when  she  turned  herself  away  from  God, 
the  answer  must  be,  her  own  free  will.  The  maxim,  that  the 
second  cause  cannot  act  without  the  first,  although  admitted  by  all, 
is  very  differently  understood  by  the  Stoic  and  by  the  Christian. 
The  former  believes  that  in  similar  circumstances  the  same  effects 
must  necessarily  take  place ;  but  the  latter  makes  an  important 
distinction  between  good  and  evil  actions,  which  the  Stoic  entirely 
overlooks.  It  is  true  that  the  second  cause  cannot  act  without  the 
first,  that  is,  unless  it  is  sustained  by  the  first ;  but  this  does  not 
hinder  the  first  cause  from  acting,  when  it  seems  good,  without  the 
second,  because  he  is  a  perfectly  free  agent ;  and  when  the  second 
cause  is  a  free  agent  it  acts  without  the  co-operation  of  the  first  in 
the  production  of  evil,  for  the  power  of  originating  such  acts  be- 
longs essentially  to  that  liberty  with  which  free  agents  are  endued. 
In  this  explanation  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  too  much  refine- 
ment, and  to  present  the  subject  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  level  to 
the  common  apprehensions  of  men.    Others,  however,  choose  to 


PHILIP    MELANCTHON    ON    THE    NATURE   OP   SIN.  227 

explain  this  matter  a  little  differently.  They  say  that  the  second 
cause  cannot  act  without  the  first,  in  producing  a  positive  effect ; 
but  in  a  mere  delinquency,  or  defect  of  right  action,  the  second  cause 
can  act  alone.  For  example,  the  will  of  Eve  in  the  first  trans- 
gression did  not  produce  a  positive  effect,  but  was  an  aberration 
from  the  proper  mark,  defect  in  the  quality  of  the  act.  This  ex- 
planation does  not  really  differ  from  the  one  already  given,  and 
may  seem  to  render  it  more  perspicuous.  But  after  all  it  is  best 
to  believe  in  the  general,  that  God  has  established  such  a  connexion 
between  the  first  and  second  cause,  as  he  acting  freely  chooses 
should  exist ;  so  that  while  he  co-operates  to  sustain  the  creature, 
He  is  not  the  author  of  sin. 


ESSAY    X. 

DOCTRINES    OF   THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

PUBLISHED    IN    1833. 


It  is  known  to  all  students  of  ecclesiastical  history,  that  Poland, 
and  the  neighbouring  states  of  Transylvania,  Bohemia,  and  Hun- 
gary, were  the  theatre  of  the  Unitarian  churches,  during  a  consi- 
derable part  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  reason  why  the  propa- 
gators of  heresy  chose  this  region,  for  the  dissemination  of  their 
opinions,  is  easily  explained.  In  all  other  countries  of  Europe, 
they  were  restrained  by  the  laws,  but  here  liberty  of  conscience 
was  enjoyed.  It  may  also  be  mentioned,  that  with  the  doctrines 
of  the  Reformation  was  introduced  a  spirit  of  free,  unshackled  in- 
quiry into  all  opinions ;  and  as  was  natural,  from  the  imbecility  of 
man,  this  liberty  degenerated  into  licentiousness,  and  frequently 
terminated  in  downright  infidelity.  At  first,  the  heterodox  of  Po- 
land professed  to  be  either  Arians  or  Sabellians ;  they  did  not,  in- 
deed, adopt  these  denominations,  but  they  held  the  opinions  which 
are  commonly  so  denominated.  There  were,  however,  numerous 
shades  of  difference  among  these  Unitarians,  and  they  separated 
into  a  great  number  of  petty  sects,  which  were  usually  denomi- 
nated from  the  town  or  province  in  which  the  leading  members 
respectively  resided.  One  writer  asserts,  that  at  a  particular  time, 
about  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  number  of  Unitarian 
sects  was  above  thirty,  but  he  does  not  inform  us  in  what  points 
they  differed  from  each  other.*  According  to  the  custom  of  the 
times,  many  public  disputations  were  held,  and  many  synods  were 
convened,  by  which  means  it  was  attempted,  but  unsuccessfully, 
to  settle  the  points  in  controversy  between  the  Trinitarians  and 
Anti-Trinitarians. 

In  the  midst  of  this  confusion  of  sects  and  prevalence  of  heresy, 
Faustus  Socinus  visited  the  country.  His  uncle,  Laelius  Socinus, 
had  been  there  many  years  before  ;  but  though  he  left  his  opinions 
as  an  inheritance  to  his  nephew,  he  was  himself  either  too  timid 

*  Maimbourg. 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANB.  229 

or  too  prudent  to  avow  and  defend  the  Unitarian  opinions  which 
he  held.  But  Faustus,  with  equal  talents  and  address,  possessed 
that  courage  which  is  requisite  to  appear  openly  as  the  advocate 
of  unpopular  tenets.  When  he  first  came  to  Poland,  all  parties 
seemed  to  be  afraid  of  him ;  for  they  were  aware  that  he  had 
pushed  his  Unitarianism  to  consequences  which  they  were  not 
prepared  to  admit.  None  of  the  sects  were  disposed,  therefore,  to 
receive  Socinus  into  their  communion.  No  doubt  he  was  dis- 
pleased at  being  expelled  from  the  communion  of  Unitarians  ;  but 
he  disguised  his  feelings,  and  artfully  turned  all  to  his  own  advan- 
tage. He  now  professed  an  unwillingness  to  be  connected  with 
any  particular  sect,  but  declared  himself  to  be  the  friend  of  all ; 
and  by  intercourse  with  the  leading  ministers  and  teachers,  he  in 
a  short  time  brought  them  all  into  one  harmonious  body,  and  in- 
duced them  to  embrace  his  peculiar  opinions,  which  have  ever 
since  been  called  Socinianism.  One  dispute,  however,  arose, 
which  Socinus,  with  all  his  address,  could  never  bring  to  a  favour- 
able conclusion.  Francis  Davidis,  a  man  of  learning  and  abilities, 
who  had  passed  through  many  changes  of  theological  opinion,  was 
a  leading  minister  among  the  Unitarians  in  Transylvania,  and  now 
began  to  teach  and  preach,  that  Jesus  Christ  being  a  mere  man, 
had  no  more  claim  to  divine  worship  than  any  other  saint ;  a  most 
legitimate  conclusion  from  the  acknowledged  premises.  But  the 
broaching  of  this  doctrine  excited  much  uneasiness  and  alarm. 
Blandrat,  who  was  now  physician  to  the  young  prince  Sigismund 
II.,  over  whom  he  had  a  decisive  influence,  sent  to  Poland  for  So- 
cinus, as  being  the  only  man  who,  by  his  skill  and  address  in  man- 
aging men,  would  be  likely  to  prevail  with  Davidis  to  renounce 
his  dangerous  opinion.  Accordingly  Socinus  came,  and  for  several 
months  was  lodged  in  the  same  house  with  the  heretic,  as  he  was 
considered  by  the  Unitarians.  But  all  his  arguments  and  persua- 
sions were  ineffectual  to  convince  Davidis  of  his  being  in  an  error. 
How  could  they,  when  the  doctrine  which  he  held  is  so  manifestly 
correct  upon  Unitarian  principles,  that  it  is  probable  there  is  not 
now  a  Unitarian  in  the  world  who  does  not  adopt  the  opinion 
of  Davidis  as  correct,  and  dissent  from  that  of  Socinus  as  most 
unreasonable?  But  light  does  not  break  upon  the  world  all  at 
once.  Even  Unitarians  may  for  a  while  remain  in  gross  error 
and  idolatry ;  and  what  to  their  successors  is  still  more  mortify- 
ing, they  may  proceed  so  far  as  to  persecute  those  who  differ 
from  them.  The  young  prince  of  Transylvania  was  induced  to 
cast  Davidis  into  prison  simply  on  account  of  his  pertinacious 
adherence  to  his  opinion.  Here  the  persecuted  man  died.  We 
ought  not,  however,  to  be  too  severe  in  our  censures  of  such 
conduct ;  for  the  doctrine  of  toleration  was  not  yet  well  under- 
stood, even  by  those  who  pleaded  for  it  in  their  own  case,  when 
they  needed  its  shelter.  We  think  that  this  case  may  fairly  be 
placed  as  a  parallel  to  that  of  Calvin.  It  is  not  clear,  however, 
that  Socinus   advised  this  measure,  although  it  is  very  certain 


230  DOCTRINES    OF   THE    EARLY   SOCINIANS. 

that  Blandrat  directed  the  whole  affair,  as  in  all  religious  matters 
the  prince  was  governed  by  him.  So  far  as  Socinus's  own  decla- 
ration will  go  to  exculpate  him  from  all  concern  in  this  transac- 
tion, we  must  acquit  him  of  being  accessory  to  the  death  of  this 
learned  man ;  for  we  recollect  to  have  seen  in  some  history  of  the 
churches  in  Poland,  that  when  at  a  large  synod  Socinus  was  ac- 
cused of  participating  in  the  persecution  of  Davidis,  he  publicly 
denied  that  he  had  advised  his  imprisonment,  or  had  any  concern 
in  the  matter.  But  although  the  leading  advocate  of  the  obnoxious 
opinion  was  thus  put  out  of  the  way,  the  doctrine  of  Davidis  pre- 
vailed more  and  more.  Socinus  not  only  never  changed  his 
opinion  respecting  the  worship  of  Christ,  but  he  would  hold  no 
communion  with  any  one  who  denied  that  Christ  should  be  wor- 
shipped, and  publicly  taught  and  published  the  opinion  that  those 
who  received  the  doctrine  of  Davidis,  had  no  just  claim  to  the  name 
of  Christians. 

The  Unitarians  of  Poland  cultivated  biblical  learning  with  assi- 
duity and  no  small  success,  as  appears  from  the  volumes  entitled 
"  Poloni  Fratres,"  &c.  Most  of  the  writings  of  Faustus  Socinus 
were  at  first  anonymous  ;  and  he  strongly  expressed  his  opinion  in 
favour  of  that  mode  of  publication,  because  men  are  so  prone  to 
be  influenced  in  forming  their  opinions,  by  prejudices  arising  from 
the  name  of  the  author.  His  principal  work  was  on  the  person 
and  offices  of  Christ,  entitled  "  De  Christo."  It  was  in  answer  to 
a  treatise  in  support  of  the  divinity  of  Christ,  written  in  the  Polish 
language,  by  a  Jesuit,  whose  name  was  Wiek.  This  work  of  the 
Pole  was,  indeed,  nothing  else  than  the  treatise  of  Bellarmin  on 
the  deity  of  the  Saviour,  translated  into  the  Polish  tongue.  Soci- 
nus's book  received  many  answers,  of  which  it  is  not  our  purpose 
at  present  to  speak.  The  Racovian  Catechism,  of  which  we  pro- 
pose to  treat  somewhat  particularly  in  this  article,  received  its 
name  from  the  town  of  Racow,  where  it  was  first  published.  It 
was  not  written  by  Socinus,  nor  published  during  his  life,  but  was 
compiled  by  Smalcius,  from  his  writings,  and  at  first  appeared  in 
the  Polish  language,  A.  D.  1606.  It  was  not  long,  however,  before 
this  Catechism  was  published  in  Latin  by  Moscorovius  ;  and  also 
in  the  German  language,  by  Smalcius  himself,  who  sent  a  copy  of 
it  to  the  professors  of  Wittenberg.  Among  the  fathers  in  this 
cradle  of  the  reformation,  it  was  a  matter  of  serious  deliberation 
whether  an  answer  should  be  given  to  it  or  not.  At  length,  how- 
ever, it  was  determined  that  it  would  not  be  expedient  to  neglect 
it,  lest  the  Socinians  should  consider  silence  as  a  sign  that  they  had 
achieved  a  victory,  and  should  be  led  vainly  to  triumph  in  the 
strength  of  their  career.  In  conformity  with  the  resolution  now 
adopted,  a  pious  and  solid  theologian,  Frederick  Baldwin,  was  re- 
quested to  undertake  a  refutation  of  this  Catechism.  An  able  an- 
swer was  also  published  by  that  consummate  theologian,  Wolfgang 
Crellius.  The  attentive  reader  will  be  in  no  danger  of  confounding 
this  orthodox  theologian  with  another  of  the  same  name  greatly 


DOCTRINES    OP    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  231 

distinguished  among  the  Socinians.  This  work  of  Crellius  was 
unfortunately  left  unfinished,  in  consequence  of  the  distinguished 
author  having  been  called  to  be  court  preacher  to  the  Duke  of  Bran- 
denburg. But  there  was  no  lack  of  polemics  to  contend  for  the 
faith,  against  this  summary  of  all  heresy.  Alsted,  Alting,  Maresius, 
Tarnovius,  Hornbeck,  John  Gerhard,  and  others,  undertook  to  re- 
fute it ;  but  no  refutation  was  so  full  and  satisfactory  as  that  of  N. 
Arnold,  professor  in  the  University  of  Franequer ;  in  which  he  sets 
down  the  questions  and  answers  of  the  Catechism,  without  abridg- 
ment, and  gives  a  solid  answer  to  each,  as  he  goes  along.  Arnold 
took  a  deep  interest  in  this  controversy,  not  only  because  he  con- 
sidered the  questions  in  dispute  as  involving  the  essence  of  Christi- 
anity, but  also  because  he  himself  was  a  native  of  Poland,  and  was 
intimately  acquainted  with  the  condition  of  the  reformed  church  in 
that  country. 

It  is  our  object  to  give  a  faithful  translation  of  a  part  of  this  work, 
principally  for  the  purpose  of  showing  by  what  sort  of  argument 
and  exegesis  the  old  Socinians  defended  their  cause;  and  that 
our  readers  may  have  the  opportunity  of  observing  the  similarity 
between  the  neology  with  which  we  are  threatened,  and  the  he- 
retical opinions  of  those  who  lived  two  centuries  ago. 

The  part  of  this  work  which  we  have  selected  for  translation 
is  the  first  part  of  the  tenth  chapter,  De  Libero  Arbitrio. 

ques.  1.  "  is  it  in  our  power  fully  to  obey  the  commandments 
of  God  ?" 

Ans.  "  Certainly :  for  it  is  evident  that  the  first  man  was  so 
formed  by  God,  that  he  was  endued  with  free  will ;  and  no  reason 
existed  why  he  should  be  deprived  of  this  power,  after  the  fall : 
nor  was  it  consistent  with  the  justice  of  God  that  man  should  be 
deprived  of  free  will.  Accordingly,  in  the  punishment  inflicted  on 
his  sin,  there  is  no  mention  made  of  any  such  loss." 

Refutation  by  Arnold. — To  obey  the  commandments  of  God, 
to  put  off  the  old  man,  to  desist  from  sinning,  not  to  walk  after,  but 
to  mortify  the  flesh,  to  contract  no  evil  habits,  but  only  such  as  are 
virtuous  and  good,  this  writer  asserts,  is  altogether  in  our  power. 
But  we  affirm,  that  these  things  are  not  at  all  in  our  power ;  ac- 
cording to  the  declaration  of  our  Saviour,  "  Without  me  ye  can  do 
nothing"  (John  xv.  5),  and  that  of  the  apostle,  "  I  can  do  all  things 
through  Christ  which  strengtheneth  me"  (Phil.  iv.  13).  And  the 
same  apostle  says,  "  For  it  is  God  which  worketh  in  you  both  to 
will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure"  (Phil.  ii.  13).  Why  should 
these  things  be  ascribed  to  God  and  to  Christ,  if  they  are  completely 
in  the  power  of  man  ? 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  man  when  created  by  God  was  endued 
with  free  will  ;  but  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  man  in  a 
state  of  integrity,  and  man  as  fallen.  In  the  former  he  possessed 
free  will,  and  also  the  power  of  obeying  all  the  commandments  of 


232  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

God,  and  of  avoiding  all  that  was  forbidden.  Not  that  man  by  the 
fall  was  entirely  deprived  of  liberty,  but  he  became  depraved,  so 
that  in  things  pertaining  to  salvation  he  labours  under  an  entire 
blindness  of  intellect.  "  For  the  natural  man  receiveth  not  the 
things  of  God  :  for  they  are  foolishness  unto  him ;  neither  can  he 
know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  discerned."  (I  Cor.  ii.  14.) 
And  the  will  of  man  has  become  so  rebellious,  that  it  is  not  subject 
to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be.  (Rom.  viii.  7.) 

When  this  author  says  that  there  was  no  reason  why  God  should 
deprive  man  of  free  will,  he  errs,  not  knowing  the  Scriptures,  which 
clearly  teach,  that  God,  as  a  just  Judge,  denounced  to  man  on  ac- 
count of  his  fall,  the  punishment  of  interminable  death.  And  this 
was  not  merely  eternal  death,  as  the  Socinians  pretend,  but  the 
threatening  comprehended  corporeal  and  spiritual  death  also ;  so 
that  man  is  not  only  liable  to  eternal  death,  but  to  death  temporal 
and  spiritual ;  and  is  declared  to  be  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins. 
Now  since  every  kind  of  death  is  a  part  of  the  penalty  incurred  by 
sin,  which  a  just  God  inflicts,  who  does  not  see  that  man  in  just 
judgment  is  deprived  of  the  right  exercise  of  free  will  X 

Hence  also  we  may  understand  what  is  to  be  thought  of  that 
declaration,  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  justice  for  a  man  to  be  de- 
prived of  free  will.  It  certainly  belongs  to  justice  to  inflict  de- 
served punishment  on  the  disobedient ;  but  this  depravation  is  a 
part  of  the  punishment.  Neither  have  you  a  right  to  say,  that 
other  men  are  not  chargeable  with  the  sin  of  Adam ;  that  as  they 
never  committed  that  sin  they  cannot  be  punished  for  it ;  for  un- 
doubtedly Adam  should  be  considered  as  the  head  of  the  whole 
human  race,  and  so  his  sin  was  not  personal  but  universal.  As 
the  father  and  head  of  the  whole  family  of  man  did  he  perpetuate 
this  crime,  and  so  he  involved  all  his  posterity  in  guilt ;  and  thus 
spiritual  death  has  come  upon  them,  as  the  merited  punishment  of 
this  sin,  and  this  includes  the  depravation  of  the  free  will  of  man. 

In  regard  to  the  last  words  of  the  answer  to  the  question  stated 
above,  that  there  is  no  mention  of  any  such  punishment  inflicted  on 
Adam,  it  is  false ;  for  we  know  that  the  punishment  of  the  sin  of 
Adam  was  death ;  but  death  is  fourfold  ;  temporal,  spiritual,  eternal, 
and  the  afflictions  of  this  life.  These  several  species  of  death,  it  is 
true,  are  not  distinctly  mentioned,  yet  they  should  all  be  considered 
as  comprehended  in  the  general  denunciation ;  and  this  is  render- 
ed manifest  where  spiritual  death  is  mentioned  as  the  state  of  man, 
by  reason  of  which  he  is  declared  to  be  dead  in  sin.  But  if  man 
be  dead  in  sin,  how  can  his  will  remain  upright  and  uninjured  ? 

In  the  primeval  state,  the  judgment  of  man  in  regard  to  things 
natural,  civil,  and  spiritual,  was  correct ;  and  the  inclination  of  his 
heart  was  pure  in  the  choice  of  the  highest  good ;  not  only  possess- 
ing freedom  from  necessity  and  coaction,  but  also  an  immunity 
from  every  degree  of  depraved  disposition,  and  from  all  moral  and 
physical  evil.  And  this  is  that  goodness  and  rectitude  in  which 
God  is  said  to  have  created  man.     But,  although  man  in  a  state  of 


DOCTRINES    OE    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  233 

integrity  was,  in  fact,  inclined  to  that  which  was  good,  neverthe- 
less, by  the  sovereign  dispensation  of  the  Creator,  and  from  the 
very  nature  of  a  dependent  creature,  his  will  was  mutable  ;  so 
that  it  could  be  turned  to  either  of  two  opposites,  and  was  liable 
to  be  deceived  by  the  false  appearance  of  objects  presented,  so  as 
to  be  led  to  embrace  that  which  was  apparent,  instead  of  the  true 
good  ;  of  which  mutability  the  event  furnished  a  certain  demon- 
stration. 

But,  in  man's  fallen  state,  his  will  is  despoiled  of  its  rectitude ; 
and,  although  his  judgment  in  other  things  may  be,  to  a  certain 
degree,  correct,  yet  in  spiritual  things  it  is  entirely  blind  ;  and  his 
inclination  is  so  averse  to  all  spiritual  good,  and  so  determined  to 
evil  only,  that  he  must  be  considered  as  entirely  depraved.  And, 
accordingly,  the  scriptures  represent  him  as  being  blind  in  his 
understanding,  perverse  in  his  will,  and  rebellious  in  his  affections ; 
nay,  as  being  "  dead  in  sin ;"  labouring  under  a  complete  impotence 
as  to  all  spiritual  good. — Gen.  vi.  3,  Matt.  vii.  13,  Rom.  viii.  7, 
1  Cor.  viii.  4,  Ephes.  ii.  1. 

Now,  although  man  in  this  state  is  free  from  the  necessity  of  na- 
ture, and  also  from  that  of  coaction,  yet  he  is  not  free  from  the 
servitude  of  sin  and  death.  Before  his  conversion,  he  is  not  only 
impotent,  as  it  relates  to  spiritual  good,  but  is  turned  away  from  it 
with  aversion.  The  fact,  therefore,  is,  that  man  can  contribute  no- 
thing towards  his  own  conversion,  but  simply  the  natural  faculty 
of  the  will,  without  which  he  would  neither  be  a  man,  nor  would 
he  be  capable  of  conversion. 

Ques.  2.  "  But  is  not  the  will  of  man  vitiated  by  original 
sin  ?" 

Ans.  "  There  is  no  such  thing  as  original  sin  ;  the  scripture 
teaches  no  such  doctrine ;  and  the  will  of  man  could  not  be  vitiated 
by  a  cause  which  had  no  existence.  The  sin  of  Adam  being  a 
single  act  could  not  corrupt  his  own  nature,  much  less  had  it  power 
to  deprave  the  nature  of  all  his  posterity.  That  this  sin  should  be 
charged  on  them,  is,  as  has  been  said,  a  doctrine  unknown  to  the 
scriptures ;  and  it  is  utterly  incredible  that  God,  who  is  the  foun- 
tain of  equity,  should  be  willing  to  impute  it  to  them." 

Refutation. — That  the  will  of  man  is  depraved  by  original  sin, 
we  have  already  declared  to  be  our  belief.  Our  opponent  denies 
this,  because,  in  his  opinion,  original  sin  has  no  existence,  and  could, 
of  course,  be  the  cause  of  no  such  depravity.  The  affirmative, 
however,  is  capable  of  being  demonstrated  by  an  appeal  to  facts, 
and  to  the  testimony  of  scripture.  From  both  these  sources,  we 
shall,  therefore,  now  endeavour  to  show  that  original  sin  exists  in 
every  man  who  has  derived  his  nature  from  Adam  by  natural 
generation. 

It  is  true  the  scriptures  do  not  express  the  inherent  and  habitual 
stain  of  our  nature  by  using  the  technical  phrase  original  sin  ; 
but  they  clearly  designate  the  same  thing,  by  words  which  have 


234  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

the  same  import.  By  a  metonymy,  it  is  called  Jlesh.  (John  iii.  6.) 
It  is  called,  by  way  of  eminence,  sin,  which  reigneth  in  our  mortal 
bodies.  (Rom.  vi.  12.)  And  sin  that  dwelleth  in  us — evil  present 
with  us.  (Rom.  vii.  17.)  So  also  it  is  denominated  the  old  man,  as 
indicating  its  origin  from  our  first  father,  and  to  designate  its  vile- 
ness  and  corruption  ;  as  it  is  contrasted  with  the  new  man,  which 
signifies  something  precious  and  excellent.  It  is  called  "  a  law  in 
our  members ;"  that  is,  a  principle  which  binds  with  force  like  a 
law.  It  is  also  denominated  "  the  body  of  sin,"  by  which  strength 
and  cohesion  are  represented  as  belonging  to  this  evil  principle. 
It  is  also  termed  "  the  old  leaven,"  and,  by  James,  lust  (i*iBvnia),  by 
a  metonymy  of  the  subject  for  the  adjunct.  But  original  sin  is  not 
any  one  faculty,  habit,  or  art,  but  a  general  disorder,  or  ira^i. 

With  the  fathers,  original  sin  has  various  names,  such  as  mali 
tradux,  a  hereditary  evil ;  malum  domesticum,  a  domestic  evil ; 
infusum  et  coagulatum  delictorum  contagium,  the  concentrated  con- 
tagion of  all  crimes.  Augustine  called  it  naturae  vitium,  the  vice 
of  nature  ;  also  peccati  contagium  ex  origine,  the  original  contagion 
of  sin ;  and,  finally,  peccatum  originale,  original  sin  ;  which  last 
name,  as  most  conveniently  expressing  the  thing,  was  retained  in 
the  schools,  and  has  been  in  common  use  to  this  day.  The  word 
original  has  no  relation  to  God  as  the  author  of  our  being,  and  the 
first  cause  of  all  things,  but  altogether  to  the  second  cause,  namely, 
our  sinning  first  parent. 

But  to  deny  the  existence  of  original  sin  altogether  is  the  mad- 
ness of  the  Socinians  ;  and  to  assert  that  it  cannot  be  proved  from 
scripture,  is  the  dotage  of  reason.  What,  then,  is  that  which  is 
said  (Gen.  iii.  5),  where  Adam  is  said  to  have  begotten  a  son  in  his 
own  image  ?  In  which  passage  we  should  carefully  attend  to  the 
antithesis  between  Adam  and  Seth  ;  that  is,  between  the  image  of 
God  in  which  Adam  was  created,  and  the  image  of  Adam  in  which 
Seth  was  begotten.  For,  as  the  image  of  God  designated  the  moral 
excellence  in  which  Adam  was  created,  the  wisdom  of  his  under- 
standing and  the  sanctity  of  his  will,  so  the  image  of  Adam,  now 
fallen,  signified  the  blindness  of  his  mind  and  the  depravation  of  his 
will.  Adam,  by  his  apostasy,  transformed  himself  from  the  image 
of  God  to  the  opposite  character.  He  could  not,  therefore,  beget 
a  son  in  the  image  of  God,  in  which  he  was  created,  but  in  his  own 
image ;  that  is,  in  a  state  of  corruption. 

It  will  not  do  to  say  that  Adam  begat  Seth  a  man  like  himself, 
as  to  his  species,  for  that  idea  was  fully  expressed  when  it  was 
said  "  he  begat  a  son ;"  nor  will  it  answer  to  say  that  he  begat  a 
son,  in  figure,  form,  and  external  lineament,  like  himself,  for  it  is 
supposed,  not  proved,  that  such  a  likeness  existed  between  the 
father  and  the  son ;  and  if  it  had  been  the  fact,  this  was  not  a  mat- 
ter of  so  much  consequence  as  that,  to  designate  it,  the  Holy  Spirit 
should  use  the  twofold  expression  of  similitude  and  likeness,  as  had 
been  done  before,  when  it  was  said  that  Adam  was  made  in  the 
image  of  God.     Certainly,  in  that  case,  the  sacred  writer  had  no 


DOCTRINES    OP   THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  235 

respect  to  any  external  image  or  likeness ;  neither,  therefore,  should 
we  suppose  he  had  here,  where  he  uses  the  same  terms. 

Another  evasion  is,  that  we  should  here  understand  the  moral 
image  of  Adam  as  regenerated  by  the  Holy  Spirit ;  so  that  Seth 
was  the  heir  of  that  renovated  image ;  but  that  renovated  image 
did  not  pertain  to  man's  nature,  but  was  altogether  the  effect  of 
supernatural  grace,  which  is  never  communicated  by  physical 
generation,  but  by  a  mystical  regeneration. 

Again:  does  not  Job  prove  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  when,  by 
the  Holy  Spirit,  he  says,  "  Who  can  bring  a  clean  thing  out  of  an 
unclean  ?  Not  one."  (Job  xiv.  5.)  To  which  Socinus  has  nothing 
to  except  but  this,  that  believers  are  not  unclean,  but  washed  and 
sanctified.  It  is  true,  believers  are  holy,  but  not  as  they  are  natural 
men,  for  "  whatsoever  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh."  The  same 
doctrine  appears  evident  from  the  necessity  of  regeneration,  con- 
cerning which,  Christ  says :  "  Except  a  man  be  born  again,  he  can- 
not see  the  kingdom  of.  God."  From  this,  it  is  clear  that  our  first 
birth  is  corrupt ;  for  what  need  would  there  be  for  regeneration  if 
our  first  generation  were  holy  ?  And  how  does  it  happen,  if 
depravity  is  not  born  with  us,  that  there  should  not  be  found  a 
man  who,  by  the  tendency  of  his  own  nature,  does  not  rush  into 
the  commission  of  sin  ?  And  if  the  whole  mass  of  human  nature 
had  not  become  corrupt,  it  would  never  have  been  said  of  Christ 
that  he  was  in  all  things  made  like  to  us,  sin  only  excepted ;  for, 
if  this  be  not  the  fact,  then  all  infants  dying  in  infancy  are  as  free 
from  sin  as  Christ  himself  was. 

But,  finally,  infants  die,  and  death  is  the  punishment  of  sin  ;  yet 
it  cannot  be  the  punishment  of  actual  sin,  for  infants,  dying  in 
infancy,  are  incapable  of  committing  it ;  they  are  destitute  of  the 
use  of  reason  and  of  the  exercise  of  free  will ;  and  those  who  are 
our  opponents  in  this  question  consider  it  a  cardinal  point  that 
there  is  no  sin  which  does  not  consist  in  the  exercise  of  the  will. 
Since,  then,  the  punishment  of  death  is  not  inflicted  on  infants  for 
actual  sin,  it  must  be  for  original  sin. 

There  is  no  truth  nor  force  in  what  is  next  asserted,  "  that  the 
fall  of  Adam  did  not  corrupt  his  own  nature,  and,  therefore,  could 
not  corrupt  that  of  his  posterity."  For  they  admit  that  eternal 
death  was  the  punishment  incurred  by  the  sin  of  Adam ;  and  why 
should  it  seem  strange,  that  that  act,  which  subjected  the  trans- 
gressor to  so  great  a  penalty,  should,  at  the  same  time,  work  a 
corruption  of  his  nature  ?  Surely  that  which  could  effect  the 
greater  might  also  produce  the  less.  But  the  reason  why  the  sin 
of  Adam  corrupted  the  nature  of  his  posterity  was,  because  it  was 
not  the  sin  of  an  individual,  as  your  sin  or  my  sin,  but  it  was  the 
sin  of  a  whole  race.  It  was  an  universal  sin.  For  Adam  was  the 
stalk,  the  root,  the  head  of  the  whole  family  of  man. 

That  this  corruption  of  nature  came  upon  man  as  the  punishment 
of  sin,  is  evident  from  this,  that  everything  which  properly  comes 
under  the  name  of  death  is  the  punishment  of  sin ;  for  this  was  the 


236  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

penalty  of  the  law,  and  it  comprehended  every  kind  of  death ;  and 
this  depravation  of  nature  is  expressly  called  by  this  name  by  the 
Apostle  Paul  (Ephes.  ii.  ] ),  wherefore  original  sin  is  the  punish- 
ment of  the  first  sin. 

The  conclusion  of  this  answer,  "  that  because  God  is  the  foun- 
tain of  all  equity,  it  is  altogether  incredible  that  he  should  punish 
the  posterity  of  Adam  on  account  of  his  sin,"  is  a  mere  assertion 
totally  incapable  of  proof;  for  why  should  God  cease  to  be  the 
fountain  of  equity  when  he  punishes  the  posterity  of  Adam  on  ac- 
count of  his  sin,  when  he  has  constituted  him  the  head  and  repre- 
sentative of  the  whole  race  ?  The  legitimate  course  of  reasoning 
is,  that  because  God  does  punish  the  posterity  of  the  first  man  on 
account  of  his  sin,  therefore  it  must  be  just,  and  should  be  so  con- 
sidered, whether  we  can  understand  it  or  not.  Whatever  he  does 
is  just,  because  he  does  it ;  for  his  will  is  the  rule  of  justice. 

Ques.  3.    "  But  are  there  not  scripture  testimonies  which 

TEACH    THE    CERTAIN    EXISTENCE    OF    ORIGINAL    SIN,  SUCH  AS    THAT    IN 

Gen.  iv.  5 :  *  And  God  saw  that  the  wickedness  of  man  was  great 
upon  the  earth,  and  that  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his 
heart  was  only  evil  continually  ;'  and  that  in  Gen.  viii.  21  :  'For 
the  imagination  of  man's  heart  is  evil  from  his  youth  V  " 

Ans.  "  These  testimonies  treat  of  voluntary  sin ;  therefore,  from 
them  original  sin  never  can  be  proved.  For  as  to  the  text  first 
cited,  Moses  teaches  that  it  was  sin  of  that  kind  which  caused  God 
to  repent  that  he  had  made  man,  and  which  provoked  him  to  bring 
a  deluge  upon  the  world ;  but  who  would  venture  to  assert  that 
this  was  done  on  account  of  original  sin  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
man  ?  And,  in  the  other  passage,  it  is  declared  that  the  sin  of  man 
should  not  again  be  the  cause  of  the  destruction  of  the  world  by  a 
deluge,  which  certainly  cannot  relate  to  original  sin,  or  inherent 
depravity." 

Refutation. — That  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  inculcated  in 
these  kindred  pages,  is  evident  from  several  considerations.  The 
corruption  of  man  is  represented  as  being  universal,  habitual,  and 
unceasing.  What  could  more  clearly  indicate  that  the  principle 
of  human  actions  was  vitiated  ?  What  sort  of  proof  could  be  more 
convincing,  that  this  depravity  was  born  with  us  ?  Our  opponent, 
however,  replies,  that  the  sacred  historian  is  here  speaking  of  actual 
sins,  on  account  of  which  God  overwhelmed  the  world  with  a  de- 
luge. I  grant  that  actual  sins  are  referred  to  in  these  passages, 
but  I  deny  that  they  alone  are  intended  to  the  exclusion  of  original 
sin :  for  the  Holy  Spirit  makes  a  plain  distinction  between  the 
wickedness  which  was  external  and  actual,  and  the  imaginations  of 
the  heart  which  are  internal  and  habitual ;  otherwise  there  would 
be  here  a  mere  tautology,  and  the  very  same  thing,  without  neces- 
sity, would  be  repeated.  Another  decisive  evidence  that  inherent 
natural  depravity  is  included  in  the  account,  is,  that  infants,  who 
were  incapable  of  actual  sin,  were  nevertheless  swallowed  up  in 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  237 

the  deluge  as  well  as  adults.  Now,  this  judgment  was  sent  upon 
them  justly  or  unjustly  ;  if  the  first,  then  they  are  chargeable  with 
sin,  and  grievous  sin,  too,  to  deserve  such  a  punishment ;  but  this 
of  necessity  must  be  original  sin,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  they  are 
not  capable  of  actual  sin.  But  if  this  punishment  should  be 
pronounced  unjust,  then  we  do  no  less  than  accuse  the  Governor 
of  the  world  of  acting  the  part  of  an  unjust  judge,  in  bringing  such 
a  calamity  unjustly  upon  his  innocent  creatures  ;  which  would  be 
blasphemy. 

In  these  passages,  it  was  the  design  of  the  Holy  Spirit  not  only 
to  indicate  actual  sin,  but  to  trace  it  up  to  its  internal  cause, 
namely,  original  sin.     For  the  declaration  is  universal,  in  relation 
to  all  the  thoughts  and  imaginations  of  the  heart ;  and,  to  give  it 
the  greater  force,  it  is  exclusive  of  everything  of  an  opposite  kind. 
"  Every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart  was  only  evil,  and 
that  continually."     Surely,  if  this  be  a  just  description  of  the  moral 
condition  of  man,  his  whole  soul  must  be  depraved.     Total  depra- 
vity could  not  be  more  emphatically  represented.     The  evil  is 
universal — every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  the  heart.     It  is 
exclusively  of  all  good — and  only  evil.     And  it  is  the  same  at  all 
times — and  that  continually.     The  true  source  of  evil  thoughts  of 
every  kind  is  designated  by  Christ,  where  he  says,  "  Out  of  the 
heart  proceed  evil   thoughts."     When,  therefore,  we  refer  the 
second  cause  to  the  first,  the  stream  to  its  fountain,  the  effect  to  its 
cause,  the  Socinian  has  no  right  to  complain.     To  the  eye  of  God, 
both  the  cause  and  the  effect  are  equally  manifest ;  the  evil  tree 
as  well  as  the  bad  fruit.     This  last  was,  indeed,  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  deluge,  but  the  former  was  the  cause  of  this.     As  in- 
fants perished  in  the  deluge,  and  God  is  here  giving  the  reason 
why  the  deluge  was  sent,  it  must  be  comprehensive  enough  to  in- 
clude them ;  and,  therefore,  must  include  original  as  well  as  actual 
sin,  unless  any  one  will  choose  to  maintain  that  infants  were  pun- 
ished without  any  faults,  which,  as  was  before  shown,  would  be  an 
impious  impeachment  of  the  character  of  God.     But  if  it  be  alleged 
that  they  could  not  be  guilty  of  actual  sin,  then  it  follows  that  they 
were  punished  on  account  of  original  sin.     So  much  for  the  first 
testimony.     As  to  the  second,  our  opponent  says,  "  that  it  is  merely 
declared  that  the  sin  of  man  shall  not  again  be  the  cause  of  a  deluge 
for  the  destruction  of  the  world  ;  but  this  can  have  no  relation  to 
original  sin."    But  why  not  ?    We  have  seen  that,  both  on  account 
of  original  and  actual  sin,  God  brought  the  deluge  on  the  world ; 
so  now,  in  this  parallel  passage,  he  makes  known  his  will,  that  in 
time  to  come,  the  sin  of  man,  both  original  and  actual,  should  not 
induce  him  again  to  destroy  the  world  by  a  deluge.     As  the  form 
of  expression  is  nearly  the  same  as  in  the  former  text,  the  argument 
will  be  the  same  ;  and  as  there  it  was  shown  that  original  might 
fairly  be  inferred  from  the  universality  and  constancy  of  the  pre- 
valence of  actual  sin,  so  thex  same  conclusion  may  be  deduced  from 
the  words  now  under  consideration.   ■ 


238  DOCTRINES    OP   THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

Ques.  4.  "  But  what  do  you  think  of  that  declaration  op 
David  (Psalm  li.  5),  '  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity,  and  in  sin 
did  my  mother  conceive  me  V  " 

Ans.  "  It  should  be  remembered  that  David  is  not  here  speak- 
ing about  every  man,  but  concerning  himself  alone,  and  that  not 
simply,  but  in  relation  to  his  Tall ;  and  he  uses  that  method  of 
speaking  of  which  he  himself  furnishes  an  example  in  Psalm  lviii.  4, 
1  The  wicked  are  estranged  from  the  womb ;  they  go  astray  as  soon 
as  they  be  born,  speaking  lies.'  Wherefore,  neither  can  original 
sin  be  evinced  by  this  testimony." 

Refutation. — When  David  says,  "  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  ini- 
quity, and  in  sin  did  my  mother  conceive  me,"  from  the  considera- 
tion of  the  actual  sin  committed  by  him,  he  ascends  to  the  origin 
of  all  his  sins,  and  laments  the  proneness  of  his  nature  to  sin ;  and 
this  inherent  depravity  he  represents  as  coeval  with  his  existence 
— a  corrupt  mass  in  which  he  was  conceived  and  born,  and  which 
he  had  derived  from  his  parents ;  all  which,  taken  together,  can 
signify  nothing  but  original  sin. 

Against  this  interpretation,  Socinians  make  many  objections,  as 
may  be  seen  in  the  work  of  Volkelius,  De  Vera  Religione  ;  all 
which,  however,  have  been  fully  discussed  and  refuted  by  our 
Spanheim,  in  his  "  Collection  of  Theological  Disputations."  It  is 
alleged  that  David  is  not  speaking  here  concerning  the  conception 
of  his  own  nature,  but  of  the  conception  of  sin.  But  the  unreason- 
ableness of  this  gloss  is  too  manifest  to  need  any  refutation.  This 
would  be  referring  what  is  said  about  the  subject  to  the  act — what 
is  said  about  the  sinner  to  his  sin.  Certainly  David  was  not  here 
speaking  of  the  mother  of  his  sin,  but  of  his  own  mother. 

Again :  it  is  alleged  "  that  David  is  not  here  speaking  of  original 
sin,  but  of  the  actual  sin  of  his  parents,  and  especially  of  his  mo- 
ther." Now,  this  is  frivolous.  David  was  not  here  confessing  the 
sins  of  his  parents,  but  his  own  sins.  Moreover,  his  parents  were, 
in  all  probability,  dead  long  before  this  time,  as  David  was  the 
youngest  of  Jesse's  sons,  who  was  an  old  man  when  Samuel 
anointed  David  to  be  king ;  and  this  Psalm  was  composed  when 
David  was  past  middle  life.  And  for  what  purpose  should  he  drag 
his  mother's  sins  into  public  notice  in  this  manner  ?  Besides,  there 
is  not  the  smallest  evidence  that  David's  mother  was  remarkable 
for  her  transgressions.  The  sin  of  which  David  complains  is  that 
from  which  he  prays  to  be  cleansed,  and  from  which  he  entreats 
that  God  would  hide  his  face ;  but  who  does  not  see  that  these 
were  his  own  sins,  and  not  those  of  his  parents  ? 

A  third  interpretation  given  to  this  passage,  is,  "  That  from  it, 
not  even  actual  sin  can  be  proved,  much  less  original  sin  ;  for  it  is 
possible  that  one  might  be  conceived  in  iniquity,  and  yet  not  be  a 
sinner,  just  as  one  might  be  conceived  and  born  in  blindness,  who 
was  not  himself  blind."  But  that  a  person  should  be  shapen  in 
iniquity,  and  yet  not  be  a  sinner,  is  a  palpable  contradiction.     If  it 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  239 

be  meant  that  we  may  derive  our  being  from  a  sinner  without 
being  infected  with  sin,  as  the  child  of  a  blind  man  need  not  be 
blind,  the  error  consists  in  comparing  things  of  an  unequal  kind. 
Individual  properties  are  not  indeed  communicated  by  ordinary 
generation  ;  but  qualities  which  affect  the  whole  species  are  trans- 
mitted, of  which  nature  is  original  sin. 

They  allege  again,  "  that  if  it  had  been  the  design  of  David,  in 
this  passage,  to  designate  the  innate  corruption  of  our  nature,  he 
would  have  ascended  from  his  own  sin  to  that  of  the  first  man  ; 
but  since  he  does  not  do  this,  but  slops  with  the  mention  of  his  im- 
mediate parents,  and  especially  of  his  mother,  it  is  a  clear  indica- 
tion that  he  did  not  mean  here  to  speak  of  original  sin."  To  which 
it  may  be  replied,  that  there  was  no  need  of  David's  ascending  to 
the  sin  of  Adam,  for  he  was  not  now  speaking  of  the  first  origin 
of  sin,  but  of  original  sin  itself;  not  of  the  originating  sin,  as  we 
say  in  the  schools,  but  of  sin  originated ;  although,  indeed,  the 
latter  supposes  the  existence  of  the  former.  It  fully  answered  the 
purpose  of  the  penitent  Psalmist,  to  describe  that  inbred  corruption 
which  he  was  deeply  convinced  dwelt  within  him,  and  also  the 
immediate  source  from  which  it  was  derived  to  him,  which  was 
by  natural  descent  from  his  parents  ;  and  this  was  substantially 
the  same,  as  if  he  had  traced  this  corruption  up  to  his  first  parent. 

But  it  is  still  objected,  "  that,  if  the  words  of  David  are  taken 
literally,  they  can  by  no  means  be  referred  to  any  person  but  him- 
self, for  he  speaks  of  no  other  :  if  they  are  to  be  understood  figura- 
tively, then,  according  to  all  just  rules  of  interpretation,  they  can- 
not be  the  foundation  of  an  argument."  Take  them  as  you  will,  if 
they  have  any  meaning  at  all,  they  must  be  considered  as  evincive 
of  the  fact  that  David  himself  was  infected  with  original  sin  ;  and 
if  it  existed  in  him,  what  reason  can  be  assigned  why  it  should  not 
be  in  others  ?  And  as  to  a  figurative  interpretation,  the  words  do 
not  appear  susceptible  of  such  an  explanation  without  being  sub- 
jected to  great  violence  ;  for  what  can  it  be  supposed  that  he  in- 
tended to  represent  by  saying  that  he  was  shapen  in  iniquity  and 
conceived  by  his  mother  in  sin  ? 

The  author  of  this  catechism,  perhaps,  distrusting  such  evasions 
as  these,  confines  himself  to  two  particulars  in  his  attempts  to  break 
the  force  of  the  argument  derived  from  these  words.  The  first  is, 
that  David  was  here  discoursing  of  himself  alone,  and  that  he  had 
special  reference  to  his  own  disgraceful  fall,  and  did  not  design 
to  speak  of  the  sin  of  other  men.  But  this  subterfuge  takes  lor 
granted  that  David  alone  was  infected  with  birth-sin,  which,  for  the 
best  reasons,  is  utterly  denied.  Moreover,  this  exposition  concedes 
the  main  point  in  controversy,  namely,  that  at  least  one  man  has 
been  born  in  original  sin ;  for  it  is  admitted  that  David  was  shapen 
in  iniquity,  and  conceived  by  his  mother  in  sin.  Now,  this  is  pre- 
cisely what  we  assert,  only  we  argue  from  the  fact,  that  if  this 
was  the  origin  of  David,  it  must  also  be  of  every  other  man,  and 


240  -      DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

the  argument  cannot  be  invalidated  as  long  as  the  fact  is  admitted  ; 
for  what  imaginable  reason  can  be  assigned  why  David,  above  all 
other  men,  should  be  conceived  in  sin  ?  There  is  the  less  reason 
to  think  that  David  would  speak  thus  of  his  origin,  as  being  in  a  pecu- 
liar manner  polluted,  when  it  is  considered  that  he  was  born  in  law- 
ful wedlock,  and  was  descended  from  pious  parents,  as  appears  by 
the  sacred  history.  But  it  would  be  easy  to  show,  if  this  were  the 
proper  place,  that  what  David  so  emphatically  declares  respecting 
his  own  sinful  origin,  the  Holy  Ghost,  in  other  passages,  teaches  to  be 
the  condition  of  all  men.     See  Psalm  xiv.  4,  Job  xiv.  2,  Ephes.  ii.  3. 

The  second  evasion  to  which  our  catechist  resorts,  is,  that  the 
words  ought  to  be  understood  hyperbolically,  just  as  we  must  un- 
derstand those  words  of  the  same  author,  in  Psalm  lviii.  4.  "  The 
wicked  are  estranged  from  the  womb  ;  as  soon  as  they  are  born, 
they  go  astray,  speaking  lies."  So  in  this  place,  David,  under  the 
strong  feelings  of  repentance,  exaggerates  his  sin ;  and  therefore 
speaks  of  it  as  if  it  was  coeval  with  his  existence.  These  people 
blow  hot  and  cold  with  the  same  breath.  What  is  here  said  about 
exaggerating  his  sin,  is  in  direct  opposition  to  what  we  read  in  the 
Institutes  of  Ostorodus,  who  asserts  that  these  words  were  spoken 
by  David,  not  with  a  view  to  exaggerate  his  criminality,  but  to  ex- 
tenuate his  sin,  as  proceeding  from  a  constitution  born  with  him. 
But  who  that  has  ever  read  attentively  the  whole  psalm,  can  be- 
lieve that  the  royal  penitent  had  the  least  thought  of  extenuating 
his  sin  ?  If  then  it  should  be  considered  a  hyperbole,  in  which 
David  exaggerates  his  sin,  I  would  retort  the  argument,  and  say, 
if  his  object  was  to  speak  in  the  strongest  terms  of  the  greatness  of 
his  actual  sin,  he  was  led  by  the  same  motive  to  designate  as  its 
source,  his  original  corruption ;  and  how  could  he  have  more  effec- 
tually represented  his  guilt,  than  by  ascending  from  his  actual 
transgressions  to  his  original  corruption  ? 

The  reference  to  the  passage  cited  from  the  fifty-eighth  psalm 
can  be  of  no  service  to  the  cause.  The  cases  are  entirely  different ; 
the  passages  are  by  no  means  parallel.  It  is  one  thing  for  a  pious 
man,  descended  from  pious  parents,  to  declare,  "  that  he  was  sha- 
pen  in  iniquity,  and  conceived  by  his  mother  in  sin,"  and  another  to 
say,  that  the  wicked  go  astray,  and  speak  lies  from  the  womb. 
These  last  words  evidently  relate  to  voluntary,  personal  acts ;  but 
this  can  by  no  means  be  said  of  the  former.  I  deny,  however,  that 
even  in  these  last  words  there  is  anything  hyperbolical ;  for  the  ob- 
ject was  to  describe  the  depravity  of  the  wicked,  both  in  relation 
to  act  and  habit.  But  admitting  that  there  is  a  hyperbole  in  the 
words  from  the  fifty-eighth  psalm  ;  yet  that  would  not  prove  that 
the  same  must  be  the  fact  in  regard  to  the  passage  in  the  fifty-first 
psalm.  Therefore,  I  must,  after  impartially  considering  all  the 
evasions  to  which  Socinians  have  had  recourse,  consider  the  doc- 
trine of  original  sin  as  fully  established  by  this  single  text,  if  there 
were  no  other  in  the  Bible. 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  241 

Ques.  5.  "But  does  not  Paul  say,  Rom.  v.  12,  'That  all  men 

HAVE  SINNED  IN  AdAM?"' 

"  Ans.  It  is  not  declared  in  the  text  quoted,  that  all  men  sinned 
in  Adam ;  for  the  words  in  Greek,  if  £,  which  are  everywhere 
rendered  in  Latin  by  in  quo,  in  whom,  niay  with  more  propriety  be 
rendered  because  that,  or  since,  as  in  the  parallel  passages,  Rom. 
viii.  3,  tv  u,  in  that;  Phil.  iii.  12,  if  $,  that  for  which;  Heb.  ii.  13, 
if  a!,  in  that ;  2  Cor.  v.  4,  if  <?,  because  that.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  cannot  be  built  on  this  pas- 
sage." 

Refutation. — The  passage  of  scripture  which  the  Catechism 
here  brings  into  view,  is  certainly  the  most  decisive  for  the  proof 
of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  of  any  in  the  Bible.  "  As  by  one  man 
sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  so  death  passed  upon  all  men  be- 
cause that  (in  whom)  all  have  sinned."  In  the  Latin  vulgate,  the 
latter  part  of  this  phrase  is  rendered,  "  in  whom  all  have  sinned." 
The  apostle  in  this  place  institutes  a  comparison  and  contrast  be- 
tween Adam  and  Christ,  and  shows  that  the  righteousness  of  Christ 
avails  to  the  justification  of  all  who  are  united  to  him,  just  as  the 
fall  and  disobedience  of  Adam  was  the  cause  of  the  sin  and  con- 
demnation of  all  his  posterity.  He  then  proceeds  to  show  that 
death  had  actually  invaded  the  whole  human  race,  in  consequence 
of  their  connection  with  their  first  father.  The  fact  is  undeniable 
that  all  die,  not  even  excepting  infants  ;  and  it  is  vain  to  allege  that 
all  became  voluntarily  sinners  by  the  imitation  of  Adam,  for  to  the 
majority  of  men  the  first  sin  was  unknown,  and  as  to  infants,  it  is 
certain  they  could  not  become  sinners  by  imitation ;  nevertheless, 
they  are  obnoxious  to  death  as  much  as  adults,  and  in  circumstan- 
ces of  as  much  bodily  pain  and  distress ;  which  can  only  be  ac- 
counted for  by  supposing  that  they  are  partakers  of  the  blame  and 
punishment  of  the  first  offence.  The  apostle  goes  on  to  declare  the 
reason  why  all  are  infected  with  the  pollution  of  sin,  and  are  ex- 
posed to  its  punishment,  which  is,  that  in  this  first  man  all  have  sin- 
ned. The  phrase  if  <5  ought  in  this  place  to  be  considered  as  of 
the  same  import  with  (» <L,  in-1  Cor.  xv.  22,  where  we  have  ivry'Aiaji 
in  Adam  all  die,  so  iv  ™  XpiV™  in  Christ  shall  all  be  made  alive. 
And  in  Mark  ii.  4,  this  identical  phrase  is  used  in  this  sense,  "  They 
let  down  the  couch  tf  <S  on  which  the  paralytic  lay."  But  if  we 
take  this  phrase  as  our  adversaries  wish,  to  designate,  not  the  sub- 
ject, but  the  cause,  it  will  come  to  the  very  same  thing.  For  the 
reason  is  here  assigned  by  the  apostle  why  death  has  passed  upon 
all  men,  and  according  to  this  interpretation,  the  reason  is,  "  be- 
cause all  have  sinned  ;"  but  this  cannot  be  understood  of  actual  sin  ; 
for  in  this  sense  all  who  die  have  not  sinned,  since  infants  are  in- 
capable of  sinning  actually.  The  meaning  therefore  must  be,  that 
all  have  sinned  in  their  first  father  and  representative.  If  they  had 
not  sinned  in  him,  they  would  not  have  been  subjected  to  the  pun- 
ishment of  his  first  transgression.     And  that  condemnation  comes 

16 


242  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

on  the  race  on  account  of  this  one  sin,  is  so  clearly  taught  in  the 
following  verses,  that  there  is  no  room  left  for  any  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  apostle  meant  to  teach  that  this  sin  was  imputed ; 
or  that  hence  condemnation  was  incurred  by  all  men.  It  is  re- 
peatedly declared  that  by  the  one  sin  of  the  one  man  many  had 
died — had  come  into  condemnation — had  been  constituted  sinners, 
&c. :  it  seems,  therefore,  most  natural  and  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  the  apostle  in  the  12th  verse,  where  he  assigns  a  reason  for 
the  death  of  our  whole  race,  means  the  same  which  he  evidently 
does  in  the  subsequent  verses.  This  interpretation  renders  the 
whole  context  consistent  with  itself;  whereas,  if  by  navres  Ipaprw,  we 
understand  the  actual  sinning  of  all,  not  only  will  infants,  who  also 
suffer  death,  be  excluded ;  but  the  reason  assigned  for  the  death  of 
all,  will  be  different  from  what  it  is  in  the  following  verse ;  *'  Guilt 
has,  by  one  man,  come  upon  all  men  to  condemnation,  not  in  effect 
merely,  but  in  righteous  judgment." 

In  this  passage  then  we  are  clearly  taught,  first,  the  universal  and 
total  corruption  of  all  men  ;  secondly,  that  this  corruption  is  derived 
from  the  first  man.  not  by  imitation  of  his  first  sin,  concerning 
which  many  knew  nothing,  and  of  which  others  were  incapable, 
but  by  a  participation  of  the  crime  of  the  first  man.  Hence  all 
men  are  bound  to  suffer  death,  although  not  guilty  of  actual  sin ; 
for  according  to  the  nature  of  the  apostle's  argument,  the  partici- 
pation and  propagation  of  sin  and  death  must  be  derived  from  one 
man,  just  as  the  participation  and  propagation  of  righteousness  and 
life  are  derived  from  another,  even  Christ.  ,  In  a  word,  the  argu- 
ment may  be  stated  simply  thus;  "As  by  Christ  alone  life  and 
righteousness  are  introduced,  so  by  Adam  sin  and  death.  And  as 
all  who  are  justified  and  receive  the  gift  of  life,  are  indebted  for 
these  benefits  to  Christ  alone ;  so  as  many  as  sin  and  die.  do  all  sin 
and  die  in  Adam  alone.  Therefore  original  sin  exists,  as  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  infants  die,  who  are  altogether  incapable  of  ac- 
tual sin. 

The  objection  which  they  make,  "  that  it  is  not  asserted  that  all 
men  die  in  Adam,"  is  of  no  force  ;  for  the  contrast  which  is  here 
set  up  between  the  first  and  second  Adam,  requires  that  the  words 
of  the  apostle  should  be  understood  in  this  sense.  The  same  thing 
is  necessarily  implied  in  those  words,  "  As  in  Adam  all  sin,  so  in 
Christ  shall  all  be  made  alive  ;"  for  evidently,  if  all  die  in  Adam,  all 
must  have  sinned  in  him.  It  is  repugnant  to  every  idea  of  divine 
justice,  that  any  should  be  subjected  to  the  punishment  due  to  ano- 
ther, without  any  participation  in  his  sin. 

Where  the  catechist  asserts  that  if  Z  should  be  rendered  because 
that,  or  inasmuch,  in  accordance  with  the  use  of  the  same  particles 
in  other  passages,  he  gains  no  help  to  his  cause,  for  I  have  shown, 
that  admitting  this  interpretation,  still  an  unanswerable  argument 
for  original  sin  may  be  derived  from  this  passage.  But  I  deny  that 
the  words  ought  to  be  thus  translated :  and  our  opponent  has  ad- 
duced no  reasons  for  his  interpretation,  unless  that  elsewhere  these 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  243 

words  are  thus  rendered ;  which  reason  makes  just  as  much  for  us 
as  it  does  for  him.  We  might  therefore  argue  thus :  the  particles 
if  <5  elsewhere  signify  in  which,  or  in  whom,  therefore  they  ought 
to  be  so  understood  here;  but  our  opponent  would  not  admit  this 
conclusion,  because  "  d  particulari  ad  particulare  non  valet  conse- 
quential that  is,  we  cannot  draw  the  conclusion  from  the  use  of  a 
particle  in  one  place,  that  its  signification  is  the  very  same  in  ano- 
ther. Well,  we  can  make  the  very  same  objection  to  his  argu- 
ment. It  is  not,  therefore,  a  satisfactory  reason  that  *>"  <I  should 
signify  inasmuch,  or  because  that,  merely  because  passages  may  be 
found  where  the  words  are  thus  used.  Besides,  the  places  alleged 
are  not  in  point,  for  in  Rom.  viii.  3,  the  phrase  is  not  the  same ;  it 
is  c»  (J.  In  2  Cor.  v.  4,  we  do  indeed  read  »y  J,  yet  the  particles  are 
here  used  subjectively,  that  is,  in  a  sense  corresponding  with  our 
interpretation,  for  ru  rvftm  is  evidently  the  antecedent  to  which  the 
relative  refers.  And  in  Heb.  ii.  18,  the  phrase  is  i»Z,  and,  there- 
fore, although  it  be  taken  casually,  it  does  not  affect  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  words  now  under  consideration.  But  while  we  judge 
that  the  Latin  version  is  correct  in  rendering  this  passage  (in  quo) 
in  whom  all  have  sinned;  yet  we  are  not  of  opinion  that  the  force 
of  the  argument  for  original  sin  is  at  all  invalidated  by  the  other 
interpretation  ;  for  as  we  have  shown  above,  it  comes  eventually 
to  the  same  thing,  whether  you  take  these  words  as  expressive  of 
the  subject  or  the  cause. 

As  to  the  exception  of  Ostorodus.  that  in  this  passage  the  word 
"  sinners"  does  not  denote  those  who  were  really  such,  but  persons 
who  are  spoken  of  as  if  they  had  been  sinners,  it  is  too  unreasonable 
to  require  a  moment's  consideration  ;  but  it  is  enough  for  ever  to  si- 
lence this  objection,  that  these  persons  are  really  subject  to  the  pen- 
alty of  death ;  if  therefore  they  are  liable  to  death,  which  is  the 
wages  of  sin,  they  must  be  sinners ;  otherwise  there  would  be  no 
correspondence  between  the  crime  and  punishment.  If  the  crime 
was  merely  supposititious,  and  the  punishment  real,  how  could  God 
be  a  just  judge  when  he  treated  those  as  real  sinners,  who  were 
only  putatively  such  ? 

Ques.  6.  "  As  you  have  taught  that  man's  free-will  is  not 

VITIATED    BY    ORIGINAL    SIN,  EXPLAIN    ALSO    HOW    FAR    THE    POWER  OF 
FREE-WILL  EXTENDS  ? 

Ans.  "Generally,  the  strength  of  human  nature  in  regard  to 
those  things  which  God  requires,  is  very  small ;  yet  for  those  duties 
which  we  are  bound  to  perform,  the  will  by  which  they  may  be 
performed  exists  in  all  men ;  so  that  human  ability  is  not  so  small, 
but  that  if  any  one  sincerely  desires  to  exert  his  power  in  obeying 
the  commandments  of  God,  he,  by  divine  assistance,  will  not  make 
his  efforts  in  vain.  This  divine  aid  God  never  withholds  from  any 
man  to  whom  he  has  communicated  the  revelation  of  his  will; 
otherwise  He  could  never  justly  chastise  or  punish  the  rebellious ; 
but  we  know  he  does  both." 


244  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

Refutation. — Although  in  man  there  is  remaining  some  light  of 
reason  and  conscience,  and  some  liberty  of  will  in  relation  to  ac- 
tions of  a  merely  moral,  civil,  or  political  nature ;  yet  in  regard  to 
things  spiritual,  and  those  which  concern  our  salvation,  the  strength 
of  human  nature  is  not  only,  as  the  catechist  acknowledges,  "  very 
small,"  but  is  absolutely  nothing  at  all ;  for  man  in  his  state  of  des- 
titution and  ruin  is  "  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins."  Now  we  know 
that  in  death  there  is  not  merely  little  strength,  but  not  any  strength. 
This  is  the  fact  in  regard  to  all  those  who  have  fallen  under  the 
power  of  corporeal  death,  as  it  relates  to  natural  actions  ;  and  the 
same  is  true  of  spiritual  death,  as  it  relates  to  spiritual  actions. 
And  as  the  man  who  is  naturally  dead,  is  altogether  impotent  to 
put  forth  the  actions  of  a  living  man ;  so  he  who  is  spiritually  dead, 
is  equally  unable  to  put  forth  those  acts  which  appertain  to  the  spi- 
ritual life.  For  although  there  remains  in  man  the  natural  faculty 
of  willing,  yet  in  this  faculty  there  is  no  ability  of  willing  that  which 
is  good,  and  of  refusing  that  which  is  evil,  of  a  spiritual  kind.  But 
what  is  this  which  our  opponent  teaches  ?  "  That  human  strength 
is  not  so  very  small,  but  that  if  a  man  will  exert  what  he  has,  by 
the  divine  aid  which  will  be  granted,  he  will  not  fail  of  obeying  the 
will  of  God."  This  is  purely  Pelagian.  It  is  as  if  you  should  say, 
"  a  man  who  is  naturally  dead,  if  he  will  exert  the  strength  which 
he  has,  may,  by  divine  aid,  put  forth  the  acts  of  a  living  creature." 
But  we  know  that  a  man  naturally  dead  can  do  nothing  toward 
his  own  resuscitation,  and  the  same  is  equally  true  respecting  spi- 
ritual death.  No  man  can  produce  strength  in  himself,  if  the  cause 
and  principle  of  that  kind  of  action  be  wanting.  If  he  can,  it  must 
be  either  in  dependence  on  God,  or  independently  of  him.  If  the 
former,  it  is  not  man  but  God  who  produces  the  effect ;  if  the  latter, 
the  creature  is  independent  of  his  Maker  for  at  least  one  good  thing 
which  he  possesses.  He  produces  ability  in  himself  by  his  own 
effort,  and  does  not  receive  it  from  above ;  but  this  pretension  ap- 
proaches near  to  atheism,  and  is  blasphemous.  This  is  for  a  man 
to  attribute  to  himself  what  the  scriptures  expressly  ascribe  to  God, 
namely,  "  the  power  to  will  and  to  do ;"  and  the  apostle  asserts, 
"  That  we  are  not  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  anything  as  of 
ourselves;  but  our  sufficiency  is  of  God"  (2  Cor.  iii.  5).  And  if 
the  words  of  Christ  himself  are  true — and  we  know  they  are  truth 
itself—"  Without  me  you  can  do  nothing,"  the  assertion  of  our 
adversary  is  altogether  false,  when  he  asserts  that  a  man,  without 
the  help  of  God,  or  previous  to  that  aid,  can  produce  strength  in 
himself  to  perform  the  will  of  God.  Indeed,  his  aid  he  will  deny  to 
none  of  those  to  whom  he  has  revealed  his  will.  But  this  is  true 
only  of  those  who,  understanding  his  will,  implore  aid  from  God. 
Thus  in  Psalm  1.  15,  "Call  upon  me  and  I  will  deliver  thee  ;"  and 
in  Luke  xi.  9,  "Ask  and  it  shall  be  given  you."  But  the  pas- 
sage which  best  suits  our  purpose  is  that  in  the  13th  verse: 
"  How  much  more  will  your  heavenly  Father  give  the  Holy  Spirit 
to  them  that  ask  him  ?"     But  even  to  ask  aright,  and  to  implore  di- 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  245 

vine  aid  sincerely,  are  not  in  the  power  of  man,  until  by  the 
operations  of  grace  those  groanings  which  cannot  be  uttered  are 
excited  in  him.  For  until  the  spirit  of  prayer  is  given  to  a  man  by 
God,  he  cannot  truly  call  Jesus,  Lord ;  nor  can  he  with  the  spirit 
of  adoption  cry  Abba,  Father.  It  is  true  then,  that  God  does  not 
withhold  his  aid  from  those  to  whom  he  not  only  externally  makes 
known  his  will,  but  whom  he  internally  persuades  ;  for  indeed,  that 
the  aids  of  grace  are  denied  to  many  who  externally  have  the  will 
of  God  preached  to  them,  can  be  doubted  by  none  except  such  as 
are  ignorant,  that  "God  heareth  not  sinners,"  and  that  their 
prayers  are  an  abomination  unto  Him  ;  but  he  will  hear  the  peti- 
tions of  the  righteous,  and  his  ear  is  ever  open  to  their  cry. 

In  answer  to  what  this  writer  says  in  the  last  place,  "That  God 
cannot  justly  punish  the  rebellious,  unless  man  is  endued  with  the 
power  of  free-will  to  obey,  is  of  no  force,  because  God  most  right- 
eously punishes  that  impotency  which  the  first  man  incurred  for 
his  posterity.  For  the  devils  themselves  are  evidently  unable  to  do 
anything  truly  good ;  and  yet  who  would  deny  that  they  are  justly 
punished  for  their  wickedness  ?  They  who  urge  this  argument 
allege  that  if  you  take  away  free-will,  you  take  away  all  punish- 
ments and  all  rewards.  But  this  is  not  true,  as  we  know  from  the 
case  of  the  blessed  angels,  whose  will  is  not  a  state  of  indifference 
between  two  opposites,  which  is  the  Socinian  notion  of  liberty,  but 
the  will  of  the  angels  is  unchangeably  determined  to  that  which  is 
good,  and  to  that  alone ;  so  that  they  cannot  will  that  which  is 
evil ;  and  yet  who  would  deny  that  these  holy  beings  are  deserving 
of  praise  for  the  perfection  of  their  obedience  ?  And  this  inclina- 
tion of  theirs  only  to  that  which  is  good,  God  is  pleased  to  crown 
with  a  gracious  reward  of  everlasting  felicity. 

Ques.  7.  "  But   what  is  that  divine  aid  of  which  you  have 

MADE  MENTION  ? 

Ans.  "  Divine  aid  is  two-fold,  internal  and  external. 

Ques.  8.  "What  is  that  divine  aid  which  is  external? 

Ans.  "  The  principal  is  the  word  of  God,  especially  its  promises 
and  threatenings ;  but  of  these,  the  promises  have  much  greater 
force  than  the  threatenings.  Here  also  it  may  be  remarked,  that 
under  the  new  covenant,  the  promises  are  far  more  excellent  than 
under  the  old.  Moreover,  it  is  much  easier  to  do  the  will  of  God 
under  the  new,  than  it  was  under  the  old  covenant." 

Refutation. — I  observe,^n  the  first  place,  that  our  author  makes 
external  aid  to  consist  in  the  promises  and  threatenings  of  God's 
word.  Now  these  mav  indeed  furnish  strong  motives  to  induce  a 
man  to  accept  the  good  proposed,  and  to  reject  the  evil ;  but  there 
seems  to  be  no  propriety  in  calling  this  by  the  name  of  "  aid,"  un- 
less we  give  to  the  term  an  acceptation  much  broader  than  usual. 
But  that  which  is  most  objectionable  in  this  statement  is,  that  divine 
aid  is  confined  to  the  external  promises  and  threatenings ;  whereas 


246  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

God  not  only  promises  good  and  threatens  evil  in  his  word,  but 
graciously  operates  within,  us,  and  by  divine  energy  renders  these 
motives  effectual,  which  without  such  an  internal  operation  would 
produce  no  effect  whatever  ;  for  the  good  contained  in  the  promise 
is  neither  apprehended  nor  desired,  much  less  enjoyed,  until  the 
mind  is  illuminated  and  excited  by  divine  power.  And  what  else 
is  that  which  we  read  in  so  many  perspicuous  texts  of  sacred 
scripture,  where  God  is  said  to  enlighten  those  who  are  spiritually 
blind?  as  in  Ephes.  i.  17,  18 — to  regenerate  and  renew  those  who 
are  carnal,  as  in  John  iii.  5,  6 ;  1  Cor.  iv.  15 ;  Peter  iii.  7.  To 
quicken  the  dead  in  sin,  as  in  Ephes.  ii.  1,  5.  To  soften  the  hard 
heart,  as  in  Ezek.  xi.  19  ;  xxxvi.  16.  To  convert  us  to  himself,  as 
in  Jer.  xxxi.  13,  19.  To  draw  us  effectually,  as  in  John  vi.  44. 
To  create  within  us  a  clean  heart,  and  renew  a  right  spirit  within 
us,  as  in  Psal.  Ii.  12.  To  open  our  understanding  to  understand 
the  scriptures,  as  in  Luke  xxiv.  31,  45.  To  confer  upon  us  saving 
faith,  as  in  Phil,  ii.  9.  To  excite  good  thoughts  and  volitions,  as  in 
2  Cor.  iii.  5;  Phil.  ii.  13.  To  cause  us  to  walk  in  his  statutes,  as 
in  Ezek.  xxxvi.  27  ;  and  to  fear  his  name,  as  Jer.  xxxii.  39 ;  and  to 
love  the  Lord,  as  Deut.  xxx.  6.  From  all  these  texts,  and  numerous 
others  which  might  be  added,  it  is  manifest  that  "  divine  aid"  con- 
sists in  God's  efficient  and  gracious  operation  within  us,  and  not  in 
the  bare  proposition  of  promises  and  threatenings.  For  without  a 
divine  agency  to  illuminate  our  minds  and  cause  us  to  understand 
the  promises,  so  as  spiritually  to  apprehend  the  good  which  they 
contain,  the  mere  exhibition  of  them  will  never  produce  any  saving 
effect.  Unless  God  incline  our  will  to  embrace  the  good  revealed 
in  the  word,  with  all  our  strength,  we  shall  continue  to  be  unaf- 
fected by  it.  "  For  the  natural  man  receiveth  not  the  things  of  the 
Spirit  of  God,  for  they  are  foolishness  unto  him,  neither  can  he 
know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  discerned."  The  writer, 
while  he  describes  both  promises  and  threatenings  under  the  name 
of  "  divine  aid,"  intimates  that  the  former  are  much  more  powerful 
in  their  operation  on  the  mind  than  the  latter ;  concerning  which, 
however,  we  are  constrained  to  doubt,  since  there  are  many  more 
who  hate  and  avoid  sin  through  fear  of  punishment  than  from  love 
of  virtue.  Again,  that  the  promises  of  the  New  Testament  are 
much  more  excellent  than  those  of  the  Old,  and  that  the  duties  of 
the  new  covenant  are  much  more  easily  performed  than  those  of 
the  old,  is  asserted,  but  not  proved,  by  our  author.  We  say,  that 
in  substance  the  promises  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  are  the 
same,  namely,  Christ  and  his  benefits,  together  with  eternal  life  ;  so 
that,  in  substance,  there  is  nothing  promised  in  the  new  covenant 
which  was  not  also  promised  in  that  of  the  former  dispensation. 
It  is  true,  however,  that  the  blessings  promised  are  much  more 
clearly  exhibited  under  the  Gospel  than  they  were  under  the  Law. 
In  regard  to  clearness  and  sweetness,  it  may  be  said,  that  the  pro- 
mises of  the  New  Testament  are  more  excellent ;  but  not  as  it  re- 
lates to  the  substance  of  the  things  promised. 


DOCTEINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCIMANS.  247 

We  are  aware,  however,  that  Socinians  believe  that  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments  differ,  not  merely  in  circumstances,  but  in 
essence. 

Ques.  9.  "  What  is  that  '  divine  aid'  which  you  call  in- 
ternal ?" 

Ans.  "  It  is  this  ;  that  God  seals  on  the  hearts  of  those  who 
obey  him  whatever  he  has  promised." 

Refutation. — Wonderful  Theology  !  This  sealing,  which  the 
catechist  calls  "  divine  aid"  of  the  internal  kind,  is  produced  by  a 
consideration  of  the  divine  promises  and  threatenings ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  seal  of  a  thing  which  is  sealed,  is  "  aid."  But  sealing  is 
an  act,  the  object  of  which  is  merely  to  produce  a  more  perfect 
confirmation.  When,  therefore,  God  is  said  to  aid  a  man  by  seal- 
ing the  promises,  it  is  nothing  else  than  for  God  to  certify  to  a  man, 
running  of  his  own  accord  in  the  right  way,  a  prosperous  issue  to 
all  his  efforts.  According  to  this  view  of  the  helps  of  grace,  there 
is  not  in  works  of  piety  any  such  thing  as  the  preventing,  co-ope- 
rating, or  accompanying  agency  of  God ;  but  only  a  certain  seal- 
ing of  the  work  consummated  by  man,  to  assure  him  that  his 
labour  shall  not  be  in  vain.  Simply  to  state  the  Socinian  theology, 
in  relation  to  this  point,  is  a  sufficient  refutation.  For  if  there  be 
any  truth  in  the  scripture  doctrine  of  grace,  it  is  God  who  first 
excites  us  to  works  of  piety,  then  co-operates  with  us  in  our  spirit- 
ual exercises,  and  enables  us  to  persevere  in  the  performance  of  the 
good  thus  commenced. 

Ques.  10.  "  If  the  will  of  man  remain  free  [and  unhurt  ry 
the  fall],  why  is  it  that  so  many  have  set  themselves  in  oppo- 
sition to  this  doctrine  V 

Ans.  "  They  are  induced  to  do  so,  from  entertaining  the  opi- 
nion that  there  are  certain  testimonies  of  scripture  which  they  are 
confident  teach  that  man  is  no  longer  possessed  of  free  will. 

Ques.  11.  "But  what  are  those  scripture  testimonies  on 
which  they  depend  ?" 

Ans.  "  They  are  of  two  kinds.  The  first  are  such,  as  that 
from  them  they  suppose  this  doctrine  can  be  fairly  inferred ;  the 
others  are  thought  to  contain  express  declarations,  that  free  will 
does  not  now  exist  in  man." 

Refutation. — It  is  not  with  the  orthodox  a  mere  matter  of  con- 
jecture or  opinion  that  the  will  of  man,  since  the  fall,  is  enslaved  to 
sin  ;  but  it  is  a  truth  which  is  capable  of  being  confirmed  by  the 
clearest  demonstration :  and  we  not  only  suppose  that  we  have  texts 
of  scripture  from  which  it  can  be  deduced  that  the  will  of  man  is  en- 
tirely indisposed  to  all  spiritual  good,  but  we  do  actually  accom- 
plish what  we  profess,  as  will  appear  when  we  come  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  particular  passages  on  which  this  doctrine  rests. 


248  DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS. 

Here  we  must,  for  the  present,  close  our  extracts  from  Arnold's 
Refutation  of  the  Racovian  Catechism.  The  writer  proceeds  in 
the  following  questions,  in  this  tenth  chapter,  Be  Libero  Arbitrio, 
to  treat  largely  of  predestination.  We  should  be  pleased,  if  our 
space  would  permit  us,  to  follow  this  learned  and  solid  theologian 
through  the  whole  discussion  ;  but  what  we  have  extracted  may- 
serve  as  a  specimen  of  the  manner  in  which  theological  discussion 
was  conducted  nearly  two  centuries  ago.  One  thing  must  have 
struck  the  reader  as  remarkable,  namely,  that  the  modern  argu- 
ments, by  which  error  attempts  to  defend  her  cause,  are  precisely 
the  same  as  those  employed  for  centuries  past.  We  know,  indeed, 
that  those  who  now  adopt  and  advocate  these  opinions,  greatly  dis- 
like this  comparison  of  modern  hypotheses  with  ancient  heresies,  and 
denounce  it  as  invidious.  But  why  should  it  be  so  considered  ? 
Or  why  should  they  be  unwilling  to  acknowledge  the  conformity 
of  their  opinions  with  those  of  ancient  times,  when  the  agreement 
is  so  manifest,  not  only  in  the  doctrines  themselves,  but  in  the  ar- 
guments and  interpretations  of  scripture  by  which  they  attempt  to 
support  them  ?  If  the  "  New  Divinity"  be  correct,  then  certainly 
many  who  were  formerly  condemned  by  the  majority  of  Christians 
as  heretics,  ought  to  be  considered  the  true  church,  and  their  doc- 
trines as  orthodox;  while  those  who  censured  and  condemned 
them,  ought  to  be  considered  as  a  set  of  unreasonable  bigots,  who 
by  their  numbers  and  influence  were  able  to  suppress  the  cause  of 
true  Christianity. 

Certainly,  then,  they  who  are  now  so  confident  that  they  have 
received  new  light,  ought  not  to  be  ashamed  of  their  brethren  who 
struck  out  this  same  light  hundreds  of  years  before  they  were 
born,  and  defended  their  opinions  by  arguments  as  ingenious,  and 
by  exegesis  as  learned,  as  any  of  those  now  living  have  a  right  to 
pretend  to.  It  is,  however,  a  fact,  that  these  theologians,  who  long 
maintained  the  character  of  being  orthodox,  are  very  reluctant  to 
be  classed  with  Arminians,  Pelagians,  and  Socinians,  even  when 
they  are  conscious  that  their  opinions  coincide  with  those  desig- 
nated by  such  denominations.  This  does  not  arise  from  any  real 
abhorrence  of  the  sects  so  denominated ;  but  from  knowing  that 
the  Christian  public,  with  which  they  are  connected,  entertain  strong 
prejudices  against  these  sects  ;  and  it  requires  no  small  degree  of 
moral  courage  to  stem  the  torrent  of  popular  prejudice.  There 
has  been,  therefore,  in  our  "  new  light"  theologians,  an  unusual 
solicitude  to  persuade  the  religious  community  that  they  were  not 
contemplating  innovations  upon  the  ancient  creed  of  the  orthodox, 
but  that  they  had  merely  adopted  a  more  rational  philosophy,  by 
which  they  were  able  to  explain  the  knotty  points  in  Calvinism,  so 
as  to  render  doctrines  naturally  offensive  to  human  reason,  if  not 
entirely  palatable,  yet  in  a  great  degree  free  from  objection.  These 
attempts  at  reconciling  the  new  opinions  with  the  commonly  re- 
ceived doctrines  of  the  church  have  been  pushed  so  far,  that  even 
some  who  have  gone  far  into  the   "  new  divinity,"  have  been 


DOCTRINES    OF    THE    EARLY    SOCINIANS.  249 

ashamed  of  the  want  of  candour  and  ingenuousness  which  has 
sometimes  been  manifested.  And  now,  at  length,  the  character 
and  tendency  of  these  modern  theories  have  created  alarm  even 
in  the  largest  body  of  professed  Arminians  on  earth.  We  mean  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  church.  The  tables  are  strangely  turned 
upon  us.  Formerly  we  shrunk  from  contact  with  this  increasing 
body  of  zealous  Christians,  lest  we  should  receive  some  taint  of 
Arminianism  ;  but  now  they  are  lifting  up  a  warning  voice  to  their 
widely  extended  disciples,  not  against  our  Calvinism — for  against 
this  they  have  uttered  their  anathemas  long  enough — but  against 
our  Pelagianism  ;  that  is,  against  the  Pelagian  character  of  the 
"  New  Divinity  f  for  they  are  at  no  loss  to  identify  the  system 
which  is  now  so  zealously  maintained  and  propagated  with  that  of 
John  Taylor  of  Norwich.  But  while  the  affinity  of  the  "  New 
Divinity"  with  Pelagianism  has  been  well  understood  by  considerate 
men  for  some  time  past,  it  has  not  been  commonly  believed  that  there 
is  also  a  striking  resemblance  in  the  modern  theories  to  the  doctrines 
of  the  ancient  Socinians.  This  will,  however,  be  remarkably  evi- 
dent by  a  perusal  of  the  Racovian  Catechism,  which  contains  the  ac- 
knowledged standard  of  Socinian  doctrine  ;  and  even  from  the 
extracts  here  given,  the  coincidence  between  the  two  systems  is 
exceedingly  manifest.  This,  however,  ought  to  be  asserted  with 
some  exception  ;  for  it  is  true  that  in  several  points  the  Socinian 
creed  stops  far  short  of  the  "  New  Divinity."  This  last  makes  no 
scruple  to  assert  the  complete  ability  of  man,  in  all  respects,  to  do 
the  will  of  God,  and  that  by  the  exercise  of  his  own  free  agency ; 
but  in  the  catechism  which  we  have  had  under  consideration  it  is 
taught  that  the  strength  or  ability  of  man  is  very  small ;  and  it  is 
not  pretended  that  he  can  do  anything  without  divine  aid ;  and 
although  they  fall  far  short  of  the  truth,  yet  they  admit  that  there 
is  need,  not  only  ©f  external  divine  aid,  but  of  that  which  is  inter- 
nal also. 

Whether  the  "  New  Divinity"  will  maintain  the  consistency  of 
the  Socinianism  of  Poland,  remains  to  be  proved ;  but  there  is 
much  reason  to  apprehend,  that  although  the  theologians  who  now 
advocate  it  will  not  have  the  courage  to  carry  it  out  in  its  legiti- 
mate consequences,  yet  their  successors  will  be  less  timid,  and 
will  feel  that,  in  self-defence,  it  is  necessary  to  go  a  great  deal 
further  in  the  line  of  deviation  from  orthodoxy  than  has  yet  been 
done.  Whoever  lives  to  see  another  generation  of  men  rising  to 
maturity,  will  see  that  the  "  New  Divinity"  is  the  stepping-stone  to 
German  neology. 


ESSAY   XI. 

THE  POWER  OF  CONTRARY  CHOICE. 

PUBLISHED    IN    1840. 


The  appearance  of  a  new  edition  of  the  standard  work  of  Presi- 
dent Edwards  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  furnishes  an  occasion, 
which  we  are  glad  to  embrace,  of  calling  the  attention  of  our  read- 
ers to  one  particular  part  of  the  subject  which  has  of  late  been  a 
matter  of  frequent  debate. 

No  attentive  and  competent  observer  of  the  controversies  which 
of  late  years  have  harassed  the  church,  will  dispute  that  in  a  great 
measure  they  turn  upon  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  human 
will.  It  is  as  evident  that  the  chief  of  these  questions,  on  which  all 
others  hinge,  is  that  which  relates  to  the  Power  of  Contrary  Choice. 
It  will  be  agreed  that  whatever  goes  to  determine  concerning  the 
reality,  nature  and  operations  of  this  power,  does  in  that  degree  de- 
termine the  controversy  itself.  In  the  hope  of  contributing  to  this 
happy  result,  the  ensuing  inquiry  will  be  conducted.  No  valuable 
progress  can  be  made  in  it,  unless  it  is  pursued  with  a  clear  con- 
ception of  the  real  point  at  issue.  Our  first  endeavour,  therefore, 
shall  be  to  ascertain  precisely  what  that  point  is. 

1.  The  question  is  not  whether  the  will  might  have  made  a 
choice  the  contrary  of  that  actually  made,  had  its  motives,  either 
internal  or  external,  or  both  united,  been  different ;  i.  e.  had  the 
state  of  the  agent's  mind  within,  or  the  outward  inducements  pre- 
sented to  it,  been  different.  No  one  disputes  that  on  this  suppo- 
sition there  might  have  been  a  choice  different  from,  or  contrary 
to,  that  actually  made.  No  one  disputes  that  should  such  a  change 
subsequently  occur,  it  might  produce  a  corresponding  change  of 
choice. 

2.  The  question  is  not  whether  there  is  a  mere  natural  power  of 
contrary  choice,  as  the  phrase  "natural  power"  has  been  under- 
stood by  the  best  theologians.  By  this  is  meant  that  such  a  con- 
trary choice  would  not  be  extrinsic  or  contradictory  to  its  nature 
as  will.     Such  a  choice,  supposing  the  requisite  influence  for  its 


THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  251 

production,  would  be  a  proper  act  of  will,  germane  to  its  nature, 
and  involving  no  inherent  absurdity  or  self-contradiction.  It  would 
involve  no  increase  of  its  faculties  or  powers,  no  change  in  its  or- 
ganic structure,  or  appropriate  nature  as  will.  Had  it  chosen  the 
contrary,  this  would  not  have  proved  or  implied  it  to  be  a  larger, 
stronger,  or  constitutionally  different  faculty.  When  men  turn  to 
the  love  of  God,  they  do  it  with  the  same  faculties  which  were  em- 
ployed in  hating  him,  both  as  to  extent  and  nature.  The  state 
and  action  of  these  faculties  towards  moral  objects  alone  are 
changed.  The  question  is  not  whether,  in  this  sense,  the  human 
will  is  endowed  with  the  power  of  contrary  choice. 

3.  The  question  is  not  whether  the  will,  in  one  and  the  same  act 
of  choice,  may  or  may  not  choose  two  contrary  objects.  This  is 
too  palpably  absurd  to  be  maintained,  and  none  avowedly  or  inten- 
tionally contend  for  it.  Whether  some  theories  do  not  involve  this 
position  in  such  a  degree  that  they  stand  or  fall  with  it,  is  a  fair 
question  for  discussion. 

4.  The  question  is  not  whether  men  may  choose  whichever  of 
two  objects  they  please.  Those  who  do  not  examine  carefully,  are 
often  made  to  believe  that  this  is  the  grand  question  at  issue.  No 
one  doubts  the  affirmative  of  this  question. 

5.  Neither  is  the  question  whether  the  will  has  liberty  of  choice, 
i.  e.  in  every  act  of  choice  acts  freely,  according  to  the  pleasure  oi 
the  agent,  and  not  by  constraint  or  compulsion.  This  is  agreed  on 
all  hands. 

6.  But  the  question  is  whether  the  will  is  so  constituted,  that,  at 
the  moment  of  any  given  choice,  under  precisely  the  same  motives 
of  inward  inclination  and  external  inducement,  it  may  turn  itself 
either  way ;  either  in  the  way  it  actually  does  choose,  or  the  oppo- 
site ;  either  in  accordance  with  its  highest  pleasure  or  inclination, 
or  in  direct  and  utter  hostility  to  them.  And  whether  such  a  pro- 
perty in  the  human  will  be  essential  to  liberty,  moral  agency,  praise 
and  blame,  rewards  and  punishments  ;  a  question  which  lies  at  the 
very  root,  as  will  be  perceived,  of  some  of  the  chief  questions  in 
divinity  and  ethics. 

That  we  may  not  be  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  raising  a  false 
issue,  and  fighting  a  fiction  of  our  own  fancy,  we  shall  quote  from 
the  abettors  of  the  notion  in  question,  a  few  sentences  showing 
clearly  what  are  the  views  of  this  subject  widely  entertained  and 
propagated  at  the  present  day. 

Their  cardinal  doctrine  on  this  subject  is  thus  expressed,  by  a 
leading  advocate  of  it:  "  Choice  in  its  very  nature  implies  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  different  or  contrary  election  to  that  which  is  made."* 
This  "  possibility,"  as  this  writer  explains  himself,  refers  not  to  its 
having  different  objects  put  at  its  election,  so  that  it  may  choose 
whichsoever  it  pleases ;  but  it  refers  to  the  possibility  of  making 
the  mind's  choices  themselves  different  or  contrary  to  what  actual- 

•  Beecher's  Views  in  Theology,  pp.  31,  32. 


252  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY   CHOICE. 

ly  occur,  at  the  same  instant,  under  precisely  the  same  internal  and 
external  motives,  and  the  same  objects  offered  to  their  election. 
For  he  says,  "  the  question  of  free  will  is  not  whether  men  choose. 
This  is  notorious,  none  deny  it."*  Again — "  Free-agency  is  known 
and  defined  by  the  confession  itself,  and  admitted  to  be  the  capacity 
of  choice,  with  power  of  contrary  choice."-]-  And  in  various  forms 
he  abundantly  asserts,  that  "  choice"  and  "  voluntariness"  are  not 
a  sufficient  ground  of  accountability,  unless  the  mind  not  only 
chooses,  but  exerts  a  "  control"  over  its  own  choices. 

Another  writer  speaks  of  "  a  will  which  has  not  its  nature  cor- 
related to  any  objects,  but  a  will  indifferent,  for  if  its  nature  were 
correlated  to  objects,  its  particular  selection  and  determination 
would  be  influenced  by  this,  and  consequently  its  action  would  be 
necessary."J 

Again :  "  The  only  escape  from  necessity,  therefore,  is  the  con- 
ception of  will  as  above  defined — a  conscious  self-moving  power, 
which  may  obey  reason  in  opposition  to  passion,  or  passion  in  op- 
position to  reason,  or  obey  both  in  their  harmonious  union  ;  and 
lastly,  which  may  act  in  the  indifferency  of  all,  that  is,  act  without 
reference  either  to  reason  or  passion."§  Again :  "  The  reason  and 
the  sensitivity  do  not  determine  the  acts  of  the  will.  The  will  has 
efficiency,  or  creative  and  modifying  power  in  itself — self-moved, 
self-directed."|| 

A  few  sentences  from  a  publication  recently  discontinued,  in  fur- 
ther explication  of  the  properties  of  this  power  of  contrary  choice, 
claimed  to  be  essential  to  true  liberty,  will  suffice  under  this  head. 
"  We  know  that  a  moral  system  necessarily  implies  the  existence 
of  free  agents,  with  the  power  to  act  in  despite  of  all  opposing 
power.  This  fact  sets  human  reason  at  defiance,  in  every  attempt 
to  prove  that  some  of  these  agents  will  not  use  that  power  and  ac- 
tually sin.H  "  This  possibility  that  moral  agents  will  sin,  remains 
(suppose  what  else  you  will),  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains ; 
and  how  can  it  be  proved  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when,  for  aught 
that  appears,  it  may  be  ?  When  in  view  of  all  the  facts  and  evi- 
dence in  the  case,  it  remains  true  that  it  may  be,  what  evidence  or 
proof  can  exist  that  it  will  not  be  ?"**  Again  :  "  It  will  not  be 
denied  that  free  moral  agents  can  do  wrong  under  every  possible 
influence  to  prevent  it.  The  possibility  of  a  contradiction  in  sup- 
posing them  to  be  prevented  from  doing  wrong  is  therefore  demon- 
strably certain."  But  we  will  not  weary  our  readers  with  a  more 
prolix  detail  of  extracts,  which  might  be  multiplied  to  any  extent. 
Most  of  them  are  familiar  with  these.  It  is  notorious  with  what 
ingenuity,  zeal  and  industry  these  sentiments  have  been  defended 
and  propagated  in  every  variety  of  form,  and  what  multitudes  have 
been  brought,  either  to  espouse  them  with  enthusiasm,  or  submit  to 
them  in  silence. 

*  Beecher's  Views  in  Theology,  p.  32.  t  Id.,  p.  91. 

%  Tappan,  Review  of  Edwards,  p.  221.  §  Id.,  p.  227.  ||  Id.,  p.  244. 

H  Christian  Spectator,  1831,  p.  417.  **  Id.,  1830,  p.  563. 


THE    POWEE    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  253 

While  the  first  of  the  writers  quoted  teaches  that  it  belongs  to 
the  very  nature  of  choice,  that  there  should  be  a  capacity  of  pro- 
ducing contrary  choice,  and  that  without  this  "  control "  of  the 
mind  over  its  own  choices,  there  is  no  true  freedom,  moral  agency 
or  accountability ;  the  second  clearly  avows  that  indifferency  of 
will  towards  the  objects  either  of  reason  or  desire,  without  which 
this  faculty  is  rather  a  metaphysical  figment  than  a  living  reality, 
and  maintains  that  no  other  constitution  of  the  will  can  exempt  us 
from  the  despotism  of  fatal  necessity :  while  in  the  last  series  of 
extracts  we  reach  the  climacteric,  to  which  the  doctrine  necessarily 
rises  by  the  demands  of  logical  consistency,  viz.,  that  it  belongs  to 
the  very  essence  of  moral  agency,  that  the  will  is  of  such  a  nature 
or  in  such  a  state  as  to  be  able  to  sin  "  despite  of  all  opposing 
power."  And  that  this  is  no  mere  theory,  but  an  awful  fact  in  their 
estimation,  is  evident,  because  they  advance  it  to  account  for  the 
introduction  of  sin  into  the  world — strongly  arguing  that  God  would 
have  excluded  it,  if  he  could  have  done  so  without  destroying  moral 
agency.  From  all  which  it  is  most  manifest  that  the  will,  accord- 
ing to  their  conception  of  it,  cannot,  without  the  loss  of  accounta- 
bility, moral  agency,  and  merit  of  praise  or  blame,  be  put  in  such 
a  state  that  it  may  not  sin,  in  spite  of  all  the  motives  and  influences 
without  and  within  the  man,  which  the  Almighty  can  employ  to 
prevent  it.  Such  is  the  power  of  contrary  choice,  extensively  and 
confidently  asserted  in  these  days  to  be  requisite  to  moral  agency. 
This  notion  we  propose  to  discuss  so  far  as  the  space  allotted  to  us 
will  permit. 

No  evidence  has  yet  been  adduced  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
property  in  the  human  will.  The  only  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  mental  attributes,  which  sound  philosophers  have  deemed  ad- 
missible, is  those  mental  operations  which  presuppose  the  faculty 
in  question.  Thus  we  judge  men  to  possess  reason  and  under- 
standing, because  we  recognize  in  them  exercises  of  reason  and 
intelligence.  We  conclude  that  they  are  endowed  with  consciences, 
because  they  take  cognizance  of  right  and  wrong  in  moral  actions. 
We  attribute  to  them  the  faculty  of  will  because  they  choose.  And 
adhering  to  this  Baconian  method  of  philosophising  by  induc- 
tion of  facts  (and  on  any  other  system  what  can  prevent  any  dream- 
ing speculator  from  endowing  the  human  soul  with  an  endless  num- 
ber of  fictitious  attributes  ?)  what  legitimate  evidence  is  furnished 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  faculty  of  contrary  choice,  as  we  are  now 
canvassing?  That  men  choose  as  they  do  choose,  all  admit,  and 
of  course  maintain  the  existence  of  a  faculty  adequate  thereto.  But 
that  they  choose  the  contrary  of  what  they  choose,  none  contend. 
How  then  can  they  contend  for  the  existence  of  a  faculty  in  all  re- 
spects adequate  to  do  what  confessedly  is  never  done  ? 

Neither  does  consciousness  testify  to  the  existence  of  any  such 
faculty,  though  most  of  all  relied  on  and  appealed  to  bear  such 
testimony.  But  this  is  a  vain  refuge.  For  consciousness  is  the 
mind's  cognizance  of  its  own  operations  ;  it  never  beholds  naked, 


254  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE. 

abstract  faculties  separate  from  their  workings.  It  discerns  them 
in  and  by  these  workings,  and  so  becomes  conscious  of  their  exist- 
ence and  nature.  This,  and  nothing  else,  is  the  office  of  conscious- 
ness. How  then  can  it  be  cognizant  of  operations  which  do  not 
exist  ?  It  may  be  conscious  indeed  of  having  been  able  to  choose 
differently,  had  it  so  pleased — because  such  has  ever  been  the  law 
of  its  choice.  Will  any  one  pretend  that  it  is  conscious  of  a  power 
to  choose  contrariwise,  its  ruling  inclination  or  pleasure  being  and 
continuing  to  choose  as  it  has  chosen,  or  that  such  a  faculty  would 
be  any  desirable  addition  to  the  moral  endowments  of  men  ;  or  lend 
any  new  aid,  finish  or  grace  to  moral  agency  ? 

Neither  is  any  evidence  of  such  a  power  contained  in  the  intui- 
tive convictions  of  men,  as  to  what  is  requisite  to  moral  agency 
and  accountability.  For  however  it  may  be  requisite  in  order  to 
men's  being  responsible,  that  they  be  able  to  do  as  they  please  or 
choose ;  yet  who  will  claim  that  it  is  deemed  necessary  that  they 
should  have  the  property  of  choosing  the  exact  contrary  of  what 
on  the  whole  appears  to  them  most  eligible  and  desirable  ?  So  far 
from  being  essential  to",  would  not  such  a  property  be  declared  by 
them  destructive  of  all  responsibility  ? 

There  is  decisive  evidence  that  such  a  property  of  the  human 
will  does  not  exist.  For  that  which  is  contended  for  is  not  merely 
that  the  will  may  put  forth  a  choice  the  contrary  of  what  actually 
occurs,  supposing  such  a  change  to  occur  in  its  circumstances  as 
would  induce  it  (which  all  admit),  but  that  in  precisely  the  case  in 
which  it  exercises  a  given  choice,  it  is  fully  adequate  to  a  contrary 
election.  Now  this  contrary  choice  is  actually  made  or  it  is  not : 
if  it  is  made,  then  the  will  chooses  the  contrary  of  what  it  does 
choose,  which  is  self-contradiction ;  if  it  is  not  made,  then  those 
conditions  were  wanting  in  it  as  a  cause,  which  were  indispensable 
to  the  effect,  and  in  the  absence  of  which  it  was  inadequate  to  the 
effect.  It  is  a  trifling  evasion  to  answer  that  the  will  could  have 
chosen  otherwise  had  it  been  so  inclined :  this  is  not  the  point  in 
hand.  The  thing  contended  for  is  that  it  might  have  chosen  other- 
wise at  all  events,  whether  inclined  or  not,  and  in  spite  of  all  op- 
posing inclination,  yea,  in  spite  of  all  opposing  power,  even  of  Om- 
nipotence :  and  that  this  is  essential  to  moral  agency.  It  might  as 
well  be  said  that  scales  could  turn  the  opposite  way,  if  induced  by 
a  preponderating  weight.  And  does  this  illustration  adequately 
exhibit  all  that  is  intended  by  that  famous  power  of  contrary  choice, 
which  has  been  so  largely  spoken  of,  as  bringing  in  a  new  era  in 
the  philosophy  of  theology  ? 

Neither  is  it  any  answer  to  say  that  this  reasoning  is  inconclusive 
in  regard  to  such  a  faculty  as  is  now  contended  for :  by  which  its 
advocates  mean  a  cause  unlike  all  others,  and  which  they  variously 
define  as  a  "  self-active,"  "  self-originating,"  "  self-determining," 
"  selecting  "  cause.  For  it  did  either  thus  of  itself  enact,  originate, 
determine  or  select  a  choice  the  contrary  of  what  it  did,  which  is 
plain  contradiction ;  or  it  did  not :  and  therefore  wanted  some  con- 


THE     POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  255 

dition  the  presence  of  which  was  indispensable  to  that  effect,  and 
the  absence  of  which  rendered  the  cause  inadequate  to  the  effect — 
as  really  though  not  as  blamelessly,  or  in  such  a  degree  so,  as  is  the 
hand  to  lift  a  mountain. 

But  again,  all  will  doubtless  admit,  that  although  the  natural 
faculty  of  will  exerts  the  choice,  the  direction  of  that  choice  under 
given  outward  motives,  is  determined,  not  by  the  bare  natural 
faculty,  but  by  its  moral  state.  Thus  the  faculty  of  will  equally  in 
good  and  bad  men  exerts  their  volitions  :  but  their  moral  goodness 
or  badness  determines  the  direction  and  quality  of  those  choices. 
To  deny  this,  is  to  deny,  confound  and  utterly  vacate  the  distinc- 
tion in  theology  between  natural  and  moral  ability.  If  then  the 
will  is  in  a  given  moral  state,  how  can  it  be  a  property  of  it  to  put 
forth  choices  of  an  opposite  moral  character  ?  Is  this  a  real  requi- 
site or  desirable  appendage  to  moral  agency  ?  / 

Such  a  property  of  the  human  will  really  amounts  to  the  liberty 
of  indifference.  For  if  the  will  be  in  a  condition,  by  which  it  is 
fitted  or  liable  to  turn  either  way,  then  it  cannot  be  already  inclin- 
ed by  a  preponderating  bias  in  one  direction :  for  this  is  but  saying 
that  it  chooses  the  contrary  of  its  own  preference.  This  difficulty 
is  attempted  to  be  evaded,  but  not  answered,  by  alleging  that  al- 
though the  will  may  not  choose  contrary  to  its  own  inclination, 
yet  it  may  reverse  that  inclination.  But  let  it  be  explained  how 
this  inclination  can  be  reversed  without  choosing  contrary  to  it. 
Suppose,  however,  it  might.  Then  surely  that  property  or  func- 
tion of  will  which  thus  reverses  its  own  ruling  bias,  must  at  least 
itself  be  free  from  the  power  of  that  bias,  or  it  would  never  incline 
against  it,  and  work  its  destruction.  It  must  therefore  at  least  be 
in  a  state  of  equipoise  or  indifference  as  to  the  objects  of  choice. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  one  leading  advocate  of  this  notion, 
clearly  discerning  this  consequence,  boldly  marches  up  to  it,  and 
embraces  it,  and  contends  that  such  a  freedom  of  will  as  involves 
its  indifference  either  to  the  objects  of  reason  or  passion,  in  short  a 
will  void  of  all  "  correlation  "  to  other  objects,  is  essential  to  free- 
dom from  that  necessity  which  destroys  moral  agency  and  accounta- 
bility! But  it  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  the  will  does  not 
by  every  act  of  choice  pass  out  of  this  indifference,  into  a  decided 
inclination  toward  some  object :  and,  by  consequence,whether  after 
the  first  choice  it  can  ever  be  endowed  with  that  glorious  indiffer- 
ence which  is  essential  to  moral  agency  and  accountability,  or  on 
this  system  can  be  responsible  for  any  of  its  acts.  And  we  would 
inquire  further,  how  it  can  make  any  first  choice  between  objects, 
while  in  a  state  of  perfect  equipoise  between  them :  why  should  it 
move  towards  either  more  th°n  towards  anything  else,  or  why 
should  it  not  remain  motionless,  if  there  is  no  "  correlation,"  no 
ground  of  affinity  and  attraction  between  them  ?  Or  could  such 
motion  be  referred  to  anything  besides  the  purest  contingency  and 
hap-hazard,  or  possess  any  property  of  a  rational  and  accountable 


256  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE. 

act  ?  On  this  scheme  all  moral  agency  and  accountability  would 
be  exorcised  from  the  universe. 

Another  class  of  advocates,  hedged  in  by  a  view  of  this  thicket 
of  absurdities,  have  taken  ground  more  cautiously.  Wishing  to 
navigate  clear  of  the  quicksands  of  indifference  on  the  one  hand, 
and,  on  the  other,  to  limit  moral  action  to  the  workings  of  this  fa- 
vourite power  of  choice  with  power  of  contrary  choice,  they  have 
struck  upon  the  rock  of  self-love.  They  teach  us,  not  that  the 
will  moves  from  indifference,  but  that  "  self-love  is  the  primary 
cause  or  reason  of  all  acts  of  choice  that  fix  supremely  on  any 
object."  And  they  maintain  that  this  self-love  has  no  moral  charac- 
ter, but  only  the  choices  prompted  by  it.  At  first  sight  this  has 
the  appearance  of  accounting  for  the  acts  of  the  will,  not  by  a  good 
or  evil  bias  within  it,  but  without  it,  and  void  of  moral  quality. 
But  let  it  be  considered  whether  this  solution,  instead  of  disen- 
tangling the  scheme,  does  not  involve  it  in  deeper  perplexity.  For 
how  can  "  self-love  be  the  primary  cause  or  reason  of  all  acts  of 
choice  or  preference,"  unless  the  will  is  so  constituted  as  to  follow 
its  leadings  ?  If  it  cannot,  then  if  there  be  any  truth  in  the  doc- 
trine, it  is  always  a  law  of  the  will's  choices  that  it  should  choose 
that  object  which  appears  to  minister  most  to  self-love.  For  sup- 
pose it  to  reject  that  which  offers  more,  and  to  elect  in  preference 
that  which  offers  less  to  self-love,  it  of  course  chooses  in  view  of 
the  perceived  difference  between  the  two ;  that  difference  in  this 
case  is  so  much  denial  to  self-love.  Therefore  self-love  could  not 
have  been  the  "  cause  or  reason"  of  such  an  act  of  choice.  Hence 
it  is  demonstrable  that  if  "  self-love  be  the  primary  cause  of  all 
acts  of  choice,"  these  acts  must  be  according  to  its  promptings. 
They  cannot  therefore  be  the  contrary  of  them.  Where  then 
shall  we  look  for  the  capacity  of  contrary  choice  ?  And  how 
does  this  scheme  get  rid  of  that  bias  in  the  will,  or  "  correlation" 
to  self-love,  or  uniform  law  of  action,  which  are  deemed  so  preg- 
nant with  fatalism,  because  fatal  to  free  agency  ?  And  if  self-love 
has  no  moral  quality  in  any  state  or  degree  of  it  which  determines 
the  will,  if  all  its  choices  are  merely  imperate  acts  of  desires  hav- 
ing no  moral  quality,  then  how  can  they  have  moral  quality  them- 
selves? However  biased  in  regard  to  objects  void  of  moral 
quality,  must  it  not  remain  eternally  indifferent  to  moral  objects  ? 
And  are  not  all  moral  agency  and  accountability  thus  swept  from 
the  universe  ?  And  is  this  conferring  on  moral  agency  any  new 
attribute  of  dignity,  or  element  of  perfection  1  The  self-love 
scheme  might  easily  be  traced  out  to  more  absurd  and  ruinous 
consequences.  But  we  confine  ourselves  to  those  which  bear  upon 
the  power  of  contrary  choice. 

This  scheme  involves  all  the  absurdities  which  attach  to  the 
notion  of  the  self  determining  power  of  the  will  as  held  by  the  old 
Arminians.  For  little  value  can  be  put  upon  a  power  of  the  mind 
to  choose  either  way,  unless  it  can  determine  which  of  the  two 
choices  in  question  it  will  put  forth.     Will  they  who  assert  a  power 


THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  257 

in  the  mind  to  choose  in  given  circumstances  the  opposite  of  what 
it  does  choose,  tell  us  how  this  power  could  be  made  available 
without  the  mind's  choosing  to  make  it  so  ;  how  its  actual  choice 
could  be  in  a  condition  either  to  be  exercised  or  avoided,  unless  it 
were  so  that  the  mind  chose  to  exercise  it,  and  could  choose  not  to 
exercise  it ;  or  how,  on  their  principles,  the  mind  could  be  respon- 
sible for  it,  without  such  a  liberty  as  this  implies?  The  question 
involves  its  own  answer.  They  never  can.  This  control  of  the 
mind  over  its  own  choices  which  they  claim,  is  surely  a  mere  nul- 
lity, unless  that  mind  chooses  those  choices.  If  then  a  free  act  of 
choice  has  not  moral  quality  in  its  own  nature,  but  can  only  ac- 
quire it  from  a  previous  act  of  choice,  the  same  is  true  of  that  pre- 
vious choice,  also  of  its  forerunner,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum  till  we 
reach  a  choice  before  the  first  choice  in  order  to  find  moral  respon- 
sibility, and  indeed  chase  it  out  of  being.  We  go  from  link  to  link 
and  never  find  a  staple  ;  we  sound  from  depth  to  depth  and  find  no 
bottom,  for  bottom  there  is  none,  neither  can  there  be  in  this  sea  of 
absurdities. 

Some  of  these  metaphysicians  have  been  fully  aware  that  the 
power  of  contrary  choice  contended  for,  was  none  other  than  the 
self-determining  power,  and  have  accordingly  undertaken  to  vindi- 
cate this  doctrine  of  self-determination  from  the  insuperable  objec- 
tions which  lie  against  it.  They  allege  that  it  is  not  obnoxious  to 
the  absurdity  of  choosing  choices ;  because,  like  all  other  causes, 
it  is  its  nature  in  working  an  effect  to  "  select"*  its  object.  That 
the  will  selects  its  objects,  and  that  such  is  its  nature,  all  agree. 
But  this  is  not  the  question.  As  one  of  these  writers  says,  "  that 
men  choose  is  notorious,  none  deny  it"  The  inquiry  is  not  whe- 
ther different  objects  are  put  at  men's  election,  or  whether  they 
could  choose  differently  if  they  pleased ;  but  whether  in  a  given 
state,  all  things  remaining  the  same,  their  choice  may  be  either 
way,  even  the  contrary  of  what  it  is.  We  object,  that  in  order  to 
this,  it  must  choose  between  its  choices.  The  answer  is,  "  by  no 
means  ;  for  like  all  other  causes  it  selects  its  objects."  By  this  one 
of  two  things  must  be  meant ;  either  that  it  is  its  nature  to  "  select" 
the  objects  it  does  choose — then  where  is  the  capacity  of  contrary 
choice  or  "  selection  ?"  or  it  "  selects"  which  "  selection"  it  will 
make  between  two  opposite  objects ;  in  other  words,  chooses  its 
choices.     So  much  for  this  evasion. 

Such  a  property  of  the  human  will  as  we  are  now  discussing 
makes  mere  and  blind  contingency  the  final  determinant  of  its  choic- 
es. For  it  teaches  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  moral  agency,  that  the 
will  should  have  any  such  ruling  bias  toward  given  objects,  as 
effectually  and  infallibly  to  prevent  its  choosing  the  opposite.  Not 
even  Omnipotence  itself  can  thus  prevent  it,  without  infringing 
upon  moral  agency.  If  then  it  be  requisite  to  free  action,  that  the 
will  should  be  void  of  all  bias  or  relation  to  any  objects,  which 

•  Tappan,  Reriew  of  Edwards,  p.  185. 
17 


258  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE. 

will  decisively  direct  its  choices  toward  them  :  if,  as  has  been 
shown  already,  according  to  this  scheme,  it  must  be  in  a  state  of 
equipoise  or  indifferenee ;  then  most  clearly  the  will  is  not  deter- 
mined either  way  by  anything  without  or  within  itself,  being  in- 
stated in  sublime  equipoise  or  indifference  above  them  all.  To 
what  then  but  the  blindest  fortuity  can  they  be  referred  ?  And 
where  is  the  survey  of  those  vast  Providential  dispensations  which 
hang  on  the  choices  of  moral  agents,  except,  as  one  has  said,  in 
"  all-powerful  contingencies  ?"* 

Such  a  property,  so  far  from  being  requisite  to,  utterly  subverts 
all  moral  agency  and  accountability.  For,  as  has  already  been 
shown,  it  drives  all  m  >ral  responsibility  out  of  the  world,  by  push- 
ing it  to  a  choice  back  of  the  first  choice.  It  makes  choice  pro- 
ceed from  indifference  and  blind  contingence  ;  and  what  moral 
qualities  can  be  attach  od  to  that  which  by  its  very  terms  has  no 
quality,  is  neither  one  ihing  nor  the  other,  is  blank  nonentity  or 
blind  contingence  ?  To  state  the  case  familiarly  :  If  at  any  mo- 
ment a  choice  may  spring  up  within  us,  "despite  all  opposing 
power,"  all  strength  of  inclination  and  force  of  persuasion  which  I 
may  have  of  myself,  or  omnipotence  can  work,  how  can  I  be  re- 
sponsible for  it,  more  than  for  an  involuntary  spasm  of  the  nerves  ? 

We  go  still  further,  and  assert  that  a  kind  of  necessity  is  requi- 
site to  the  very  freedom  of  actions,  and  cannot  be  divorced  from 
them  without  destroying  or  impairing  that  freedom.  For  is  not  a 
free  act  one  which  possesses  certain  qualities  ?  If  then  such  an 
action  as  is  possessed  of  such  qualities,  and  no  other,  is  free,  it  fol- 
lows that  if  a  given  choice  be  free  it  must  be  such  an  action  and 
no  other.  For  example  :  let  any  person  choose  freely  what  his 
inclination  would  prompt,  as  to  property,  location,  opportunities  of 
study  or  usefulness,  and  would  not  such  a  choice,  if  free,  be  some 
given  thing  to  the  exclusion  and  rejection  of  its  opposite  ?  and 
could  a  choice,  if  free  and  "  unhindered  by  fatal  coercion,"  elect 
and  prefer  one  thing  or  its  opposite,  e.  g.,  affluence  or  poverty,  at 
the  same  moment  ?  On  this  point  we  may  safely  appeal  to  human 
consciousness.  The  question  speaks  its  own  answer.  Thus  in 
order  to  freedom  in  the  manner  and  quality  of  an  action,  there  must 
be  a  necessity  as  to  its  event ;  a  necessity  that  it  be  as  it  is  and 
not  otherwise.  Thus,  if  you  choose  freely  between  two  objects, 
there  is  one  on  which  that  choice  will  fall  ;  nay,  cannot  but  fall 
without  losing  its  freedom.  This  conclusion  cannot  be  escaped 
without  plunging  into  blind  contingency  as  the  determiner  of  the  will. 
This  pretended  competency  of  the  will,  to  one  choice  or  its  oppo- 
site, as  effectually  destroys  all  true  freedom,  as  would  a  denial  of 
freedom  to  choose  whatever  it  pleases  ;  nay,  it  is  one  and  the  same 
thing.  So  true  is  that  fundamental  position  of  Calvinism,  which, 
so  far  as  we  are  informed,  all  Calvinistic  writers  have  maintained ; 
that  in  respect  to  the  choices  of  moral  agents,  there  is  freedom  as 

*  President  Day. 


THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  259 

to  the  manner,  and  necessity  or  fixedness  as'to  the  event  of  them  ; 
and  the  one  involves  the  other.  Neander  has  beautifully  expressed 
Augustine's  doctrine  thus  :  "  On  the  highest  point  of  moral  eleva- 
tion, freedom  and  necessity  coincide."*  So  our  Protestant  confes- 
sionst  each  that  although  "  God  unchangeably  ordains  whatsoever 
comes  to  pass,"  yet  he  does  it  so  that  "  violence  is  not  offered  to 
the  will  of  the  creatures,  nor  is  the  liberty  or  contingency  of 
second  causes  taken  away,  but  rather  established."  And  again : 
"  Although  in  relation  to  the  foreknowledge  and  decrees  of  God, 
the  first  cause,  all  things  come  to  pass  immutably  and  infallibly; 
yet  by  the  same  providence  he  ordereth  them  to  fall  out,  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  second  causes,  either  necessarily,  freely,  or 
'  contingently.' "  By  "  contingently,"  is  meant,  as  another  article 
teaches,  not  that  any  "  thing  to  God  is  contingent  or  uncertain  ;" 
but,  as  these  confessions  assert,  "  according  to  the  nature  of  se- 
cond causes,"  by  which  is  meant  that  to  them  the  actions  are  con- 
tingent or  avoidable  if  they  choose  to  avoid  them ;  not  that  their 
choices  are  liable  to  be  of  a  given  thing  or  its  opposite,  for  they 
teach  that  the  choices  themselves  are  immutably  foreknown  and 
determined  ;  yet  not  so  as  to  impair  but  establish  their  liberty,  for 
the  manner  of  them  also  is  immutably  fixed. 

This  is  precisely  the  view  we  have  maintained  ;  that  freedom  as 
to  manner,  and  necessity  as  to  event,  stand  or  fall  together.  And 
this  is  what  Dr.  Twisse,  prolocutor  of  the  Westminster  Assembly, 
not  only  means,  but  laboriously  argues,  in  the  context  of  that  fa- 
mous passage,  in  which  he  says,  "  contingently  means  avoidably,  as 
every  university  scholar  knows,"  which  has  been  so  abundantly 
quoted  to  prove  that  he  and  with  him  the  Assembly  of  Divines,  and 
their  venerable  confessions,  held  to  the  power  of  contrary  choice, 
in  the  sense  contended  for  in  the  late  controversies  among  us.  It 
is  worthy  of  observation  too,  that  in  the  very  next  page,  Dr.  Twisse 
confines  this  power  of  avoiding  evil  to  particular  purposes  and  acts 
of  abstaining  from  given  sins ;  while  he  expressly  asserts  that 
"fallen  man  has  no  power  to  abstain  from  them  in  a  gracious  and 
holy  manner."  Thus  Judas,  had  he  chosen,  could  have  refrained 
from  betraying  Christ,  but  not  in  a  holy  manner,  that  is,  from  prin- 
ciples of  faith  and  love.  In  other  words,  it  was  perfectly  consis- 
tent with  Judas's  continuing  a  wicked  man,  that  it  should  have 
pleased  him  to  refrain  from  his  act  of  treachery ;  and  had  it  thus 
pleased  him  he  could  and  would  have  abstained  from  it.  But  there 
is  no  conceivable  act  or  state  of  the  natural  man,  no  desire  of  sal- 
vation, or  resolutions  to  be  holy,  which  do  or  can  produce  faith 
and  love.  There  is  a  gulf  between  the  two  which  nothing  can  fill, 
but  the  renewing  work  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  Now  it  is  notorious 
that  the  power  of  contrary  choice  has  been  chiefly  handled  in  refer- 
ence to  one  point ;  viz.,  to  establish  the  ability  of  the  unrenewed 
man  to  turn  himself  to  God,  and  make  a  new  heart,  without  Divine 

•  Bib.  Repository,  1833,  p.  96. 


260  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE. 

Grace,  and  that  other  points  interwoven  are  merely  collateral  and 
subordinate  to  this.  Whatever  else  Twisse  meant  by  "  avoidable," 
he  directly  denies  this,  almost  in  the  same  sentence.  Is  it  alto- 
gether just  to  hold  him  forth  as  its  champion  ?  If  many  of  our 
"  University  scholars,"  aye,  and  teachers  too,  were  more  conversant 
with  his  treatises,  and  those  of  other  kindred  defenders  of  the  faith, 
it  would  go  far  to  prepare  the  way  of  the  Lord,  and  restore  the 
unity  of  the  Spirit  in  the  bond  of  peace. 

The  most  perfect  moral  agents  in  being  are  destitute  of  this  pro- 
perty in  question,  which  is  asserted  to  be  requisite  to  moral  agency. 
Such  is  God,  all  whose  acts  are  immutably  (freely  as  to  the  man- 
ner yet  necessarily  as  to  the  event)  determined  by  perfect  wisdom 
and  goodness.  It  is  impossible  for  God  to  lie.  He  cannot  deny 
himself.  Is  not  he  supremely  excellent,  and  deserving  of  praise  1 
To  deny  this  is  to  deny  his  perfections,  and  blaspheme  his  name  ! 
The  elect  angels  can  never  become  the  subjects  of  sinful  choices. 
Regenerate  men,  who  are  kept  by  the  power  of  God  through  faith 
unto  salvation,  cannot  prevailingly  sin,  or  utterly  fall  away.  Are 
they  not  moral  agents  ?  Are  they  the  less  excellent  and  praise- 
worthy, for  being  so  inflexibly  holy,  that  they  cannot  become  the 
prey  of  sin  and  Satan  ?  But  you  say  they  can  lapse  into  sin  if 
they  please.  Indeed  !  can  they  unless  it  be  their  pleasure  so  to 
do  ?  Dare  you  question  that  it  will  always  be  their  pleasure  to 
abide  holy  1  If  not,  where  is  the  possibility  of  their  apostasy  ? 
This  is  the  very  point  at  issue  ;  whether  it  ever  will  or  can  be  their 
pleasure  to  lapse  ?  Will  you  presume  to  suggest  that  their  pow- 
ers of  moral  agency  would  be  improved  by  such  a  liability  ?  But 
you  say  there  can  be  no  merit  or  worthiness  in  their  standing  if 
they  have  not  power  to  fall.  That  they  have  power  to  fall,  if  they 
choose  or  please,  none  dispute.  But  if  they  will  not  choose  or  be 
pleased  to  fall,  is  there  no  worthiness  in  such  a  character  ?  Then 
is  there  none  in  the  Universe.  So  this  notion,  like  all  other  errors 
in  theology,  cannot  be  maintained  without  striking  at  the  Deity 
himself.  It  puts  his  unchangeable  holiness  in  jeopardy  and  doubt. 
The  foregoing  l^easons  satisfy  us  that  such  a  power  pf  contrary 
choice  as  that  which  has  been  canvassed  is  no  indispensable  pro- 
perty of  moral  agency.  We  will  briefly  advert  to  some  of  the 
methods  adopted  to  give  this  notion  currency  and  popularity. 

Its  advocates  speak  of  the  opposite  view  as  if  it  implied  that 
men  were  compelled  to  act,  to  sin,  or  to  be  holy,  against  their  wills. 
They  abound  in  phraseology  like  this  :  If  there  is  no  possibility  of 
a  contrary  choice  ;  if  men  are  compelled  to  act  as  they  do  by  fatal 
necessity;  if  their  inability  is  not  wholly  in  their  aversion  of  will, 
if  it  is  something  which  no  purity  of  desire  or  purpose  can  remove, 
and  the  like,  then  they  are  not  accountable.  Whereas  our  view  is 
exposed  to  no  such  objection  ;  for  it  implies  that  there  is  no  sup- 
posable,  prevailing  will,  desire  or  choice,  contrary  to  the  actual 
choice.  Otherwise  the  actual  choice  would  be  omitted,  and  the 
contrary  put  forth.     Their  system,  if  any,  is  in  fact  obnoxious  to 


THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  261 

this  charge.  For  it  supposes  that  choices  may  spring  up  contrary 
to  prevailing  inclination,  yea,  "all  opposing  power."  And  yet  the 
changes  are  ever  ringing  on  this  idea  of  compulsion  contrary  to 
their  will,  to  bewilder  careless  theologians,  and  the  more  careless 
multitude. 

They  set  it  forth  in  glaring  colours  as  stoicism,  fatalism,  heathen- 
ish destiny,  and  are  abundant  in  such  words  as  fatal  necessity,  ada- 
mantine bonds  of  fate,  &c.  They  noise  them  abroad  with  great 
frequency,  variety  and  emphasis,  as  if  they  were  of  vital  importance 
to  their  cause. 

Our  present  limits  forbid  any  inquiry  into  the  doctrines  of  the 
ancient  Stoics  and  Fatalists.  But  we  beg  leave  to  say  that  these 
startling  words  neither  answer  nor  constitute  an  argument. 
Neither  do  they  prove  the  identity  of  our  doctrine  with  any  held 
by  the  Stoics  and  Fatalists  :  neither,  if  that  were  proved,  does  it  of 
itself  prove  its  untruth,  unless  every  sentiment  ever  held  by  their 
schools  is  to  be  concluded  false,  to  the  suppression  of  all  further  in- 
quiry ;  which  few  will  be  bold  to  assert.  And  if  it  be  incumbent 
on  some,  is  it  not  so  on  all,  not  to  resort  to  "  other  means  than  truth 
and  argument"  in  this  controversy  ? 

It  is  much  insisted  on  and  reiterated,  that  if  their  doctrine  be  de- 
nied, then  there  is  no  further  use  of  endeavours  to  attain  virtue  in 
ourselves,  or  of  employing  means,  endeavours,  and  persuasions  to 
promote  it  in  others.  This  is  plausible,  and  strongly  seizes  the 
sympathies  of  men.  But  let  us  examine  whether  this  difficulty 
does  not  press  with  more  crushing  weight  on  their  own  scheme. 
For  if  the  will  be  without  bias  or  "  correlation"  to  any  object,  if  it 
be  liable  to  choose  either  way,  in  spite  of  all  motive  and  induce- 
ment, and  all  internal  inclination,  which  Omnipotence  itself  can 
work,  of  what  avail  is  it  to  employ  means  and  persuasions  with 
such  an  agent?  Were  it  not  as  hopeful  and  rational  to  expostulate 
with  the  idle  wind,  which  bloweth  where  it  listeth,  and  none  can 
tell  whence  it  cometh,  nor  whither  it  goeth  ?  But  in  the  orthodox 
scheme,  there  are  some  characteristical  susceptibilities  in  man  to 
which  appeals  can  be  hopefully  addressed.  The  impenitent  even, 
if  not  peculiarly  obdurate,  can  be  persuaded  to  refrain  from  exter- 
nal impurity  and  vice  ;  and  by  the  efficacious  grace  of  the  Spirit 
can  b3  "  effectually  softened,  bowed  and  renewed,  as  to  hear  the 
word  with  gladness,  obey,  and  live."  Our  only  and  our  sufficient 
encouragement  to  preach  the  Gospel  to  every  creature  is,  that  God 
can  make  them  willing  to  embrace  it  in  the  day  of  his  power.  Are 
there  any  who  rely  on  any  other  encouragement  ?  If  so,  let  them 
avow  it.  If  not,  why  tax  our  scheme  with  a  perplexity  which  con- 
fessedly burdens  their  own? 

Lastly  and  pre-eminently,  the  chief  allurement  by  which  this 
scheme  has  fascinated  multitudes  of  young  ministers,  and  others,  is 
to  be  found  in  its  vaunting  airs  of  new  light  and  discovery  in  reli- 
gion, and  being  the  only  true  philosophy.  This  after  all  is  the 
occult  enchantment,  the  magic  wand  by  which  it    has   spelled 


262  THE    POWER    OF    CONTRARY    CHOICE. 

throngs  of  votaries.  And  it  is  precisely  this  which  needs  to  be  dis- 
sipated, before  a  respectful  hearing  can  be  gained  in  behalf  of  the 
true  system,  however  masterly  and  irrefragable  the  style  in  which 
it  may  be  defended.  That  it  has  reared  up  a  generation  of  preach- 
ers who  pride  themselves  on  their  philosophic  insight,  and  exten- 
sively given  birth  to  a  style  of  preaching,  in  which  the  dry  bones 
of  lifeless  metaphysical  subtleties  have  had  an  undue  proportion  to 
the  milk  and  meat  of  God's  word,  which  feeds  his  church,  is  un- 
deniable. But  in  view  of  the  foregoing  considerations,  it  is  for  our 
readers  to  decide,  whether  the  holders  of  this  scheme  do  indeed 
exhibit  that  extraordinary  philosophical  acumen,  that  rare  genius 
for  solving  metaphysical  problems,  that  unexampled  insight  into 
the  true  structure  of  the  mind,  which  they  would  fain  pretend. 
We  submit  whether  any  theory  ever  advanced  by  the  wildest  scio- 
list, or  most  transcendent  transcendentalist,  surpasses  this  for  crude 
absurdities,  and  glaring  self-contradiction ;  and  when  we  hear  the 
flourish  of  trumpets  about  new  light  and  unparalleled  discovery, 
we  submit  to  any  one  tolerably  versed  in  the  past  controver- 
sies of  the  church,  whether  there  be  anything  in  this  doctrine,  or  its 
attendant  sisterhood  of  errors,  which  has  not,  from  the  time  of  Pe- 
lagius  till  now,  alternately  infested  the  church,  and  been  exorcised 
from  it,  as  God  has  seen  fit  to  try  his  people,  or  to  deliver  them 
with  an  outstretched  arm.  And  we  submit  also  to  men's  sober 
judgments,  without  comment,  the  fulsome  pretensions  which  have 
been  so  largely  made  to  intellectual  greatness  and  superiority,  in 
the  case  of  those  competent  to  invent  or  defend  such  a  scheme  as 
this ;  as  also  the  free  imputations  of  dulness  or  insanity,  or  some 
other  malformation,  in  the  case  of  those  minds  which  cannot  per- 
ceive its  beauties,  or  lend  it  their  sanction.  Indeed,  any  scheme 
which  prides  and  vaunts  itself  much  on  its  great  display  of  meta- 
physical tact,  and  philosophic  wonders,  does  so  far  forth  evince  its 
inconsistence  with  the  glorious  Gospel  of  the  blessed  God.  For  this 
is  no  philosopheme  of  men,  but  a  testimony  of  God,  which  brings 
to  naught  the  wisdom  of  the  wise  and  the  understanding  of  the  pru- 
dent. It  teaches  us  that  "  vain  philosophy"  "  spoils"  men.  True 
philosophy  takes  the  yoke  and  learns  of  Christ,  as  a  disciple  of  his 
master.  Spurious  philosophy  is  an  usurper  in  the  city  of  the  great 
King,  commanding  what  Christ  may  and  may  not  teach,  and  thus 
lords  it  over  our  faith. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  in  the  several  heads  of  this  disquisition 
we  have  barely  struck  and  opened  veins  of  thought,  without  ex- 
hausting them,  each  of  which  would  yield  a  rich  reward  to  the 
most  patient  and  thoroughgoing  inquiry.  We  have  a  deep  and 
deliberate  conviction,  a  conviction  strengthened  by  every  day's  ex- 
perience, that  this  point  is  the  hinge  on  which  the  chief  theological 
differences  that  agitate  our  Zion  turn ;  and  that  there  will  be  no 
relief,  no  sufficient  check  to  those  errors  which  have  harassed  the 
church,  until  the  truth  on  this  subject  is  clearly  settled. 

It  seems  too  plain,  indeed,  to  be  questioned,  that  if  it  be  essential 


THE    POWER    OP    CONTRARY    CHOICE.  263 

to  moral  agency,  that  it  be  a  property  of  the  will  to  choose  either 
way  in  spite  of  all  opposing  power  ;  that  it  be  endowed  with  such 
independence,  that  no  "  evidence  or  proof"  can  exist  that  it  will 
act  in  a  given  way,  not  even  in  anything  which  Omnipotence  can 
do  to  direct  it ;  then  there  can  be  no  proof  or  evidence  that  any- 
thing which  God  does  or  forbears  to  do  through  all  eternity,  is  the 
reason  or  cause,  positive  or  privative,  why  moral  agents  act  as  they 
do  act.  Of  course  the  doctrine  of  decrees  is  subverted.  There 
can  be  no  evidence  of  God's  providential  government,  as  concerns 
the  actions  of  free  agents  or  things  depending  upon  them.  There 
can  be  no  evidence  that  any  work  of  his  Spirit  upon  the  souls  of 
men  is  the  reason  or  cause  of  their  turning  to  God.  Indeed,  no 
work  of  any  sort  can  be  the  cause  of  such  a  change  in  them  who 
have  power  to  sin  despite  all  opposing  power,  for  it  cannot  pro- 
duce the  change  until  they  permit  it  by  the  very  terms  of  the 
statement.  Thus  an  end  is  made  of  efficacious  grace.  With  this 
doctrine,  as  all  know,  Divine  sovereignty  and  the  orthodox  view 
of  election  stand  or  fall.  If  it  is  indispensable  to  moral  agency 
that  the  infallible  prevention  of  moral  agents  from  sinning  "  may 
involve  a  contradiction  f  that  they  should  not  be  in  a  state  which 
would  be  incompatible  with  their  ever  sliding  into  apostasy; 
"  what  evidence  or  proof  can  exist"  that  the  saints  will  persevere 
unto  salvation,  or  that  the  glorified  saints  and  angels,  and  even  God 
himself,  may  not  lapse  from  heavenly  purity  ?  "  For,"  as  these 
writers  say,  "  how  can  it  be  proved  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when, 
for  aught  that  appears,  it  may  be  ?"  A  fearful  prospect  this  for  all 
holy  intelligences  !  And  if  nothing  beside  the  actings  of  this  power 
possesses  moral  quality,  or  can  be  sinful  or  holy,  then  surely  there 
can  be  no  native  or  hereditary  sinfulness  in  men,  if  indeed  there 
can  be  any  of  any  sort- 
Is  it  not  then  clear  beyond  dispute,  that  those  cardinal  points  of 
the  evangelical  systems,  which  have  been  so  much  in  controversy 
of  late,  are  thus  shaken  by  this  notion  of  contrary  choice  which 
saps  and  mines  the  foundation  on  which  they  rest  ?  To  us  this  is 
past  all  doubt.  Having  often  had  occasion  to  reason  with  the  ad- 
vocates of  this  new  scheme,  we  have  found  them  uniformly  taking 
refuge  in  this  notion  as  their  impregnable  citadel.  They  have 
uniformly  confessed  that  the  whole  controversy  hinges  upon 
it.  Is  it  not  then  of  vital  importance  to  labour  to  establish  the 
true  philosophy  on  this  point ;  and  not  merely  prune  away  the 
branches  of  this  poison-tree,  but  lay  the  axe  at  its  root  ? 

While  we  build  not  our  faith  on  the  wisdom  of  men,  but  on  the 
sure  testimonies  of  God,  is  it  not  lawful,  nay,  obligatory,  to  ward 
off  the  boastful  assaults  of  a  pretended  philosophy,  by  showing 
that  it  is  "  philosophy  falsely  so  called,"  evincing  its  folly,  and 
humbling  its  pride  ?  Has  not  this  been  the  method  of  the  most 
successful  defenders  of  the  faith  ?  On  this  subject  let  the  illustrious 
Edwards,  though  dead,  yet  speak,  whose  own  immortal  treatise  on 
this  very  subject  is  a  most  noble  example  and  confirmation  of  what 


364  THE  POWER  OF  CONTRARY  CHOICE. 

he  says.*  "  There  is  therefore  no  need  that  the  strict  philosophic 
truth  should  be  at  all  concealed ;  nor  is  there  any  danger  in  con- 
templation and  profound  discovery  in  these  things.  Indeed  these 
things  never  can  be  well  established,  and  the  opposite  errors,  so 
subversive  of  the  whole  Gospel,  which  at  this  day  so  greatly  and 
generally  prevail,  be  well  confuted,  or  the  arguments  by  which 
they  are  maintained  answered,  till  these  points  are  settled.  While 
this  is  not  done,  it  is  to  me  beyond  doubt  that  the  friends  of  those 
great  Gospel  truths  will  but  poorly  maintain  their  controversy  with 
the  adversaries  of  those  truths  ;  they  will  be  obliged  often  to  shuffle, 
hide,  and  turn  their  backs,  and  the  latter  will  have  a  strong  fort 
whence  they  can  never  be  driven,  and  weapons  to  use,  from  which' 
those  who  oppose  them  will  find  no  shield  to  screen  themselves ; 
and  they  will  always  puzzle,  confound,  and  keep  under  the  friends 
of  sound  doctrine,  and  glory  and  vaunt  themselves  in  their  advan- 
tage over  them  ;  and  carry  their  affairs  with  a  high  hand,  as  they 
have  done  already  for  a  long  time  past." 

Was  this  written  near  a  century  ago  by  so  accurate  a  drafts- 
man as  Jonathan  Edwards  ?  If  it  truly  delineates  what  then  was, 
could  it  better  describe  what  now  is  ?  Who  more  valiant  for  the 
truth,  or  mighty  in  counsel  and  act  for  its  defence,  than  he  ?  Shall 
we  not  heed  his  counsels  as  well  as  revere  his  name  ?  There  is 
no  new  thing  under  the  sun.  If  his  history  was  prophecy  as  to 
the  danger,  shall  not  his  counsel  be  so  as  to  the  remedy  ? 

Let  his  testimony  admonish  us  all  to  burnish  and  gird  on  our 
armour  for  a  victorious  conflict  with  false  doctrine,  not  only  in  its 
outworks  but  also  in  this  its  strong  citadel.  While  there  may  be  a 
presumptuous  and  perilous  delving  into  the  labyrinths  of 

"Fixed  fate, freewill,  fore-knowledge  absolute, 
To  find  no  end  in  wandering  mazes  lost," 

there  is  also  a  safe  and  prudent  study  of  them  which  is  necessary 
and  profitable. 

Particularly  ought  we  to  master  and  confound  all  reasonings 
and  doctrines  which  go,  or  tend,  to  a  denial  of  the  possibility  of 
"  that  which  is  the  true  system  of  administration  in  the  city  of 
God;"  that  it  is  possible,  at  least,  that  the  Maker  of  all  things 
should  have  his  creatures  at  his  own  disposal ;  that  he  may  work 
in  them,  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  own  good  pleasure  ;  that  he  doeth 
his  pleasure  in  the  armies  of  heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants  of 
earth  ;  that  it  is  not  of  him  that  willeth,  nor  of  him  that  runneth, 
but  of  God  that  showeth  mercy.  For  of  him,  and  through  him, 
and  to  him  are  all  things,  to  whom  be  glory  for  ever ! 

*  Works,  vol.  ii.,  p.  3Q0.    New  York  Edition. 


ESSAY   XII. 

THE  INABILITY  OF  SINNERS.' 


There  has  occurred  within  our  recollection,  a  considerable  dif- 
ference in  the  manner  of  treating  this  subject,  especially  in  addresses 
to  the  impenitent  from  the  pulpit.  It  was  customary  formerly,  for 
Calvinistic  preachers  to  insist  much  on  the  helpless  inability  of  the 
sinner.  He  was  represented,  according  to  the  language  of  the 
scriptures,  to  be  "  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins,"  and  utterly  unable  to 
put  forth  one  act  of  spiritual  life ;  and  too  often  this  true  represen- 
tation was  so  given,  as  to  leave  the  impression  that  the  person  la- 
bouring under  this  total  inability  was  not  culpable  for  the  omission 
of  acts  which  he  had  no  power  to  perform.  The  fact  of  man's  be- 
ing a  free  accountable  agent  was  not  brought  into  view  with  suffi- 
cient prominence ;  and  the  consequence  was,  that  in  many  cases 
the  impenitent  sinner  felt  as  if  he  were  excusable ;  and  the  conclu- 
sion was  too  commonly  adopted,  that  there  was  no  encouragement 
to  make  any  effort  until  it  should  please  a  sovereign  God  to  work. 
And  if  at  any  time  the  zealous  preacher  urged  upon  his  hearers  in 
private  the  duty  of  repentance,  he  was  sure  to  hear  the  echo  of  his 
own  doctrines  ;  we  are  incapable  of  doing  anything  until  God  shall 
be  pleased  to  work  in  us  "  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure  ;" 
it  is  useless  for  us  to  attempt  anything.  We  do  not  say  that  the 
inability  of  man  was  so  represented  by  all  as  to  produce  these  im- 
pressions, for  we  know  that  by  some,  not  only  man's  dependence, 
but  also  his  duty,  was  distinctly  and  forcibly  inculcated. 

Some  excellent  men,  who  saw  the  danger  of  so  insisting  on  the 
inability  of  man  as  to  furnish  an  apology  for  the  careless  sinner, 
borrowed  a  little  aid  from  the  Arminian  scheme,  and  taught  that  if 
the  sinner  would  do  what  was  in  his  power,  and  continue  faithfully 
to  use  the  outward  means  of  grace,  the  Spirit  of  God  would  assist 
his  endeavours :  and  thus  a  connection  was  formed  between  the 
strivings  of  the  unregenerate  and  the  grace  of  God.  But  this  was 
not  consistent  with  the  other  opinions  of  these  men,  and  involved 

*  Published  in  1331,  in  review  of  the  following  work : — "  An  Inquiry  into  that  in- 
ability under  which  the  sinner  labours,  and  whether  it  furnishes  any  excuse  for  his 
neglect  of  duty." 


266  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

them  in  many  practical  difficulties,  and  contradicted  many  clear 
passages  of  scripture,  which  teach  that  "  without  faith  it  is  impos- 
sible to  please  God :"  and  it  seemed  to  be  obviously  absurd,  that 
the  promise  of  grace  should  be  made  to  acts  and  exercises  which, 
it  could  not  be  denied,  were  in  their  nature  sinful.  Some,  indeed, 
spoke  of  a  kind  of  sincerity  which  they  supposed  an  unregenerate 
sinner  might  possess  ;  but  it  was  found  difficult  to  tell  what  it  was  ; 
and  another  difficulty  was  to  quiet  the  minds  of  those  convinced 
sinners  who  had  been  long  using  the  means  of  grace.  Such  per- 
sons would  allege  that  they  had  prayed,  and  read,  and  heard  the 
word  for  a  long  time,  and  yet  received  no  communications  of 
grace.  To  such,  nothing  could  on  this  plan  be  said,  but  to  exhort 
them  to  wait  God's  time,  and  to  entertain  the  confident  hope  that 
no  soul  ever  perished,  that  continued  to  the  last  seeking  for  mercy. 
The  inconvenience  and  evil  of  these  representations  being  per- 
ceived, many  adopted  with  readiness  a  distinction  of  human  ability 
into  natural  and  moral.  By  the  first  they  understood  merely  the 
possession  of  physical  powers  and  opportunities ;  by  the  latter,  a 
mind  rightly  disposed.  In  accordance  with  this  distinction,  it  was 
taught  that  every  man  possessed  a  natural  ability  to  do  all  that  God 
required  of  him  ;  but  that  every  sinner  laboured  under  a  moral  ina- 
bility to  obey  God,  which,  however,  could  not  be  pleaded  in  excuse 
for  his  disobedience,  as  it  consisted  in  corrupt  dispositions  of  the 
heart,  for  which  every  man  was  responsible.  Now  this  view  of 
the  subject  is  substantially  correct,  and  the  distinction  has  always 
been  made  by  every  person,  in  his  judgments  of  his  own  conduct 
and  that  of  others.  It  is  recognized  in  all  courts  of  justice,  and  in 
all  family  government,  and  is  by  no  means  a  modern  discovery. 
And  yet  it  is  remarkable  that  it  is  a  distinction  so  seldom  referred 
to,  or  brought  distinctly  into  view,  by  old  Calvinistic  authors.  The 
first  writer  among  English  theologians  that  we  have  observed 
using  this  distinction  explicitly,  is  the  celebrated  Dr.  Twisse,  the 
prolocutor  of  the  Westminster  Assembly  of  Divines,  and  the  able 
opposer  of  Arminianism,  and  advocate  of  the  Supralapsarian  doc- 
trine of  divine  decrees.  It  was  also  resorted  to  by  the  celebrated 
Mr.  Howe,  and  long  afterwards  used  freely  by  Dr.  Isaac  Watts, 
the  popularity  of  whose  evangelical  writings  probably  had  much 
influence  in  giving  it  currency.  It  is  also  found  in  the  theological 
writings  of  Dr.  Witherspoon,  and  many  others,  whose  orthodoxy 
was  never  disputed.  But  in  this  country  no  man  has  had  so  great 
an  influence  in  fixing  the  language  of  theology,  as  Jonathan  Ed- 
wards, president  of  New  Jersey  College.  In  his  work  on  "  The 
Freedom  of  the  Will,"  this  distinction  holds  a  prominent  place,  and 
is  very  important  to  the  argument  which  this  profound  writer  has 
so  ably  discussed  in  that  treatise.  The  general  use  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  natural  and  moral  ability  may,  therefore,  be  ascribed 
to  the  writings  of  President  Edwards,  both  in  Europe  and  America. 
No  distinguished  writer  on  theology  has  made  more  use  of  it  than 
Dr.  Andrew  Fuller ;  and  it  is  well  known  that  he  imbibed  nearly 


THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS.  267 

all  his  views  of  theology  from  an  acquaintance  with  the  writings  of 
President  Edwards.  And  it  may  be  said  truly,  that  Jonathan  Ed- 
wards has  done  more  to  give  complexion  to  the  theological  system 
of  Calvinists  in  America,  than  all  other  persons  together.  This  is 
more  especially  true  of  New  England ;  but  it  is  also  true  to  a  great 
extent  in  regard  to  a  large  number  of  the  present  ministers  of  the 
Presbyterian  church.  Those,  indeed,  who  were  accustomed  either  to 
the  Scotch  or  Dutch  writers,  did  not  adopt  this  distinction,  but  were 
jealous  of  it  as  an  innovation,  and  as  tending  to  diminish,  in  their 
view,  the  miserable  and  sinful  state  of  man,  and  as  derogatory  to 
the  grace  of  God.  But  we  have  remarked,  that  in  almost  all  cases 
where  the  distinction  has  been  opposed  as  false,  or  as  tending  to 
the  introduction  of  false  doctrine,  it  has  been  misrepresented.  The 
true  ground  of  the  distinction  has  not  been  clearly  apprehended ; 
and  those  who  deny  it  have  been  found  making  it  themselves  in 
other  words;  for  that  an  inability  depending  on  physical  defect, 
should  be  distinguished  from  that  which  arises  from  a  wicked  dis- 
position, or  perverseness  of  will,  is  a  thing  which  no  one  can  deny 
who  attends  to  the  clear  dictates  of  his  own  mind ;  for  it  is  a  self- 
evident  truth,  which  even  children  recognize  in  all  their  apologies 
for  their  conduct.  We  do  not  assert,  however,  that  the  dispute 
between  the  advocates  and  opposers  of  this  distinction  has  been  a 
mere  logomachy.  There  is  one  important  point  of  difference. 
They  who  reject  the  distinction,  maintain  that  if  we  have  lost  any 
physical  ability  to  perform  our  duty  by  our  own  fault,  the  obliga- 
tion to  obedience  remains,  although  the  ability  to  execute  it  is  ut- 
terly lost ;  while  the  advocates  of  the  distinction  between  natural 
and  moral  ability  hold  that  obligation  and  ability  must  be  of  equal 
extent;  and  although  they  admit  that  we  are  accountable  for  the 
loss  of  any  faculty  which  takes  place  through  our  fault,  yet  the 
guilt  must  be  referred  entirely  to  the  original  act,  and  no  new  sin 
can  be  committed  for  not  exercising  a  faculty  which  does  not  ex- 
ist, or  which  is  physically  incapable  of  the  actions  in  question.  To 
illustrate  this  point,  let  us  suppose  the  case  of  a  servant  cutting  off 
his  hands  to  avoid  the  work  required  of  him.  The  question  then 
is,  is  this  servant  guilty  of  a  crime  for  not  employing  those  mem- 
bers which  he  does  not  possess  ?  It  is  admitted  that  he  is  charge- 
able with  the  consequences  of  his  wicked  act,  but  this  only  goes  to 
show  the  greater  guilt  of  that  deed.  It  is  also  true,  that  if  the 
same  perverse  disposition  which  led  to  this  act  is  still  cherished, 
he  is  virtually  guilty  of  the  neglect  of  that  obedience  which  was 
due.  Sin  consists  essentially  in  the  motives,  dispositions,  and  voli- 
tions of  the  heart,  and  the  external  act  only  possesses  a  moral  na- 
ture by  its  connection  with  these  internal  affections.  But  it  cannot 
be  truly  said  that  a  man  can  be  guilty  of  a  crime  in  not  using  hands 
which  he  does  not  possess.  Let  us  suppose  this  servant  to  have 
become  truly  penitent,  and  to  have  nothing  in  his  mind  but  a  strong 
desire  to  do  his  duty ;  can  any  impartial  man  believe  that  he  com- 
mits a  sin  in  not  doing  the  work  which  he  has  no  hands  to  execute  1 


268  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

We  think  not.  The  case  will  appear  more  evident,  if  the  faculty 
lost  should  be  one  which  is  essential  to  moral  agency ;  as  if  a  man 
should  by  his  own  fault  deprive  himself  of  reason.  It  is  manifest 
that  a  man  totally  destitute  of  reason  is  incapable  of  any  moral 
acts ;  and  this  is  equally  true,  however  this  defect  may  have  been 
contracted.  If  a  man  performs  an  act  by  which  he  knows  reason 
will  be  extinguished  or  perverted,  he  is  guilty  in  that  act  of  a  crime 
which  takes  its  measure,  in  part,  from  the  consequences  likely  to 
ensue.  Thus  in  the  case  of  the  drunkard ;  he  who  destroys  his 
reason  by  ebriety,  may  be  considered  as  guilty  of  an  act,  the  guilt 
of  which  has  respect  to  all  the  probable  consequences.  In  human 
courts  we  are  aware  that  intoxication  cannot  be  pleaded  as  a  justi- 
fication of  crime ;  but  on  this  subject  it  may  be  observed,  that 
drunkards  are  not  commonly  so  destitute  of  a  knowledge  of  right 
and  wrong  as  to  be  deprived  of  their  moral  agency.  And  again, 
it  would  be  of  dangerous  consequence  to  admit  the  principle,  that 
a  man  might  plead  one  crime  in  justification  of  another ;  and  it 
would  be  exceedingly  liable  to  abuse,  as  a  man  might  become  intox- 
icated for  the  very  purpose  of  committing  a  great  crime,  or  he 
might  affect  a  greater  degree  of  intoxication  than  was  real ;  so  that 
it  is  a  sound  political  maxim,  that  a  man  shall  be  held  responsible 
for  all  acts  committed  in  a  state  of  ebriety.  But  in  foro  conscien- 
tiae,  we  cannot  but  view  the  matter  in  a  different  light.  If  by  an 
intoxicating  liquor  reason  is  completely  subverted,  and  the  man  is 
no  longer  himself,  we  cannot  judge  that  he  is  as  accountable  for 
what  he  does,  as  when  in  his  sober  senses.  You  may  accumulate 
as  much  guilt  as  you  will  on  the  act  of  extinguishing  or  perverting 
his  reason ;  but  you  cannot  think  that  what  he  madly  perpetrates 
under  the  influence  of  strong  drink,  is  equally  criminal  as  if  com- 
mitted while  reason  was  in  exercise.  This  we  take  to  be  the  de- 
liberate judgment  of  all  impartial  men. 

The  most  difficult  question  relative  to  this  matter  is,  whether 
ignorance  and  error  do  wholly,  or  in  any  degree  exculpate  from  the 
guilt  of  actions  committed  under  their  influence.  On  this  subject, 
it  has  been  customary  to  distinguish  ignorance  (and  all  error  is  only 
a  species  of  ignorance)  into  voluntary  and  involuntary.  The  for- 
mer, however  great,  does  not  excuse  ;  the  latter,  if  invincible,  does  ; 
or  mitigates  criminality  in  proportion  as  it  approximates  to  insuper- 
able ignorance.  But  when  we  speak  of  voluntary  ignorance,  we 
do  not  mean  that  there  is  a  deliberate  volition  to  remain  in  igno- 
rance, or  that  it  could  be  removed  by  an  act  of  the  will ;  but  we 
mean  that  ignorance  or  misconception  which  is  a  part  of  our  de- 
pravity, or  a  consequence  of  it.  A  mind  depraved  by  sin  is  inca- 
pable of  perceiving  the  beauty  and  sweetness  of  spiritual  objects, 
and  is  therefore  totally  incapable  of  loving  such  objects.  This  ig- 
norance constitutes  an  essential  part  of  human  depravity,  and  can 
never  be  an  apology  for  it,  nor  in  the  least  exculpate  from  the  guilt 
of  sins  committed  under  its  influence.  It  is,  in  fact,  that  very  blind- 
ness of  mind  and  unbelief  of  heart  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of 


THE    INABILITY    OF   SINNERS.  269 

all  departures  from  God.  To  which  we  may  add,  that  the  actual 
exercise  of  corrupt  affections  obscures  the  intellect  and  perverts  the 
judgment,  as  has  been  remarked  by  all  moralists,  and  the  same  is 
observable  in  all  the  common  transactions  of  life.  Ignorance  or  er- 
ror, induced  by  criminal  self-love  or  by  malignant  passions,  forms  no 
excuse  for  the  evil  which  flows  from  this  source ;  but  this  very  igno- 
rance and  error  form  a  part  of  that  sinful  character  which  belongs  to 
the  moral  agent.  We  are  aware  that  there  has  been  current  with 
many  in  our  day,  a  theory  which  separates  entirely  between  the  in- 
tellect and  will,  and  maintains  that  the  former  in  its  operations  is  in- 
capable of  virtue  or  vice  ;  and  to  corroborate  this  opinion,  a  distinc- 
tion has  been  made  of  the  powers  of  the  soul  itself,  into  natural  and 
moral.  By  this  division,  the  understanding  or  intellect  belongs  to  the 
former  class,  the  will  and  affections  to  the  latter.  According  to  this 
hypothesis,  all  sin  consists  in  voluntary  acts  or  in  the  exercise  of 
the  will,  and  the  understanding  is  incapable  of  moral  obliquity,  be- 
cause it  is  not  a  moral  faculty.  They  who  have  adopted  this  theo- 
ry (and  they  are  many)  entertain  the  opinion,  that  depravity  con- 
sists very  much  in  the  opposition  of  the  heart  to  the  dictates  of  the 
understanding.  In  regeneration,  according  to  them,  there  is  no 
illumination  of  the  understanding  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  This,  ac- 
cording to  the  theory  under  consideration,  is  altogether  unnecessa- 
ry. This  work,  therefore,  consists  in  nothing  else  than  giving  a 
new  heart,  or  a  new  set  of  feelings.  If  the  person  has  received 
correct  doctrinal  instruction,  no  other  illumination  is  needed  ;  and 
the  whole  difference  in  the  conceptions  of  truth,  between  the  re- 
generate and  unregenerate,  is  owing  to  nothing  else  than  a  change 
in  the  feelings  ;  for  as  far  as  mere  intellect  is  concerned,  the  views 
of  the  understanding  are  the  same  before  regeneration  as  after- 
wards ;  except  that  a  renewed  heart  disposing  the  person  to  the 
impartial  love  of  truth,  he  will  be  more  careful  to  collect  and  weigh 
its  evidences,  and  will  thus  be  preserved  from  errors  into  which 
the  unregenerate,  through  the  corrupt  bias  produced  by  the  affec- 
tions, are  prone  to  fall. 

Now  against  this  whole  method  of  philosophizing  we  enter  our 
dissent.  This  total  dissociation  of  the  understanding  and  heart, 
and  this  entire  repugnance  between  them,  are  contrary  to  all  experi- 
ence. There  can  be  no  exercise  of  heart  which  does  not  necessa- 
rily involve  the  conception  of  the  intellect ;  for  that  which  is  cho- 
sen must  be  apprehended,  and  that  which  is  loved  and  admired 
must  be  perceived.  And  although  it  is  true  that  the  knowledge  of 
the  unregenerate  man  is  inefficacious,  so  that  while  he  knows  the 
truth  he  loves  it  not ;  yet  we  venture  to  maintain,  that  the  reason 
why  his  knowledge  produces  no  effect,  is  simply  because  it  is  inade- 
quate. It  does  not  present  truth  in  its  true  colours  to  the  heart. 
It  is  called  speculative  knowledge,  and  may  be  correct  as  far  as  it 
goes  ;  but  it  does  not  penetrate  the  excellence  and  the  beauty  of  any 
one  spiritual  object ;  and  it  may  be  averred,  that  the  affections  of 
the  heart  do  always  correspond  with  the  real  views  of  the  under- 


270  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

standing.  The  contrary  supposition,  instead  of  proving  that  man  is 
morally  depraved,  would  show  that  his  rationality  was  destroyed. 
If  it  be  alleged  that  this  apprehension  of  the  beauty,  sweetness,  and 
glory  of  spiritual  things,  which  is  peculiar  to  the  regenerate,  arises 
merely  from  the  altered  state  of  the  heart,  I  have  no  objection  to 
the  statement,  if  by  heart  be  meant  the  moral  nature  of  the  renew- 
ed mind ;  but  it  is  reversing  the  order  of  nature  and  rational  exercise, 
to  suppose  that  we  first  have  an  affection  of  love  to  an  object,  and 
then  see  it  to  be  lovely.  We  may  ask,  what  excited  ihis  affection 
of  love  ?  If  anything  is  known  of  the  order  of  exercises  in  the  ra- 
tional mind,  the  perception  of  the  qualities  on  which  an  affection 
terminates,  is,  in  the  order  of  nature,  prior  to  the  affection.  The 
soul,  in  an  unregenerate  state,  is  equally  incapable  of  seeing  and 
feeling  aright  in  relation  to  spiritual  objects.  And  indeed,  we 
hardly  know  how  to  distinguish  between  the  clear  perception  of 
the  beauty  of  an  object,  and  the  love  of  that  object;  the  one  might 
serve  as  a  just  description  of  the  other.  Not  but  that  the  intellect 
and  heart  may  be  distinguished  ;  but  when  beauty,  sweetness,  ex- 
cellence, and.  glory,  or  good  in  any  of  its  forms,  is  the  object  of  the 
understanding,  this  distinction  in  experience  vanishes.  And  accord- 
ingly the  schoolmen  distinguished  between  the  understanding  and. 
will,  not  by  referring  nothing  to  the  latter  but  blind,  feeling ;  but 
by  dividing  all  objects  which  could  be  presented  to  the  mind,  into 
such  as  were  received  as  true  merely,  and  such  as  were  not  merely 
apprehended  as  true,  but  as  good.  These  last  they  considered  as 
having  relation  to  the  will,  under  which  all  appetitive  affections 
were  included. 

The  Scriptures  have  been  repeatedly  appealed  to,  as  placing  all 
moral  acts  in  the  will ;  but  they  furnish  no  aid  to  those  who  make 
this  wide  distinction  between  understanding  and  will.  They  do 
often  use  the  word  heart  for  moral  exercise,  but  not  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  intellect.  Indeed,  this  word  in  the  Old  Testament, 
where  it  most  frequently  occurs,  is  used  for  the  whole  soul ;  or  for 
any  strong  exercise  of  the  intellect,  as  well  as  the  feelings.  We 
are  required  to  love  with  the  understanding ;  and  "  a  wise  and  un- 
derstanding heart,"  is  a  mode  of  expression  which  shows  how  little 
the  inspired  penmen  were  influenced  by  a  belief  of  this  modern 
theory.  And,  in  the  New  Testament,  to  "  believe  with  the  heart," 
includes  the  intellect  as  much  as  what  is  called  the  will.  It  means 
to  believe  really  and  sincerely ;  so  to  believe,  as  to  be  affected  by 
what  we  believe,  according  to  its  nature.  But  is  not  all  moral  ex- 
ercise voluntary,  or  an  exercise  of  the  will  ?  Yes,  undoubtedly ; 
and  so  is  all  mora!  exercise  rational,  or  such  as  involves  the  ex- 
ercise of  intellect.  If  the  will  were  a  moral  power,  as  many 
suppose,  then  every  volition  would,  be  of  a  moral  nature — the 
instinctive  preference  of  life  to  death  would  be  moral ;  the  choice 
of  happiness  in  preference  to  misery,  which  no  sentient  being  can 
avoid,  would  be  moral.  At  this  rate,  it  would  follow,  that  mere 
animals  are  moral  beings,  because  it  is  certain  they  possess  will. 


TOE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS.  271 

But  the  simple  truth  is,  that  the  understanding  and  will  stand  in 
the  same  relation  to  the  morality  of  actions ;  and  the  latter  no 
more  deserves  to  be  called  the  moral  part  of  our  constitution  than 
the  former.  The  only  faculty  belonging  to  our  constitution,  which 
can  properly  be  denominated  moral,  is  conscience  ;  not  because  its 
exercise  furnishes  the  only  instance  of  moral  acts,  for  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  monitions  of  this  faculty  partake  of  a  moral 
nature ;  but  because  by  this  we  are  enabled  to  perceive  the  moral 
qualities  of  actions. 

Our  object  in  this  discussion  is,  to  establish  the  point,  that  igno- 
rance is  a  part  of  the  depravity  which  sin  has  introduced  into  our 
minds ;  and  we  maintain,  in  strict  accordance  with  the  Scriptures, 
that  no  unregenerate  man  has  any  adequate  or  true  knowledge  of 
God  ;  nor,  indeed,  is  he  capable  of  such  knowledge.  It  is  a  com- 
prehensive description  of  the  wicked,  that  "  they  know  not  God." 
"  Know  not  the  way  of  peace."  To  know  the  true  God  and  Jesus 
Christ  is  eternal  life.  "  The  natural  man  receiveth  not  the  things 
of  the  spirit  of  God,  they  are  foolishness  unto  him,  neither  can  he 
know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  discerned."  The  rege- 
nerate have  the  eyes  of  their  understanding  enlightened,  and  have 
been  translated  from  darkness  to  the  marvellous  light  of  the  Gos- 
pel. As  to  invincible  ignorance,  it  is  manifest  that  it  must  stand 
on  the  same  footing  with  the  want  of  the  requisite  physical  powers. 
It  is  equally  impossible  for  a  man  to  see,  whether  he  be  deficient 
in  the  organs  of  vision  or  in  light.  If  God  has  revealed  his  will  on 
certain  points,  and  in  consequence  has  demanded  our  faith  and 
obedience,  the  obligation  to  perform  these  duties  will  be  co-exten- 
sive with  the  communication  of  this  revelation,  and  no  further. 
The  heathen,  therefore,  will  not  be  condemned  for  not  believing  in 
the  Messiah,  "  for  how  could  they  believe  in  him  of  whom  they 
have  not  heard  ?"  This,  however,  will  not  be  any  excuse  for  not 
seeking  after  more  light  by  every  means  in  their  power.  If  per- 
sons, who  are  surrounded  by  the  means  of  instruction,  obstinately 
neglect  to  avail  themselves  of  the  opportunity  of  knowing  the  will 
of  God,  they  do  render  themselves  exceedingly  guilty  by  such  per- 
verseness,  and  make  themselves  responsible  for  all  the  omission  of 
duty  which  arises  from  this  state  of  obstinate  ignorance. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  inquiry  respecting  natural  and  moral 
inability.  We  asserted  that  all  men,  and  even  children,  were  in 
the  constant  habit  of  making  a  distinction  between  an  impediment 
to  the  doing  of  a  thing,  which  arose  from  want  of  physical  power, 
and  that  which  depended  solely  on  the  disposition  or  will.  But  it 
may  be  useful  to  inquire,  whether  any  advantage  has  been  derived 
from  the  use  of  these  terms ;  or,  whether  they  have  not  rather 
served  to  perplex  and  mislead  the  people,  for  whose  benefit  they 
were  devised.  That  this  latter  is  probably  a  correct  statement  of 
the  truth,  may  with  some  probability  be  presumed  from  the  fact, 
that  these  terms  are  evidently  falling  into  disuse  with  many  who 
were  once  tenacious  of  them.     But  to  render  this  more  evident,  we 


272  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

would  remark,  that  there  is  an  obvious  inaccuracy  in  speaking  of 
two  kinds  of  ability,  both  of  which  are  requisite  to  accomplish  the 
same  object.  If  both  are  necessary  to  the  end,  then  evidently 
either  by  itself  is  not  an  ability.  If  the  strength  of  a  man,  together 
with  a  machine  of  a  certain  power,  be  necessary  to  lift  a  weight, 
it  is  evidently  incorrect  to  say,  that  the  hand  of  the  man  is  able  to 
elevate  this  heavy  body;  his  strength  is  only  an  ability  when 
combined  with  the  machine,  which  is  needed  to  give  it  force ;  so,  if 
the  mere  possession  of  natural  powers  to  do  the  commandments  of 
God  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  reach  the  end,  it  is  not  properly 
called  an  ability ;  it  is  only  such  when  combined  with  what  is 
called  moral  ability. 

Again,  the  word  natural  is  here  used  in  an  uncommon  and  tech- 
nical sense  ;  and  the  term  being  already  in  common  use,  in  relation 
to  the  same  subject,  in  a  sense  entirely  different,  it  is  calculated  to 
perplex  and  mislead.  When  we  say,  man  possesses  a  natural 
ability,  we  mean  by  the  word  natural  that  which  is  contra-distin- 
guished from  moral ;  that  which  is  destitute  of  any  moral  quality; 
but  we  are  accustomed  to  say,  and  the  usage  is  derived  from 
Scripture,  that  man  is  naturally  depraved,  naturally  blind,  naturally 
impotent :  but  in  this  case  we  mean,  that  which  is  innate ;  that 
which  is  constitutional ;  and  when  applied  to  this  subject,  the 
meaning  is  entirely  diverse  from  the  one  stated  above ;  for  while 
there,  all  idea  of  moral  character  is  excluded,  here  it  relates  to 
moral  qualities.  Man  is  naturally  able  to  obey  the  commandments 
of  God : — man  is  naturally  a  depraved  and  impotent  being,  are 
contradictions,  if  the  word  natural  be  used  in  the  same  sense,  in 
both  cases ;  but  as  intended,  there  is  no  contradiction ;  for  the 
word,  in  the  first  instance,  has  an  entirely  different  meaning  from 
what  it  has  in  the  second.  But  surely,  such  confusion  in  the  use 
of  terms  should  be  avoided.  And  if  you  will  inquire  of  the  com- 
mon people  what  they  understand  by  natural  ability,  you  will  be 
convinced  that  it  is  a  phrase  which  perplexes  and  obscures,  rather 
than  elucidates  the  subject.  We  have  known  instances  in  which 
clergymen  of  some  learning,  and  even  doctors  of  divinity,  have 
understood  that  they  who  held  the  doctrine  of  man's  natural  ability, 
denied  that  of  total  depravity ;  whereas  the  fact  is,  that  there  are 
no  sterner  advocates  of  universal  and  total  depravity  than  those 
who  make  this  distinction. 

But  an  objection  of  a  different  but  not  less  weighty  kind,  lies 
against  the  use  of  the  phrases,  "  moral  ability "  and  "  moral  in- 
ability." By  the  former  is  meant,  that  state  of  the  heart  or  affec- 
tions which  leads  a  person  to  choose  to  perform  any  act  of  exter- 
nal obedience ;  by  the  latter,  the  contrary,  or  an  indisposition  or 
unwillingness  to  do  our  duty.  Now,  we  know  that  the  law  of 
God  extends  to  the  heart,  and  requires  rectitude  in  every  secret 
thought  and  affection ;  yea,  the  essence  of  obedience  consists  in 
this  conformity  of  the  heart  to  the  law  of  God.  But  according 
to  the  import  of  this  distinction,  these  internal  affections  are  no 


THE    INABILITY    OF   8INNER8.  273 

more  than  a  moral  ability  to  obey.  The  phrase  seems  to  contem- 
plate external  acts  only  as  acts  of  obedience,  and  the  affections  of 
the  heart  as  the  ability  to  perform  them  ;  but  this  is  evidently  in- 
correct. What  is  the  sum  of  the  obedience  which  the  law  of 
God  requires  of  man  ?  Is  it  not  supreme  and  perfect  love  ?  What 
is  moral  ability?  It  is  this  very  thing  in  which  the  essence  of 
obedience  consists.  This  moral  ability  should  relate  to  something 
prior  to  love ;  but  what  ability  is  that  which  is  prior  to  all  holy 
affection  ?  If  you  say  the  nature  or  disposition,  the  law  requires 
that  this  be  pure  also,  as  well  as  the  acts  and  exercises.  There  is, 
then,  no  such  thing  as  a  moral  ability  to  obey,  as  distinct  from 
obedience  itself.  And,  again,  what  is  moral  inability  but  sin  itself? 
It  is  the  want  of  a  right  temper  and  a  holy  will — the  defect  of 
that  love  which  the  law  requires ;  and  what  is  this  but  sin  ?  It 
certainly  can  have  no  other  effect  but  to  mislead,  to  call  the  essence 
of  disobedience  by  the  name  of  "  moral  inability."  It  can  be  no 
question  whether  sin  can  furnish  any  excuse  for  disobedience. 
Now  what  is  called  "  moral  inability,"  when  it  comes  to  be  ana- 
lyzed, is  nothing  but  the  essence  of  sin  as  it  exists  in  the  heart. 
Man  labours  under  a  moral  inability  to  obey  God,  because  he  does 
not  love  him ;  but  love  is  the  sum  and  essence  of  all  obedience ;  it 
is  the  same,  therefore,  as  to  say,  that  man  in  his  natural  state  has 
no  love  to  God.  Man  is  in  a  state  of  sin,  which,  while  it  continues, 
must  be  an  effectual  hindrance  to  the  service  of  God. 

We  have  already  remarked  that  the  distinction  of  inability  into 
natural  and  moral,  is  much  less  used  of  late,  than  it  was  some 
fifteen  or  twenty  years  ago.  It  has  not  answered  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  invented.  If  there  be  a  real  inability  which  man 
cannot  remove,  it  must  have  the  effect  of  discouraging  human 
exertions.  Let  it  be  conceded  that  it  does  not  render  man 
excusable ;  yet  it  does  render  his  unassisted  efforts  ineffectual ; 
therefore,  they  who  consider  it  all  important,  not  merely  to  fix 
upon  the  conscience  the  conviction  of  ill-desert,  but  to  rouse  the 
powers  of  the  soul  to  action,  have  adopted  a  new  method  of  treat- 
ing this  subject,  which  not  a  little  alarms  those  who  are  tenacious 
of  old  notions  and  the  ancient  forms  of  speech.  These  new 
preachers,  in  their  addresses  to  the  impenitent  sinner,  say  nothing 
about  natural  and  moral  inability.  They  preach  that  man  is  in 
possession  of  every  ability  which  is  requisite  for  the  discharge  of 
his  duty.  That  it  is  as  easy  for  him  to  repent,  to  exercise  faith, 
and  to  love  God,  as  to  speak,  or  eat,  or  walk,  or  perform  any 
other  act.  And  men  are  earnestly  and  passionately  exhorted  to 
come  up  at  once  to  the  performance  of  their  duty.  Nothing  is 
more  in  the  power  of  a  man,  they  allege,  than  his  own  will ;  and 
the  consent  of  the  will  to  the  terms  of  the  Gospel  is  all  that  is  re- 
quired to  constitute  any  man  a  Christian.  When  sinners  are 
awakened,  and  become  anxious  about  their  salvation,  it  is  deemed 
by  these  teachers  improper  to  manifest  any  sympathy  with  their 
feelings  of  pungent  conviction ;  for  the  only  reason  of  their  re- 

18 


274  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

maining  in  distress,  is  their  obstinate  continuance  in  impenitence. 
All  conversation  with  such,  therefore,  should  assume  the  character 
of  stern  rebuke,  and  continued  earnest  exhortations  to  submit  to 
God,  to  give  up  their  rebellion,  and  to  make  choice  of  the  service 
of  God.  '  And  if  any  convinced  sinner  ventures  to  express  the  opi- 
nion, that  he  labours  under  any  sort  of  inability  to  do  what  is  re- 
quired of  him,  he  is  severely  reproved,  as  wishing  to  cast  the  blame 
of  his  impenitence  on  his  Maker.  And  it  is  believed,  that  upon  the 
new  plan  of  treating  awakened  sinners,  they  are  brought  to  the  en- 
joyment of  peace  much  sooner,  than  upon  the  old  plan  of  treating 
them  rather  as  unfortunate  than  as  guilty.  Men,  upon  being  as- 
sured that  salvation  is  in  their  power,  are  induced  to  make  an  ex- 
ertion to  submit  to  God,  and  do  often  persuade  themselves  that  now 
they  have  complied  with  their  duty,  and  have  passed  from  death 
unto  life.  There  is  much  reason  to  fear,  however,  that  many  souls, 
who  have  very  slight  convictions  of  sin,  are  deluded  into  the  opi- 
nion, that  they  have  submitted,  and  are  reconciled  to  God,  though 
they  have  never  been  led  to  any  deep  views  of  the  dreadful  sin- 
fulness of  their  own  hearts.  And,  others,  who  have  deeper  con- 
victions, find  all  their  own  efforts  unavailing ;  and  while  they  con- 
fess that  the  fault  is  in  the  total  depravity  of  their  nature,  continue 
to  profess  their  inability  to  repent ;  and  whatever  power  others 
may  have  to  change  the  heart,  are  more  and  more  convinced,  that 
no  such  power  belongs  to  them.  The  obstinate  cases  cannot  but 
be  perplexing  and  troublesome  to  the  zealous  preachers  of  full 
ability ;  but  they  contrive  to  reconcile  them  with  their  doctrine,  by 
various  methods,  which  it  is  not  to  our  purpose  to  specify.  Now, 
as  a  large  portion  of  our  younger  theologians  appear  to  be  adopt- 
ing this  new  theory  of  ability,  and  consider  it  a  great  improvement 
upon  both  the  old  Calvinistic  doctrine,  and  also  upon  the  Ed- 
wardean  theory  of  natural  and  moral  ability ;  and  especially,  as  it 
claims  a  near  alliance  with  the  many  revivals  of  religion  which 
are  now  in  progress  in  the  church,  it  becomes  a  duty  of  high  obli- 
gation to  bring  these  opinions,  which  ai-e  now  so  widely  and  con- 
fidently inculcated,  to  the  test  of  reason  and  scripture ;  and  we 
trust  that  our  readers  will  indulge  us,  while  we  enter,  with  some 
degree  of  minuteness,  into  the  discussion.  And,  to  give  our  views 
clearly  and  fully  on  the  subject  of  man's  ability  and  inability,  we 
shall  endeavour  to  go  back  to  first  principles,  and  cautiously  ex- 
amine those  maxims,  which,  by  most  who  speak  on  this  subject,  are 
taken  for  granted. 

On  the  subject  of  man's  moral  agency  and  accountableness,  there 
is  no  controversy. 

It  is  also  agreed  by  most,  that  an  obligation  to  perform  an  act  of 
obedience  supposes  the  existence  of  the  faculties  or  physical  pow- 
ers requisite  for  its  performance.  An  irrational  being  cannot  be 
under  a  moral  obligation  to  perform  a  rational  act.  Man  cannot 
be  under  obligation  to  do  what  requires  powers  which  do  not  be- 
long to  his  nature  and  constitution.  For  example,  man  could  not 
justly  be  required  to  transport  himself  from  earth  to  heaven,  as  the 


THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS.  275 

angels  do,  because  this  exceeds  the  power  which  belongs  to  his 
nature.  And  it  is  admitted,  that  where  there  is  a  willingness  to 
perform  a  duty,  anything  which  renders  the  execution  of  our  de- 
sire impracticable,  removes  the  obligation.  For  no  man  can  be 
bound  to  perform  impossibilities.  The  maxim,  that  obligation  to 
obey  any  command  supposes  the  existence  of  an  ability  to  do  the  ac- 
tion required,  relates  entirely  to  actions  consequent  upon  volitions. 
If  we  appeal  to  the  common  sense,  or  universal  judgment  of  man- 
kind, on  this  point,  we  must  be  careful  to  understand  precisely  the 
common  principle  respecting  which  all  men  arc  agreed  ;  and  must 
be  careful  not  to  extend  the  maxim  to  other  things,  entirely  dis- 
tinct from  its  usual  application.  An  infant  cannot  justly  be  re- 
quired to  build  a  house  or  a.  ship.  A  person  of  weak  intellect  and 
little  invention  cannot  be  obliged  to  write  an  elegant  poem.  No 
man  can  be  under  obligation  to  remember  every  word  which  he 
ever  spoke,  and  every  thought  which  ever  passed  through  his 
mind.  A  man  who  has  lost  his  hands  or  his  feet,  cannot  after- 
wards be  under  a  moral  obligation  to  exercise  these  members. 
This  case  is  so  plain,  and  the  judgment  of  men  so  uniform  on  the 
subject,  that  we  need  not  dwell  longer  on  the  point. 

The  next  thing  to  be  inquired,  is,  whether  this  maxim  applies  to 
the  ability  of  willing  as  well  as  doing. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  possession  of  the  faculty 
of  willing,  or  of  choosing  and  refusing,  is  essential  to  a  moral  agent; 
and,  therefore,  a  being  who  has  no  such  faculty,  can  never  be  sub- 
ject to  a  moral  law.  On  this  point  there  can  be  no  difference  of 
opinion.  Neither  is  it  supposed  by  any,  that  we  have  the  power 
of  avoiding  an  exercise  of  will,  when  an  object  is  proposed ;  or 
when  a  particular  action  is  in  the  contemplation  of  the  mind ;  for, 
if  we  do  not  choose  a  proposed  object,  we  of  course  refuse  it ;  and 
if  we  do  not  determine  on  an  action  which  may  be  suggested,  we 
of  necessity  let  it  alone.  There  is  here  no  other  alternative. 
Hence,  it  is  evident,  that  the  liberty  of  man  does  not  consist  in  the 
power  to  will  or  not  to  will.  In  regard  to  this,  man  may  be  said 
to  lie  under  necessity  ;  but  it  is  obviously  no  hardship,  since  he  is 
at  liberty  to  will  as  he  pleases.  But  the  most  important  question 
is,  has  the  moral  agent  the  power  of  willing  differently  from  what 
he  does  in  any  particular  case  ?  This  is  a  very  intricate  subject, 
and  will  require  close  attention  and  an  impartial  judgment,  in  order 
to  see  clearly  where  the  truth  lies. 

The  word  will  is  taken  in  a  greater  or  less  latitude.  It  signifies, 
according  to  some,  every  desire  and  inclination  ;  every  preference 
and  choice.  According  to  others,  volitions,  or  the  acts  of  the  will, 
are  properly  such  acts  of  the  mind  as  result  in  some  change  of  the 
body  or  mind.  The  whole  active  power  of  man  consists  in  an 
ability,  when  he  chooses  to  exercise  it,  to  alter  the  train  of  thought, 
by  turning  the  mind  from  one  subject  of  contemplation  to  another; 
and  in  the  ability  to  move  the  members  of  the  body  within  certain 
limits.     Let  any  man  seriously  inquire,  whether  he  possesses  any 


276  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

other  power  or  ability  than  this.  We  know  that  there  are  many 
things  which  he  has  no  ability  to  perform.  He  cannot  alter  the 
nature  of  the  perceptions  of  sense  ;  he  cannot  excite  in  himself  af- 
fections to  any  objects  at  will.  If  a  man  wish  to  enkindle  love  in 
his  breast  to  any  person,  he  cannot  possibly  do  more  than  contem- 
plate all  the  traits  of  character  which  are  amiable  in  that  person, 
or  all  those  circumstances  which  have  a  tendency  to  create  an  in- 
terest in  the  person :  but  it  is  a  vain  effort  to  endeavour  to  love 
another  by  the  mere  effort  of  will.  If  we  take  the  word  will  in 
the  larger  sense,  all  clear  distinction  between  desire  and  will  is  re- 
moved. If  we  call  every  preference  an  act  of  volition,  then,  ob- 
viously, will  and  affection  are  confounded  ;  for  what  is  preference, 
but  a  superior  affection  ?  and  choice,  if  it  result  in  no  determination 
to  act,  is  nothing  else  but  preference,  or  the  cherishing  a  stronger 
affection  for  one  thing  than  another.  It  seems  to  us,  therefore,  to 
be  altogether  expedient,  to  confine  the  words  will  and  volition  to 
those  distinctly  marked  actions,  which  lead  to  some  change  in 
body  or  mind.  Those  determinations  which  lead  directly  to  ac- 
tion, whether  of  body  or  mind,  are  properly  called  volitions  ;  as 
when  I  resolve  to  raise  my  hand ;  to  direct  my  eyes  to  this  quar- 
ter or  that;  to  turn  my  thoughts  from  one  subject  to  another. 
These  are  acts  which  are  clearly  defined,  and  which  are  easily  dis- 
tinguishable from  mere  desires  or  emotions.  A  late  philosophical 
writer  has,  indeed,  attempted  to  sweep  away  all  controversies  re- 
specting the  determination  of  the  will,  by  confounding  will  and  de- 
sire together :  but  still  he  is  obliged  to  acknowledge,  that  some  of 
our  desires  are  followed  by  action,  or  by  a  change  in  the  body  or 
mind ;  and  these  being  thus  clearly  distinguished  by  their  effects, 
and  being  also  the  most  important  of  all  our  acts,  it  is  expedient  to 
have  them  put  into  a  class  by  themselves,  with  an  appropriate  de- 
nomination. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  inquiry  already  instituted,  which  is, 
whether,  when  we  will  any  particular  thing,  we  have  it  in  our 
power  to  will  the  contrary  ?  Here  it  will  be  acknowledged,  at 
once,  that  a  man  cannot  will  at  the  same  time  opposite  things  ;  for 
if  he  determines  on  an  act,  he  cannot  determine  to  let  it  alone. 
When  it  is  asked,  whether  the  person  who  wills  an  action  had  it  in 
his  power  to  omit  it,  the  answer  is,  that  if  he  had  been  so  inclined, 
he  could  have  willed  the  opposite.  The  very  nature  of  a  volition 
is,  the  resolving  on  that  which  is  agreeable  to  our  inclinations.  To 
suppose  any  constraint  or  compulsion  in  willing,  is  absurd;  for 
then  it  would  not  be  a  volition.  No  greater  liberty  can  be  con- 
ceived, than  freely  to  choose  what  we  please.  But  if  the  import  of 
the  question  is,  whether  with  an  inclination  one  way,  we  are  able 
to  will  the  very  contrary  ?  the  thing  is  absurd.  If  we  were  capable 
of  such  a  volition,  it  would  be  a  most  unreasonable  act.  Such  a 
self-determining  power  as  would  lead  to  such  acts,  would  render 
man  incapable  of  being  governed  by  a  moral  law,  and  would  sub- 
ject him,  so  far  as  such  a  power  was  exercised,  to  the  most  capri- 


THE    INABILITY   OF    SINNERS.  277 

cious  control.  He  could  no  longer  be  said  to  be  the  master  of  him- 
self; for  while  his  whole  soul  was  inclined  to  one  thing,  he  might 
be  led  in  an  opposite  direction,  without  having  any  reason  or  mo- 
tive for  his  conduct.  Such  a  power  as  this,  no  one,  I  think,  will 
plead  for,  who  understands  its  nature.  Man  has  the  power  to  de- 
termine his  own  will,  but  in  accordance  with  his  own  inclinations 
— the  only  kind  of  power  over  the  will  which  any  reasonable  being 
can  wish.  If  I  can  will  as  I  please,  surely  I  need  not  complain 
that  I  cannot  will  as  I  do  not  please.  If  I  govern  my  volitions  by 
my  prevailing  inclination,  this  is  surely  a  greater  privilege,  and 
more  truly  liberty,  than  a  power  to  determine  the  will  without  any 
motive,  and  contrary  to  all  my  wishes.  My  actions  are  as  truly 
my  own  and  self-determined,  when  they  accord  with  inclination,  as 
if  they  could  spring  up  without  any  desire.  Many  philosophical 
men,  from  a  fear  of  being  involved  in  the  doctrine  of  necessity, 
have  talked  and  reasoned  most  absurdly,  in  relation  to  this  point. 
And  it  is  to  be  regretted,  that  many  writers,  who  have  substantially 
maintained  the  true  doctrine  of  the  will,  have  employed  language 
which  has  had  the  effect  of  confirming  their  prejudices.  To  talk, 
of  a  necessity  of  willing  as  we  do,  although  we  may  qualify  the 
word  by  "  moral,"  or  "  philosophical,"  is  inexpedient.  There  can 
be  no  necessity  in  volition.  It  is  the  very  opposite  of  necessity. 
It  is  liberty  itself.  Because  volition  has  a  determinate  cause  which 
makes  it  what  it  is,  this  does  not  alter  the  case.  If  the  cause  be  a 
free  agent,  and  the  kind  of  volition  be  determined  by  the  uncon- 
strained inclinations  of  the  heart,  the  freedom  of  our  actions  is  no 
how  affected,  by  this  certain  connection  between  volitions  and 
their  cause.  The  contrary  doctrine  involves  the  monstrous  absur- 
dity, that  volitions  have  no  cause,  and  no  reason  for  being  what 
they  are.  If,  then,  we  can  will  as  we  please,  we  have  all  conceiva- 
ble liberty  and  power,  so  far  as  the  will  is  concerned.  But  the 
maxim,  that  no  man  is  under  obligation  to  do  that  which  he  has  no 
power  to  perform,  does  not  apply  to  the  act  of  volition,  as  was  be- 
fore observed,  but  to  the  ability  to  act  according  to  our  will. 

We  come  now  to  the  inquiry,  whether  a  man  has  a  power  to 
change  the  affections  of  his  heart ;  or  to  turn  the  current  of  his 
inclinations  in  a  contrary  direction  to  that  in  which  they  run.  On 
this  subject  our  first  remark  is,  that  the  very  supposition  of  a  person 
being  sincerely  desirous  to  make  such  a  change  is  absurd,  for  if 
there  existed  a  prevailing  desire  that  our  affections  should  not  be 
attached  to  certain  objects,  then  already  the  change  has  taken 
place  ;  but  while  our  souls  are  carried  forth  in  strong  affections  to 
an  object,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  say  that  that  soul  desires  the  affec- 
tions to  be  removed  from  that  object :  for  what  is  affection  but  the 
outgoing  of  the  soul  with  desire  and  delight  towards  an  object  ? 
But  to  suppose  a  desire  not  to  love  the  object  which  has  attracted 
our  affections,  is  to  suppose  two  opposite  affections  prevailing  in 
the  same  soul  at  the  same  time,  and  in  relation  to  the  same  object. 
It  is  true  that  there  may  exist  conflicting  desires  in  regard  to  the 


278  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

objects  which  are  pursued;  for,  while  with  a  prevailing  desire  we 
are  led  on  to  seek  them,  there  may,  and  often  do,  exist  inferior  de- 
sires which  draw  us,  according  to  their  force,  in  another  direction. 
Thus,  a  drunkard  may  be  prevailingly  inclined  to  seek  the  grati- 
fication which  he  expects  from  strong  drink,  but  while  he  is  re- 
solved to  indulge  his  appetite,  a  regard  to  health,  reputation,  and 
the  comfort  of  his  family,  may  produce  a  contrary  desire  ;  but,  in 
the  case  supposed,  it  is  overcome  by  the  stronger  inclination  which 
a  vicious  appetite  has  generated.  It  is  also  true,  as  has  been  re- 
marked by  President  Edwards,  that  in  contemplating  some  future 
time,  a  man  may  desire  that  the  appetite  or  affection  which  now 
governs  him  may  be  subdued.  And  again,  a  man  may  be  brought 
into  such  circumstances  that  his  desire  of  happiness,  or  dread  of 
eternal  misery,  may  be  so  strong  as  to  induce  him  to  wish  that 
his  predominant  affections  might  be  changed  ;  and  under  the  pow- 
erful influence  of  these  constitutional  principles  he  may  be  led  to 
will  a  change  in  the  temper  of  his  mind  and  the  inclinations  of  his 
heart.  The  question  is,  whether  a  volition  to  change  the  desires 
or  dispositions  is  ever  effectual.  If  our  philosophy  of  the  mind  be 
correct,  this  is  a  thing  entirely  out  of  the  power  of  the  will.  Every 
person,  however,  can  put  the  matter  to  the  test  of  experience  at 
any  moment.  The  best  way  to  prove  to  ourselves  that  we  have  a 
power  over  our  affections,  is  to  exercise  it.  Who  was  ever  con- 
scious of  loving  any  person  or  thing,  merely  from  willing  to  do  so  ? 
What  power,  then,  has  the  sinner  to  change  his  own  heart  ?  He 
does  not  love  God,  but  is  at  enmity  with  him — how  shall  he  change 
his  enmity  into  love  ?  You  tell  him  that  he  has  the  power  to  re- 
pent and  to  love  God,  and  urge  him  instantly  to  comply  with  his 
duty.  Now  we  should  be  exceedingly  obliged  by  any  one  who 
would  explain  the  process  by  which  a  sinner  changes  the  current 
of  his  affections.  We  have  often  tried  the  experiment,  and  have 
found  ourselves  utterly  impotent  to  accomplish  this  work.  Per- 
haps the  zealous  preacher  of  the  doctrine  of  human  ability  will 
say  it  is  as  easy  to  love  God,  or  easier  than  to  hate  him.  He 
can  only  mean,  that  when  the  heart  is  in  that  state  in  which  the 
exhibition  of  the  character  of  God  calls  fogth  love,  the  exercise  of 
love  in  such  a  soul  is  as  easy  as  the  exercise  of  enmity  in  one  of 
a  different  moral  temperament.  The  ability  to  repent  and  love 
God  then  amounts  to  no  more  than  this,  that  the  human  faculties 
when  rightly  exercised  are  as  capable  of  holy  as  of  sinful  acts, 
which  no  one,  we  presume,  ever  denied  ;  but  it  is  a  truth  which 
has  no  bearing  on  the  point  in  hand.  The  impenitent  sinner  can- 
not sincerely  will  to  change  his  heart,  and  if  under  the  influence 
of  such  motives  as  he  is  capable  of  feeling,  he  does  will  a  change 
of  affection,  the  effect  does  not  follow  the  volition.  Those  per- 
sons, therefore,  who  are  continually  preaching  that  men  have  every 
ability  necessary  to  repent,  are  inculcating  a  doctrine  at  war  with 
every  man's  experience,  and  directly  opposed  to  the  word  of  God, 
which  continually  represents  the  sinner  as  "  dead."  and  impotent, 


THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS.  279 

and  incapable  of  thinking  even  a  good  thought.  But  we  shall  be 
told  that  it  is  a  maxim  of  common  sense,  that  whatever  we  are 
commanded  to  do  we  must  have  power  or  ability  to  perform — 
that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  any  man  is  under  obligations  to  do 
what  he  is  unable  to  perform.  Now,  we  are  of  opinion  that  this 
is  precisely  the  point  where  these  advocates  of  human  ability  mis- 
take, and  their  error  consists  in  the  misapplication  of  the  maxim 
already  mentioned — which  is  true  and  self-evident  when  properly 
applied — to  a  case  to  which  it  does  not  belong.  We  have  admitted, 
over  and  over,  that  this  doctrine  is  universally  true,  in  relation  to 
the  performance  of  actions  consequent  on  volition ;  but  we  now 
deny  that  this  is  true  when  applied  to  our  dispositions,  habits,  and 
affections.  We  utterly  deny,  that,  in  order  to  a  man's  being  ac- 
countable and  culpable  for  enmity  to  God,  he  should  have  the 
power  of  instantly  changing  his  enmity  into  love.  If  a  man  has 
certain  affections  and  dispositions  of  heart  which  are  evil,  he  is 
accountable  for  them ;  and  the  more  inveterate  and  immovable 
these  traits  of  moral  character  are,  the  more  -he  is  to  be  blamed, 
and  the  more  he  deserves  to  be  punished.  But  as  it  is  alleged  that 
the  common  judgment  of  man's  moral  faculty  is,  that  he  cannot  be 
culpable  unless  he  possesses  the  power  to  divest  himself  of  his 
evil  temper  by  an  act  of  volition,  we  will  state  one  or  two  cases, 
and  leave  it  to  every  reader  to  judge  for  himself,  after  an  impartial 
consideration  of  the  facts. 

In  the  first  place,  we  take  the  case  of  a  son,  who  being  of  a 
self-willed  disposition,  and  having  a  great  fondness  for  sensual 
pleasure  and  a  strong  desire  to  be  free  from  restraint,  has  been  led 
to  cherish  enmity  to  his  father.  The  father  we  will  suppose  to  be  a 
man  of  conscientious  integrity,  who,  from  natural  affection  and  from 
a  regard  to  higher  principles,  wishes  to  perform  his  duty,  by  re- 
proving, restraining,  and  correcting  his  child.  But  all  this  disci- 
pline, instead  of  working  a  reformation,  has  the  effect  of  irritating 
the  son,  who  every  day  becomes  more  stubborn  and  incorrigible  ; 
until  he  comes  at  length  to  look  upon  his  father  as  a  tyrannical 
master — an  object  of  utter  aversion.  Hatred  readily  takes  root  in 
the  bosom  of  such  a  one,  and  by  the  wicked  counsels  of  ill  advi- 
sers this  feeling  is  cherished,  until  by  degrees  it  becomes  so  invete- 
rate that  he  cannot  think  of  his  father  without  being  conscious  of 
malignant  feelings.  The  effect  of  such  feelings  will  be  to  pervert 
every  action  of  the  hated  person,  however  kind  or  just.  Malice 
also  causes  everything  to  be  seen  through  a  false  medium.  Now 
suppose  this  process  to  have  been  going  on  for  years,  the  first 
question  is,  can  this  ungrateful  son  change  in  a  moment  these  feel- 
ings of  enmity  and  ill-will  for  filial  affection?  The  impossibility 
is  too  manifest  to  require  any  discussion  ;  he  cannot.  But  is  he, 
on  account  of  his  inability  to  change  his  affections,  innocent? 
Surely  the  guilt  of  such  a  state  of  mind  does  not  require  that  the 
person  be  at  once,  or  at  all,  able  to  change  the  state  of  his  heart. 
And  we  maintain  that  according  to  the  impartial  judgment  of 


280  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

mankind,  such  a  man  would  be  the  object  of  blame  without  regard 
to  any  ability  to  change  his  heart.  And  this  is  the  case  in  regard 
to  impenitent  sinners.  Their  enmity  to  God,  and  aversion  to  his 
law,  is  deep  and  inveterate  ;  and  though  they  have  neither  ability  nor 
will  to  change  the  temper  of  their  minds,  they  are  not  the  less 
culpable  on  that  account ;  for  the  nature  of  moral  evil  does  not 
consist  in  that  only  which  can  be  changed  at  will,  but  the  deeper 
the  malignity  of  the  evil,  the  greater  the  sinfulness,  and  the  more 
justly  is  the  person  exposed  to  punishment.  We  are  of  opinion, 
therefore,  that  the  new  doctrine  of  human  ability,  which  is  so 
much  in  vogue,  is  false  and  dangerous.  And  to  corroborate  this 
opinion,  we  remark,  that  men  who  are  forsaken  of  God,  and  given 
over  to  believe  a  lie,  and  to  work  all  uncleanness  with  greediness ; 
or,  who  have  committed  the  unpardonable  sin,  so  that  they  cannot 
be  "  renewed  again  to  repentance,"  are  surely  unable  to  change 
their  hearts,  and  yet  they  are  exceedingly  guilty. 

The  same  thing  may  be  strongly  illustrated  by  a  reference  to 
the  devils.  They  are  moral  agents  and  act  freely,  for  they  con- 
tinue to  sin  ;  but  who  would  choose  to  assert  that  they  can  change 
their  nature  from  sin  to  holiness,  from  enmity  to  love  ?  But  they 
possess,  as  fully  as  man,  what  has  been  called  "  natural  ability . 
They  have  all  the  physical  powers  requisite  to  constitute  them 
moral  agents,  and  to  perform  the  whole  will  of  God,  and  are  con- 
tinually adding  to  their  guilt  by  their  willing  commission  of  sin. 
But  it  is  impossible  for  the  devils  to  become  holy  angels  ;  and  this 
one  fact  is  sufficient  to  demonstrate,  that  a  power  to  change  the 
heart  is  not  necessary  to  render  a  man  guilty  for  continuing  in  sin. 
The  very  reverse  comes  nearer  the  truth.  The  more  unable  a 
sinner  is  to  cease  from  his  enmity,  the  deeper  is  his  guilt :  yet  on 
the  very  same  principles  on  which  it  is  argued,  that  it  is  as  easy  for 
man  to  love  God  as  to  hate  him,  it  might  be  proved  that  it  was 
perfectly  easy  for  the  fallen  angels  to  love  God  ;  or  for  the  spirits 
shut  up  in  the  prison  of  despair  to  begin  to  love  God,  and  thus  dis- 
arm the  law  of  that  penalty  which  dooms  them  to  everlasting 
death.  If  holiness  is  anything  real ;  if  it  has  any  foundation  or 
principle  in  the  mind  in  which  it  exists  ;  and  if  this  principle  was 
lost  by  the  fall  of  men  and  angels,  then  it  is  certain  that  man  can- 
not restore  to  his  own  soul  the  lost  image  of  God.  Again :  they 
who  insist  upon  it,  that  the  sinner  has  all  ability  to  repent  and  turn 
to  God,  and  who  so  peremptorily  and  sternly  rebuke  the  impeni- 
tent for  not  doing  instantly  what  they  have  it  in  their  power  to  do 
so  easily,  ought  to  set  the  example  which  these  sinners  should  fol- 
low. Surely  the  renewed  man  has  the  same  kind  of  ability,  and 
as  much  ability,  to  be  instantly  perfect  in  holiness,  as  the  unre- 
generate  man  has  to  renew  his  own  soul  or  to  change  his  own 
heart.  Let  the  preacher  give  an  immediate  example  of  this  ability 
by  becoming  perfectly  holy,  and  we  will  consent  that  he  preach 
this  doctrine. 

But  the  strongest  argument  against  this  notion  of  human  ability, 


THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS.  281 

is  derived  from  the  scriptural  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  regene- 
ration by  the  operations  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  It  is  a  maxim  in  phi- 
losophy, that  no  more  causes  should  be  admitted  than  are  both 
true  and  sufficient  to  account  for  the  effects.  And  it  is  equally 
clear,  that  if  supernatural  influence  is  necessary  to  repentance  and 
other  holy  exercises,  then  man  has  not  the  ability  to  repent  with- 
out such  aid.  It  is  manifestly  a  contradiction  to  assert  that  man  is 
able  to  commence  the  work  of  holiness  by  his  own  exertions ;  and 
yet  that  he  cannot  do  this  without  divine  aid.  Every  text,  there- 
fore, which  ascribes  regeneration  to  God,  is  a  proof  of  man's  ina- 
bility to  regenerate  himself.  Indeed  the  very  idea  of  a  man's 
regenerating  his  own  heart  is  absurd  ;  it  is  tantamount  to  a  man's 
creating  himself,  or  begetting  himself.  Besides,  the  scriptures  posi- 
tively declare  man's  inability  to  turn  to  God  without  divine  aid. 
"  No  man,"  says  the  Lord  Jesus,  "  can  come  to  me  except  the 
Father  which  hath  sent  me  draw  him."  "  Without  me  ye  can  do 
nothing."  "  Christ  is  exalted  a  Prince  and  a  Saviour,  to  give  re- 
pentance and  the  remission  of  sins."  "  Which  were  born  not  of 
blood,  nor  of  the  will  of  the  flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of 
God."  "  So  then,  it  is  not  of  him  that  willeth,  nor  of  him  that 
runneth,  but  of  God  that  showeth  mercy."  "  Not  that  we  are  suf- 
ficient of  ourselves  to  think  anything  as  of  ourselves  ;"  but  see 
Cor.  iii.  5.  Our  sufficiency  is  of  the  Lord.  Everything  is  ascribed 
to  the  grace  of  God,  and  man,  in  scripture,  is  continually  represented 
as  "dead  in  trespasses  and  sins,"  as  "blind,"  "  not  subject  to  the  law 
of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be." 

It  will  be  objected,  with  much  confidence,  that  if  man  has  no 
ability  to  repent  he  cannot  be  blamed  for  not  repenting.  But  this 
is  only  true  if  he  desires  to  repent  and  is  unable  to  do  it.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  case  of  the  impenitent  sinner.  He  does  not 
wish  to  repent — if  he  did,  there  is  no  hindrance  in  his  way.  But  his 
soul  is  at  enmity  with  God,  and  this  opposition  is  so  deep  and  total 
that  he  has  neither  the  will  nor  the  power  to  convert  himself  to  the 
love  of  God.  But  will  his  wickedness,  therefore,  excuse  him,  be- 
cause it  is  so  great  that  it  has  left  no  desire  nor  ability  to  change 
his  mind  ?  Certainly  the  judgment  of  mankind  is  sufficiently  ascer- 
tained on  this  point,  and  is  entirely  different  from  this.  The  wretch 
who  is  so  abandoned  to  vice,  that  he  never  feels  a  wish  for  refor- 
mation, is  not  on  this  account  free  from  blame  ;  so  far  from  it,  that 

THE  GREATER  THE  INABILITY,  THE    GREATER    THE    GUILT.       The    more 

entirely  a  murderer  has  been  under  the  influence  of  malice,  the 
more  detestable  his  crime.  The  object  of  all  judicial  investigation 
is  to  ascertain,  first,  the  fact,  and  then  the  motive  ;  and  the  more 
deliberate,  unmixed,  and  invincible  the  malevolence  appears  to  have 
been,  the  more  unhesitating  is  the  determination  of  every  juror,  or 
judge,  to  find  him  guilty.  It  is  the  common  sense  of  all  men,  that 
the  more  incorrigible  and  irreclaimable  a  transgressor,  the  more 
deserving  is  he  of  severe  punishment.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  a 
fact,  that  men  generally  think,  that  where  there  is  any  kind  of  ina- 


282  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNERS. 

bility  there  is  no  blame.  The  very  reverse  is  true.  And  it  will 
be  found  to  be  the  universal  conviction  of  men  in  all  ages  and 
countries,  that  a  totally  depraved  character  creates  an  inability  to 
do  good ;  and  that  the  greater  this  inability  the  more  criminal  is 
the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  it. 

Another  objection  is,  that  if  impenitent  men  are  informed  that 
they  can  do  nothing,  they  will  sit  still  and  make  no  manner  of  ex- 
ertion, but  will  wait  until  God's  time,  as  it  is  certain  all  their  efforts 
will  be  in  vain,  until  God  works  in  them  to  will  and  to  do.  To 
which  we  reply,  that  unregenerate  men  are  ever  disposed  to  per- 
vert the  truth  of  God,  so  as  to  apologise  for  their  own  negligence ; 
but  this  must  not  hinder  us  from  embracing  it  and  preaching  it ; 
though  this  should  teach  us  to  exercise  peculiar  caution  when  there 
is  danger  of  mistake  or  perversion.  Again,  it  answers  no  good 
end  to  set  such  persons  to  strive  in  their  own  strength,  and  some- 
times fatally  misleads  them  ;  for  either  they  become  discouraged, 
not  finding  their  strength  to  answer  to  the  doctrine  of  the  preacher, 
or  they  are  led  to  think  that  the  exertions  which  they  make  are 
acts  of  faith  and  repentance  ;  and  thus,  without  feeling  their  de- 
pendence on  God,  are  induced  to  rely  on  their  own  strength.  Now, 
the  true  system  is  to  exhort  sinners  to  be  found  in  the  use  of  God's 
appointed  means  ;  that  is,  to  be  diligent  in  attendance  on  the  word 
and  at  the  throne  of  grace.  They  should  also  be  exhorted  to  re- 
pent and  to  perform  all  other  commanded  duties,  but  at  the  same 
time  distinctly  informed  that  they  need  the  grace  of  God  to  enable 
them  rightly  to  perform  these  acts ;  and  their  efforts  should  be 
made  in  humble  dependence  on  divine  assistance.  While  they  are 
reading,  or  hearing,  or  meditating,  or  praying,  God  may  by  his 
Holy  Spirit  work  faith  in  their  hearts,  and  while  they  are  using  the 
means  of  repentance,  the  grace  of  repentance  may  be  bestowed 
upon  them.  We  should  not  exhort  men  to  perform  any  duty 
otherwise  than  as  God  has  commanded  it  to  be  done  ;  but  we  may 
exhort  an  unregenerate  sinner  to  read  and  pray,  for  in  attending  on 
these  means  he  is  making  the  effort  to  believe  and  to  repent ;  and 
while  engaged  in  the  use  of  these  external  means,  God  may  give 
a  believing  and  penitent  heart.  Besides,  we  do  not  know  when 
men  cease  to  be  unregenerate.  They  are  often  renewed  before 
they  are  aware  that  they  have  experienced  a  saving  change ;  and 
if  we  omit  to  exhort  them  to  pray,  &c,  under  the  apprehension 
that  they  cannot  perform  the  duty  aright,  we  may  be  hindering  the 
access  of  some  of  God's  dear  children  to  his  presence.  And  in  re- 
gard to  those  who  pray  with  an  unregenerate  heart,  we  are  per- 
suaded that  they  do  not,  by  making  the  attempt  to  pray,  sin  so 
egregiously  as  by  omitting  the  duty  altogether.  If  the  principle 
on  which  some  act  in  their  treatment  of  the  awakened,  were  car- 
ried out  to  its  legitimate  consequences,  they  should  be  told  neither 
to  plough  nor  sow  ;  no,  nor  perform  the  common  duties  of  justice 
and  morality,  because  they  sin  in  all  these  as  certainly  as  in  their 
prayers. 


THE    INABILITY    OF    8INNEBS.  283 

It  is  thought  that  inculcating  the  doctrine  of  the  inability  of  sin- 
ners, has  a  tendency  to  lead  them  to  procrastinate  attention  to 
their  salvation,  upon  the  plea  that  it  is  useless  for  them  to  strive 
until  God's  grace  shall  be  granted  ;  and  it  has  been  admitted,  that 
this  abuse  may  be  made  of  the  doctrine ;  but  is  there  no  danger 
of  abuse  on  the  other  side  ?  When  men  in  love  with  sin  are  taught 
that  they  possess  all  necessary  ability  to  turn  to  God,  and  that  they 
can  repent  at  any  moment  by  a  proper  use  of  their  own  powers, 
will  they  not  be  led  to  postpone  attention  to  the  concerns  of  the 
soul,  under  the  persuasion  that  it  is  a  work  which  they  can  per- 
form at  any  time,  even  on  a  death-bed  ?  Will  they  not  run  the 
risk  of  being  suddenly  cut  off,  when  they  are  informed  that  in  a 
moment,  or  in  a  very  short  time,  they  can  give  their  hearts  to 
Christ  ?  In  fact,  this  is  precisely  the  practical  system  of  every 
careless  sinner.  He  knows  that  he  is  going  astray  at  present ;  but 
then  he  flatters  himself  that  after  enjoying  his  sinful  pleasures 
awhile  longer  he  will  give  them  all  up  and  become  truly  pious  ; 
and  this  common  delusion  is  carried  so  far,  that  the  secret  thought 
of  many  is,  that  if  on  a  death-bed  they  should  only  be  favoured 
with  the  exercise  of  reason  for  a  short  time,  they  can  easily  make 
their  peace  with  God,  and  prepare  for  another  world.  Therefore, 
faithful  ministers  have  felt  it  to  be  their  duty  to  endeavour  to  dissi- 
pate this  delusion,  and  to  convince  men  that  their  hopes  of  future  re- 
pentance are  fallacious  ;  and  they  have  found  nothing  more  effectual 
to  remove  this  dangerous  self-confidence  than  to  insist  on  the  utter 
helplessness  and  total  inability  of  the  sinner  to  convert  his  own 
soul.  But  now  the  strain  of  preaching  which  is  heard  from  many, 
coincides  most  perfectly  with  the  erroneous  persuasion  which  ig- 
norance of  their  depravity  leads  natural  men  to  cherish.  We  are 
persuaded,  therefore,  that  much  evil  will  result  from  this  new  me- 
thod of  preaching  respecting  man's  ability.  The  evil  will  be  two- 
fold :  first,  multitudes  will  be  confirmed  in  their  false  persuasion  of 
their  ability  to  become  truly  religious  whenever  they  please  ;  and 
will,  in  this  persuasion,  go  on  presumptuously  in  their  indulgence 
of  sin,  with  the  purpose  to  repent  at  some  future  day ;  the  second 
evil  will  be,  that  multitudes,  under  superficial  conviction,  being  told 
that  they  have  the  power  to  turn  to  God,  will,  upon  entirely  insufli 
cient  grounds,  take  up  the  opinion  that  they  have  complied  with 
the  terms  of  salvation,  because  they  are  conscious  they  have  ex- 
erted such  power  as  they  possess,  and  thus  false  hopes  will  be 
cherished  which  may  never  be  removed.  We  are  of  opinion, 
therefore,  that  what  is  cried  up  as  "new  light,"  in  regard  to  the 
proper  method  of  dealing  with  sinners,  is  really  a  dangerous  prac- 
tical error ;  or,  if  what  is  inculcated  can,  by  any  explanation,  be 
reconciled  with  truth,  yet  this  method  of  exhibiting  it  is  calculated 
to  mislead,  and  has  all  the  pernicious  effects  of  error. 

The  truth  is,  that  no  unregenerate  man  can  change  his  own 
heart,  and  yet  he  is  accountable  for  all  its  evil,  and  culpable  for  all 


284  THE    INABILITY    OF    SINNEES. 

the  inability  under  which  he  labours.  Man  is  a  moral  agent,  and 
free  in  his  sinful  actions ;  that  is,  they  are  voluntary.  He  does 
what  he  pleases,  and  he  wills  what  he  pleases ;  but  when  his  heart 
is  fully  set  in  him  to  do  evil,  there  is  no  principle  from  which  a 
saving  change  can  take  place.  He  must  be  renewed  by  the  Spirit 
of  God.  He  must  be  created  anew  in  Christ  Jesus  unto  good 
works. 


ESSAY    XIII. 

THE    NEW  DIVINITY  TRIED. 


In  the  autumn  of  the  year  1831  it  appears  that  the  Rev.  Mr. 
Finney  delivered  a  sermon  on  making  a  new  heart,  founded 
on  Ezek.  xviii.  13.  The  Rev.  Mr.  Rand  being  one  of  his  auditors, 
took  notes  of  the  discourse,  which  he  published,  attended  with  a 
series  of  strictures,  in  a  periodical  work  of  which  he  was  the  editor. 
As  these  notes,  in  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Finney's  friends,  presented 
an  imperfect  view  of  his  sermon,  one  of  their  number  obtained  the 
outline  used  by  the  preacher  himself,  and  sent  the  requisite  correc- 
tions to  Mr.  Rand,  who  availed  himself  of  the  aid  thus  afforded. 
The  notes  and  strictures  were  afterwards  published  in  a  pamphlet 
form,  under  the  title,  "  The  New  Divinity  Tried."  It  is  the  review 
of  this  pamphlet  by  an  anonymous  writer,  of  which  we  propose  to 
give  a  short  notice. 

We  are  not  prepared  to  justify  the  course  pursued  by  Mr.  Rand, 
in  thus  bringing  Mr.  Finney  before  the  public  without  his  know- 
ledge or  consent.  The  considerations  which  evince  the  general 
impropriety  of  such  a  step  are  obvious,  and  are  forcibly  stated  in  the 
Review.  That  there  may  be  cases  in  which  the  evil  produced  by 
a  popular  preacher  constantly  presenting  erroneous  views  in  his 
discourses,  is  so  serious,  that  the  usual  etiquette  of  literary  pro- 
ceedings should  be  sacrificed  in  order  to  counteract  its  influence, 
we  do  not  doubt.  Nor  do  we  question  that  Mr.  Rand  felt  the  pre- 
sent to  be  such  a  case.  As  the  publication  has  not  only  been  made, 
but  noticed  by  the  friends  and  advocates  of  Mr.  Finney,  there  can 
be  no  impropriety  in  our  calling  the  attention  of  our  readers,  for  a 
few  moments,  to  the  contents  of  this  Review.  It  is  an  elaborate 
production,  distinguished  both  by  acuteness  and  research,  and  per- 
vaded by  a  tone  of  moderation.  These  are  its  favourable  charac- 
teristics. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  lamentably  deficient  in  open, 
manly  discussion.  Instead  of  a  clear  and  bold  statement  of  the 
distinguishing  principles  of  the  New  Divinity,  and  a  frank  avowal 
of  dissent  from  the  Old  Divinity  of  New  England,  there  is  an  anx- 

*  This  article  was  published  in  1832,  in  review  of  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  The  New 
Divinity  Tried ;  or  An  Examination  of  the  Rev.  Mr.  Rand's  Strictures  on  a  sermon 
delivered  by  the  Rev.  C.  J.  Finney  on  making  a  new  Heart." 


286  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

ious,  attorney-like  mincing  of  matters ;  a  claiming  to  agree  with 
everybody,  and  an  endeavour  to  cast  off  his  opponent  intb  the  po- 
sition of  the  solitary  dissentient,  and  overwhelm  him  with  the  au- 
thority of  great  names.  The  evidence  on  which  this  judgment  is 
found  will  appear  in  what  follows ;  of  its  correctness  the  reader 
must  judge. 

We  gather  from  the  Review  itself  (for  we  have  in  vain  endea- 
voured to  obtain  in  season  a  copy  of  Mr.  Rand's  pamphlet),  that 
the  leading  objections  to  the  New  Divinity  are  those  which  have 
been  urged  from  various  quarters  against  some  of  the  doctrines  of 
the  Christian  Spectator.  Indeed,  the  reviewer,  to  show  that  Mr. 
Rand  was  not  obliged  to  publish  the  notes  of  an  extemporaneous 
discourse,  in  order  to  bring  the  opinions  which  it  advocated  before 
the  public,  tells  us  the  doctrines  of  the  sermon  are  those  which  have 
been  repeatedly  presented  in  the  Spectator,  and  elsewhere.  We 
need  therefore  be  at  no  loss  for  the  distinguishing  features  of  the 
New  Divinity.  It  starts  with  the  assumption  that  morality  can  only 
be  predicated  of  voluntary  exercises  ;  that  all  holiness  and  sin  con- 
sist in  acts  of  choice  or  preference.  When  this  principle  is  said  to  • 
be  one  of  the  radical  views  of  the  New  Divinity,  neither  Mr.  Rand 
nor  any  one  else  can  mean  to  represent  the  opinion  itself  as  a  no- 
velty. It  is  on  all  hands  acknowledged  to  be  centuries  old.  The 
novelty  consists  in  its  being  held  by  men  professing  to  be  Calvin- 
ists,  and  in  its  being  traced  out  by  them  to  very  nearly  the  same 
results  as  those  which  the  uniform  opponents  of  Calvinism  have 
derived  from  it.  Thus  Dr.  John  Taylor,  of  Norwich,  presents  it 
as  the  grand  objection  to  the  doctrines  of  original  sin  and  original 
righteousness  ;  and  in  defending  these  doctrines,  President  Edwards 
laboriously  argues  against  this  opinion.  Yet  it  is  in  behalf  of  this 
radical  view  of  the  new  system,  that  the  authority  of  Edwards, 
Bellamy,  Witherspoon,  Dwight,  Griffin,  Woods,  as  well  as  Augus- 
tine and  Calvin,  is  quoted  and  arrayed  against  Mr.  Rand.  Almost 
every  one  of  these  writers  not  only  disclaims  the  opinion  thus  as- 
cribed to  them,  but  endeavours  to  refute  it.  Thus  President  Ed- 
wards, after  stating  Dr.  Taylor's  great  objection  to  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin' to  be,  "that  moral  virtue  in  its  very  nature  implieth  the 
choice  and  consent  of  the  moral  agent,"  and  quoting  from  him  the 
declaration,  "  To  say  that  God  not  only  endowed  Adam  with  a  ca- 
pacity of  being  righteous,  but,  moreover,  that  righteousness  and 
true  holiness  were  created  with  him,  or  wrought  into  his  nature  at 
the  same  time  he  was  made,  is  to  affirm  a  contradiction,  or  what  is 
inconsistent  with  the  very  nature  of  righteousness,"  goes  on  to  re- 
mark, "  with  respect  to  this  I  would  observe  that  it  consists  in  a 
notion  of  virtue  quite  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  things  and  the 
common  notions  of  mankind."  That  it  is  thus  inconsistent  with  the 
nature  of  things,  he  proceeds  to  prove.  In  the  course  of  this  proof 
we  find  such  assertions  as  the  following :  "  The  act  of  choosing 
what  is  good  is  no  further  virtuous  than  it  proceeds  from  a  good 
principle,  or  virtuous  disposition  of  mind.     Which  supposes  that  a 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  287 

virtuous  disposition  of  mind  may  be  before  a  virtuous  act  of  choice, 
and  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  there  should  first  be  thought, 
reflection,  and  choice,  before  there  can  be  any  virtuous  disposition." 
"  There  is  no  necessity  that  all  virtuous  dispositions  or  affections 
should  be  the  effect  of  choice.  And  so,  no  such  supposed  necessity 
can  be  a  good  objection  against  such  a  disposition  being  natural,  or 
from  a  kind  of  instinction,  implanted  in  the  mind  at  its  creation."* 
Again,  p.  409,  in  showing  Dr.  Taylor's  inconsistency,  he  says,  "  If 
Adam  must  choose  to  be  righteous  before  he  was  righteous,"  then 
Dr.  Taylor's  scheme  involves  a  contradiction,  &c.  A  mode  of  ex- 
pression which  clearly  shows  the  position  against  which  he  argues. 
Again,  "  Human  nature  must  be  created  with  some  dispositions ;  a 
disposition  to  relish  some  things  as  good  and  amiable,  and  to  be 
averse  to  other  things  as  odious  and  disagreeable  *  *  *  *.  But 
if  it  had  any  concreated  dispositions  at  all,  they  must  have  been 
right  or  wrong ;  and  he  then  says,  if  man  had  at  first  a  disposition 
to  find  happiness  in  what  was  good,  his  disposition  was  morally 
right ;  but  "  if  he  had  a  disposition  to  love  most  those  things  that 
were  inferior  and  less  worthy,  then  his  dispositions  were  vicious." 
"  This  notion  of  Adam's  being  created  without  a  principle  of  holi- 
ness in  his  heart,  taken  with  the  rest  of  Dr.  Taylor's  scheme,  is  in- 
consistent with"  the  history  in  the  beginning  of  Genesis,  p.  413.  It 
would,  however,  be  an  endless  business  to  quote  all  that  might  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  Edwards  did  not  hold  the  opinion  which  the 
reviewer  imputes  to  him.  There  can,  it  would  seem,  be  no  mis- 
take as  to  his  meaning.  These  are  not  mere  casual  expressions, 
which  he  afterwards  retracts  or  contradicts.  Neither  is  there  any 
room  for  doubt  as  to  the  sense  in  which  he  uses  the  words,  dispo- 
sition, principle,  tendency,  &c.  Because  he  carefully  explains 
them,  and  characterizes  the  idea  he  means  to  express  by  every  one 
of  the  marks  which  the  reviewer  and  others  give,  in  describing 
what  they  spurn  and  reject  under  the  name  of  "principle,"  "holy 
or  sinful  taste."  They  mean  something  distinct  from,  and  prior  to, 
volitions  ;  so  does  President  Edwards ;  it  is  that  which,  in  the 
case  of  Adam,  to  use  his  own  word,  was  "  concreated ;"  it  was  a 
disposition  to  love — not  love  itself — a  relish  for  spiritual  objects,  or 
adaptation  of  mind  to  take  pleasure  in  what  is  excellent ;  it  was  a 
kind  of  instinct,  which,  as  to  this  point  (i.  e.,  priority  as  to  the  order 
of  nature  to  acts),  he  says  is  analogous  to  other  instincts  of  our  na- 
ture. He  even  argues  long  to  show  that  unless  such  a  principle  of 
holiness  existed  in  man  prior  to  all  acts  of  choice,  he  never  could 
become  holy.  Again,  the  "  principle,"  or  "  disposition"  which  they 
object  to,  is  one  which  is  represented  as  not  only  prior  to  volunta- 
ry exercises,  but  determines  their  character,  and  is  the  cause  of 
their  being  what  they  are.  So  precisely  President  Edwards,  "  It  is 
a  foundation  laid  in  the  nature  of  the  soul,  for  a  new  kind  of  exer- 
cises of  the  faculty  of  the  will."  f     This  he  assumes  in  the  case  of 

*  Works,  vol.  ii.,  pp  407,  408.  f  Treatise  on  the  Affections,  p.  232. 


288  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

Adam  to  have  existed  prior  to  his  choosing  God,  and  determined 
his  choice ;  what  in  the  case  of  men  since  the  fall  he  assumes  as  the 
cause  of  their  universally  sinning  ;  and  in  those  which  are  renewed, 
as  the  cause  of  their  holy  exercises.  If  President  Edwards  did  not 
hold  and  teach  the  doctrine  which  the  reviewer  rejects  and  de- 
nounces, then  no  man  ever  did  hold  it,  or  ever  can  express  it.  The 
case  is  no  less  plain  with  regard  to  Dr.  Dwight,  who  also  gives 
the  two  characteristic  marks  of  the  kind  of  disposition  now  in  ques- 
tion, viz.,  its  priority  to  all  voluntary  exercises,  and  its  being  the 
cause  of  the  character  of  those  exercises.  Both  these  ideas  are  ex- 
pressed with  a  frequency,  clearness,  and  confidence,  which  mark 
this  as  one  of  his  most  settled  opinions.  Take  a  single  specimen : 
"  There  is  a  reason,"  he  says,  "  why  one  being  is  holy  and  another 
sinful."  This  reason,  or  "  cause  of  moral  action,  is  indicated  by  the 
words  principle,  affections,  nature,  habits,  tendency,  propensity." 
That  he  does  not  intend  by  "  this  cause  of  moral  action,"  an  act, 
exercise,  volition,  is  plain ;  first,  because  he  says,  "  these  terms  in- 
dicate a  cause,  which  to  us  is  wholly  unknown ;"  secondly,  because 
he  expressly  and  repeatedly  asserts  the  contrary.  "  We  speak  of 
human  nature  as  sinful,  intending  not  the  actual  commission  of  sin, 
but  a  general  characteristic  of  man,  under  the  influence  of  which 
he  has  committed  sins  heretofore,  and  is  prepared,  and  is  prone  to 
commit  others.  With  the  same  meaning  in  our  minds,  we  use  the 
phrases  sinful  propensities,  corrupt  heart,  depraved  mind;  and  the 
contrary  ones,  holy  or  virtuous  dispositions,  moral  rectitude  of 
character,  and  many  others  of  like  import.  When  we  use  these 
kinds  of  phraseology,  we  intend  that  a  reason  exists,  although  un- 
definable  and  unintelligible  by  ourselves,  why  one  mind  will  either 
usually  or  uniformly  be  the  subject  of  holy  volitions,  and  another  of 
sinful  ones.  We  do  not  intend  to  assert  that  any  one,  or  any  num- 
ber of  the  volitions  of  the  man  whom  we  characterize,  has  been,  or 
will  be,  holy  or  sinful,  nor  do  we  mean  to  refer  to  actual  volitions  at 
all.  Instead  of  this,  we  mean  to  indicate  a  state  of  mind  general- 
ly existing,  out  of  which  holy  volitions  may  in  one  case  be  fairly 
expected  to  arise,  and  sinful  ones  in  another.*  Again,  "  When 
God  created  Adam,  there  was  a  period  of  his  existence  after  he 
began  to  be,  antecedent  to  that  in  which  he  exercised  the  first  vo- 
lition. Every  man,  who  believes  the  mind  to  be  something  besides 
ideas  and  exercises,  and  who  does  not  admit  the  doctrine  of  casual- 
ty, will  acknowledge  that  in  this  period  the  mind  of  Adam  was  in 
such  a  state ;  that  it  was  propense  to  the  exercise  of  virtuous  voli- 
tions, rather  than  sinful  ones.  This  state  of  mind  has  been  com- 
monly styled  disposition,  temper,  inclination,  heart,  &c.  In  the 
scriptures  it  usually  bears  the  last  of  these  names.  I  shall  take  the 
liberty  to  call  it  disposition.  This  disposition  was  the  cause  whence 
his  virtuous  volitions  proceeded :  the  reason  why  they  were  vir- 
tuous and  not  sinful.     Of  the  metaphysical  nature  of  this  cause,  I 

*  Works,  vol.  i.,  pp.  410,  411. 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  289 

am  ignorant."  "  This  cause  of  necessity  preceded  these  volitions, 
and  therefore  certainly  existed  in  that  state  of  mind  which  was 
previous  to  his  first  volition."*  This  idea  enters  essentially  into 
his  views  of  several  important  doctrines.  Thus  he  says  Adam  was 
created  holy ;  i.  e.,  with  holy  or  virtuous  dispositions,  propense  to 
the  exercises  of  holy  volitions.  See  his  Sermon  on  Man,  and  that 
on  Regeneration.  Again,  he  makes  original  sin,  or  depravity  de- 
rived from  Adam,  to  consist  in  this  sinful  disposition — a  contami- 
nated moral  nature — and  argues  that  infants  are  depraved  before 
they  are  "  capable  of  moral  action."  And  again,  he  represents  re- 
generation to  consist  in  "  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects,  communicat- 
ed to  it  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost,"  and  explains  his  mean- 
ing by  a  reference  to  "  the  state  of  mind  of  Adam,  in  the  period 
antecedent  to  that  in  which  he  exercised  his  first  volition."  "  The 
soul  of  Adam  was  created  with  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects.  The 
soul  of  every  man  who  becomes  a  Christian,  is  renewed  by  the 
communication  of  the  same  relish.  In  Adam  this  disposition  pro- 
duced virtuous  volitions.  In  every  child  of  Adam,  who  becomes 
the  subject  of  virtue,  it  produces  the  same  effects."!  It  is  impossi- 
ble, we  should  think,  for  any  man  to  force  himself  to  believe  that 
Dr.  Dwight  held  the  doctrine  that  "  moral  character  is  to  be  as- 
cribed to  voluntary  exercises  alone."  To  reconcile  all  the  declara- 
tions which  we  have  quoted,  and  a  multitude  of  others  with  which 
his  works  abound,  is  an  impossibility ;  unless,  indeed,  we  admit 
that  he  did  not  really  believe  what  he  over  and  over  declares  to 
have  been  his  faith,  and  really  adopted  an  opinion  against  which  he 
earnestly  protests  and  ably  argues,  or  that  he  was  so  little  master 
of  the  English  language  as  to  be  unable  to  communicate  ideas  at 
all.  The  reviewer  may  possibly  say,  that  he  does  not  deny  that 
Dr.  Dwight  and  others  held  to  the  existence  of  a  metaphysical 
something,  as  the  cause  of  moral  actions ;  but  they  did  not  attribute 
to  this  something  itself  a  moral  chara'cter ;  that  it  was  called  holy 
or  sinful,  not  from  its  nature,  but  only  from  its  effects.  To  this, 
however,  the  reply  is  obvious;  Dr.  Dwight  not  only  speaks  of  this 
disposition  as  virtuous  or  vicious,  calls  it  a  sinful  or  holy  propensi- 
ty, principle,  nature,  habit,  heart ;  terms  which,  in  themselves,  one 
would  suppose  necessarily  imply  that  the  thing  to  which  they  ap- 
ply had  a  moral  character :  but  he  in  so  many  words  declares  it  to 
be  "  the  seat  of  moral  character  in  rational  beings ;"  it  is  that 
which  mainly  constitutes  the  moral  character  ;  it  is  what  we  mean, 
he  says,  when  we  use  the  phrases,  corrupt  heart,  depraved  mind; 
or  the  contrary  ones,  holy  disposition,  moral  rectitude,  holiness  of 
character.  He  tells  us  he  intends  by  these  phrases  "  a  state  of 
mind,"  which  is  not  a  voluntary  exercise,  but  the  cause  of  volitions. 
"  This  cause  is  what  is  so  often  mentioned  in  scripture  under  the 
name  of  the  heart;  as  when  it  is  said,  '  The  heart  is  deceitful  above 
all  things,  and  desperately  wicked.'"     Will  the  reviewer  have  us 

•  Works,  voL  ii.,  p.  419.  t  v°l-  »••  P-  214. 

19 


290  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

believe  Dr.  Dwight  taught  there  was  no  moral  character  in  this 
cause  of  voluntary  exercises,  which  he  supposed  the  Bible  meant, 
when  it  speaks  of  a  desperately  wicked  heart  ?  Besides,  he  tells  us 
the  communication  of  a  holy  disposition,  or  relish  for  spiritual  ob- 
jects, constitutes  regeneration — is  not  the  moral  character  changed 
in  regeneration  ?  Has  that  no  moral  character,  the  reception  of 
which  constitutes  a  man  a  new  creature  in  Christ  Jesus'?  Yet 
this,  Dr.  Dwight  says,  is  not  a  volition  (p.  418,  vol.  ii.),  but  "  a  relish 
for  spiritual  objects,"  "  a  disposition  which  produces  virtuous  voli- 
tions." Again  :  the  very  same  objections  which  the  reviewer  and 
other  advocates  of  the  New  Divinity,  urge  against  the  idea  of  mo- 
ral principles  prior  to  voluntary  exercises,  and  determining  their 
character,  Dr.  Dwight  considers  and  refutes.  And  finally,  the 
reviewer  tells  that  he  and  his  friends  agree  on  this  point  with  the 
advocates  of  "  the  exercise  scheme,"  the  very  persons  from  whom 
Dr.  Dwight  most  earnestly  dissents  as  to  this  very  point,  which,  he 
says,  no  one  but  a  friend  of  that  scheme,  or  of  the  liberty  of  indif- 
ference, would  think  of  maintaining.  Very  much  to  the  same  pur- 
pose, President  Edwards  says,  that  this  opinion  concerning  virtue 
(as  entirely  depending  on  choice  and  agency)  arises  from  the  ab- 
surd notions  in  vogue  concerning  the  freedom  of  the  will,  as  if  it 
consisted  in  the  will's  self-determining  power."* 

If  anything  could  be  more  wonderful  than  the  reviewer's  claim- 
ing the  authority  of  Edwards  and  Dwight,  in  favour  of  the  opinion 
under  consideration,  it  would  be  his  claiming  Dr.  Griffin  in  the 
same  behalf;  a  theologian  who  is  almost  an  ultra  on  the  other  side. 
Our  limits  and  time  utterly  forbid  our  exhibiting  the  evidence  in 
every  case  of  the  lamentable  misrepresentations  by  the  reviewer 
of  the  opinions  of  the  authors  to  whom  he  refers.  In  the  case  of 
Dr.  Griffin,  it  is  the  less  necessary,  as  his  Park  Street  Lectures  are 
so  extensively  known,  and  as  he  has  so  recently  proclaimed  his 
dissent  from  the  New  Divinity  in  his  sermon  on  Regeneration.  We 
refer  the  readers  to  these  works.  In  the  former,  they  will  find  him 
speaking  of  sin  as  an  "  attribute  of  our  nature,"  derived  from  our 
original  parents,  "  propagated  like  reason  or  speech  (neither  of 
which  are  exercised  at  first),  propagated  like  many  other  propen- 
sities, mental  as  well  as  bodily — propagated  like  the  noxious  nature 
of  other  animals." — P.  12. 

As  to  poor  Augustine  and  Calvin  being  represented  as  holding 
the  radical  doctrine  of  Pelagius,  we  must  think  it  a  great  oversight 
in  the  reviewer.  It  destroys  the  whole  verisimilitude  of  his  story. 
It  forces  the  reader  to  suspect  the  writer  of  irony,  or  to  set  down 
his  statements  with  regard  to  less  notorious  authors,  for  nothing. 
Calvin  defines  original  sin  "  an  hereditary  depravity  and  corrup- 
tion of  our  nature,  diffused  through  every  part  of  the  soul  [strange 
definition  of  a  voluntary  exercise],  which  first  makes  us  obnoxious 
to  the  wrath  of  God,  and  then  produces  those  works  which  the 

*  Works,  vol.  ii.,  p.  410. 


THE    NEW*  DIVINITY    TRIED.  291 

scriptures  denominate  the  works  of  the  flesh."  Do  not  the  "  works 
of  the  flesh"  include  all  sinful  exercises  ?  and  is  there  not  here  as- 
serted a  cause  of  those  exercises,  which  has  itself  a  moral  charac- 
ter ?  Infants,  he  says,  at  their  birth,  are  liable  to  condemnation, 
"  for  though  they  have  not  at  that  time  produced  the  fruits  of  their 
unrighteousness,  yet  they  have  the  seed  inclosed  in  them ;  nay, 
their  whole  nature  is  a  mere  seed  of  sin,  so  that  it  cannot  but  be 
odious  and  abominable  to  God." — Institutiones,  lib.  ii.,  cap.  1,8. 
And  in  another  place  he  speaks  of  men  being  sinners,  "  non  pravae 
duntaxat  consuetudinis  vitio  sed  naturae  quoque  pravitate"  Is  this 
the  language  of  Mr.  Finney  ?  Could  any  advocate  of  the  New 
Divinity  say  with  Calvin,  that  the  "  whole  nature"  of  man,  prior  to 
the  production  of  the  works  of  the  flesh,  "  is  odious  and  abominable 
to  God?"  If  not,  why  quote  Calvin  as  agreeing  with  them  as  to 
this  very  point,  that  all  sin  consists  in  voluntary  exercises  ?  The 
reviewer  himself  "represents  Calvin  as  teaching  that  original  sin 
consists  in  "  inherent  corruption,"  a  mode  of  expression  constantly 
employed  by  such  writers,  to  indicate  moral  depravity  as  distinct 
from  actual  sins,  and  prior  to  them. 

With  regard  to  Augustine  the  case  is  still  more  extraordinary. 
The  reviewer  quotes  from  De  Moor  the  following  passage  from 
this  father  :  "  Sin  is  so  far  a  voluntary  evil,  that  it  would  not  be  sin 
if  it  were  not  voluntary,"  in  proof  that  he  also  held,  "  that  a  moral 
character  was  to  be  ascribed  to  voluntary  exercises  alone."  And 
yet  De  Moor  immediately  adds,  in  answer  to  the  appeal  which  he 
says  Pelagians  make  to  this  passage,  that  Augustine  did  not  wish 
the  declaration  to  be  understood  of  original  sin,  but  restricts  it  to 
actual  sin,  and  quotes  in  proof  from  his  work  against  Julian,  an  ex- 
plicit statement  that  the  principle  was  to  be  so  restricted.  "  Hoc 
enim"  says  Augustine,  ** recte  dicitur  propter  proprium  cujusque 
peccatum,  non  propter  primi  peccati  originate  contaginm."  "  This 
is  properly  said  in  reference  to  the  proper  (or  actual)  sin  of  each 
one,  but  not  of  the  original  contagion  of  the  first  sin."  With  this 
declaration  before  his  eyes,  how  could  the  reviewer  make  such  a 
representation  ? 

It  is  this  reference  to  such  men  as  Edwards,  Bellamy,  and 
Dwight,  besides  older  writers,  as  holding  opinions  which  they  not 
only  did  not  hold,  but  which  in  every  form,  expressly  and  by  impli- 
cation, they  rejected  and  condemn,  that  we  consider  unfair  and  un- 
candid.  We  are  painfully  anxious  to  have  this  course  on  the  part 
of  the  reviewer  and  others  explained.  We  wish  to  know  on  what 
principle  such  statements  can  be  reconciled  with  honesty.  We 
take  it  for  granted  they  must  have  some  esoteric  sense,  some  pri- 
vate meaning,  some  arriere  pensee,  by  which  to  clear  their  con- 
sciences in  this  matter  ;  but  what  it  is  we  cannot  divine.  This  has 
become  so  common  and  so  serious  an  evil,  that  we  are  not  sur- 
prised to  find  some  of  the  leading  theologians  of  Connecticut  say- 
ing, "  It  is  surely  time  that  the  enemies  of  truth  were  relieved  of 
the  burden  of  making  doctrines  for  us,  or  of  informing  us  what  we 


292  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

ourselves  believe."*  It  is  just  as  easy  to  make  Mr.  Rand  agree 
with  Mr.  Finney,  as  it  is  President  Edwards  or  Dr.  Dwight.  All 
that  is  necessary  is  to  take  some  declaration  which  is  intended  to 
apply  to  one  subject  and  apply  it  to  another  ;  and  adopt  the  prin- 
ciple that  language  is  to  be  interpreted,  not  according  to  the  writ- 
er's views  of  the  nature  of  the  subject,  but  according  to  those  of 
the  reviewer.  If  he  say  with  Dr.  Griffin,  "  men  are  voluntary  and 
free  in  all  their  wickedness ;"  or  ask  with  Dr.  Witherspoon,  "  Does 
any  man  commit  sin  but  from  his  own  choice  ?  or  is  he  hindered 
from  any  duty  to  which  he  is  sincerely  and  heartily  inclined  ?" 
then  he  holds  "  that  a  moral  character  is  to  be  ascribed  to  volun- 
tary exercises  alone."  These  identical  passages,  referring  as  the 
very  language  implies  to  actual  sins,  are  quoted  by  the  reviewer 
in  his  defence  of  that  position,  and  as  implying  that  a  moral  charac- 
ter can  be  ascribed  to  nothing  anterior  to  such  voluntary  exercises. 
It  matters  not,  it  would  seem,  that  these  declarations  are  perfectly 
consistent  with  the  belief  in  moral  principles,  dispositions,  or  tastes, 
as  existing  prior  to  all  acts,  or  that  their  authors  express  such  to  be 
their  belief.  This  is  gross  misrepresentation  of  a  writer's  real 
opinions,  whatever  be  its  motive,  or  on  whatever  principle  its  jus- 
tification may  be  attempted. 

We  have  already  admitted  that  there  was  no  novelty  in  this 
fundamental  principle  of  the  New  Divinity,  but  that  the  novelty 
consisted  in  its  being  adopted  by  nominal  Calvinists,  and  traced  to 
much  the  same  results  as  it  ever  has  been  by  the  open  opposers  of 
Calvinism.  Thus  Mr.  Finney  says,  with  great  plainness,  "  a  na- 
ture cannot  be  holy.  The  nature  of  Adam  at  his  creation  was 
not  holy.  Adam  was  made  with  a  nature  neither  sinful  nor  holy. 
When  he  began  to  act  he  made  it  his  governing  purpose  to  serve 
God."  This  declaration  is,  at  least,  in  apparent  opposition  to  the 
statements  so  constantly  occurring  in  theological  writers — that  the 
nature  of  Adam  was  holy  at  his  creation — that  the  nature  of  man 
since  the  fall  is  sinful,  and  others  of  similar  import.  The  method 
which  the  reviewer  adopts  of  reconciling  this  apparent  discre- 
pance is,  as  usual,  entirely  unsatisfactory.  He  tells  us  there  are 
three  senses  in  which  the  word  nature  is  used,  as  applied  to  moral 
beings  ;  first,  it  indicates  something  which  is  an  original  and  essen- 
•  tial  part  of  their  constitution,  not  resulting  at  all  from  their  choice 
or  agency,  and  necessarily  found  in  them  of  whatever  character 
and  in  whatever  circumstances  ;"  second,  it  is  used  to  designate 
the  period  prior  to  conversion,  as  when  Paul  says,  "  we  are  by 
nature,"  i.  e.,  in  our  unregenerate  state,  "  the  children  of  wrath ;" 
and  *  a  third  sense  is,  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  being  a  thing  spoken  of,  which  is  the  ground  or  occa- 
sion of  a  certainty  that  it  will,  in  all  its  appropriate  circumstances, 


*  See  the  prospectus  of  a  new  monthly  religious  periodical,  to  be  entitled  the 
Evangelical  Magazine,  and  to  be  conducted  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Con- 
necticut Doctrinal  Tract  Society. 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  293 

exhibit  the  result  or  quality  predicated  of  it."  What  the  preacher 
meant  and  only  meant,  according  to  the  reviewer,  was  "  that  holi- 
ness was  not  an  essential  part  of  Adam's  constitution  at  his  crea- 
tion, so  as  not  to  result  at  all  from  his  choice  and  agency." — Pp.  9, 
10.  There  is  in  all  this  statement  a  great  want  of  precision  and 
accuracy.  The  reviewer  uses  the  expressions,  essential  part  of 
the  constitution,  and  "  not  resulting  from  choice  or  agency,"  as 
synonymous,  though  he  must  be  aware  that  Mr.  Rand  and  the 
great  body  of  Christians  agree  in  saying,  that  holiness  and  sin  are 
not  and  cannot  be  essential  attributes,  in  the  sense  of  the  reviewer. 
An  essential  attribute  is  an  attribute  which  inheres  in  the  essence 
of  a  thing,  and  is  necessary  to  its  being.  Thus  the  attributes 
of  thought  and  feeling  are  essential  to  mind ;  without  them  it  is 
not  mind.  Who  ever  maintained  that  holiness  was  so  essential  a 
part  of  man's  constitution  that  he  ceased  to  be  man  when  he  lost 
it  ?  Who  ever  maintained  that  either  sin  or  holiness  resided  in  the 
essence  of^the  soul,  or  was  a  physical  attribute  ?  The  reviewer 
knows  as  well  as  anybody,  that  this  Manichean  and  Flacian  doc- 
trine was  spurned  and  rejected  by  the  whole  Christian  church. 
But  does  it  follow  from  this,  that  holiness  and  sin  must  depend  en- 
tirely on  choice  and  agency  ;  that  there  can  be  nothing  of  a  moral 
character  prior  to  acts  of  preference  ?  Certainly  not.  For  this 
simple  reason,  that  while  the  Christian  church  has  rejected  the  idea 
of  the  substantial  nature  of  sin  and  holiness,  it  has  with  equal  una- 
nimity held  the  doctrine  of  moral  propensities,  dispositions,  or  ten- 
dencies, prior  to  all  acts  of  choice.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  they 
have  affirmed,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  the  New  Divinity  denies,  that 
u  a  nature  may  be  sinful  or  holy."  And  this  denial,  as  Mr.  Rand 
correctly  states,  is  a  denial  of  the  doctrines  of  original  righteous- 
ness and  original  sin.  "The  doctrine  of  original  righteousness,  or 
the  creation  of  our  first  parents  with  holy  principles  and  disposi- 
tions, has  a  close  connexion,"  says  President  Edwards,  "  with  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin.  Dr.  Taylor  was  sensible  of  this ;  and 
accordingly  he  strenuously  opposes  this  doctrine  in  his  book  on 
original  sin."  "Dr.  T.'s  grand  objection  against  this  doctrine, 
which  he  abundantly  insists  on,  is  this  :  that  it  is  utterly  inconsis- 
tent with  the  nature  of  virtue  that  it  should  be  created  with  any 
person ;  because,  if  so,  it  must  be  by  an  act  of  God's  absolute 
power  without  our  knowledge  or  concurrence ;  and  that  moral 
virtue,  in  its  very  nature,  implieth  the  choice  and  consent  of  the 
moral  agent."  This  is  the  notion  of  virtue  which  he  pronounces 
quite  inconsistent  with,  the  nature  of  things.  Human  nature,  he 
afterwards  says,  must  be  created  with  some  dispositions ;  these 
concentrated  dispositions  must  be  right  or  wrong ;  if  man  had  a 
disposition  to  delight  in  what  was  good,  then  his  dispositions  were 
morally  right. — Vol.  ii.,  pp.  406  and  413.  This  is  the  view  which 
has  been  wellnigh  universal  in  the  Christian  church ;  this  is  the 
idea  of  original  righteousness  which  the  New  Divinity  rejects, 
urging  the  same  objection  to  it  which  Dr.  Taylor  of  Norwich,  and 


294  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

Pelagians  and  Socinians  long  before  him  had  done.  We  are  not, 
any  more  than  the  reviewer,  discussing  the  truth  of  these  doctrines, 
but  merely  endeavouring  to  correct  his  very  uncandid*representa- 
tions,  as  they  appear  to  us. 

It  is  further  objected  to  the  New  Divinity,  that  it  rejects  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin.  .This  the  reviewer  denies.  What  is  this 
doctrine  ?  If  this  point  be  ascertained,  the  question  whether  the 
objection  is  well  founded  or  not  can  be  easily  answered.  Let  us 
advert  then  to  the  definitions  of  the  doctrine  as  given  in  the  lead- 
ing Protestant  Confessions.  In  the  Helvetic  Confession,  the  Con- 
fessio  et  Expositio  brevis,  fyc,  cap.  viii.,  after  stating  that  man 
was  at  first  created  in  the  image  of  God,  but  by  the  fall  became 
subject  to  sin,  death,  and  various  calamities,  and  that  all  who  are 
descended  from  Adam  are  like  him  and  exposed  to  all  these  evils, 
it  is  said,  "  Sin  we  understand  to  be  that  native  corruption  of  man, 
derived  or  propagated  from  our  first  parents  to  us,  by  which  we 
are  immersed  in  evil  desires,  averse  from  good,  prone  to  all  evil," 
&c.  "  We  therefore  acknowledge  original  sin  to  be  in  all  men  ; 
we  acknowledge  all  other  sins  which  arise  from  this,"  &c.  The 
Basil  Confession  of  1532:  "  We  confess  that  man  was  originally 
created  in  the  image  of  God,"  &c,  "  but  of  his  own  accord  fell  into 
sin,  by  which  fall  the  whole  human  race  has  become  corrupt  and 
liable  to  condemnation.  Hence  our  nature  is  vitiated,"  &c.  The 
Gallican  confession,  1561  :  "  We  believe  that  the  whole  race  of 
Adam  is  infected  with  this  contagion  which  we  call  original  sin, 
that  is,  a  depravity  which  is  propagated,  and  is  not  derived  by 
imitation  merely,  as  the  Pelagians  supposed,  all  whose  errors  we 
detest.  Neither  do  we  think  it  necessary  to  inquire  how  this  sin 
can  be  propagated  from  one  to  another,"  &c.  The  ninth  Article 
of  the  Church  of  England  states :  "  Original  sin  standeth  not  in  the 
following  of  Adam  (as  the  Pelagians  do  vainly  talk),  but  it  is  the 
fault  and  corruption  of  every  man,  that  naturally  is  engendered  of 
the  offspring  of  Adam,  whereby  man  is  very  far  gone  from  origi- 
nal righteousness,  and  is  of  his  own  nature  inclined  to  evil,  so  that 
the  flesh  lusteth  always  contrary  to  the  Spirit."  The  Belgic  Con- 
fession says,  "  We  believe,  that  by  the  disobedience  of  Adam, 
original  sin  has  been  diffused  through  the  whole  human  race,  which 
is  a  corruption  of  the  whole  nature  and  a  hereditary  depravity,  by 
which  even  infants  in  their  mother's  womb  are  polluted,  and  which, 
as  a  root,  produces  every  kind  of  sin  in  man,  and  is  so  foul  and 
execrable  before  God,  that  it  suffices  to  the  condemnation  of  the 
human  race."  The  Polish  Confession,  Art.  iii. :  "  All  men,  Christ 
only  excepted,  are  conceived  and  born  in  sin,  even  the  most  holy 
Virgin  Mary.  Original  sin  consists  not  only  in  the  entire  want  of 
original  righteousness,  but  also  in  depravity  or  proneness  to  evil, 
propagated  from  Adam  to  all  men."  The  Augsburgh  Confession, 
Art.  ii. :  "  This  disease  or  original  depravity  is  truly  sin,  condemn- 
ing and  bringing  even  now  eternal  death  to  those  who  are  not 
renewed  by  baptism  and  the  Holy  Spirit."     And  the  Forma  Con- 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  295 

cordantiae  :  "  Not  only  actual  transgressions  should  be  acknow- 
ledged as  sins,  but  especially  this  hereditary  disease  should  be 
regarded  as  a  horrible  sin,  and  indeed  as  the  principle  and  head  of 
all  sins,  whence,  as  from  a  root,  all  other  transgressions  grow." 

We  have  referred  to  the  leading  confessions  of  the  period  of  the 
Reformation  to  show  that  they  all  represent  as  the  constituent 
essential  idea  of  original  sin — a  corrupted  nature,  or  hereditary 
taint  derived  from  Adam,  propagated  by  ordinary  generation,  in- 
fecting the  whole  race,  and  the  source  or  root  of  all  actual  sin. 
This  is  not  the  doctrine  therefore  of  Calvinists  merely,  but  of  the 
reformed  churches  generally,  as  it  was  of  the  catholic  church  be- 
fore the  Reformation.  It  is  the  doctrine,  too,  of  the  great  body  of 
Arminians.  It  is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  individual  writers  after 
this  reference  to  symbols  which  express  the  united  testimony  of 
thousands  as  to  what  original  sin  is.  That  the  more  modern  Cal- 
vinists (with  the  exception  of  the  advocates  of  the  exercise  scheme) 
unite  in  this  view  is  as  plain,  and  as  generally  acknowledged,  as  that 
it  was  held  by  the  Reformers.  Thus  President  Edwards  defines 
original  sin  to  be  "an  innate  sinful  depravity  of  heart."  He 
makes  this  depravity  to  consist  "  in  a  corrupt  and  evil  disposition," 
prior  to  all  sinful  exercises.  He  infers  from  the  universality  and 
certainty  of  the  sinful  conduct  of  men,  first,  "  that  the  natural  state 
of  the  mind  of  man  is  attended  with  a  propensity  of  nature  to  such 
an  issue  ;"  and  secondly,  that  their  "  nature  is  corrupt  and  depraved 
with  a  moral  depravity."  He  speaks  of  this  propensity  "  as  a  very 
evil,  pernicious,  and  depraved  propensity  ;"  "  an  infinitely  dreadful 
and  pernicious  tendency."  He  undertakes  to  prove  "  that  wicked- 
ness belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  men."  He  devotes  a  chapter 
to  the  consideration  of  the  objection,  "  that  to  suppose  men  born 
in  sin  without  their  choice,  or  any  previous  act  of  their  own,  is  to 
suppose  what  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  sin  ;"  and  another 
to  the  objection,  that  "  the  doctrine  of  native  corruption"  makes 
God  the  author  of  sin.  Precisely  the  objections  of  the  New  Di- 
vinity to  the  common  views  on  this  subject. 

Dr.  Dwight  is  not  less  explicit ;  he  makes  this  depravity  to  con- 
sist in  "  the  corruption  of  that  energy  of  the  mind  whence  volitions 
flow,  and  which  is  the  seat  of  moral  character  in  rational  beings." 
Vol.  i.,  p.  488.  He  proves  that  "  infants  are  contaminated  in  their 
moral  nature,"  from  the  sinful  conduct  of  "  every  infant  who  lives 
long  enough  to  be  capable  of  moral  action."  Here  then  is  moral 
pollution  prior  to  moral  action. 

Dr.  Woods  also  maintains  the  doctrine  of  depravity  as  natural, 
innate,  and  hereditary,  in  his  letters  to  Dr.  Ware.  "  Sin,"  accord- 
ing to  Dr.  Griffin,  "  belongs  to  the  nature  of  man,  as  much  as  rea- 
son or  speech  [which  we  do  not  believe ;  but  it  serves  to  show 
to  what  lengths  the  reviewer  has  permitted  himself  to  go,  when 
he  quotes  this  writer  in  support  of  the  position,  that  all  sin  consists 
in  voluntary  exercises],  though  in  a  sense  altogether  compatible 
with  blame,  and  must  be  derived,  like  other  universal  attributes, 


296  THE    NEW   DIVINITY    TRIED. 

from  the  original  parent ;  propagated  like  reason  or  speech  (nei- 
ther of  which  is  exercised  at  first)  ;  propagated  like  many  other 
propensities,  mental  as  well  as  bodily,  which  certainly  are  inherited 
from  parents  ;  propagated  like  the  noxious  nature  of  animals."  He 
afterwards  argues,  "  if  infants  receive  their  whole  nature  from  their 
parents  pure,"  "if  they  are  infected  with  no  depravity,"  when 
born,  "  it  is  plain  that  they  never  derived  a  taint  of  moral  pollu- 
tion from  Adam."  "  There  can  be  no  conveyance  after  they  are 
born,  and  his  sin  was  in  no  sense  the  occasion  of  the  universal  de- 
pravity of  the  world,  otherwise  than  merely  as  the  first  example."* 

We  think  it  must  be  apparent  that  Mr.  Rand  was  perfectly  jus- 
tifiable in  asserting  that  the  New  Divinity  rejects  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin.  What  is  the  meaning  of  this  assertion  ?  Is  it  not 
that  the  idea  commonly  expressed  by  that  term  is  discarded  ? 
This  idea,  as  we  have  shown,  is  that  of  natural  hereditary  depra- 
vity, or  of  a  corrupt  moral  nature  derived  from  our  first  parent. 
Sometimes  indeed  more  is  included  in  the  term,  as  the  idea  of  im- 
putation. Sometimes  the  phrase  is  explained  with  more  and  some- 
times with  less  precision,  some  resolving  the  idea  of  corruption 
into  its  constituent  parts — the  want  of  original  righteousness  and 
tendency  to  evil — and  others  not ;  but  with  an  uniformity  almost 
unparalleled  in  theological  language  and  opinion,  has  the  idea  of 
innate  corruption  been  represented  as  the  essential  constituent  idea 
of  original  sin.  The  very  distinction  between  original  and  actual 
sin,  so  common,  shows  that  the  former  expression  is  intended  to 
convey  the  idea  of  something  which  is  regarded  as  sin,  which  is 
not  an  act  or  voluntary  exercise.  The  obvious  sense,  therefore,  of 
Mr.  Rand's  assertion  is  correct. 

The  reviewer's  answer  is  a  little  remarkable.  He  tells  us  there 
are  various  senses  in  which  the  phrase  "  original  sin"  has  been 
used  in  orthodox  confessions  and  standard  writings,  in  some  one 
of  which  senses  Mr.  Finney  may,  and  doubtless  does,  hold  to 
"original  sin." — P.  13.  He  then  undertakes  to  enumerate  eight 
different  senses,  mainly  by  representing  as  distinct,  different  modes 
of  stating  the  same  idea.  1.  The  first  sin  of  the  first  man.  2. 
The  first  sin  of  the  first  man  and  woman.  (Is  it  not  clear  the  re- 
viewer was  anxious  to  swell  his  list?)  3.  Natural  or  inherent  cor- 
ruption. 4.  Want  of  original  righteousness  and  inclination  to  evil. 
(Identical  with  the  preceding.)  5.  Imputation  of  Adam's  sin,  and 
the  innate  sinful  depravity  of  the  heart.  6.  Something  not  de- 
scribed, but  distinct  from  natural  corruption,  and  that  came  to  us 
by  the  fall  of  Adam.  (This  specification  is  founded  on  the  answer 
given  in  the  form  of  examination  before  the  communion  in  the 
Kirk  of  Scotland,  1591,  to  the  question,  "What  things  come  to 
us  by  that  fall  ?  Ans.  Original  sin,  and  natural  corruption.  Where 
it  is  plain  that  by  original  sin  is  meant,  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first 
sin.)     7.  The  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin,  the  defect  of  original  right- 

■   I 

*  Park  Street  Lectures,  pp.  12—18. 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  297 

eousness,  and  concupiscence.  8.  The  universal  sinfulness  of  Adam's 
posterity  as  connected  with  his  first  sin  by  divine  constitution. — 
Dr.  Hopkins. 

No  one,  we  presume,  could  imagine  that  Mr.  Rand  intended  to 
charge  Mr.  Finney  with  denying  the  fact  that  Adam  sinned,  when 
he  said  he  denied  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  The  first  and  se- 
cond, therefore,  of  the  foregoing  specifications,  might  safely  have 
been  omitted.  As  to  all  the  others,  excepting  the  last,  they 
amount  to  the  simple  statement  of  President  Edwards,  that  the 
phrase  is  commonly  used  to  indicate  either  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first 
sin,  or  inherent  corruption,  sometimes  the  one  and  sometimes  the 
other,  but  most  frequently  both  conjoined.  The  cases  in  which 
original  sin  is  said  to  include  both  the  want  of  original  righteous- 
ness and  corruption  of  nature,  are,  as  we  before  remarked,  but  ex- 
amples of  greater  precision  in  the  description  of  the  thing  intended, 
and  not  statements  of  an  opinion  diverse  from  that  expressed  by 
the  single  phrase,  innate  depravity.  The  absence  of  light  is  dark- 
ness, the  absence  of  heat  is  cold,  the  absence  of  order  is  confusion, 
and  so  the  absence  of  original  righteousness  is  depravity ;  and  this 
is  all  that  President  Edwards  intended  to  express  in  the  passage 
quoted  by  the  reviewer,  in  which  he  says  there  is  no  necessity,  in 
order  to  account  for  a  sinful  corruption  of  nature,  yea,  a  total  na- 
tive depravity  of  the  heart  of  man,  to  suppose  any  evil  quality  in- 
fused, but  that  the  absence  of  positive  good  qualities  is  abundantly 
sufficient.  The  reviewer,  we  presume,  knows  very  well  that  this 
is  the  common  view  adopted  by  those  who  hold  the  doctrine  of 
physical  depravity,  as  it  is  styled  by  the  New  Divinity.  He  knew 
that,  according  to  their  views,  it  is  just  as  supposable  that  man 
might  be  created  with  an  "  instinctive"  disposition  to  love  God,  as  ■ 
with  the  disposition  to  love  himself,  love  society,  his  children,  or 
anything  else ;  that  Adam  was  actually  thus  created,  that  this  dis- 
position was  not  constitutional  in  the  sense  in  which  the  instinct  of 
self-love  is  constitutional,  but  supernatural,  resulting  from  his  being 
in  communion  with  the  Spirit  of  God  ;  that  the  human  soul,  instinct  * 
with  the  dispositions  of  self-love,  natural  appetite,  &c,  and  desti- 
tute of  any  disposition  to  take  delight  in  God  or  holiness,  is  not  in 
its  normal  state,  but  in  a  state  of  moral  degradation  and  ruin  ;  that 
they  believe  there  is  a  great  difference  between  the  state  of  the 
soul  when  it  comes  into  existence  since  the  fall,  and  the  state  of 
Adam's  soul ;  between  the  soul  of  an  ordinary  man  and  the  state 
of  the  soul  of  the  blessed  Jesus ;  that  this  difference  is  prior  to  all 
choice  or  agency,  and  not  dependent  upon  them,  and  it  is  a  moral 
difference,  Adam  being  in  a  holy  state,  instinct  with  holy  disposi- 
tions, and  men  being  in  a  state  of  moral  corruption  at  the  moment 
of  their  coming  into  existence.  He  doubtless  knew  also,  as  his 
own  enumeration  shows,  that  the  phrase,  original  sin,  has  been 
with  great  unanimity  employed  to  designate  this  state  of  the  soul 
prior  to  moral  action,  and  that  the  fact  that  all  men  actually  sin, 
and  that  their  sinfulness  is  somehow  connected  with  the  sin  of 


298  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

Adam,  is  not  the  fact  which  the  term  has  been  employed  (to  any 
extent)  to  express  ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  one  fact  (the  univer- 
sally sinful  conduct  of  men)  has  been  the  standing  argument  to 
prove  the  other  fact,  viz.,  innate  inherent  depravity ;  and  he 
should,  therefore,  have  seen  that  it  is  preposterous  to  assert  that  the 
fact  of  all  men  actually  sinning,  and  that  this  is  somehow  connected 
with  Adam's  sin,  is  the  fact  expressed  by  the  term  original  sin.  If 
this  be  so,  then  all  Pelagians,  and  all  Socinians,  and  all  opposers 
of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  still  hold  it.  For  they  all  believe 
that  men  universally  sin,  and  that  this  is  somehow  (by  example,  &c.) 
connected  with  Adam's  sin.  The  reviewer's  saying,  "  that  men  sin, 
and  only  sin,  until  renewed  by  the  Holy  Ghost,"  although  it  may 
make  a  difference  as  to  the  extent  of  the  wickedness  of  men,  makes 
none  in  the  world  as  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  This  doctrine, 
as  it  has  been  held  by  ninety-hundredths  of  the  Christian  church, 
he  rejects  just  as  much  as  the  Pelagians  do.#  We  presume  this 
will  be  called  an  ad  invidiam  argument.  It  little  concerns  us  what 
it  is  called,  if  it  is  but  just  and  proper  in  itself.  What  is  the  state 
of  the  case  ?  Here  are  a  set  of  men  who  hold  certain  opinions, 
which  they  assiduously  and  ably  advocate.  Not  content  with  al- 
lowing them  to  stand  on  their  own  merits,  they  seek  to  cover  them 
with  the  robes  of  authority,  asserting  that  this,  and  that,  and  almost 
every  man  distinguished  for  piety  and  talents,  has  held  or  does  hold 
them.  When  currency  and  favour  are  thus  sought  to  be  obtained 
for  these  opinions,  by  claiming  in  their  behalf  the  authority  of  ve- 
nerable names,  is  it  not  a  duty  to  say  and  show  that  this  claim  is 
unfounded,  if  such  be  really  the  case  ?  What  means  this  arraying 
against  Mr.  Rand  the  authority  of  Augustine,  Calvin,  Edwards, 
Bellamy,  Dwight,  &c,  &c.  ?  What  is  the  object  of  this  array,  if  it 
is  not  to  crush  him,  and  sustain  Mr.  Finney  ?  And  yet  we  presume 
there  is  no  fact  in  the  history  of  theological  opinions  more  notorious, 
than  that  as  to  the  points  in  debate  they  agree  with  Mr.  Rand, 
and  differ  from  Mr.  Finney.  The  earliest  advocate  of  some  of  the 
*  leading  doctrines  of  the  New  Divinity,  the  author  of  Views  in  The- 
ology, instead  of  pursuing  this  objectionable  and  unworthy  course, 
came  out  with  a  distinct  avowal  of  dissent  from  the  generally  re- 
ceived doctrines  on  this  subject.  The  same  honourable  course  was 
taken  by  Dr.  Cox  ;  by  the  late  Mr.  Christmas,  in  his  sermon  on 
Ability  ;  by  Mr.  Duffield,  in  his  recent  work  on  Regeneration  ;  and 
we  venture  to  commend  it  to  the  reviewer  as  the  right  course,  and, 
if  such  a  consideration  need  be  suggested,  as  the  most  politic.  We 
have  little  doubt  some  of  the  advocates  of  the  New  Divinity  have 
suffered  more  in  public  confidence  from  taking  the  opposite  course, 

*  The  appeal  which  the  reviewer  makes  to  writings  of  the  disciples  of  Dr.  Emmons, 
is,  as  he  must  know,  entirely  unsatisfactory.  Though  as  to  the  verbal  statement,  that 
sin  consists  in  voluntary  acts,  there  is  an  agreement,  the  whole  view  and  relations  of 
the  doctrine  as  held  by  him  and  them  are  different,  and  some  of  the  most  zealous  op- 
ponents of  the  New  Divinity  are  these  very  Emmonites,  to  whom  he  is  constantly 
appealing  for  protection. 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  299 

than  from  their  opinions  themselves.     And  we  suspect  the  review- 
er's pamphlet  will  be  another  mill-stone  around  their  neck. 

Another  inference  from  the  leading  idea  of  this  new  system  is, 
that  regeneration  is  man's  own  act,  consisting  in  the  choice  of 
God  as  the  portion  of  the  soul,  or  in  a  change  in  the  governing  pur- 
pose of  the  life.  Mr.  Finney's  account  of  its  nature  is  as  fol- 
lows :  "  I  will  show,"  says  he,  "  what  is  intended  in  the  com- 
mand in  the  text  (to  make  a  new  heart).  It  is  that  a  man 
should  change  the  governing  purpose  of  his  life.  A  man  resolves 
to  be  a  lawyer  ;  then  he  directs  all  his  plans  and  efforts  to  that  ob- 
ject, and  that  for  the  time  is  his  governing  purpose.  Afterwards, 
he  may  alter  his  determination  and  resolve  to  be  a  merchant.  Now 
he  directs  all  his  efforts  to  that  object,  and  so  has  changed  his  heart, 
or  governing  purpose."  Again :  "  It  is  apparent  that  the  change 
now  described,  effected  by  the  simple  volition  of  the  sinner's  mind 
through  the  influence  of  motives,  is  a  sufficient  change,  all  that  the 
Bible  requires.  It  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  make  a  sinner  a  Chris- 
tian." 

This  account  of  making  a  new  heart,  the  reviewer  undertakes  to 
persuade  the  public,  is  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  regeneration  and 
conversion.  This  he  attempts  by  plunging  at  once  into  the  depths 
of  metaphysics,  and  bringing  out  of  these  plain  sentences  a  mean- 
ing as  remote  from  their  apparent  sense,  as  ever  Cabalist  extract- 
ed from  Hebrew  letters.  He  begins  by  exhibiting  the  various 
senses  in  which  the  words,  will,  heart,  purpose,  volition,  &c,  are 
used.  We  question  the  accuracy  of  his  statements  with  regard  to 
the  first  of  these  terms.  He  is  right  enough  in  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  restricted  and  extended  meaning  of  the  word,  that  is, 
between  the  will  considered  as  the  power  of  the  mind  to  determine 
on  its  own  actions,  and  as  the  power  to  choose  or  prefer.  But 
when  he  infers  from  this  latter  definition,  that  not  only  the  natural 
appetites,  as  hunger  and  thirst,  but  also  the  social  affections,  as 
love  of  parents  and  children,  &c,  are  excluded  by  Edwards  and 
others  who  adopt  it,  from  the  will,  we  demur.  Edwards  says  that 
"  all  liking  and  disliking,  inclining  or  being  averse  to,  being  pleased 
or  displeased  with,"  are  to  be  referred  to  the  will,  and  conse- 
quently it  includes  these  affections.  However,  it  is  not  to  our  pur- 
pose to  pursue  this  subject.  The  reviewer  claims,  as  usual, 
to  agree  with  Edwards,  and  excludes  all  such  affections  as  love  of 
parents,  love  of  children,  &c,  from  the  will,  until  they  involve  a 
preference  or  choice  ;  as  though  every  exercise  of  these  affections 
did  not  in  their  own  nature  involve  such  a  preference,  as  much  as 
love,  when  directed  to  any  object.  He  then  makes  the  will  and 
heart  synonymous  (thus  excluding  love  of  children,  &c,  from  the 
heart),  and  proceeds  to  enumerate  the  various  classification  of  vo- 
litions into  principal,  ultimative,  subordinate,  immanent,  and  im- 
perative, and  winds  up  his  elucidation  and  defence  of  Mr.  Finney's 
statement,  by  making  his  "  governing  purpose"  to  be  equivalent 
with  an  "immanent  volition,"  or  "the  controlling  habitual  pre- 


300  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

ference  of  the  soul."  We  cannot  understand  by  what  rule  of  in- 
terpretation this  sense  can  be  got  out  of  the  preacher's  expressions 
in  their  connexion  in  the  sermon.  Certain  it  is  the  common  usage 
of  language  would  never  lead  any  reader  to  imagine  that,  in  a  plain 
popular  discourse,  not  in  a  metaphysical  essay  from  an  avowed 
advocate  of  the  exercise  scheme,  the  phrase,  a  "  governing  pur- 
pose," meant  an  immanent  volition  ;  or  "  to  alter  a  determination," 
meant  to  change  the  supreme  controlling  affection  or  choice  of  the 
soul.  The  reviewer  himself  betrays  his  conviction  that  this  is  not 
the  proper  acceptation  of  the  terms,  for  he  complains  of  Mr. 
Rand  for  making  Mr.  Finney's  governing  purpose  mean  no  more 
than  a  mere  determination  of  the  mind  ;  and  yet  the  preacher 
substitutes  one  of  these  expressions  for  the  other,  as,  in  his  own 
view,  synonymous.  He  tells  us  "  a  man  alters  his  determination, 
and  so  has  changed  his  heart  or  governing  purpose."  But  suppos- 
ing we  should  admit  that,  taken  by  themselves,  the  words  "  go- 
verning purpose"  might  bear  the  sense  the  reviewer  endeavours  to 
place  under  them,  how  is  this  to  be  reconciled  with  the  preacher's 
illustrations  ?  "A  man  resolves  to  be  a  lawyer ;  then  he  directs  all 
his  plans  and  efforts  to  that  object,  and  that  for  the  time  is  his 
governing  purpose :  afterwards  he  may  alter  his  determination,  and 
resolve  to  be  a  merchant  ;  now  he  directs  all  his  efforts  to  that 
object,  and  so  has  changed  his  heart  or  governing  purpose."  What 
is  the  nature  of  the  change  involved  in  the  alteration  of  a  man's 
purpose,  with  regard  to  his  profession  ?  Is  it  a  radical  change  of 
the  affections,  or  is  it  a  mere  determination  of  the  mind,  founded 
on  considerations  of  whose  nature  the  determination  itself  can 
give  us  no  certain  information  ?  As  one  man  may  make  the 
change  from  one  motive,  and  another  from  another ;  one  from  real 
love  to  the  pursuit  chosen,  and  another  from  extraneous  reasons ; 
it  is  evident  the  change  of  purpose  does  not  imply  nor  necessarily 
involve  a  change  in  the  affections.  When,  therefore,  Mr.  Finney 
tells  his  hearers  that  the  change  required  of  them  is  a  change 
analogous  to  that  which  takes  place  when  a  man  alters  his  deter- 
mination as  to  his  profession,  and  that  this  is  all  that  is  required, 
all  that  is  necessary  to  make  a  sinner  a  Christian,  he  is  justly  re- 
presented as  making  religion  to  consist  in  a  mere  determination  of 
the  mind.  Whatever  may  be  his  esoteric  sense,  this  is  the  mean- 
ing his  words  convey,  and  his  hearers,  we  have  no  doubt,  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten  receive.  This  impression  would  be  further  con- 
firmed by  their  being  told  that  it  is  a  very  simple  change,  effected 
by  a  simple  volition  of  their  own  minds  ;  and  that  it  is  a  very  easy 
change,  it  being  as  easy  to  purpose  right  as  wrong.  The  review- 
er's defence  of  this  mode  of  representing  a  change,  which  is  said 
in  scripture  to  be  effected  by  the  mighty  power  of  God,  strikes  us 
as  singularly  weak.  He  tells  us,  "  there  are  two  different  senses 
in  which  a  moral  act  may  be  said  to  be  easy  or  difficult  to  a  man ; 
the  one  referring  to  the  nature  of  the  act  nnd  the  capacity  of  the 
agent,  that  is,  his  possession  of  the  requisite  powers  for  its  per- 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  301 

formance  ;  and  the  other  referring  to  the  disposition  and  habit  of  his 
mind  in  reference  to  the  act." — P.  11.  Thus  we  may  say,  it  is  as 
easy  to  be  generous  as  covetous,  and  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  a 
covetous  man  to  be  generous.  It  is  admitted  then,  that  it  is  very 
difficult  for  a  man  to  do  anything  contrary  to  the  disposition  or 
habit  of  his  mind,  and  of  course  it  must  be  exceedingly  difficult  to 
make  an  entire  and  radical  change  in  the  affections.  But  Mr.  Fin- 
ney says  it  is  very  easy  to  change  the  heart — to  alter  one's  pur- 
pose. Would  not  this  prove  that  he  supposed  the  thing  to  be  done 
was  not  the  thing  which  the  reviewer  represents  to  be  very  diffi- 
cult ?  Does  it  not  go  to  confirm  the  impression  that  he  makes  the 
change  in  question  to  consist  in  a  mere  determination  of  the  mind, 
to  the  exclusion  of  a  change  in  the  affections  ?  When  the  ease  of 
the  work  to  be  done  is  urged  as  a  motive  for  doing  it,  we  have  a 
right  to  suppose  that  an  easy  work  is  intended.  But  the  transfer- 
ring the  affections  from  one  object  to  another  of  an  opposite  charac- 
ter ;  to  love  what  we  have  been  accustomed  to  hate,  and  to  hate 
what  we  have  been  in  the  habit  of  loving,  is  a  difficult  work,  and 
therefore  not  included  in  the  mere  alteration  of  one's  purpose, 
which  is  declared  to  be,  and  in  fact  is,  so  easy.  Not  only,  there- 
fore, the  mode  of  expression  employed  in  describing  a  change  of 
heart,  but  the  illustrations  of  its  nature,  and  the  mode  of  enforcing 
the  duty,  are  adapted  to  make  precisely  the  impression  which  Mr. 
Rand  received  from  the  sermon,  that  conversion,  in  the  judgment 
of  the  preacher,  is  a  very  trifling  affair,  effected  as  easily  as  a 
change  in  our  plans  of  business  ;  and  we  have  reason  to  know 
that  this  is  the  impression  actually  produced  on  the  minds  of  hear- 
ers by  the  preachers  of  this  class,  and  on  the  minds  of  the  friends 
and  advocates  of  the  new  system  themselves.  Such,  we  think,  is 
the  natural  and  fair  impression  of  the  popular  mode  of  represent- 
ing the  subject ;  and  we  very  much  question  whether  the  meta- 
physical explanation  of  it  amounts  to  anything  more.  It  is  one  of 
the  most  singular  features  of  the  review  under  consideration,  that 
although  the  writer  seems  willing  to  take  shelter  under  any  great 
name,  his  principal  reliance  is  on  the  advocates  of  Emmonism. 
Yet  it  so  happens  that  his  system  and  theirs  are  exactly  the  poles 
apart.  In  the  one,  divine  agency  is  exalted  to  the  real  exclusion 
of  that  of  man ;  in  the  other,  very  much  the  reverse  is  the  case. 
According  to  the  one,  it  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  sin  and  virtue 
to  be  created  ;  according  to  the  other,  necessary  holiness  is  no 
holiness,  there  cannot  be  even  an  "  instinct"  for  holiness,  to  borrow 
President  Edwards's  expression.  The  same  expression,  therefore, 
in  the  mouth  of  the  advocate  of  the  one  theory,  may  have  a  very 
different  meaning  from  what  it  has  in  that  of  an  advocate  of  the 
other ;  and  even  if  the  idea  be  the  same,  its  whole  relations  and 
bearings  are  different.  It  is  not,  then,  to  the  followers  of  Dr.  Em- 
mons we  are  to  go  to  learn  what  is  meant  by  the  immanent  voli- 
tions, primary  choices,  or  governing  purposes  of  the  New  Divinity. 
We  must  go,  where  the  reviewer  himself  in  another  part  of  his 


302  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

pamphlet  sends  us,  to  the  advocates  of  the  new  system  itself.  We 
find  that  when  they  come  to  give  their  philosophical  explanation  of 
the  nature  of  regeneration,  it  amounts  to  little  more  than  the  popu- 
lar representations  of  Mr.  Finney.  In  the' Christian  Spectator,  for 
example,  we  find  regeneration  described  as  the  choice  of  God,  as 
the  chief  good,  under  the  impulse  of  self-love  or  desire  of  happi- 
ness. The  sinner  is,  therefore,  directed  to  consider  which  is 
adapted  to  make  him  most  happy,  God  or  the  world  ;  to  place  the 
case  fairly  before  his  mind,  and,  by  a  great  effort,  choose  right. 
This,  as  we  understand  it,  is  a  description,  not  of  an  entire  and 
radical  change  in  the  affections,  but  of  a  simple  determination  of 
the  mind,  founded  on  the  single  consideration  of  the  adaptation  of 
the  object  chosen  to  impart  happiness.  If  I  determine  to  seek  one 
thing  because  it  will  make  me  more  happy  than  another  (and  if 
any  other  consideration  be  admitted,  as  determining  the  choice,  the 
whole  theory  is  gone),  this  is  a  mere  decision  of  the  mind ;  it  nei- 
ther implies  nor  expresses  any  radical  change  of  the  affections. 
On  the  contrary,  the  description  seems  utterly  inappropriate  to 
such  a  change.  Does  any  man  love  by  a  violent  effort  ?  Does  he 
ever,  by  summoning  his  powers  for  the  emergency,  by  a  volition 
and  in  a  moment,  transfer  his  heart  from  one  object  to  another  ? 
Was  it  ever  known,  that  a  man  deeply  in  love  with  one  person,  by 
a  desperate  effort  and  at  a  stroke  destroyed  that  affection  and  ori- 
ginated another  ?  He  may  be  fully  convinced  his  passion  is  hope- 
less, that  it  will  render  him  miserable,  but  he  would  stare  at  the 
metaphysician  who  should  tell  him  it  was  as  easy  to  love  one  per- 
son as  another,  all  he  had  to  do  was  to  energize  a  new  volition  and 
choose  another  object,  loving  it  in  a  moment  with  all  the  ardour  of 
his  first  attachment.  As  this  description  of  an  immanent  volition 
does  not  suit  the  process  of  a  change  in  the  affections  in  common 
life  ;  as  no  man,  by  a  simple  act  of  the  will,  and  by  a  strenuous 
effort,  transfers  his  heart  from  one  object  to  another ;  so  neither 
does  it  suit  the  experience  of  the  Christian.  We  have  no  idea 
that  the  account  given  in  the  Spectator  of  the  process  of  regene- 
ration, was  drawn  from  the  history  of  the  writer's  own  exercises, 
nor  do  we  believe  there  is  a  Christian  in  the  world  who  can  re- 
cognize in  it  a  delineation  of  his  experience.  So  far  as  we  have 
ever  known  or  heard,  the  reverse  of  this  is  the  case.  Instead  of 
loving  by  a  desperate  effort,  or  by  a  simple  volition  effecting  this 
radical  change  in  the  affections,  the  Christian  is  constrained  to  ac- 
knowledge he  knows  not  how  the  change  occurred.  "  Whereas  I 
was  blind,  now  I  see,"  is  the  amount  of  his  knowledge.  He  per- 
ceives the  character  of  God  to  be  infinitely  lovely,  sin  to  be  loath- 
some, the  Saviour  to  be  all  he  needs ;  but  why  he  never  saw  all 
this  before,  or  why  it  all  appears  so  clear  and  cheering  to  him  now, 
he  cannot  tell. 

We  cannot  but  think  that  the  impression  made  by  the  mode  of 
representation  adopted  by  the  New  Divinity  of  this  important  sub- 
ject, is  eminently  injurious  and  derogatory  to  true  religion ;  that 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  303 

the  depravity  of  the  heart  is  practically  represented  as  a  very 
slight  matter;  that  the  change,  and  the  whole  change,  necessary  to 
constitute  a  man  a  Christian  is  represented  as  a  mere  determina- 
tion of  his  own  mind,  analogous  to  a  change  of  purpose  as  to  his 
profession ;  that  a  sense  of  his  dependence  on  the  Spirit  of  God  is 
almost  entirely  destroyed,  and  of  course  the  Spirit  himself  dis- 
honoured.    This  latter  evil  results  not  merely  from  the  manner  in 
which  the  nature  of  the  change  of  heart  is  described,  and  the 
ability  of  the  sinner  to  effect  it  is  represented,  nor  from  the  fact 
that  this  dependence  is  kept  out  of  view ;  but  also  from  the  ideas  of 
the  nature  of  agency  and  freedom  of  the  will,  which,  as  we  have 
before  had  occasion  to  remark,  appear  to  lie  at  the  foundation  of 
the  whole  system,  as  it  has  been  presented  in  the  Christian  Spectator, 
and  from  the  manner  in  which  the  Spirit's  influence  is  described 
by  many  of  the  most  prominent  advocates  of  the  theory.     These 
views  of  human  agency  are  such,  that  God  is  virtually  represented 
as  unable  to  control  the  moral  exercises  of  his  creatures ;  that  not- 
withstanding all  that  he  can  do,  they  may  yet  act  counter  to  his 
wishes,  and  sin  on  in  despite  of  all  the  influence  which  he  can  exert 
over  them  consistently  with  their  free  agency.     If  this  be  not  to 
emancipate  the  whole  intelligent  universe  from  the  control  of  God, 
and  destroy  all  the  foundations  of  our  hopes  in  his  promises,  we 
know  not  what  it  is.     When  sinners  are  thus  represented  as  de- 
pending on  themselves,  God  having  done  all  he  can,  exhausted  all 
his  power  in  vain  for  their  conversion,  how  they  can  be  made  to 
feel  that  they  are  in  his  hands,  depending  on  his  sovereign  grace, 
we  cannot  conceive.     What  the  nature  of  the  sinner's  dependence 
on  the  Spirit  of  God  according  to  Mr.  Finney  is,  we  may  learn 
from  the  following  illustration.     "  To  illustrate  the  different  senses 
in  which   making  a  new  heart,"   says  the   reviewer,  "  may  be 
ascribed  to  God,  to  the  preacher,  to  the  truth  or  word  of  God,  and 
to  the  sinner  himself,  Mr.  F.  supposed  the  case  of  a  man  arrested 
when  about  to  step  over  a  precipice  by  a  person  crying  to  him, 
stop  ;  and  said,  This  illustrates  the  use  of  the  four  kinds  of  expres- 
sion in  the  Bible  in  reference  to  the  conversion  of  a  sinner,  with 
one  exception.     In  the  case  supposed,  there  was  only  the  voice  of 
the  man  who  gave  the  alarm,  but  in  conversion,  there  is  both  the 
voice  of  the  preacher  and  the  voice  of  the  Spirit ;  the  preacher 
cries  stop,  and  the  Spirit  cries  stop  too." — P.  28.     On  this  subject, 
however,  the  advocates  of  the  system  profess  not  to  be  united. 
Mr.  Finney  and  others  maintain  that  there  is  no  mystery  about  the 
mode  of  the  Spirit's  operation  :  the  reviewer  is  inclined  to  think 
there  is :  the  one  says,  "  there  is  no  direct  and  immediate  act ;"  the 
other,  if  he  must  adopt  a  theory,  is  disposed  to  admit  that  there  is 
an  immediate  influence  on  the  mind.     The  reviewer  lays  little 
stress  on  the  difference,  as  both  views,  he  says,  have  not  only  been 
held  by  many  Calvinistic  divines,  but  in  connexion  with  a  firm  be- 
lief of  the  absolute  necessity  and  universal  fact  of  the  special 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  producing  conversion.     We   are 


304  THE    NEW   DIVINITY    TRIED. 

aware  of  the  diversity  of  representation  as  to  this  special  point 
among  orthodox  writers,  but  we  are  fully  persuaded  that  whatever 
may  be  the  private  opinions  of  those  who  preach  as  Mr.  Finney  is 
represented  to  have  done  in  this  sermon,  the  impression  made  on 
their  audience  of  the  necessity  of  divine  influence,  of  the  sinner's 
dependence,  is  immeasurably  below  the  standard  of  the  divines  to 
whom  the  reviewer  appeals  in  their  justification.  For  an  audience 
to  be  told  that  all  the  Spirit  does  for  them  is  to  tell  them  to  stop; 
that,  antecedently  even  to  this  influence,  they  may  and  can  do  all 
that  God  requires  ;  and,  what  is  part  of  the  system  of  the  Spec- 
tator, that  subsequently  or  during  the  utmost  exertion  of  this  influ- 
ence, they  may  and  can  resist  and  remain  unconverted ;  is  surely  a 
representation  from  which  those  divines  would  have  revolted,  and 
which  has  a  necessary  tendency  to  subvert  what  the  reviewer  calls 
the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  special 
agency  of  the  Holy  Ghost  in  producing  conversion. 

We  believe  that  the  characteristic  tendency  of  this  mode  of 
preaching  is  to  keep  the  Holy  Spirit  and  his  influences  out  of 
view  ;  and  we  fear  a  still  more  serious  objection  is,  that  Christ  and 
his  cross  are  practically  made  of  none  effect.  The  constant  ex- 
hortation is,  to  make  choice  of  God  as  the  portion  of  the  soul,  to 
change  the  governing  purpose  of  the  life,  to  submit  to  the  moral 
Governor  of  the  universe.  The  specific  act  to  which  the  sinner 
is  urged  as  immediately  connected  with  salvation,  is  an  act  which 
has  no  reference  to  Christ.  The  soul  is  brought  immediately  in 
contact  with  God  ;  the  Mediator  is  left  out  of  view.  We  maintain 
that  this  is  another  Gospel.  It  is  practically  another  system,  and  a 
legal  system  of  religion.  We  do  not  intend  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  mediation  of  Christ  is  rejected,  but  that  it  is  neglected  ;  that 
the  sinner  is  led  to  God  direclly ;  that  he  is  not  urged,  under  the 
pressure  of  the  sense  of  guilt,  to  go  to  Christ  for  pardon,  and 
through  him  to  God  ;  but  the  general  idea  of  submission  (not  the 
specific  idea  of  submission  to  the  plan  of  salvation  through  Jesus 
Christ)  is  urged,  or  the  making  a  right  choice.  Men  are  told  they 
have  hitherto  chosen  the  world,  all  they  have  to  do  is  to  choose 
God  ;  that  they  have  had  it  as  their  purpose  to  gain  the  things  of  this 
life,  and  they  must  now  change  their  purpose  and  serve  God.  Our 
objection  is  not  now  to  the  doctrines  actually  held  by  these  bre- 
thren, but  to  their  characteristic  method  of  preaching,  the  effects 
of  which  we  have  had  some  opportunity  of  learning.  Conviction 
of  sin  is  made  of  little  account,  Christ  and  his  atonement  are  kept 
out  of  view,  so  that  the  method  of  salvation  is  not  distinctly  pre- 
sented to  the  minds  of  the  people.  The  tendency  of  this  defect, 
as  far  as  it  extends,  is  fatal  to  religion  and  the  souls  of  men.  The 
happiness  is,  that  sinners  are  not  under  the  influence  of  this  kind 
of  preaching  alone  ;  their  religious  character  is  not  entirely  formed 
by  this  mode  of  representing  what  God  requires  ;  but  when  excited 
by  the  pungency  and  power  with  which  these  brethren  frequently 
address  the  conscience,  and  when  aroused  to  the  necessity  of  doing 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  305 

something  to  secure  the  favour  of  God,  they  are  influenced  by  the 
truth  already  lodged  in  their  minds,  or  derived  from  the  immediate 
perusal  of  the  scriptures ;  and  hence,  under  the  influence  of  the 
Spirit  of  God,  instead  of  following  the  directions  of  their  teachers 
which  would  lead  to  God  in  some  other  way  than  through  Christ, 
they  feel  their  need  of  the  Saviour,  and  go  to  him  as  the  Gospel 
directs.  It  is  in  this  way,  we  have  no  doubt,  much  of  the  evil  of 
this  lamentable  neglect  of  the  grand  doctrines  of  the  Gospel  is 
prevented.  But  just  so  far  as  this  defective  mode  of  representing 
the  mode  of  salvation  has  any  influence,  it  is  to  introduce  a  radi- 
cally new  system  of  religion.  We  again  remark,  we  do  not  doubt 
that  if  these  preachers  were  asked  if  they  meant  to  leave  Christ 
thus  out  of  view,  and  to  direct  sinners  to  God  without  his  inter- 
vention, they  would  answer,  No.  But  we  are  not  speaking  of 
what  they  may  believe  on  the  subject,  but  of  the  manner  in  which, 
both  from  the  press  and  the  pulpit,  the  great  duty  of  the  sinner 
under  the  Gospel  is  presented. 

It  was  our  intention  to  call  the  attention  of  our  readers  to  the 
panacea  which  the  reviewer  has  discovered  (or  rather  undertaken 
to  recommend)  for  the  cure  of  all  doctrinal  differences.  But 
our  notice  of  his  pamphlet  has  already  been  protracted  to  three 
times  the  length  we  originally  intended,  and  we  therefore  have 
time  to  say  but  little  on  the  subject.  His  prescription  is,  to  draw 
a  distinction  between  the  doctrines  of  religion  and  the  philosophy 
of  the  doctrines,  which,  he  justly  remarks,  is  an  important  distinc- 
tion, which  it  is  of  the  highest  moment  should  be  understood  and 
properly  applied.  "  The  doctrines  of  religion  are  the  simple  facts 
of  Christianity.  The  philosophy  of  the  doctrines  is  the  mode  adopt- 
ed of  stating  and  illustrating  those  facts  in  their  relations  to  each 
other,  to  the  human  mind,  to  the  whole  character  and  government  of 
God.  From  this  distinction  results  the  following  most  important 
practical  principle  of  Christian  fellowship  and  of  theological  dis- 
cussion. All  who  teach  the  leading  facts  or  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tianity are  orthodox,  though  they  differ  greatly  in  their  philosophy 
of  those  doctrines." — P.  31.  The  reviewer  gives  these  passages 
in  italics,  to  note  his  sense  of  their  importance.  We  are  con- 
strained, however,  to  think  that  although  they  contain  a  very  ob- 
vious and  familiar  truth,  they  are  of  little  consequence  for  his  pur- 
pose. The  truth  they  contain  is,  that  there  is  a  distinction  between 
the  essentials  and  non-essentials  of  a  doctrine.  We  care  little 
about  his  calling  doctrines  facts.  But  how  is  this  to  aid  any  one 
in  deciding  on  what  is  heresy,  and  what  is  not  ?  The  reviewer 
chooses  to  say  that  the  fact  which  all  the  orthodox  must  receive 
respecting  sin  is,  that  it  exists  and  that  it  is  a  dreadful  evil.  But 
how  its  existence  is  accounted  for,  is  philosophising  about  it  But 
if  I  assert  it  exists  by  the  immediate  efficient  agency  of  God,  do  not 
I  assert  a  fact  as  much  as  when  I  say  it  exists?  Or,  if  I  say  it  ex- 
ists because  God  cannot  control  a  moral  agent,  do  I  not  assert  a 
fact  ?     Again,  the  orthodox  fact  about  man's  natural  character  is, 

20 


306  THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED. 

that  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  Adam  men  sin,  and  only  sin,  until 
renewed  by  the  Holy  Spirit ;  the  philosophy  is  in  accounting  for  it. 
But  is  it  not  obvious,  that  when  the  church  declares  that  the  uni- 
versality of  actual  sin  is  to  be  accounted  for  by  a  sinful  corruption 
of  nature,  she  means  to  declare  that  the  scriptures  account  for 
one  fact  by  another?  When  it  is  said,  we  are  condemned  for  the 
sin  of  Adam,  is  it  not  a  fact  again  asserted  ?  We  think,  therefore, 
the  reviewer's  distinction  between  facts  and  the  philosophy  of  them, 
perfectly  futile.  The  use  he  would  make  of  it  is  still  worse.  "  All 
who  teach  the  leading  facts  of  Christianity  are  orthodox."  But 
what  are  these  facts  ?  Let  the  reviewer  state  them  and  then  he  is 
orthodox  ;  let  Edwards  state  them  and  he  is  a  heretic.  The  sub- 
stance of  the  fact  regarding  man's  character  is,  that  somehow,  in 
consequence  of  the  fall,  he  sins,  and  only  sins,  &c.  Is  not  this  a 
bald  petitio principii?  That  somehow  may  be  the  very  thing  which 
the  scriptures  clearly  reveal,  and  reveal  as  a  fact.  Again :  it  is  a 
fact  that  we  are  saved  by  the  death  of  Christ — this  we  have  stated 
as  the  doctrine  of  atonement.  Yet,  as  so  stated,  there  is  not  a  So- 
cinian  in  the  world  who  is  not  orthodox  on  this  point.  This  fact 
is  not  all  that  the  scriptures  teach,  nor  that  it  is  necessary  to  be- 
lieve. The  death  of  Christ  saves  us,  and  saves  us  as  a  sacrifice. 
That  it  operates  in  this  mode,  and  not  in  another,  is  as  much  a 
matter  of  fact,  as  that  it  operates  at  all.  Again  :  it  is  a  fact  that 
men  are  renewed  and  sanctified  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  here 
again,  all  Arminians,  Pelagians,  and  even  Socinians,  are  ortho- 
dox ;  for  they  admit  the  fact  as  much  as  the  reviewer  does  (allow- 
ing them  to  make  the  spirit  of  God  mean  "  divine  energy").  They 
and  he  might  philosophise  rather  differently  about  it ;  but  the  fact.*- 
they  all  admit.  How  the  Spirit  does  the  work  is  a  matter  of  ex- 
planation ;  some  say,  by  an  immediate  influence  on  the  mind ; 
others,  by  moral  suasion,  or  presenting  motives  ;  others,  by  having 
revealed  the  truth  in  the  scriptures ;  so  that  the  result  may  be 
ascribed  either  to  the  truth  as  the  immediate  cause,  or  to  its  re- 
vealer,  the  Spirit.  And  so,  finally,  though  illustrations  might  be 
multiplied  without  end,  the  scriptures  are  a  divine  revelation  ;  here 
is  a  fact  in  which  it  would  seem  all  might  acquiesce  and  be  ortho- 
dox, without  asking  how  God  reveals  truth  to  man.  Yet  this  fact 
the  neologists  of  Germany  hold  and  proclaim.  It  is  true,  when 
they  come  to  the  philosophy  of  the  fact,  they  tell  us  they  mean 
that  the  scriptures  are  a  providential  revelation  from  God,  in  the 
same  sense  as  the  Dialogues  of  Plato. 

It  is  too  obvious  to  need  comment,  that  the  reviewer's  position 
is  all  that  any  man  in  the  world,  who  professes  any  form  of  Chris- 
tianity, needs  to  prove  his  orthodoxy.  Let  him  have  the  stating 
of  scriptural  facts,  and  he  will  do  as  the  reviewer  in  many  cases 
has  done,  state  them  so  generally,  that  Arminians,  Pelagians,  and 
Socinians,  as  well  as  Calvinists,  can  adopt  them,  and,  according  to 
this  standard,  be  orthodox. 

We  have  spoken  of  this  anonymous  pamphlet  with  sincerity : 


THE    NEW    DIVINITY    TRIED.  307 

that  is,  as  we  really  felt.  We  view  it  as  highly  objectionable  in 
the  respect  to  which  we  have  principally  referred.  Whoever  the 
writer  may  be,  we  think  he  has  more  reason  to  lament  having 
given  occasion  to  the  Christian  public  to  ask  how  his  statements 
can  be  reconciled  with  notorious  facts,  than  to  be  offended  at  the 
strictures  to  which  it  may,  and  ought  to  subject  him. 


ESSAY    XIV. 

BEMAN    ON   THE    ATONEMENT." 


The  doctrine  of  which  this  little  book  treats  has  always  been 
regarded  as  the  cardinal  doctrine  of  the  Gospel.  It  was  the  bur- 
den of  apostolical  preaching ;  the  rock  of  offence  to  Jews  and 
Greeks  ;  the  corner-stone  of  that  temple  in  which  God  dwells  by 
his  Spirit.  The  cross  is  the  symbol  of  Christianity  ;  that  in  which 
every  believer  glories,  as  the  only  ground  of  his  confidence  toward 
God.  The  rejection  of  this  doctrine,  therefore,  has  always  been 
regarded,  and  is,  in  fact,  a  rejection  of  the  Gospel.  It  is  the  repu- 
diation of  the  way  of  salvation  revealed  by  God,  and  the  adoption 
of  some  method  not  only  different  but  irreconcilable.  Whatever, 
therefore,  affects  the  integrity  of  this  doctrine,  affects  the  whole 
system  of  religion.  It  lies  in  such  immediate  contact  with  the 
source  of  all  spiritual  life,  that  the  very  nature  of  religion  depends 
on  the  manner  in  which  it  is  apprehended.  Though  all  moral  and 
religious  truths  are  in  their  nature  sources  of  power,  and  never 
fail  to  influence,  more  or  less,  the  character  of  those  who  embrace 
them,  yet  some  truths  are  more  powerful,  and  hence  more  impor- 
tant than  others.  We  may  speculate  with  comparative  impunity 
on  the  nature  of  angels,  on  the  origin  of  evil,  on  the  purposes  of 
God,  on  his  relation  to  the  world,  and  even  on  the  grounds  and 
nature  of  human  responsibility ;  but  when  we  come  to  the  ques- 
tion :  How  am  I  to  gain  access  to  God  ?  how  can  I  secure  the 
pardon  of  my  sins  and  acceptance  with  Him  ?  what  is  the  true 
ground  of  hope,  and  what  must  I  do  to  place  myself  on  that  ground 
so  as  to  secure  the  assurance  of  God's  love,  peace  of  conscience, 
and  joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost  ?  then  the  less  we  speculate  the  better. 
The  nearer  we  keep  to  the  simple,  authoritative  statements  of 
God's  word,  the  firmer  will  be  our  faith,  the  more  full  and  free  our 
access  to  God,  and  the  more  harmonious  and  healthful  our  whole 
religious  experience.  Such  is  the  informing  influence  of  such 
experience,  when  it  is  genuine  ;  that  is,  when  really  guided  by  the 

*  Published  in  1845,  in  review  of  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  Christ,  the  only  Sacrifice  ; 
or  the  Atonement  in  its  Relations  to  God  and  Man."  By  Nathan  S.  S.  Beman, 
D.D.,  Pastor  of  the  First  Presbyterian  Church,  Troy,  New  York. 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  309 

Spirit  and  conformed  to  the  revelation  of  God,  that  it  effects  a  far 
nearer  coincidence  of  views  in  all  the  children  of  God  than  the 
multiplicity  of  sects  and  conflicting  systems  of  theology  would  lead 
us  to  imagine.     The  mass  of  true  Christians,  in  all  denominations, 

fet  their  religion  directly  from  the  Bible,  and  are  but  little  affected 
y  the  peculiarities  of  their  creeds.  And  even  among  those  who 
make  theology  a  study,  there  is  often  one  form  of  doctrine  for 
speculation,  and  another,  simpler  and  truer,  for  the  closet.  Meta- 
physical distinctions  are  forgot  in  prayer,  or  under  the  pressure  of 
real  conviction  of  sin,  and  need  of  pardon  and  of  divine  assistance. 
Hence  it  is  that  the  devotional  writings  of  Christians  agree  far 
nearer  than  their  creeds.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  that 
mode  of  stating  divine  truth,  which  is  most  in  accordance  with  the 
devotional  language  of  true  Christians  ;  which  best  expresses  those 
views  which  the  soul  takes  when  it  appropriates  the  doctrines  of 
the  Gospel  for  its  own  spiritual  emergencies,  is  the  truest  and  the 
best. 

How,  then,  does  the  believer  regard  the  person  and  work  of 
Christ  in  his  own  exercises  of  faith,  gratitude,  or  love  ?  What  is 
the  language  in  which  those  exercises  are  expressed  ?  If  we  look 
to  the  devotional  writings  of  the  church,  in  all  ages  and  countries,  and 
of  all  sects  and  names,  we  shall  get  one  clear,  consistent  answer. 
What  David  wrote  three  thousand  years  ago,  expresses,  with  pre- 
cision, the  emotions  of  God's  people  now.  The  hymns  of  the  early 
Christians,  of  the  Lutherans,  the  Reformed,  of  Moravians,  of  British 
and  American  Christians,  all  express  the  common  consciousness 
of  God's  people ;  they  all  echo  the  words  and  accents  in  which  the 
truth  came  clothed  from  the  mouth  of  God,  and  in  which,  in  spite 
of  the  obstructions  of  theological  theories,  it  finds  its  way  to  every 
believing  heart.  Now,  one  thing  is  very  plain,  Dr.  Beman's  theory 
of  the  atonement  never  could  be  learnt  from  the  devotional  lan- 
guage of  the  church ;  ours  can.  Everything  we  believe  on  the 
subject  is  inwrought,  not  only  in  the  language  of  the  Bible,  but  in 
the  language  of  God's  people,  whether  they  pray  or  praise,  whether 
they  mourn  or  rejoice.  We  have,  therefore,  the  heart  of  the  church 
on  our  side,  at  least. 

It  lies  on  the  very  surface  of  the  scriptures: — 1.  That  all  men 
are  sinners.  2.  That  sin,  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  merely  to  pre- 
vent others  from  sinning,  deserves  punishment.  3.  That  God  is 
just ;  that  is,  disposed,  from  the  very  excellence  of  his  nature,  to 
treat  his  creatures  as  they  deserve,  to  manifest  his  favour  to  the 
good,  and  his  disapprobation  towards  the  wicked.  4.  That  to  pro- 
pitiate God,  to  satisfy  his  righteous  justice,  the  Son  of  God  assumed 
our  nature,  was  made  under  the  law,  fulfilled  all  righteousness, 
bore  our  sins,  the  chastisement  or  punishment  of  which  was  laid 
on  him.  5.  That  by  his  righteousness,  those  that  believe  are  con- 
stituted righteous  ;  that  his  merit  is  so  given,  reckoned  or  imputed 
to  them,  that  they  are  regarded  and  treated  as  righteous  in  the 
sight  of  God.     These  truths,  which  lie  on  the  surface  of  the  scrip- 


310  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

ture,  are  wrought  into  the  very  soul  of  the  church,  and  are,  in  fact, 
its  life.  Yet  every  one  of  them,  except  the  first,  Dr.  Beman  either 
expressly  or  virtually  denies. 

He  denies  that  sin  for  its  own  sake  deserves  punishment.  He 
everywhere  represents  the  prevention  of  crime  as  the  great  end  to 
be  answered  by  punishment,  even  in  the  government  of  God.  If 
that  end  can  be  otherwise  answered,  then  justice  is  satisfied  ;  the 
necessity  and  propriety  of  punishment  ceases.  This  is  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  whole  system,  and  is  avowed  or  implied 
upon  almost  every  page.  His  argument  in  proof  that  repentance 
is  not  a  sufficient  ground  for  pardon,  is  that  it  has  no  tendency  to 
prevent  crime  in  others.  In  human  governments,  he  says,  punish- 
ment is  designed  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  crime  by  the  criminal, 
and  to  prevent  its  commission  by  others.  The  former  of  these 
ends  might  be  answered  by  repentance,  but  not  the  latter.  So  in 
the  case  of  the  divine  government,  repentance  on  the  part  of  the 
sinner  might,  "  so  far  as  his  moral  feelings  are  concerned,"  render 
it  consistent  in  God  to  forgive,  but  then  "  Where  is  the  honour  of 
the  law  ?  Where  is  the  good  of  the  universe  ?" — P.  57.  The  design 
of  "  penalty  is  to  operate  as  a  powerful  motive  to  obedience." — P.  1 27. 
There  is,  he  says,  the  same  necessity  for  atonement  as  for  the 
penalty  of  the  moral  law,  and  that  necessity  he  uniformly  repre- 
sents as  a  necessity  "  to  secure  the  order  and  prosperity  of  the 
universe." — P.  128. 

It  is  of  course  admitted  that  the  prevention  of  crime  is  one  of 
the  effects,  and  consequently  one  of  the  ends  of  punishment.  But 
to  say  that  it  is  the  end,  that  it  is  so  the  ground  of  its  infliction, 
that  all  necessity  for  punishment  ceases  when  that  end  is  answered, 
is  to  deny  the  very  nature  of  sin. '  The  ideas  of  right  and  wrong 
are  simple  ideas,  derived  immediately  from  our  moral  nature. 
And  it  is  included  in  those  ideas  that  what  is  right  deserves  appro- 
bation, and  what  is  wrong  deserves  disapprobation,  for  their  own 
sake,  and  entirely  irrespective  of  the  consequences  which  are  to 
flow  from  the  expression  of  this  moral  judgment  concerning  them. 
When  a  man  sins  he  feels  that  he  deserves  to  suffer,  or,  as  the  apostle 
expresses  it,  that  he  is  "  worthy  of  death."  But  what  is  this  feel- 
ing ?  Is  it  that  he  ought  to  be  punished  to  prevent  others  from 
sinning  ?  So  far  from  this  being  the  whole  of  the  feeling,  it  is  no  part 
of  it.  If  the  sinner  were  alone  in  the  universe,  if  there  was  no 
possibility  of  others  being  affected  by  his  example,  or  by  his  im- 
punity, the  sense  of  ill-desert  would  exist  in  all  its  force.  For  sin  is 
that  which  in  itself,  and  for  itself,  irrespective  of  all  consequences, 
deserves  ill.  This  is  the  very  nature  of  it,  and  to  deny  this  is  to 
deny  that  there  is  really  any  such  thing  as  sin.  There  may  be 
acts  which  tend  to  promote  happiness,  and  others  which  tend 
to  destroy  it ;  but  there  is  no  morality  in  such  tendency  merely, 
any  more  than  there  is  health  and  sickness.  The  nature  of  moral 
acts  may  be  evinced  by  their  tendency,  but  that  tendency  does  not 
constitute  their  nature.     To  love  God,  to  reverence  excellence,  to 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  311 

forgive  injuries,  all  tend  to  promote  happiness,  but  no  man,  who 
has  a  moral  sense  in  exercise,  can  say  that  they  are  right  only 
because  of  such  tendency.  They  are  right,  because  they  are  right, 
in  virtue  of  their  own  inherent  nature.  And  the  opposite  disposi- 
tions or  acts  are  in  their  nature  evil,  irrespective  of  their  tendency 
to  produce  misery. 

The   theory  that  the  end  of  punishment,  even  in  the  divine 
government,  is  to  prevent  crime,  is  only  one  expression  of  the 
more  general  theory,  that  happiness  is  the  end  of  creation,  and 
that  all  holiness  is  resolvable  into  benevolence.     This  theory  is  a 
product  of  the  mere  understanding,  and  does  violence  to.  the  in- 
stinctive moral  judgment  of  men.     We  know  that  holiness  is  some- 
thing more  than  a  means ;  that  to  be  happy  is  not  the  end  and 
reason  for  being  holy ;  that  enjoyment  is  not  the  highest  end  of 
being.     Our  moral  nature  cannot  be  thus  obliterated,  and  right  and 
wrong  made  matters  of  profit  and  loss.     The  command  not  to  do 
evil  that  good  may  come,  would  on  this  theory  be  a  contradiction, 
since  that  ceases  to  be  evil  which  produces  good.     All  virtue  is 
thus  resolved  into  expediency,  and  the  doctrine  that  the  end  sanc- 
tifies the  means  becomes  the  fundamental  principle  of  virtue.     It 
is  strange  that  even  when  the  moral  feelings  are  in  abeyance,  and 
men  are  engaged  in  spinning  from  the  intellect,  a  theory  that  will 
reduce  to  unity  the  conflicting  facts  of  the  moral  world,  they  could 
adopt  a  view  which  reduces  all  intelligent  beings  to  mere  recipients 
of  happiness,  and  degrades  the  higher  attributes  of  their  nature 
into  mere  instruments  of  enjoyment ;  a  theory  which  meets  its 
refutation  in  every  moral  emotion,  and  which  has  proved  itself 
false  by  its  practical  effects.     We  may  safely  appeal  to  the  convic- 
tions of  every  man's  breast,  against  this  whole  theory,  and  against 
the  doctrine  that  sin  is  punished  and  deserves  punishment  only  as 
a  warning  to  others.    No  man,  when  humbled  under  the  sense  of  his 
guilt  in  the  sight  of  God,  can  resist  the  conviction  of  the  inherent 
ill-desert  of  sin.     He  feels  that  it  would  be  right  that  he  should  be 
made  to  suffer,  nay,  that  rectitude,  justice,  or  moral  excellence 
demands  his  suffering ;  and  the  hardest  thing  for  the  sinner  to  be- 
lieve, is,  often,  that  it  can  be  consistent  with  the  moral  excellence 
of  God,  to  grant  him  forgiveness.     Into  this  feeling  the  idea  of 
counteracting  the  progress  of  sin,  or  promoting  the  good  of  the 
universe,  does  not  in  any  measure  enter.     The  feeling  would  be 
the  same  though  there  were  no  universe.     It  is  ill-desert  and  not 
the  general  good,  which  every  man  feels  in  his  own  case,  is  the 
ground  of  his  just  liability  to  punishment.     And  without  this  feel- 
ing there  can  be  no  conviction  of  sin.     We  may  also  appeal  against 
this  metaphysical  theory  to  the  universal  consciousness  of  men. 
Though  it  is  admitted  that  governmental  reasons  properly  enter 
into  the  considerations  which  determine  the  nature  and  measure  of 
punishment,  yet  it  is  the  universal  and   intuitive  judgment  of  men, 
that  the  criminal  could  not  be  rightly  punished  merely  for  the  pub- 
lic good,  if  he  did  not  deserve  to  be  punished  irrespective  of  that 


312  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

good.  His  suffering  benefits  the  public  because  it  is  deserved  ;  it 
is  not  deserved  because  it  benefits  the  public.  That  this  is  the 
universal  judgment  of  men  is  proved  by  every  exhibition  of  their 
feelings  on  this  subject.  When  any  atrocious  crime  is  committed, 
the  public  indignation  is  aroused.  And  when  the  nature  of  that 
indignation  is  examined,  it  becomes  manifest  that  it  arises  from  a 
sense  of  the  inherent  ill-desert  of  the  crime ;  that  it  is  a  sense  of 
justice,  and  not  a  regard  to  the  good  of  society  which  produces 
the  demand  for  punishment.  To  allow  such  a  criminal  to  escape 
with  impunity,  is  felt  to  be  an  outrage  against  justice,  and  not 
against  benevolence.  If  the  public  good  was  the  grand  end  of 
punishment,  then  if  the  punishment  of  the  innocent  would  promote 
that  most  effectually,  the  innocent  should  suffer  instead  of  the 
guilty ;  consequently  if  murders  would  be  most  restrained  by  the 
execution  of  the  wives  and  children  of  the  assassins,  it  would  be 
right  and  obligatory  to  execute  them,  and  not  the  perpetrators  of 
the  crime.  If  this  would  shock  every  man,  let  him  ask  himself 
why.  What  is  the  reason  that  the  execution  of  an  innocent  woman 
for  the  public  good,  would  be  an  atrocity,  when  the  execution  of 
the  guilty  husband  is  regarded  as  a  duty  ?  It  is  simply  because 
the  guilty  deserve  punishment  irrespective  of  the  good  of  society. 
And  if  so,  then  the  public  good  is  not  the  ground  of  punishment 
in  the  government  of  God,  but  the  inherent  ill-desert  of  sin.  Men 
in  all  ages  have  evinced  this  deep-seated  sense  of  justice.  Every 
sacrifice  ever  offered  to  God,  to  propitiate  his  favour,  was  an  ex- 
pression of  the  conviction  that  the  sin  for  its  own  sake  deserved 
punishment.  To  tell  a  man  who  brought  his  victim  to  the  altar, 
that  the  real  philosophy  of  his  conduct  was  to  express  a  desire  for 
his  own  reformation,  or  for  the  good  of  society,  would  be  a  mock- 
ery. Such  an  idea  never  entered  any  human  heart,  when  in  the 
presence  of  God  and  seeking  his  forgiveness. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  this  theory  is  taught  in  the  Bible.  It  pur- 
ports to  be  a  philosophy.  The  Bible  contradicts  it  on  every  page, 
because  every  page  contains  some  expression  of  genuine  human 
feeling,  of  the  conviction  of  the  real  difference  between  right  and 
wrong,  of  a  true  sense  of  sin,  or  of  the  great  truth  that  our  re- 
sponsibility is  to  God,  and  not  to  the  universe.  The  doctrine  there- 
fore that  sin  is  punished  merely  to  preserve  the  order  and  pros- 
perity of  the  universe,  is  an  utterly  false  and  revolting  theory ; 
inconsistent  with  the  intuitive  moral  judgments  of  men,  subversive 
of  all  moral  distinctions,  irreconcilable  with  the  experience  of 
every  man  when  really  convinced  of  sin,  and  contradicted  by  every- 
thing the  Bible  teaches  on  the  subject. 

Dr.  Beman  again  denies,  and  it  is  essential  to  his  system  that  he 
should  deny,  the  justice  of  God.  He  admits  that  God  has  a  dispo- 
sition to  promote  the  welfare  of  his  creatures,  and  so  to  order  his 
moral  government  as  to  make  it  produce  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness.  This  however  is  benevolence,  and  not  justice.  The 
two  sentiments  are  perfectly  distinct.     This  our  own  consciousness 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  313 

teaches.  We  know  that  pity  is  not  reverence,  that  gratitude  is 
not  compassion,  and  we  know  just  as  well  that  justice  is  not  bene- 
volence. The  two  are  perfectly  harmonious,  and  are  but  different 
exhibitions  of  moral  excellence.  The  judge  of  all  the  earth  must 
do  right.  It  is  right  to  promote  happiness,  and  it  is  right  to  punish 
sin  r  but  to  refer  the  punishment  of  sin  to  the  desire  to  promote 
happiness,  is  to  attribute  but  one  form  of  moral  excellence  to  God, 
and  to  make  his  excellence  less  comprehensive  than  our  own. 
Dr.  Beman  speaks  of  commutative,  distributive,  and  general  justice. 
The  former  has  relation  only  to  the  regulation  of  property,  and 
has  nothing  to  do  with  this  subject.  Distributive  justice  consists 
in  the  distribution  of  rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  merit 
or  demerit.  General  justice,  he  says,  embraces  the  general 
principles  of  virtue  or  benevolence  by  which  God  governs  the 
universe.  The  second  kind,  he  correctly  says,  is  justice  in  the 
common  and  appropriate  sense  of  the  word. — P.  131.  When  we 
say  that  he  denies  the  justice  of  God,  we  mean  that  he  denies  that 
justice,  in  its  common  and  appropriate  sense,  is  an  essential  attri- 
bute of  the  divine  nature.  There  is  nothing  in  his  nature  that  leads 
to  the  punishment  of  sin,  but  benevolence,  or  a  regard  to  the  hap- 
piness of  the  universe.  If  that  is  secured,  sin  and  all  sin  may  go 
unpunished  for  ever.     This,  we  say,  is  a  denial  of  divine  justice. 

It  is  a  principle  of  our  nature,  and  a  command  of  God,  that  we 
should  regard  him  as  absolutely  perfect ;  that  every  moral  excel- 
lence which  we  find  in  ourselves  we  should  refer  to  him  in  an  infi- 
nite degree.  Why  do  we  believe  that  God  is  merciful,  but  because 
he  has  so  made  us  that  we  approve  of  mercy,  and  because  he  has 
in  his  word  declared  himself  to  be  full  of  compassion  ?  Our  moral 
nature  is  as  much  a  revelation  of  God's  perfections,  as  the  heavens 
are  of  his  wisdom  and  power.  If  therefore  he  has  implanted  in  us 
a  sentiment  of  justice,  distinct  from  that  of  benevolence,  we  are  con- 
strained by  the  very  constitution  of  our  nature  to  refer  that  perfection 
to  God.  All  men  in  fact  do  it.  It  enters  into  the  sense  of  responsi- 
bility, into  the  nature  of  remorse,  and  into  that  fearful  looking  for 
of  judgment  which  manifest  themselves  in  every  human  breast. 
Men  know  that  God  is  just,  for  they  in  their  measure  are  just ;  and 
tiiey  instinctively  fear  the  punishment  of  their  sins.  To  be  told 
that  God  is  only  benevolent,  that  he  punishes,  only  when  the  hap- 
piness of  his  government  requires  it,  is  to  destroy  our  whole  alle- 
giance to  God,  and  to  do  violence  to  the  constitution  of  our  nature. 
This  is,  a  doctrine  that  can  only  be  held  as  a  theory.  It  is  in  con- 
flict with  the  most  intimate  moral  convictions  of  men.  This,  as 
already  remarked,  is  evinced  by  the  sacrificial  rites  of  all  ages 
and  nations,  which  derive  their  whole  character  and  import  from 
the  assumption  that  God  is  just.  If  justice  is  merged  into  benevo- 
lence, they  cease  to  have  any  significance  as  propitiatory  offerings. 
If,  then,  distributive  justice,  justice  "  in  its  common  and  appropriate 
sense,"  is  by  the  common  consciousness  of  men  declared  to  be  a 
virtue,  it  is  thereby  revealed  to  belong  to  God ;  and  he  can  no 


314  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

more  cease  to  be  just,  than  he  can  cease  to  be  benevolent  or  holy. 
This  is  only  saying  that  if  moral  excellence  leads  us  to  judge  that 
sin  in  itself  deserves  punishment,  then  the  infinite  moral  excellence 
of  God  cannot  but  lead  him  to  treat  it  as  it  deserves. 

Again:  it  is  included  in  our  conception  of  God  as  absolutely  in- 
dependent and  self-sufficient,  that  the  reasons  of  his  acts  should  be 
in  himself.  He  is  absolutely  perfect,  he  acts  with  undeviating  rec- 
titude, and  by  so  acting  he  promotes  the  highest  good  of  his  crea- 
tures. But  the  good  of  his  creatures  is  not  the  end  of  his  actions, 
for  of  him  and  through  him  and  to  him  are  all  things.  It  is  to  sub- 
ordinate God  to  the  creature,  to  make  the  creature  the  end  of  his 
actions.  He  rewards  one  man  and  punishes  another,  not  because 
he  will  thus  make  others  happy,  but  because  it  is  right,  and  by  doing 
right  the  greatest  good  to  others  is  the  result.  This  is  the  view 
which  both  reason  and  scripture  present  of  God  as  infinite  and 
self-sufficient,  who  is  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  all  things.  It  is 
hence  plain  how  the  justice  of  God  necessarily  flows  from  his  ho- 
liness. He  is  so  holy  that  he  delights  in  all  that  is  good,  and  hates 
all  that  is  evil  ;  and  if  he  acts  agreeably  to  his  nature,  he  constant- 
ly manifests  this  love  of  excellence  and  hatred  of  sin.  But  what 
is  reward  and  punishment  but  the  manifestation  of  the  approbation 
or  disapprobation  of  God?  If  holiness  is  communion  with  him,  sin 
is  alienation  from  him ;  if  his  favour  goes  out  towards  the  one,  his 
displeasure  goes  out  towards  the  other ;  if  the  one  is  attracted,  the 
other  is  repelled.  The  attributes  of  God  are  not  so  many  distinct 
qualities,  but  one  perfection  of  excellence,  diversified  in  our  concep- 
tions, by  the  diversity  of  the  objects  towards  which  it  is  manifested. 
The  justice  of  God  is  therefore  nothing  but  the  holiness, of  God  in 
relation  to  sin.  So  long  as  he  is  holy,  he  must  be  just ;  he  must 
repel  sin,  which  is  the  highest  idea  we  can  form  of  punishment. 
To  say  then  that  God  punishes  only  for  governmental  reasons,  is  to 
destroy  our  very  conception  of  his  nature. 

That  distributive  justice  is  an  essential  attribute  of  God,  is  there- 
fore revealed  to  us  in  the  very  constitution  of  our  nature,  in  which 
we  find  a  sense  of  justice,  which  is  no  more  a  form  of  benevolence 
than  it  is  of  reverence.  It  is  revealed  in  all  the  operations  of  con- 
science ;  in  the  common  consciousness  of  men,  as  expressed  in  all 
their  prayers,  confessions  and  sacrificial  rites.  It  is  revealed  in  the 
scriptures  in  every  possible  way  ;  in  all  they  teach  of  the  nature 
of  God,  of  his  holiness,  of  his  hatred  of  sin,  of  his  determination 
to  punish  it ;  in  the  institution  of  sacrifices,  and  in  the  law.  If  the 
precepts  of  the  law  are  an  expression  of  the  divine  perfection,  so 
is  the  penalty.  If  the  one  declares  what  it  is  right  for  God  to  re- 
quire, the  other  declares  what  it  is  right  for  him  to  inflict.  If  God 
does  not  command  us  to  love  him,  merely  to  make  his  dominions 
happy,  neither  does  he  punish  merely  for  the  public  good.  The 
law  is  a  revelation  of  what  is  right,  and  God  will  require  and  do 
right  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  for  another  and  a  lower  end.  God 
then  is  just,  and  Dr.  Beman  and  his  theory,  by  denying  that  there 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  315 

is  any  such  attribute  in  God  as  justice  distinct  from  benevolence, 
do  equal  violence  to  conscience,  reason,  and  the  Bible. 

Dr.  Beman,  again,  denies  that  Christ  made  a  true  and  proper 
satisfaction  to  divine  justice,  and  thus  departs  from  the  common 
faith  of  Christendom,  and  seriously  vitiates  the  whole  doctrine  of 
redemption.  It  is  well  known  that  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation 
there  was  no  controversy  between  Protestants  and  Romanists  either 
as  to  the  necessity  or  nature  of  the  atonement.  All  classes  of  Pro- 
testants and  the  church  of  Rome  itself,  united  in  teaching,  1.  That 
the  Son  of  God  having  assumed  our  nature  obeyed  and  suffered  in 
our  stead,  thereby  making  a  true,  proper,  and  complete  satisfaction 
for  our  sins.  And  2.  That  his  righteousness  was  so  given  or  im- 
puted unto  us  as  to  constitute  us  righteous  in  the  sight  of  God.  The 
Romanists  even  reproached  Protestants  for  not  coming  up  to  their 
doctrine  on  this  subject,  insisting  that  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  was 
not  only  full  and  equivalent,  but  superabundant.  "  Pretium,"  says 
the  Cat.  Rom.  i.,  5,  15,  "quod  Christus  pro  nobis  persolvit,  debitis 
nostris  non  par  solum  et  aequale  fuit,  verum  ea  longe  superavit." 
It  is  one  of  the  standing  heads  of  theology  in  the  Romish  systems, 
Satisfactio  Christi  fuit  de  rigore  justitiae,  which  they  prove  ;  and 
answer  the  common  Socinian  objections,  viz.,  that  such  a  satisfac- 
tion destroys  the  grace  of  salvation  ;  that  it  is  impossible  that  the 
temporal  sufferings  of  Christ  should  have  such  efficacy,  &c.  As 
to  their  views  of  the  second  point  above  mentioned,  it  is  enough  to 
quote  the  following  passage  from  Turrettin,  vol.  ii.,  p.  709.  "  It  is 
not  questioned,"  he  says,  "  whether  the  righteousness  and  merit  of 
Christ  are  imputed  to  us ;  for  this  the  Papists  dare  not  deny.  The 
Council  of  Trent,  sess.  vi.,  c.  8,  says, '  Christ  by  his  most  holy  pas- 
sion on  the  cross  merited  justification  for  us,  and  satisfied  God  the 
Father  in  our  behalf,  and  no  one  can  be  righteous  to  whom  the 
merits  of  the  passion  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  are  not  communi- 
cated.' Hence  Vasques  in  1.  ii.,  q.  114,  disp.  222,  chap,  i.,  says, 
'  We  concede  that  not  only  what  is  within  us,  as  sin,  faith,  right- 
eousness, may  be  imputed  to  us,  but  also  what  is  without  us,  as  the 
merits  and  obedience  of  Christ ;  because  not  only  what  is  within, 
but  also  what  is  without,  on  account  of  which  something  is  given 
to  us,  is  said  to  belong  to  us,  (ad  aliquem  effectum),as  though  they 
were  really  our  own.'  Bellarmin,  lib.  ii..  de  Justif.,  cap.  vii.,  ac- 
knowledges the  same  thing,  when  he  says,  '  If  Protestants  meant 
only  that  the  merits  of  Christ  are  imputed  to  us,  because  God  gives 
them  to  us,  so  that  we  can  present  them  to  God  for  our  sins,  he 
having  assumed  the  burden  of  making  satisfaction  for  us,  and  of  re- 
conciling us  to  the  Father,  the  doctrine  would  be  true.'  This  is  in 
fact  precisely  what  we  do  mean.  For  when  he  adds,  '  we  hold 
that  the  righteousness  of  Christ  is  so  imputed  to  us,  as  by  it  we  be- 
come formally  or  inherently  just,'  he  asserts  what  is  gratuitous  and 
false,  on  account  of  his  own  perverse  and  preposterous  theory  of 
moral  justification."* 

•  It  is  characteristic  of  the  church  of  Rome  that  while  she  holds  the  truth,  she  con- 


316  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

The  Lutheran  church  held  the  strictest  form  of  doctrine  as  to 
the  nature  of  Christ's  satisfaction,  and  as  to  justification.  That 
church  teaches  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  strictly  penal,  that 
his  obedience  and  death  made  a  full  and  proper  satisfaction  to  the 
law  and  justice  of  God,  and  are  imputed  to  the  believers  as  the  sole 
ground  of  their  justification.  We  cannot  swell  our  article  with 
numerous  citations  in  proof  of  a  well  known  fact.  In  the  Apology 
for  the  Augsburg  Confession,  p.  93,  it  is  said,  "  Christus,  quia  sine 
peccato  subiit  poenam  peccati,  et  victima  pro  nobis  factus  est,  sus- 
tulit  illud  jus  legis,ne  accuset,  ne  damnet  hos  qui  credunt  in  ipsum, 
quia  ipse  est  propitiatio  pro  eis,  propter  quam  justi  reputantur."  In 
the  Form  of  Concord,  it  is  said,  "  Justitia  ilia,  quae  coram  Deo  fidei 
aut  credentibus  et  mera  gratia  imputatur,  est  obedientia,  passio,  et 
resurrectio  Christi,  quibus  ille  legi  nostra  causa  satisfecit  et  peccata 
nostra  expiavit." — P.  684.  Again,  p.  696.  "  Humana  riatura  sola, 
sine  divinitate,  aeterno  omnipotenti  Deo  neque  obedientia,  neque 
passione  pro  totius  mundi  peccatis  satisfacere  valuisset.  Divinitas 
vero  sola  sine  humanitate  inter  Deum  et  nos  mediatoris  partes  im- 
plere  non  potuisset.  Cum  autem.  .  .  .  obedientia  ilia  Christi 
non  sit  unius  duntaxat  naturae,  sed  totius  personae  ;  ideo  ea  est  per- 
fectissima  pro  humano  genere  satisfactio  et  expiatio ;  qua  aeternae 
et  immutabili  justi tiae  divinae     .     .     .     satis  est  factum." 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  prove  that  the  Reformed  churches 
held  precisely  the  same  doctrine.  There  was  no  controversy  be- 
tween them  and  the  Lutherans  either  as  to  the  nature  of  the  satis- 
faction of  Christ,  or  as  to  justification.  They  differed  only  as  to  the 
design  of  Christ's  death,  whether  it  had  respect  equally  to  all  men, 
or  had  a  special  reference  to  his  own  people,  a  point  which  we 
hope  to  have  room  to  discuss  in  the  sequel  of  this  article.  We  are 
now  concerned  only  about  the  nature  of  the  atonement.  Bretsch- 
neider  states,  in  a  few  words,  the  common  doctrine  on  this  subject 
of  the  two  great  divisions  of  the  Protestant  world.  After  saying 
that  God,  according  to  that  doctrine,  is  immutably  just,  and  there- 
fore must  punish  sin,  and  yet  being  immutably  benevolent,  he  de- 
termined to  provide  redemption,  he  proceeds,  "  For  this  it  was  ne- 
cessary, 1.  That  some  one  in  the  place  of  men  should  fulfil  the 
law  which  they  ought  to  have  kept,  and  2.  That  some  one  should 
endure  the  punishment  (Strafen)  which  they  had  incurred.  This 
no  mere  man  could  do,  for  no  man  (since  all  are  subject  to  original 
sin)  could  perfectly  keep  the  law,  and  every  man  must  sufter  for 
his  own  sin.  Neither  could  any  divine  person  accomplish  the  task, 
since  he  could  not  sustain  suffering  and  punishment.  He  alone 
who  is  at  once  God  and  man,  with  a  human  nature  free  from  sin, 

trives  to  make  it  of  no  effect  by  her  traditions.  Thus  while  she  teaches  that  the  merit 
of  Christ  is  the  ground  of  our  justification,  she  makes  those  merits  accessible  only 
through  her  ministrations,  and  confounds  justification  and  sanctification.  And  while 
she  holds  the  truth  as  to  the  nature  of  Christ's  satisfaction,  she  chooses  to  confine  it 
to  original  and  mortal  sins,  that  she  may  make  room  for  her  own  doctrine  of  satisfac- 
tion by  good  works  and  penances.  The  infinite  value  of  the  Saviour's  merit,  she  per- 
verts as  a  source  whence  to  derive  the  power  to  grant  indulgences,  &c. 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  317 

could  accomplish  the  work."*  This  righteousness,  he  adds,  "God 
imputes  to  men  as  though  they  had  wrought  it  out  themselves." 

Against  this  doctrine  of  satisfaction  to  the  divine  justice  the  So- 
cinians  were  the  first  to  object,  f  Under  the  pressure  of  their  ob- 
jections the  Remonstrants  in  Holland  gave  way,  and  Grotius  in  his 
work,  De  Satisfactione  Christi,  though  defending  in  the  main  the 
catholic  or  common  doctrine,  introduced  the  principle,  that  the 
satisfaction  of  Christ  was  rendered  to  the  governmental  justice  of 
God.  Very  far  below  the  doctrine  of  Grotius,  in  many  important 
respects,  is  the  theory  of  Dr.  Beman.  In  some  cases  he  falls  even 
below  Socinus.  "  God,  as  the  supreme  governor,"  he  says,  "  must 
so  conduct  all  his  movements,  whether  of  justice  or  mercy,  as  to 
leave  on  the  minds  of  dependent  creatures  a  deep  and  just  impres- 
sion, that  the  penalty  of  the  law  will  be  executed,  and  that  the  sin- 
ner must  perish.  To  fix  this  impression  indelibly  in  the  breast  of 
the  sinner,  is  the  object  of  the  atonement^ — P.  41.  J  This,  however, 
is  probably  a  lapsus,  such  an  one,  however,  as  few  men  could  make. 
He  generally  includes  other  intelligent  creatures.  Still,  with  him. 
the  atonement  is  a  mere  method  of  instruction  ;  a  means  to  exhibit 
a  certain  truth  for  the  moral  restraint  or  improvement  of  those  to 
whom  it  is  made  known.  The  gratuitous  forgiveness  of  sin,  it  is 
said,  would  tend  to  produce  the  impression  that  God  was  indifferent 
to  his  law,  and  that  sin  might  be  committed  with  impunity.  To 
counteract  that  impression,  to  teach,  or  declare  that  sin  was,  in  the 
sight  of  God,  an  evil,  and  would  be  punished,  and  thus  to  open  a 
way  to  exercise  mercy,  without  weakening  the  motive  to  obedience, 
is  the  design  of  the  death  of  Christ.  Justice,  in  its  "common  ap- 
propriate sense,"  he  says,  "  was  not  satisfied  by  the  atonement  of 
Jesus  Christ." — P.  131.  "The  law,  or  justice,  that  is,  distributive 
justice,  as  expressed  in  the  law,  has  received  no  satisfaction  at  all." 
— P.  133.  So  far  as  the  atonement  secured  the  government  of  God 
from  the  evils  of  gratuitous  forgiveness,  it  was  a  satisfaction  to  his 
benevolence,  but  not  to  justice  in  any  other  sense. — P.  182.  It 
was  designed  to  teach  a  certain  truth  ;  it  is  "  a  symbolical  and  sub- 
stantive expression  of  God's  regard  to  the  moral  law." — P.  35.  "It 
furnishes  an  expression  of  his  regard  for  the  moral  law,"  and 
"  evinces  his  determination  to  punish  sin." — P.  91.  "To  fix  inde- 
libly this  impression  on  the  heart  of  the  sinner  is  the  object  of  the 
atonement." — P.  42. 

Our  first  remark  on  this  subject,  after  showing,  as  we  think  we 

*  Bretschneider's  Handbuck  der  Dogmatik,  vol.  ii. ,  p.  26G. 

f  In  the  Racovian  Catechism,  it  is  asked,  "Did  Christ  die  that  he  might,  properly 
speaking,  merit  our  salvation,  or,  in  like  manner,  properly  speaking,  discharge  the 
debt  due  for  our  sins  ?  Ans.  Although  Christians  generally  now  hold  that  opinion, 
yet  the  sentiment  is  false,  erroneous,  and  exceedingly  pernicious." 

%  Socinus  taught  that  the  atonement  was  designed,  1.  To  confirm  the  new  cove- 
nant and  all  its  promises,  especially  those  of  the  pardon  of  sin,  and  of  eternal  life. 
2.  To  assure  us  of  the  love  of  God.  3.  To  induce  us  to  embrace  the  Gospel.  4.  To 
encourage  us  by  his  example  to  trust  in  God.  5.  To  abrogate  the  old  dispensa- 
tion, &.C. 


318  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

have  done,  that  the  whole  basis  of  this  theory  is  false,  is  that  it  is 
destitute  of  any  semblance  of  support,  from  scripture.  It.  hardly 
purports  to  be  anything  more  than  a  hypothesis  on  which  to 
reconcile  what  the  Bible  teaches  with  our  views  of  moral  govern- 
ment. It  is  a  device  to  make  the  atonement  rational,  to  explain 
away  the  mystery  which  hangs  over  it,  and  makes  the  whole 
august  transaction  perfectly  intelligible.  Dr.  Beman  says  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  atonement  enters  "into  the  very  texture  of  revela- 
tion, warp  and  woof."  It  is,  he  says,  "  the  vital  principle,  in  the 
very  heart  of  the  Gospel." — P.  62.  Surely  then  we  have  a  right 
to  have  it  treated  as  "  a  purely  biblical  question,"  as  he  affirms  it 
to  be.  Yet  in  his  chapter  on  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  as  far 
as  we  can  find,  he  refers  but  to  one  solitary  text  in  the  whole 
Bible  !  It  is  a  theory  woven  warp  and  woof  out  of  the  under- 
standing, not  even  out  of  the  conscience.  The  solitary  passage 
which  Dr.  Beman  cites  as  teaching  his  doctrine  is  Rom.  iii.  25, 
where  it  is  said  that  God  set  forth  Christ  as  a  propitiation  for  our 
sins,  to  declare  his  righteousness.  "  The  object  of  the  atonement," 
he  says,  "  is  here  stated  in  explicit  terms.  It  was  required  and 
made  in  order  to  open  a  consistent  way  for  the  publication  of  par- 
don, or  for  the  exercise  of  grace  to  sinners.  Its  purpose  was  to 
declare  the  righteousness  or  moral  rectitude  and  perfection  of  God 
in  dispensing,  in  this  instance,  with  the  literal  execution  of  the 
penalty  of  the  law,  and  in  bestowing  eternal  life  upon  those  who 
deserved  to  die." — P.  124.  He  afterwards,  p.  132,  says,  the 
words  just  and  righteousness  as  here  used  have  "  no  direct  refer- 
ence to  law,"  but  express  "  those  principles  of  virtue  or  benevo- 
lence by  which  we  are  bound  to  regulate  our  conduct,  and  by 
which  God  governs  the  universe."  Then  of  course  the  passage 
might  be  rendered,  "  Christ  was  set  forth  as  a  propitiation  to  de- 
clare the  benevolence  of  God,  that  he  might  be  benevolent  even  in 
remitting  the  sins  of  those  that  believe  ;  an  interpretation  which 
needs  no  refutation.  The  first  remark  then  to  be  made  on  this 
passage  is,  that  it  teaches  the  very  reverse  of  what  it  is  cited  to 
prove.  Dr.  Beman  himself  says  that  in  their  "  common  and  appro- 
priate sense,"  the  words  just  and  justice  have  reference  to  law,  and 
express  what  he  calls  distributive  justice.  Then  if  the  language 
of  the  apostle  is  to  be  taken  in  a  "  common  and  appropriate  sense," 
it  teaches  that  the  propitiation  of  Christ  was  designed  as  an  exhi- 
bition of  justice  in  its  proper  sense,  in  order  to  make  it  apparent 
that  God  was  just  even  in  remitting  sin ;  that  the  demands  of 
justice  had  not  been  sacrificed,  but  on  the  contrary  fully  satisfied. 
It  is  only  by  taking  the  words  in  a  sense  that  is  inappropriate  and 
unusual,  that  any  other  doctrine  can  be  got  out  of  the  passage. 
Besides,  Dr.  Beman's  interpretation  is  not  only  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  common  meaning  of  the  words,  but  to  the  necessary  sense 
of  the  context.  Satisfaction  to  justice  is  the  formal  idea  of  a  pro- 
pitiation ;  and  saying  that  Christ  was  a  propitiation,  is  only  saying 
in  other  words,  that  our  sins  were  laid  on  him,  that  he  bore  the 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  319 

chastisement  or  punishment  of  our  sins,  in  order  that  God  might 
be  just,  in  justifying  those  that  believe.  Again  :  this  interpretation 
is  agreeable  to  the  sense  in  which  the  words  just,  righteous, 
righteousness,  &c,  are  familiarly  used  by  the  apostle.  Is  God 
unrighteous,  he  asks,  who  taketh  vengeance  ?  Rom  iii.  5.  He 
denounces  the  divine  judgment,  by  saying,  God  will  cut  short  the 
work  in  righteousness.  Rom.  ix.  28.  See  also  2  Thess.  i.  5,  6. 
The  obvious  sense  then  of  the  passage  in  Romans  iii.  25,  is  the  op- 
posite to  that  which  Dr.  Beman  gives  it.* 

But  if  we  admit  that  the  passage  in  question  does  teach  that  the 
atonement  was  designed  to  set  forth  God's  regard  for  the  good  of 
the  universe,  what  then  ?  would  it  establish  Dr.  Beman's  theory  ? 
Far  from  it.  It  is  one  of  the  most  common  fallacies  of  theological 
writers,  to  seize  upon  some  one  passage,  and  shutting  their  eyes 
to  all  others,  assume  that  it  teaches  the  whole  truth  on  a  given 
subject.  The  death  of  Christ  was  designed  to  answer  manifold 
ends,  more  perhaps  than  it  has  yet  entered  into  the  heart  of  man 
to  imagine.  It  would  be  the  extreme  of  folly  to  take  one  of  those 
ends,  and  infer  that  its  attainment  was  its  whole  design,  or  let  us 
into  the  full  knowledge  of  its  nature.  Is  it  not  said  a  hundred 
times  that  the  death  of  Christ  was  designed  to  exhibit  the  love  of 
God  ?  does  this  prove  that  it  does  not  display  his  righteousness  1 
It  is  said  to  declare  his  wisdom ;  does  that  prove  it  does  not  dis- 
play his  love  ?  It  was  designed  to  bring  us  unto  God,  but  does 
that  prove  it  was  not  also  an  atonement  ?  It  is  not  by  taking  any 
one  view,  or  any  one  text,  that  we  can  arrive  at  the  truth.  We 
must  have  a  theory  which  will  embrace  all  the  facts  ;  a  doctrine 
which  includes  all  the  revelations  God  has  made  on  this  subject. 
The  objection  to  Dr.  Beman's  view  of  the  design  of  Christ's  death 
is  not  that  it  is  false,  but  that  it  is  defective.  It  states  only  a  part, 
and  a  subordinate  part  of  the  truth.  The  atonement  is  an  exhi- 
bition of  God's  purpose  to  maintain  his  law  and  to  inflict  its  penalty, 
and  thus  to  operate  as  a  restraint  and  a  motive  on  all  intelligent 
beings,  because  it  involves  the  execution  of  that  penalty.  It  is 
this  that  gives  it  all  its  power.  It  would  be  no  exhibition  of  jus- 
tice, if  it  were  not  an  exercise  of  justice  ;  it  would  not  teach  that 
the  penalty  of  law  must  be  inflicted,  unless  it  was  inflicted.  We 
hold  all  the  little  truth  there  is  in  Dr.  Beman's  doctrine,  but  we 
hold  unspeakably  more. 

*  "  We  see  ourselves  obliged,"  says  Tholuck,  "  to  admit,  in  this  place,  the  idea  of 
distributive  justice  (vergeltende  Gerechtigkeit)."  He  afterwards  says  that  the  loss  of 
that  idea  in  theology  has  occasioned  "  unspeakable  evil,"  and  that  the  doctrine  of 
atonement  "  must  remain  sealed  up  until  it  is  acknowledged."  See  his  Romerbrief, 
ed.  1812.  He  refers  with  approbation  to  Usteri's  exposition  of  this  passage  in  his 
Paulinischer  Lehrbegriff.  On  turning  to  that  author  we  find  he  says,  his  object  is  to 
prove  "that  the  representation  contained  in  Rom.  iii.  24,25,  viz.,  that  God,  to  de- 
clare his  righteousness,  laid  on  Christ  the  punishment  of  the  sins  of  men,  is  the  doc- 
trine of  Paul."  And  he  accordingly  goes  on  to  prove  it,  particularly  from  Rom.  viii. 
3.  Usteri  is  one  of  those  writers  who  do  not  feel  called  upon  to  believe  what  the 
scripture  teaches,  though  they  make  it  a  point  of  honour  to  state  its  meaning  fairly. 


320  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

Our  immediate  object,  however,  is  to  call  attention  to  the  entire 
absence  of  all  scriptural  support  for  this  theory.  We  have  already 
shown  that  the  only  passage  directly  referred  to  does  not  teach 
what  it  is  cited  to  prove,  and  that  if  it  did,  it  would  give  no  sup- 
port to  the  theory  built  upon  it.  The  surprising  fact,  however, 
should  be  more  distinctly  noticed,  that  while  the  Bible  is  said  to  be 
full  of  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  scarcely  an  attempt  is  made  to 
prove  its  nature  from  the  Bible.  Christ  is  said  to  be  a  sacrifice,  to 
bear  our  sins,  to  be  a  propitiation,  a  ransom,  &c,  &c,  but  no 
attempt  is  made  to  tell  us  what  all  this  means.  There  is  no  exa- 
mination of  the  terms,  no  elucidation  of  the  meaning  they  bore  in 
the  age  of  the  apostles.  The  writer  does  not  even  pretend  to 
found  his  theory  upon  them.  In  the  chapter  in  which  he  gives  his 
own  view  of  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  they  are  scarcely  even 
mentioned.  The  whole  affair  is  a  piece  of  pure  Rationalistic  spe- 
culation, formed  on  certain  principles  of  moral  philosophy  which 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Bible.  It  is  assumed  that  happiness 
is  the  end  of  all  things  ;  that  to  promote  happiness  is  the  essence 
of  virtue  ;  that  the  prevention  of  crime,  which  causes  misery,  is 
the  end  of  punishment ;  that  the  death  of  Christ,  as  it  tends  to  pre- 
vent crime,  supersedes  the  necessity  of  punishment.  There  is  the 
theory.  And  we  can  hardly  avoid  saying  that  it  has  more  affinity 
with  Jeremy  Bentham,  and  "  the  greatest  happiness"  system,  than 
it  has  with  the  Bible,  or  with  the  sympathies  of  Christians. 

Our  next  remark  on  this  theory  is  that  it  is  perfectly  arbitrary. 
The  Bible  teaches  that  Christ  was  a  sacrifice,  that  he  bore  our 
sins,  that  the  chastisement  of  our  peace  was  laid  upon  him  ;  that 
he  propitiated  God  ;  was  a  ransom  ;  was  made  sin,  that  we  might 
be  made  righteous.  These  and  similar  statements  set  forth  the 
nature  of  the  atonement.  There  are  many  others  describing  some 
of  its  manifold  effects.  It  declared  the  justice  of  God,  exhibited 
his  wisdom,  set  us  an  example,  purifies  his  people,  and  in  short, 
glorifies  God  and  promotes  the  best  interests  of  his  kingdom.  If 
you  take  in  the  former  statements,  there  is  perfect  unity  in  all 
these  representations.  The  work  of  Christ  is  a  display  of  the  jus- 
tice and  love  of  God,  it  leads  men  to  repentance,  and  exerts  this 
moral  influence  on  the  universe,  because  it  is  a  satisfaction  to 
divine  justice,  and  answers  the  demands  of  his  law.  But  if  the 
scriptural  account  of  its  nature  be  rejected,  then  it  is  a  matter  to 
be  arbitrarily  decided,  which  of  its  effects  shall  be  selected  as  de- 
termining its  character.  If  Dr.  Beman  says  it  is  an  atonement 
because  it  expresses  God's  regard  to  the  order  and  welfare  of  his 
government ;  Socinus  may  say,  it  is  an  atonement  because  it 
assures  us  of  the  love  of  God.  The  one  is  just  as  much  right  as 
the  other ;  for  both  are  right  as  far  as  they  go  ;  but  both  are 
arbitrary  in  selecting  what  suits  their  taste,  or  their  philosophy, 
and  rejecting  all  the  rest.  Dr.  Beman  does  not  pretend  that  his 
doctrine  is  taught  in  those  passages  of  scripture  which  really 
describe  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  neither  does  Socinus.     Both 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  321 

• 

say  all  that  is  figurative.  The  one  says  its  nature  is  to  be  infer- 
red from  one  of  its  effects,  the  other  from  another  ;  the  one  con- 
siders it  as  designed  mainly  to  teach  God's  rectoral  justice,  the 
other  his  love.  It  is  perfectly  plain  that  on  this  plan  the  citadel  is 
surrendered.  Dr.  Beman  can  have  nothing  to  say  to  the  Socinian, 
which  the  Socinian  cannot  retort  on  Dr.  Beman.  Both  admit  that 
we  are  saved  by  the  death  of  Christ ;  the  one  affirming  that  it  is 
because  it  brings  us  to  repentance,  and  thus  makes  our  forgiveness 
consistent  with  the  character  of  God  and  the  interests  of  his 
kingdom  ;  the  other,  that  it  is  because  it  reconciles  forgiveness 
with  the  good  of  the  universe,  in  a  different  way. 

It  may  also  on  this  ground  be  made  a  fair  subject  of  debate, 
which  view  really  assigns  most  importance  to  the  death  of  Christ. 
Is  it  clear  that  fear  is  more  conservative  than  love  ?  that  the  exhi- 
bition of  God's  regard  to  law  would  have  a  greater  effect  in  pro- 
moting holiness  than  the  exhibition  of  his  mercy  ?  We  very 
much  doubt  it.  And  we  confess  ourselves  very  much  at  a  loss  to 
see,  why  the  Socinian  view  of  the  design  of  the  Redeemer's  death 
should  be  regarded  as  a  rejection  of  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  if 
his  death  was  merely  designed  to  exert  a  conservative  influence 
on  the  moral  government  of  God.  Certain  it  is  that  this  is  not  the 
doctrine  against  which  the  early  Socinians  contended. 

It  is  further  plain  that  the  principles  of  interpretation  which  Dr. 
Beman  is  obliged  to  adopt  to  reconcile  his  theory  with  the  Bible, 
are  all  that  is  wanted  to  serve  the  purpose  of  Socinians.  They 
both  deny  that  we  are  to  take  the  language  of  scripture  according 
to  its  "  common  and  appropriate  sense,"  and  agreeably  to  the  mode 
of  thinking  prevalent  in  the  age  in  which  it  was  uttered.  The 
vastly  different  views  entertained  by  Dr.  Beman  and  Socinus  as  to 
the  person  of  Christ,  make  of  course  a  corresponding  difference 
in  their  whole  religious  system.  But  as  to  the  nature  of  the  atone- 
ment, we  have  always  considered  the  ground  advocated  by  Dr. 
Beman,  as  utterly  untenable  against  the  arguments  of  Socinians. 
It  is  a  rejection  of  the  scriptural  account,  and  after  that  is  done, 
one  theory  has  as  much  authority  as  another. 

Our  third  remark  is,  that  this  theory,  besides  being  independent 
of  scripture,  and  perfectly  arbitrary,  is  directly  opposed  to  the  ex- 
plicit teaching  of  the  word  of  God.  Be  it  remembered  that  the 
Bible  is  admitted  to  be  full  of  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement ;  that 
it  is  the  great  central  point  in  the  religion  of  redeemed  man. 
It  is  also  admitted  that  God  has  revealed  not  only  the  fact  that  we 
are  saved  by  the  obedience  and  death  of  Christ,  but  also  the  way 
in  which  his  work  is  efficacious  to  that  end.  The  Socinian  says, 
it  is  by  its  moral  effect  upon  men  ;  Dr.  Beman  says,  it  is  from  its 
tendency  to  prevent  crime  and  preserve  the  order  of  the  universe  ; 
the  common  faith  of  Christendom  is,  that  Christ  saves  us  by  satis- 
fying the  demands  of  law  and  justice  in  our  stead.  As  the  Bible 
is  full  of  this  doctrine  it  must  enable  us  to  decide  which  of  these 
views  is  right,  for  the  Bible  was  intended  to  teach  us  the  way  of 

21 


322  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

salvation.  We  are  taught  then  first,  that  Christ  bore  our  sins. 
Heb.  ix.  28,  1  Pet.  ii.  24,  Is.  liii.  12,  &c.  It  cannot  be  disputed 
that  the  usual  scriptural  meaning  of  the  expression,  to  bear  sin,  is 
to  bear  the  punishment  due  to  sin.  Lev.  xxii.  9.  If  they  keep 
not  my  ordinance  "  they  shall  bear  sin  for  it."  Num.  xviii.  22, 
xiv.  33,  Lev.  v.  1,  17.  "  He  is  guilty,  and  shall  bear  his  iniquity." 
Ez.  xviii.  20.  "  The  soul  that  sinneth  it  shall  die.  The  son  shall 
not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,  neither  shall  the  father  bear  the 
iniquity  of  the  son."  No  one  doubts  that  this  means,  the  son  shall 
not  be  punished  for  the  sins  of  the  father,  nor  the  father  for  the 
sins  of  the  son.  When  therefore  the  scriptures  say  that  Christ 
bore  our  sins,  they  say  in  express  terms,  that  he  bore  the  punish- 
ment of  our  sins.  This  is  rendered  the  more  certain,  because  he 
bore  them  by  suffering,  or  by  dying ;  and  because  the  scriptures 
express  this  same  idea  in  so  many  other  ways.  This  account  of 
the  nature  of  the  atonement  is  found  not  only  in  poetical  descrip- 
tions of  Christ's  sufferings,  but  in  the  most  didactic  portions  of  the 
Bible.  The  language  used  had  an  established  sense  in  the  minds 
of  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  who  could  not  fail  to  under- 
stand it  according  to  its  obvious  meaning.  That  meaning,  there- 
fore, we  are  bound,  by  all  sound  rules  of  interpretation,  to  believe 
the  sacred  writers  intended  to  convey.  How  does  Dr.  Beman 
answer  this  ?  Does  he  attempt  to  show  that  the  phrase  "  to  bear 
sin"  does  commonly  mean  to  bear  the  punishment  of  sin  ?  or  that 
it  has  not  that  meaning  when  used  in  reference  to  Christ  ?  As  far 
as  we  have  been  able  to  find,  he  contents  himself  with  some  gene- 
ral remarks  against  taking  figurative  language  in  its  literal  sense. 
He  subjects  the  passages,  in  which  the  phrase  in  question  occurs, 
to  no  critical  examination.  He  makes  no  attempt  to  show  that 
figurative  language  may  not  convey  a  definite  meaning,  or  that 
that  meaning  is  not  to  be  learnt  from  usage,  and '  the  known 
opinions  of  those  to  whom  it  is  addressed.  It  is  enough  for  him 
that  he  does  not  like  the  truth,  which  the  passages  in  question 
would  then  teach  ;  that  he  cannot  see  how  the  innocent  could  so 
take  the  place  of  the  guilty  as  to  bear  their  punishment ;  that  he 
cannot  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  the  justice  of  God,  nor  with 
his  views  of  other  portions  of  scripture.  In  the  meantime  the 
plain  meaning  of  the  scriptures  stands,  and  those  who  find  all  other 
scriptural  representations  consistent  with  that  meaning,  and  to 
whom  it  is  in  fact  the  very  ground  of  their  hope  towards  God,  will 
receive  it  gladly,  and  in  all  its  simplicity.  The  theory  of  Dr. 
Beman,  then,  which  denies  that  Christ  suffered  the  penalty  due  to 
our  sins,  must  be  admitted  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  these  ex- 
press declarations  of  the  word  of  God.* 

*  Prof.  Stuart,  in  his  Commentary  and  Excursus  on  Heb.  ix.  28,  says,  "  To  bear  the 
sins  of  others,  is  to  bear  or  endure  the  penalty  due  to  them."  Having  proved  this, 
he  adds,  "  The  sentiment  of  the  clause  then  clearly  is,  that  Jesus  by  his  death 
(which  could  take  place  but  once),  endured  the  penalty  that  our  sins  deserved,  or 
bore  the  sorrows  due  to  us."     What  he  further  says,  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  323 

Secondly,  the  scriptures,  in  order  to  teach  us  the  nature  of  atone- 
ment, say  that  Christ  offered  himself  as  a  sacrifice  unto  God. 
What,  then,  is,  according  to  the  scriptures,  a  sacrifice  for  sins  ? 
"  The  essence  of  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,"  says  Storr,  "  is  the  for- 
giveness of  sin,  through  the  transfer  of  punishment  from  the  actual 
offender  to  another."*  The  moderate  Bishop  Burnett  says  :  "  The 
notion  of  an  expiatory  sacrifice  which  was  then,  when  the  New 
Testament  was  writ,  well  understood  all  the  world  over,  both  by 
Jews  and  Gentiles,  was  this,  that  the  sin  of  one  person  was  trans- 
ferred on  a  man  or  beast,  who  upon  that  was  devoted  or  offered  to 
God,  and  suffered  in  the  room  of  the  offending  person  ;  and,  by  this 
oblation,  the  punishment  of  the  sin  being  laid  on  the  sacrifice,  an 
expiation  was  made  for  sin,  and  the  sinner  was  believed  to  be 
reconciled  to  God."f  That  this  is  the  correct  view  of  the  scrip- 
tural doctrine  concerning  sacrifices,  may  be  inferred : — 1.  From 
its  being  confessedly  the  light  in  which  they  were  generally 
regarded  by  the  Jews  and  by  the  whole  ancient  world,  and  from 
its  being  a  simple  and  natural  explanation  of  the  service.  On  this 
hypothesis,  everything  is  significant  and  intelligible.  2.  From  the 
express  didactic  statements  of  the  Bible.  The  life  is  said  to  be  in 
the  blood,  and  "  I  have  given  it  to  you  as  an  atonement  for  your 
souls  ;  for  it  is  the  blood  that  maketh  atonement  for  the  soul  (life)." 
Lev.  xvii.  11.  The  very  nature  of  the  service,  then,  was  the  sub- 
stitution of  life  for  life.  The  life  forfeited  was  redeemed  by  the  life 
paid.  3.  From  all  the  rites  connected  with  the  service,  and  all  the 
expressions  employed  concerning  it.  There  was  to  be  confession 
of  sin,  imposition  of  hands  (as  expressing  the  idea  of  transfer  and 
substitution),  the  sins  were  said  to  be  laid  on  the  head  of  the  vic- 
tim, which  was  then  put  to  death,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  the  scape- 
goat, dismissed  into  the  wilderness,  and  another  goat  sacrificed  in 
its  place.  All  these  directions  plainly  teach  that  the  nature  of 
expiatory  offerings  consisted  in  the  substitution  of  the  victim  for 
the  offender,  and  in  the  infliction  of  the  penalty  of  death  incurred 
by  the  one  upon  the  other.  4.  That  this  is  the  scriptural  doctrine 
on  this  subject,  is  made  still  plainer  by  the  fact,  that  all  that  is 
taught  by  saying  that  the  Messiah  bore  our  sins,  that  our  iniquities 
were  laid  upon  him,  that  he  bore  our  sorrows,  that  the  chastise- 
ment of  our  peace  was  laid  on  him,  is  expressed  by  the  prophet 
by  saying,  He  made  "  his  soul  an  offering  for  sin."  Then  an 
offering  for  sin  is  one  on  whom  sin  is  laid,  who  bears  sins,  i.  e.,  as 
has  been  shown,  the  penalty  due  to  sin.  5.  This  view  of  the  sub- 
ject is  further  confirmed  by  a  consideration  of  the  effects  ascribed 

were  not  in  all  respects,  and  considered  in  every  point  of  view,  an  exact  and  specific 
quid  pro  quo,  as  it  regards  the  penalty  threatened  against  sin,  that  the  Saviour  did 
not  suffer  a  guilty  conscience,  or  despair,  would  be  pertinent,  had  he  first  proved 
that  any  respectable  body  of  Christians  held  any  such  doctrine,  or  that  a  guilty  con- 
science, or  despair,  is  an  essential  part  of  the  penalty  of  the  law.. 

*  Zweck  des  Todes  Jesu.     §  8. 

f  Burnet  on  the  Thirty-nine  Articles.     Article  2. 


324  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

to  these  sacrifices.  They  made  atonement ;  they  propitiated  God  ; 
they  secured  the  remission  of  the  penalty  incurred.  When  an 
Israelite  had  committed  any  offence  by  which  he  forfeited  his 
standing  in  the  theocracy  (that  is,  the  favour  of  God  as  his  theo- 
cratical  ruler),  he  brought  to  the  priest  the  appointed  sacrifice, 
made  confession  of  his  sin,  the  victim  was  slain  in  his  place,  and 
he  was  restored  to  his  standing,  and  saved  from  being  cut  off  from 
his  people.  These  sacrifices  always  produced  these  effects  ;  they 
always  secured  the  remission  of  the  theocratical  penalty  for  which 
they  were  offered  and  accepted.  Whether  they  secured  the  for- 
giveness of  the  soul  before  God,  depended  on  the  state  of  mind  of 
the  offerer.  Of  themselves  they  had  no  such  efficacy,  since  it  was 
impossible  that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  goats  could  take  away  sin. 
But  nothing  is  plainer  from  scripture  than  that  the  way  in  which 
the  Israelites  obtained  the  remission  of  the  civil  or  theocratical 
penalties  which  they  had  incurred,  was  intended  to  teach  us  how 
sin  is  pardoned  in  the  sight  of  God  through  Jesus  Christ. 

If,  then,  the  Bible,  according  to  the  almost  unanimous  judgment 
of  Christians,  teaches  that  the  idea  of  an  expiatory  sacrifice  is,  that 
by  vicarious  punishment  justice  is  satisfied  and  sin  forgiven  ;  if  this 
was  the  view  taken  of  them  by  Jews  and  Gentiles,  then  does  the 
Bible,  in  so  constantly  representing  Christ  as  a  propitiation,  as  a 
lamb,  as  a  sacrifice  for  sin,  expressly  teach  that  he  bore  the  penalty 
due  to  our  sins,  that  he  satisfied  divine  justice,  and  secured,  for  all 
in  whose  behalf  that  sacrifice  is  accepted,  the  pardon  of  sin  and 
restoration  to  the  divine  favour.  To  talk  of  figure  here  is  out  of 
the  question.  Admit  that  the  language  is  figurative,  the  question 
is,  what  idea  was  it  intended  to  convey?  Beyond  doubt  that 
which  the  sacred  writers  knew  with  certainty  would  be  attached 
to  it  by  their  immediate  readers,  and  which,  in  fact,  has  been 
attached  to  it  in  all  ages  of  the  church.*  To  tell  a  conscience- 
stricken  Israelite  that  a  sacrifice  was  designed  either  to  impress 
his  own  mind,  or  the  mind  of  others,  with  the  truth  that  God  is  just 
or  benevolent,  would  have  been  a  mockery.  It  was  to  him  an 
atonement,  a  propitiation,  a  vicarious  punishment,  or  it  was  nothing. 
And  it  is  no  less  a  mockery  to  tell  a  convinced  sinner  that  the  death 
of  Christ  was  designed  to  lead  him  to  repentance,  or  to  preserve 
the  good  order  of  the  universe.  Unless  the  Redeemer  was  a  sacri- 
fice, on  whom  our  sins  were  laid,  who  bore  the  penalty  we  had 
incurred,  it  is,  to  such  a  sinner,  no  atonement,  and  no  adequate 
ground  of  confidence  toward  God.  f 

*  "  It  is  not  possible  for  us  to  preserve,"  says  Bishop  Burnet,  •*  any  reverence  for 
the  New  Testament,  or  the  writers  of  it,  so  far  as  to  think  them  even  honest  men, 
not  to  say  inspired  men,  if  we  can  imagine,  that  in  so  sacred  and  important  a  matter 
they  could  exceed  so  much  as  to  represent  that  a  sacrifice  which  is  not  truly  so.  This 
is  a  subject  which  will  not  bear  figures  and  amplifications  ;  it  must  be  treated  strict- 
ly, and  with  a  just  exactness  of  expression." — Burnet  on  the  Thirty-JVine  Articles, 
the  same  page  quoted  above. 

]  "  The  innate  sense  of  divine  justice,  which  all  men  possess,  demands  that  the 
sinner  should  receive  his  due,  that  the  stroke  he  has  given  to  the  law,  should  recoil 


BBMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  325 

Again :  it  is  a  part  of  the  common  faith  of  the  church,  that  Jesus 
Christ  is  a  true  and  proper  priest ;  that  what  was  symbolical  and 
figurative  with  regard  to  other  priests,  is  real  as  it  regards  him.  He 
is  called  a  priest ;  it  is  proved  that  he  has  all  the  qualifications  for 
the  office ;  that  he  was  divinely  appointed ;  that  he  performed  all 
its  duties,  secures  all  its  benefits ;  and  that  his  priesthood  super- 
sedes all  others.  We  are  accordingly  commanded  to  come  to 
him  in  the  character  of  a  priest ;  to  commit  our  souls  into  his  hands, 
that  he  may  reconcile  us  to  God,  and  make  intercession  for  us. 
This  is  the  scriptural  method  of  representing  the  manner  in  which 
Christ  saves  us,  and  the  nature  of  his  work.  Dr.  Beman,  in  his 
chapter  on  the  "  Fact  of  the  Atonement,"  which  is  directed  against 
Socinians,  avails  himself  of  all  the  usual  sources  of  scriptural  proof; 
and,  in  the  course  of  the  chapter,  is  forced  to  speak  of  Christ  as  a 
sacrifice  and  a  Priest.  But  when  he  comes  to  the  exposition  of  his 
views  of  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  he  finds  it  expedient,  and  even 
necessary,  to  leave  that  mode  of  representation  entirely  out  of 
view.  We  hear  no  more  of  propitiating  God,  of  Christ  as  a  sacri- 
fice, of  his  character  as  a  Priest.  It  is  now  all  moral  government, 
the  order  and  interest  of  the  universe,  symbolical  teaching,  exhibi- 
tion of  truth  and  motives.  Why  is  all  this  ?  Why  does  not  Dr. 
Beman's  doctrine  admit  of  being  thrown  into  the  scriptural  form  ? 
Why  must  the  terms  sacrifice,  priest,  propitiation,  be  discarded 
when  teaching  the  nature  of  the  atonement  1  For  the  very  obvi- 
ous reason  that  there  is  an  entire  incongruity  between  his  views 
and  the  word  of  God.  What  has  a  sacrifice  and  priest  to  do  with 
governmental  display  ?  This  fact  alone  works  the  condemnation 
of  Dr.  Beman's  whole  theory.  His  plan  of  salvation,  his  method 
of  access  to  God,  is  irreconcilable  with  that  presented  in  the  scrip- 
tures. There  we  are  taught  that,  as  the  Israelite  who  had  offended 
came  to  the  priest,  who  made  an  atonement  for  him  in  the  appointed 
way,  and  thus  reconciled  him  to  God,  so  the  penitent  sinner  must 
come  to  Christ  as  his  High  Priest,  who  satisfies  the  divine  justice 
by  presenting  his  own  merits  before  God,  and  who  ever  lives  to 

upon  himself.  The  deeper  his  sense  of  guilt,  the  less  can  he  be  satisfied  with  mere 
pardon,  and  the  more  does  he  demand  punishment,  for  by  punishment  he  is  justified. 
Whence  do  we  derive  his  intimate  persuasion  of  God's  justice  ?  Not  from  without ; 
because  men,  as  empirically  guided,  regard  freedom  from  suffering  as  the  highest 
good  ;  it  must  therefore  be  implanted  in  our  nature  by  God  himself.  The  holiness  of 
God,  which  reveals  itself  to  the  sinner  by  the  connexion  between  suffering  and  trans- 
gression, has,  therefore,  a  witness  for  itself  in  every  human  breast.  Hence,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  proclamation  of  pardon  and  reconciliation  could  not  satisfy  the  conscience 
of  the  sinner,  unless  his  guilt  had  been  atoned  for  by  punishment ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  divine  love  could  not  offer  its  blessings  to  the  sinner,  unless  holiness  was  re- 
vealed together  with  love.  It  was  therefore  necessary  that  suffering  commensurate 
with  the  apostasy  of  man  should  be  endured,  which  men  would  impute  to  themselves 
as  their  own.  Such  was  the  suffering,  inward  and  outward,  of  the  Redeemer.  Two 
things  were  necessary,  1.  That  those  sufferings  should  correspond  to  (entsprechen) 
the  greatness  of  the  sin  of  mankind ;  2.  That  the  sinner  could  rightfully  impute 
them  to  himself." — Tholuck,  Beilage  ii.,  zum  Hebraerbrief,  p.  104.  There  is  more 
real  and  precious  truth,  according  to  our  judgment,  in  that  short  paragraph ,  than  in 
all  Dr.  Beman's  book. 


326  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

make  intercession  for  him.  Would  this  representation  ever  lead  a 
human  being  to  imagine  that  Christ  merely  makes  pardon  possible 
— that  his  death  was  a  symbolical  lesson  to  the  universe  ?  Accord- 
ing to  Dr.  Beman's  theory,  Christ  is  not  a  priest.  We  are  under 
no  necessity  of  recognizing  him  as  such,  nor  of  committing  our- 
selves into  his  hands,  nor  of  relying  on  his  merits  and  intercession. 
A  mere  possibility  of  salvation  for  all  men  is  all  that  Christ  has 
accomplished.  But  does  this  make  him  a  High  Priest  in  the  scrip- 
tural and  universally  received  sense  of  the  term  1 

A  third  method  by  which  the  scriptures  teach  us  the  nature  of 
the  atonement,  is  by  express  declarations  concerning  the  nature  of 
his  sufferings,  or  the  immediate  design  of  his  death.  It  is  expressly 
taught  that  his  sufferings  were  penal,  that  he  endured  the  penalty 
of  the  law,  and  that  he  thus  suffered  not  for  himself  but  for  us. 
This  is  a  point  about  which  there  is  so  much  strange  misconcep- 
tion, that  it  is  necessary  to  explain  the  meaning  of  the  terms  here 
used.  The  sufferings  of  rational  beings  are  either  calamities,  hav- 
ing no  reference  to  sin,  or  chastisement  designed  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  sufferer,  or  penal  when  designed  for  the  satisfaction  of 
justice.  Now,  what  is  meant  by  the  language  above  used  is,  that 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  not  mere  calamities ;  neither  were 
they  chastisements  (in  the  sense  just  stated),  nor  were  they  simply 
exemplary,  nor  merely  symbolical,  designed  to  teach  this  or  that 
truth,  but  that  they  were  penal,  i.  e.,  designed  to  satisfy  divine  jus- 
tice. This  is  the  distinctive  character  assigned  to  them  in  scrip- 
ture. Again  :  by  the  penalty  of  the  law  is  meant  that  suffering 
which  the  law  demands  as  a  satisfaction  to  justice.  It  is  not  any 
specific  kind  or  degree  of  suffering,  for  it  varies  both  as  to  degree 
and  kind,  in  every  supposable  case  of  its  infliction.  The  sufferings 
of  no  two  men  that  ever  lived,  are  precisely  alike,  in  this  world  or 
the  next,  unless  their  constitution,  temperament,  sins,  feelings,  and 
circumstances  were  precisely  alike,  which  is  absolutely  incredible. 
The  objection  therefore  started  by  Socinians,  that  Christ  did  not 
suffer  the  penalty  of  the  law,  because  he  did  not  suffer  remorse, 
despair,  or  eternal  banishment  from  God,  was  answered,  by  cotem- 
porary  theologians,  by  denying  that  those  things  entered  essential- 
ly into  the  penalty  of  the  law.  That  penalty  is  in  scripture  called 
death,  which  includes  every  kind  of  evil  inflicted  by  divine  justice 
in  punishment  of  sin  ;  and  inasmuch  as  Christ  suffered  such  evil, 
and  to  such  a  degree  as  fully  satisfied  divine  justice,  he  suffered 
what  the  scriptures  call  the  penalty  of  the  law.  It  is  not  the  na- 
ture, but  the  relation  of  sufferings  to  the  law,  which  gives  them  their 
distinctive  character.  What  degree  of  suffering  the  law  demands, 
as  it  varies  in  every  specific  case,  God  only  can  determine.  The 
sufferings  of  Christ  were  unutterably  great ;  still  with  one  voice, 
Papists,  Lutherans,  and  Reformed,  rebutted  the  objection  of  Soci- 
nus,  that  the  transient  sufferings  of  one  man  could  not  be  equivalent 
to  the  sufferings  due  to  the  sins  of  men,  by  referring,  not  to  the  de- 
gree of  the  Saviour's  anguish,  as  equal  to  the  misery  due  to  all  for 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  327 

whom  he  died,  but  to  the  infinite  dignity  of  his  person.  It  was  the 
Lord  of  glory  who  was  crucified.  As  the  bodily  sufferings  of  a 
man  are  referred  to  his  whole  person,  so  the  scriptures  refer  the 
sufferings  of  Christ's  human  nature  to  his  whole  person.  And  he 
was  a  divine,  and  not  a  human  person ;  but  a  divine  person  with  a 
human  nature.  This  is  an  awful  subject,  on  which  all  irreverent 
speculation  must  be  very  offensive  to  God.  Let  it  be  enough  to 
say  with  the  scriptures  that  Christ  suffered  the  penalty  of  the  law 
in  our  stead,  and  that  the  penalty  of  the  law  was  that  kind  and 
amount  of  suffering,  which,  from  such  a  Person,  was  a  full  satisfac- 
tion to  the  divine  justice.  All  that  our  standards  say  on  this  point, 
they  say  wisely,  viz.,  that  the  Saviour  endured  the  miseries  of  this 
life,  the  wrath  of  God,  the  accursed  death  of  the  cross,  and  conti- 
nued under  the  power  of  death  for  a  time.  This  was  the  penalty 
of  the  law  ;  for  the  wrath  of  God,  however  expressed,  constitutes 
that  penalty,  in  its  strictest  and  highest  sense. 

That  the  scriptures  do  teach  that  Christ's  sufferings  were  penal, 
has  already  been  proved  from  those  passages  in  which  he  is  said 
to  bear  our  sins,  that  our  iniquities  were  laid  upon  him,  that  he  suf- 
fered the  chastisement  of  our  peace,  and  that  as  a  sacrifice  he  en- 
dured the  death  which  we  had  incurred.  The  same  truth  is  ex- 
pressed still  more  explicitly  in  Gal.  iii.  13.  The  apostle  thus 
argues.  The  law  pronounces  accursed  all  who  do  not  obey  every 
command ;  no  man  has  ever  rendered  this  perfect  obedience,  there- 
fore all  men  are  under  the  curse  ;  but  Christ  has  redeemed  us  from 
the  curse  of  the  law,  having  been  made  a  curse  for  us.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  what  the  apostle  means,  when  he  says,  that  all  men 
are  under  the  curse  ;  nor  when  he  says,  cursed  is  every  one  who 
continueth  not  in  all  things  written  in  the  law  to  do  them  ;  neither 
can  it  be  doubted  what  he  means  when  he  says,  Christ  was  made 
a  curse.  The  three  expressions,  under  the  curse,  accursed,  and 
made  a  curse,  cannot  mean  essentially  different  things.  If  the  former 
mean  that  we  were  exposed  to  the  penalty,  the  latter  must  mean 
that  Christ  endured  the  penalty.  He  hath  redeemed  us  from  the 
curse  by  bearing  it  in  our  stead.* 

To  the  same  effect  the  apostle  speaks  in  Rom.  viii.  3.  What 
the  law  could  not  do  (i.  e.,  effect  the  justification  of  men)  in  that  it 
was  weak  through  the  flesh,  that  God  did,  having  sent  his  Son  in 
the  likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for  sin,  or  as  a  sin-offering,  he  con- 
demned, i.  e.,  punished  sin,  in  the  flesh,  i.  e.,  in  him,  who  was  clothed 
in  our  nature.  This  passage  agrees,  as  to  the  principal  point,  with 
the  one  cited  from  Galatians.     The  sentence  which  we  had  incur- 


*  In  this  interpretation  every  modern  commentator  of  whom  we  have  any  know- 
ledge concurs,  as  for  example,  Koppe,  Flatt,  Winer,  Usteri,  Matthias,  Ruckert,  De 
Wette.  What  the  apostle  adds  in  the  next  verse,  "  For  it  is  written,  cursed  is  every 
one  that  is  hung  upon  a  tree,"  is  evidently  intended  to  justify  from  scripture  the  use 
of  the  word  curse.  Those  publicly  exposed  as  suffering  the  sentence  of  the  law, 
are  called  cursed ;  hence,  since  Christ,  though  perfectly  holy,  did  bear  the  sentence 
of  the  law,  the  word  may  be  properly  applied  to  him. 


328  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

red  was  carried  into  effect  upon  the  Redeemer,  in  order  that  we 
might Jbe  delivered  from  the  law  under  which  we  were  justly  con- 
demned. In  2  Cor.  v.  21,  the  apostle,  in  urging  men  to  be  recon- 
ciled to  God,  presents  the  nature  and  mode  of  the  atonement,  as 
the  ground  of  his  exhortation.  "  For  he  hath  made  him  to  be  sin 
for  us,  who  knew  no  sin,  that  we  might  become  the  righteousness 
of  God  in  him."  The  only  sense  in  which  Christ,  who  was  free 
from  all  sin,  could  be  made  sin,  was  by  having  our  sins  laid 
upon  him  ;  and  the  only  way  in  which  our  sins  could  be  laid  upon 
him,  was  by  his  so  assuming  our  place  as  to  endure,  in  our  stead, 
the  penalty  we  had  incurred.  "  God  made  him  to  be  sin,"  says  De 
Wette,  "  in  that  he  laid  on  him  the  punishment  of  sin."  Here  again 
we  have  precisely  the  same  doctrine,  taught  under  all  the  other 
forms  of  expression  already  considered.  Christ  was  made  sin,  as 
we  in  him  are  made  righteousness ;  we  are  justified,  he  was  con- 
demned ;  we  are  freed  from  the  penalty,  he  endured  it ;  he  was 
treated  as  justice  required  the  sinner  to  be  treated ;  we  are  treated 
according  to  his  merits  and  not  our  own  deserts. 

Fourthly,  there  are  various  other  forms  under  which  the  scrip- 
tures set  forth  the  nature  of  Christ's  death,  which  the  limits  of  a  re- 
view forbid  our  considering.  He  has  redeemed  us ;  he  has  pur- 
chased us  ;  he  gave  himself  as  a  ransom,  &c.  It  is  readily  admit- 
ted that  all  these  terms  are  often  used  in  a  wide  sense,  to  express 
the  general  idea  of  deliverance  without  reference  to  the  mode  by 
which  that  deliverance  is  effected.  It  cannot,  however,  be  denied 
that  they  properly  express  deliverance  by  purchase,  i.  e.,  by  the 
payment  of  what  is  considered  equivalent  to  the  person  or  thing 
redeemed.  In  the  Bible  it  is  not  simply  said  that  Christ  has  deliver- 
ed us  ;  nor  is  it  said  he  delivered  us  by  power,  nor  by  teaching,  but 
by  his  death,  by  his  own  precious  blood,  by  giving  himself,  by  being 
made  a  curse  for  us.  Such  representations  cannot  fail  to  convey 
the  idea  of  a  redemption  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  and  there- 
fore teach  the  true  nature  of  the  atonement.  We  are  redeemed  ; 
that  which  was  given  for  us  was  of  infinite  value. 

If  the  scriptures  thus  teach  that  Christ  saves  us  by  bearing  our 
sins,  or  being  made  a  sin-offering  in  our  place,  then  the  more 
general  expressions,  such  as  he  died  for  us,  he  gave  himself  for  us, 
we  are  saved  by  his  death,  his  blood,  his  cross,  and  others  of  a  simi- 
lar kind,  are  all  to  be  understood  in  accordance  with  those  more 
explicit  statements.  To  the  pious  reader  of  the  New  Testament, 
therefore,  the  precious  truth  that  Christ  died  as  our  substitute,  en- 
during in  his  own  person  the  death  which  we  had  incurred,  re- 
deeming us  from  the  curse  by  being  made  a  curse  for  us,  meets  him 
upon  almost  every  page,  and  confirms  his  confidence  in  the  truth 
and  exalts  his  estimate  of  its  value,  by  this  frequency  of  repetition 
and  variety  of  statement. 

Fifthly,  there  is  still  another  consideration  in  proof  of  the  unscrip- 
tural  character  of  Dr.  Beman's  theory,  which  is  too  important  to 
be  overlookeJ.      The  apostle,  in  unfolding  the  plan  of  redemption 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  329 

proceeds  on  the  assumption  that  men  are  under  a  law  or  covenant 
which  demands  perfect  obedience,  and  which  threatens  death  in 
case  of  transgression.  He  then  shows  that  no  man,  whether  Jew 
or  Gentile,  can  fulfil  the  conditions  of  that  covenant,  or  so  obey  the 
law  as  to  claim  justification  on  the  ground  of  his  own  righteous- 
ness. Still,  as  this  law  is  perfectly  righteous,  it  cannot  be  arbitra- 
rily set  aside.  What  then  was  to  be  done  ?  What  hope  can  there 
be  for  the  salvation  of  sinners?  The  apostle  answers  by  saying, 
that  what  the  law  could  not  do  (that  is,  save  men),  God  has  ac- 
complished by  the  mission  of  his  Son.  But  how  does  the  Son  save 
us  ?  This  is  the  very  question  before  us.  It  relates  to  the  nature 
of  the  work  of  Christ,  which  Dr.  Beman  has  undertaken  to  discuss. 
Paul's  answer  to  that  question  is,  that  Christ  saves  us  by  being  made 
under  the  law  and  fulfilling  all  its  demands.  He  fulfilled  all  right- 
eousness, he  knew  no  sin,  he  was  holy,  harmless,  and  separate  of 
sinners.  He  bore  our  sins  in  his  own  body  on  the  tree,  and  thus 
endured  the  death  which  the  law  threatened  against  sin.  He  has 
thus  redeemed  us  from  the  law  ;  that  is,  we  are  no  longer  under 
obligation  to  satisfy,  in  our  own  person,  its  demands,  in  order  to  our 
justification.  The  perfect  righteousness  of  Christ  is  offered  as  the 
ground  of  justification,  and  all  who  accept  of  that  righteousness  by 
faith,  have  it  so  imputed  to  them,  that  they  can  plead  it  as  their 
own,  and  God  has  promised  to  accept  it  to  their  salvation.  We 
can  hardly  persuade  ourselves  that  any  ordinary  reader  of  the 
Bible  can  deny  that  this  is  a  correct  representation  of  the  manner 
in  which  Paul  preached  the  Gospel.  It  is  the  burden  of  all  his 
writings,  it  is  the  Gospel  itself  as  it  lay  in  his  mind,  and  as  he  pre- 
sented it  to  others.  It  is  the  whole  subject  of  the  first  eight  chap- 
ters of  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  and  of  all  the  doctrinal  part  of 
his  Epistle  to  the  Galatians.  In  the  former  of  these  epistles,  he 
shows  that  there  are  but  two  methods  of  justification,  the  one  by 
our  own  righteousness,  and  the  other  by  the  righteousness  of  God. 
Having  shown  that  no  man  has  or  can  have  an  adequate  right- 
eousness of  his  own,  he  shows  that-  the  Gospel  reveals  the  right- 
eousness of  God,  that  is,  the  righteousness  which  is  by  faith  in 
Jesus  Christ,  and  which  is  upon  all  them  that  believe.  This 
righteousness  is  so  complete,  that  God  is  just  in  justifying  those 
who  have  the  faith  by  which  it  is  received  and  appropriated.  He 
afterwards  illustrates  this  great  doctrine  of  imputed  righteous- 
ness by  a  reference  to  the  case  of  Adam,  and  shows  that  as  on 
account  of  the  offence  of  one  man  a  sentence  of  condemnation 
passed  on  all  men,  so,  on  account  of  the  righteousness  of  one  man, 
the  free  gift  of  justification  has  come  upon  all.  As  by  the  disobe- 
dience of  one  the  many  were  made  sinners,  so  by  the  obedience 
of  one  the  many  are  made  righteous.  It  is  involved  in  all  this,  that 
we  are  no  longer  under  the  law,  no  longer  subject  to  its  demand 
of  a  perfect  personal  righteousness,  but  justified  by  a  righteousness 
which  satisfies  its  widest  claims.  Hence  the  apostle  so  frequently 
asserts,  ye  are  not  under  the  law,  ye  are  free  from  the  law.     But 


330  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

how  ?  not  by  abrogating  the  law,  or  by  dispensing  with  its  right- 
eous claims,  but  legally,  as  a  woman  is  free  from  her  husband,  not 
by  deserting  him,  not  by  repudiating  his  authority,  but  by  his  ceas- 
ing to  have  any  claim  to  her,  which  continues  only  so  long  as  he 
lives.  So  we  are  freed  from  the  law  by  the  body  of  Christ,  i.  e., 
by  his  death.  He  was  made  under  the  law  that  he  might  redeem 
them  who  were  under  the  law ;  he  hath  redeemed  us  from  its 
curse  by  being  made  a  curse  for  us,  he  has  taken  away  the  hand- 
writing which  was  against  us,  nailing  it  to  the  cross.  There  is, 
therefore,  now  no  condemnation  to  those  who  are  in  Christ  Jesus, 
because  we  are  by  this  Gospel  freed  from  the  law  and  its  condem- 
nation. Hence  Paul  teaches  that  if  righteousness  (that  is,  what 
satisfies  the  demands  of  the  law)  could  have  come  in  any  other 
way,  Christ  is  dead  in  vain.  How  exclusively  this  righteousness 
of  Christ  was  the  ground  of  the  apostle's  personal  confidence,  is 
plain  from  his  pregnant  declaration  to  the  Philippians,  that  he 
counted  all  things  but  dung,  that  he  might  win  Christ,  and  be  found 
in  him  ;  not  having  his  own  righteousness,  but  that  which  is  through 
the  faith  of  Christ,  the  righteousness  which  is  of  God  by  faith. 

With  this  representation  of  the  plan  of  salvation,  Dr.  Beman's 
theory  is  utterly  irreconcilable.  According  to  his  theory,  the  de- 
mands of  the  law  have  not  been  satisfied.  The  relation  of  the 
sinner  to  the  curse  which  this  law  pronounces  against  the  trans- 
gressor, is  legally — not  evangelically — just  the  same  that  it  was 
without  an  atonement.  "  The  law  has  the  same  demand  upon 
him,  and  utters  the  same  denunciation  of  wrath  against  him.  The 
law  or  justice,  that  is  distributive  justice,  as  expressed  in  the  law, 
has  received  no  satisfaction  at  all." — P.  133.  What  then  has 
Christ's  atonement  done  for  us?  He  has  simply  opened  the  way 
for  pardon.  "  All  that  the  atonement  has  done  for  the  sinner," 
says  Dr.  Beman,  "  is  to  place  him  within  the  reach  of  pardon." — 
P.  137.  "  The  way  is  now  open.  Mercy  can  now  operate.  The 
door  is  open." — P.  106.  The  atonement  "  was  required  and  made 
in  order  to  open  a  consistent  way  for  the  publication  of  pardon,  or 
for  the  exercise  of  grace  to  sinners." — P.  124. 

This  theory  directly  contradicts  the  apostle's  doctrine;  1.  Be- 
cause he  teaches  that  Christ  was  made  under  the  law  for  the  pur- 
pose of  redeeming  them  that  are  under  the  law,  and  that  he  was 
made  a  curse  for  us.  We  are  therefore  delivered  from  the  law, 
as  a  covenant  of  works,  and  are  not  subject  to  its  demands  and  its 
curse  when  united  to  him.  2.  Because  it  virtually  denies  that 
Christ  wrought  out  any  righteousness  which  is  the  ground  of  our 
justification.  He  merely  makes  pardon  possible,  whereas  Paul 
says  that  by  his  obedience  we  are  made  righteous,  that  we  become 
the  righteousness  of  God  in  him.  On  this  new  theory,  the  lan- 
guage of  the  apostle,  when  he  speaks  of  not  having  his  own  right- 
eousness, but  the  righteousness  which  is  by  faith  of  Jesus  Christ, 
is  unintelligible.  3.  It  destroys  the  very  nature  of  justification, 
which  is  an  act  of  God's  free  grace,  wherein  he  pardoneth  all  our 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  331 

sins  and  accepteth  us  as  righteous  in  his  sight  only  for  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ,  imputed  unto  us  and  received  by  faith  alone." 
But  according  to  this  theory  there  is  no  such  thing  as  justification ; 
we  are  merely  pardoned.  In  scripture,  however,  and  in  all  lan- 
guages, the  ideas  of  pardon  and  justification  are  distinct  and  in  a 
measure  opposite.*  If  we  are  justified,  we  are  declared  righteous. 
That  is,  it  is  declared  that,  as  concerns  us,  on  some  ground  or  for 
some  reason,  the  law  is  satisfied  ;  and  that  reason  Paul  says  must 
either  be  our  own  righteousness,  or  the  righteousness  of  Christ. 
Dr.  Beman's  theory  admits  of  no  such  idea  of  justification.  The 
sinner  is  merely  forgiven,  because  the  death  of  Christ  prevents 
such  forgiveness  doing  any  harm.  This  is  not  what  the  Bible 
teaches  when  it  speaks  of  our  being  made  the  righteousness  of  God 
in  Christ ;  or  of  his  imputing  righteousness  to  us  ;  or  of  our  re- 
ceiving the  gift  of  righteousness.  This  is  not  what  the  convinced 
sinner  needs,  to  whom,  not  mere  pardon,  but  justification  on  the 
ground  of  a  righteousness  which,  though  not  his  own,  is  his,  as 
wrought  out  for  him  and  bestowed  by  the  free  gift  of  God,  is  neces- 
sary to  peace  with  God. — Rom.  v.  1. 

4.  It  destroys  the  nature  of  justifying  faith  and  deranges  the 
whole  plan  of  salvation.  In  accordance  with  the  scriptures,  faith 
in  Jesus  Christ  is,  in  our  standards,  declared  to  be  a  saving  grace, 
whereby  we  receive  and  rest  upon  him  alone  for  salvation,  as  he 
is  offered  to  us  in  the  Gospel.  This  is  perfectly  natural  and  intelli- 
gible, if  Christ  is  our  righteousness.  If  his  work  of  obedience  and 
death  is  the  sole  ground  of  justification  before  God,  then  we  under- 
stand what  the  Bible  means  by  believing  upon  Christ,  putting  our 
trust  in  him,  being  found  in  him  ;  then  the  phrase,  faith  of  Christ, 
which  so  often  occurs  as  expressing  the  idea  of  a  faith  of  which 
he  is  the  object,  has  its  appropriate  meaning.  Then  too  we  under- 
stand what  is  meant  by  coming  to  Christ,  receiving  Christ,  putting 
on  Christ  being  in  Christ.  Upon  Dr.  Beman's  theory,  however, 
all  this  is  well  nigh  unintelligible.  We  admit  that  a  vague  sense 
may  be  put  on  these  expressions  on  any  theory  of  the  atonement, 
even  that  of  the  Socinians.  If  the  death  of  Christ  is  necessary  to 
salvation,  either,  as  they  say,  by  revealing  the  love  of  God,  or  as 
Dr.  Beman  says,  by  revealing  his  regard  for  law,  then  to  believe 
in  Christ,  or  to  receive  Christ,  might  be  said  to  mean,  to  believe 
the  truth  that  without  the  revelation  made  by  his  death,  God  would 
not  forgive  sin.  But  how  far  is  this  from  being  the  full  and  natural 
import  of  the  terms !  Who  would  ever  express  mere  acquies- 
cence in  the  fact  that  Christ  has  made  salvation  possible,  by  saying, 
"  I  would  be  found  in  him  not  having  mine  own  righteousness,  but 
the  righteousness  which  is  by  faith  of  Jesus  Christ  ?"  The  fact  is, 
the  Socinian  view  is  in  some  respects  much  easier  reconciled  with 
scripture  than  that  of  Dr.  Beman.     The  passage  just  quoted,  for 

*  "  The  word  StKaiovr,"  says  De  Wette,  "  means  not  merely  negatively  to  pardon  ; 
hut  also  affirmatively  to  declare  righteous." 


332  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

example,  might  have  this  meaning,  viz.,  we  must  have,  not  the  moral 
excellence  which  the  law  can  give,  but  that  inward  righteousness 
of  which  faith  in  Christ  is  the  source.  This  would  have  some 
plausibility,  but  what  "the  righteousness  which'  is  by  faith  of 
Jesus  Christ"  can  mean,  as  opposed  to  our  own  righteousness,  on 
Dr.  Beman's  ground,  it  is  hard  to  conceive. 

Again :  according  to  the  Bible  and  the  common  doctrine  of  the 
church,  when  a  sinner  is  convinced  of  his  sin  and  misery,  of  his 
entire  unworthiness  in  the  sight  of  God,  he  is  to  be  directed  to  re- 
nounce all  dependence  upon  himself  and  to  believe  in  Christ,  that 
is,  to  place  all  his  confidence  in  him.  But  if  Christ  has  only  made 
salvation  possible,  if  he  has  merely  brought  the  sinner  within  the 
reach  of  mercy,  this  is  a  most  unnatural  direction.  What  has  the 
sinner  to  come  to  Christ  for  ?  Why  should  he  be  directed  to  re- 
ceive or  submit  to  the  righteousness  of  God  1  Christ  has  nothing 
to  do  for  him.  He  has  made  salvation  possible,  and  his  work  is 
done  ;  what  the  sinner  has  to  do  is  to  submit  to  God.  The  way 
is  open,  let  him  lay  aside  his  rebellion,  and  begin  to  love  and 
serve  his  Maker.  Such  are  the  directions,  which  this  theory  would 
lead  its  advocates  to  give  to  those  who  are  convinced  of  their  sin 
and  danger.  This  is  not  a  mere  imagination ;  such  are  the  direc- 
tions, commonly  and  characteristically  given  by  those  who  adopt 
Dr.  Beman's  view  of  the  atonement.  Christ  disappears  in  a  great 
measure  from  his  own  Gospel.  You  may  take  up  volume  after 
volume  of  their  sermons,  and  you  will  find  excellent  discourses 
upon  sin,  obligation,  moral  government,  regeneration,  divine  sove- 
reignty, &c,  but  the  cross  is  comparatively  kept  out  of  view. 
Christ  has  no  immediate  work  in  the  sinner's  salvation ;  and  ac- 
cordingly the  common  directions  to  those  who  ask,  what  they 
must  do  to  be  saved,  are,  submit  to  God,  choose  him  and  his  service, 
or  something  of  similar  import.  To  such  an  extreme  has  this  been 
carried,  by  some  whose  logical  consistency  has  overcome  the  influ- 
ence of  scriptural  language  and  traditionary  instruction,  that  they 
have  not  hesitated  to  say  that  the  command,  Believe  in  Christ,  is 
obsolete.  It  was  the  proper  test  of  submission  in  the  apostolic  age, 
but  in  our  day,  when  all  men  recognise  Christ  as  the  Messiah,  it  is 
altogether  inappropriate.  We  doubt  not  that  thousands  who  agree 
substantially  with  Dr.  Beman,  would  be  shocked  at  this  language ; 
nevertheless  it  is  the  legitimate  consequence  of  his  theory.  If  the 
atonement  is  a  mere  governmental  display,  a  mere  symbolical 
method  of  instruction,  then  the  command  to  believe  in  Christ,  to 
come  to  him,  to  trust  in  him  and  his  righteousness,  is  not  the  lan- 
guage in  which  sinners  should  be  addressed.  It  does  not  inform 
them  of  the  specific  thing  which  they  must  do  in  order  to  be  saved. 
Christ  has  opened  the  door,  their  business  is  now  immediately  with 
God. 

Again :  can  any  reader  of  the  Bible,  can  any  Christian  at  least, 
doubt  that  union  with  Christ  was  to  the  apostles  one  of  the  most 
important  and  dearest  of  all  the  doctrines  of  the  Gospel ;  a  doc- 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  333 

trine  which  lay  at  the  root  of  all  the  other  doctrines  of  redemption, 
the  foundation  of  their  hopes,  the  source  of  their  spiritual  life. 
But  according  to  the  theory  that  Christ's  death  is  a  mere  symboli- 
cal method  of  instruction,  an  expression  of  a  great  truth,  that  it 
merely  opens  the  way  for  mercy,  what  can  union  with  Christ 
mean?  In  what  sense  are  we  in  him?  how  are  we  his  members? 
How  is  it  that  we  die,  that  we  live,  that  we  are  to  rise  from  the 
dead  in  virtue  of  that  union  ?  What  is  meant  by  living  by  faith 
of  which  he  is  the  object?  The  fact  is,  this  theory  changes  the 
whole  nature  of  the  Gospel ;  everything  is  altered ;  the  nature  of 
faith,  the  nature  of  justification,  the  mode  of  access  to  God,  our 
relation  to  Christ,  the  inward  exercises  of  communion  with  him, 
so  that  the  Christian  feels  disposed  to  say  with  Mary, "  They  have 
taken  away  my  Lord,  and  I  know  not  where  they  have  laid  him." 

We  do  not  believe  there  is  truth  enough  in  this  theory  to  sustain 
the  life  of  religion  in  any  man's  heart.  We  have  no  idea  that 
Dr.  Beman,  Dr.  Cox,  or  any  good  man  really  lives  by  it.  The 
truth,  as  it  is  practically  embraced  and  appropriated  by  the  soul 
under  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  is  the  truth  in  the  form  in 
which  it  is  presented  in  the  Bible,  and  not  as  expressed  in  abstract 
propositions.  It  is  therefore  very  possible  for  a  man  to  adopt 
theoretically  such  an  abstract  statement  of  a  scriptural  doctrine, 
as  really  denies  its  nature  and  destroys  its  power,  and  yet  that 
same  man  may  receive  the  truth  for  his  own  salvation  as  it  is  re- 
vealed in  the  Bible.  We  see  daily  instances  of  this  in  the  case  of 
Arminians,  who  professedly  reject  doctrines,  which  are  really  in- 
cluded in  every  prayer  they  utter.  In  like  manner  we  believe  that 
many  who  profess  to  adopt  the  theory,  that  the  death  of  Christ 
merely  opens  the  way  for  mercy,  that  it  is  only  the  symbolical  ex- 
pression of  a  moral  truth,  deny  that  theory  in  every  act  of  faith 
they  exercise  in  Jesus  Christ.  Still  the  theory  is  none  the  less 
false  and  dangerous.  It  has  its  effect,  and  just  so  far  as  it  ope- 
rates, it  tends  to  destroy  all  true  religion.  Its  tendency,  especially 
in  private  Christians,  is  counteracted  by  reading  the  scriptures  and 
by  the  teaching  of  the  Spirit.  But  the  evil  of  the  constant  incul- 
cation of  error  and  mirepresentation  of  truth,  cannot  easily  be 
exaggerated.  The  particular  error  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
atonement  inculcated  in  this  book,  has,  we  believe,  done  more  to 
corrupt  religion,  and  to  promote  Socinianism,  than  any  other  of 
the  vaunted  improvements  of  American  theology,  which,  after  all, 
are  but  feeble  reproductions  of  the  rejected  errors  of  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries. 

The  doctrine  of  atonement  for  which  we  contend  as  the  dis- 
tinguishing and  essential  doctrine  of  the  Gospel,  is,  1.  That  sin  for  its 
own  sake  deserves  the  wrath  and  curse  of  God.  2.  That  God  is 
just,  immutably  determined,  from  the  excellence  of  his  nature,  to  pun- 
ish sin.  3.  That  out  of  his  sovereign  and  infinite  love,  in  order  to 
redeem  us  from  the  law,  that  is,  from  its  demands  and  curse,  he  sent 
his  own  Son,  in  the  likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  who  in  his  own  person 


334  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

fulfilled  those  demands,  and  endured  that  curse  in  our  stead.  That 
his  righteousness,  or  merit,  thus  wrought  out,  is  imputed  to  every 
one  that  believes,  to  his  justification  before  God.  This  is  the  doc- 
trine of  the  church  catholic,  overlaid,  corrupted  and  made  of  none 
effect,  in  the  church  of  Rome ;  disembarrassed,  reproduced,  and 
exhibited  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Reformation ;  in  manifold  forms 
since  opposed  or  rejected,  but  ever  virtually  embraced  and  trusted 
in  by  every  sincere  child  of  God. 

What  then  are  the  objections  to  this  great  doctrine  ?  The  first  ob- 
jection urged  by  Dr.  Beman  is,  that  it  involves  "  a  transfer  of  moral 
character  between  Christ  and  those  for  whom  he  died.  Christ  could 
not  be  punished  on  legal  principles,  until  he  was  guilty  in  the  eve  of 
the  law ;  and  his  people  could  not  be  justified  on  legal  principles,  till 
its  penalty  was  literally  inflicted.  This  transfer  of  character,  so  as  to 
render  Jesus  Christ  the  sinner,  and  the  soul  for  whom  he  died,  inno- 
cent, appears  to  us  without  foundation  in  reason  and  scripture."  The 
objection  then  is,  that  the  doctrine  that  Christ  endured  the  punish- 
ment of  our  sins,  and  that  we  are  justified  by  the  imputation  of  his 
righteousness*  involves  such  a  transfer  of  moral  character  as  to  ren- 
der Jesus  Christ  a  sinner,  and  those  for  whom  he  died  innocent.  This 
objection  is  directed,  not  against  this  or  that  individual  writer,  but 
against  whole  bodies  and  classes  of  men,  for  Dr.  Beman  over  and 
over  asserts  that  there  are  but  two  views  of  the  atonement,  the  one 
against  which  he  brings  this  and  other  objections,  and  his  own 
governmental  theory.  We  have  already  shown  that  the  former 
is  the  common  doctrine  of  all  the  churches  of  the  Reformation. 
It  is  against  them,  therefore,  this  objection  is  brought.  Our  first 
remark  on  it  is,  that  it  is  the  old,  often  repeated,  and  often  refuted 
slander  of  Socinians  and  Papists,  the  latter  corrupting  and  denying 
the  doctrine  of  their  own  church.  Our  second  remark  is,  that  it 
is  a  gross,  shocking,  and,  we  are  constrained  in  conscience  to  add, 
wicked  misrepresentation.  Dr.  Beman  betrays  his  want  of  faith 
in  the  truth  of  the  accusation,  though  he  makes  it  against  hun- 
dreds and  thousands  of  his  brethren,  by  saying  that  a  doctrine 
which  represents  Jesus  Christ  as  a  sinner,  "  appears  to  us  without 
foundation  in  reason  and  scripture  !"  Shocking  blasphemy  appears 
to  us  without  foundation !  What  man  who  believed  what  he  said 
could  utter  such  language  ?  Is  this  the  way  in  which  a  doctrine 
which  represents  the  Son  of  God  a  sinner,  is  to  be  spoken  of?  No, 
Dr.  Beman  knew  full  well,  that  the  doctrine  he  writes  against,  in- 
cludes no  such  blasphemy.  He  cannot  be  so  grossly  ignorant  as 
not  to  know  that  the  distinction  between  the  imputation  and  the 
infusion  of  sin  and  righteousness,  is  one  for  which  the  churches  of 
the  Reformation  contended  as  for  their  life ;  and  that  the  distinc- 
tion is  plain,  intelligible,  scriptural,  and  unavoidable — one  which  he 
and  all  other  men  do  make,  and  must  make.  When  the  prophet  says, 
"  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,"  does  Dr.  Beman 
pretend  to  believe,  that  he  means  that  the  moral  character  of  the 
father  shall  not  be  transferred  to  the  son  ?  that  the  sin  of  the  one 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  335 

shall  not  be  infused  into  the  other  ?  Why  then  does  he  pretend  to 
believe  (for  we  hope  it  is  mere  pretence),  that  when  we  say,  our 
sins  were  laid  on  Christ,  we  teach  that  our  moral  character  was 
so  transferred  to  him  as  to  render  him  a  sinner  ?  Our  third  remark 
is,  that  the  objection  is  glaringly  unjust.  We  say,  in  the  very  lan- 
guage of  scriptures,  that  Christ  bore  our  sins.  We  tell  in  what 
sense  we  understand  that  language,  viz.,  that  it  means,  not  that 
Christ  was  rendered  in  a  moral  character  a  sinner,  which  is  blas- 
phemy, but  that  he  bore  the  punishment  of  our  sins,  which  is  the 
universally  admitted  meaning  of  the  scriptural  phrase.  We  say 
further,  that  by  punishment  we  mean  sufferings  judicially  inflicted 
as  a  satisfaction  to  justice.  These  things  are  so  plain,  they  have 
been  so  often  repeated,  they  so  evidently  do  not  involve  the  shock- 
ing doctrine  charged  on  those  who  use  this  language,  that  we  can 
have  little  respect  for  the  man  who  can  gravely  and  tamely  repeat 
the  charge,  to  the  prejudice  of  the  truth,  and  to  the  wounding  of 
his  brethren. 

Dr.  Beman's  second  objection  is,  that  the  system  he  opposes  de- 
stroys "  all  mercy  in  God  the  Father,  in  the  salvation  of  sinners, 
because  it  represents  God  as  totally  disinclined  to  the  exercise  of 
compassion,  till  every  jot  and  tittle  of  the  legal  curse  was  inflicted. 
On  the  same  principle,  grace  or  pardon  in  the  release  of  the  sinner 
from  future  punishment  would  be  out  of  the  question  ;  for  what 
grace,  or  pardon,  or  favour,  can  there  be  in  the  discharge  of  a 
debtor  whose  demand  (debt  ?)  has  been  cancelled  to  the  uttermost 
farthing?" — P.  122.  This  objection  is  the  staple  of  his  book.  On 
page  100  he  represents  us  as  teaching  that  "  the  Son  of  God  en- 
dured the  exact  amount  of  suffering  due,  on  legal  principles,  to  sin- 
ners." On  page  107,  he  says,  "The  amount  of  Christ's  sufferings 
must  consequently  be  the  same  as  the  aggregate  sufferings  included 
in  the  eternal  condemnation  of  all  those  who  are  saved  by  his 

merit The  agonies  which  he  suffered  were  equal  to 

the  endless  misery  of  all  those  who  will  be  saved  by  his  interpo- 
sition in  their  behalf."  On  page  146,  he  says,  "If  one  soul  were 
to  be  saved  by  the  atonement,  Christ  must  sustain  an  amount  of 
suffering  equal  to  that  involved  in  the  eternal  condemnation  of  that 
one  soul ;  and  if  a  thousand  were  to  be  saved  a  thousand  times 
that  amount,  and  in  the  same  proportion  for  any  greater  number 
who  are  to  be  rescued  from  perdition  and  exalted  to  glory.  To 
this  scheme  there  are  insurmountable  objections."  True  enough, 
but  who  hold  that  scheme  ?  Dr.  Beman  attributes  it  to  all  who 
believe  in  the  atonement,  and  do  not  adopt  his  scheme,  for  he  says 
there  are  but  two.  This  doctrine,  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
amounted  to  the  aggregate  sufferings  of  those  who  are  to  be  saved, 
that  he  endured  just  so  much  for  so  many,  is  not  found  in  any  con- 
fession of  the  Protestant  churches,  nor  in  the  writings  of  any 
standard  theologian,  nor  in  the  recognized  authorities  of  any  church 
of  which  we  have  any  knowledge.     The  whole  objection  is  a  gross 


336  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

and  inexcusable  misrepresentation.*  In  a  more  moderate  form  it 
was  brought  forward  by  the  Socinians,  and  repelled  by  the  writers 
of  that  and  subsequent  ages.  De  Moor  is  generally  recognised  as 
the  theologian  of  most  authority  among  the  churches  of  Holland, 
and  Turrettin  is  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  strictest  of  the  Geneva 
school,  and  they  both  answer  this  calumny,  by  denying  that,  ac- 
cording to  their  doctrine,  there  is  any  necessity  for  the  assumption 
that  Christ's  sufferings  were  equal  to  the  sufferings  of  all  his  peo- 
ple. Thus  Turrettin,  after  quoting  at  length  the  objection  from 
Socinus,  answers  it,  1.  By  showing  that  the  scriptures  teach 
that  the  one  death  of  Christ  was  a  satisfaction  for  all ;  that  as  by 
the  one  sin  of  Adam  many  were  made  sinners,  so  by  the  righteous- 
ness of  Christ  many  are  made  righteous.  2.  By  insisting  on  the 
distinction  between  pecuniary  and  penal  satisfaction.  A  piece 
of  money  in  the  hand  of  a  king  is  of  no  more  value  than  in  the 
hands  of  a  peasant,  but  the  life  of  a  king  is  of  more  value  than 
that  of  a  peasant,  and  one  commander  is  often  exchanged  for  many 
soldiers.  3.  He  says  the  adversaries  forget  that  Christ  is  God, 
and  therefore  though  his  sufferings  could  not  be  infinite,  as  they  were 
endured  by  his  finite  nature,  they  were  of  infinite  value  in  virtue 
of  the  infinite  dignity  of  his  person.  Sin,  he  says,  is  an  infinite 
evil,  because  committed  against  an  infinite  God,  through  the  act  of 
a  finite  nature.  So  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  though  endured  in  his 
human  nature,  are  of  infinite  value  from  the  dignity  of  his  person.f 
Dr.  Beman,  under  this  head,  frequently  objects  that  we  degrade 
the  atonement  into  a  mere  commercial  transaction,  a  payment  of  a 
debt,  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  excludes  the  idea  of 
free  remission.  Our  first  remark  on  this  objection  is,  that  the 
scriptures  use  this  same  figure,  and  therefore  it  is  right  it  should 
be  used.  When  it  is  said,  Christ  purchased  the  church  with  his 
own  blood,  that  we  are  redeemed  not  with  corruptible  things  as 
silver  and  gold,  but  with  the  precious  blood  of  Christ,  such  lan- 
guage means  something.  In  every  metaphor  there  is  a  point  of 
comparison ;  the  essential  idea  involved  in  the  figure  must  be 
found  in  the  subject  to  be  illustrated.  To  purchase  is  to  acquire, 
and  to  acquire  by  giving  or  doing  something  which  secures  a  title  to 
the  thing  acquired.  When  it  is  said  that  Christ  purchased  the 
church,  it  is  certainly  meant  that  he  acquired  it,  that  it  is  his,  and 
that  by  his  death  he  has  secured  a  title  to  it,  founded  in  the  justice 
and  promise  of  God.  This  does  not  make  redemption  a  commer- 
cial transaction,  nor  imply  that  there  are  not  essential  points  of 
diversity  between  acquiring  by  money  and  acquiring  by  blood. 
Hence  our  second  remark  is,  that  if  Dr.  Beman  will  take  up  any 

*  There  was  a  little  anonymous  work  called  Gethsemane,  republished  some  years 
ago  in  this  country,  which  taught  this  quid  pro  quo  system  of  the  atonement.  But 
we  do  not  know  a  single  man,  now  of  our  church,  who  adopted  the  sentiments  of 
that  work. 

t  See  the  fourth  vol.  of  his  works,  the  treatise  De  Satisfactione  Christi,  p.  2S9. 
The  same  answer  to  the  same  objection  may  be  seen  in  De  Moor,  vol.  iii.,  p.  1030. 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  337 

elementary  work  on  theology,  he  will  find  the  distinction  between 
pecuniary  and  penal  satisfaction  clearly  pointed  out,  and  the  satis- 
faction of  Christ  shown  to  be  of  the  latter,  and  not  of  the  former 
kind.  1.  In  the  one,  the  demand  is  upon  the  thing  due,  in  the  other 
case  it  is  upon  the  person  of  the  criminal.  Hence,  2.  The  creditor 
is  bound  to  accept  the  payment  of  the  debt,  no  matter  when  or  by 
whom  offered ;  whereas,  in  the  case  of  a  crime  or  sin,  the  sove- 
reign is  bound  neither  to  provide  a  substitute  nor  to  accept  of  one 
when  offered.  If  he  does  either,  it  is  a  matter  of  grace.  3.  Hence 
penal  satisfaction  does  not  ipso  facto  liberate  ;  the  acceptance  is  a 
matter  of  arrangement  or  covenant,  and  the  terms  of  that  covenant 
must  depend  on  the  will  of  the  parties.  Dr.  Beman  lapsed  into 
an  important  truth,  when  he  said,  "  Christ  suffered  by  covenant." — 
P.  98.  What  that  covenant  is,  we  learn  from  scripture,  and  from 
the  manner  in  which  it  is  executed.  The  Bible  teaches  that,  agree- 
ably to  that  covenant,  the  merits  of  Christ  do  not  avail  to  the  benefit 
of  his  people  immediately ;  his  children  remain  under  condemna- 
tion as  well  as  others  until  they  believe  ;  and  when  they  do  believe 
they  receive  but  the  first  fruits  of  their  inheritance,  they  are  but 
imperfectly  sanctified,  and  are  still  subject  to  many  evils,  but  being 
in  a  justified  state  their  sufferings  are  chastisements  and  not  punish- 
ments, that  is,  they  are  designed  for  their  own  improvement,  and 
not  to  satisfy  justice. 

The  satisfaction  of  Christ,  therefore,  being  for  sin  and  by  suffer- 
ing, is  expressly  and  formally  declared  not  to  be  of  the  nature  of 
pecuniary  satisfaction.  The  grace  of  the  Gospel  is  thereby  not 
obscured  but  rendered  the  more  conspicuous.  God  is  not  rendered 
merciful  by  the  atonement  (as  we  be  slanderously  reported,  as 
some  affirm  that  we  say),  on  the  contrary,  the  atonement  flows 
from  his  infinite  love.  Dr.  Beman  writes  as  a  Trithcist,  or  as 
against  Tritheists,  when  he  speaks  of  the  work  of  the  Son  render- 
ing the  Father  gracious,  and  attributes  that  representation  to  us. 
The  Lord  our  God  is  one  God.  It  was  his  infinite  love  devised 
the  plan  of  redemption,  and  it  was  so  devised,  that  the  exercise  of 
love  should  be  perfectly  consistent  with  holiness,  in  order  that  God 
might  be  just  in  justifying  sinners.  Surely  then  our  doctrine  does 
not  obscure  the  grace  of  the  Gospel,  at  least  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
plan  of  mercy.  But  it  is  further  objected  that  if  Christ  rendered 
a  complete  satisfaction  to  divine  justice,  then  pardon  becomes  a 
matter  of  justice  and  not  of  grace.  Justice  to  whom  ?  certainly 
not  to  the  ungodly,  the  unrighteous,  the  utterly  undeserving,  and 
hell-deserving  sinner.  If  Christ  suffered  by  covenant,  and  fulfilled 
all  the  conditions  of  that  covenant,  then  he  acquired  a  right  to  its 
promises.  If  he  purchased  his  church  he  has  a  right  to  it.  If  it 
was  promised  that  for  his  obedience  to  death,  he  should  see  of  the 
travail  of  his  soul  and  be  satisfied,  then  he,  having  done  all  that 
was  required  of  him,  has  a  right  to  the  promised  reward.  But 
what  right  have  we  ?  None  in  the  world  ;  we  are  poor,  and  blind, 
and  miserable,  having  nothing,  meriting  nothing,  our  only  hope  is 

22 


i 


388  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

that  we  shall  be  treated,  not  according  to  our  deserts,  but  accord- 
ing to  the  merits  of  another. 

The  objection  sounds  strange  to  our  ears,  coming  from  such  a 
quarter,  that  we  destroy  the  grace  of  the  Gospel.  What  is  salva- 
tion by  grace,  if  it  is  not  that  God  of  his  mere  good  pleasure  pro- 
vided redemption  ;  that  he  determines  of  his  own  will  who  shall  be 
partakers  of  its  benefits  ;  that  those  who  are  brought  to  repentance 
and  faith,  are  not  only  justified  avowedly  on  the  ground  of  a  right- 
eousness which  is  not  their  own,  but  are  made  to  feel  and  acknow- 
ledge as  the  very  condition  of  their  acceptance,  their  own  ill-de- 
sert and  misery  ;  and  that  they  not  only  owe  everything  to  Christ, 
but  possess  everything  simply  in  virtue  of  their  union  with  him, 
which  union  is  kept  up  only  by  a  self-renouncing,  self-emptying 
faith  ?  The  feeblest  infant  resting  on  its  mother's  bosom,  a  new- 
born lamb  carried  in  the  shepherd's  arms,  might  with  as  much 
plausibility  be  suspected  of  doubting  the  love  that  sustains  them, 
as  the  believer  in  Christ's  having  purchased  the  church  with  his 
own  blood,  of  doubting  the  entire  gratuitousness  of  his  own  sal- 
vation. 

It  would  be  easy  to  retort,  and  show  that  it  is  Dr.  Beman's  doc- 
trine that  destroys  the  grace  of  salvation.  If  Christ  only  makes 
pardon  possible,  if  the  possibility  of  forgiveness  is  all  we  owe  to  him, 
to  whom  or  what  do  we  owe  heaven  7  Is  it  to  ourselves,  as  some 
of  the  advocates  of  his  doctrine  teach  ?  This  is  the  natural  an- 
swer. Christ  having  made  pardon  possible,  then  God  deals  with 
men  according  to  their  works.  Whatever  answer  Dr.  Beman 
himself  would  give  to  the  above  question,  it  must,  from  the  nature 
of  his  system,  be  tame  compared  with  the  answer  which  flows 
from  the  doctrine  that  we  owe  the  blessed  Redeemer,  not  the  pos- 
sibility of  pardon  merely,  but  justification,  adoption,  sanctification, 
the  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  life  everlasting.  These  things 
and  all  the  blessedness  they  include  or  suppose,  are  not  merely 
rendered  possible,  but  actually  secured  and  given  for  Christ's  sake 
alone  ;  and  hence  the  spirits  of  the  just  made  perfect,  whose  robes 
have  been  washed  and  made  white  in  the  blood  of  the  Lamb,  would 
drown  in  their  thanksgiving  to  Him  that  has  cleansed  them  from 
all  sin,  the  whispered  acknowledgments  of  those  who  have  nothing 
for  which  to  give  thanks  but  the  possibility  of  pardon. 

These  objections  which  Dr.  Beman  urges  in  various  forms 
throughout  his  book  are  all  old,  and  have  been  answered  a  hundred 
times.  There  is  indeed  one  objection  which  is  certainly  American. 
It  seems  there  was  no  economy  in  the  atonement.  It  saved  nothing, 
and  gained  nothing.  The  atonement,  it  is  said,  is  "  the  grand  de- 
vice of  heaven  for  preventing  misery  and  promoting  happiness." — 
P.  108.  And  it  is  triumphantly  urged  (through  some  eight  pages), 
that  if  Christ  suffered  as  much  as  the  redeemed  would  have  en- 
dured there  is  no  gain  of  happiness.  It  is  "  a  mere  quid-pro-quo 
transaction." — P.  111.  We  have  already  shown  that  no  church, 
or  class  of  men,  hold  that  the  blessed  Redeemer  endured  as  much 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  339 

suffering  as  the  redeemed  would  have  endured.  It  is  a  mere  mis- 
representation. But  dismissing  that  point,  the  objection  itself  is 
unworthy  of  a  being  gifted  with  a  moral  sense.  Would  it  be 
nothing  that  unnumbered  millions  are  saved  from  sin  and  made 
perfect  in  holiness  ?  Supposing  there  was  no  absolute  gain  as  to 
the  amount  of  misery  prevented,  that  Christ  had  in  a  lew  years 
suffered  all  that  finite  beings  through  eternity  could  endure,  still 
would  the  vast  accession  to  the  holy  inhabitants  of  heaven  be 
nothing  ?  Does  not  the  Bible  say  that  he  gave  himself  for  his 
church,  to  purify  and  cleanse  it  ?  that  the  promotion  of  the  holiness 
was  the  design  of  his  death  ?  Has  it  come  to  this,  that  the  theory 
which  makes  happiness  the  end  of  the  creation,  must  represent 
holiness  as  nothing,  not  worth  giving  thanks  for,  if  gained  at  the 
least  expense  of  happiness  ?  This  gross,  epicurean  view  of  the 
sublime  and  awful  mystery  of  redemption,  is  a  disgrace  to  the  age 
and  country  that  gave  it  birth. 

We  have  thus  endeavoured  to  show  that  the  theory  of  atone- 
ment advocated  by  Dr.  Beman  is  founded  on  the  false  assumption 
that  the  punishment  of  sin  is  for  the  prevention  of  crime,  and  not 
on  account  of  its  own  intrinsic  ill-desert ;  that  it  of  necessity  in- 
volves a  denial  of  the  justice  of  God,  and  makes  mere  happiness 
the  end  of  creation ;  that  it  is  destitute  of  any  semblance  or  pre- 
tence of  support  from  the  scriptures  ;  that  it  is  just  as  arbitrary, 
and  as  much  a  philosophical  speculation,  as  the  Socinian  theory ; 
the  latter  asserting  that  the  design  of  Christ's  death  was  to  display 
the  love  of  God,  and  thus  lead  men  to  repentance,  and  the  former, 
that  it  was  intended  to  express  his  regard  for  his  law,  and  thus  act 
as  a  motive  to  obedience.  We  further  endeavoured  to  prove  that 
the  theory  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  Bible.  The  scriptures 
teach,  in  every  possible  way,  that  as  man  was  under  a  law  or  cove- 
nant which  requires  perfect  obedience  and  threatens  death  in  case 
of  transgression,  the  Son  of  God  was  born  of  a  woman  and  made 
under  that  law,  fulfilling  its  conditions  of  perfect  obedience  and 
sustaining  its  curse  for  man's  redemption  ;  and  that  his  righteous- 
ness is  freely  imputed  to  all  those  who  receive  and  rest  upon  it  by 
faith.  In  denying  this  doctrine,  which  is  the  common  faith  of 
Christendom,  Dr.  Beman's  theory  involves  the  denial  of  justifica- 
tion, reducing  it  to  mere  pardon  ;  destroys  the  true  doctrine  of 
justifying  faith  ;  overlooks  the  union  between  Christ  and  his  peo- 
ple ;  tends  to  banish  Christ  from  view,  and  to  vitiate  the  very 
source  of  all  evangelical  religion. 

We  showed  that  his  objections  to  this  doctrine,  with  one  melan- 
choly exception,  were  the  oft  repeated  and  oft  refuted  calumnies 
of  Socinians ;  that  the  common  doctrine  does  not  involve  the 
transfer  of  moral  character  or  represent  Christ  as  a  sinner ;  that 
so  far  from  obscuring  the  grace  of  the  Gospel,  or  teaching  that  the 
atonement  is  the  cause  of  the  love  of  God,  it  represents  it  as  flow- 
ing from  that  love,  and  presents  in  the  clearest  possible  light  the 
gratuitous  nature  of  salvation.     It  is  of  grace  that  a  Saviour  was 


340  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

provided  ;  of  grace  that  the  benefits  of  his  death  are  conferred  on 
one  rather  than  another.  And  though  we  rejoice  to  know  that  he 
has  acquired  a  right  to  his  church,  having  bought  it  with  his  own 
blood,  yet  his  people  know,  feel,  and  acknowledge  that  to  them 
everything  is  of  grace, — their  vocation,  justification,  and  final  salva- 
tion. This  is  Christianity,  a  religion  of  which  Christ  is  the  Alpha 
and  Omega,  the  first  and  the  last,  the  author  and  the  finisher,  not 
the  mere  cause  of  the  possibility  of  pardon.- 

Our  discussion  of  the  all-important  question  respecting  the  na- 
ture of  the  atonement  has  run  out  to  so  great  a  length  that  we 
cannot  claim  much  room  for  the  consideration  of  its  extent.  Dr. 
Beman  writes  on  this  whole  subject,  very  much  as  a  man  might  be 
expected  to  write  against  Calvinism,  who  got  his  views  of  that 
system  from  the  furious  harangues  of  itinerant  Methodist  preachers. 
He  quotes  no  authorities,  establishes  no  assertions,  but  coolly  goes 
on  attributing  just  what  opinions  come  into  his  head  to  those  against 
whom  he  writes.  Had  he  taken  up  any  one  author,  or  class  of 
authors,  cited  from  their  writings  their  own  exhibitions  of  doctrine, 
and  proceeded  to  examine  them,  his  readers  would  know  what 
credit  to  give  to  his  statements.  He  however  has  preferred  to 
state  in  general  terms  that  there  are  but  two  views  of  the  atone- 
ment, his  own  and  another.  That  other  he  then  most  grievously 
misrepresents.  He  attributes  to  all  who  reject  his  doctrine  opi- 
nions which  not  one  in  a  million  of  them  ever  entertained.  As  far 
as  relates  to  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  these  misrepresentations 
have  already  been  pointed  out.  He  commences  and  continues  his 
discussion  concerning  its  extent  on  the  same  plan.  He  assumes 
that  the  question  relates  to  the  limitation  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
work  of  Christ.  "  If,"  he  says,  "the  atonement  is  to  be  considered 
as  a  literal  payment  of  a  debt,  or,  in  other  words,  if  it  consisted  in 
suffering  the  exact  penalty  of  the  law  in  the  room  of  those  who 
will  be  saved,  it  is  manifest  that  it  must  be  limited  in  its  extent. 
In  this  case  it  would  be  a  provision  which  must  be  regulated  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  commutative  justice.  If  one  soul  were 
to  be  saved,  "  then  Christ  must  suffer  so  much,  if  a  thousand,  then 
a  thousand  times  as  much,"  &c. — P.  145.  The  opposite  doctrine, 
which  he  adopts,  necessarily  leads  to  the  conclusion  "  that  an 
atonement  sufficient  for  one,  is  sufficient  for  all ;"  of  course  those 
who  reject  his  view,  are  made  to  hold  an  insufficient  atonement. — 
P.  147.  So  Dr.  Cox,  in  his  introductory  chapter,  speaks  of  "  the 
limitation  of  the  nature"  of  the  atonement,  and  represents  those 
whom  he  opposes  as  holding  that  it  is  as  "  limited  in  its  nature  as 
in  its  application." — Pp.  16,  17.  If  these  gentlemen  would  take 
the  trouble  to  read  a  little  on  this  subject  they  would  find  that  this 
is  all  a  mistake.  They  are  merely  beating  the  air.  Those  who 
deny  that  Christ  died  for  Judas  as  much  as  for  Paul,  for  the  non- 
elect  as  much  as  for  the  elect,  and  who  maintain  that  he  died 
strictly  and  properly  only  for  his  own  people,  do  not  hold  that  there 
is  any  limitation  in  the  nature  of  the  atonement.     They  teach  as 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  341 

fully  as  any  men,  that  "  an  atonement  sufficient  for  one  is  sufficient 
for  all."  It  is  a  simple  question  relating  to  the  design,  and  not  to  the 
nature  of  Christ's  work.  That  work,  as  far  as  we  know  or  believe, 
would  have  been  the  same  had  God  purposed  to  save  but  one  soul 
or  the  souls  of  all  mankind.  We  hold  that  the  atonement  as  to  its 
value  is  infinite,  and  as  to  its  nature  as  much  adapted  to  one  man 
as  to  another,  to  all  as  to  one.  The  whole  question  is,  for  what 
purpose  did  he  die  ?  What  was  the  design  which  God  intended  to 
accomplish  by  his  mission  and  death  ?  That  this  is  the  true  state 
of  the  question  is  obvious  from  the  fact  that  the  Reformed  and 
Lutherans  do  not  differ  at  all  as  to  the  nature  of  Christ's  satis-  ■ 
faction,  though  they  do  differ  as  to  its  design.  Lutherans,  as  they 
deny  the  doctrine  of  election,  deny  that  the  satisfaction  of  Christ 
had  special  reference  to  the  elect,  though  they  are  even  more  strict 
than  the  Reformed  in  their  views  of  the  vicarious  nature  of  the 
atonement,  i.  e.,  of  the  imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ,  and  of  his 
obedience  to  us.  Accordingly,  in  all  the  early  defences  of  Calvin- 
ists,  their  arguments  on  the  necessity  and  on  the  truth  or  nature  of 
the  atonement,  are  directed  against  Socinians,  and  not  against 
either  Romanists  or  Lutherans.  But  when  the  question  is  discussed, 
"  For  whom  did  Christ  die  ?"  they  address  their  arguments  against 
the  latter.  Turrettin,  for  example,  in  the  statement  of  this  ques- 
tion, says,  "  It  is  not  a  question  concerning  the  value  and  sufficiency 
of  Christ's  death,  whether  it  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  for  the  salva- 
tion of  all  men.  That  is  on  both  sides  admitted.  His  death  being 
of  infinite  value,  would  have  been  most  amply  sufficient  for  the 
redemption  of  all  men,  if  God  had  seen  fit  to  extend  it  to  all. 
Hence  the  common  distinction  made  by  the  fathers,  and  retained 
by  many  theologians,  Christ  died  sufficiently  for  all,  efficaciously 
for  the  elect,  is  perfectly  true  if  understood  of  the  worth  of  Christ's 
death,  but  not  so  accurate  if  understood  of  his  purpose  and  design 
in  dying.  The  question,  therefore,  properly  relates  to  the  purpose 
of  the  Father  in  giving  his  Son,  and  the  intention  of  the  Son  in 
laying  down  his  life.  Did  the  Father  destine  his  Son  for  all  and 
every  man,  and  did  the  Son  deliver  himself  to  death  with  the  inten- 
tion of  substituting  himself  in  the  place  of  all  and  every  one,  in 
order  to  make  satisfaction  and  procure  salvation  for  them  ?  Or, 
did  Christ  give  himself  for  the  elect  alone,  who  were  given  to  him 
by  the  Father,  and  whose  head  he  was  to  be  ?  The  heart  of  the 
question,  therefore,  comes  to  this,  not  what  is  the  nature  or  efficacy 
of  the  death  of  Christ,  but  what  was  the  design  of  the  Father  in 
giving  him  up,  and  the  intention  of  Christ  in  dying."* 

The  simple  statement  of  our  doctrine,  therefore,  answers  two 
thirds  of  Dr.  Beman's  objections  against  it.  This  is  not  a  state- 
ment got  up  for  the  occasion,  but  made  a  century  and  a  half  before 
he  was  born.  There  is  one  view  in  which  the  question  concerning 
the  extent  of  the  atonement  is  indeed  intimately  connected  with 

•  Turrettin,  vol.  ii.,  p.  498. 


342  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

its  nature.  If  any  man  holds  the  doctrine  that  the  atonement  was 
nothing  more  than  a  symbolical  expression  of  a  truth,  and  "  merely 
opened  the  door  of  mercy,"  there  is  of  course  an  end  to  all  ques- 
tion as  to  its  design.  If  that  be  its  nature,  it  can  have  no  more 
reference  to  the  saved  than  to  the  lost.  And  it  is  probably  in  order 
to  get  rid  of  all  difficulty  as  to  the  extent  of  the  atonement,  that 
many  have  been  led  to  adopt  the  above  mentioned  most  unscrip- 
tural  and  dangerous  view  of  its  nature.  But  if  the  true  doctrine 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  satisfaction  is  retained,  as  it  was  by 
the  Lutherans,  and  even  in  a  great  measure  by  the  early  Remon- 
strants, at  least  by  Grotius,  the  question  as  to  its  extent  resolves 
itself  into  a  question  concerning  the  purposes  of  God.  It  might 
seem  as  if  this  were  an  entirely  useless  question.  The  purposes 
of  God  are  not  the  rule  of  our  duty,  and  whatever  God  may  de- 
sign to  do,  we  are  to  act  in  accordance  with  his  preceptive  will. 
Still  there  is  a  right  and  a  wrong  in  every  question,  and  what  is 
wrong  in  relation  to  one  point,  must  tend  to  produce  erroneous 
views  with  regard  to  others. 

Dr.  Cox  intimates  with  some  truth  that  the  difference  of  opinion 
on  this  point  has  its  origin  in,  or  at  least  implies  a  difference  of  view 
as  to  the  order  of  the  divine  purposes. — P.  18.  As  in  fact,  how- 
ever, there  is  no  order  of  succession  in  the  purposes  of  God,  but 
simply  in  our  mode  of  conceiving  them,  all  his  decrees  being 
comprehended  in  one  eternal  purpose,  any  question  about  the  order 
of  those  decrees  must  be  a  question  relating  to  our  own  thoughts. 
Those  thoughts,  however,  may  be  confused,  contradictory,  or  lead 
to  conclusions  in  conflict  with  revealed  facts.  Even  this  question, 
therefore,  is  not  without  its  importance.  If  the  purposes  of  God 
are  all  one,  any  mode  of  conceiving  them  which  prevents  their 
being  reduced  to  unity ;  which  supposes  either  a  change  or  uncer- 
tainty in  the  divine  plan,  must  be  erroneous.  As  it  is  involved  in 
our  idea  of  God  as  the  intelligent  ruler  of  the  universe,  that  he  had 
a  design  in  the  creation  and  redemption  of  man,  all  classes  of  the- 
ologians form  some  theory  (if  that  word  may  be  used)  of  the  plan 
adopted  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  design.  According  to  one 
system,  God  purposed  to  create  man,  to  permit  the  fall,  to  provide 
salvation  for  all,  to  give  all  sufficient  grace,  to  elect  to  life  those 
who  improve  this  grace.  This  is  the  scheme  of  the  Remonstrants, 
and  of  those  generally  who  reject  the  doctrines  of  election  and 
efficacious  grace.  According  to  another  system,  God  purposed  to 
create  man,  to  permit  the  fall,  to  provide  for  the  salvation  of  all ; 
but,  foreseeing  that  none  would  accept  of  that  salvation,  he  chose 
some  to  everlasting  life,  and  determined,  by  his  effectual  grace,  to 
give  them  faith  and  repentance.  This  is  the  scheme  proposed  by 
Amyraud,  Testard,  Camero,  and  other  French  theologians  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  According  to  others,  God  purposed  to  create 
man,  to  permit  the  fall,  to  choose  from  the  mass  of  fallen  men  an 
innumerable  multitude  as  vessels  of  mercy,  to  send  his  Son  for 
their  redemption,  and  with  him  to  give  them  everything  necessary 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  343 

for  their  salvation.  This  was  the  common  doctrine  of  all  the  Re- 
formed churches,  from  which  the  two  former  systems  were  depart- 
ures. The  common  New  School  system,  adopted  in  this  country, 
lies  between  the  Arminian  and  the  French  scheme,  containing  more 
truth  than  the  former,  and  less  than  the  latter. 

The  question,  which  of  these  views  of  the  whole  plan  of  God's 
dealings  with  men  is  the  most  correct,  must  be  determined,  1.  By 
ascertaining  which  is  most  consistent  with  itself;  which  best  admits 
of  being  reduced  to  one  simple  purpose.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to 
show  that  the  two  former  include  contradictions,  and  involve  the  as- 
cription of  conflicting  purposes  to  God.  2.  By  ascertaining  which 
is  most  in  harmony  with  the  admitted  character  of  God,  as  infinite, 
independent,  and  self-sufficient,  of  whom,  and  through  whom,  and 
to  whom  are  all  things.  3.  By  ascertaining  which  is  most  consistent 
with  revealed  facts.  The  first,  or  Arminian  scheme,  breaks  down 
entirely  by  coming  in  conflict  with  the  clearly  revealed  truth  of 
God's^sovereignty  in  election,  and  of  conversion  by  his  mighty 
power,  and  not  by  an  influence  common  to  all  men.  Our  present 
business,  however,  is  with  the  two  latter  schemes,  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  the  design  of  Christ's  death.  Was  the  Son  of  God  sent 
into  the  world,  as  Dr.  Beman  says,  merely  to  make  the  salvation 
of  all  men  possible,  or  actually  to  save  all  whom  God  had  given 
him? 

Before  attempting  to  answer  this  question,  it  is  proper  to  remark 
that  Dr.  Beman  and  those  who  adopt  his  theory,  seem  constantly  dis- 
posed to  forget  that  Salvation  is  by  Grace.  If  it  is  of  grace,  then 
it  is  a  matter  of  grace  that  God  provided  salvation  at  all  for  guilty 
men.  If  this  is  not  so,  the  gift  of  Christ,  the  influences  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  every  other  gift  requisite  for  our  salvation,  are  mere 
matters  of  justice,  which  it  would  have  been  unrighteous  to  with- 
hold. No  man  can  believe  that,  however,  without  contradicting 
every  page  of  the  Bible,  and  the  testimony  of  every  true  Christian. 
2.  But  if  God  was  not  bound  to  save  any,  he  is  at  liberty  to  save 
whom  he  pleases.  If  he  need  not  provide  salvation  for  any,  there 
could  be  no  injustice  in  providing  it  for  some  and  not  for  others.  If 
salvation  is  of  grace,  it  is  of  grace  that  one  and  not  anotheris 
saved.  And  to  complain  that  the  mission  of  Christ  was  not  de- 
signed to  save  all,  or  even  that  it  did  not  open  the  door  of  mercy 
for  all,  if  such  were  actually  the  case,  would  be  to  complain  of  the 
gratuitous  nature  of  salvation.  And,  3.  If  salvation  is  by  grace, 
then  those  who  are  saved,  are  freely  called,  justified  and  glorified. 
The  ground  of  their  acceptance  is  not  to  be  found  in  them,  but  in 
the  good  pleasure  of  God.  This  is  the  plain  doctrine  of  the  Bible, 
to  which  we  must  submit ;  and  it  is  so  clearly  revealed,  and  so  es- 
sential to  the  very  nature  of  the  Gospel,  that  those  who  are  not 
willing  to  be  saved  by  grace,  cannot  be  saved  at  all. 

There  is  therefore  no  preliminary  presumption  against  the  doc- 
trine that  the  death  of  Christ  had  not  an  equal  reference  to  all  men, 
but  had  a  special  relation  to  his  own  people.     The  presumption  is 


344  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

all  the  other  way.  As  the  whole  plan  of  salvation  is,  according 
to  the  apostle,  arranged  with  a  view  "  to  show  the  exceeding  riches 
of  the  grace  of  God,  by  his  kindness  towards  us,"  that  view  of 
the  economy  of  redemption,  which  renders  the  grace  of  God  the 
most  conspicuous,  is  the  most  in  harmony  with  its  grand  design. 
What  God's  actual  purpose  was  in  the  mission  of  his  Son  we  can 
only  learn  from  his  own  declarations.  He  reveals  his  designs  to 
us  partly  by  their  execution,  and  partly  by  the  annunciation  of 
them  in  his  word.  What  God  does,  is  the  clearest  revelation  of 
what  he  intended  to  do.  Hence,  if  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  actu- 
ally saves  all  men,  it  was  certainly  designed  to  save  all  men ;  but 
if  it  saves  only  a  part  of  the  human  race,  it  was  certainly  designed 
only  for  a  part.  It  cannot  be  questioned  that  Christ  came  to  save 
men  from  their  sins,  and  if  we  ask,  Who  he  intended  to  save  ?  we 
can  get  no  better  answer  than  by  learning  whom  he  does  in  fact 
save.  If  the  end  of  Christ's  mission  was  salvation,  it  is  not  con- 
ceivable that  he  died  equally  for  all,  unless  he  purposed  to  save  all. 
Dr.  Beman,  however,  denies  that  the  design  of  his  mission  was 
salvation,  it  was  merely  to  make  salvation  possible. 

In  assuming  this  ground,  he  is  guilty  of  the  same  one-sidedness, 
the  same  contracted  view,  which  he  exhibits  in  his  doctrine  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  the  atonement.  It  is  conceded  that  the  work 
of  Christ  does  lay  the  foundation  for  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all 
men.  Dr.  Beman  hence  concludes  that  this  was  its  only  end  ;  that 
it  merely  opens  the  way  for  the  general  offer  of  pardon.  His  theo- 
ry is  designed  to  account  for  one  fact,  and  leaves  all  the  other  re- 
vealed facts  out  of  view,  and  unexplained.  The  Bible  teaches, 
however,  a  great  deal  more  in  relation  to  this  subject,  than  that 
one  fact.  It  teaches,  1.  That  Christ  came  in  execution  of  a  pur- 
pose ;  that  he  suffered,  as  Dr.  Beman  expresses  it,  by  covenant, 
and  ratified  that  covenant  with  his  own  blood.  2.  That  his  mis- 
sion was  the  result  and  expression  of  the  highest  conceivable  love. 
3.  That  it  not  merely  removes  obstacles  out  of  the  way,  but  actu- 
ally secures  the  salvation  of  his  people.  4.  That  it  lays  the  founda- 
tion for  a  free,  full,  and  unrestrained  offer  of  salvation  to  all  men. 
5.  That  it  renders  just  the  condemnation  of  those  who  reject  him 
as  their  Saviour ;  that  rejection  being  righteously  the  special  ground 
of  their  condemnation. 

Dr.  Beman's  theory  accords  only  with  the  last  two  facts  just 
mentioned.  It  will  account  for  the  general  offer  of  the  Gospel,  and 
for  the  condemnation  of  those  who  reject  it,  but  it  is  inconsistent 
with  all  the  other  facts  above  stated,  which  are  not  less  clearly  re- 
vealed, and  not  less  important.  It  overlooks,  in  the  first  place,  the 
fact  that  Christ  came  into  the  world  and  accomplished  the  work  of 
redemption,  in  execution  of  the  covenant  of  grace.  The  use  of 
such  words  as  covenant,  is  often  convenient,  and  sometimes  una- 
voidable, as  a  concise  method  of  expressing  several  related  truths. 
Wherever  there  is  a  promise  by  one  person  to  another,  suspended 
upon  the  performance  of  a  condition,  there  is  a  covenant.      As, 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  345 

therefore,  the  scriptures  expressly  speak  of  a  promise  made  to  the 
Son,  suspended  upon  the  condition  of  his  incarnation,  obedience, 
and  death,  they  teach  that  there  was  a  covenant  of  grace.  The 
promise  made  to  the  Redeemer  was,  that  he  should  see  the  travail 
of  his  soul ;  that  he  should  have  the  heathen  for  his  inheritance, 
and  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  earth  for  his  possession ;  that  those 
whom  the  Father  had  given  him  should  come  unto  him ;  that  they 
should  all  be  taught  of  God,  receive  the 'Spirit,  and  be  raised  up 
the  last  day ;  that  He  should  be  the  first-born  among  many  breth- 
ren, and  be  highly  exalted  as  the  head  of  his  people,  and  far  above 
all  principalities  and  powers.  It  is  further  expressly  taught  that 
he  secured  all  these  inestimable  blessings  by  his  obedience  unto 
death.  Because  he  thus  humbled  himself,  God  has  highly  exalted 
him  ;  on  account  of  the  suffering  of  death,  he  was  crowned  with 
glory  and  honour ;  because  he  made  his  soul  an  offering  for  sin, 
therefore  God  hath  divided  to  him  his  portion.  If  these  things  are 
so,  if  Christ  had  the  attainment  of  these  blessings,  which  involve 
the  salvation  of  his  people,  in  view  in  coming  into  the  world ;  if 
the  accomplishment  of  this  work  was  the  object  of  his  mission, 
then  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  say  that,  as  far  as  the  purpose 
of  God  and  his  own  intention  are  concerned,  he  had  not  a  special 
reference  to  his  own  people  and  to  their  salvation  in  his  death. 
Their  salvation  was  the  reward  promised,  when  it  was  said,  "  he 
shall  see  his  seed,"  and  it  was  for  that  recompense  he  died.  Dr. 
Beman's  theory  denies  all  this.  It  assumes  that  his  death,  his  whole 
work,  had  no  reference  to  one  class  of  men  more  than  to  another, 
to  the  saved  more  than  to  the  lost.  It  simply  made  the  pardon  of 
all  men  possible.  This  is  of  course  a  denial  of  what  Dr.  Beman 
himself,  in  an  unguarded  hour,  admitted,  viz.,  that  Christ  suffered 
by  covenant.  What  covenant  ?  The  scriptures  make  mention  of 
no  other  covenant  in  connection  with  the  Redeemer's  death  than 
that  which  included  the  promise  of  his  people  to  him  as  a  reward, 
and  which  was  ratified  in  his  blood.  Here  then  is  one  plain,  im- 
portant, revealed  fact,  which  Dr.  Beman's  theory  overlooks  and 
contradicts.  If  Christ  in  his  death  had  regard  to  the  recompense 
of  reward,  and  if  that  reward  included  the  holiness  and  salvation 
of  his  people,  then,  beyond  contradiction,  his  satisfaction  had  a  spe- 
cial reference  to  them. 

In  the  second  place,  his  theory  contradicts  the  plainly  revealed 
fact,  that  the  mission  and  death  of  Christ  are  the  expressions  of  the 
highest  conceivable  love.  According  to  Dr.  Beman,  they  are  the 
expression  of  mere  general  benevolence.  It  is  admitted  that  love 
was  the  motive  which  led  to  the  gift  of  the  Son  of  God.  If  that 
love  was  general  benevolence  to  all  men,  then  he  died  for  all ;  if  it 
was  special  love  to  his  own  people,  then  he  died  for  them.  That 
there  is  such  special  love  in  God,  is  involved  in  the  doctrine  of  elec- 
tion. According  to  that  doctrine,  God,  of  his  mere  good  pleasure, 
before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  chose  some  to  everlasting  life, 
and,  for  infinitely  wise  and  holy  reasons,  left  others  to  perish  in  their 


346  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

sins.  To  say  that  the  infinite  love  which  led  to  the  mission  of 
Christ  was  a  benevolence  which  had  equal  regard  to  these  two 
classes,  is  to  deny  the  doctrine  of  election.  That  doctrine,  in  its 
very  nature,  supposes  a  difference  in  the  regard  had  for  the  vessels 
of  mercy  and  the  vessels  of  wrath  ;  for  those  in  whom  God  pur- 
posed to  display  the  riches  of  his  grace,  and  those  on  whom  he  de- 
signed to  show  his  wrath,  and  make  his  power  known.  In  teach- 
ing this  doctrine,  therefore,  the  scriptures  teach,  that  besides  the 
benevolence  with  which  God  regards  all  men,  there  is  a  higher, 
special,  mysterious,  unspeakable  love,  which  he  has  to  his  own 
children  ;  and  to  this  love  they  refer  the  incarnation  and  death  of 
the  Son  of  God.  The  scriptures  are  too  explicit  and  too  full  on 
this  latter  point  to  allow  of  its  being  questioned.  Greater  love,  said 
Christ  himself,  hath  no  man  than  this,  that  a  man  lay  down  his  life 
for  his  friends.  Paul  prays  that  the  Ephesians  may  be  strengthen- 
ed by  the  Holy  Spirit,  to  be  able  to  comprehend  what  is  the 
breadth,  and  length,  and  depth,  and  height,  and  to  know  the  love 
of  Christ  which  passes  knowledge.  Hereby  perceive  we  the  love 
of  God,  because  he  laid  down  his  life  for  us.  In  this  we  perceive 
the  love  of  God  towards  us,  because  that  God  sent  his  only  begot- 
ten Son  into  the  world  that  we  might  live  through  him.  He  that 
spared  not  his  own  Son,  but  delivered  him  up  for  us  all,  how  shall 
he  not  with  him  freely  give  us  all  things  ?  In  these  and  in  various 
similar  passages,  it  is  distinctly  asserted  that  the  love  which  led  to 
the  gift  of  Christ  was  not  general  benevolence,  consistent  with  the 
eternal  reprobation  of  its  objects,  but  the  highest  conceivable  love, 
that  would  spare  nothing  to  secure  the  salvation  of  those  on  whom 
it  rested. 

Again,  it  is  with  equal  explicitness  and  frequency  asserted,  love 
to  his  people  was  the  motive  of  the  Son  of  God  in  laying  down  his 
life.  "  For  their  sakes,"  said  the  Redeemer,  "  I  sanctify  myself." 
"  I  am  the  good  shepherd,  the  good  shepherd  giveth  his  life  for  his 
sheep."  "  I  lay  down  my  life  for  my  sheep."  "  Christ  loved  the 
church,  and  gave  himself  for  it."  Do  not  these  passages  assert 
that  love  for  his  church,  his  friends,  his  sheep,  was  the  motive  of 
Christ  in  dying  1  When  the  scriptures  divide  men  into  classes,  the 
sheep  and  the  goats,  the  church  and  those  who  are  not  the  church, 
and  say  that  love  to  his  sheep,  love  to  his  church,  led  the  Saviour 
to  lay  down  his  life,  they  expressly  assert  that  it  was  a  peculiar 
love  for  them,  and  not  a  general  benevolence  including  them  and 
all  others  alike,  that  was  the  motive  of  Christ  in  laying  down  his 
life.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  this  whole  question  relates,  not  to 
the  incidental  effects  of  Christ's  death,  but  to  his  intention  in  dying. 
The  passages  above  quoted,  and  the  scriptures  generally,  do  then 
teach  that,  besides  his  general  benevolence  for  men,  God  has  a  spe- 
cial love  for  his  own  people,  and  that  that  special  love,  for  his  own, 
for  his  friends,  for  his  sheep,  led  the  Saviour  to  give  himself  up  to 
death.  If  this  is  so,  it  overturns  Dr.  Beman's  theory,  which  is  in 
direct  conflict  with  this  plain  and  precious  truth.     It  is  not  that  be- 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  347 

nevolence  which  consists  with  eternal  reprobation,  i.  e.,  with  the 
eternal  purpose  to  leave  men  to  suffer  the  just  recompense  of  their 
sins,  that  led  the  Father  to  give  up  the  Son,  and  the  Son  to  assume 
our  nature  and  die  upon  the  cross.  Those  who  admit  this,  admit 
all  the  limitation  of  the  atonement  for  which  we  contend  ;  a  limi- 
tation not  as  to  its  nature  or  value,  but  as  to  the  purpose  of  God 
and  intention  of  Christ.  Besides,  docs  it  not  involve  a  contradic- 
tion, to  say  that  love  to  those  whom  God  purposed,  for  wise  rea- 
sons, not  to  save,  was  his  motive  in  providing  salvation?  Our  Sa- 
viour teaches  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Gospel  aggravates  the 
guilt,  and  consequently  the  misery,  of  those  who  reject  it ;  then 
certainly,  love  to  them  was  not  the  motive  which  led  either  to  the 
adoption  or  the  proclamation  of  the  scheme  of  redemption.  The 
fact  is,  this  doctrine  that  Christ  died  as  much  for  Judas  as  for  Paul, 
is  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  election ;  and  the  two  have  never 
for  any  length  of  time  been  held  together.  Those  theologians  in 
the  church  of  Rome,  who  remained  faithful  to  the  doctrine  of  elec- 
tion, also  held  that  the  death  of  Christ  had  special  reference  to  his 
own  people.  The  Lutherans,  when  they  rejected  the  one  doctrine, 
rejected  also  the  other.  So  did  the  Arminians.  A  few  French 
divines  endeavoured,  by  reversing  the  natural  order  of  the  decrees, 
for  a  time  to  unite  the  two  ;  but  the  attempt  failed.  Both  doctrines 
were  soon  rejected.  The  sovereignty  of  God,  election,  special 
love  as  the  motive  of  redemption,  and  consequently  a  special  refer- 
ence to  the  elect,  in  the  death  of  Christ,  are  joined  together  in  the 
scriptures,  and  they  cannot  long  be  separated  in  the  faith  of  God's 
people. 

Another  revealed  fact  which  Dr.  Beman's  theory  overlooks  and 
contradicts,  is,  that  Christ's  death  not  only  removes  obstacles  out  of 
the  way  of  the  exercise  of  mercy,  but  actually  secures  the  salva- 
tion of  his  people.  It  has  been  repeatedly  shown  that  Dr.  Beman 
constantly  asserts  that  the  only  effect  of  the  atonement  is  to  bring 
the  sinner  within  the  reach  of  mercy,  it  merely  makes  pardon  pos- 
sible. This  is  the  only  effect  claimed  for  it,  and  all  that  can  be  at- 
tributed to  it  on  his  theory.  This,  however,  is  in  direct  conflict 
with  the  scriptures,  because  they  teach  that  the  death  of  Christ 
renders  the  salvation  of  his  own  people  certain.  This  follows  from 
what  has  already  been  said.  If  Christ  suffered  by  covenant ;  if  that 
covenant  promised  to  him  his  people  as  his  reward  and  inheritance, 
on  condition  of  his  obedience  and  death,  then  assuredly  when  he 
performed  that  condition  the  salvation  of  all  whom  the  Father  had 
given  to  him  was  rendered  absolutely  certain.  Hence,  it  is  said 
that  he  purchased  his  church,  that  is,  acquired  a  right  to  it.  He 
gave  himself  for  his  church,  that  he  might  purify  and  cleanse  it. 
He  came  into  the  world  to  save  his  people  from  their  sins.  He 
gave  himself  for  our  sins,  that  he  might  redeem  us  from  this 
present  evil  world  ;  or,  as  elsewhere  said,  to  purify  a  peculiar  peo- 
ple unto  himself.  These  and  similar  declarations  teach  that  the 
design  of  Christ's  death  was  actually  to  save  his  people.     They 


348  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

are,  therefore,  so  many  direct  contradictions  of  the  doctrine,  that 
he  merely  opened  the  door  of  mercy.  To  make  salvation  possi- 
ble, is  not  to  save  ;  to  make  holiness  possible,  is  not  to  purify  ;  to 
open  the  door,  is  not  to  bring  us  near  to  God. 

The  scriptures  also  ascribe  effects  to  the  death  of  Christ,  irre- 
concileable  with  the  idea  that  it  is  a  mere  governmental  display. 
We  are  justified  by  his  blood,  we  thereby  obtain  remission  of  sins, 
we  have  peace  with  God,  we  are  delivered  from  the  wrath  to  come, 
and  obtain  eternal  redemption.  It  is  contrary  to  all  scriptural 
usage  to  bring  down  all  these  and  similar  declarations  to  mean  no- 
thing more  than  that  these  blessings  are  rendered  attainable  by  the 
work  of  Christ.  This  is  not  what  the  words  mean.  To  say  that 
we  are  justified,  or  reconciled,  or  cleansed,  is  not  to  say  that  the 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  obtaining  the  blessings  mentioned  are  mere- 
ly removed.  It  is  to  say  that  his  blood  secures  those  blessings  ; 
and  secures  them  in  the  time  and  way  that  God  has  appointed. 
No  instance  can  be  produced  in  which  a  sacrifice,  offered  and  ac- 
cepted, is  said  to  propitiate  God  and  be  the  ground  of  pardon, 
when  nothing  more  is  meant  than  that  the  sacrifice  renders  pardon 
possible.  The  meaning  uniformly  is,  that  it  secures  and  renders  it 
certain.  The  very  acceptance  of  it  is  the  established  way  of  pro- 
mising forgiveness  to  those  in  whose  behalf  the  sacrifice  was  offer- 
ed. Dr.  Beman's  theory,  therefore,  in  attributing  so  little  to  the 
death  of  Christ,  contradicts  the  established  meaning  of  scriptural 
phrases  ;  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  clearly  revealed  fact  that  His 
death  makes  salvation  not  only  possible,  but  certain. 

It  is  further  revealed  that  there  is  an  intimate  connection  between 
the  death  of  Christ  and  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Spirit 
was  promised  to  Christ,  to  be  given  to  his  people.  The  apostle 
Peter  says,  He  having  received  the  promise  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
hath  shed  forth  this,  which  ye  both  see  and  hear.  Acts  ii.  33.  In 
Tit.  iii.  5,  6,  God  is  said  to  shed  on  us  abundantly  the  Holy  Ghost, 
through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord.  All  spiritual  blessings  are  said  to 
be  given  to  us  in  Christ  Jesus,  Ep.  i.  3  ;  that  is,  on  account  of  our 
union  with  him,  a  union  eternal  in  the  purpose  of  God,  and  actual 
when  we  believe.  This  union  existing  in  the  divine  purpose,  this 
covenant  union  is  represented  as  the  ground  of  the  gift  of  regene- 
ration. In  Ep.  ii.  5,  6,  we  are  said  to  be  quickened  with  Christ,  to 
be  raised  up  in  him.  This  can  only  mean  that  there  is  a  union  be- 
tween Christ  and  his  people,  which  secures  to  them  that  influence 
by  which  they  are  raised  from  spiritual  death.  If  so,  then  in  the 
covenant  to  ratify  which  Christ  died,  it  was  promised  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  should  be  given  to  his  people,  and  to  secure  that  promise  was 
one  design  of  his  death.  And  consequently,  all  for  whom  he  died 
must  receive  that  Spirit,  whose  influences  were  secured  by  his 
death.  He  is,  therefore,  said  to  have  redeemed  us  from  the  curse 
of  the  law,  that  we  might  receive  the  promise  of  the  Spirit,  Gal. 
iii.  13,  14.  It  obviously  contradicts  this  important  truth,  to  teach 
that  Christ's  death  had  as  much  reference  to  one  man  as  another, 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  349 

or  that  it  merely  renders  mercy  possible.  If  Christ  suffered  by  co- 
venant, and  if  that  covenant  included  the  promise  of  the  Holy  Spi- 
rit, to  teach,  renew,  and  sanctify  his  people,  then  it  cannot  be  de- 
nied that  those  thus  taught,  renewed,  and  sanctified,  are  those  for 
whom  he  died. 

Dr.  Beman's  theory,  therefore,  which  denies  that  the  death  of 
Christ  had  a  special  reference  to  his  own  people,  is  inconsistent 
with  the  plainly  revealed  facts:  1.  That  he  died  in  execution  of  a 
covenant  in  which  his  people  were  promised  to  him  as  his  reward, 
to  secure  which  reward  is  declared  to  be  his  specific  and  imme- 
diate design  in  laying  down  his  life.  2.  That  the  motive  which 
led  to  the  gift  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Son  in  dying,  was  not  gene- 
ral benevolence,  but  the  highest  conceivable  love,  love  for  his 
sheep  and  for  his  friends.  3.  That  the  design  of  his  death  was 
not  simply  to  remove  obstacles  out  of  the  way  of  mercy,  but  ac- 
tually to  secure  the  salvation  of  those  given  to  him  by  the  Father ; 
and  that  it  does  in  fact  secure  for  them  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
and  consequently  justification  and  eternal  life.  In  other  words, 
God,  having  out  of  his  mere  good  pleasure  elected  some  to  ever- 
lasting life,  did  enter  into  a  covenant  of  grace  to  deliver  them  out 
of  the  estate  of  sin  and  misery,  and  to  bring  them  into  an  estate  of 
salvation  by  a  Redeemer.  The  only  Redeemer  of  God's  elect  is 
the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  who,  being  the  eternal  Son  of  God,  became 
man,  was  made  under  the  law,  satisfied  by  his  obedience  and  death 
all  its  demands,  and  thus  fulfilled  the  conditions  of  that  covenant 
on  which  the  salvation  of  his  people  was  suspended,  and  thereby 
acquired  a  right  to  them  as  his  stipulated  reward.  Such  was  the 
specific  design  and  certain  effect  of  his  death.  This  is  the  plain  doc- 
trine of  our  standards,  and,  as  we  fully  believe,  of  the  word  of  God. 

It  will,  however,  doubtless  be  asked,  admitting  that  our  doctrine 
of  the  atonement  does  accord  with  the  facts  above  mentioned,  can 
it  be  reconciled  with  the  no  less  certian  facts  that  the  Gospel  is  to 
be  freely  offered  to  all  men,  and  that  those  who  reject  it  are  justly 
condemned  for  their  unbelief?  If  it  cannot,  it  must  be  defective. 
On  this  score,  however,  we  feel  no  difficulty. 

Our  doctrine  is,  that  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  in  order  to  secure  the 
salvation  of  his  people,  and  with  a  specific  view  to  that  end,  ful- 
filled the  conditions  of  the  law  or  covenant  under  which  they  and 
all  mankind  were  placed.  Those  conditions  were,  perfect  obe- 
dience and  satisfaction  to  divine  justice,  by  bearing  the  penalty 
threatened  against  sin.  Christ's  righteousness,  therefore,  consists 
in  his  obedience  and  death.  That  righteousness  is  precisely  what 
the  law  demands  of  every  sinner,  in  order  to  his  justification  before 
God.  It  is,  therefore,  in  its  nature  adapted  to  all  sinners  who  are 
under  that  law.  Its  nature  is  not  altered  by  the  fact  that  it  was 
wrought  out  for  a  portion  only  of  such  sinners,  or  that  it  is  secured 
to  them  by  the  covenant  between  the  Father  and  the  Son.  What 
is  necessary  for  the  salvation  of  one  man,  is  necessary  for  the  sal- 
vation of  another,  and  of  all.     The  righteousness  of  Christ,  there- 


* 


350  BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT. 

fore,  consisting  in  the  obedience  and  death  demanded  by  the  law 
under  which  all  men  are  placed,  is  adapted  to  all  men.  It  is  also 
of  infinite  value,  being  the  righteousness  of  the  eternal  Son  of  God, 
and  therefore  sufficient  for  all.  On  these  two  grounds,  its  adapta- 
tion to  all  and  its  sufficiency  for  all,  rests  the  offer  made  in  the 
Gospel  to  all.  With  this  its  design  we  have  nothing  to  do  ;  who 
are  to  be  saved  by  it  we  do  not  know.  It  is  of  such  a  nature  and 
value,  that  whosoever  accepts  of  it  shall  be  saved.  If  one  of  the 
non-elect,  should  believe  (though  the  hypothesis  is  on  various  ac- 
counts unreasonable),  to  him  that  righteousness  would  be  imputed 
to  his  salvation.  And  if  one  of  the  elect  should  not  believe,  or 
having  believed  should  apostatize,  he  would  certainly  perish. 
These  suppositions  are  made  simply  to  show  that,  according  to  our 
doctrine,  the  reason  why  any  man  perishes  is  not  that  there  is  no 
righteousness  provided  suitable  and  adequate  to  his  case,  or  that  it 
is  not  freely  offered  to  all  that  hear  the  Gospel,  but  simply  because 
he  wilfully  rejects  the  proffered  salvation.  Our  doctrine,  there- 
fore, provides  for  the  universal  offer  of  the  Gospel,  and  for  the 
righteous  condemnation  of  unbelievers,  as  thoroughly  as  Dr.  Be- 
man's.  It  opens  the  door  for  mercy,  as  far  as  legal  obstructions 
are  concerned,  as  fully  as  his  ;  while  it  meets  all  the  other  revealed 
facts  of  the  case.  It  is  not  a  theory  for  one  fact.  It  includes 
them  all  ;  the  fact  that  Christ  died  by  covenant  for  his  own  people, 
that  love  for  his  own  sheep  led  him  to  lay  down  his  life,  that  his 
death  renders  their  salvation  absolutely  certain,  that  it  opens  the 
way  for  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all  men,  and  shows  the  justice  of 
the  condemnation  of  unbelief.  No  man  perishes  for  the  want  of 
an  atonement,  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Synod  of  Dort ;  it  is  also 
our  doctrine. 

Dr.  Cox  is  pleased  to  call  us  "  restrictionists."  A  most  inap- 
propriate designation.  There  is  more  saving  truth  in  the  parings 
of  our  doctrine  than  in  his  whole  theory.  Our  doctrine  contains 
all  the  modicum  of  truth  there  is  in  his,  and  it  contains  unspeakably 
more.  His  own  theory  is  the  most  restricted,  jejune,  meager,  and 
lifeless,  that  has  ever  been  propounded.  It  provides  but  for  one 
fact ;  it  teaches  a  possible  salvation,  while  it  leaves  out  the  very 
soul  of  the  doctrine.  It  vitiates  the  essential  nature  of  the  atone- 
ment, makes  it  a  mere  governmental  display,  a  symbolical  method 
of  instruction,  in  order  to  do  what  was  better  done  without  any 
such  corruption.  While  we  teach,  that  Christ,  by  really  obeying 
the  law,  and  really  bearing  its  penalty  in  the  place  of  his  people, 
and  according  to  the  stipulations  of  the  covenant  of  grace,  secured 
the  salvation  of  all  whom  the  Father  had  given  him,  and  at  the 
same  time  throws  open  the  door  of  mercy  to  all  who  choose  to 
enter  it ;  we  retain  the  life-giving  doctrine  of  Christ's  union  with 
his  own  people,  his  obeying  and  dying  in  their  stead,  of  his  bearing 
our  sins,  and  of  our  becoming  the  righteousness  of  God  in  him ; 
of  the  necessity  of  entire  self-renunciation  and  of  simple  reliance 
on  his  righteousness,  on  the  indwelling  of  his  Spirit,  and  on  his 


BEMAN    ON    THE    ATONEMENT.  351 

strength  for  our  salvation ;  while  we  impose  no  restriction  on  the 
glorious  Gospel  of  the  grace  of  God. 

Long  as  this  discussion  has  become,  we  have  touched  only  what 
appeared  to  us  the  most  important  points  of  the  controversy,  and 
must  leave  others  unnoticed.  We  trust  we  have  said  enough  to 
show  that  there  is  no  necessity  for  surrendering  the  common  faith 
of  Christendom,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  for  the  misera- 
ble theory  propounded  by  Dr.  Beman.  We  cannot  close  this  arti- 
cle without  a  single  remark  concerning  his  book  itself.  It  is  a 
small  volume,  sold  at  a  moderate  price,  and  intended  for  general  cir- 
culation. It  is  written  in  a  calm  and  confident  spirit,  but  without 
force,  discrimination,  or  learning.  It  is  the  very  book  to  do  harm. 
It  presents  its  readers  the  choice  between  two  doctrines ;  the  one  no 
man  can  adopt,  the  other  is  hardly  worth  accepting.  So  far  as 
this  book  is  concerned,  the  atonement  must  be  rejected  either  as 
incredible  or  as  worthless.  He  represents  the  one  doctrine,  as 
teaching  that  Christ  became  personally  and  morally  a  sinner,  that 
he  suffered  just  what  in  kind  and  degree  all  his  people  throughout 
eternity  would  have  endured,  and  that  they  by  his  righteousness 
became  morally  innocent.  This  view  of  the  atonement  no  man 
can  believe  and  be  a  Christian.  His  own  doctrine  makes  the 
atonement  a  mere  symbolical  method  of  instruction,  and  reduces 
the  whole  work  of  Christ  in  this  matter  to  making  pardon  possible. 
This  again  is  a  doctrine  which  we  see  not  how  any  man  can  prac- 
tically believe  and  be  a  Christian.  The  book  in  itself  is  of  little 
consequence.  But  from  its  gross  and  yet  confident  misrepresenta- 
tion of  the  truth,  it  has  more  of  the  power  due  to  falsehood  than 
any  book  of  the  kind  we  know. 


ESSAY    XV. 

SACERDOTAL    ABSOLUTION/ 


By  absolution  is  meant  the  authoritative  forgiveness  of  sins  ;  by 
sacerdotal  absolution,  the  exercise  of  this  official  power  by  the 
Christian  ministry,  considered  as  a  priesthood.  The  doctrine  of 
sacerdotal  absolution,  therefore,  comprehends  two  dogmas ;  first, 
that  Christian  ministers  are  priests,  and  then,  that  as  priests,  they 
possess  this  power  of  forgiving  sins.  Now  these  two  propositions 
are  not  only  distinguishable,  but  distinct ;  they  do  not  involve  each 
other ;  the  truth  of  the  one  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  truth  of 
the  other.  It  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  the  ministry  might  have 
the  power  claimed  without  being  priests ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
that  they  might  be  priests  without  having  the  power.  This  will 
be  seen  more  clearly  in  the  sequel.  For  the  present  it  will  be  suf- 
ficient to  observe,  that  the  two  doctrines,  though  distinct,  are  near 
of  kin  and  congenial,  that  they  are  commonly  held  by  the  same 
persons,  that  they  are  usually  discussed  together,  and  in  particular 
that  they  are  so  discussed  in  the  pamphlet  now  before  us. 

This  publication  has  just  come  into  our  hands,  and  of  its  author 
we  know  nothing ;  nor  should  we  consider  any  notice  of  it  needful 
or  expedient,  if  we  did  not  wish  to  make  it  the  occasion  of  express- 
ing our  own  views  upon  the  subject, — a  wish  arising  from  our  view 
of  its  importance,  with  respect  not  only  to  its  comprehensive 
nature  and  its  many  points  of  contact  with  the  entire  system  of 
opinion  in  relation  to  the  church,  but  also  to  its  practical  bearing  on 
the  method  of  redemption,  and  the  answer  to  the  question,  What 
shall  I  do  to  be  saved  ?  To  make  Mr.  Curtis's  discourse  the  occa- 
sion for  considering  this  subject,  and  to  let  his  argument  give  shape 
and  colour  to  our  own,  we  are  the  more  disposed,  because  it  seems 
to  be  a  fair  and  not  discreditable  exhibition  of  the  high  episcopa- 
lian doctrine  now  in  vogue,  and  because  it  is  a  thing  which  can  be 
handled  without  tongs  or  even  gloves,  being  not  ill-written  nor 
devoid  of  talent,  and  as  moderate  in  tone  and  temper  as  it  is  ex- 
travagant in  its  conclusions  and  assumptions.     We  shall,  of  course, 

*  Published  in  1845,  in  review  of  "  Sacerdotal  Absolution :  a  Sermon  preached 
before  the  Convention  of  the  Diocese  of  North  Carolina,  1843."  By  the  Rev.  M.  A. 
Curtis,  Rector  of  St.  Matthew's  Church,  Hillsborough,  N.  C. 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  353 

not  confine  ourselves  throughout  to  the  reasonings  and  statements 
of  this  writer,  but  shall  pay  him  the  compliment  of  making  his 
discourse  the  text  and  starting-point  of  ours,  first  presenting  the 
subject  as  it  appears  in  his  pages,  and  then  as  it  appears  to  us,  be- 
ginning with  his  argument  and  ending  with  our  own. 

In  executing  the  former  part  of  this  plan,  we  shall  try  first  to 
ascertain  distinctly  what  the  preacher's  doctrine  is,  and  then  show 
how  he  attempts  to  prove  it  and  to  repel  objections.  It  will  be  ne- 
cessary to  state  his  doctrine  negatively  as  well  as  positively,  in 
justice  to  him,  that  he  may  not  be  supposed  to  hold  opinions  which 
he  expressly  disavows,  and  injustice  to  ourselves,  that  we  may  not 
be  supposed  to  combat  doctrines  which  we  heartily  believe. 

We  begin,  then,  by  negatively  stating  that  the  absolution  which 
the  author  claims  is  not  a  mere  ecclesiastical  absolution,  having 
reference  to  ecclesiastical  offences  and  ecclesiastical  penalties,  and 
affecting  only  the  ecclesiastical  relations  of  the  subject,  or  his 
standing  before  the  church ;  but  an  absolution  having  reference  to 
sin  in  general,  to  the  sinner's  standing  in  the  sight  of  God,  his  spir- 
itual condition,  and  his  ultimate  salvation.  Again :  the  absolution 
which  the  author  argues  for,  is  not  a  mere  declarative  absolution, 
setting  forth  the  conditions  on  which  God  will  forgive  sin ;  nor  a 
hypothetical  absolution,  declaring  sin  forgiven,  on  the  supposition 
of  the  sinner's  repentance  ;  nor  an  optative  or  intercessory  absolu- 
tion, expressing  a  desire  that  his  sins  may  be  forgiven ;  but  an  au- 
thoritative, efficacious  absolution,  as  effective  of  its  purpose  as  if  ad- 
ministered by  the  independent  and  supreme  power,  without  any  in- 
termediate human  agency.  With  respect  to  the  "formal  character 
of  the  act  of  absolution,"  the  author  does  indeed  adopt,  or  at  least 
quote,  a  classification  of  the  learned  Bingham,  which  establishes 
the  fourfold  distinction  of  sacramental  absolution,  declaratory  ab- 
solution, precatory  absolution,  and  judicial  absolution.  It  is  clear, 
however,  that  the  first  and  last  of  these,  except  so  far  as  the  out- 
ward form  and  circumstances  are  concerned,  are  one  and  the  same 
thing,  and  that  the  other  two  are  no  absolution  at  all,  according  to 
the  author's  judgment,  that  is  to  say,  no  such  absolution  as  would 
satisfy  the  conditions  of  his  argument,  or  be  considered  by  him  wor- 
thy of  the  ministry.  The  whole  drift  of  his  reasoning  is  to  show  that 
an  efficacious  absolution,  as  described  above,  is  a  necessary  function 
of  the  Christian  ministry,  not  indeed  in  virtue  of  any  intrinsic  inde- 
pendent power,  but  of  a  special  delegated  power,  just  as  real  and 
effective  as  it  could  be  if  inherent  or  original. 

In  proof  of  this  doctrine  the  author  appeals  briefly  to  tradition, 
and  at  more  length  to  the  scriptures.  His  traditional  argument  is 
drawn  from  the  alleged  fact,  that  the  doctrine  has  been  uniformly 
held  by  the  Holy  Catholic  Church,  and  as  a  distinct  fact,  or  included 
in  the  first,  that  the  Reformers  held  it,  and  the  first  Reformed 
Churches  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  rejected  only  by 
latitudinarians,  who  are  bent  on  reducing  the  ministry  to  the  lowest 

23 


354  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

point  of  inefficiency,  and  are   utterly  unable  to  agree  as  to  the 
meaning  of  the  scriptures  on  this  subject. 

Having,  by  this  historical  presumption,  created  a  prejudice  in 
favour  of  his  doctrine,  which  we  admit  to  be  fair  enough,  so  far  as 
the  alleged  facts  are  substantiated,  he  adduces  his  argument  from 
scripture,  founded  on  the  following  three  passages : 

"  Whosesoever  sins  ye  remit,  they  are  remitted  unto  them,  and  whosesoever 
sins  ye  retain,  they  are  retained." — John  xx.  23. 

"  Verilv  I  say  unto  you,  whatsoever  ye  shall  bind  on  earth,  shall  be  bound  in 
heaven ;  and  whatsoever  ye  shall  loose  on  earth,  shall  be  loosed  in  heaven." — 
Matt,  xviii.  18. 

"  And  I  will  give  unto  thee  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  and  whatsoever 
thou  shalt  bind  on  earth,  shall  be  bound  in  heaven,  and  whatsoever  thou  shalt  loose 
on  earth,  shall  be  loosed  in  heaven.'' — Matt.  xvi.  19. 

With  respect  to  the  interpretation  of  these  passages,  it  will  only 
be  necessary  here  to  state,  that  the  author  denies  the  second  and 
third  to  be  exegetical  of  the  first,  and  contends  that  it  is  exegetical 
of  them.  In  other  words,  instead  of  arguing  that  because  the 
figurative  terms  in  Matthew  may  be  descriptive  of  a  mere  eccle- 
siastical absolution,  therefore  the  literal  terms  in  John  must  be 
limited  and  understood  accordingly,  he  argues  that,  because  the 
passage  in  John  contains  a  literal  grant  of  power  to  forgive  sins, 
the  metaphors  in  Matthew  must  be  interpreted  to  signify  the  same 
thing.  As  to  the  metaphors  themselves,  he  adopts  the  opinion  of 
Calixtus,  that  the  shutting  and  opening  of  heaven  implied  in  the 
grant  of  the  keys,  and  the  binding  and  loosing  expressly  mentioned 
in  both  cases,  have  reference  alike  to  the  bondage  of  sin,  and  con- 
vey the  same  idea  that  is  literally  expressed  in  John,  viz.,  the 
remission  or  non-remission  of  sin,  in  the  uniform  sense  of  that 
phrase  in  the  New  Testament,  which  could  not  be  departed  from 
without  the  risk  of  dangerous  errors. 

Besides  this  argument  derived  from  the  express  declarations  of  our 
Saviour,  there  is  another,  upon  which  the  author  seems  to  lay  great 
stress,  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  ministerial  office.  The  argu- 
ment, in  its  most  general  form,  is  this,  that  the  ministry  without 
this  power  is  worthless,  or  at  least  without  "  special  and  positive 
value,"  and  productive  only  of  "  incidental  benefit,  such  as  might 
ensue  from  the  sober  action  of  any  man  whatever,  and  not  of  an 
appointed  and  certain  efficacy."  To  teach  the  truth,  to  preach 
Christ,  to  invite  men  to  him,  to  administer  the  ordinances,  to  exer- 
cise discipline,  to  feed  the  sheep  and  lambs  of  Christ's  flock,  seem 
to  go  for  nothing  with  the  author,  unless  accompanied  by  the 
power  of  life  and  death,  salvation  and  perdition,  to  give  dignity 
and  efficacy  to  the  office. 

This  view  of  the  ministry  is  so  remote  from  that  contained  in 
the  New  Testament,  and  so  far  from  naturally  springing  out  of 
the  idea  of  a  ministry,  that  it  might  well  appear  inexplicable,  were 
it  not  clear  that  the  author,  in  thus  judging,  has  constantly  before 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  355 

him  a  standard  of  comparison  afforded  by  another  ministry, — that 
of  the  Old  Testament,  the  Levitical  priesthood.  It  is  not  only 
implied  but  expressed  in  his  reasonings,  that  such  a  power  of  absolu- 
tion as  he  claims  is  needed  to  put  the  Christian  ministry  upon  a  level 
with  the  Jewish.  Hence  his  argument  may  be  more  specifically 
stated  in  this  form,  that  the  Christian  ministry  is  a  priesthood,  and 
must  therefore  have  this  power,  without  which  it  cannot  be  a 
priesthood,  nor  compete  in  point  of  dignity  and  efficacy  with  that 
of  the  Mosaic  law.  The  premises  in  this  ratiocination  are  inva- 
riably assumed  as  too  unquestionable  to  require  or  admit  of  proof. 
Combining  this  argument,  founded  on  the  nature  of  the  ministerial 
office,  with  that  derived  from  the  express  declarations  of  the  scrip- 
ture, we  may  thus  reduce  them  to  a  single  proposition :  the  scrip- 
tures (in  the  passages  already  quoted)  recognise  the  power  of 
efficacious  absolution  as  a  sacerdotal  function  of  the  Christian 
ministry. 

Having  thus  established  his  main  doctrine  by  an  appeal  both  to 
tradition  and  to  scripture,  and  in  the  latter  both  directly  from  express 
declarations,  and  indirectly  from  the  nature  of  the  ministerial  office, 
he  proceeds  to  consider  the  objections  which  may  be  alleged 
against  the  doctrine.  Of  these  he  enumerates  three,  which  he  is 
pleased  to  call  "  popular  objections."  The  first  is,,  that  the  doctrine 
is  unscriptural ;  the  second,  that  it  is  dishonouring  to  God,  as  an 
encroachment  upon  his  prerogative ;  the  third,  that  it  is  practically 
incompatible  with  human  fallibility  and  weakness. 

The  first  objection  he  disposes  of  by  saying  that  it  cannot  be 
discussed  apart  from  the  other  two ;  such  is  their  mutual  depen- 
dence that  they  must  stand  or  fall  together  ;  if  the  doctrine  is  scrip- 
tural, it  cannot  be  either  unworthy  of  God  or  impossible  to  man  ; 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  either  of  these  allegations  is  well  founded,  it 
cannot  be  scriptural.  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  inconsistency  of 
this  opinion  of  the  word  of  God  cannot  be  urged  as  a  specific 
objection  against  it,  simply  because  it  involves  the  whole  matter  in 
dispute,  and  either  includes  all  other  objectionsror  renders  them 
unnecessary.  To  say  that  it  is  contrary  to  scripture  is  to  say  that 
it  is  false,  which  cannot  of  course  be  urged  as  a  separate  argument 
to  prove  it  false.  It  was  not,  however,  altogether  fair  in  Mr.  Curtis 
to  present  this  as  a  sample  of  the  objections  urged  against  his  doc- 
trine, and  of  the  ease  with  which  he  can  dispose  of  them.  We 
may  let  him  try  his  hand  upon  some  others  by  and  by ;  but  in  the 
meantime  we  are  willing  to  make  this  stipulation,  that  if  the  doc- 
trine can  be  proved  from  scripture,  the  other  two  objections  shall 
go  for  nothing,  but  if  not,  its  interference  with  the  divine  preroga- 
tive and  its  incompatibility  with  human  weakness,  shall  be  held  to 
aggravate  its  false  pretensions  and  to  give  it  a  character  of  moral ' 
as  well  as  intellectual  obliquity. 

The  authors  answer  to  the  second  and  third  of  these  "  popular 
objections  "  is,  that  they  are  founded  on  a  misconception  of  his 
doctrine,  as  asserting  an  original,  inherent  power,  in  the  ministry, 


356  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

whereas  it  asserts  only  a  derivative  and  delegated  power,  or  a  spe- 
cial human  agency  and  mediation,  constituted  by  divine  appoint- 
ment, in  accordance  with  the  general  analogy  of  God's  dispensa- 
tions, which  the  author  illustrates  by  a  great  variety  of  scripture 
instances.  Among  these  are  the  communication  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
to  Joshua  by  the  imposition  of  the  hands  of  Moses ;  the  necessity 
of  circumcision  and  sacrifices  under  the  Old  Testament ;  the  mis- 
sion of  Peter  and  John  to  "  confirm  "  the  Samaritan  converts  after 
Philip  had  baptized  them ;  the  washing  away  of  Paul's  sins  by  his 
baptism  at  the  hands  of  Ananias ;  the  cure  of  Naaman  the  Syrian 
by  washing  in  the  Jordan ;  the  forgiveness  of  sins  at  the  interces- 
sion of  Abraham  and  Hezekiah ;  Christ's  promise  to  be  present 
whenever  two  or  three  of  his  apostles  were  assembled ;  and  the 
promise  of  healing  to  the  sick,  as  an  effect  of  prayer  and  unction 
by  the  elders  of  the  church. 

These  cases  are  adduced  to  prove  not  merely  that  God  uses 
human  agency  in  cases  where  he  might  dispense  with  it,  but  also 
that  he  thus  employs  a  special  "  mediation,"  as  the  preacher  calls 
it,  where  we  should  least  expect  it,  and  where  reason  can  afford 
no  explanation  of  it.  This  proposition  there  was  no  need  of  prov- 
ing, since  nobody  disputes  it.  What  the  author  ought  to  have 
established  is  not  the  general  fact  that  God  does  specially  appoint 
certain  media  or  channels  for  the  communication  of  his  grace,  but 
the  specific  fact,  that  the  ministry  is  so  appointed  for  the  purpose 
of  communicating  pardon  to  sinners.  He  seems  to  have  been 
conscious  of  his  inability  to  do  this,  and  has  consequently  confused 
the  subject  by  recurring  to  Bingham's  fourfold  division,  and  arrang- 
ing the  scriptural  examples  just  referred  to,  under  those  heads  ;  a 
course  which  answers  very  well  until  he  comes  to  judicial  absolu- 
tion, where,  instead  of  citing  even  one  case,  he  contents  himself 
with  telling  what  the  power  is,  and  asserting  that  it  must  be  in  the 
ministry,  and  showing  its  tremendous  consequences.  This  we 
regard  as  a  tacit  but  significant  concession  of  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  recorded  instance  of  the  actual  exercise  of  the  power  which  the 
author  claims  for  Christian  ministers. 

We  believe  we  have  now  noticed  all  the  author's  arguments,  ex- 
cept those  by  which  he  undertakes  to  show  that  the  power  of  re- 
mission granted  by  our  Saviour  was  not  an  extraordinary  or  tem- 
porary one.  These  it  will  be  sufficient  to  have  named,  as  we 
have  no  intention  to  assume  that  ground  of  opposition  to  the  doc- 
trine. We  may  say,  however,  that  to  us  the  author's  account  of 
the  miraculous  powers  of  the  first  Christian  ministers  does  not 
appear  consistent  with  itself,  since  he  sometimes  speaks  of  them  as 
being  merely  higher  degrees  of  the  same  power  which  the  ministry 
now  exercises,  and  sometimes  as  so  totally  distinct  that  their  coin- 
cidence was  wholly  fortuitous. 

Having  seen  how  triumphantly  the  author  disposes  of  the  "  popu- 
lar objections"  to  his  doctrine,  we  are  sorry  to  be  under  the  neces- 
sity of  bringing  forward  a  few  others  which  he  has  overlooked, 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  357 

either  because  he  never  heard  of  them,  or  because  lie  regarded 
them  as  too  unpopular.  In  doing  this  we  waive  entirely  the  three 
objections  which  he  has  discussed,  until  the  others  are  disposed  of, 
and  agree  that  if  the  latter  are  untenable  the  former  may  be 
thrown  away,  provided  always,  that  in  case  of  a  contrary  result, 
our  argument  shall  have  the  benefit  of  these  subsidiary  reasons  to 
corroborate  and  perfect  it. 

In  order  to  preclude  misapprehension,  let  us  state  again  the  doc- 
trine which  we  understand  the  author  to„  maintain,  viz.,  that  the 
scriptures  recognise  a  power  of  authoritative  efficacious  absolution 
or  forgiveness  of  sins,  as  an  essential  function  of  the  Christian 
priesthood. 

I.  Our  first  objection  to  this  doctrine  is,  that  the  power  contended 
for  is  not  a  sacerdotal  power  at  all.  We  prove  it,  first,  by  the 
scriptural  definition  of  a  priest,  as  one  "  ordained  for  men  in  things 
pertaining  to  God,  that  he  may  offer  both  gifts  and  sacrifices  for 
sin." — Heb.  v.  1.  This  includes  mediation  and  atonement,  but  not 
absolution  or  forgiveness.  We  prove  it,  next,  from  the  Levitical 
practice.  The  Old  Testament  priests  did  not  forgive  sin,  they 
simply  made  atonement  for  it.  We  prove  it,  thirdly,  from  the 
priesthood  of  Christ,  who  is  nowhere  represented  as  forgiving  sin 
in  his  sacerdotal  character.  We  prove  it,  lastly,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case.  The  two  functions  of  atonement  and  forgiveness  are 
not  only  distinct,  but,  in  a  certain  sense,  incompatible.  Christ  him- 
self acts  as  Lord  when  he  forgives.  Pardon  is  always  an  exercise 
of  sovereignty,  inherent  or  derivative.  Upon  these  four  reasons, 
drawn  from  the  definition  of  a  priest,  the  Levitical  practice,  the 
priesthood  of  Christ,  and  the  very  nature  of  the  power  claimed, 
we  rest  our  first  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  "  sacerdotal  absolu- 
tion," viz.,  that  it  is  not  a  sacerdotal  function. 

II.  Our  second  objection  to  the  doctrine  is,  that  the  Christian 
ministry  is  not  a  priesthood. 

1.  They  are  not  priests,  first,  because  they  are  never  so  de- 
scribed in  scripture,  as  they  must  have  been  if  this  were  their  true 
character,  the  rather  as  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  had 
never  known  a  religion,  true  or  false,  without  a  priesthood,  were 
perfectly  familiar  with  the  names  and  functions  of  the  Jewish 
hierarchy,  and  had  the  most  exalted  notions  of  the  Christian  minis- 
try, as  the  most  honourable  office  in  the  world,  for  which  no  man 
is  sufficient,  and  of  which  no  man  is  worthy.  That  the  name 
should  never  be  applied  is  wholly  inexplicable  on  the  supposition 
of  a  Christian  priesthood.  The  solitary  figurative  phrase  which 
is  alleged  in  opposition  to  this  statement,*  and  in  which  the  official 
title  is  not  used,  but  only  a  derivative  or  cognate  verb,  can  no  more 
prove  that  Paul  was  a  literal  priest,  than  it  can  prove  that  the  Gen- 

*  "  That  I  should  be  the  minister  of  Jesus  Christ  to  the  Gentiles,  ministering 
(Upovpyovrra)  the  Gospel  of  God,  that  the  offering  up  (*po?$apa)  of  the  Gentiles  might 
be  acceptable,"  &c. — Rom.  xv.  16, 


358  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

tiles  were  a  literal  sacrifice,  or  that  the  parallel  passages  in  Phi- 
lippians  and  Timothy*  can  prove  that  Paul  was  a  literal  libation. 

2.  They  are  not  priests,  secondly,  because  no  priestly  function 
is  ascribed  to  them.  The  essential  functions  of  a  priesthood,  as 
appears  from  the  inspired  definition  above  quoted,  from  the  Leviti- 
cal  practice,  and  from  the  analogy  of  Christ's  sacerdotal  office,  are 
mediation  and  atonement ;  exclusive  mediation  between  parties 
who  are  otherwise  mutually  inaccessible,  and  real  atonement  by 
the  presentation  of  an  expiatory  sacrifice.  Such  mediation  and 
such  atonement  the  New  Testament  never  ascribes  to  Christian 
ministers.  To  assert  that  the  essential  function  of  a  priesthood 
is  "  ministerial  intervention  for  the  pardon  of  sin,"  is  either  saying 
nothing  that  is  definite  and  to  the  purpose,  or  saying  too  much,  to 
wit,  that  women  and  laymen  who  baptize  for  the  remission  of  sins, 
and  all  who  teach  men  how  to  obtain  pardon,  are,  by  reason  of 
this  ministerial  intervention,  ipso  facto  priests  ;  or  it  is  saying  in 
ambiguous  and  doubtful  terms  what  we  have  just  said  plainly,  to 
wit,  that  the  very  idea  of  a  priest  involves  that  of  exclusive  and 
necessary  mediation,  a  kind  of  "  ministerial  intervention"  of  which 
the  New  Testament  knows  nothing. 

3.  They  are  not  priests,  thirdly,  because  the  scriptures  repre- 
sent Christ  as  the  only  priest  of  his  people,  who  by  the  one  offering 
up  of  himself  has  perfectly  and  for  ever  answered  all  the  ends  of 
the  old  priesthood.  Having  then  such  a  High  Priest,  Jesus  the 
Son  of  God,  we  may  come  with  boldness  to  the  throne  of  grace. 
And  he  not  only  has  performed  the  work  of  a  priest,  but  he  is  ever 
present  in  that  character.  There  were  many  priests  of  old,  be- 
cause they  could  not  continue  by  reason  of  death  ;  but  Christ  is  a 
perpetual  priest  because  he  ever  lives.  They  had  successors  be- 
cause they  were  mortal  men.  He  has  no  successor  because  he  is 
partaker  of  an  endless  life.  The  apostle  argues  that  if  Christ  were 
on  earth  he  could  not  be  a  priest,  that  is,  a  priest  of  the  old  cove- 
nant, because  the  office  was  preoccupied  by  others,  whose  priest- 
hood must  either  supersede  his  or  be  superseded  by  it.  If,  then, 
there  could  not  be  two  priesthoods  under  the  old  covenant,  neither 
can  there  be  two  priesthoods  under  the  new.  If  his  priesthood, 
then,  was  incompatible  with  that  of  others,  that  of  others  must  now 
be  incompatible  with  his.  It  follows,  therefore,  either  that  the 
Christian  ministry  is  not  a  priesthood,  or  that  Christ  is  net  the 
great  High  Priest  of  our  profession. 

4.  They  are  not  priests  under-  Christ,  and  in  a  sense  compatible 
with  his  high-priesthood,  as  the  priests  of  old  were,  because  these 
were  types  of  Christ,  as  a  high  priest  yet  to  come  and  only  par- 
tially revealed,  whereas  now  the  revelation  is  complete,  and  Christ 
is  not  only  come  but  is  still  present ;  so  that  the  supposition  of  a 
continued  priesthood  now,  confounds  the  old  with  the  new  cove- 

*  "  Yea  and  if  I  be  offered  (oirivSopai)  upon  the  sacrifice  and  service  of  your  faith." 
Phil.  ii.  17.     "  For  I  am  now  ready  to  be  offered  (Wij  oitiv&ojiai)" — 2  Tim.  iv.  6. 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  359 

nant,  the  future  with  the  past,  and  makes  the  type  as  necessary 
after  as  before  the  appearance  of  the  antitype,  which  is  absurd.  It 
might  as  well  be  said  that  there  must  still  be  John  the  Baptists  to 
be  Christ's  forerunners,  or  that  the  dawn  of  day  can  be  continued 
after  the  rising  of  the  sun.  It  is  no  reply,  then,  to  the  foregoing 
argument  derived  from  Christ's  exclusive  priesthood,  to  allege  that 
there  can  just  as  well  be  priests  now  as  before  his  advent,  since 
his  advent  is  the  very  thing  which  has  removed  the  necessity  or 
rather  destroyed  the  possibility  of  any  priesthood  but  the  highest. 
For  the  very  reason  that  before  Christ  came  there  was  a  priest- 
hood to  prefigure  him  and  represent  him,  it  follows  that  there  can- 
not be  a  priesthood  now  when  there  is  nothing  to  prefigure,  and 
when  the  object  represented  is,  and  for  ever  will  be,  personally 
present. 

5.  They  are  not  priests,  in  the  sense  contended  for,  and  as  suc- 
cessors to  the  ancient  priests,  because  the  functions  claimed  for 
Christian  ministers-  are  wholly  different  from  those  of  the  Levitical 
priesthood,  whose  sacerdotal  acts  were  not  designed  to  secure  the 
pardon  of  sin  in  the  sight  of  God,  it  being  impossible  that  the  blood 
of  bulls  and  of  goats  should  take  away  sin,  but  had  relation  to  the 
external  theocracy,  and  were  intended  to  secure  the  remission  of 
its  penalties,  and  the  restoration  of  the  offender  to  its  privileges, 
so  that  they  might  have  their  full  effect  and  yet  leave  the  relation 
of  the  offerer  to  God  entirely  unchanged.  The  way  in  which 
these  ends  were  answered  was  indeed  designed  to  typify  the  me- 
thod of  atonement,  but  so  was  the  lifting  up  of  the  serpent  in  the 
wilderness,  the  slaying  of  the  passover,  and  other  rites  which  had 
not  the  nature  of  sin-offerings.  If,  then,  Christian  ministers  are 
indeed  the  successors  of  the  ancient  priesthood,  they  should  claim 
no  more  than  the  power  to-  secure  ecclesiastical  remissions  and 
advantages  ;  whereas  the  advocates  of  this  succession  claim  to  do, 
not  what  the  ancient  priests  did,  but  the  very  thing  which  Christ 
does,  and  are,  therefore,  at  the  same  time,  perverters  of  the  priest- 
hood of  Aaron  and  usurpers  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ. 

6.  They  are  not  priests  in  the  sense  of  human  mediators  specially 
appointed  to  bring  men  to  Christ,  as  Christ  brings  men  to  God,  be- 
cause the  scriptures,  while  they  constantly  and  clearly  teach  that  we 
must  come  to  God  through  the  mediation  of  Christ,  teach  no  less  con- 
stantly and  clearly  that  we  may  come  to  Christ  without  any  media- 
tion at  all.  This  distinction  cannot  be  unmeaning  or  fortuitous,  and 
is  itself  decisive  of  the  question.  The  argument,  however,  is  not 
merely  negative  but  positive.  Not  only  are  the  scriptures  silent  as  to 
the  necessity  of  any  such  "  ministerial  intervention,"  as  a  means  of 
access  to  the  benefits  of  Christ's  death,  but  they  hold  forth  the  free- 
ncss  of  immediate  access  to  the  Saviour  without  any  intervention, 
as  one  of  the  great  distinctive  doctrines  of  the  Gospel.  To  cite  the 
proofs  of  this  position  in  detail,  would  be  to  quote  all  those  scriptures 
in  which  Christ  is  represented  as  having  died  for  the  very  purpose 
of  bringing  us  to  God,  and  as  being  the  only  mediator  between 


360  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

God  and  man.  That  another  mediation  is  required  to  make  this 
mediation  available,  is  a  priori  so  improbable,  and  so  destructive 
of  the  very  end  for  which  the  greater  mediation  is  expressly  said 
to  be  intended,  namely,  direct  and  free  access  to  God,  that  it  can- 
not be  rendered  even  credible,  much  less  proved  true,  by  anything 
short  of  explicit  declarations  of  the  word  of  God,  which  are  not 
only  altogether  wanting,  but  in  place  of'  which  we  have  innumera- 
ble invitations  and  commands  to  come  at  once  to  Christ.  In  the 
face  of  all  this  to  assert,  as  a  point  of  Gospel  doctrine,  that  no  one 
comes  to  Christ  but  through  his  ministers,  seems  as  extravagant  as 
it  would  be  to  assert,  as  a  fact  of  Gospel  history,  that  Christ  never 
wrought  a  miracle  of  healing  until  his  followers  had  wrought  one 
first.  Alas,  how  many  who  have  tried  the  effect  of  "  ministerial  inter- 
vention" for  themselves  or  others,  might  say  with  the  father  of  the 
lunatic,  "  I  brought  him  to  thy  disciples  and  they  could  not  cure 
him  !"  And  the  terms,  if  not  the  meaning,  of  our  Lord's  reprov- 
ing answer  would  be  equally  appropriate,  "  O  faithless  and  per- 
verse generation,  how  long  shall  I  be  with  you  1  how  long  shall  I 
suffer  you  ?  bring  him  hither  to  me."  The  parallel  must  not  in- 
deed be  carried  further ;  for  the  reason  why  the  Christian  priest- 
hood cannot  forgive  sin  is  not  the  want  of  faith,  but  of  authority 
and  power.  Let  the  illustration  serve,  however,  to  throw  light 
upon  the  contrast  between  pardon  as  obtained  by  "  ministerial  in- 
tervention," and  pardon  as  immediately  bestowed  by  Christ.  Un- 
less the  offers  of  the  Gospel  are  entirely  unmeaning,  the  Christian 
ministry  is  not,  in  this  or  any  other  sense,  a  priesthood. 

7.  They  are  not  priests,  finally,  because  the  scriptures  declare 
them  to  be  something  altogether  different.  The  simple  fact  that 
they  are  not  described  as  priests,  would  be  sufficient  of  itself,  even 
if  no  description  had  been  given  of  their  true  official  character ; 
but  the  conclusion  is  immeasurably  strengthened  by  the  frequent 
and  uniform  representation  of  the  ministry  as  messengers,  heralds 
of  salvation,  teachers,  watchmen,  rulers,  overseers,  shepherds. 
"  Simon,  son  of  Jonas,  lovest  thou  me  ?  Feed  my  sheep."  "  Si- 
mon, son  of  Jonas,  lovest  thou  me  ?  Feed  my  lambs."  "  Christ 
sent  me  not  to  baptize,  but  to  preach  the  Gospel."  "  Who  is  Paul, 
and  who  is  Apollos,  but  ministers,  by  whom  ye  believed,  even  as 
the  Lord  gave  to  every  man  ?"  "  So  then  neither  is  he  that  plant- 
eth  anything,  neither  he  that  watereth,  but  God  that  giveth  the  in- 
crease." "  Let  a  man  so  account  of  us  as  ministers  of  Christ,  and 
stewards  of  the  mysteries  of  God  (i.  e.,  dispensers  of  divine  truth"). 
"  We  preach  not  ourselves,  but  Jesus  Christ  the  Lord,  and  our- 
selves your  servants  for  Jesus'  sake."  Not  only  is  all  this  no  de- 
scription of  a  priesthood ;  but  that  an  office  thus  described,  again 
and  again,  and  in  every  variety  of  metaphorical  and  literal  expres- 
sion, should  be  after  all  a  priesthood,  is,  if  not  impossible,  beyond 
belief.  And  we  are  not  surprised  that  most  of  those  who  hold  the 
doctrine,  found  it  not  on  scripture,  but  tradition,  or,  in  other  words, 
believe  that  Christian  ministers  are  priests,  because  they  say  so. 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  361 

On  all  these  grounds,  then,  that  the  scriptures  nowhere  give  the 
name  of  priest,  or  ascribe  any  sacerdotal  function  to  the  ministry ; 
that  Christ  is  represented  as  the  one  only  priest  of  the  new  cove- 
nant, of  whom  the  ancient  priests  were  types,  no  longer  needed  or 
admissible ;  that  the  functions  of  these  ancient  priests  were  wholly 
different  from  those  now  exercised  or  claimed  by  Christian  minis- 
ters ;  that  any  mediation  between  Christ  and  sinners  is  not  only 
unknown,  but  directly  contradictory  to  scripture ;  and  that  the  mi- 
nistry is  there  represented  under  characters  the  most  remote  from 
that  of  priests,  if  not  wholly  inconsistent  with  it ;  we  are  justified 
in  urging,  as  a  second  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  Sacerdotal  Ab- 
solution, that  the  Christian  ministry  is  not  a  priesthood. 

III.  Our  third  objection  is,  that  the  grant  of  the  power  of  remis- 
sion was  not  made  to  the  ministry.  We  find  the  grant  in  the  same 
three  passages  to  which  Mr.  Curtis  has  appealed,  and  we  agree 
with  him  in  thinking  that  they  all  express  the  same  idea  under  dif- 
ferent forms.  But  we  differ  from  him  as  to  the  persons  to  whom 
the  grant  of  power  is  addressed.  This  is  often  a  difficult  question 
to  determine  in  our  Lord's  addresses,  as  the  word  disciples,  which 
is  generally  used,  has  both  a  narrower  and  a  wider  meaning,  some- 
times denoting  all  Christ's  followers,  and  sometimes  the  apostles 
only,  so  that  the  objects  of  address  can  often  be  determined  only 
by  the  context  and  the  analogy  of  scripture.  In  the  case  before 
us,  the  parallel  passages  must  of  course  be  suffered  to  explain  each 
other,  not  only  in  relation  to  the  nature  of  the  grant,  but  also  to 
the  persons  upon  whom  it  was  bestowed.  The  one  recorded  in 
the  sixteenth  of  Matthew,  taken  by  itself,  would  seem  to  show  that 
the  power  in  question  was  conferred  on  Peter  and  his  personal 
successors ;  but  this  conclusion  is  rejected  equally  by  Mr.  Curtis 
and  ourselves,  not  only  on  the  ground  that  such  pre-eminence  is 
nowhere  else  ascribed  to  Peter,  and  that  no  such  peculiar  power 
was  ever  claimed  or  exercised  by  him  ;  but  also  on  the  ground  that 
in  the  eighteenth  of  Matthew  a  like  grant  is  made  to  the  "  disci- 
ples" generally.  And  that  this  does  not  mean  the  apostles  merely, 
we  infer  from  a  comparison  of  John  xx.  23  with  Luke  xxiv.  33, 
which  shows  that  our  Lord's  words  recorded  in  the  former  place, 
were  addressed  to  "  the  eleven  and  them  that  were  with  them." 
This  is  our  first  reason  for  believing  that  the  power  of  remission 
granted  by  our  Saviour  was  not  granted  to  the  apostles  or  to  mi- 
nisters exclusively,  but  to  disciples  or  believers  generally. 

2.  A  second  reason  for  this  same  conclusion  may  be  drawn  from 
the  connexion  in  which  the  words  appealed  to  stand  in  the  eight- 
eenth chapter  of  Matthew,  which  contains  one  continuous  discourse, 
all  the  parts  of  which  are  intimately  connected.  Our  Lord  first 
teaches  the  necessity  of  conversion  in  order  to  enter  the  kingdom 
of  heaven ;  then  the  sin  of  offending  those  who  believe  on  him ; 
then  the  method  of  dealing  with  offenders,  first  in  private,  then  be- 
fore two  or  three  witnesses,  and  then  before  the  church ;  which  is 
followed  directly  by  the  assurance  that  their  decisions  would  be 


362  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  . 

ratified  in  heaven,  an  assurance  founded  on  the  promise  that  where 
two  or  three  are  gathered  together  in  the  Saviour's  name,  he  is  in 
the  midst  of  them.  Peter  then  asked  how  often  they  were  to  for- 
give private  and  personal  offences,  to  which  Christ  replies,  that 
there  can  be  no  limit  to  the  duty  of  forgiveness ;  and  then  shows 
by  a  parable  the  obligation  resting  upon  those  whom  God  had  for- 
given to  forgive  their  brethren.  Now,  to  make  any  one  part  of  this 
conversation  have  respect  to  the  apostles,  while  the  rest  relates  to 
Christians  generally,  is  altogether  arbitrary,  and  may  as  easily  be 
denied  as  affirmed.  Unless  the  necessity  of  conversion,  the  duty 
of  avoiding  offences,  and  of  private  dealing  with  offenders,  are 
all  peculiar  to  the  apostles,  why  should  the  promise  of  Christ's  pre- 
sence, and  of  ratification  to  the  judgment  passed,  be  limited  to  them  ? 
The  command  is  to  "  tell  it  to  the  church,"  and  the  promise  must 
be  likewise  to  the  church.  That  the  formal  exercise  of  the  power 
granted  is  to  be  by  officers,  may  be  true  enough  ;  but  this  much  is 
plain,  that  whatever  power  is  here  bestowed,  is  not  bestowed  upon 
the  ministry,  but  on  the  church. 

3.  A  third  reason  for  denying  that  the  power  of  remission  is 
granted  to  the  ministry  exclusively,  may  be  derived  from  the  con- 
nexion which  the  scriptures  recognise,  and  which  all  interpreters 
indeed  admit,  between  this  power  and  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 
We  learn  from  the  New  Testament  that  to  every  man  was  given 
the  manifestation  of  the  Spirit,  to  one  the  word  of  wisdom,  to  ano- 
ther the  word  of  knowledge,  to  another  faith,  to  another  the  gifts 
of  healing,  to  another  the  working  of  miracles,  to  another  prophe- 
cy, to  another  the  discerning  of  spirits,  to  another  the  gift  of  tongues, 
to  another  the  interpretation  of  tongues.  All  these  wrought  the 
self-same  Spirit,  dividing  to  every  man  severally  as  he  would.  The 
Spirit  descended  not  only  on  apostles,  not  only  on  Jews,  but  on 
Gentiles,  as  when  Peter  preached  in  the  house  of  Cornelius.  Even 
the  power  to  confer  miraculous  gifts  was  not  peculiar  to  the  apos- 
tles, as  we  learn  from  the  case  of  Ananias,  by  whose  agency  such 
gifts  were  bestowed  on  Paul  himself.  Still  less  reason  is  there  for 
assuming  that  the  ordinary  and  abiding  presence  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
is  confined  to  the  rulers  of  the  church.  They  who  claim  it  must 
either  adduce  a  special  promise,  or  show  that  a  general  promise  is 
fulfilled  in  them  alone,  by  proving  their  exclusive  possession  of  those 
"  fruits  of  the  Spirit "  by  which  alone  the  presence  of  the  Spirit 
can  be  known.  If  the  power  of  remission  now  in  question  is  con- 
nected with  the  gift  of  the  Spirit,  and  arises  from  his  presence, 
then  the  power  must  belong  to  all  those  in  whom  the  Spirit  dwells, 
or  in  other  words,  it  does  not  belong  to  the  ministry,  as  such,  but 
to  the  church  at  large. 

4.  The  same  thing  may  be  argued  from  the  practice  of  the  apos- 
tolic age,  so  far  as  it  is  left  on  record.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find 
no  case  where  a  power  of  remission  is  said  to  have  been  exercised 
by  the  apostles,  or  by  other  ministers,  suo  jure.  We  never  read 
of  men  confessing  their  sins  to  them  and  receiving  absolution  or 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  363 

forgiveness  at  their  hands.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  unambi- 
guous traces  of  a  power  residing  in  the  church  collectively  to  judge 
its  members  and  to  try  the  spirits  even  of  those  who  taught  and 
governed  it.  These  negative  and  positive  considerations,  though 
they  may  not  be  sufficient  to  establish  a  disputed  fact,  strongly  cor- 
roborate the  inference  already  drawn  from  the  terms  and  context 
of  the  passages  in  which  the  power  is  granted,  and  from  its  con- 
nexion with  the  gift  and  promise  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  that  the  power 
of  remitting  sins,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  not  a  peculiar  function  of 
the  Christian  ministry. 

IV.  Our  fourth  objection  to  the  doctrine  is,  tfiat  the  power  of  ab- 
solute effectual  forgiveness  is  not  bestowed  at  all.  1.  The  admit- 
ted fact,  that  pardon  is  an  act  of  sovereignty,  and  that  none  can, 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  forgive,  except  the  person  against 
whom  the  offence  is  committed,  cannot,  as  we  have  already  con- 
ceded, be  alleged  in  opposition  to  an  express  delegation  of  the 
power,  or  a  special  designation  of  the  ministry  as  the  only  medium 
through  which  it  will  be  exercised.  But  does  it  not  create  a  strong 
presumption  against  the  fact  of  such  delegation  and  appointment, 
and  enhance  the  necessity  of  positive  explicit  proof,  in  order  to  es- 
tablish it  ?  In  this  sense  only  do  we  here  adduce  one  of  Mr.  Cur- 
tis's  three  "  popular  objections,"  not  to  disprove  his  doctrine,  but 
to  show  how  indispensable,  and  yet  how  hard  it  is  for  him  to  prove 
it.  And  this  presumption,  far  from  being  weakened,  is  corroborat- 
ed by  the  analogies  of  other  special  agencies  or  mediations,  which 
he  cites,  but  which,  as  we  have  seen,  including  instances  of  every 
other  "  mediation  "  but  the  one  in  question,  raise  the  presumption 
almost  to  a  certainty,  that  this  awful  prerogative  of  the  divine  sove- 
reignty, if  not  incommunicable  in  its  nature,  has  at  least  never  been 
communicated  to  mere  creatures. 

2.  Even  supposing  that  our  Saviour's  words  apparently  admitted 
of  no  other  explanation  than  the  one  assumed  in  the  adverse  argu- 
ment, the  consideration  just  presented  would  require  us  to  seek  ano- 
ther sense  before  we  acquiesced  in  one  so  much  at  variance  with 
all  our  preconceptions  of  the  nature  of  the  pardoning  power,  and 
its  relation  to  the  sovereignty  of  God.  In  point  of  fact,  however, 
this  is  not  the  only  sense  which  our  Lord's  expressions  naturally 
bear.  It  is  only  by  insulating  this  one  declaration  that  such  an  ex- 
position of  it  seems  to  become  necessary.  That  the  power  to  remit 
sins  may  mean  something  less  than  the  power  absolutely  and  au- 
thoritatively to  pardon  them,  is  conceded  by  Mr.  Curtis  and  "  the 
learned  Bingham,"  when  they  speak  of  declarative  and  precatory 
absolution  as  included  in  this  grant.  If  a  declaration  of  the  terms 
of  pardon,  and  if  prayer  for  pardon,  are  a  part  of  the  meaning  of 
"  remission,"  there  is  no  absurdity,  although  there  may  be  error,  in 
assuming  these  to  be  the  whole.  If  our  Saviour's  declaration  con- 
veys to  those  whom  he  addressed  the  power  of  absolution,  and  if 
absolution  means  (as  Bingham  says  it  means)  declarative  and  pre- 
catory absolution,  and  if  we  are  satisfied  with  this  sense,  and  refuse 


364  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

to  look  for  any  other,  how  does  Mr.  Curtis  convince  us  of  our  error? 
By  adducing  arguments  from  other  quarters,  from  the  nature  of  the 
ministry,  the  Jewish  priesthood,  and  the  analogy  of  God's  dispen- 
sations ;  not  by  insisting  that  the  words  themselves  can  only  mean 
authoritative  efficacious  absolution,  which  would  be  directly  con- 
tradictory to  what  he  says  about  the  other  and  inferior  kinds. 
What  we  allege  is,  not  that  the  words  cannot  mean  forgiveness  in 
the  highest  sense,  but  that  they  need  not  be  so  understood,  if  any 
good  cause  can  be  shown  for  giving  them  another  explanation. 

3.  It  is  plain  from  the  connexion  in  which  these  words  of  Christ 
are  found,  that  the  power  bestowed  is  twofold,  that  of  authoritative 
teaching  and  that  of  authoritative  judgment.  By  virtue  of  the  for- 
mer, the  church  was  to  act  as  a  witness  of  the  truth,  that  is,  simply 
to  proclaim  the  doctrines  which  she  had  received  from  Christ ;  by 
virtue  of  the  latter,  to  apply  these  doctrines  to  the  case  of  indivi- 
duals, to  bind  and  loose,  to  open  and  shut,  to  receive  into  the  church 
and  to  exclude  from  it.  In  the  discharge  of  both  these  functions 
she  was  to  be  under  the  control  and  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
as  well  as  regulated  by  the  written  word,  so  that  nothing  at  vari- 
ance with  this  standard  should  be  received  even  upon  her  authori- 
ty. This  intimate  connexion  between  the  powers  of  teaching  and 
of  judgment,  and  the  common  dependence  of  both  upon  the  Spirit 
and  the  word  of  God,  make  it  the  more  improbable  that  the  one 
was  designed  to  be  more  authoritative  or  effectual  than  the  other, 
and  furnish  a  strong  reason  for  believing  that  the  power  of  remis- 
sion which  Christ  gave  to  his  disciples  was  power  to  declare  the 
conditions  on  which  God  would  pardon  sin,  and,  in  accordance  with 
this  declaration,  to  receive  or  exclude  men  from  communion. 

4.  This  conclusion  is  confirmed  by  the  actual  practice  of  the 
apostolic  church.  The  sense  in  which  Christ's  words  were  under- 
stood by  his  disciples,  is  determined  by  the  way  in  which  they  acted 
on  them.  If  they  believed  themselves  to  be  invested,  either  indi- 
vidually or  collectively,  with  power  absolutely  to  forgive  sins,  as 
the  only  appointed  channels  of  communication  between  the  souls 
of  sinners  and  the  mercy  of  God  or  the  merits  of  Christ,  we  might 
expect  to  find  them  claiming  this  authority  in  words,  or  at  least 
exerting  it  in  act.  Instead  of  this,  we  find  them  simply  preaching 
the  doctrine  of  repentance  for  the  remission  of  sins.  The  constant 
burden  of  their  preaching  is,  that  faith  in  Christ  is  of  itself  sufficient 
to  secure  forgiveness,  not  at  the  hands  of  men,  as  "  mediating 
agents,"  or  in  any  other  character,  but  at  the  hands  of  God,  to 
whom  the  power  and  the  act  of  pardon  are  always  and  immedi- 
ately ascribed.  That  a  power,  which  is  now  claimed  as  essential 
to  the  dignity  and  value  of  a  ministry,  as  well  as  one  expressly 
granted  by  the  Saviour,  should  be  thus  omitted,  both  in  word  and 
deed,  by  those  who  first  received  it,  or  at  least  by  the  inspired  his- 
torians of  the  acts  of  the  apostles,  is  to  us  inexplicable,  nay  incre- 
dible, and  added  to  the  previous  considerations,  seems  to  show  that 
Christ's  words,  in  the  passages  appealed  to,  not  only  may  but  must 


SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION.  365 

refer  to  something  very  different.  On  these  grounds,  therefore,  we 
would  rest  our  fourth  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  Sacerdotal  Ab- 
solution, viz.,  that  no  such  power  as  the  one  contended  for  has  ever 
been  conferred  by  Christ  at  all. 

V.  Our  fifth  objection  to  the  doctrine  is  that,  as  a  theory,  it  is 
part  and  parcel  of  a  system  of  falsehood,  from  which  it  cannot  be 
detached  without  gross  inconsistency  and  arbitrary  violence. 
Among  the  unscriptural  and  dangerous  doctrines  which  it  presup- 
poses, or  to  which  it  leads,  is  the  doctrine  that  the  apostles  were 
the  original  recipients  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  whom  they  alone  had  the 
power  to  communicate  by  the  imposition  of  hands  ;  that  they  trans- 
mitted this  power  to  their  episcopal  successors ;  that  in  every  ordi- 
nation by  a  bishop,  sanctifying  grace  and  supernatural  power  are 
imparted;  that  all  who  are  thus  ordained  priests  have  power  to 
make  the  sacraments  effectual  means  of  communicating  the  bene- 
fits of  redemption,  the  power,  as  even  Protestants  express  it,  of 
making  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ;  that  in  the  eucharist  the  sa- 
crifice of  Christ  is  really  repeated,  or  at  least  so  commemorated  as 
to  secure  the  pardon  of  sin  ;  that  it  is  only  by  participation  in  the 
sacraments,  thus  administered,  that  men  can  be  sanctified  or  saved. 
With  the  priestly  power  to  forgive  sins  is  connected,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  necessity  of  specific  confession,  and  on  the  other,  the  in- 
fallibility of  the  church ;  with  that,  the  denial  of  the  right  of  pri- 
vate judgment ;  and  with  that,  the  necessity  of  persecution.  To 
one  who  goes  the  whole  length  of  these  errors,  their  connexion  and 
agreement  can  but  serve  to  strengthen  his  convictions  :  but  to  those 
who  shrink  from  any  of  them,  it  ought  to  be  a  serious  considera- 
tion, that  they  stand  in  the  closest  logical  relation  to  the  plausible 
and  cherished  dogma  of  Sacerdotal  Absolution. 

VI.  Our  sixth  objection  to  the  doctrine  is,  that  it  is  practically  a 
subversion  of  the  Gospel,  a  substitution  of  human  mediation  for  the 
mediation  of  Christ,  and  an  exaltation  of  the  priest  into  the  place 
of  God.  It  is  easily  said  that  the  power  arrogated  by  the  clergy 
is  derivative  and  delegated,  that  it  is  God  who  pardons,  and  Christ 
who  makes  the  throne  of  grace  accessible,  just  as  it  may  be  said 
and  is  said,  that  the  Papist  who  adores  an  image  uses  it  only  as  a 
help  to  his  devotion  while  he  worships  God.  The  profession  may 
in  either  case  be  honest,  but  in  neither  case  can  it  avail  to  change 
the  practical  result,  to  wit,  that  God  is  neglected  or  forgotten  in  the 
idol  or  the  priest.  Instead  of  that  dependence  on  the  Spirit  and 
the  Word,  which  form  an  indispensable  condition  of  Christ's  pro- 
mise to  his  people,  the  clergy  are  invested  with  authority,  first,  to 
decide  what  is  scripture ;  then,  to  determine  what  the  scripture 
means  ;  and  then,  what  is  to  be  believed  as  matter  of  faith,  though 
not  contained  in  scripture ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  alone  have 
power  to  forgive  the  sins  of  men.  This  practical  restriction  of  the 
power  to  determine  what  is  sin  and  to  forgive  sin,  in  the  hands  of 
a  certain  class  of  ministers,  as  such,  without  regard  to  their  cha- 
racter and  standing  before  God,  is  the  sum,  essence,  and  soul  of 


366  SACERDOTAL  ABSOLUTION. 

Antichrist ;  the  constituent  principle  of  that  very  power  which  has 
debauched  and  enslaved  the  world  ;  of  the  power  which  sits  in  the 
temple  of  God,  claiming  to  be  God ;  the  mystery  of  iniquity,  sus- 
tained by  the  working  of  Satan  with  all  power,  the  power  of  the 
sword,  the  power  of  learning,  the  power  of  superstition,  the  power 
of  an  evil  conscience,  the  power  of  lying  wonders,  a  power  which 
has  held  and  will  hold  the  world  in  subjection,  till  the  Lord  shall 
consume  it  with  the  Spirit  of  his  mouth,  and  destroy  it  by  the 
brightness  of  his  coming.  The  Gospel  thus  preached  is  "  another 
Gospel,"  and  the  doctrine,  which  tends  to  such  a  practical  result,  is 
and  must  be  false. 

To  such  of  our  readers  as  are  satisfied  by  these  or  any  other 
arguments,  that  forgiveness  of  sins  is  not  a  sacerdotal  function,  that 
the  Christian  ministry  is  not  a  priesthood,  that  the  power  of  remis- 
sion was  not  given  to  the  ministry,  that  the  power  of  absolute  ef- 
fectual remission  was  not  given  at  all,  that  the  contrary  hypothesis 
is  one  link  in  a  chain  of  fearful  errors,  and  practically  tends  to  the 
subversion  of  the  Gospel,  we  may  now  say  what  we  waived  our 
right  to  say  before,  to  wit,  that  the  doctrine  of  Sacerdotal  Absolu- 
tion is  unscriptural,  dishonouring  to  God,  and  incompatible  with 
human  fallibility  and  weakness. 

In  the  course  of  our  argument,  and  at  its  close,  the  question  na- 
turally presents  itself,  what  is  the  church  to  which  the  power  of 
remission  has  been  granted,  how  does  it  act,  how  can  it  be  con- 
sulted, what  relation  has  it  to  the  Christian  ministry  1  These  are 
inquiries  of  the  highest  moment,  and  the  answer  to  them  is  really 
involved  in  the  preceding  argument ;  but  a  direct  and  full  so- 
lution is  not  necessary  to  the  negative  conclusions  which  we  have 
endeavoured  to  establish,  and  may  be  better  given  in  another  place. 


ESSAY    XVI. 

REGENERATION. 


Voltaire,  in  one  of  his  historical  works,  snceringly  inquires, 
"  How  were  the  priests  employed  while  the  Saracens  were  deso- 
lating the  fairest  portion  of  their  church  ?"  "  Disputing,"  he  an- 
swers, "  whether  Christ  has  one  will  or  two  !"  It  will  be  well,  if 
the  theologians  of  the  nineteenth  century  do  not  furnish  occasion 
to  some  future  infidel  historian  for  a  similar  taunting  remark. 
There  is  scarcely  any  subject  in  the  history  of  the  church  which 
is  more  humiliating  than  that  of  theological  discussions  of  this  na- 
ture. The  evil  appears  to  have  arisen  early,  for  Paul,  in  his  Epis- 
tles to  Timothy,  repeatedly  and  earnestly  exhorts  him  "  not  to  strive 
about  words  to  no  profit,"  but  to  avoid  "  foolish  questions  which 
gender  strifes."  Yet  not  a  century  has  passed  from  that  day  to 
this,  which  has  not  been  disturbed  and  disgraced  by  disputes  fairly 
within  the  apostle's  description.  That  there  are  serious  evils  at- 
tending controversies  of  this  character,  no  one  will  deny.  They 
bring  discredit  on  religion  ;  they  alienate  brethren  who  should  live 
together  in  love ;  they  call  off  the  attention  from  the  practical  du- 
ties of  benevolence  and  piety ;  and  they  are,  from  their  nature, 
destructive  of  the  spirit  of  true  religion.  These  disputes,  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten,  turn,  not  on  the  correct  exposition  of  the  Bible, 
but  on  the  decision  of  some  point  in  mental  or  moral  science. 
Philosophy,  instead  of  being  the  handmaid  of  religion,  has  become 
the  mistress  of  theology.  This  is  a  fact  deeply  to  be  lamented. 
The  subjects,  we  admit,  are  so  nearly  allied  that  they  cannot  be 
kept  entirely  distinct ;  still,  theology  might  have,  and  ought  to  have, 
much  less  of  a  philosophical,  and  more  of  an  exegetical,  character 
than  it  has  commonly  assumed.  The  predominance  of  the  former 
over  the  latter  element  in  theology,  has  been  unquestionably  one 
of  the  most  prolific  sources  of  evil  to  the  church.  What  is  Pela- 
gianism,  Arminianism,  or  almost  any  other  ism,  but  a  particular 
system  of  religious  philosophy  ?      And   what  are  the  questions 

*  Published  in  1830,  in  Review  of  "  Regeneration  and  the  Manner  of  its  Occur- 
rence. A  Sermon  from  John  v.  24.  Preached  at  the  opening  of  the  Synod  of  New 
York,  in  the  Rutgers'  Street  Church,  on  Tuesday  evening,  Oct.  20,  1629."  By  Samuel 
H.  Cox,  D.  D.,  Pastor  of  the  Laight  Street  Presbyterian  Church." 


368  REGENERATION. 

which  now  alienate  and  divide  Christians  in  this  country,  but  ques- 
tions in  mental  or  moral  science  ?  If  a  man  tells  you  his  theory 
of  virtue,  you  need  ask  no  questions  about  his  theology.  Hence 
it  is  that  these  diversities  of  opinion  are  in  a  great  measure  con- 
fined to  professed  theologians,  clergymen  or  laymen.  The  views 
which  ordinary  Christians,  under  the  guidance  of  common  sense 
and  sanctified  feeling,  take  of  divine  truth,  are  in  all  ages  and 
countries  very  nearly  the  same.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  us  correct 
to  say,  that  common  sense  is  nothing  more  than  the  popularized 
results  of  philosophical  speculations,  because  we  find  it  the  same 
in  countries  where  entirely  different  systems  of  philosophy  have 
for  ages  prevailed.  Look  at  Germany  and  England  for  an  illus- 
tration. The  philosophical  theologians  of  these  countries  differ 
toto  coelo  in  their  views.  They  have  hardly  a  single  principle  in 
common.  But  how  is  it  with  common  Christians?  They  are  as 
much  united  in  opinion  as  they  are  in  feeling.  And  why  ?  Be- 
cause their  opinions  are  formed  from  the  Bible,  under  the  guidance 
of  the  Spirit,  and  the  influence  of  those  essential  and  consequently 
universal  principles  of  our  nature  which  it  has  been  the  grand  re- 
sult of  philosophy  to  sophisticate  and  pervert.  Is  all  philosophy 
then  to  be  proscribed  ?  By  no  means.  The  very  statements  we 
have  made  demonstrate  its  importance.  If  a  man's  speculative 
opinions  do  thus  influence  his  views  of  religious  truth  and  duty,  it 
is  a  matter  of  unspeakable  moment  that  these  opinions  should  be 
correct.  And,  in  a  multitude  of  cases,  the  only  means  of  prevent- 
ing the  evils  which  flow  from  erroneous  principles  is  to  show  the 
fallacy  of  the  principles  themselves.  Besides,  all  truth  is  harmo- 
nious, whether  taught  in  the  word  of  God  or  learned  from  the  con- 
stitution of  our  own  nature,  and  in  itself  there  can  be  no  subject 
more  worthy  of  accurate  knowledge  than  that  mysterious  and  im- 
mortal principle  which  was  created  in  the  image  of  God.  All  this 
we  cheerfully  admit.  At  the  same  time  the  undeniable  fact,  that 
systems  of  philosophy  have  been  as  changeable  as  the  wind  ;  that 
each  in  its  turn  has  been  presented,  urged  and  adopted  with  the 
utmost  confidence  ;  and  each  in  its  measure  perverted  the  simple 
truths  of  the  Bible,  should  teach  us  to  be  modest :  it  should  teach 
us  to  separate  the  human  from  the  divine  element  in  our  theology, 
and  to  be  careful  not  to  clothe  the  figments  of  our  own  minds  with 
the  awful  authority  of  God,  and  denounce  our  brethren  for  not  be- 
lieving him  when  they  do  not  agree  with  us.  It  should  teach  us, 
too,  not  to  ascribe  to  men  opinions  which,  according  to  our  notions, 
may  be  inferred  from  the  principles  which  they  avow.  This  is  an 
impropriety  of  very  frequent  occurrence,  and  of  which  we  think 
we  have  great  reason  to  complain  in  the  sermon  before  us.  To 
state  what  appears  to  us  to  be  fair  deductions  from  principles  as- 
sumed, as  arguments  against  them,  is  one  thing ;  but  to  charge 
those  who  hold  these  principles  with  holding  our  deductions,  is  a 
very  different  affair. 

With  regard  to  the  author  of  this  sermon,  we  can  truly  say 


REGENERATION.  369 

that  we  entertain  for  him  the  highest  respect.  We  love  his  honesty. 
We  admire  the  frankness  and  decision  with  which  he  always  avows 
his  opinions.  We  rejoice  to  see  that  there  is  little  of  that  evil 
spirit  in  the  discourse  which  so  often  converts  investigations  of 
truth  into  angry  disputations.  But  while  we  give  Dr.  Cox  full 
credit  for  sincerity,  and  acquit  him  of  entertaining  any  bad  feelings 
towards  his  brethren,  we  still  think  that  he  is  chargeable  with 
grossly  misrepresenting  their  opinions,  and  holding  them  up  to  a 
contempt  and  reprobation  due  only  to  his  acknowledged  carica- 
ture. We  refer  specially  to  page  6  of  the  Introduction,  where, 
after  stating  that  there  are  certain  dogmas,  "  some  of  them  not 
proved,  or  even  suspected  by  those  who  employ  them,"  which 
have  a  tendency  "  to  solace  the  sinner  in  his  distance  from  Christ," 
and  "  excuse  his  disobedience  to  the  Gospel,  and  which  ought  to 
be  rejected  as  false  and  ruinous,"  he  gives  the  following  specifi- 
cations : 


"  A  man  has  no  ability  to  do  his  duty. 

"  Where  the  means  of  grace  are  purely  and  abundantly  vouchsafed,  by  the 
sovereign  goodness  of  Providence,  a  man  can  do  nothing  for,  but  can  only  coun- 
teract, his  own  salvation  ;  having  no  ability,  even  if  he  had  the  inclination,  to  be- 
lieve the  Gospel  and  be  saved. 

"  The  wickedness  of  men  consists  in  physical  defect  or  disorganization  of  the 
faculties  of  the  soul,  so  that  total  depravity  and  physical  depravity  are  nearly  sy- 
nonymous, and  both  equally  true. 

"  Regeneration  is  the  implantation  of  a  certain  kind  of  'principle  of  holiness,' 
which  is  incapable  of  definition  or  demonstration,  and  has  no  connexion  with 
human  consciousness  ;  which  precedes  all  active  mental  holiness,  and  is  antecedent 
also  to  all '  the  fruit  of  the  Spirit,'  as  specified  in  the  New  Testament,  in  the  sus- 
ception  and  sustentationof  which,  the  Creator  is  sole  as  well  as  sovereign  agent; 
man  no  agent  at  all,  but  only  a  passive  receiver,  an  unconscious  subject  of  the 
mysterious  gratuity  ;  and  which  is  the  happy  contrary  of  a.  principle  of  sin,  which 
is  concreated  with  us,  and  is  the  permanent  fund  of  all  our  depravity,  in  which 
also  we  are  passive — though  quite  active  in  exercising  all  the  wickedness  which 
flows  (full  copiously)  from  such  an  inserted  fountain,  and  which  has  its  residence 
and  location  somewhere  in  the  texture  of  the  soul,  which  is  itself  a  very  wicked 
thing  somehow  physiologically,  in  the  very  nature  of  it,  antecedent  to  any  agency 
at  all  of  ours. 

u  Regeneration  consists  in  some  secret  physical  motion  on  the  soul,  which  re- 
stores its  dislocated  powers,  and  cures  the  connatural  diseases  of  its  texture  ;  since 
the  work  of  the  Creator,  as  such,  is  not  '  good,'  but  lays  the  foundation  in  the 
very  entity  of  the  soul  for  all  its  overt  wickedness,  and  for  the  necessity  of  re- 
generation. 

"  The  soul  is  passive,  entirely  passive,  and  God  the  sole  agent  of  regeneration. 

"The  means  of  grace,  and  the  Gospel  itself,  are  in  no  sense  moral  causes  of 
regeneration  ;  since  their  important  use  is  merely  to  illustrate  the  strength  of  an 
invincible  depravity,  to  make  the  sinner  worse  and  worse,  till  he  is  physically  re- 
generated, and  then  to  signalize  the  prodigious  efforts  and  labours  of  Omnipotence, 
in  this  department  of  constant  miracle-working  : — as  if  there  were  no  considera- 
ble difference  between  dividing  the  Red  Sea  symbolically  by  the  rod  of  Moses, 
and  conciliating  the  human  mind  by  the  revealed  glories  of  the  everlasting  Gospel ! 

"  It  is  wrong  to  require  a  sinner  in  the  name  of  God  to  repent  immediately,  and 
believe  the  Gospel,  and  to  urge  him  to  this  as  the  only  way  of  salvation. 

"  The  offer  or  salvation  is  not  made  to  every  hearer ;  or,  if  it  be,  to  accept  it  is 
impracticable,  and  to  require  this  of  the  sinner,  wanton  and  absurd. 

24 


370  REGENERATION. 

"  If  there  is  a  universal  offer  in  the  Gospel,  it  is  founded — not  on  the  atonement 
of  Jesus  Christ  at  all,  but  only  on  the  ministerial  commission  ;  or  on  human  ig- 
norance of.  who  the  elect  are  ;  or  it  has  no  moral  foundation ;  or  it  is  only  man's 
offer,  and  not  God's  ;  or  it  is  a  matter  of  mere  sovereignty,  and  so  insoluble  ;  or 
it  is  an  offer  in  form,  and  in  fact  no  offer  or  overture  at  all :  and  this,  although 
there  is  no  salvation  known  to  the  Gospel  but  that  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  as  an 
atoning  Saviour. — Prov.  i.  20 — 33  ;  Luke  xiv.  24  ;  Acts  iv.  12,  xiii.  26,  46." 

The  doctor  then  says,  "  if  I  have  caricatured  these  dogmas,  I 
have  done  so  intentionally  ;  but  only  by  representing  them  as  they 
are,  and  making  the  reality  govern  the  appearance."  It  is  not 
probable  that  Dr.  Cox,  in  writing  these  paragraphs,  had  any  one 
class  of  theologians  exclusively  in  his  eye ;  because  some  of  "  these 
dogmas"  are  inconsistent  with  each  other.  We  have  no  doubt,  how- 
ever, that  most  of  what  is  here  stated,  was  intended  as  an  exhibition 
of  the  doctrines  of  the  old  Calvinists  (sit  venia  verbo).  Our  reason 
for  thinking  so  is,  that  we  are  accustomed  to  see  such,  and  even  still 
more  gross  misrepresentations  of  these  doctrines,  though,  we  ac- 
knowledge, not  often  from  such  men  as  Dr.  Cox.  It  is,  however, 
notorious  that  this  class  of  theologians  are  constantly  represented 
as  maintaining  that  "  man  has  no  ability,  even  if  he  had  the  incli- 
nation, to  believe  the  Gospel  and  be  saved," — that  man's  depravity 
"  is  a  physical  defect" — that  regeneration  is  "  a  physical  change," 
&c.  Representations  have  been  made  of  these  doctrines  which 
we  had  supposed  no  man,  who  felt  the  obligation  "  of  interpreting 
language  in  conformity  with  the  known  and  declared  nature  of 
the  thing  described,"  could  ever  allow  himself  to  make.  Belong- 
ing as  we  do  to  the  class,  which  for  the  sake  of  convenience  and 
distinction  we  have  called  old  Calvinists,  we  feel  ourselves  ag- 
grieved by  such  representations,  and  called  upon  to  show  that  no 
such  doctrines  can  be  fairly  imputed  to  the  elder  Calvinists.  It 
will  not  be  expected  that  in  a  single  article  we  should  go  over  the 
formidable  list  presented  by  Dr.  Cox.  We  shall,  for  the  present  at 
least,  confine  ourselves  to  the  doctrine  of  this  sermon,  and  show 
that  the  old  standard  Calvinistic  authors  expressly  disclaim  the 
opinions  here  imputed  to  them,  and  that  they  are  not  fairly  dedu- 
cible  from  any  of  the  principles  which  they  avow.  Should  we 
entirely  fail  as  to  the  second  point,  it  would  still  be  very  unjust  to 
charge  men  with  holding  doctrines  which  they  constantly  disclaim, 
because  we  consider  them  as  flowing  from  their  principles. 

The  two  main  points  of  Dr.  Cox's  sermon  are,  first,  that  regene- 
ration is  a  moral,  in  distinction  from  a  physical  change ;  and  se- 
condly, that  it  occurs  in  a  manner  perfectly  accordant  with  the 
active  powers  of  the  soul.  We  use  the  word  physical,  not  as  sy- 
nonymous with  natural,  but  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  this 
sermon,  implying  something  referring  to  the  substance  or  essence. 
By  physical  regeneration  in  this  sense,  is  intended  a  change  in  the 
essence  or  essential  properties  of  the  soul,  or,  in  the  language  of 
Dr.  Cox,  an  influence  by  which  "  the  connatural  diseases  in  the 
texture  of  the  soul  are  healed."     Our  object  is  to  show  that  Dr. 


REGENERATION.  371 

Cox  has  misrepresented  the  views  of  his  brethren  on  this  subject ; 
that  they  hold  to  no  change  in  the  substance  of  the  soul  nor  in  any 
of  its  essentia]  properties,  but  uniformly  teach  that  the  change  is  a 
moral  one,  and  takes  place  in  a  manner  perfectly  congruous  to  the 
nature  of  a  rational  and  active  being.  We  appeal  to  the  language 
and  doctrines  of  all  the  old  Calvinistic  divines,  in  support  of  this 
assertion. 

Charnock,  in  his  discourse  on  regeneration,  contained  in  "Vol.  II. 
of  the  folio  edition  of  his  works,  proposes  in  the  first  place  to  state 
in  reference  to  the  nature  of  this  change,  what  it  is  not.  On  page 
72,  he  says,  "  It  is  not  a  removal  or  taking  away  of  the  old  sub- 
stance or  faculties  of  the  soul.  Some  thought  that  the  substance 
of  Adam's  soul  was  corrupted  when  he  sinned,  therefore  suppose 
the  substance  of  his  soul  to  be  altered  when  he  is  renewed.  Sin 
took  not  away  the  essence  but  the  rectitude  ;  the  new  creation 
therefore  gives  not  a  new  faculty  but  a  new  quality."  Who  the 
"  some"  were,  to  whom  Charnock  refers  as  holding  that  the  sub- 
stance of  Adam's  soul  was  corrupted  by  the  fall,  we  know  not  ; 
all  we  know  is  that  such  is  not  the  doctrine  of  any  respectable 
body  of  Calvinists,  nor  of  any  standard  writer  on  the  subject. 
The  only  man  of  whom  we  have  heard  who  taught  this  doctrine, 
was  Flaccius  Illyricus,  Professor  at  Jena,  and  a  pupil  of  Luther ; 
but  we  know,  too,  that  his  opinions  on  this  subject  were  condemned, 
almost  without  a  dissenting  voice,  by  the  reformed  theologians  of 
Germany  and  England. 

On  the  73d  page,  Charnock  says  expressly,  "  the  essence  and 
faculties  remain  the  same."  "  The  passions  and  affections  are  the 
same  as  to  the  substance  and  nature  of  the  acts  ;  but  the  difference 
lies  in  the  objects."  "  When  a  man  loves  God,  or  fears  God,  or 
loves  man,  or  fears  man,  it  is  the  same  act  of  love  and  the  same 
act  of  fear ;  there  are  the  same  motions  of  the  soul,  the  same  sub- 
stantial acts  simply  considered,"  &c.  "  This  new  creation  is  not  a 
destruction  of  the  substance  of  the  soul,  but  there  is  the  same  phy- 
sical being,  and  the  same  faculties  in  all,  and  nothing  is  changed  in 
its  substance  as  it  respects  the  nature  of  man." — P.  85.  We  have 
here  a  most  explicit  disavowal  of  the  doctrine  of  physical  regene- 
ration in  the  sense  in  which  Dr.  Cox  represents  the  old  Calvinists 
as  holding  it. 

As  to  the  manner  in  which  this  work  is  effected,  he  remarks,  in  the 
first  place,  that  "it  is  a  secret  work,  and  therefore  difficult  to  ex- 
plain." "  Yet,  secondly,  this  is  evident,  that  it  is  rational,  that  is, 
congruous  to  the  essential  nature  of  man.  God  does  not  deal  with 
us  as  beasts,  or  as  creatures  destitute  of  sense,  but  as  creatures  of 
an  intelligent  order.  Who  is  there  that  believes  in  Christ,  as  heavy 
things  fall  to  the  earth,  or  as  beasts  run  at  the  beck  of  their  sen- 
sual appetites  without  rule  or  reason?" — P.  217.  "God  that  re- 
quires of  us  a  reasonable  service,  would  work  upon  us  by  a  reason- 
able operation.     God  therefore  works  by  the  way  of  a  spiritual 


372  REGENERATION. 

illumination  of  the  understanding,  in  propounding  the  creature's 
happiness  by  arguments  and  reasons  ;  and  in  the  way  of  a  spiritual 
impression  on  the  will,  moving  it  sweetly  to  embrace  that  happi- 
ness, and  the  means  to  it  which  he  doth  propose  ;  and  indeed  with- 
out this  work  preceding,  the  motion  of  the  will  could  never  be 
regular."— P.  218. 

In  speaking  more  particularly  of  the  direct  operation  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  on  the  will,  his  first  proposition  is,  that  there  is  such  an  influ- 
ence ;  second,  that  "  this  work,  though  immediate,  is  not  compul- 
sive. It  is  a  contradiction  for  the  will  to  be  moved  unwillingly : 
any  force  upon  it  destroys  its  nature.  It  is  not  forced  because  it  is 
according  to  reason,  and  the  natural  motion  of  the  creature ;  the 
understanding  proposing  and  the  will  embracing;  the  understand- 
ing going  before  with  light,  the  will  following  after  with  love." 
"  The  will  being  a  rational  faculty  cannot  be  wrought  upon  but 
rationally."— P.  221. 

The  instrumentality  of  the  truth  in  regeneration  is  strongly  as- 
serted by  all  old  Calvinists.  Charnock  says,  "that  to  make  an 
alteration  in  us  according  to  our  nature  of  understanding,  will  and 
affections,  it  is  necessary  there  should  be  some  declaration  of  things 
under  those  considerations  of  true,  good  and  delightful,  in  the 
highest  manner,  to  make  a  choice  change  in  every  faculty  of  the 
soul ;  and  without  this  a  man  cannot  be  changed  as  a  rational 
creature,"  &c. — P.  233.  "  The  word  operates,  first,  objectively, 
as  it  is  a  declaration  of  the  will  of  God,  and  presenting  the  objects 
of  all  holy  acts ;  and  secondly  it  has  an  active  force.  It  is  opera- 
tive in  the  hand  of  God  for  sanctification."  "  The  Spirit  doth  so 
edge  the  word  that  it  cuts  to  the  quick,  discerns  the  very  thoughts, 
insinuates  into  the  depths  of  the  heart,"  &c. — P.  235.  "  To  con- 
clude, the  promise  in  the  word  breeds  principles  in  the  heart  suita- 
ble to  itself;  it  shows  God  a  father  and  raises  up  principles  of 
love  and  reverence  ;  it  shows  Christ  a  Mediator,  and  raises  up 
faith  and  desire.  Christ  in  the  word  conceives  Christ  in  the  heart, 
Christ  in  the  word  the  beginning  of  grace,  conceives  Christ  in  the 
heart  the  hope  of  glory." — P.  236.  The  use  of  the  word  in  rege- 
neration is  surely  according  to  this  view  something  more  than  "  the 
rod  of  Moses  stretched  out  over  the  Red  Sea."  We  presume, 
however,  that  the  paragraph  in  which  Dr.  Cox  denounces  the  opi- 
nion that  the  means  of  grace  have  no  tendency  to  produce  holiness, 
was  designed  for  a  different  quarter.  Old  Calvinists  have  generally 
been  charged  with  laying  too  much  stress  on  the  use  of  means. 

Charnock  was  by  no  means  singular  in  the  views  here  expressed. 
Living  as  he  did  in  the  days  of  the  Puritan  ascendency  in  England, 
the  companion  of  Owen,  Goodwin,  Burgess,  Bates,  and  many  others 
of  the  same  class,  he  was  united  with  them  in  opinion  as  well  as 
in  labours. 

Owen,  in  his  work  on  the  Spirit,  when  speaking  of  regeneration, 
lays  down  the  following  proposition  (page  270  of  the  folio  edition). 


REGENERATION.  373 

"  In  whom  or  towards  whomsoever  the  Holy  Spirit  puts  forth  his 
power,  or  the  acts  of  his  grace  for  their  regeneration,  it  removes  all 
obstacles,  overcomes  all  opposition,  and  infallibly  produces  the  effect 
intended."  But  how  is  this  done  ?  Is  it  by  changing  the  substance 
of  the  soul  or  violating  any  of  the  laws  of  its  being?  The  words 
which  immediately  follow,  and  which  are  intended  to  explain  this  ge- 
neral proposition,  contain  the  answer.  "  The  power  which  the  Holy 
Spirit  puts  forth  in  our  regeneration,  is  such  in  its  actings  or  exercise, 
as  our  minds,  wills  and  affections  are  suited  to  be  wrought  upon,  and 
to  be  affected  by,  according  to  their  natures  and  natural  operations. 
He  doth  neither  act  in  them  any  otherwise  than  they  themselves 
are  meet  to  be  moved  and  to  move,  to  be  acted  and  to  act,  accord- 
ing to  their  own  nature,  power  and  ability.  He  draws  us  with  the 
cords  of  a  man,  and  the  work  itself  is  expressed  by  a  persuading; 
'God  persuade  Japhet ;  I  will  allure  her  into  the  wilderness  and 
speak  comfortably  :'  for,  as  it  is  certainly  effectual,  so  it  carries  no 
more  repugnancy  to  our  faculties  than  a  prevalent  persuasion 
doth."  One  can  hardly  imagine  how  men  who  use  such  language 
can  be  charged  with  holding  a  "physical  regeneration,"  by  which 
"  the  connatural  diseases  of  the  texture  of  the  soul "  are  cured.  Owen 
proceeds  to  say,  secondly,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  "  doth  not  in  our 
regeneration  possess  the  mind  with  any  enthusiastical  impressions  ; 
but  he  works  in  the  minds  of  men  on  and  by  their  own  natural 
actings,  through  an  immediate  influence  and  impression  of  his  pow- 
er. *  Create  in  me  a  clean  heart,  O  God.'  He  worketh  to  will 
and  to  do.  Thirdly,  he  therefore  offers  no  violence  or  compulsion 
to  the  will.  This  that  faculty  is  not  naturally  capable  to  give  ad- 
mission unto.  If  it  be  compelled  it  is  destroyed."  And  again  on 
the  next  page,"  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  in  his  power  and  operation  is 
more  intimate,  as  it  were,  unto  the  principles  of  our  souls  than  they 
are  to  themselves,  doth,  with  the  preservation  and  in  the  exercise 
of  the  liberty  of  our  wills,  effectually  work  our  regeneration  and 
conversion  unto  God.  This  is  the  substance  of  what  we  have  to 
plead  for  in  this  cause,  and  which  declares  the  nature  of  this  work 
of  regeneration,  as  it  is  an  inward  spiritual  work." 

Bates's  view  of  the  manner  in  which  this  change  is  effected,  is  the 
same  with  that  of  Owen.  In  the  fourth  volume  of  his  works  (octavo 
edition),  page  140,  he  says,  "the  effectual  operation  of  grace  does  not 
violate  the  native  freedom  of  the  will,  but  is  congruous  to  it.  God's 
drawing  is  by  teaching :  '  every  one  who  hath  heard  and  learned 
of  the  father  cometh  unto  me.'  When  the  author  of  the  Gospel  is 
a  teacher  of  it,  the  most  stupid  and  obstinate  sinners  shall  be  con- 
vinced and  obedient."  Again:  "God  draws  sinners  to  himself 
'  with  the  cords  of  a  man,'  in  a  rational  way,  without  violence  to 
their  faculties,  and  fastens  them  by  the  bonds  of  love."  In  another 
place,  Vol.  II.,  page  298,  he  says,  "  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  work 
grace  in  us,  as  the  sun  forms  gold  in  the  earth,  without  any  sense 
in  ourselves  of  his  operations :  but  we  feel  them  in  all  our  faculties 


374  REGENERATION. 

congruously  to  their  nature,  enlightening  the  mind,  exciting  the 
conscience,  turning  the  will,  and  purifying  the  affections." 

The  opinions  of  the  reformed,  or  Calvinistic  divines  of  Germany 
and  Holland,  were  the  same  on  these  points  as  those  of  the  Calvin- 
ists  of  England.  Turrettin,  Theol.  Elenct.  loc.  15,  quaest.  4,  §  15, 
says,  "  Gratiae  efficacis  motio  non  est  simpliciter  physica,  quia 
agitur  de  facilitate  morali,  quae  congruenter  naturae  suae  moveri 
debet;  nee  simpliciter  ethica, quasi  Deus  objective  solum  ageret  et 
leni  suasione  uteretur,  quod  pertendebant  Pelagiani :  sed  superna- 
turalis  est  et  divina,  quae  transcendit  omnia  haec  genera."  "  Po- 
tens  est,  ne  sit  frustranea ;  suavis  est,  ne  sit  coacta.  Vis  est  sum- 
ma  et  inexpugnabilis  ut  vincatur  naturae  corruptio  et  summa  bene 
agendi  impotentia  ac  male  agendi  necessitas :  sed  arnica  tamen  et 
grata,  qualis  naturam  intelligentem  et  rationalem  decet." 

The  Synod  of  Dort,  in  order  to  prevent  any  misapprehension 
of  their  views  of  efficacious  grace,  as  though  it  were  inconsistent 
in  its  operation  with  the  rational  and  moral  powers  of  our  nature, 
say  in  reference  to  the  fourth  article  in  dispute  between  them  and 
the  Remonstrants,  "  Sicuti  vero  per  lapsum  homo  non  desiit  esse 
homo,  intellectu  et  voluntate  praeditus,  nee  peccatum,  quod  univer- 
sum  genus  humanum  pervasit,  naturam  generis  humani  sustulit, 
sed  depravavit  et  spiritualiter  occidit :  ita  etiam  haec  divina  rege- 
nerationis  gratia,  non  agit  in  hominibus  tanquam  truncis  et  stipiti- 
bus,  nee  voluntatem  ejusque  proprietates  tollit,  aut  invitam  violen- 
ter  cogit,  sed  spiritualiter,  sanat,  corrigit,  suaviter  simul  et  potenter 
flectit:  ut  ubi  antea  plene  dominabatur  carnis  rebellio  et  resistentia 
nunc  regnare  incipiat  prompta  ac  sincera  spiritus  obedientia ;  in 
quo  vera  et  spiritualis  nostrae  voluntatis  libertas  consistit." 

Spanheim,  in  his  Elench.  Controv.  cum  August.  Confess.  Theol. 
Oper.  torn,  hi.,  col.  909,  after  stating  how  nearly  the  views  of  the 
Lutheran  divines  coincided  with  those  of  Calvinists  on  this  subject, 
says  that  the  difference  which  did  exist  seemed  to  result  from  a 
misapprehension  of  the  Calvinistic  doctrine.  Supponunt  precario, 
he  says,  1.  "  Nos  velle  per  gratiam  insuperabilem.  motionem  coac- 
tam,  violentam,  qualis  trunci,  lapidis,  &c.  2.  Negare  nos  resisti- 
bilitatem  gratiae  respectu  naturae  corruptae,  et  carnis  Deo  inimi- 
cae,  qua  sane  quantum  in  se  est  nimis  resistit." 

Stapfer,  in  his  Institut.  Theol.  Polem.,  cap.  iii.,  §  136,  maintains 
in  unison  with  the  common  mode  of  speaking  among  Calvinists  of 
his  day,  that  there  was  in  regeneration  a  divine  illumination  of  the 
understanding,  and  a  divine  influence  on  the  will.  What  he  intend- 
ed by  these  expressions  he  carefully  explains.  "  Per  illuminatio- 
nem  autem  intelligimus  convictionem  supernaturalem  veritatum 
revelatarum,  et  nexus  illarum  distinctam  repraesentationem."  And 
this,  he  says,  though  certainly  producing  conviction,  offers  no  more 
violence  to  the  mind  than  the  demonstration  of  a  proposition  in 
geometry.  "  Neque  magis  (are  his  words),  hominis  libertati  obes- 
se  potest,  ac  illi  aliquid  derogatur,  si  sole  post  tenebras  redeunte 
objecta  circumjacentia  ipsi  clare  repraesentantur,  aut  si  de  veritate 


REGENERATION.  375 

geometrica  per  illius  demonstrationem  convincitur."  With  regard 
to  the  influence  which  operates  on  the  will,  he  says,  "  Pono  ita 
agit,  ut  homo  in  determinatione  sua  liber  maneat,  neque  obtorto 
quasi  collo  ct  invitus  trahitur ;  facit  ut  homo  volens  agat.  Veri- 
tatem  tarn  clare  mentibus  ingerit,  ut  non  possint  non  assentiri,  et 
tanta  motiva  voluntati  suggerit,  ut  non  possit  nolle,  sed  fertur: 
Pell'existi  me  Jehova,  et  pellectus  sum,  fortior  fuisti  me,  et  praeva- 
luisti." — Jer.  xx.  7. 

This  he  asserts,  over  and  over,  is  the  true  Calvinistic  doctrine. 
This  he  does,  not  only  in  his  chapters  on  Pelagianism  and  Armini- 
anism,  where  he  is  answering  precisely  the  same  objection,  which 
(and  it  is  one  of  the  wonders  of  the  age)  Calvlnists  are  now 
urging  against  Calvinism,  viz.,  that  efficacious  grace,  as  explained 
by  them,  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  man  as  a  rational  and 
responsible  creature ;  but  also  in  his  chapter  De  Consensu  et  Dis- 
sensu  Protestantium,  and  in  his  preliminary  statement  of  the  gene- 
ral truths  of  theology. 

We  fear  that  we  have  already  exhausted  the  patience  of  our 
readers,  in  proving  a  point  concerning  which  every  one  acquainted 
with  Calvinistic  writers  must  have  been  satisfied  before  we  began. 
We  hope  however  that  our  labour  will  not  be  regarded  as  alto- 
gether unnecessary ;  because  when  an  imputation  comes  from  a 
source  in  every  way  so  respectable,  and  in  fact  so  highly  respect- 
ed, the  inference  will  be,  that  in  sober  truth  old  Calvinists  do  hold, 
that  the  texture  of  the  soul  is  diseased ;  that  its  substance  is 
changed  in  regeneration ;  that  some  unknown  violence  to  its  facul- 
ties is  suffered  under  the  Spirit's  influence.  It  is  proper,  therefore, 
that  it  should  be  shown,  that  the  direct  reverse  of  all  this  is  dis- 
tinctly declared  by  them  to  be  their  opinion ;  that  they  profess  to 
believe  regeneration  to  be  a  moral  and  not  a  physical  change ;  and 
that  it  takes  place  without  any  violence  being  done  to  the  soul  or 
any  of  its  laws.  Our  readers,  too,  will  be  led,  we  trust,  to  think 
with  us,  that  there  should  be  something  more  than  mere  inferential 
reasoning,  to  justify  ascribing  to  men  a  set  of  opinions  which  they 
constantly  and  earnestly  disclaim. 

We  are  perfectly  willing  to  admit  that  old  Calvinists,  when 
treating  on  the  subject  of  regeneration,  often  speak  of  a  direct  and 
physical  influence  of  the  Spirit  on  the  soul.  But  in  what  sense  ? 
In  the  sense  in  which  Dr.  Cox  represents  them  as  holding  physical 
regeneration?  Far  from  it.  He  says  that  physical  regeneration 
and  physical  depravity  stand  together.  He  thus  uses  the  word 
as  qualifying  the  effect  produced.  They  use  it  to  qualify  the  influ- 
ence exerted  in  producing  the  effect.  But  what  do  they  mean 
when  they  speak  of  a  physical  influence  being  exerted  on  the  soul 
in  regeneration  ?  They  mean  precisely  what  we  suppose  Dr.  Cox 
means,  when  he  speaks  of  "  the  agency  of  the  Spirit,  apart  from 
the  power  of  the  truth,  which  is  his  instrument." — P.  27.  They 
mean  to  assert  that  regeneration  is  not  effected  by  mere  moral  sua- 
sion ;  that  there  is  something  more  than  the  simple  presentation  of 


376  REGENERATION. 

truth  and  urging  of  motives.  The  idea  of  Calvinists  uniformly 
was,  that  the  truth,  however  clearly  presented  or  forcibly  urged, 
would  never  produce  its  full  effect  without  a  special  influence  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  This  influence  they  maintained  was  supernatural, 
that  is,  above  the  mere  moral  power  of  the  truth,  and  such  as  in- 
fallibly to  secure  the  result,  and  yet,  to  use  their  own  illustration, 
did  the  soul  no  more  violence  than  demonstration  does  the  intellect, 
or  persuasion  the  heart.  This  opinion  is  not  confined  to  any  one 
class  of  Calvinists :  as  far  as  we  know  it  is  common  to  them  all. 
We  understand  Dr.  Cox  as  teaching  the  same  doctrine.  In  fact  we 
know  no  Calvinist  who  denies  it.  The  author  of  the  review,  in 
the  last  number  of  the  Christian  Spectator,  of  the  strictures  of  Dr. 
Tyler  on  some  previous  articles  in  that  work,  says,  "We  have 
never  called  in  question  the  doctrine  of  an  immediate  or  direct 
agency  of  the  Spirit  on  the  soul  in  regeneration."  This  is  all  the 
old  Calvinists  intended  by  physical  influence.  That  this  assertion 
is  correct  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  they  taught,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  that  this  influence  is  perfectly  "  congruous"  to  the  nature  of 
the  soul,  doing  it  no  more  violence  than,  in  the  language  of  Owen, 
"  an  effectual  persuasion  doth  ;"  and  that  it  produces  no  physical 
change  in  the  substance  of  the  soul  or  any  of  its  faculties.  Unless, 
therefore,  we  mean  to  interpret  their  language,  not  according  to 
their  clear  and  often  repeated  statements  of  their  meaning,  but  ac- 
cording to  the  sense  which  a  particular  expression  has  attained 
among  ourselves,  we  must  admit  that  no  part  of  the  proof  of  the 
charge  which  we  are  considering  can  be  made  to  rest  on  the  oc- 
currence of  the  phrase, <:  physical  influence,"  in  their  writings.  But 
there  is  still  further  evidence  that  our  assertion  on  this  subject  is: 
correct,  which  is  derived  from  the  fact,  that  it  is  in  controversy 
with  those  who  taught  that  there  was  no  influence  beyond  "  mora! 
suasion"  and  " common  grace "  exerted  in  regeneration,  that  the 
older  writers  maintained  what  they  sometimes  called  a  physical  in- 
fluence of  the  Spirit.* 

Turretin,  in  the  passage  quoted  above,  describing  the  nature  of 
the  influence  exerted  in  regeneration,  says  that  it  is  not  merely  a 
moral  influence,  such  as  the  Pelagians  contended  for,  but  superna- 
tural and  divine  ;  and  immediately  adds,  u  aliquid  de  ethico  et  phy- 
sico  participat,"  where  it  is  plain  that  it  is  in  opposition  to  the  Pe- 
lagian doctrine  that  he  uses  this  expression ;  precisely  as  Dr.  Cox 
would  do  the  words,  direct  and  immediate.  When  the  Remon- 
strants arose,  they  objected  strongly  to  the  modes  of  expression 
which  had  become  common  among  the  Reformed  theologians  on 
the  subject  of  efficacious  grace.  This  led  to  a  more  precise  state- 
ment of  what  their  real  doctrines  were  on  this  subject,  and  they 
uniformly  repelled  the  imputations  of  their  opponents  that  they 


*  This  expression,  however,  is  by  no  means  so  common  as  that  of  "  direct  and  imme- 
diate influence,"  and  is  so  carefully  guarded  as  to  prevent  any  justifiable  mistake  as  to 
its  meaning. 

■ 


REGENERATION.  377 

taught  that  this  influence  was  inconsistent  with  the  rational  nature 
of  the  soul.  They  very  unwillingly  used  even  the  word  irresisti- 
ble, which  they  said  was  no  word  of  their  selection,  but  was  put 
upon  them  by  the  Jesuits  and  Remonstrants.  It  afterwards  indeed 
became  very  common  ;  but  they  tell  us  they  intended  by  it  nothing 
more  than  certainly  efficacious.  Stapfer,  cap.  17,  p.  540,  says,  in 
answer  to  such  objections,  that  when  the  Reformed  speak  of  irre- 
sistible grace,  "  hoc  volunt,  ita  efficaciter  divinam  gratiam  operari, 
ut  hominis  resistentiam  infallibiliter  superet,  ut  suasio  ipsius  tantae 
sit  efficaciae  ut  homo  non  possit  non  velle  summaque  spontanei- 
tate  sequi."  The  necessity  or  certainty  as  to  the  result  for  which 
they  contended,  was  none  other  than  that  for  which  President  Ed- 
wards and  all  other  Calvinists  contend,  and  which  is  inconsistent 
with  no  other  theory  of  liberty  than  that  of  indifference.  If  any 
man  would  candidly  compare  one  passage  with  another  in  the  writ- 
ings of  old  Calvinists,  and  interpret  their  language  agreeably  to  the 
fair  rules  of  construction,  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  their 
meaning,  by  physical  influence,  what  Dr.  Cox,  we  presume,  means 
by  "  an  influence  apart  from  the  truth."  Charnock,  in  speaking  on 
this  subject,  says,  in  the  general,  that  the  work  is  secret,,  yet  "  congru- 
ous to  the  essential  nature  of  the  soul."  He  then  states  more  par- 
ticularly, first,  that  there  is  "  an  immediate  and  supernatural  work 
on  the  will :"  as  synonymous  with  this  expression  he  on  the  next 
page  uses  the  words  "  physical  operation."  His  second  proposition 
is,  that  "  this  work,  though  immediate,  is  not  compulsive  and  by 
force."  "  The  will  being  a  rational  faculty  cannot  be  wrought  upon 
but  rationally,"  is  one  of  his  assertions,  in  explanation  of  nis  idea 
of  this  immediate  influence.  "  God,  who  knows  how  to  make  a 
will  with  a  principle  of  freedom,  knows  how  to  work  upon  the 
will,  without  intrenching  upon  or  altering  the  essential  privilege  he 
bestowed  upon  it,"  is  another.  His  third  position  is,  that  this  im- 
mediate work  "  is  free  and  gentle."  "  A  constraint,  not  by  force, 
but  love."  **  It  is  sweet  and  alluring  :  the  Spirit  of  grace  is  called 
the  oil  of  gladness ;  it  is  a  ready  and  delightful  motion  which  it 
causes  in  the  will  ;  it  is  a  sweet  efficacy,  and  an  efficacious  sweet- 
ness." Is  this  "  to  paralyze  the  soul,  or  to  strike  it  through  with  a 
moral  panic?"  Surely  Dr.  Cox  will  regret  having  made  such  a  re- 
presentation of  the  views  of  men  whose  opinions  as  to  the  nature 
of  divine  influence  do  not  differ  one  tittle  from  his  own.  "  At  what 
time,"  Charnock  goes  on  to  say,  "  God  doth  savingly  work  upon 
the  will,  to  draw  the  soul  from  sin  and  the  world  to  himself,  it  doth 
with  the  greatest  willingness,  freedom,  and  delight,  follow  after 
God,  turn  to  him,  close  with  him,  and  cleave  to  him,  with  all  the 
heart,  and  with  purpose  never  to  depart  from  him — Cant.  i.  4. 
Draw  me,  and  we  will  run  after  thee :  drawing  signifies  the  effica- 
cious power  of  grace ;  running  signifies  the  delightful  motion  of 
grace :  the  will  is  drawn,  as  if  it  would  not  come  ;  it  comes,  as  if 
it  were  not  drawn.  His  grace  is  so  sweet  and  so  strong,  that  he 
neither  wrongs  the  liberty  of  his  creature,  nor  doth  prejudice  his 


378  REGENERATION. 

absolute  power.  As  God  moves  necessary  causes,  necessarily  ; 
contingent  causes,  contingently;  so  he  moves  free  agents  freely, 
without  offering  violence  to  their  natures.  The  Spirit  glides  into 
the  heart  by  sweet  illapses  of  grace,  and  victoriously  allures  the 
soul. — Hos.  ii.  14.  I  will  allure  her,  and  speak  to  her  heart;  not 
by  crossing,  but  changing  the  inclination,  by  the  all  conquering  and 
alluring  charms  of  love,"  &c,  222.  The  fourth  proposition  is,  that 
this  influence  is  "  insuperably  victorious,"  or,  in  other  words,  irre- 
sistible. In  what  sense  is  it  irresistible  ?  Let  the  following  expla- 
nation from  Charnock  in  this  immediate  connexion  answer,  and 
prevent  those  brethren  reproaching  us  for  a  word,  who  agree  with 
us  as  to  the  thing  intended.  "  As  the  demonstration  of  the  Spirit 
is  clear  and  undeniable,  so  the  power  of  the  Spirit  is  sweet  and  ir- 
resistible ;  both  are  joined,  1  Cor.  ii.  4.  An  inexpressible  sweetness 
allures  the  soul,  and  an  unconquerable  power  draws  the  soul ;  there 
are  clear  demonstrations,  charming  persuasions,  and  invincible  effi- 
cacy combined  in  the  work.  He  leaves  not  the  will  in  indifference. 
(This  is  what  they  were  arguing  against.)  If  God  were  the  author 
of  faith  only  by  putting  the  will  into  indifference,  though  it  be  de- 
termined by  its  own  proper  liberty,  why  may  not  he  also  be  said 
to  be  the  author  of  unbelief,  if  by  the  same  liberty  of  indifference 
it  be  determined  to  reject  the  Gospel  ?"  "  This  irresistibleness 
takes  not  away  the  liberty  of  the  will.  Our  Saviour's  obedience 
was  free  and  voluntary,  yet  necessary  and  irresistible."  "  Is  God 
not  freely  and  voluntarily  good,  yet  necessarily  so  ?  He  cannot  be 
otherwise  than  good  ;  he  will  not  be  otherwise  than  good.  So  the 
will  is  irresistibly  drawn,  and  yet  doth  freely  come  to  its  own  hap- 
piness." It  is  perfectly  evident,  therefore,  that  nothing  more  was 
intended  by  this  expression  than  what  President  Edwards  and  all 
other  Calvinists  contend  for,  viz.,  moral  or  philosophical  necessity. 
Now,  when  it  is  remembered  that  all  the  expressions  which  we  have 
quoted,  and  much  more  of  the  same  import,  are  used  in  explana- 
tion of  the  nature  of  that  divine  influence  by  which  regeneration 
is  effected,  we  think  that  our  readers  will  feel  that  the  strongest 
possible  evidence  should  be  required  to  sustain  the  charge  against 
those  who  use  them,  of  holding  doctrines  utterly  inconsistent  with 
their  most  clearly  expressed  opinions.  We  think  that  any  candid 
man  will  acknowledge,  who  should  take  the  trouble  to  read  the 
writings  of  the  older  Calvinists,  that  they  held  no  other  doctrines 
on  the  subject  of  divine  influence  than  such  as  are  common  among 
all  classes  of  opposers  of  Arminianism.  Their  "  supernatural  "  or 
"  physical "  influence  meant  nothing  more  than  what  is  now  intend- 
ed by  "  a  direct  and  immediate  influence."  Owen,  whose  language 
on  this  subject  is  as  strong  as  that  of  any  writer  with  whom  we 
are  acquainted,  states  clearly,  as  we  have  already  seen,  his  belief 
that  the  influence  for  which  he  contended  is  perfectly  "  congruous  " 
to  the  nature  of  the  soul.  He  tells  us  also,  page  257,  that  it  is 
against  the  Pelagian  theory  that  he  is  arguing  when  he  maintains 
that  moral  suasion  alone  does  not  effect  our  regeneration,  but  that 


REGENERATION.  379 

there  is  a  direct  agency  of  the  Spirit  in  the  work,  which  is  such 
"  as  our  minds,  wills,  and  affections,  are  suited  to  be  wrought  upon 
and  affected  by,  according  to  their  natures  and  natural  operations." 

But  if  old  Calvinists  held  such  opinions  (and  they  hold  them 
still)  on  "  the  nature  of  regeneration  and  the  mode  of  its  occur- 
rence," where  is  the  difference  between  them  and  Dr.  Cox  ?  None 
in  the  world,  as  far  as  these  general  statements  go.  His  general 
propositions,  that  regeneration  is  a  moral,  and  not  a  physical  change, 
and  that  it  takes  place  in  a  manner  accordant  to  the  nature  of  the 
soul,  are  as  orthodox  as  Owen  or  Charnock  could  wish  them.  We 
take  it  for  granted,  however,  that  Dr.  Cox  would  think  we  had 
treated  him  rather  unhandsomely  thus  to  convict  him  of  old  ortho- 
doxy. We  proceed,  therefore,  to  state  where  the  difference  really 
lies.  It  is  simply  this.  All  the  old  Calvinists,  and  the  great  major- 
ity, we  hope  and  believe,  of  the  new  school  also,  hold  that  the 
result  of  the  Holy  Spirit's  operation  on  the  soul  is  a  holy  principle 
or  disposition  ;  Dr.  Cox  says,  if  we  understand  him,  that  the  result 
is  a  holy  act.  This  is  the  whole  ground  of  debate,  and  to  lookers 
on  it  may  appear  rather  too  narrow  to  be  worth  disputing  about. 
Dr.  Cox,  however,  seems  to  think  that  this  is  a  subject  of  vital  im- 
portance, affecting  deeply  our  views  of  the  whole  system  of  divine 
truth,  and  our  manner  of  preaching  ;  involving  the  high  questions 
of  the  grounds  of  man's  accountability,  the  nature  of  sin  and  holi- 
ness, and  of  human  liberty.  And  here  we  are  sorry  to  say  we 
agree  with  him.  We  are  afraid  that  this  is  a  turning  point.  We 
do  not  see  how  it  is  possible  to  hold  together  the  tattered  shreds  of 
Calvinism,  if  this  ground  be  assumed.  Is  Calvinism,  then,  a  mere 
metaphysical  system  ?  We  think  not.  But  there  are  some  meta- 
physical opinions  utterly  inconsistent  with  it ;  that  indifference  is 
necessary  to  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  one,  and  that  morality  con- 
sists in  acts  only,  we  fear,  is  another. 

All  the  ground  that  we  have  for  supposing  that  Dr.  Cox  holds 
this  latter  opinion,  is  found  in  the  pamphlet  under  review.  And 
even  here  it  is  not  distinctly  asserted  ;  but  it  seems  to  be  constantly 
implied,  and  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  that  is  peculiar  in  the  ser- 
mon or  introduction.  The  principle  assumed  is,  that  there  is  no- 
thing in  the  soul  but  its  substance,  with  its  essential  attributes,  and 
its  acts.  Therefore,  if  regeneration  be  not  a  change  in  its  acts,  it 
must  be  a  change  in  the  substance.  If  sin  be  not  an  act,  then  it  is 
substance,  "  an  entity,"  "  a  disease  of  the  texture  of  the  soul."  This, 
we  take  it,  is  the  ground  of  the  imputation  that  Calvinists  believe 
in  physical  depravity  and  physical  regeneration;  for  if  this  princi- 
ple be  not  assumed,  there  is  not  even  the  slender  and  insufficient 
ground  of  these  doctrines  being  deducible,  in  the  author's  opinion, 
from  Calvinistic  principles,  to  justify  the  charge.  Besides,  every 
one  knows  that  this  is  the  ground  on  which  this  charge  has  been 
made  before,  in  a  manner  far  more  offensive  and  unfair  than  Dr. 
Cox  is  capable  of  making  it.  It  is  on  this  ground,  also,  we  pre- 
sume, that  Dr.  Cox  maintains  that  the  soul  is  as  active  in  regenera- 


380  REGENERATION. 

tion,  as  in  repentance  or  the  exercise  of  faith.  And  it  is  on  this 
ground,  we  suppose,  that  he  ridicules  the  idea  of  regeneration  being 
the  production  of  a  holy  principle  in  the  soul,  "  the  happy  contra- 
ry," as  he  calls  it,  "  of  a  principle  of  sin,  which  is  concreated  with 
us."  This  view  of  the  doctrine  of  regeneration  (that  it  is  the  pro- 
duction of  a  holy  principle),  he  says,  can  "  command  the  confidence 
of  no  well  disciplined  mind  "  (rather  a  bold  assertion  by  the  way), 
and  then  adds,  "  By  holy  principle  /  mean  love  to  God,  and  not 
anything  antecedent  to  it ;  and  by  love  to  God,  I  mean  loving  him  ; 
and  in  that  the  subject  is  active." 

Dr.  Cox,  we  believe,  pins  his  faith  to  no  man's  sleeve,  and  is  the 
follower  of  no  party.  His  opinions  are  his  own  ;  but  what  they 
are  we  pretend  not  to  know,  further  than  they  are  developed  in 
this  discourse.  He  has  here  brought  forward  the  charge  against 
many  of  his  brethren,  whom  he  loves,  and  who  love  him,  of  be- 
lieving in  physical  depravity  and  physical  regeneration.  On  what 
grounds  he  rests  the  charge  we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining,  but 
from  the  opinions  advanced  in  this  discourse.  We  are  anxious  to 
show,  that,  as  far  as  old  Calvinists  are  concerned,  the  imputation  is 
unfounded.  And  we  think  that  we  have  shown,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  every  candid  reader,  that  these  doctrines  are  constantly  and  ex- 
plicitly disclaimed  by  this  class  of  theologians.  When  it  is  assert- 
ed, therefore,  in  the  face  of  such  positive  declarations  to  the  con- 
trary, that  they  do  entertain  these  opinions,  it  can  only  be  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  fair  inferences  from  the  principles  which 
they  avow.  This,  though  a  very  improper  ground  for  a  direct 
imputation,  is  all,  we  are  persuaded,  that  can  exist.  How  Dr. 
Cox  would  endeavour  to  make  it  appear  that  these  are  fair  infer- 
ences we  do  not  know,  and  therefore  do  not  wish  to  be  considered, 
in  our  further  remarks  on  this  subject,  as  having  reference  to  Dr. 
Cox's  theological  opinions  any  further  than  they  are  distinctly 
avowed  in  this  sermon.  Our  object  is  simply  this  :  to  endeavour 
to  show  that  the  Calvinistic  doctrine,  that  regeneration  consists  in 
the  production  of  a  holy  habit  or  principle  in  the  soul,  fitting  and 
disposing  it  to  holy  acts,  is  not  liable  to  the  charge  here  advanced. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  take  up  much  time  or  space  in  prov- 
ing that  the  doctrine  of  regeneration,  as  just  stated,  is  that  which 
is  held  by  old  Calvinists.  Charnock,  page  85,  vol.  ii.,  says,  "  This 
new  creation  consists  in  gracious  qualities  and  habits  which  beau- 
tify and  dispose  the  soul  to  act  righteously  and  holily."  Owen 
says  the  new  creation  is  "  an  habitual  holy  principle  wrought  in 
us  by  God,  and  bearing  his  image,"  or,  as  in  the  next  sentence,  "  a 
divine  supernatural  principle,  of  spiritual  actions  and  operations," 

We  prefer,  however,  referring  to  the  statements  of  a  few  of  the 
theologians  of  our  own  country,  some  of  whom  do  not  belong  to 
the  class  which,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  we  have  called  old 
Calvinists.  President  Edwards  not  only  admits  that  moral  princi- 
ples or  habits  may  and  must  exist  in  the  soul  prior  (in  the  order  of 
nature)  to  moral  action,  but  his  whole  system  of  practical  theology, 


REGENERATION.  381 

as  it  seems  to  us,  rests  on  this  foundation.  The  great  fundamental 
principle  of  his  work  on  the  affections  is  this : — All  gracious  or 
spiritual  affections  presuppose  and  arise  from  spiritual  views  of 
divine  truth.  These  views  the  natural  man  neither  has,  nor  can 
have,  while  he  remains  such.  Hence  arises  the  necessity  of  such 
a  change  being  wrought  in  the  state  of  the  soul,  that  it  can  per- 
ceive the  real  beauty  and  excellence  of  divine  things.  This  change 
consists  in  imparting  to  the  soul  what  he  calls  "a  new  sense,"  or  a 
new  taste,  or  relish,  or  principle,  adapted  to  the  perception  and  love 
of  spiritual  excellence.  Were  we  to  attempt  to  exhibit  all  the  evi- 
dence which  might  be  adduced  in  proof  of  the  fact  that  his  views 
were  such  as  we  have  represented,  we  should  be  obliged  to  quote 
a  great  part  of  the  work  just  mentioned.  We  refer  the  reader 
especially  to  what  he  says  on  the  first  and  fourth  signs  of  gracious 
affections.  With  regard  to  the  nature  of  regeneration,  we  quote 
only  a  single  passage.  After  having  stated  that  the  exercises  of 
the  true  Christian  are  specifically  different  from  those  of  unsancti- 
fied  men,  he  infers  that  if  the  exercises  are  different,  the  principle 
whence  they  proceed  must  be  different,  or  there  must  be,  "'as  it 
were,  a  new  spiritual  sense,  or  a  principle  of  new  kind  of  percep- 
tion or  spiritual  sensation."  And  he  hence  explains  why  it  is  that 
"  the  work  of  the  Spirit  of  God  in  regeneration  is  often,  in  scrip- 
ture, compared  to  giving  a  new  sense,  giving  eyes  to  see,  and  ears 
to  hear,  unstopping  the  ears  of  the  deaf,  and  opening  the  eyes  of 
them  that  were  born  blind,  and  turning  them  from  darkness  unto 
light."     The  nature  of  this  "  hew  sense"  he  thus  explains. 

"  This  new  sense,  and  the  new  dispositions  that  attend  it,  are  no 
new  faculties,  but  are  new  principles  of  nature.  I  use  the  word 
principles,  for  want  of  a  word  of  a  more  determinate  signification. 
By  a  principle  of  nature,  in  this  place,  1  mean  that  foundation 
which  is  laid  in  nature,  either  old  or  new,  for  any  particular  kind 
or  manner  of  exercise  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul ;  or  a  natural 
habit,  or  foundation  for  action,  giving  a  person  ability  and  disposi- 
tion to  exert  the  faculties  in  exercises  of  such  a  certain  kind  ;  so 
that  to  exert  the  faculties  in  that  kind  of  exercises,  may  be  said  to 
be  his  nature.  So  this  new  spiritual  sense  is  not  a  new  faculty  of 
understanding,  but  it  is  a  new  foundation  laid  in  the  nature  of  the 
soul,  for  a  new  kind  of  exercises  of  the  same  faculty  of  under- 
standing. So  that  new  holy  disposition  of  the  heart  that  attends 
this  new  sense,  is  not  a  new  faculty  of  the  will,  but  a  foundation 
laid  in  the  nature  of  the  soul  for  a  new  kind  of  exercises  of  the 
same  faculty  of  will.  The  Spirit  of  God,  in  all  his  operations  on 
the  minds  of  natural  men,  only  moves,  impresses,  assists,  improves, 
or  some  way  acts  upon  natural  principles,  but  gives  no  new  spi- 
ritual principles."* 

We  have  never  met  with  a  stronger  or  more  formal  statement 

*  Treatise  concerning  Religious  Affections,  pp.  231,  232.     Elizabethtown  edition, 

1787. 


382  REGENERATION'. 

of  the  doctrine  which  we  are  endeavouring  to  support,  than  is 
found  in  this  passage.  And  it  should  be  considered  that  this  is  not 
a  passing  remark  on  the  part  of  President  Edwards,  or  the  state- 
ment of  an  isolated  opinion,  but  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of 
his  whole  theology,  as  we  understand  it.  Take  this  away,  and  his 
whole  theory  of  original  righteousness,  original  sin,  of  the  nature 
of  holiness,  and  the  nature  of  sin,  and  of  the  liberty  of  the  will, 
go  with  it.  Whether  his  views  on  these  subjects  are  correct,  al- 
though the  main  question,  is  one  thing,  but  that  he  really  enter- 
tained the  opinion  here  so  clearly  expressed,  we  wonder  that  any 
man  should  ever  have  doubted.  We  trust  that  respect  for  the 
memory  of  President  Edwards,  and  the  obligation  "  to  interpret 
language  according  to  the  known  and  declared  nature  of  the  thing 
described,"  will  prevent  any  one  saying,  that  he  believed  that  "  this 
new  sense"  is  an  entity,  or  "  this  foundation"  for  moral  exercises 
is  "  something  inserted  in  the  soul,"  "  an  agent  within  an  agent," 
&c,  &c. 

Dr.  Bellamy  seems  to  teach  the  same  doctrines  as  President  Ed- 
wards with  regard  to  spiritual  blindness,  the  necessity  of  divine 
illumination  prior  to  the  exercise  of  any  holy  affections,  and  the 
nature  of  regeneration.  In  the  second  volume  of  his  works,  page 
502,  he  says,  "  In  regeneration  there  is  a  new,  divine,  and  holy 
taste  begotten  in  the  heart,  by  the  immediate  influences  of  the 
Holy  Spirit."  And  on  the  opposite  page,  "  The  idea  of  a  natural 
beauty  supposes  an  internal  sense,  implanted  by  our  Creator,  by 
which  the  mind  is  capacitated  to  discern  such  kind  of  beauty." 
"  And  that  the  idea  of  spiritual  beauty  supposes  an  internal  spiritual 
sense,  communicated  to  the  soul  by  the  Spirit  of  God  in  the  work  of 
the  new  creation,  is  clearly  illustrated  and  proved  by  a  late  divine, 
whose  praise  is  in  all  the  churches."  He  here  refers  his  readers 
to  Edwards  on  Religious  Affections. 

Dr.  Dwight  taught  the  same  doctrine,  and  that  clearly  and  de- 
finitely. In  his  discourse  on  the  nature  of  regeneration,*  he  says, 
"  This  change  of  heart  consists  in  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects, 
communicated  to  it  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost."  That 
"  this  relish"  was  antecedent,  according  to  his  view,  to  all  holy 
acts,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  because  he  expressly  asserts  it,  and 
because  his  arguments  go  to  prove  it.  What  he  calls  "  a  relish  for 
spiritual  objects,"  he  elsewhere  calls  a  holy  disposition,  and  refers 
to  the  case  of  Adam  for  an  illustration  of  its  nature.  "  When 
God  created  Adam,"  he  remarks,  "  there  was  a  period  of  his  exist- 
ence after  he  began  to  be,  antecedent  to  that  in  which  he  exercised 
the  first  volition.  Every  man  who  believes  the  mind  to  be  some- 
thing besides  ideas  and  exercises,  and  does  not  admit  the  doctrine 
of  casualty,  will  acknowledge  that  in  this  period  the  mind  of  Adam 
was  in  such  a  state,  that  he  was  propense  to  the  exercise  of  virtu- 
ous volitions  rather  than  that  of  sinful  ones.     This  state  of  mind 

*  Works,  vol.  ii.,  p.  418. 


REGENERATION.  383 

has  been  commonly  styled  disposition,  temper,  inclination,  heart, 
&c.  In  the  scriptures  it  usually  bears  the  last  of  these  names.  1 
shall  take  the  liberty  to  call  it  disposition.  This  disposition  in 
Adam  was  the  cause  whence  his  virtuous  volitions  proceeded  ;  the 
reason  why  they  were  virtuous  and  not  sinful.  Of  the  metaphy- 
sical nature  of  this  cause  I  am  ignorant ;  but  its  existence  is,  in  my 
view,  certainly  proved  by  its  effects."  Again,  on  the  same  page, 
"  In  regeneration,  the  very  same  thing  is  done  by  the  Spirit  of  God 
for  the  soul,  which  was  done  for  Adam  by  the  same  Divine  Agent 
at  his  creation.  The  soul  of  Adam  was  created  with  a  relish  for 
spiritual  objects.  The  soul  of  every  man  who  becomes  a  Chris- 
tian is  renewed  by  the  communication  of  the  same  relish.  In  Adam 
this  disposition  produced  virtuous  volitions.  In  every  child  of 
Adam,  who  becomes  the  subject  of  virtue,  it  produces  the  same 
effects."  The  same  idea  is  expressed,  if  possible,  even  more  for- 
mally in  the  same  volume,  page  451,  where,  among  other  things 
equally  explicit,  he  says  that  by  this  disposition  he  intends  "  the 
cause,  which  in  the  mind  of  man  produces  all  virtuous  affections 
and  volitions."  The  same  doctrine  is  repeatedly  taught  in  other 
passages  of  his  works,  as  in  the  sermons  on  the  Probation  of  Man, 
vol.  i.,  394,  on  the  Fall,  410,  413,  on  Depravity  as  derived  from 
Adam,  &c. 

From  various  passages  which  occur  in  the  pamphlet  of  Dr.  Ty- 
ler, already  mentioned,  we  infer  that  he  holds  the  same  doctrine. 
The  same  principle  (that  moral  disposition  may  exist  antecedently 
to  all  moral  acts)  is  also  frequently  and  clearly  asserted  by  Dr. 
Woods  of  Andover,  in  his  controversy  with  Dr.  Ware.  We  refer 
to  the  opinions  of  these  distinguished  men,  to  show  how  united 
Calvinists,  old  and  new,  are  in  their  views  on  this  point,  and  that  if 
the  charge  of  believing  in  physical  depravity  and  physical  regene- 
ration be  sustained,  it  lies  on  almost  the  whole  Calvinistic  world. 
Still  the  main  question  recurs — is  the  charge  well  founded  ? 

The  main  principle,  as  before  stated,  which  is  assumed  by  those 
who  make  this  charge  is,  that  we  can  only  regard  the  soul  as  to  its 
substance  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  actions  on  the  other.  If,  there- 
fore, there  be  any  change  wrought  in  the  soul  other  than  of  its 
acts,  it  must  be  a  physical  change.  And  if  any  tendency,  either 
to  sin  or  holiness,  exist  prior  to  choice,  it  is  a  positive  existence,  a 
real  entity.  Thus  the  charge  of  physical  depravity  and  physical 
regeneration  is  fairly  made  out.  We  are  constrained  to  confess, 
that  if  the  premises  are  correct,  the  conclusions,  revolting  as  they 
are,  and  affecting,  as  they  do,  the  fair  names  of  so  large  a  portion 
of  the  Christian  church,  are  valid.  The  principle  itself,  however, 
we  believe  to  be  a  gratuitous  assumption.  It  is  inconsistent  with 
the  common,  and  as  we  believe,  correct  idea  of  habits,  both  con- 
natural and  acquired.  The  word  habit  (habitus)  was  used  by  the 
old  writers  precisely  in  the  same  sense  as  "principle"  by  President 
Edwards,  as  explained  above,  or  disposition,  as  used  and  explained 
by  President  Dwight.     That  there  are  such  habits  or  dispositions 


384  REGENERATION. 

which  can  be  resolved  neither  into " essential  attributes"  nor  "acts," 
we  maintain  to  be  the  common  judgment  of  mankind.  Let  us 
take  for  illustration  an  instance  of  an  acquired  habit  of  the  lowest 
kind,  the  skill  of  an  artist.  He  has  a  soul  with  the  same  essential 
attributes  as  other  men ;  his  body  is  composed  of  the  same  mate- 
rials ;  and  the  same  law  regulates  the  obedience  of  his  muscular 
actions  to  his  mind.  By  constant  practice  he  has  acquired,  what 
is  usually  denominated  skill ;  an  ability  to  go  through  the  pro- 
cesses of  his  art,  with  greater  facility,  exactness  and  success  than 
ordinary  men.  Take  this  man  while  asleep  or  engaged  in  any  in- 
different occupation,  you  have  a  soul  and  body  not  differing  in  any 
of  their  essential  attributes  from  those  of  other  men.  Still  there 
is  a  difference.  What  is  it  ?  Must  it  be  either  "  a  real  existence, 
an  entity,"  an  act  or  nothing  ?  It  cannot  be  "  an  entity,"  for  it  is 
acquired,  and  it  will  hardly  be  maintained  that  a  man  can  acquire 
a  new  essential  attribute.  Neither  is  it  an  act,  for  the  man  has 
his  skill  when  it  is  not  exercised.  Yet  there  is  certainly  "  some- 
thing," which  is  the  ground  of  certainty,  that  when  called  to  go 
through  the  peculiar  business  of  his  art,  he  will  do  it  with  an  ease 
and  rapidity  impossible  for  common  men.  It  is  as  impossible  not 
to  admit  that  this  ground  or  reason  exists,  in  order  to  account  for 
the  effect,  as  it  is  not  to  admit  the  existence  of  the  soul  to  account 
for  its  exercises.  By  constant  practice,  a  state  of  mind  and  body 
has  been  produced  adapted  to  secure  these  results,  and  which  ac- 
counts for  their  character.  But  this  is  the  definition  of  principle 
or  habit  as  given  above.  A  single  circumstance  is  here  wanting 
which  is  found  in  other  "  habits,"  and  that  is,  there  is  not  the  ten- 
dency or  proneness  to  those  particular  acts  to  which  this  state  of 
mind  is  adapted.  This  difference,  however,  arises  not  from  any 
difference  in  the  "habits"  themselves,  but  from  the  nature  of  the 
faculties  in  which,  so  to  speak,  they  inhere.  A  principle  in  the 
will  (in  its  largest  sense,  including  all  the  active  powers),  is  not 
only  a  state  of  mind  adapted  to  certain  acts,  but  prone  to  produce 
them.  This  is  not  the  case,  at  least  to  the  same  degree,  with  in- 
tellectual habits.  Both  classes,  however,  come  within  the  defini- 
tion given  by  President  Edwards  and  Dr.  Dwight, — "  a  state  of 
mind,"  or  "  foundation  for  any  particular  kind  of,exercise  of  the 
faculties  of  the  soul."  The  same  remarks  may  be  made  with 
regard  to  habits  of  a  more  purely  intellectual  character.  A  man, 
by  devoting  himself  to  any  particular  pursuit,  gradually  acquires 
a  facility  in  putting  forth  the  mental  exercises  which  it  requires. 
This  implies  no  change  of  essence  in  the  soul ;  and  it  is  not  merely 
an  act,  which  is  the  result  of  this  practice.  The  result,  whatever 
it  is,  is  an  attribute  of  the  man  under  all  circumstances,  and  not 
merely  when  engaged  in  the  exercises  whence  the  habit  was 
acquired. 

But  to  come  nearer  to  the  case  in  hand.     We  say  a  man  has  a 
malignant  disposition,  or  an  amiable  disposition.     What  is  to  be 


REGENERATION.  385 

understood  by  these  expressions  ?     Is  it  merely  that  he  often  in- 
dulges malignant  or  amiable  feelings  ?  or  is  it  not  rather  that  there 
is  an  habitual  proneness  or  tendency  to  their  indulgence  ?     Surely 
the  latter.      But,  if  so,  the  principle   stated  above,  that  we  can 
regard  the  soul  only  as  to  its  substance  or  its  actions,  cannot  be 
correct.     For  the  result  of  a  repetition  of  acts  of  the  same  kind 
is  an  abiding  tendency,  which  is  itself  neither  an  act  (eminent  or 
imminent)  nor  an  "  entity."     Here,  then,  is  the  soul  with  its  essen- 
tial attributes — an  habitual  tendency  to  certain  exercises,  and  the 
exercises  themselves.     The  tendency  is  not  an  act,  nor  an  active 
state  of  the  feelings  in  question ;  for  it  would  be  a  contradiction 
to  say  that  a  man  whose  heart  was  glowing  with  parental  affec- 
tion, or  filled  for  the  time  with  any  other  amiable  feeling,  had  at 
the   same  moment  the  malignant  feelings  in  an  active  state,  al- 
though there  might  exist  the  greatest  proneness  to  their  exercise. 
We  have  seen  no  analysis  of  such  dispositions  which  satisfies  us 
that  they  can  be  reduced  to  acts.     For  it  is  essential  to  the  nature 
of  an  act  that  it  should  be  a  matter  of  consciousness.      This  is 
true  of  those  which  are  imminent  acts  of  the  will,  or  ultimate 
choices  (by  which  a  fixed  state  of  the  affections  is  meant  to  be  ex- 
pressed), as  well  as  of  all  others.     But  a  disposition  or  principle, 
as  explained  above,  is  not  a  matter  of  consciousness.     A  man  may 
be  aware  that  he  has  a  certain  disposition,  as  he  is  aware  of  the 
existence  of  his  soul,  from  the  consciousness  of  its  acts,  but  the 
disposition  itself  is  not  a  subject  of  direct  consciousness.     It  exists 
when  the  man  is  asleep  or  in  a  swoon,  and  unconscious  of  any- 
thing.    Neither  can  these  habits  be  with  any  propriety  called  a 
choice,  or  permanent  affection.     For  in  many  cases  they  are  a 
mere  proneness  to  acts  which  have  their  foundation  in  a  constitu- 
tional principle  of  the  mind.     Our  object  at  present  is  merely  to 
show,  that  we  must  admit  that  there  are  mental  habits  which  can- 
not be  resolved  either  into  essential  attributes  of  the  soul,  fixed 
preferences,  or  subordinate  acts ;    and  consequently,  that  those 
who  believe  in  dispositions,  prior  to  all  acts,  do  not  necessarily 
maintain  that  such  dispositions  are  of  the  essence  of  the  soul  itself. 
If  it  be  within  the  compass  of  the  divine  power  to  produce  in  us 
that,  which  by  constant  exercise  we  can  produce  in  ourselves,  then 
a  holy  principle  or  habit  may  be  the  result  of  the  Spirit's  influence 
in  regeneration,  without  any  physical  change  having  been  wrought. 
But  it  is  not  only  objected,  that  regeneration  is  a  physical  change, 
if  anything  beyond  a  change  in  the  exercises  of  the  soul  is  effected  ; 
but  it  is  said,  that  the  thing  contended  for  is  utterly  unintelligible,  in- 
capable of  definition  or  explanation.     We  are  ready  to  acknow- 
ledge that  it  admits  of  no  other  explanation  than  that  which  is  derived 
from  stating  its  effects,  and  referring  to  cases  of  an  analogous  kind. 
There  is  in  all  men  a  social  principle,  as  it  is  called,  which  is  some- 
thing else  than  a  desire  to  live  in  society,  because  it  is  connatural, 
as  may  be  inferred  from  its  universality  ;  there  is  a  tendency  in  all 
men  to  love  their  children,  which  is  something  besides  loving  them ; 

25 


386  REGENERATION. 

there  is  a  tendency  in  man  also  to  sympathize  in  the  sufferings  of 
others,  &c.  It  may  be  said  these  are  all  constitutional  tendencies 
implanted  in  our  nature.  This  is  very  true  ;  but  does  saying  this 
enable  us  to  understand  their  nature  ?  May  it  not  be  objected  to 
those  who  employ  this  language,  You  are  using  words  without 
meaning ;  what  do  you  know  of  a  social  principle  distinct  from 
the  actual  desire  to  live  in  society,  or  prior  to  its  exercise  ?  What 
idea  can  you  form  of  a  principle  of  self-love,  excepting  actually 
loving  one's  self?  Are  we  then  to  deny  that  there  are  any  such 
original  propensities  or  tendencies  as  these  implanted  in  our  nature, 
because  we  cannot  directly  conceive  of  them  ?  Yet  Dr.  Cox  says, 
in  reference  to  this  subject,  "  By  holy  principle,  J  mean  love  to 
God,  and  by  love  to  God  I  mean  actually  loving  him."  On  the 
same  principle,  he  might  deny  the  existence  of  any  of  the  original 
dispositions  or  tendencies  of  the  soul.  For  they  are  as  incapable 
of  being  defined,  as  the  holy  principle  which  is  produced  in  rege- 
neration. The  soul  itself  is  in  the  same  predicament.  We  know 
nothing  of  it  but  from  our  consciousness  of  its  acts.  And  if  the 
objection  which  we  are  now  considering  be  valid  against  the  ex- 
istence of  principles  prior  to  acts,  then  it  is  valid  against  the  ex- 
istence of  the  soul.  We  are  conscious  only  of  its  exercises  ;  and 
therefore  some  philosophers  and  theologians  tell  us,  we  are  not 
authorized  to  go  any  further.  The  existence  of  a  substance  apart 
from  the  exercises  is  not  necessary  to  account  for  their  existence, 
and  therefore  is  a  gratuitous  assumption.  An  assumption,  too,  of 
the  being  of  something  which  we  are  incapable  of  defining,  ex- 
plaining, or  even  conceiving.  The  reply  which  Dr.  Cox  would 
make  to  this  reasoning,  is  probably  the  same  that  we  should  be 
disposed  to  make  to  his  objection  against  the  existence  of  holy 
principles  prior  to  holy  acts.  For  the  mind  as  instinctively  seeks  a 
reason  for  the  choice  which  the  soul  makes  in  loving  God,  as  it  does 
for  the  various  ideas  and  exercises  of  which  it  is  constantly  con- 
scious. And  we  should  probably  be  as  little  satisfied  with  the 
reasons  which  Dr.  Cox  could  assign  to  account  for  this  choice, 
as  he  would  be  with  those  of  the  defenders  of  the  exercise  scheme 
to  account  for  these  exercises  without  resorting  to  a  thinking  sub- 
stance. If  he  were  to  say,  that  the  effect  is  produced  by  the  Holy 
Spirit,  we  should  answer  that  this  can  only  be  done  in  one  of  three 
ways  that  we  can  conceive  of.  First,  either  by  his  direct  agency 
producing  the  choice,  in  which  case  it  would  be  no  act  of  ours ; 
or,  secondly,  by  addressing  such  motives  to  our  constitutional  and 
natural  principle  of  self-love  as  should  induce  us  to  make  the 
choice,  in  which  case  there  would  be  no  morality  in  the  act ;  or, 
thirdly,  by  producing  such  a  relish  for  the  divine  character,  that 
the  soul  as  spontaneously  and  immediately  embraces  Gol  as  its 
portion,  as  it  rejoices  in  the  perception  of  beauty.  The  thing  con- 
tended for  is  not  more  unintelligible  than  a  hundred  things  of  like 
nature.  Taste  is  the  ready  perception  and  quick  feeling  of  natu- 
ral beauty.     That  is,  these  are  its  effects.     But  no  one  can  directly 


REGENERATION.  387 

conceive  of  it,  as  it  is  an  attribute  of  the  mind,  either  original  or 
acquired.  It  is  absolutely  certain,  however,  that  the  man  who 
does  thus  readily  perceive  and  feel  the  beauty  of  natural  objects, 
has  a  quality  of  mind  which  a  clown  does  not  possess.  And  we 
should  be  astonished  to  hear  any  one  maintain  that  there  was  no 
such  thing  as  taste,  but  the  exercise.  "  By  taste  I  mean  the  love 
of  beauty,  and  by  love  of  beauty  I  mean  actually  loving  it,  and 
that  is  an  act  and  not  a  principle."  But  why  does  one  man  see 
and  feel  a  beauty  in  certain  objects,  when  others  do  not?  Is  there 
no  difference  between  the  clown  and  the  most  refined  votary  in 
the  arts,  but  in  their  acts  ?  Is  any  man  satisfied  by  being  told  that 
one  loves  them,  and  the  other  does  not ;  that  it  is  in  vain  to  ask 
why ;  the  fact  is  enough,  and  the  fact  is  all ;  there  is  no  difference 
in  the  state  of  their  minds  antecedent  to  their  acts ;  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  as  a  principle  of  taste,  or  sense  of  beauty,  distinct 
from  the  actual  love  of  beauty  ?  We  are  disposed  to  think  that 
no  man  can  believe  this :  that  the  constitution  of  our  nature  forces 
us  to  admit,  that  if  one  man,  under  all  circumstances,  and  at  all 
times,  manifests  this  quick  sensibility  to  natural  beauty,  and  another 
does  not,  there  is  some  difference  between  the  two  besides  their 
acts ;  that  there  is  some  reason  why,  when  standing  before  the 
same  picture,  one  is  filled  with  pleasure,  and  the  other  is  utterly 
insensible.  We  cannot  help  believing  that  one  has  taste  (a  quality, 
principle,  or  "  inward  sense ")  which  the  other  does  not  possess. 
It  matters  not  what  it  may  be  called.  It  is  the  ground  or  reason 
of  the  diversity  of  their  exercises,  which  lies  back  of  the  exercises 
themselves,  and  must  be  assumed  to  account  for  the  difference  of 
their  nature.  Now,  there  is  moral,  as  well  as  natural  beauty,  and 
it  is  no  more  unintelligible  that  there  should  be  a  "sense,"  or  taste, 
for  the  one  than  for  the  other.  The  perfect  character  of  God, 
when  exhibited  to  different  men,  produces  delight  and  desire  in 
some,  repugnance  in  others.  We  instinctively  ask  why  ?  Why 
do  some  perceive  and  delight  in  his  moral  beauty,  while  others  do 
not  1  The  answer,  some  love,  and  others  do  not,  is  no  answer  at 
all.  It  is  merely  saying  the  same  thing,  in  other  words.  There 
must  be  some  reason  why  one  perceives  this  kind  of  beauty,  to 
which  others  are  blind  ;  why  one  is  filled  with  love  the  moment 
it  is  presented,  and  the  other  with  repugnance.  And  this  reason 
must  lie  back  of  the  mere  exercise  of  this  affection,  must  be  some- 
thing besides  the  act  itself,  and  such  as  shall  account  for  its  nature. 
It  may  be  said,  however,  that  the  cases  are  not  analogous:  that 
the  emotion  excited  by  beauty  is  involuntary,  while  moral  objects 
address  themselves  to  the  voluntary  affections ;  and  that  it  is  admit- 
ted, that  there  is  not  only  "something"  back  of  each  exercise  of 
love,  but  we  are  told  distinctly  what  it  is,  viz.,  the  soul  with  its 
essential  attributes,  its  ultimate  or  supreme  choice,  or  dominant 
affection,  and  the  object  in  view  of  the  mind.  Accordingly,  it  is 
easily  accounted  for,  that  when  the  character  of  God  is  presented, 
one  man  is  filled  with  love,  another  with  repugnance.     The  reason 


388  REGENERATION. 

of  the  difference  in  these  acts  does,  indeed  lie  back  of  the  acts 
themselves  ;  for  it  is  found  in  the  ultimate  or  supreme  choice  of 
the  different  individuals.  But  how  is  this  to  be  accounted  for  ? 
If  there  is  no  necessity  for  accounting  for  the  particular  character 
of  the  first  or  ultimate  choice  (if  so  it  must  needs  be  called),  there 
is  no  need  of  accounting  for  the  others.  The  difficulty  is  not  at 
all  met  by  this  statement.  It  is  only  pushed  back,  from  the  sec- 
ondary and  subordinate,  to  the  primary  and  dominant  preference. 
There  it  returns.  The  question  still  is,  why  does  the  soul  of  one 
man  make  this  supreme  choice  of  God,  or,  in  other  words,  love 
him,  while  another  sets  his  affections  on  the  world?  There  is  pre- 
cisely the  same  necessity  for  assuming  some  ground  or  reason  for 
the  nature  of  the  first  choice,  as  for  any  acts  subordinate  and  sub- 
sequent to  it.  Let  us  suppose  two  individuals  called  into  exist- 
ence, in  the  full  maturity  of  their  faculties  ;  each  has  a  soul  with 
the  same  constitutional  powers,  or  essential  attributes;  the  one  is 
filled  with  delight  the  moment  the  character  of  God  is  presented, 
and  the  other  is  not ;  or  the  one  loves  his  Maker  as  soon  as  the 
idea  of  his  excellence  is  presented,  the  other  does  not.  According 
to  this  theory,  there  is  no  reason  for  this  difference.  There  is 
nothing  back  of  the  first  act  of  choice  that  is  not  common  to  both. 
If  instead  of  two  individuals,  we  suppose  two  millions,  one  portion 
having  their  affections  spontaneously  called  forth  on  their  first  view 
of  their  Maker,  the  other  unaffected ;  we  have  only  a  greater  number 
of  effects  without  a  cause,  but  the  case  is  the  same.  It  will  not  do  to 
answer,  that  the  choice  is  made  under  the  influence  of  the  desire 
of  happiness,  for  this  being  common  to  all,  is  no  reason  for  the  dif- 
ference of  the  result,  which  is  the  very  thing  to  be  accounted  for. 
To  say  that  the  choice  is  made  under  the  influence  of  the  desire 
of  happiness,  is  only  to  say,  that  when  the  character  of  God  is 
presented  it  gives  pleasure.  But  the  same  character  is  presented 
in  both  cases,  the  same  desire  exists  in  both,  yet  in  one  it  gives 
pleasure,  is  an  object  of  desire ;  in  the  other  not.  This  is  the  fact 
which  is  left  entirely  unaccounted  for  on  the  theory  in  question, 
and  for  which  the  mind  as  instinctively  seeks  a  question,  as  it  does 
for  any  other  effect.  To  account  for  the  difference  from  the  nature 
of  agency,  is  to  assume  the  liberty  of  indifference.  For  if  the 
choice  be  made  prior  to  the  rising  of  desire  towards  the  object, 
then  it  is  made  in  indifference,  and  is  of  no  moral  character.  If 
the  desire  rise,  it  is  love ;  which  is  the  very  thing  to  be  accounted 
for.  We  are  at  a  loss  to  see  how  this  theory  is  to  be  reconciled 
with  the  Calvinists'  doctrine  on  the  will,  which  is  not  peculiar  to 
Edwards,  but  constituted  the  great  dividing  line  between  Calvin- 
ists and  Arminians  from  the  beginning.  We  feel,  therefore,  a  ne- 
cessity for  assuming  that  there  is  "  something "  back  of  the  first 
moral  act,  besides  the  soul  and  its  essential  attributes,  which  will 
account  for  the  nature  of  that  act,  which  constitutes  the  reason 
why,  in  the  case  supposed,  the  soul  of  the  one  individual  rose  im- 
mediately to  God,  and  the  other  did  not ;   and  the  "  something n 


REGENERATION.  389 

assumed  in  this  case  is  no  more  indefinite  and  undefineable,  than 
the  constitutional  propensity  to  live  in  society,  to  love  our  chil- 
dren, or  the  mental  quality  called  taste,  all  which  are  assumed 
from  a  necessity  not  more  imperious  than  that  which  requires  a 
holy  principle  to  account  for  the  delight  experienced  in  view  of 
the  character  of  God.  And  if  our  Maker  can  endow  us  not  only 
with  the  general  susceptibility  of  love,  but  also  with  a  specific 
disposition  to  love  our  children ;  if  he  can  give  us  a  discernment 
and  susceptibility  of  natural  beauty,  he  may  give  us  a  taste  for 
spiritual  loveliness.  And  if  that  taste,  by  reason  of  sin,  is  vitiated 
and  perverted,  he  may  restore  it  by  the  influences  of  his  Spirit 
in  Regeneration.  Neither,  therefore,  the  objection,  that  what  is 
not  an  act,  must  be  an  essential  attribute ;  nor  the  unintelligible 
nature  of  a  "  principle  of  nature,"  is,  in  our  view,  any  valid  objec- 
tion to  the  common  doctrine  on  regeneration. 

There  is  a  third  objection,  however,  to  this  doctrine,  and  that  is, 
that  it  renders  the  sinner  excusable,  because  it  makes  regeneration 
to  consist  in  something  else  than  the  sinner's  own  act.  This  objec- 
tion, as  it  seems  to  us,  can  only  be  valid  on  one  or  the  other  of  two 
grounds  :  the  first  is,  that  the  common  doctrine  supposes  sin  to  be 
a  physical  defect,  and  regeneration  a  physical  change ;  and  the  se- 
cond is,  that  a  man  is  responsible  solely  for  his  acts,  or  that  there 
can  be  no  moral  principle  anterior  to  moral  action.  With  regard 
to  tlie  first,  it  is  enough  to  say,  that  no  physical  change,  according 
to  the  constant  declaration  of  Calvinistic  writers,  is  held  to  take 
place  in  regeneration,  and  that  no  such  change  is  implied  in  the 
production  of  a  holy  principle,  as  we  have  already  endeavoured  to 
show. 

The  second  ground  is  inconsistent  with  the  common  notions  of 
men  on  the  nature  of  virtue,  and,  if  true,  would  render  the  com- 
mencement of  holiness  or  regeneration  impossible.  It  is  according 
to  the  universal  feeling  and  judgment  of  men,  that  the  moral  cha- 
racter of  an  act  depends  upon  the  motive  with  which  it  is  done. 
This  is  so  obviously  true  that  Reid  and  Stewart,  and  almost  all 
other  advocates  of  the  liberty  of  indifference,  readily  admit  it.  And 
so  do  the  advocates  of  the  theory  on  which  this  objection  is  found- 
ed, with  regard  to  all  moral  acts,  excepting  the  first.  All  acts  of 
choice,  to  be  holy,  must  proceed  from  a  holy  motive,  excepting  the 
first  holy  choice  which  constitutes  regeneration;  that  may  be  made 
from  the  mere  desire  of  happiness  or  self-love.  We  confess  that 
this  strikes  us  as  very  much  like  a  relinquishment  of  the  whole 
system.  For  how  is  it  conceivable  that  anything  should  be  essen- 
tial to  the  very  nature  of  one  act  as  holy,  that  is  not  necessary  to 
another  ?  Is  not  this  saying  that  that  on  which  the  very  nature  of 
a  thing  depends  may  be  absent,  and  yet  the  thing  remain  the  same  ? 
Is  it  not  saying  that  that  which  makes  an  act  what  it  is,  and  gives 
it  its  character,  may  be  wanting  or  altered,  and  yet  the  character 
of  the  act  be  unaffected  ?  It  is  the  motive  which  gives  the  moral 
character  to  the  act     If  the  motive  is  good,  the  act  is  good  ;  if  the 


390  REGENERATION. 

motive  is  bad,  the  act  is  bad  ;  if  the  motive  is  indifferent,  so  is  the 
act.  The  act  has  no  character  apart  from  the  motive.  This,  it 
seems,  is  admitted  with  regard  to  all  moral  acts  excepting  the  first. 
But  the  first  act  of  a  holy  kind  is  an  act  of  obedience,  as  well  as 
all  subsequent  acts  of  the  same  kind.  How  then  is  it  conceivable 
that  the  first  act  of  obedience  performed  from  the  mere  desire  of 
happiness  or  self-love  can  be  holy,  when  no  other  act  of  the  same 
kind,  and  performed  from  the  same  motive,  either  is  or  can  be  ? 
How  does  its  being  first  alter  its  very  nature  ?  It  is  still  nothing 
more  than  an  act  done  for  self-gratification,  and  cannot  be  a  holy 
act.  It  is  said  we  must  admit  this,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
or  acknowledge  that  there  can  be  holiness  before  moral  action. 
We  prefer  admitting  the  latter,  and  believing  that  "  God  created 
man  upright,"  and  not  that  he  made  himself  so.  That  there  was  a 
disposition,  or  relish,  or  taste  for  holiness,  before  there  was  any  holy 
act,  which  to  us  is  far  more  reasonable  than  that  an  act  is  holy  be- 
cause the  first  of  a  series,  which,  if  performed  from  the  same  mo- 
tive at  a  different  point  of  the  line,  would  have  a  different  charac- 
ter. The  grand  objection,  we  know,  that  is  made  to  all  this  is,  that 
holy  beings  have  fallen,  which  it  is  maintained  would  be  impossible 
if  the  ground  here  assumed  is  correct.  If  the  character  of  an  act 
depends  on  its  motive,  a  sinful  act  cannot  be  performed  by  a  being 
in  whom  sin  does  not  already  exist ;  and,  consequently,  neither  the 
fallen  angels,  nor  Adam,  could  ever  have  apostatized.  We  think, 
however,  that  there  is  a  broad  difference  between  the  commence- 
ment of  holiness  and  the  commencement  of  sin,  and  that  more  is 
necessary  for  the  former  than  for  the  latter.  An  act  of  obedience, 
if  it  is  performed  under  the  mere  impulse  of  self-love,  is  virtually 
no  act  of  obedience.  It  is  not  performed  with  any  intention  to  obey, 
for  that  is  holy,  and  cannot,  according  to  the  theory,  precede  the 
act.  But  an  act  of  disobedience  performed  from  the  desire  of  hap- 
piness is  rebellion.  The  cases  are  surely  widely  different.  If  to 
please  myself  I  do  what  God  commands,  it  is  not  holiness ;  but  if 
to  please  myself  I  do  what  he  forbids,  it  is  sin.  Besides,  no  crea- 
ture is  immutable.  Though  created  holy,  the  taste  for  holy  enjoy- 
ments may  be  overcome  by  a  temptation  sufficiently  insidious  and 
powerful,  and  a  selfish  motive  or  feeling  excited  in  the  mind.  Nei- 
ther is  a  sinful  character  immutable.  By  the  power  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  the  truth  may  be  so  clearly  presented,  and  so  effectually  ap- 
plied, as  to  produce  that  change  which  is  called  regeneration ; 
that  is,  as  to  call  into  existence  a  taste  for  holiness,  so  that  it  is 
chosen  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  merely  as  a  means  of  happiness. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  theory  which  denies  the  possibi- 
lity of  moral  distinctions  being  carried  back  of  acts  of  choice, 
forces  its  advocates  to  adopt  the  opinion  that  the  first  holy  act  is 
specifically  different  from  all  others.  That  Adam  was  not  created 
holy,  but  by  choosing  God,  made  himself  holy,  and  that  this  choice, 
though  made  with  no  holy  motive  or  intention,  but  merely  from  a 
desire  of  happiness,  has  a  moral  character.     This  we  think  not  only 


REGENERATION.  391 

contradictory  to  the  express  declaration  of  scripture,  which  says 
that  man  was  created  in  the  image  of  his  Maker  (which  includes 
his  moral  as  well  as  his  natural  image,  as  we  are  taught  in  the  New 
Testament),  but  is  inconsistent  with  the  very  first  principles  of  mo- 
rals, as  it  teaches  that  an  act  performed  without  any  good  inten- 
tion or  motive,  is  yet  holy.  It  seems  to  us  liable,  also,  to  this  fur- 
ther objection,  that  it  represents  man's  obligation  to  love  God,  to 
rest  upon  the  fact  that  it  will  promote  his  happiness.  This  is  in- 
volved in  the  principle,  that  the  choice  made  from  this  motive  is  a 
good  choice ;  for  it  can  only  be  good  as  it  is  in  obedience  to  a  mo- 
ral obligation.  If  the  obligation  fulfilled  is  to  God,  then  to  fulfil  it 
must  be  the  motive.  If  the  motive  which  prompts  the  choice  have 
reference  to  himself,  then  the  only  obligation  which  he  fulfils,  is  to 
himself.  It  is  a  wise  decision,  but  it  is  no  holy  act.  If  it  be  said 
that  the  excellence  of  the  choice  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  object 
chosen,  it  is  giving  up  the  question.  For  if  the  excellence  of  the 
object  be  the  ground  of  the  choice,  it  can  act  as  a  motive  only  by 
exciting  a  desire  for  it  as  excellent,  which  must  needs  be  a  holy 
desire,  and  if  this  determines  the  choice,  then  the  man  is  holy  be- 
fore he  chooses  God  as  his  portion,  and  the  choice  is  the  result,  and 
not  the  cause  of  his  holiness.  Or,  if  we  call  the  desire  itself  the 
choice  (which  is  an  incorrect  use  of  terms),  still  the  case  is  the 
same.  For  the  best  definition  that  can  be  given  of  a  holy  being 
is,  that  holy  objects  excite  in  him  desire  as  soon  as  they  are  pre- 
sented. If  Adam,  therefore,  was  filled  with  desire  and  pleasure,  as 
soon  as  his  mind  rested  on  the  character  of  God,  then  he  was  cre- 
ated holy.  As  we  remarked  above,  this  theory,  that  the  first  moral 
act  is  not  performed  from  a  holy  motive,  but  from  the  constitution- 
al desire  of  happiness,  is  not  only  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  a 
holy  act,  but  affords  no  relief  in  the  case.  For  the  difficulty  still 
remains,  why  the  character  of  God  should  appear  desirable  to  one 
being,  and  not  to  another,  if  both  are  called  into  existence  in  puris 
naturalibus. 

That  Adam  was  created  holy,  that  is,  with  a  holy  disposition, 
which  existed  prior  to  his  first  holy  act,  though  necessarily  destruc- 
tive of  the  very  first  principle  of  the  theory  referred  to,  has  been 
considered  as  a  fixed  point  among  Calvinists.  We  have  already 
seen  that  Dr.  Dwight  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  prove  it.  Be- 
cause, he  says,  "evjry  man  who  believes  the  mind  to  be  something 
more  than  ideas  and  exercises,  and  does  not  admit  the  doctrine  of 
casualty,  will  acknowledge  "  it.  President  Edwards,  in  his  work 
on  original  sin,  has  a  whole  chapter,  in  which  he  endeavours  to 
prove  that  our  first  parents  were  created  in  righteousness,  or,  as  he 
expresses  it,  "  with  holy  principles  and  dispositions."  The  grand 
objection  against  this  doctrine,  he  says,  is  this:  "  that  it  is  utterly  in- 
consistent with  the  nature  of  virtue,  that  it  should  be  concreated 
with  any  person ;  because,  if  so,  it  must  be  by  an  act  of  God's  abso- 
lute power,  without  our  knowledge  or  concurrence  ;  and  that  mo- 
ral virtue,  in  its  very  nature,  implieth  the  choice  and  consent  of  the 


392  REGENERATION. 

moral  agent,  without  which  it  cannot  be  virtue  and  holiness  :  that 
a  necessary  holiness  is  no  holiness ;"  and  he  quotes  from  Dr.  Tay- 
lor, of  Norwich,  the  words,  "  Adam  must  exist,  he  must  be  created, 
yea,  he  must  exercise  thought  and  reflection  before  he  was  right- 
eous." To  this  he  replies,  "  In  the  first  place,  I  think  it  a  contra- 
diction to  the  nature  of  things,  as  judged  of  by  the  common  sense 
of  mankind.  It  is  agreeable  to  the  sense  of  the  minds  of  men  in 
all  ages,  not  only  that  the  fruit  or  effect  of  a  good  choice  is  virtu- 
ous, but  the  good  choice  itself,  from  which  that  effect  proceeds ; 
yea,  and  not  only  so,  but  also  the  antecedent  good  disposition,  tem- 
per, or  affection  of  mind  from  whence  proceeds  that  good  choice, 
is  virtuous.  This  is  the  general  notion,  not  that  principles  derive 
their  goodness  from  actions,  but  that  actions  derive  their  goodness 
from  the  principles  whence  they  proceed  ;  and  so  that  the  act  of 
choosing  that  which  is  good,  is  no  further  virtuous  than  it  proceeds 
from  a  good  principle,  or  virtuous  disposition  of  mind  ;  which  sup- 
poses, that  a  virtuous  disposition  of  mind  may  be  before  a  virtuous 
act  of  choice  ;  and  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there 
should  first  be  thought,  reflection,  and  choice,  before  there  can  be  any 
virtuous  disposition.  If  the  choice  be  first,  before  the  existence  of 
a  good  disposition  of  heart,  what  signifies  that  choice?  There 
can,  according  to  our  natural  notions,  be  no  virtue  in  a  choice 
which  proceeds  from  no  virtuous  principle,  but  from  mere  self-love, 
ambition,  or  some  animal  appetite." — P.  140.  If  there  was  a  holy 
disposition  before  there  was  "  thought,  reflection,  or  choice,"  Ed- 
wards most  assuredly  carried  moral  distinctions  back  of  moral  acts. 
That  by  so  doing  he  carried  them  into  the  "  essential  attributes  of 
the  soul,"  is  an  assertion  founded  on  the  assumption  that  what  is 
not  an  act  must  be  an  essential  attribute,  which  we  believe  few  are 
prepared  to  admit.  God  has  created  man  with  various  susceptibi- 
lities, dispositions  or  tendencies  of  mind  towards  objects  without 
himself;  these  tendencies  are  not  necessarily  "  real  existences,  en- 
tities," or  essential  attributes,  for  tendencies  or  habits  may,  as  be- 
fore remarked,  be  acquired,  as  the  skill  of  an  artist,  or  a  proneness 
to  any  particular  mental  exercise.  They  may  result  from  the  re- 
lative state  of  all  the  essential  attributes,  and  yet  be  no  "part  of  the 
soul "  themselves.  Their  nature,  however,  is  confessedly  as  incon- 
ceivable as  the  nature  of  the  soul,  and  no  more  so  ;  and  they  are 
as  necessarily  assumed  to  account  for  the  results  which  meet  our 
view,  as  the  soul  or  any  of  its  attributes.  If  a  million  of  intelligent 
beings,  the  first  moment  they  think  of  the  character  of  God,  are 
filled  with  desire  and  delight,  it  is  as  evident  that  they  were  created 
with  a  proneness  or  disposition  to  take  pleasure  in  holiness,  as  it  is 
that  the  hearts  of  mothers  have  an  innate  tendency  to  love  their 
children,  because  they  glow  with  delight  the  first  moment  they  are 
given  to  them.  Nothing,  we  think,  but  the  most  determined  adher- 
ence to  a  speculative  opinion,  can  prevent  any  man  acknowledging 
that  it  is  as  possible  for  the  mind  to  be  created  with  this  "  instinc- 
tive "  love  of  holiness,  as  with  a  disposition  for  any  other  specific 


REGENERATION.  393 

class  of  objects.  And  we  think,  too,  that  the  vast  body  of  men 
will  agree  with  President  Edwards  in  thinking  that  "  such  a  dispo- 
sition's being  natural,  or  from  a  kind  of  instinct,  implanted  in  the 
mind  in  its  creation,"  is  no  objection  to  its  being  of  a  virtuous  or 
moral  character.  Does  the  maternal  instinct  cease  to  be  amiable, 
because  it  is  natural  ?  Does  a  disposition  to  kindness  and  gentle- 
ness lose  its  character  by  being  innate  ?  Are  not  the  instinctive 
love  of  justice,  abhorrence  of  cruelty,  admiration  of  what  is  noble, 
which  God  has  implanted  in  our  nature,  objects  of  approbation  ? 
If  our  feelings  and  the  general  sense  of  mankind  answer  these 
questions  in  the  affirmative,  they  as  certainly  will  decide  that  an 
innate  disposition  to  love  God,  existing  in  the  mind  of  Adam  at  the 
moment  of  his  creation,  does  not  lose  its  moral  character  by  being 
innate.  The  common  feelings  and  judgment  of  men,  therefore,  do 
carry  moral  distinctions  back  of  acts  of  choice,  and  must  do  so 
unless  we  deny  that  virtue  ever  can  commence,  for  "  there  can, 
according  to  our  natural  notions,  be  no  virtue  in  a  choice  which 
proceeds  from  no  virtuous  principle,  but  from  mere  self-love." 

If  this  be  so,  the  very  foundation  of  the  objection  that  the  com- 
mon doctrine  of  regeneration  destroys  the  responsibility  of  the 
sinner  is  taken  away.  This  responsibility  rests  upon  the  fact,  that 
he  stands  in  the  relation  of  a  rational  and  moral  creature  to  God. 
He  has  all  the  attributes  of  a  moral  agent — understanding,  con- 
science, and  will.  He  has  unimpaired  the  liberty  of  acting  accord- 
ing to  his  own  inclinations.  His  mind  is  not  subject  to  any  law  of 
causation,  which  determines  his  acts  independently  of  himself. 
Motives,  as  external  to  the  mind,  have  no  influence,  but  as  the  mind 
itself,  according  to  the  laws  of  all  rational  creation,  is  affected  by 
them  and  voluntarily  admits  their  influence,  and  yields  to  it.  The 
responsibility  of  man,  therefore,  resting  on  the  immutable  obliga- 
tions which  bind  him  to  love  and  obey  God,  and  on  the  possession 
of  all  the  attributes  of  moral  agency,  is  not  destroyed  by  his  moral 
depravity,  of  which  the  want  of  a  disposition  to  holiness  is  an  in- 
tegral part.  He  does  not  love  God,  not  because  there  is  any  phy- 
sical defect  in  his  constitution,  but  because  his  moral  taste  is  per- 
verted by  reason  of  sin.  He  is  so  corrupt  that  even  infinite 
loveliness  appears  hateful  to  him.     There  can,  in  the  nature  of 

ings,  be  no  reason  why  an  intelligent  and  moral  being  should  be 
olind  to  moral  excellence,  excepting  moral  corruption.  And  if  this 
be  an  excuse,  then  the  more  depraved,  the  less  he  is  to  blame. 
How  he  became  thus  depraved  is  another  question, — but  it  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  point  before  us,  which  is,  the  nature  of  the 
inability  which  it  involves  to  love  God.  He  may  have  been  born 
so,  or  he  may  have  made  himself  so.  It  makes  no  difference  as  to 
this  point.  So  long  as  this  depravity  is  his  own,  his  own  moral 
character,  it  can  furnish  no  excuse  or  palliation  for  not  complying 
with  the  great  command  of  the  law  and  Gospel.  An  object 
worthy  of  all  affection  is  presented  to  his  view,  viz.,  the  divine 
character ;  he  is  capable  of  intellectually  apprehending  this  object. 


394  REGENERATION. 

If  blind  to  its  loveliness  it  is,  in  his  own  judgment  and  that  of  all 
men,  his  sin ;  it  is  the  very  height  of  corruption  to  view  as  un- 
lovely what  is  the  perfection  of  moral  beauty.  That  men  do  la- 
bour under  this  moral  blindness,  is  one  of  the  most  frequently 
asserted  doctrines  of  the  scriptures.  "  The  natural  man  receiveth 
not  the  things  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  for  they  are  foolishness  unto 
him ;  neither  can  he  know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  dis- 
cerned." "  These  things,"  says  our  Saviour,  "  will  they  do  unto 
you,  because  they  have  not  known  the  Father  nor  me."  "  To  know 
God  is  eternal  life."  We  are  said  to  be  saved  through  knowledge. 
The  Gospel  is  "  hid  to  them  that  are  lost."  Their  eyes  are  blinded. 
Light  has  shined  into  the  hearts  of  those  that  believe.  The  saints 
of  old  prayed  to  have  their  minds  illuminated  ;  and  Paul  intercedes 
for  his  fellow  Christians  earnestly  and  frequently  for  this  blessing, 
as  the  only  possible  means  of  their  sanctification.  This  is  so  plain, 
that  President  Edwards,  in  speaking  on  this  subject,  says,  "  There 
is  such  a  thing,  if  the  scriptures  are  of  any  use  to  teach  us  any- 
thing, as  a  spiritual,  supernatural  understanding  of  divine  things 
that  are  peculiar  to  the  saints,  and  which  those  who  are  not  saints 
know  nothing  of." — P.  298,  On  the  Affections.  The  cause  of  this 
blindness  is  sin,  and  therefore  it  is  inexcusable.  But  if  it  exists, 
there  is  an  evident  necessity  for  such  a  change  in  the  soul,  that  it 
shall  be  brought  to  see  this  beauty  of  holiness,  and  from  the  con- 
stitution of  our  nature,  this  change  must  precede  the  exercise  of 
love.  For  how  can  we  love  that  which  we  do  not  see.  The 
affections  must  have  an  object,  and  that  object  must  be  apprehend- 
ed in  its  true  nature,  in  order  to  be  truly  loved.  It  is  obvious, 
therefore,  that  regeneration,  to  be  of  a  moral  character  at  all,  must 
consist  in  such  a  change  as  brings  the  soul  into  a  state  to  see  and 
love  the  beauty  of  holiness.  It  matters  not  what  the  change  be 
called — a  "  spiritual  sense,"  or  "  a  taste,"  or  "  disposition  ;"  it  is  as 
necessary  as  that  an  object  should  be  seen  in  order  to  be  loved. 

Now  it  is  evident  that  all  this  must  be  denied  by  those  who 
make  regeneration  to  consist  in  the  "  act  of  loving  God,"  who  deny 
that  there  is  any  change  prior  in  the  order  of  nature  to  the  exer- 
cise of  love.  For  if  the  sinner  is  blind  to  God's  loveliness,  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  that  he  should  love  it,  until  he  is  brought  to 
see  it.  It  may  be  said,  that  this  is  to  render  the  sinner's  case  ab- 
solutely hopeless.  So  it  is.  And  they  do  but  delude  and  mock 
him,  who  represent  it  otherwise.  It  is  thus  the  Bible  represents  it. 
It  tells  him  that  the  natural  man  cannot  know  the  things  of  the 
Spirit  of  God.  And  it  is  moreover  necessary,  that  the  sinner 
should  be  brought  to  feel  that  his  case,  as  far  as  he  himself  is  con- 
cerned, is  absolutely  hopeless  ;  that  he  may  be  brought  to  fall,  with 
his  blind  and  wicked  heart,  at  the  feet  of  sovereign  mercy,  and 
cry,  Lord  save  me  !  or  I  perish.  But  does  this  make  the  sinner 
excusable  ?  not  unless  his  sin  is  his  excuse.  It  is  this,  and  this 
alone,  which  prevents  his  perception  of  the  loveliness  of  God,  and, 
therefore,  the  more  complete  his  blindness,  the  greater  his  loath- 


REGENERATION.  395 

someness  and  guilt.  The  two  sentiments  of  complete  helplessness, 
and  of  entire  blame-worthiness,  are  perfectly  consistent,  and  are 
ever  united  in  Christian  experience.  The  believer  feels  them  every 
day.  He  knows  that  it  is  his  duty,  at  once,  to  love  God  as  purely, 
and  fervently,  and  constantly,  as  do  the  saints  made  perfect.  Yet 
he  feels  that  no  mere  efforts  of  his  own,  no  use  of  means,  no  pre- 
sentation of  motives,  no  summoning  of  his  powers,  will  ever  ena- 
ble him  to  raise  his  carnal  heart  to  heaven.  Does  this  free  him 
from  a  sense  of  guilt  ?  No.  He  covers  his  face  with  both  his 
hands,  and  bows  down  in  the  dust,  and  cries,  Behold,  I  am  vile. 
Have  mercy  on  me,  O  Lord,  and  create  within  me  a  clean  heart. 

That  the  denial  of  the  sinner's  blindness  to  the  holiness  of  God, 
is  involved  in  the  theory  of  regeneration  under  consideration,  is 
perfectly  evident,  and  is  not,  we  presume,  denied.  If  the  mere 
choice  of  God,  as  the  supreme  portion  of  the  soul,  is  regeneration, 
and  the  performance  of  this  act  constitutes  the  change,  then  of 
course  no  previous  change  is  admitted  to  be  necessary  to  enable 
him  to  make  the  choice  ;  no  opening  of  his  eyes  to  see  the  moral 
excellence  of  the  object  he  is  to  choose,  no  production  of  any 
sense  of. its  loveliness;  the  choice  itself  is  all  that  is  demanded  ; 
and  for  this,  everything  is  present  that  the  act  requires — the  ob- 
ject, the  capacity  of  viewing  it  in  its  true  moral  excellence,  and 
the  motive  whence  the  choice  is  to  proceed.  For  he  need  not 
choose  God  from  any  holy  motive  or  intention  (which  would  be  to 
make  holiness  precede  moral  action),  the  simple  desire  of  happi- 
ness is  all  that  is  required.  The  character  of  this  first  act  does 
not  depend  on  its  motive.  It  is  holy,  though  performed  merely 
from  the  desire  of  self-gratification.  This  is  a  conclusion  from 
which  our  minds  instinctively  revolt,  and  which,  Edwards  says,  is 
contrary  to  the  natural  notions  of  men.  It  is,  however,  a  conclu- 
sion which  is  legitimate  and  acknowledged,  and  being,  in  our  view, 
a  complete  reductio  ad  absurdum,  the  system  is  fairly,  in  our  hum- 
ble apprehension,  felo  de  se. 

Dr.  Cox  asks  whether  it  is  not  "  intrinsically  absurd,"  that  a  man 
should  be  regenerated  before  he  does  his  duty  ?  We  think  the 
absurdity  is  all  the  other  way,  that  he  should  do  his  duty  without 
being  regenerated.  That  he  should  love  God  without  having  any 
proper  perception  of  his  character  ;  or  that  an  unholy  soul  snould 
have  this  perception  of  the  beauty  of  holiness.  It  appears  to  us 
a  contradiction  in  terms  to  say,  that  a  holy  object  can  be  viewed 
as  excellent  and  desirable  by  a  carnal  mind  ;  for  a  holy  mind  is 
best  defined  by  saying,  that  it  perceives  and  relishes  the  beauty  of 
holiness.  It  is  inconceivable  to  us,  therefore,  that  any  sinner  should 
love  God,  without  this  previous  change,  except  on  one  or  the  other  of 
these  two  grounds ;  that  all  his  acts  are  created  in  him,  and  he  is 
really  no  agent  at  all,  or  that  an  act  proceeding  from  mere  self- 
love  is  holy.  Both  which  contradict  what  to  us  are  primary  prin- 
ciples or  intuitive  truths.  But  how  is  it  that  regeneration  precedes 
the  exercise  of  love  ?     As  the  opening  of  the  eyes  precedes  sight; 


396  REGENERATION. 

as  a  sense  of  the  beautiful  precedes  the  emotion  of  beauty ;  as  the 
maternal  instinct  precedes  maternal  love.  As  it  is  impossible  for 
a  man  to  have  his  eyes  open  in  the  daytime  without  seeing,  so  it 
is  impossible  for  a  man  to  be  regenerated  without  delighting  in 
God.  Yet  opening  the  eyes  is  not  seeing,  nor  is  regeneration  de- 
lighting in  God.  What  the  metaphysical  nature  of  this  change  is, 
no  one  can  tell.  All  the  soul  can  say  is,  Whereas  I  was  blind, 
now  I  see.  What  once  appeared  repulsive  and  "  foolishness,"  now 
appears  supremely  desirable  and  excellent.  What  once  excited 
enmity,  now  calls  forth  love.  What  once  was  irksome  and  diffi- 
cult, is  now  easy  and  delightful.  To  say  that  these  exercises  them- 
selves constitute  the  change,  and  the  whole  change,  is  to  say  that 
a  wicked  man  is  suddenly  transformed  in  all  his  views,  feelings, 
and  conduct,  without  any  reason  for  it.  And  to  refer  all  to  the 
immediate  operations  of  the  Spirit,  is  to  make  man  a  machine,  or 
mere  instrument,  on  which  a  mysterious  hand  plays  what  tune  it 
pleases,  to  the  delight  or  torment  of  the  conscious  but  passive  subject. 
There  is  still  another  point.  Dr.  Cox  speaks  of  this  "  certain 
kind  of  principle,"  as  "  a  mysterious  gratuity,"  with  which  the 
receiver  has  nothing  to  do.  A  something  inserted  in  the  soul  in 
some  magic  manner  to  influence  his  exercises,  but  which  forms  no 
part  of  his  character.  We  are  persuaded  that  a  fundamental  dif- 
ference, as  to  the  nature  of  agency  and  human  liberty,  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  all  such  objections.  We  are  as  yet  only  fighting  in 
the  dark.  The  real  turning  point  is  yet  in  the  background.  We 
do  not  mean  that  it  is  intentionally  kept  there,  but  that  these  objec- 
tions have  not  even  the  semblance  of  force,  if  (what  is  yet  con- 
sidered common  ground)  the  Calvinistic  theory  of  the  will  is  re- 
tained. Was  it  a  mere  "  mysterious  gratuity,"  without  moral 
character  for  him,  that  Adam  was  created  in  the  image  of  God 
"  with  holy  principles  and  dispositions  ?"  Were  these  not  volun- 
tary principles  ?  Was  he  not  free  in  all  his  exercises  of  love  de- 
termined by  them  ?  A  disposition  is  not  the  less  voluntary  because 
it  is  innate.  The  affections  are  all  voluntary,  although  concreated 
with  us.  Is  a  man  less  free  in  loving  himself  because  self-love  is 
a  constitutional  propensity  ?  Does  a  mother  love  her  child  against 
her  will,  because  she  acts  agreeably  to  her  nature  ?  Does  not  the 
disposition  so  to  do  enter  into  her  character  ?  If  this  be  true  with 
regard  even  to  constitutional  propensities,  it  is  still  more  obviously 
true  with  respect  to  moral  disposition,  whether  originally  implanted 
or  restored  in  regeneration.  There  is  a  continual  play  upon  the 
double  sense  of  the  word  voluntary.  When  the  faculties  of  the 
soul  are  reduced  to  understanding  and  will,  it  is  evident  that  the 
latter  includes  all  the  affections.  In  this  sense,  all  liking  or  dis- 
liking, desiring  or  being  averse  to,  &c,  are  voluntary,  or  acts  of 
the  will.  But  when  we  speak  of  the  understanding,  will,  and  af- 
fections, the  word  "  will"  includes  much  less.  It  is  the  power  of  the 
soul  to  come  to  a  determination,  to  fix  its  choice  on  some  object  of 
desire.     These  two  meanings  are  distinct,  though  they  may  relate 


REGENERATION.  397 

only  to  different  states  of  the  same  faculty.  In  the  latter  sense, 
will  and  desire  are  not  always  coincident.  A  man  may  desire 
money  and  not  will  to  take  it,  or  make  it  an  object  of  pursuit ;  he 
may  not  fix  his  choice  upon  it.  The  will  is  here  determined  by 
some  other  desire  of  greater  force  ;  desire  of  doing  right,  for  ex- 
ample. When  we  speak  of  a  volition,  of  a  choice,  of  a  decision 
or  determination  of  the  will,  the  word  "will"  is  used  in  the  restricted 
sense.  A  man  may  have  many  objects  of  desire  before  his  mind  ; 
the  decision  which  the  will  makes  among  them,  or  its  selection,  is 
its  choice.  There  are  a  thousand  things  capable  of  ministering  to 
our  happiness ;  riches,  honour,  sensual  pleasure,  the  service  of 
God;  the  selection  which  the  soul  makes,  is  made  by  the  will  in 
the  narrower  sense.  This  is  a  voluntary  act,  in  one  sense  of  the 
term.  But  in  another,  the  desire  itself  which  the  soul  has  for  these 
objects,  and  not  merely  its  decision  or  choice, is  a  voluntary  act.  For, 
according  to  Edwards,  "  all  choosing,  refusing,  approving,  disap- 
proving, liking,  disliking,  directing,  commanding,  inclining,  or  be- 
ing averse,  a  being  pleased,  or  displeased  with"  are  acts  of  the 
will.  In  this  sense,  all  the  affections,  and  all  desires,  are  voluntary 
exercises,  whether  constitutional  or  not,  and  not  merely  the  deci- 
sions to  which  they  lead.  Hence  self-love,  the  love  of  children, 
the  love  of  society,  the  desire  of  esteem,  are  all  voluntary,  although 
all  springing  from  native  tendencies  of  the  mind. 

This  distinction  between  these  different  senses  of  the  word  will, 
although  frequently  made,  and  formally  stated,  is  yet,  time  after 
time,  lost  sight  of  in  discussions  of  this  nature ;  which  gives  rise 
to  endless  confusion.  The  word  is  often  used  in  one  sense  in  the 
premises  of  an  argument,  and  in  the  other  in  the  conclusion.  How 
often  is  it  said  that  a  man  can  love  God  if  he  will  ?  What  does 
this  mean  ?  If  will  be  here  used  in  its  narrower  sense,  this  is  not 
true.  The  affections  no  more  obey  a  determination  of  the  mind, 
than  the  emotions  do.  A  man  can  no  more  will  to  love,  to  hate, 
to  be  pleased  or  displeased,  than  he  can  will  to  be  joyful  or  sorrow- 
ful, gay  or  sad,  or  even  hot  or  cold  at  any  given  moment.  But  if 
the  word  be  taken  in  its  larger  sense,  as  including  the  affections, 
then  the  proposition  is  identical ;  it  is  saying,  a  man  can  love  God 
if  he  does  love  God.  And  when  Dr.  Cox  says  there  are  some 
men  who  teach  that  a  man  has  no  ability  to  believe,  even  if  he  has 
the  inclination ;  the  very  statement  is  absurd.  For  if  the  mind 
is  inclined  to  embrace  the  truth  in  its  real  character,  it  does  believe. 

Although  the  advocates  of  the  theory,  tha*t  morality  attaches 
only  to  acts  of  choice,  lay  down  as  the  foundation  of  their  doc- 
trine Edwards's  definition  of  the  will  as  given  above,  yet  it  is  plain 
that  in  a  multitude  of  cases  they  confine  acts  of  choice  to  acts  of 
the  will  in  the  restricted  sense.  Thus  the  desire  of  money  becomes 
avarice,  they  say,  only  when  the  will  comes  in  and  decides  on 
money  as  the  main  object  of  pursuit.  Self-esteem  is  not  pride, 
until  the  will  decides  on  preferring  our  own  claims  unduly.  In 
all  such  cases  it  is  the  will,  as  the  faculty  of  decision  between  dif- 


398  REGENERATION. 

ferent  objects  of  desire,  that  is  intended.  It  is  to  acts  of  the  will 
in  this  restricted  sense,  and  to  the  states  of  mind  thence  resulting, 
and  not  to  voluntary  acts  in  the  broad  sense  of  President  Edwards, 
that  morality  is  made  to  attach.  Hence,  in  the  case  of  Adam,  the 
desire  excited  by  a  view  of  the  divine  affections,  has  no  moral 
character.  That  belongs  only  to  the  act  of  the  will  which  fixes 
on  God  as  the  chief  good.  And  the  first  holy  act  of  a  new-born 
soul  is  not  the  desire  which  rises  in  view  of  the  Divine  Being,  but 
the  act  of  the  will  by  which  he  is  chosen  as  a  portion.  Hence,  in 
the  distinction  between  constitutional  and  voluntary  propensities, 
the  social  affections,  the  love  of  children,  desire  of  esteem,  &c, 
are  referred  to  the  former  class,  and  are  not  considered  as  volun- 
tary. Yet,  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  word  will,  assumed  as  the 
foundation  of  the  theory,  according  to  which,  all  "  inclining  or  be- 
ing averse,"  all  "  being  pleased  or  displeased  with,"  are  acts  of  the 
will,  they  are  as  truly  voluntary  as  the  others.  Now,  when  it  is 
asserted  that  no  disposition  is  of  a  moral  character,  except  so  far 
as  it  depends  on  choice  or  preference,  and  that  all  morality  lies  in 
the  will,  the  whole  meaning  turns  on  the  sense  in  which  the  word 
will  is  taken.  Jf  taken  in  its  broader  sense,  this  would  be  admitted ; 
if  in  the  restricted  sense,  we  should  deny  it  altogether.  Those 
who  make  the  assertion,  doubtless  take  it  in  the  latter  ;  for  they 
say  that  all  that  precedes  the  decision  of  the  soul,  its  fixing  on 
some  object  of  desire  as  its  chief  portion,  is  neither  sinful  nor  holy; 
that  holiness  consists  in  the  selection  of  God,  and  sin  in  the  choice 
of  the  world,  and  that  there  is  nothing  sinful  nor  holy  but  these 
primary  or  ultimate  choices,  and  the  subordinate  acts  resulting 
from  them.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  term  voluntary  applies  not 
only  to  such  acts  of  choice,  but  to  all  exercises  of  the  affections 
or  desires  preliminary  thereto.  No  one  would  say  that  the  dispo- 
sition to  love  ourselves,  or  our  children,  depends  on  choice  ;  and 
yet  these  dispositions  are  properly  and  truly  voluntary.  We  can- 
not love  otherwise  than  voluntarily.  When,  therefore,  these  gen- 
tlemen use  the  word  voluntary,  it  is  in  reference  to  acts  of  the  will 
in  the  restricted  sense,  excluding  the  spontaneous  exercises  of  the 
native  propensities  of  our  nature.  They  of  course  deny  that  Adam 
was  created  holy.  The  spontaneous  rising  of  desire  in  his  mind 
to  God  was  neither  holy  nor  unholy.  His  moral  character  com- 
menced with  the  first  act  of  choice,  that  is,  with  his  selection  of 
God  from  among #the  various  sources  of  happiness  as  his  chief 
good.  Here  lies  one  great  point  of  difference  between  them  and 
common  Calvinists.  President  Edwards  maintains  clearly  that 
Adam  was  holy  before  this  act  of  choice,  yea,  before  he  exercised 
"  thought  or  reflection."  And  he  says,  that  it  is  according  to  our 
natural  notions  of  things  that  there  could  be  no  virtue  in  this 
choice,  unless  it  was  determined  by  a  virtuous  disposition.  The 
common  judgment  of  men  is,  that  moral  character  belongs  to  the 
desire  of  moral  objects.  The  morality  lies  in  its  nature,  inde- 
pendently of  its  origin.  Its  being  from  "  a  kind  of  instinct,"  does 
not  destroy  its  moral  character.     The  desire  of  holiness  is  holy, 


REGENERATION.  309 

no  matter  how  it  rises  in  the  mind.  If  this  be  so,  a  similar  ten- 
dency of  mind  and  a  similar  desire,  if  produced  in  our  mind  by 
the  power  of  the  spirit  in  regeneration,  is  not  "something  inserted 
in  the  soul"  without  influence  on  our  character.  It  constitutes  us 
holy,  as  truly  as  Adam  was  holy  at  his  first  creation,  though  much 
of  sin  may  yet  remain.  It  is  indeed  "  a  mysterious  gratuity ;"  the 
scriptures  call  it  grace  ;  but  it  is  still  ours,  from  its  nature,  volun- 
tary and  active.  It  is  an  inclination  of  the  heart,  and,  as  Dr.  Bel- 
lamy remarks,  an  "  involuntary  inclination  of  the  heart  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms."  He  uses  the  word  voluntary  in  its  larger 
sense,  as  Edwards  does,  and  not  merely  in  that  which  applies  to  a 
decision  or  selection  from  among  different  objects  of  desire.  With 
him  all  spontaneous  exercises  of  the  mind  are  voluntary  ;  self-love, 
the  love  of  children,  and  all  other  similar  affections.  A  disposition 
therefore  to  these,  or  any  other  exercises,  existing  prior  to  the  ex- 
ercises, in  his  view,  does  not  destroy  their  character  as  voluntary, 
nor  their  morality,  if  they  have  reference  to  moral  objects ;  this 
depends  upon  their  nature,  not  their  origin. 

We  have  already  remarked  that  the  opposite  system  destroys 
the  moral  character  of  the  first  act  (in  reference  to  moral  objects) 
in  Adam,  and  in  regeneration.  We  are  ready  to  admit,  that  as  the 
desire  of  a  holy  object  is  from  its  nature  holy,  so  the  choice  of  such 
an  object  as  holy,  is  from  its  nature  good.  But  it  is  inconceivable 
that  holiness,  as  such,  can  be  chosen  without  a  previous  apprehen- 
sion of  its  real  excellence,  and  desire  for  it  as  such  ;  for  the  choice 
is  but  the  determination  of  the  desire.  If,  therefore,  moral  charac- 
ter be  denied  to  the  antecedent  desire,  the  choice  loses  its  moral 
character  also.  It  cannot  be  confined  to  the  act  of  choice,  for 
there  can,  in  fact,  be  .no  choice  of  a  holy  object  as  such,  but  from 
a  desire  for  it  in  its  true  character,  and  this  is  a  holy  desire,  and 
precedes  the  choice.  If  self-love  be  only  so  far  the  motive  to  this 
choice,  that  it  "  prompts  to  the  choice,  but  not  determines  it,"  what, 
we  ask,  does  determine  it  ?  There  are  but  two  answers  to  this 
question.  The  one  is,  that  the  will  determines  itself,  i.  e.,  the  choice 
is  made  in  indifference,  and  has  clearly  no  moral  character ;  or  it 
is  determined  by  a  desire  of  the  object  as  such  (not  mere  desire  of 
happiness,  for  that  only  prompts  the  choice,  not  determines  it),  and 
then  the  whole  theory  is  relinquished,  for  here  is  the  desire  of  a  holy 
object,  not  merely  as  a  means  of  happiness,  but  for  the  object  as 
holy,  which  must  needs  be  a  holy  desire,  and  being  antecedent  to 
the  choice,  would  be,  according  to  the  theory,  anterior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  holiness. 

The  truth  is,  that  this  whole  system  is  a  forced  and  unnatural 
union  between  Arminian  philosophy  and  Calvinistic  facts  ;  a  union 
which  can  neither  be  peaceful  nor  lasting.  Nor  is  this  the  first  time 
that  it  has  been  attempted.  The  favourite  principle  of  the  oppo- 
sers  of  the  doctrines  which  are  now  called  Calvinistic,  in  all  ages, 
has  been,  that  moral  character  can  only  belong  to  acts  of  choice ; 
and,  of  course,  that  no  such  thing  as  original  righteousness  or  ori- 


400  REGENERATION. 

ginal  sin  is  possible  or  conceivable ;  that  any  other  influence  in  re- 
generation than  that  of  moral  suasion,  by  which  one  man  is  led  to 
make  a  good  choice,  which  another  man,  under  the  same  influence, 
might  refuse  to  make,  is  inconsistent  with  moral  agency ;  that 
doctrines  of  election  and  perseverance  of  the  saints,  presupposing 
that  of  efficacious  grace,  must  necessarily  be  untrue.  The  first 
departures  from  these  doctrines  have  commenced  by  adopting  the 
main  principle,  and  endeavouring  to  reconcile  it,  as  far  as  possible, 
with  the  facts  involved  in  the  doctrines  themselves ;  viz.,  that  all 
men  do  sin,  with  absolute  certainty,  the  moment  they  become  moral 
agents  ;  that  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  is  infallibly  efficacious  :  and 
that  all  whom  God  has  chosen  certainly  believe  and  attain  eternal 
life.  But  less  than  a  generation  has  commonly  been  sufficient  to 
break  the'connexion,  and  leave  the  philosophical  principle  undis- 
puted master  of  the  field. 

That  this  principle  is  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  original 
righteousness,  is  formally  admitted.  That  it  involves  the  denial  of 
original  sin,  as  this  doctrine  has  been  commonly  held  among  Cal- 
vinists,  is  equally  clear.  According  to  the  prevalent  doctrine  on 
this  subject,  original  sin  consists,  first,  in  the  imputation  of  Adam's 
sin.  This,  it  seems,  has  been  long  exploded.  Secondly,  in  the  want 
of  original  righteousness.  This  is  gone  too,  for  there  never  was  any 
such  thing.  And  thirdly,  in  the  corruption  of  nature,  that  is,  a  ten- 
dency to  do  what  God  has  prohibited,  existing  prior  to  all  acts  of 
choice,  and  independently  of  them  ;  and  now  this  is  gone.  There 
is  no  such  tendency  to  sin,  as  can  be  considered  a  moral  disposi- 
tion. 

Although  this  article  has  already  swollen  far  beyond  our  expec- 
tations, we  cannot  pass  this  subject  without  a  single  remark  on  the 
charge  of  physical  depravity.  The  futility  and  unfairness  of  the 
same  charge,  as  it  regards  the  subject  of  regeneration,  we  have  en- 
deavoured to  expose  above.  As  this  rests  on  precisely  the  same 
grounds,  it  must  stand  or  fall  with  the  other.  If  there  may  be  mo- 
ral principles  prior  to  moral  acts  (as  we  think  must  be  assumed,  in 
the  case  of  Adam,  or  make  the  commencement  of  holiness  impos- 
sible), then  there  is  not  a  shadow  of  ground  for  this  charge.  Nor 
is  it  the  Calvinistic  doctrine,  that  there  is  a  specific  propensity  to 
sin  (analogous  to  the  holy  disposition  implanted  in  the  heart  of 
Adam),  connatural  with  the  soul  of  man.  None  such  need  be  as- 
sumed, and  none  such  is  believed  to  exist.  The  mere  absence  of 
a  native  tendency  to  God  leaves  the  soul  in  moral  confusion  and 
ruin.  There  is  no  positive  infusion  of  wickedness.  The  essential 
attributes  and  constitutional  propensities  are  there,  and  nothing 
more.  But  they  are  there  without  a  principle  of  moral  order  and 
subordination.  There  is  no  presiding  spirit  to  turn  them  to  the 
service  of  God.  The  result  of  this  absence  is  all  manner  of  evil, 
and  a  tendency  to  all  this  evil  lies  in  this  very  state  of  the  soul, 
and  exists  prior  to  any  of  its  moral  acts.  Does  the  withholding 
this  predisposition  to  holiness,  from  a  being  to  whom  all  the  essen- 


REGENERATION.  401 

tial  attributes  of  his  nature  are  left  unimpaired,  make  God  the  au- 
thor of  sin  ?  then  must  he  be  accused  of  being  the  author  of  all  sin 
that  results  from  the  abandonment  of  the  reprobate,  and  of  all  that 
by  the  utmost  exertion  of  his  power  he  could  prevent.  Nor  is  it 
more  difficult  to  reconcile  this  fact  (that  God  should  withhold  from 
the  fallen  race  of  man  those  communications  which  resulted  in  the 
innate  tendency  to  holiness,  which  filled  the  soul  of  Adam)  with 
the  divine  justice  and  goodness,  than  it  is  the  admitted  fact  that  he 
has  brought,  and  is  still  bringing,  the  countless  millions  of  the  hu- 
man family  into  existence  under  circumstances  so  unfavourable, 
that  all,  without  exception,  incur  the  penalty  of  eternal  death  at  the 
first  moment  of  moral  agency.  And  that  moment  arriving,  too,  at 
the  first  dawn  of  intellect,  and  when  the  first  faint  flushes  of  moral 
feeling  rise  in  the  soul.  If  this  be  no  penalty,  we  know  not  what 
is.  "  To  be  placed  under  a  law,"  says  Coleridge  (Aids  to  Reflec- 
tion, p.  168),  "the  difficulty  of  obeying,  and  the  consequences  of 
not  obeying  which,  are  both  infinite,  and  to  have  momently  to  strug- 
gle with  this  difficulty,  and  to  live  in  momently  hazard  of  these 
consequences — if  this  be  no  punishment ! — words  have  no  corres- 
pondence with  thoughts,  and  thoughts  are  but  shadows  of  each 
other,  shadows  that  own  no  substance  for  their  anti-type.  Of  such 
an  outrage  on  common  sense,  Taylor  (Bishop  Jeremy)  was  inca- 
pable. He  himself  calls  it  a  penalty ;  he  admits  that  in  effect  it  is 
a  punishment."  It  is  a  penalty,  too,  according  to  this  theory,  with- 
out transgression ;  a  punishment  without  a  crime.  We  cannot  see, 
therefore,  that  anything  is  gained  by  the  new  theory  over  the  old 
doctrine,  which  represents  our  race  as  having  enjoyed  a  full  and 
fair  and  favourable  probation  in  their  first  parent,  and  as  being  re- 
garded and  treated  as  an  apostate  race  on  account  of  his  rebellion; 
so  that  the  withholding  those  divine  communications  which  result- 
ed in  the  first  man,  in  the  moral  image  of  his  Maker,  is  a  penal  evil, 
from  which,  it  is  true,  utter  ruin  results,  but  it  is  the  ruin,  not  of  in- 
nocent, but  of  fallen  human  beings.  This  doctrine  involves  no 
mysterious  confusion  of  the  identity  of  the  race  with  that  of  Adam, 
and  no  transfer  of  moral  character  from  him  to  us.  His  act  was 
personally  his  own,  and  only  his  ;  it  is  ours  only  on  the  represen- 
tative principle,  which  is  recognised  not  only  by  Dr.  Hopkins  and 
his  followers  distinctly,  but  by  Arminians  and  Pelagians,*  and  is  so 
clearly  taught  by  the  fact,  that  the  race  fell  when  Adam,  fell,  that 
it  is  admitted  in  reality  even  by  those  who  formally  deny  it 

But  to  return  to  our  subject.  This  theory  not  only  overthrows- 
the  doctrines  which  we  have  just  mentioned,  but  it  throws  the 
Spirit's  influences  almost  entirely  out  of  view.  We  are  not  speak- 
ing of  the  opinions  of  its  advocates,  but  of  the  tendency  of  the 
theory.  According  to  their  views,  regeneration  consists  in  the 
choice  of  God  as  the  supreme  portion  of  the  soul.  This  requires 
that  the  soul  should  view  him  as  supremely  desirable.     This  the 

•  See  Whitby  on  Romans,  v.  12. 

26 


402  REGENERATION. 

sinner  is,  not  only  naturally,  but  morally,  able  to  do ;  for  his  cor- 
ruption does  not  blind  him  to  the  excellence  of  holiness,  or  its 
adaptedness  to  promote  his  happiness.  To  secure  this  happiness 
is  the  only  impulse  or  motive  necessary  to  make  this  choice,  and 
he  is  urged  to  make  it,  assured  that  if  he  will  summon  all  his  pow- 
ers to  the  effort,  the  result,  by  the  grace  of  God,  may  follow.  We 
think  the  grace  of  God  acts  a  part  scarcely  more  conspicuous  in 
all  this  scheme,  than  it  does  in  the  enumeration  of  the  titles  of  an 
European  monarch.  There  is  no  blindness  to  the  excellence  of 
the  object  of  choice  to  be  removed,  no  holy  motive  is  necessary 
for  the  grand  decision ;  all  that  is  required  is  a  practical  convic- 
tion that  it  will  be  for  the  sinner's  interests.  Firmly  as  these 
brethren  may  believe  in  the  necessity  of  the  Spirit's  interference, 
it  is  evident  that  necessity  is  left  out  of  view  almost  entirely  in 
their  theory.  Accordingly,  when  they  come  to  describe  the  pro- 
cess of  this  great  change,  the  sinner  is  the  only  agent  brought  to 
view ;  he  is  to  consider,  ponder  and  decide,  for  all  which  he  abso- 
lutely needs  no  assistance,  though  it  may  be  graciously  afforded. 
This  mode  of  representation  stands  in  strong  contrast  with  the 
language  of  scripture  in  those  passages  in  which  we  are  said  "  to 
be  born  of  the  Spirit,"  "  to  be  created  anew  in  Christ  Jesus,"  to 
experience  the  workings  "  of  the  exceeding  greatness  of  the  power 
of  God,"  and  many  others  of  a  similar  character. 

As  to  the  point  which  Dr.  Cox  thinks  so  "  intrinsically  absurd," 
and  about  which  he  says  so  much,  whether  man  is  passive  in  re- 
generation, it  will  be  seen  that,  for  its  own  sake,  it  does  not  merit 
a  moment's  discussion.  It  depends  entirely  on  the  previous  ques- 
tion. If  regeneration  be  that  act  of  the  soul  by  which  it  chooses 
God  for  its  portion,  there  is  an  end  of  all  debate  on  the  subject. 
For  no  one  will  maintain  that  the  soul  is  passive  in  acting.  But 
if  there  be  any  change  in  the  moral  state  of  the  soul,  prior  to  its 
turning  unto  God,  then  it  is  proper  to  say,  that  the  soul  is  passive 
as  to  that  particular  point.  That  is,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the 
author,  and  the  soul  the  subject  of  the  change.  For  all  that  is 
meant  by  the  soul's  being  passive,  is,  that  it  is  not  the  agent  of  the 
change  in  question.  Its  immediate  and  delightful  turning  unto  God 
is  its  own  act,  the  state  of  mind  which  leads  to  this  act  is  produced 
directly  by  the  spirit  of  God.  The  whole  question  is,  whether  any 
such  anterior  change  is  necessary.  Whether  a  soul  polluted  and 
degraded  by  sin,  or  in  scripture  language,  carnal,  needs  any 
change  in  its  moral  taste  before  it  can  behold  the  loveliness  of  the 
divine  character.  For  that  this  view  must  precede  the  exercise  of 
affection,  we  presume  will  not  be  denied.  If  this  point  be  decided, 
the  propriety  of  using  the  word  passive  to  denote  that  the  soul  is 
the  subject  and  not  the  agent  of  the  change  in  question,  need  not 
give  us  much  trouble.  Sure  it  is  that  this  change  is  in  scripture 
always  referred  to  the  Holy  Spirit.  It  is  the  soul  that  repents, 
believes,  hopes  and  fears,  but  it  is  the  Holy  Spirit  that  regenerates. 
He  is  the  author  of  our  faith  and  repentance  by  inducing  us  to  act, 


REGENERATION.  403 

but  no  man  regenerates  himself.  The  soul,  though  essentially 
active,  is  still  capable  of  being  acted  upon.  It  receives  impres- 
sions from  sensible  objects,  from  other  spirits  and  from  the  Holy 
Ghost.  In  every  sensation,  there  is  an  impression  made  by  some 
external  object,  and  the  immediate  knowledge  which  the  mind 
takes  of  the  impression.  As  to  the  first  point,  it  is  passive,  or  the 
subject ;  as  to  the  second,  it  is  active,  or  the  agent.  These  two 
are  indeed  inseparably  connected,  and  so  are  regeneration  and 
conversion.  It  is  even  allowable  to  say  that  the  mind  is  passive 
considered  as  the  recipient  of  any  impression,  no  matter  how  com- 
municated. Coleridge  says,  "  In  attention,  we  keep  the  mind 
passive ;  in  thought,  we  rouse  it  into  activity.  In  the  former,  we 
submit  to  an  impression,  we  keep  the  mind  steady  in  order  to  re- 
ceive the  stamp." — P.  252.  Whether  this  is  technically  •'  wretched, 
philosophically  wrong,  and  theologicaHy  false,"  or  not,  we  do  not 
pretend  to  say.  All  that  we  say  is,  that  it  is  perfectly  intelligible 
and  perfectly  according  to  established  usage,  to  speak  of  the  mind 
as  passive,  when  considered  as  the  subject  of  an  impression.  And 
if  the  Holy  Spirit  does  make  such  an  impression  on  the  mind,  or 
exert  such  an  influence  as  induces  it  immediately  to  turn  to  God, 
then  it  is  correct  to  say  that  it  is  passive  in  regeneration,  though 
active  in  conversion.  However,  this  is  a  very  subordinate  point ; 
the  main  question  is,  whether  there  is  not  a  holy  "  relish,"  taste,  or 
principle  produced  in  the  soul  prior,  in  the  order  of  nature,  to  any 
holy  act  of  the  soul  itself.  If  Dr.  Cox  can  show  this  to  be  "  intrin- 
sically absurd,"  we  shall  give  up  the  question  of  "  passivity,"  with- 
out a  moment's  demur.  To  relinquish  the  other  point,  however, 
will  cost  us  a  painful  struggle.  It  will  be  the  giving  up  the  main 
point  in  debate  between  the  friends  and  opposers  of  the  doctrines 
of  grace  from  Augustine  to  the  present  day.  It  will  be  the  renun- 
ciation, not  only  of  a  favourite  principle  of  old  Calvinists,  but  of 
one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  theology  of  Edwards,  Bel- 
lamy, D wight,  and,  as  we  believe,  of  the  great  body  of  the  New 
England  clergy.  It  will  be  the  renunciation  of  what  Calvinists, 
old  and  new,  have  believed  to  be  the  scriptural  doctrine  of  original 
righteousness,  original  sin  and  efficacious  grace.  It  will  be  the 
rejection  of  that  whole  system  of  mingled  sovereignty  and  love 
which  has  been  the  foundation,  for  ages,  of  so  many  hopes  and  of 
so  much  blessedness  to  the  people  of  God.  And  all  for  what  ? 
Because  it  has  been  discovered,  that  what  is  not  an  act  is  an  entity ; 
that  to  suppose  the  existence  of  moral  disposition  prior  to  moral 
action,  is  making  morality  a  substance.  As  we  are  incapable  of 
seeing  the  truth  of  these  axioms,  and  believe  their  assumption  to 
be  encumbered  with  all  the  difficulties  above  referred  to,  we  are 
not  disposed  to  renounce,  on  their  behalf,  doctrines  which  have  for 
ages  been  held  dear  by  the  best  portion  of  the  Christian  church. 

Dr.  Cox  demands  what  has  been  the  moral  history  of  these  doc- 
trines ?  It  would  require  more  time  and  space  than  we  can  now 
command  fully  to  answer  this  question.     Not  to  enter  on  question- 


* 


404  REGENERATION. 

able  ground,  however,  we  would  refer  him  for  an  answer  to  the 
history  of  the  reformation.  These  doctrines  were  held  sacred  by 
all  those  men  who  were  God's  great  instruments  in  that  blessed 
work,  and  are  incorporated  in  the  confessions  of  all  the  reformed 
churches.  We  would  point  him  to  the  history  of  the  English  Pu- 
ritans and  Nonconformists ;  to  the  Puritans  of  New  England,  from 
the  time  of  their  landing  down  to  a  late  period  in  their  history,  and 
to  the  present  opinions  of  the  great  body  of  their  descendants. 
We  would  refer  him  to  any  age  or  any  church,  peculiarly  distin- 
guished for  genuine  piety.  For  there  is  scarcely  one  of  the  doc- 
trines which  he  has  empaled  in  his  introduction  (with  the  exception 
of  the  mere  extent  of  the  atonement,  a  point  of  very  subordinate 
importance  to  that  of  its  nature),  which  does  not  enter  into  the  faith 
of  the  great  body  of  evangelical  Christians.  We  have  no  doubt 
that  Dr.  Cox  believes  these  doctrines.  What  we  lament  is,  that 
he  should  have  "  caricatured"  the  manner  in  which  the  vast  major- 
ity of  those  who  hold  them  have  been  accustomed  to  represent 
them,  and  that  he  should  even  seem  to  advocate  a  principle  which 
we  fear  is  subversive  of  them  all. 


• 


ESSAY    XVII. 

SANCTIFICATION. 


This  judicious  and  excellent  treatise  presents,  in  a  small  compass, 
the  substance  of  the  modern  controversy  on  the  doctrine  of  entire 
sanctification  in  the  present  life.  The  author's  statements  are 
calm  and  clear,  his  method  logical,  his  arguments  conclusive,  and 
his  style  simple  and  dignified.  Though  it  is  not  long  since  we 
called  the  attention  of  our  readers  to  this  subject,  especially  in  the 
form  in  which  it  is  presented  by  the  Oberlin  professors,  we  think 
they  will  not  regard  the  following  pages  as  misapplied,  when  they 
consider  how  ceaseless  are  the  efforts  of  the  advocates  of  error  to 
propagate  a  doctrine  which  the  history  of  the  church  teaches  us 
seldom  fails  to  become,  in  one  fornl  or  other,  an  apology  for  sin. 

The  notion  of  the  actual  attainment,  in  some  instances,  of  perfect 
virtue  in  this  life,  is  so  gratifying  to  human  pride,  that  we  need  not 
wonder  at  its  adoption  by  some  in  nearly  every  age  of  the  world. 
Contrary  as  it  is  to  scripture  and  experience,  it  is  too  deeply  radi- 
cated in  man's  selfishness,  not  to  find  apologists  and  advocates 
among  the  conceited,  the  enthusiastic,  and  such  as  are  unaccustomed 
to  an  impartial  scrutiny  of  their  own  hearts.  It  flatters  exceed- 
ingly all  those  pretensions  to  superior  sanctity  which  are  disjoined 
from  humility,  penitence,  and  ardent  aspirations  after  entire  assimi- 
lation to  the  perfection  of  the  divine  moral  character.  In  most  of 
the  false  religions  of  the  earth,  the  doctrine  of  human  perfection, 
manifested  in  at  least  some  peculiarly  favoured  instances,  has,  if  we 
mistake  not,  formed  an  essential  article  of  belief;  and  in  all  coun- 
tries, perhaps,  individuals  have  been  found,  possessing  an  exemp- 
tion from  the  common  frailties  of  their  race.  A  kind  of  perfection 
has  been  claimed  for  Greek  and  Roman  sages,  for  Hindoo  devotees, 
for  Mahommedan  saints ;  and  even  for  the  savage  warrior,  smiling 
in  death  at  the  impotent  efforts  of  his  enemies  to  extract  from  his 
agonized  nature  the  shriek,  or  the  groan  of  suffering.  That  Pan- 
theism, which  is  the  philosophical  basis  of  most  of  the  popular  sys- 

*  Published  in  1842,  in  review  of  "  The  Scriptural  Doctrine  of  Sanctification 
stated  and  defended  against  the  error  of  Perfectionism.  By  W.  D.  Snodgrass,  D.D." 
Philadelphia. 


A     A 


406  SANCTIFICATION. 

tems  of  idolatry,  assumes  as  a  fundamental  position,  such  a  union 
of  man  to  the  Deity,  as  constitutes  the  leading  principle  of  modern 
perfectionism,  in  its  purest  and  most  sublimated  form.  Hence 
originates  the  deification  of  men,  as  well  as  the  divine  worship 
paid  to  stocks,  stones,  rivers,  mountains,  wind,  and  all  the  inferior 
parts  of  the  creation  ;  Pantheism  (elevating  a  creature  of  yesterday 
to  the  rank  of  a  divinity),  which  is  supposed  by  many  to  have  been 
of  more  ancient  date  than  the  universal  deluge,*  was  maintained 
in  all  the  following  ages  till  the  time  of  Christ,  and  was  not  en- 
tirely relinquished  even  by  some  of  his  professed  disciples.  Hold- 
ing such  a  principle,  they  were  prepared  to  adopt  other  opinions 
equally  preposterous  and  unchristian.  To  this,  perhaps,  should  be 
attributed,  in  part,  at  least,  the  antinomianism  and  perfectionism 
of  some  of  the  heretics  in  the  apostolic  age — so  the  Nicolaitans 
and  Simonians — who  maintained  that  they  were  released  from 
all  obligation  to  the  law,  and  that  none  of  their  actions,  however 
contrary  to  the  letter  of  the  precept,  were  really  opposed  to  the 
divine  will  and  worthy  of  punishment :  and  how  could  they,  who 
were  parts  of  God,  or  rather  identical  with  him,  commit  sin? 
"  The  Gnostics  of  the  first  and  second  centuries,  and  the  Manicha- 
eans  of  the  third,  believed  human  souls  to  be  particles  of  the  celes- 
tial light,  of  the  same  essential  nature  with  God  himself,  and  no 
otherwise  corrupt  or  corruptible,  than  by  being  combined  with 
sinful  matter.  The  new  Platonists  of  Egypt  held  substantially  the 
same  opinions.  Hieronymus,  in  the  preface  to  his  dialogues 
against  Pelagius,  says  that  Manichaeus,  Precillian,  Evagrinus,  Hy- 
perborius,  Flavinian,  Origen,  and  the  Menalians  of  Syria,  were 
Perfection ists."f  The  brethren  and  sisters  of  the  Free  Spirit,  in 
the  thirteenth,  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  held  that  all  things 
flowed  by  emanation  from  God  ;  that  rational  souls  were  portions 
of  the  divine  essence  ;  that  the  universe  was  God  ;  and  that  by  the 
power  of  contemplation,  they  were  united  to  the  Deity,  and  ac- 
quired hereby  a  glorious  and  sublime  liberty,  both  from  sinful  lusts, 
and  the  common  instinct  of  nature.  J  "  In  the  latter  part  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  the  disciples  of  Michael  de  Molinos  in  Spain, 
France,  and  Italy,  were  Perfectionists."^  It  is  worthy  of  remark, 
that  in  none  of  all  these,  during  so  many  successive  centuries,  do 
we  trace  any  evidence  of  the  belief  of  the  direct  agency  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  on  the  heart,  turning  its  affections  to  God,  and  securing 
the  perfection  of  its  obedience.  For  the  most  part,  they  asserted, 
that  regeneration  and  complete  deliverance  from  sin  could  be 
effected  by  contemplation,  and  the  soul  thus  be  so  identified  with 
God  as  to  constitute  them  not  two  things  united,  but  one  being  ; 
and  in  this  way,  they  explained  the  indwelling  and  controlling 
agency  of  the  Most  High  in  man.     Of  the  reality  and  presence  of 

*  See  the  Princeton  Review,  vol.  xiii.,  p.  539. 
f  Literary  and  Theological  Review,  vol.  Hi.,  p.  23. 
X  Buck's  Theological  Diet  and  Mosheim. 
§  Lit.  and  Theological  Review,  ut  supra. 


m 


h  * 


8ANCTIFICATION.  407 

native  moral  corruption,  as  maintained  by  consistent  Calvinists, 
they  seem  to  have  had  no  conception.*  Pelagius  and  Coelestius, 
in  the  fourth  century,  who  denied  the  innate  sinfulness  of  the  hu- 
man heart,  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  efficacious  grace  in  its 
renewal,  maintained,  with  entire  systematic  consistency,  that  men 
might  live  without  sin  during  the  whole  period  of  their  life ;  that 
some  had  actually  so  lived  for  so  many  years,  and  that  others, 
restored  by  repentance  after  transgression,  had  subsequently  con- 
tinued perfect  in  holiness  to  the  close  of  their  days.f  The  primi- 
tive Quakers,  the  French  Prophets,  the  Shakers,  Jemima  Wilkin- 
son, Joanna  Southcott,  and  the  great  body  of  Mystics  in  every 
communion,  held  to  perfection  in  this  life,  as  the  attainment  of  the 
privileged  few ;  and  the  advocates  of  this  doctrine  have  usually 
represented  the  denial  of  it  as  involving  great  licentiousness,  and  a 
state  of  utter  spiritual  bondage.  The  views  of  the  famous  John 
Wesley,  the  father  of  Arminian  Methodism,  are  well  known  to  the 
reading  part  of  the  religious  community.  He  affirmed,  as  Whit- 
field asserts,  "  that  no  Baptist  or  Presbyterian  writer,  whom  he  had 
ever  read,  knew  anything  of  the  liberties  of  Christ ;"  to  which  state- 
ment Whitfield  replied,  in  his  own  pointed  and  emphatical  manner 
— "  What !  neither  Bunyan,  Henry,  Flavel,  Halyburton,  nor  any 
of  the  New  England  and  Scotch  Divines  ?  See,  dear  sir,  what 
narrow-spiritedness  and  want  of  charity  arise  from  your  princi- 
ples ;  and  then  do  not  say  aught  against  election  any  more,  on 
account  of  its  being  destructive  of  meekness  and  love.  I  know 
you  think  meanly  of  Abraham,  though  he  was  eminently  called 
the  friend  of  God,  and  I  believe  also  of  David,  the  man  after  God's 
own  heart."J  Wesley  gives  us  an  account  of  the  steps  by  which 
he  was  led,  during  a  course  of  many  years,  to  embrace  what  he 
calls  the  doctrine  of  "  Christian  perfection,"  which,  as  he  explains 
it,  though  it  includes  the  idea  of  freedom  from  sin,  implies  neither 
perfection  in  knowledge  nor  infallibility,  nor  security  against  tempta- 
tions and  infirmities.^  According  to  the  system  of  the  Romish 
church,  good  men  may  not  only  attain  to  perfection,  but  perform, 
moreover,  works  of  supererogation,  serving  as  a  fund  of  merit,  for 
the  advantage  of  believers  of  inferior  spiritual  attainments. 

It  is  not  till  lately  that  Perfectionism  has  been  professed  within 
the  pale  of  Congregational  and  Presbyterian  churches.  By  our 
fathers  it  was  accounted  heresy,  inconsistent  with  the  express  tes- 
timony of  the  scriptures,  contradictory  to  Christian  experience, 
and  subversive  of  the  entire  scheme  of  the  Gospel.  But,  in  conse- 
quence of  certain  Pelagian  speculations  concerning  moral  agency, 

*  Lit.  and  The.  Review,  vol.  iii.,p.  28. 

t  Lit.  and  The.  Review,  vol.  iii.,  p.  29,  where  we  have  in  a  note  a  curious  speci 
men  of  the  arguments  of  Coelestius  on  this  subject.  Also  Wigger's  Hist,  of  Augus- 
tinism  and  Pelagianism. 

X  Gillies's  Life  of  Whitfield,  New  Haven  edition,  1812,  p.  256. 

§  Wesley's  Plain  Account  of  Christian  Perfection,  New  York  edition,  1837,  pp.  3, 
16,  et  passim. 


408  SANCTIFICATION. 

human  ability,  and  the  divine  influence  in  sanctification — errors 
that  have  become  extensively  popular — individuals,  once  reputed 
most  zealous  for  revivals  of  religion,  have  been  led  to  join  Pelagius 
and  other  kindred  spirits,  in  their  views  of  the  attainableness  of 
perfection  in  the  present  life.  Such,  as  we  believe,  is  the  philo- 
sophical origin  of  Perfectionism,  as  held  by  the  professors  at  Ober- 
lin  and  their  theological  friends'. 

That  we  may  not  misrepresent  the  meaning  of  those  to  whom 
we  refer,  we  will  state  their  doctrine  of  perfection  in  their  own 
language.  "  What  is  perfection  in  holiness  ?  In  answer  to  this 
inquiry  I  would  remark,"  says  Mr.  Mahan,*  "  that  perfection  in 
holiness  implies  a  full  and  perfect  discharge  of  our  entire  duty,  of 
all  existing  obligations  in  respect  to  God  and  all  other  beings.  It 
is  perfect  obedience  to  the  moral  law."  With  respect  to  the  at- 
tainableness of  perfection  in  this  life,  the  same  writer  says,  "  We 
have  evidence  just  as  conclusive,  that  perfect  and  perpetual  holi- 
ness is  promised  to  Christians,  as  we  have  that  it  is  required  of 
them."  "  We  have  the  same  evidence  from  scripture,  that  all 
Christians  may,  and  that  some  of  them  will,  attain  to  a  state  of 
entire  sanctification  in  this  life,  that  they  will  attain  to  that  state  in 
heaven."  "  There  is  positive  evidence  that  some  of  them  did 
attain  to  this  state."  Mr.  Finney  affirms,  and  in  this,  we  suppose, 
he  expresses  the  opinion  of  his  associates  at  Oberlin,  that  sinless 
perfection  for  the  time  being,  is  implied  in  the  lowest  degree  of 
true  piety.  "It  seems  to  be  a  very  general  opinion,"  says  he, 
"  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  imperfect  obedience  to  God,  i.  e. 
as  it  respects  one  and  the  same  act ;  but  I  cannot  see  how  an  im- 
perfect obedience,  relating  to  one  and  the  same  act,  can  be  possible. 
Imperfect  obedience  !  What  can  be  meant  by  this,  but  disobedi- 
ent obedience  !  a  sinful  holiness  !  Now,  to  decide  the  character 
of  any  act,  we  are  to  bring  it  into  the  light  of  the  law  of  God ;  if 
agreeable  to  this  law,  it  is  obedience — it  is  right — wholly  right. 
If  it  is  in  any  respect  different  from  what  the  law  of  God  requires, 
it  is  wrong — wholly  wrong."f  Here  we  have  the  doctrine  that 
all  Christians  are  sometimes  perfect,  or  are  perfect  so  far  as  they 
have  any  true  holiness ;  and  it  is  a  very  natural  inference  from 
such  premises,  that  believers  may  attain  to  a  confirmed  state  of 
perfection  in  the  present  life.  This  conclusion  is  adopted  by  Mr. 
Finney,  as  well  as  Mr.  Mahan. 

To  disprove  the  perfectionism  taught  in  the  above  extracts,  or 
to  show  that  none  of  the  saints  are  entirely  free  from  sin  in  the 
present  life,  will  be  our  object  in  this  essay. 

We  shall  begin  with  noticing  the  principal  arguments,  which  are 
commonly  adduced  by  perfectionists  of  different  descriptions,  in 
support  of  their  views  of  this  subject.  We  shall  next  exhibit  direct 
evidence  of  the  sinful  imperfection  of  the  heart  of  the  saints,  in  this 
life ;  and  lastly,  we  shall  show  the  great  practical  importance  of 

*  Christian  Perfection,  pp.  4,  27,  3S.  f  Oberlin  Evangelist,  vol.  1. 


SANCTIFICATION.  409 

the  doctrine  for  which  we  contend,  in  opposition  to  the  error 
which  it  controverts. 

The  arguments  of  the  perfectionists  are  first  to  be  considered. 

The  command  of  God  requires  perfection,  is  one  of  their  argu- 
ments. Answer.  It  is  doubtless  true,  that  the  Most  High  does 
command  us  to  be  perfect ;  and  to  enjoin  anything  less  than  per- 
fection, would  be  inconsistent  with  his  own  purity,  and  those  eter- 
nal principles  of  rectitude,  according  to  which  he  governs  the 
universe.  The  law  expresses  his  feelings  towards  moral  objects  ; 
but  it  leaves  wholly  undetermined  the  question,  whether  his  ra- 
tional creatures  will  acknowledge,  or  reject  his  authority.  His 
command,  in  any  instance,  neither  supposes  that  it  will  be  obeyed, 
nor  implies  any  insincerity  in  him,  provided  he  foresees  that  it  will 
not  be  obeyed.  The  contrary  supposition  would  be  incompatible 
with  some  of  the  most  undeniable  facts  of  revealed  religion.  Does 
the  divine  command  to  be  perfect,  prove  that  some  may,  or  will 
obey  this  righteous  precept  ?  Then,  for  the  same  reason,  the  di- 
vine prohibition  of  all  sin  in  mankind  equally  proves  that  some  of 
them  may  pass  through  a  long  life  without  a  single  act  of  trans- 
gression- It  is  by  no  means  certain,  therefore,  that  all  the  human 
race  are  or  have  been  sinners :  and,  of  course,  the  doctrine  of  uni- 
versal depravity,  unequivocally  and  frequently  as  it  is  taught  in  the 
scriptures,  may  be  false.  It  is  as  easyuto  imagine  that  some  never 
sin,  as  that  they  become  perfectly  holy  after  they  have  acquired  a 
sinful  character.  The  opinion  of  Pelagius  with  regard  to  this  sub- 
ject was,  therefore,  more  specious  and  more  logical  than  is  the 
notion  of  those  who  make  God's  requirement  of  perfect  sanctifica- 
tion  an  argument  that  some  are  perfectly  sanctified  in  this  life ; 
while,  with  strange  inconsistency,  they  assert  the  universal  moral 
depravity,  anterior  to  conversion,  of  such  of  mankind  as  have  suf- 
ficient knowledge  to  be  moral  agents.  Besides,  entire  holiness  is 
plainly  obligatory  on  all  rational  creatures ;  and  no  strength  of 
depraved  affection  or  hopelessness  of  condition  can  release  any 
from  the  demands  of  the  law  of  God.  On  this  principle,  the  devils, 
in  their  place  of  torment,  are  bound  to  love  their  Maker,  and  yield 
themselves  implicitly  to  his  authority.  To  say  they  are  not  thus 
bound,  is  to  take  their  part  against  their  Maker,  and  pronounce 
them  entirely  excusable  and  innocent  in  their  present  rebellion, 
rage  and  blasphemy.  But  does  it  follow,  because  they  are  under 
law,  that  they  will,  therefore,  ever  return  to  their  duty?  The  Bi- 
ble, on  the  other  hand,  assures  us,  that  their  misery,  and  conse- 
quently, their  enmity  to  God,  will  be  without  end. 

The  command  of  God,  it  is  alleged,  implies  our  ability  to  obey ; 
and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  where  ability  exists,  it  will 
sometimes  at  least  manifest  itself  by  obedience.  This  argument 
has  been  strongly  urged,  both  to  account  for  the  existence  of  sin 
(for  where  there  is  ability  to  obey,  there  is  also  supposed  to  be 
ability  to  disobey,  or  "  the  power  of  contrary  choice  "),  and  to  show 
the  practicability  of  obedience,  in  the  highest  degree,  to  all  the  di- 


410  SANCTIF1CATION. 

vine  requisitions.  "  Were  it  not,"  says  Mr.  Finney,*  "  that  there 
is  a  sense  in  which  a  man's  heart  may  be  better  than  his  head,  I 
should  feel  bound  to  maintain,  that  persons  holding  this  sentiment, 
that  man  is  unable  to  obey  God  without  the  Spirit's  agency,  were 
no  Christians  at  all — obligation  is  only  commensurate  with  ability." 

Again  he  says,f  "  Certain  it  is  that  men  are  able  to  resist  the  ut- 
most influence  that  the  truth  can  exert  upon  them,  and,  therefore, 
have  ability  to  defeat  the  wisest,  most  benevolent,  and  most  power- 
ful exertions  which  the  Holy  Spirit  can  make  to  effect  their  sancti- 
fication."  Mr.  Mahan  says,J  "  I  infer  that  a  state  of  perfect  holi- 
ness is  attainable  in  this  life,  from  the  commands  of  scripture,  ad- 
dressed to  Christians  under  the  new  covenant."  The  philosophy, 
from  which  perfection  is  thus  inferred,  had  been  previously  assert- 
ed by  certain  divines  of  celebrity  in  Connecticut.  In  proof  of  this, 
the  reader  is  referred  to  two  or  three  citations  from  the  Christian 
Spectator,  formerly  published  at  New-Haven.  "  Free  moral  agents 
can  do  wrong  under  all  possible  preventing  influence."§  "  We 
know  that  a  moral  system  necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  free 
agents,  with  the  power  to  act  in  despite  of  all  opposing  power. 
This  fact  sets  human  reason  at  defiance,  in  every  attempt  to  prove 
that  some  of  these  agents  will  not  use  that  power,  and  actually 
sin."||  Again :  "  God  not  only  prefers  on  the  whole  that  his  crea- 
tures should  for  ever  perform  their  duties  rather  than  neglect  them, 
but  purposes  on  his  part  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  promote  this  very 
object  of  his  kingdom.''^!  In  all  these  statements,  the  implication  is 
clear,  that  men  are,  of  course,  able  to  do  whatever  God  requires  of 
them ;  and  that  the  mind  is  in  reality  self-moved  in  all  its  moral 
exercises. 

We  readily  admit  that  men  have  the  requisite  faculties  to  obey 
God  ;  in  other  words,  that  they  are  moral  agents.  And  this  is  often 
what  is  meant  by  natural  ability.  We  admit,  also,  that  the  inabi- 
lity of  sinners  is  a  moral  inability,  inasmuch  as  it  relates  to  moral 
objects,  arises  from  moral  causes,  and  is  removed  by  a  moral 
change.  The  possession,  however,  of  natural  ability,  in  the  sense 
just  stated,  does  not  establish  the  conclusion  contended  for  in  the 
preceding  argument.  Because  men  or  devils  have  the  requisite 
intellectual  or  physical  faculties  to  serve  their  Creator,  does  it  cer- 
tainly follow  that  they  will  serve  him  ?  As  it  regards  moral  abili- 
ty, it  is  absurd  to  imagine  that  the  rule  of  duty  is  to  be  measured 
by  this.  On  this  supposition  there  is  really  no  rule  of  right  except 
the  inclinations  of  creatures ;  or,  guilt  is  diminished  in  proportion 
to  the  stubbornness  and  virulence  of  the  principle  of  evil  to  be 
overcome  ;  which  is  but  saying,  in  other  language,  that  the  more 
sinful,  the  more  bent  on  rebellion  any  one  is,  the  less  is  he  to  blame 
for  his  disobedience.     Mankind  by  nature,  then,  are  perfectly  inno- 


*  Lectures  on  Revivals  of  Religion,  p,  17. 

t  Oberlin  Evangelist,  Lect.  21,  p.  193.     t  Christian  Perfection,  p.  28. 

§  Christian  Spectator,  1830,  p.  563.         ||  Ibid.,  1831,  p.  61 7.    IT  Ibid.,  1832,  p.  660. 


8ANCTIFICATI0N.  411 

cent  in  hating  God,  and  in  rejecting  the  manifold  overtures  of  the 
Gospel;  for  it  is  clear  from  this  inspired  volume,  that  they  are 
"  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins."  Their  disinclination  to  obedience 
is  affirmed  to  be  so  great  that  it  can  be  overcome  by  nothing  less 
than  the  direct  exertion  of  Almighty  power.  "  No  man,"  says 
Christ,  "  can  come  unto  me,  except  the  Father  who  hath  sent  me 
draw  him."  Accordingly,  the  commencement  of  holiness  in  the 
sinner's  heart  is  again  and  again  described  by  such  phrases  as  indi- 
cate the  highest  manifestation  of  the  immediate  and  creative  agen- 
cy of  God.  It  is  the  donation  of  a  new  heart — a  second  birth — a 
new  creation — a  resurrection  from  the  dead.  These  figures,  strong 
as  they  are,  are  doubtless  used  with  the  utmost  propriety,  as  most 
happily  expressive  of  the  inveteracy  of  the  evil  disposition  to  be 
vanquished,  of  the  sinner's  moral  helplessness,  and  of  his  absolute 
dependence  on  sovereign  grace.  The  continuance  of  believers  in 
obedience  is  also  constantly  ascribed  to  the  same  power  by  which 
they  were  originally  renewed  after  the  image  of  God.  "  Without 
me,"  says  Jesus  Christ,  "  you  can  do  nothing."  "  Ye  have  not  cho- 
sen me,  but  I  have  chosen  you,  and  ordained  you,  that  ye  should 
go  and  bring  forth  fruit,  and  that  your  fruit  should  remain."  Here 
we  learn  that  the  growth  of  the  fruit  in  the  first  instance,  and  its 
permanency  afterwards,  are  both  owing  to  the  choice,  purpose,  and 
effectual  agency  of  the  Redeemer.  "We  are  not  sufficient  of  our- 
selves," says  Paul,  "  to  think  anything  as  of  ourselves  ;  but  our  suf- 
ficiency is  of  God."  "  Being  confident  of  this  very  thing,  that  he 
which  hath  begun  a  good  work  in  God,  will  perform  (finish)  it  until 
the  day  of  Jesus  Christ."  The  good  work  here  intended  is  doubt- 
less, as  appears  from  the  connexion,  the  implantation  of  holiness  in 
the  heart  by  the  efficacious  grace  of  God.  "  Who  are  kept,"  says 
Peter,  "  by  the  power  of  God,  through  faith,  unto  salvation." 
From  these  passages,  and,  indeed,  from  the  whole  tenor  of  the  Bi- 
ble, it  is  evident  that,  whatever  may  be  men's  natural  power,  or 
freedom  as  moral  agents,  their  depraved  propensities  present  as  ef- 
fectual an  obstacle  to  obedience,  as  the  want  of  liberty  itself  would 
do.  At  the  same  time,  they  are  constantly  blamed  for  that  disin- 
clination, or  moral  inability,  which,  but  for  the  interposition  of  om- 
nipotent grace,  insures  their  destruction.  They  have  ruined  them- 
selves ;  and  their  only  hope  is  in  the  mercy  and  unconquerable 
might  of  their  injured  Creator,  who  may  justly  leave  them  to  perish 
in  their  perverseness.  There  is  no  reason,  then,  for  the  conclusion, 
that  because  men  have  the  natural  ability,  they  will,  therefore,  obey 
the  law  of  God,  any  more  than  there  is  ground  for  arguing  with 
Pelagius,  that  a  portion  of  the  human  race  will  live  without  sin, 
from  the  commencement  of  their  existence  till  death  ;  and,  conse- 
quently, that  for  them,  no  repentance,  no  pardon,  no  Saviour,  will 
be  necessary  ;  or,  than  there  is  ground  for  inferring  with  Univer- 
salists,  the  future  probable,  if  not  certain  return  of  devils  and  the 
spirits  of  lost  men  in  hell,  to  their  duty  and  to  happiness.  The  ar- 
gument from  ability,  therefore,  in  this  instance,  is  of  too  wide  a 


412  SANCTIFICATION. 

sweep  in  its  general  application,  to  be  admitted  as  of  any  force ; 
for  it  manifestly  goes  to  undermine  the  whole  Gospel,  and  over- 
throw all  the  revealed  principles  of  the  moral  government  of  God. 

Another  argument,  connected  with  the  foregoing,  in  favour  of 
Perfectionism,  is  founded  in  an  erroneous  philosophy  concerning  the 
nature  of  sin.  This  affirms,  that  those  propensities  which  we  can- 
not overcome  by  the  force  of  our  own  sovereign  determination,  are 
merely  constitutional  susceptibilities,  or  physical  attributes,  having 
no  moral  character,  the  extirpation,  or  extinguishment  of  which  is, 
consequently,  not  necessary  to  sinless  perfection.  Thus  it  has  been 
argued,  that  the  most  selfish  innate  desires  and  passions  are  in  them- 
selves innocent,  being  nothing  more  than  incentives  or  occasions  to 
sin,  which  must  be  expected  to  continue  after  the  heart  has  become 
completely  sanctified. 

This  summary  method  of  disposing  of  the  subject  must  doubt- 
less be  very  gratifying  to  those  who  choose  rather  to  find  an  apo- 
logy for  their  sins,  than  to  confess  and  mourn  over  them  before 
God.  Where  there  is  no  sin,  there  is  surely  no  occasion  for  godly 
sorrow  on  account  of  sin.  Let  the  standard  of  duty  be  low  enough, 
and  it  will  be  easy  to  show  that  perfection  belongs  to  many  men, 
or  to  all  men,  or  even  to  the  inhabitants  of  hell  themselves.  Sup- 
pose, for  example,  that  malice,  hatred  of  God,  enmity  to  creatures, 
and  furious  blasphemy,  under  circumstances  of  hopeless  suffering, 
are  not  criminal ;  and  it  will  follow,  incontrovertibly,  that  these 
feelings  and  acts  are  perfectly  innocent  in  Satan  and  his  hosts,  in 
their  present  state  of  misery.  God  cannot,  therefore,  with  pro- 
priety, punish  them  for  their  present  irreconcileable  malignity,  and 
that  conduct  which  flows  spontaneously  from  their  hearts.  In  this 
view  of  the  subject,  the  devils  are  as  truly  perfect  now  as  they 
were  when  they  existed  enthroned  seraphs  in  the  heavenly  para- 
dise. Their  condition  has,  indeed,  been  changed  ;  but,  then,  the 
divine  law  has  been  altered  to  suit  their  new  condition.  To  bring 
this  reasoning  to  bear  on  the  case  before  us — if  the  natural  passions 
of  anger,  revenge,  covetousness,  pride,  and  ambition,  be  not  in 
themselves  wrong,  and  if  nothing  but  strong  resolutions  against  sin, 
a  resistance  of  our  evil  propensities,  a  devout  and  moral  life,  and 
reliance  on  the  grace  of  Christ,  be  needful  to  constitute  a  sinless 
character,  then  we  admit  that  many  of  the  human  race  have  attain- 
ed to  perfection  in  this  life.  Yea,  verily,  according  to  this  philoso- 
phy, sinless  perfection  is  consistent  with  an  eternal  war  in  the 
breast  between  principle  and  passion ;  and,  as  there  is  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  physical  attributes  of  the  soul  will  continue  after 
death,  it  is  next  to  certain  that  the  saints  in  glory  will  be  obliged 
to  maintain  an  unceasing  conflict  with  such  innocent  things  as  their 
love  of  self-indulgence,  their  fondness  for  distinction  and  power, 
and  their  constitutional  susceptibility  to  resentment  and  revenge. 
Deny  the  principle  of  concupiscence  to  be  sinful,  and  what  hinders 
its  existence,  its  disquieting  irruptions,  its  violent  onsets  even  within 
the  walls  of  New  Jerusalem  ? 


SANCTIFICATION.  413 

This  philosophy  requires  an  exposition  of  the  law  entirely  con- 
trary to  the  scriptures.  The  sacred  volume  condemns  the  first 
risings  of  inordinate  desire,  and,  of  course,  all  vicious  tendencies 
to  transgression  in  the  soul.  "  Whoso  hateth  his  brother  is  a 
murderer."  "  Whosoever  looketh  upon  a  woman  to  lust  after  her, 
hath  committed  adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart."  It  re- 
quires us,  not  merely  to  choose  and  strive  after,  but  to  possess  and 
exercise  right  affections  and  passions  ;  to  love  God  and  our  neigh- 
bour ;  to  feel  kindly  even  to  our  enemies.  "  Thou  shalt  not  covet," 
is  one  of  its  express  prohibitions.  Yet  coveting  may  exist,  when 
from  the  restraints  of  conscience  and  fear  there  is  no  effort,  no 
purpose  to  obtain  the  desired  object.  The  affection  is  wrong  and 
is  forbidden,  though  it  lead  to  no  correspondent  external  acts,  or 
conscious  determinative  volition  of  the  mind. 

It  was  an  apprehension  of  the  spirituality  of  the  law  which  con- 
vinced the  Pharisee,  Saul  of  Tarsus,  of  the  exceeding  corruption 
of  his  heart,  and  destroyed  all  his  self-righteous  hopes.  "  I  had 
not  known  sin  but  by  the  law  ;  for  I  had  not  known  lust"  (concu- 
piscence), that  is,  I  had  not  known  that  it  was  sin,  "  except  the  law 
had  said,  thou  shalt  not  covet."  "  For  I  was  alive  without"  (a  just 
apprehension  and  sense  of)  "  the  law  once ;  but  when  the  com- 
mandment came"  (with  a  clear  view  of  its  spiritual  requirements 
and  immutable  obligation),  "  sin  revived,  and  I  died."  Thus  plain 
it  is,  that  whether  we  call  the  principle  of  concupiscence  constitu- 
tional or  not,  it  is  still  sinful  in  the  eye  of  the  law.  Words  may 
create  confusion  in  the  mind,  but  they  do  not  change  the  nature  of 
things.  So  long  as  the  Christian  is  agitated,  in  any  degree,  by 
excessive  or  ill-directed  desires,  he  is  deficient  in  his  obedience, 
and  therefore  continues  to  be  a  transgressor. 

Changing  his  ground,  the  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of  perfection 
in  this  life  sometimes  asserts,  that  though  Christians  cannot  accom- 
plish their  own  sanctification,  and  ought  not  to  attempt  it,  yet  if 
they  cast  themselves  upon  Christ  for  this  boon  it  will  be  bestowed 
upon  them.  Instead  of  working  themselves,  they  must  come  to 
Christ  to  work  in  them,  both  to  will  and  to  do,  and  he  will  make 
them  perfect.  This  notion,  too,  is  affirmed  by  the  very  men  who 
contend,  when  it  suits  their  purpose,  that  sinners  have  perfect 
ability  to  change  their  own  hearts,  and  believers  perfect  ability  to 
do  all  that  is  required  of  them.  "  I  am  willing  to  proclaim  it  to 
the  world,"  says  Mr.  Mahan,*  "  that  I  now  look  to  the  very  God 
of  peace  to  sanctify  me  wholly."  "  I  have  for  ever  given  up  all 
idea  of  resisting  temptation,  subduing  any  lust,  appetite,  or  pro- 
pensity, or  of  acceptably  performing  any  service  for  Christ,  by 
the  mere  force  of  my  own  resolutions.  If  any  propensities  which 
lead  to  sin  are  sacrificed,  I  know  it  must  be  done  by  an  indwelling 
Christ."  "  If  you  will  cease  from  all  efforts  of  your  own,  and 
bring  your  sins,  and  sorrows,  and  cares,  and  propensities,  which 

♦  Christian  Perfection,  pp.  189,  190,  191. 


414  SANCTIFICATION. 

lead  to  sin,  to  Christ,  and  cast  them  all  upon  him — if,  with  implicit 
faith,  you  will  hang  your  whole  being  upon  him,  and  make  it  the 
great  object  of  life  to  know  him,  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  and 
reflecting  his  image — you  will  find  that  all  the  exceeding  great  and 
precious  promises  of  his  word  are,  in  your  own  blissful  experience, 
a  living  reality."  "  You  shall  have  a  perpetual  and  joyful  victory." 
"  Everywhere,  and  under  all  circumstances,  your  peace  in  Christ 
shall  be  as  a  river." 

From  these  and  other  similar  passages  in  the  writings  of  the 
new  Perfectionists,  it  would  seem  that  Christians  have  nothing  to 
do  but  to  lie  passively  in  the  hands  of  Christ,  and  "  roll  the  respon- 
sibility" of  their  sanctification  upon  him.  What  mean,  then,  the 
numerous  scriptural  inculcations  upon  believers  to  strive,  to  run, 
to  wrestle,  to  fight,  to  put  on  the  whole  armour  of  God  ?  It  is 
manifest  from  the  inspired  volume  that  we  are  to  come  to  Christ, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  saving  ourselves  the  trouble  of  a  personal 
warfare,  but  that  we  may  engage  in  such  a  warfare  with  good 
motives,  with  becoming  zeal,  with  persevering  energy,  and  with 
success.  The  effect  of  faith  is  not  drowsiness,  but  vigilance :  not 
self-satisfied  repose,  but  self-distrust ;  not  slothfulness,  but  untiring 
activity.  When  Christ  works  in  us,  both  to  will  and  to  do,  of  his 
own  good  pleasure,  it  is  that  sustained,  quickened  by  his  power, 
we  may  work  out  our  own  salvation  with  fear  and  trembling.  The 
present  is  not  the  first  time  in  which  Pelagian  self-sufficiency  and 
Antinomian  indolence  have  been  found  co-inhabitants  of  the  same 
dwelling,  interchangeably  occupying  one  another's  places,  and 
adopting  one  another's  phraseology.  But  how  are  these  apparent 
contradictions  to  be  reconciled  ?  They  cannot  be ;  yet,  after  all, 
it  is  not  intended  by  the  writers  to  whom  we  refer,  to  ascribe  all 
holiness  to  divine  agency.  Their  meaning  appears  to  be,  that 
Christ  will  sanctify  us  wholly,  if  we  look  to  him  for  such  a  bless- 
ing ;  yet  there  is  no  provision  in  their  system  to  secure  the  act  of 
looking  itself.  Man  begins  to  turn,  and  God  completes  the  sancti- 
fication of  man.  Hence  it  is  affirmed,  that,  notwithstanding  the 
promises  of  the  new  covenant,  insuring  perfection  in  this  life,  com- 
paratively few  of  the  saints  do  ever  become  perfect  on  this  side  of 
the  grave. 

The  fact  that  the  saints  are,  in  scripture,  sometimes  said  to  be 
perfect,  has  been  alleged  as  another  argument  in  favour  of  Per- 
fectionism. 

We  answer,  that  the  word  perfection  is  used  in  different  senses. 
It  is  sometimes  employed  to  express  advancement  and  maturity  in 
the  Christian  character  and  in  knowledge,  as  distinguished  from 
the  comparatively  low  conceptions,  Weakness,  and  inconsistencies 
of  mere  infants  in  the  divine  life.  "  We  speak  wisdom  among 
them  that  are  perfect,"  that  is,  the  thoroughly  instructed.  "  Let 
us  therefore,  as  many  as  be  perfect,  be  thus  minded."  It  is  some- 
times used  to  denote  evangelical  uprightness,  or  sincere  piety,  in 
distinction  from  an  empty  profession  of  godliness.     In  this  sense 


BANCTIFICATION.  415 

of  the  word,  perfection  belongs  to  all  real  saints.  Thus  the  Psalm- 
ist says,  "  Mark  the  perfect  man,  and  behold  the  upright,  for  the 
end  of  that  man  is  peace."  Here  perfect  and  upright,  agreeably 
to  a  well-known  rule  of  Hebrew  construction,  are  evidently  sy- 
nonymous terms.  A  perfect  man,  in  this  place,  then,  is  a  man  who 
is  sincere  in  his  religious  profession,  a  real  friend  of  God,  and  an 
heir  of  heaven.  The  wicked  are  said  to  "  shoot  in  secret  at  the 
perfect,"  that  is,  at  the  regenerated  children  of  God.  "  For  the 
upright,"  says  Solomon,  "  shall  dwell  in  the  land,  and  the  perfect 
shall  remain  in  it."  In  this  passage,  too,  the  terms  uprightness  and 
perfection  have  the  same  meaning.  Noah  is  said  to  have  been  a 
perfect  man  ;  yet  the  phrase  is  immediately  explained  as  signify- 
ing the  reality  of  his  piety,  or  his  humble  walk  with  God.  That 
he  was  not  without  the  remains  of  moral  corruption,  is  manifest 
from  a  subsequent  instance  of  intoxication  with  which  he  is  charged 
in  the  scriptures.  Job  is  also  affirmed  to  bo  a  perfect  man.  But 
that  it  was  not  intended  to  assert  his  freedom  from  sin,  is  apparent 
from  his  conduct,  which  is  recorded,  for  he  afterwards  cursed  the 
day  of  his  birth.  He,  also,  himself  confessed  his  want  of  sinless 
perfection.  "  If  I  justify  myself,  mine  own  mouth  shall  condemn 
me  :  if  I  say  I  am  perfect,  it  shall  also  prove  me  perverse."  f  If  I 
wash  myself  with  snow-water,  and  make  my  hands  never  so  clean, 
yet  shalt  thou  plunge  me  in  the  ditch,  and  mine  own  clothes  shall 
abhor  me."  "  Behold  I  am  vile  ;  what  shall  I  answer  thee  ?  I 
will  lay  mine  hand  upon  my  mouth."  In  the  same  sense  we  are 
to  understand  the  phrase  as  used  by  Hezekiah,  when  he  says,  "  Re- 
member now,  how  I  have  walked  before  thee  in  truth,  and  with  a 
perfect,"  that  is,  with  a  sincere  "  heart."  That  sinless  perfection  was 
not  intended,  seems  evident  from  what  the  scriptures  tell  us  con- 
cerning his  conduct  soon  after  the  prayer  in  which  these  words 
are  contained.  "  But  Hezekiah  rendered  not  again  according  to 
the  benefit  done  unto  him,  for  his  heart  was  lifted  up :  therefore 
wrath  was  upon  him,  and  upon  Judah  and  Jerusalem.  Notwith- 
standing, Hezekiah  humbled  himself  for  the  pride  of  his  heart." 
Most  clearly,  therefore,  though  he  was  perfect  in  the  sense  of  sin- 
cere, or  truly  pious,  he  was  yet  far  from  being  sinless.  Of  several 
of  the  kings  of  Judah,  it  is  said  that  their  heart  was  perfect  with 
the  Lord,  yet  actions  are  attributed  to  them  utterly  inconsistent 
with  the  supposition  that  they  were  exempt  from  all  sinful  defects. 
The  obvious  meaning  of  the  phrase  as  applied  to  those  good  men 
is,  that  they  were  sincere  believers,  and  maintained  by  their  exam- 
ple and  public  acts,  the  doctrines,  institutions,  and  laws  of  true  re- 
ligion in  their  dominions.  It  is  affirmed  of  Zacharias  and  Elizabeth, 
that  "  they  were  both  righteous  before  God.  walking  in  all  the 
commandments  and  ordinances  of  the  Lord  blameless."  In  this  pas- 
sage, it  is  plainly  the  design  of  the  inspired  writer  to  teach  us  that 
Zacharias  and  Elizabeth  were  eminent  saints,  maintaining  an  ex- 
ample of  impartial  and  universal  obedience.  That  he  did  not 
mean  to  attribute  to  them  sinless  obedience  is  manifest,  because  in 


416  SANCTIFICATION. 

the  context  Zacharias  is  charged  with  criminal  unbelief,  for  which 
he  was  punished  with  the  temporary  loss  of  the  power  of  speech. 
What !  a  perfectly  holy  man  subject  himself  to  the  divine  displea- 
sure, and  struck  dumb  for  his  distrust  of  God's  word  !  Paul  calls 
upon  those  whom  he  had  addressed  as  perfect,  to  be  followers  of 
him,  Phil.  iii.  15,  17 ;  yet,  in  the  same  connexion  he  says,  "  Not  as 
though  I  had  already  attained,  either  were  already  perfect."  It  is 
certain,  therefore,  that,  in  the  one  instance,  the  word  has  a  different 
meaning  from  what  it  has  in  the  other  ;  for  it  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  a  wise  and  humble  man,  who  confessed  himself  to  be  still  im- 
perfect, would  exhort  those  whom  he  regarded  as  sinless,  to  look 
to  him  as  an  example.  Some  have  understood  by  the  perfect, 
whom  Paul  addressed,  full  grown  men  in  Christian  knowledge,  in 
distinction  from  children.  Accordingly,  Beza  translates  the  pas- 
sage, "  quotquot  itaque  adulti  sumus,  hoc  sentiamus." 

One  of  the  arguments  of  Mr.  Mahan,  on  which  he  strongly  in- 
sists, is  expressed  in  the  following  terms.  "  The  Bible  positively 
affirms,  that  provision  is  made  in  the  Gospel  for  the  attainment  of 
a  state  of  perfection,  and  that  to  make  such  provision  is  one  of  the 
great  objects  of  Christ's  redemption."* 

This  language  is  ambiguous  in  several  respects.  It  may  mean, 
that  God  has  revealed  it  as  his  determination,  that  his  people,  or 
some  of  them,  shall  become  perfect  in  the  present  world ;  and,  in 
this  sense,  it  is  but  an  assumption  of  the  doctrine  to  be  proved. 
It  may  mean  that  God's  plan  includes  the  complete  sanctification 
of  his  children,  at  some  future  period  of  their  existence  ;  a  fact 
which  no  one  questions,  and  which  proves  nothing  with  respect  to 
the  subject  in  dispute.  God  has  also  made  provision  for  the  deli- 
verance' of  his  people  from  sickness,  pain  and  all  afflictions,  and 
for  the  enjoyment  of  the  Redeemer's  presence  in  glory ;  but  this 
purpose  concerning  the  elect,  is  not  accomplished  till  they  are 
released  from  the  present  world  by  death.  Does  Mr.  Mahan 
mean,  that  nothing  hinders  the  perfect  obedience  of  Christians  but 
their  own  culpable  abuse,  or  disregard  of  their  privileges  ?  Very 
well ;  and  it  may  with  equal  truth  be  said,  that  nothing  different 
from  this,  hinders  the  perfect  obedience  of  impenitent  sinners. 
Does  he  mean  merely  that  believers  might  be  perfect  but  for  their 
own  fault  ?  It  is  also  true,  as  the  apostle  assures  us,  that  the  very 
heathen  are  without  excuse ;  and  the  damned  themselves  are  doubt- 
less inexcusably  criminal  for  their  present  rebellion.  Does  he  mean, 
that  the  atonement  secures  the  perfect  holiness  of  Christians  in  the 
present  life  ?  This  is  simply  a  begging  of  the  question ;  and  it  is 
moreover  contradicted  by  fact ;  since  the  great  body  of  believers 
are,  by  the  acknowledgment  of  Mr.  Mahan  himself,  far  from  per- 
fect holiness.  Does  he  mean  that  the  Spirit  of  God  is  able  and 
gracious  enough  to  make  them  perfect  ?  So  the  Spirit  of  God  is 
able  and  gracious  enough  to  make  the  whole  world  perfect,  and 

*  Christian  Perfection,  p.  20. 


SANCTIFICATION.  417 

even  to  exclude  all  sin  from  the  universe.  But  his  power  and  mercy 
are  ever  regulated,  in  their  exercise,  by  his  wisdom  and  his  supreme 
regard  to  the  interests  of  universal  being.  The  only  question,  in 
reference  to  this  subject,  is,  what  is  God's  revealed  purpose  ?  Has 
he  anywhere  told  us  that  his  people,  or  a  part  of  them,  will  become 
perfectly  holy  during  their  abode  in  this  world  ?  If  not,  the  removal 
of  external  obstacles  to  their  perfection  no  more  proves  that  they 
will  be  perfect,  than  God's  readiness  to  receive  every  true  penitent 
justifies  the  conclusion,  that  all  mankind  will  repent  and  cordially 
embrace  the  overtures  of  the  Gospel.  The  loose  manner  in  which 
Mr.  Mahan  expresses  himself,  makes  it  difficult  to  say  what  he 
does  mean,  except  that  he  intends  to  assert  that  God  has  done  or 
will  do  something  that  renders  it  certain  a  part  of  his  people  will 
grow  to  a  state  of  perfection,  before  they  exchange  earth  for 
heaven.  Excellent,  therefore,  as  Dr.  Woods's  discussion  of  this 
subject  mainly  is,  we  cannot  agree  with  him  in  saying,  that  "  de- 
vout Christians  and  orthodox  divines  have  in  all  ages  maintained 
the  same  doctrines  "  with  Mr.  Mahan,  concerning  "  the  provisions 
of  the  Gospel."  We  must  know  what  Mr.  Mahan  means  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Gospel,  before  we  can  say  anything  like  this. 
In  all  "  the  practical  writings  of  Calvin,  Flavel,  Owen,  Bunyan, 
Watts,  Doddridge,  President  Davies,  and  Good,"  not  a  sentence 
can  be  found  which  implies  that  God  has,  in  such  a  sense,  made 
provision  for  the  complete  sanctification  of  his  children  while  they 
"  abide  in  the  flesh,"  that  his  plan  includes  this  result  of  his  admi- 
nistration towards  them ;  and  if  Mr.  Mahan  does  not  mean  so 
much  as  this,  he  means  nothing  to  his  purpose. 

Mr.  Mahan  also  affirms  that  "  perfection  in  holiness  is  promised 
to  the  Christian  in  the  new  covenant  under  which  he  is  placed."* 

If  it  be  true  that  God  has  promised  that  his  people  shall  become 
perfect  in  this  life,  the  question  is  settled.  But  what  are  the  proofs 
adduced  of  this  fact  ?  Why,  he  cites  a  number  of  passages,  which, 
if  they  are  at  all  relevant  to  his  design,  prove  that  all  Christians 
become  completely  holy  at  the  moment  of  their  regeneration. 
The  promises  he  mentions  belong  to  all  under  the  new  covenant. 
These  are  contained  in  such  passages  as  Jer.  xxxi.  31-34,  and 
Heb.  viii.  8-11 ;  Deut.  xxx.  10;  Jer.  i.  20  ;  Ezek.  xxxvi.  25-27; 
Isaiah  lix.  21,  and  Luke  i.  74,  75,  &c.  God  circumcises  the 
hearts  of  all  his  people ;  he  puts  his  law  in  their  inward  parts ; 
he  takes  away  the  stony  heart  out  of  their  flesh ;  and  he  causes 
them  to  walk  in  his  statutes.  But  does  Mr.  Mahan  believe  (as  he 
should,  in  order  to  be  consistent  with  himself)  that  all  the  elect 
are  completely  sanctified,  at  the  very  instant  of  their  conversion  ? 
So  far  from  it  he  says,  "  the  great  men  of  the  church  are  slumber- 
ing in  Antinomian  death,  or  struggling  in  legal  bondage,  with 
barely  enough  of  the  evangelical  spirit  to  keep  the  pulse  of  spirit- 
ual life  faintly  beating."f    But  does  Mr.  Mahan  believe  that  the 

*  Christian  Perfection,  p.  22.  t  lb.,  pp.  100,  101. 

27 


418  SANCTIFICATION. 

promises  of  the  new  covenant  have  failed  with  respect  to  "  the 
great  mass  of  the  church  ?"  How,  then,  can  he  argue  from  these 
promises,  that  any  part  of  the  church  will  be  completely  sanctified 
in  this  life  ?  Again,  he  says,  "  from  the  evangelical  simplicity  of 
their  first  love,  they  (i.  e.,  the  great  mass  of  Christians)  fall  into  a 
state  of  legal  bondage,  and  after  a  fruitless  struggle  of  vain  reso- 
lutions with  the  world,  the  flesh  and  the  devil,  they  appear  to 
descend  into  a  kind  of  Antinomian  death."  "  The  spirit  of  Anti- 
nomian  slumber  prevails,  and  death,  not  a  present  Christ,  is  looked 
for  as  the  great  deliverer  from  bondage."  What  does  this  mean  ? 
Has  God  forgotten  his  covenant  ?  Or  is  it  simply  conditional  ? 
But  a  conditional  covenant,  from  its  very  nature,  does  not  insure 
the  compliance  of  a  single  individual  with  its  proposals.  The 
truth,  however,  is,  that  the  promises  enumerated  by  Mr.  Mahan, 
have  their  incipient  fulfilment  here,  and  will  be  accomplished,  in 
the  broadest  extent  of  their  meaning,  hereafter.  God,  therefore, 
is  faithful,  though  it  remain  true,  that  none  are  entirely  free  from 
sin  on  this  side  of  heaven. 

Some  have  insisted  on  those  texts,  in  which  God  promises  to 
cleanse  his  people  from  all  sin,  as  an  evidence  that  they  may  attain 
to  perfection  in  this  life. 

In  some  instances,  to  be  cleansed  from  sin,  is  equivalent  to  pardon, 
or  gratuitous  justification.  Thus,  in  Ps.  li. :  "  Wash  me  thoroughly 
from  mine  iniquity,  and  cleanse  me  from  my  sin ;"  that  is,  save  me 
from  the  deserved  consequences  of  my  disobedience.  Again,  in 
allusion  to  ceremonial  purification,  which  represented  atoning 
blood,  David  says  in  the  same  psalm,  "  purge  me  with  hyssop,  and 
I  shall  be  clean,  wash  me  and  I  shall  be  whiter  than  snow."  Thus, 
in  Jer.  xxxiii.  8  :  "  And  I  will  cleanse  them  from  all  their  iniquity, 
whereby  they  have  sinned  against  me."  That  this  refers  to  justi- 
fying grace,  rather  than  sanctification,  seems  evident  from  what 
immediately  follows — "  and  I  will  pardon  all  their  iniquities,  where- 
by they  have  sinned,  and  whereby  they  have  transgressed  against 
me."  Thus,  also,  in  1  John  i.  7,  8,  "  The  blood  of  Jesus  Christ, 
his  Son,  cleanseth  us  from  all  sin,"  that  is,  obtaineth  our  pardon ; 
for  it  is  not  the  atonement,  but  a  direct  divine  influence,  which 
removes  the  power  and  pollution  of  sin.  Again  :  "  If  we  confess 
our  sins  he  is  faithful  and  just  to  forgive  us  our  sins,  and  to  cleanse 
us  from  all  unrighteousness."  Here,  to  forgive  sins,  and  to  cleanse 
from  all  unrighteousness,  appear  to  be  equivalent  phrases.  In  the 
sense  of  pardon,  or  free  justification,  all  believers  are  cleansed 
from  sin,  since  they  are  all  acquitted,  and  viewed  and  treated  as 
perfectly  righteous,  for  the  Redeemer's  sake. 

Where  deliverance  from  the  dominion  of  sin  is  promised,  refe- 
rence is  in  part  had  to  what  takes  place  in  this  world,  but,  more 
especially,  to  the  future  perfection  of  the  heavenly  state.  The 
purifying  process  begins  in  the  new  birth,  and  is  gradually  carried 
forward  in  sanctification,  till  the  work  is  completed  in  glory.  But 
how  does  the  promise  of  future  entire  emancipation  from  the  thral- 


SANCTIFICATION.  419 

dom  of  sin,  prove  that  this  blessing  will  be  obtained  immediately,  or 
during  the  brief  term  of  our  earthly  existence  ?  It  is  also  promised 
to  believers,  that  they  shall  be  delivered  from  all  sorrow,  that  they 
shall  vanquish  completely  death  and  hell,  and  shall  live  and  reign 
with  Christ ;  and  it  might  as  well  be  argued,  that  these  promises  will 
have  their  full  accomplishment  here,  as  those  which  relate  to  the  en- 
tire purgation  of  the  saints  from  their  moral  defilement.  The  truth 
is,  God's  faithfulness  peculiarly  appears  in  sustaining  his  people, 
amidst  the  temptations  and  difficulties  connected  with  a  state  of 
sinful  imperfection,  till  death  is  swallowed  up  in  victory.  Every 
good  thing  which  the  Lord  has  spoken  will  be  shortly  accomplish- 
ed ;  and  is  his  veracity  to  be  distrusted,  because  he  does  not  give 
to  his  children  in  this  world,  the  perfect  rest  and  triumph  of  heaven  ? 
Was  God  unfaithful  to  his  ancient  saints,  because  he  did  not  send 
them  the  promised  Messiah  in  the  time  of  Moses  ?  I  may  remark 
in  general,  that  if  we  regard  not  the  scope  of  a  passage,  nor  the 
peculiar  import  of  scriptural  phrases,  nor  the  analogy  of  the  faith, 
we  may,  from  insulated  texts,  deduce  doctrines  as  preposterous  as 
any  that  were  ever  advanced  by  the  greatest  heretics.  Thus  from 
the  passage,  "  Behold  the  Lamb  of  God,  who  taketh  away  the  sin 
of  the  world,"  we  might  argue,  in  opposition  to  the  repeated  decla- 
rations and  general  tenor  of  the  scriptures,  that  Christ  sanctifies 
or  pardons  and  saves  the  whole  human  race.  Whereas,  the  truth 
intended  to  be  taught  in  these  words,  is  the  reality  and  universal 
extent  of  the  atonement  of  Christ. 

"  I  argue,"  says  Mr.  Mahan,*  "  that  perfection  in  holiness  is  at- 
tainable in  this  life,  and  that  the  sacred  writers  intended  to  teach 
the  doctrine,  from  the  fact,  that  inspired  men  made  the  attainment 
of  this  particular  state  the  subject  of  definite,  fervent,  and  constant 
prayer." 

So  we  have  examples  of  inspired  men,  praying  for  the  purity 
and  blessedness  of  the  heavenly  state.  But  do  believers,  while 
sojourning  on  earth,  ever  literally  become  companions  of  the  glo- 
rified? Paul  was  continually  pressing  toward  the  mark,  for  the 
prize  of  the  high  calling  of  God  in  Christ  Jesus ;  the  acquisition 
of  this  prize  was  the  object  of  his  most  earnest  labours,  of  his  most 
fervent  prayers ;  and  Mr.  Mahah  supposes!  that  the  "  mark "  at 
which  the  apostle  so  strenuously  aimed  was  the  "  resurrection  of 
the  dead."  But  was  Paul  actually  raised  from  the  dead,  during 
the  period  of  his  abode  in  this  world  ?  Or,  does  it  follow,  because 
he  continued  to  sigh  and  groan,  being  burdened,  that  he  did  not 
pray  in  faith  for  a  glorious  resurrection?  Christ  taught  his  disci- 
ples to  pray,  "  Thy  kingdom  come,  thy  will  be  done  on  earth  as  it 
is  in  heaven."  This  prayer  was  offered  by  the  apostles,  and  has 
been  offered  by  the  most  devoted  Christians,  in  all  later  ages  ;  yet 
to  this  day,  much  the  greater  part  of  mankind  continue  the  slaves 
of  sin,  and  ignorant  of  the  way  of  salvation  by  the  Mediator.     Are 

•  Christian  Perfection,  p.  34.  t  H>->  P-  80. 


420  SANCTIFICATION. 

we  to  conclude,  therefore,  that  this  prayer  has  been  so  long,  and 
by  such  multitudes  of  the  excellent  of  the  earth,  offered  in  vain  ? 

Perfectionists  have  urged  the  prayer  of  Christ,  recorded  in  John 
xvii.  21,  23,  as  a  proof  of  their  doctrine,  "That  they  all  may  be 
one  ;  as  thou,  Father,  art  in  me,  and  I  in  thee,  that  they  also  may 
be  one  in  us :  that  the  world  may  believe  that  thou  hast  sent  me." 
"  I  in  them,  and  thou  in  me,  that  they  may  be  perfect  in  one." 
"  The  union  here  prayed  for,"  says  Mr.  Mahan,  "is  a  union  of  perfect 
love."  "  We  must  admit  that  this  love,  and  consequent  union,  will 
exist  among  believers,  or  maintain,  1st,  That  Christ  prayed  for 
that  which  he  requires  us  to  believe  that  it  is  not  for  the  glory  of 
God  to  bestow  on  his  children.  2d,  That  the  world  are  never  to 
believe  in  Christ."* 

That  this  prayer  was  offered  in  behalf  of  all  God's  children, 
cannot  admit  of  a  doubt.  But  if  it  was  offered  for  all,  it  has  been 
answered  in  part  at  least,  with  respect  to  all,  since  the  supplica- 
tions of  the  Son  are  ever  prevalent  with  the  Father.  However 
imperfect  Christians  may  be,  they  are  all  united  to  their  head  by 
a  living  faith,  they  all  have  essentially  the  same  views  of  the  Gos- 
pel ;  they  approve  of  one  another's  character,  and  rejoice  in  the 
prosperity  of  the  kingdom,  of  which  they  are  all  subjects  ;  they  all 
hate  sin,  and  love  the  same  divine  objects ;  they  have  all  been 
washed  in  the  same  blood,  have  been  renewed  by  the  same  spirit, 
have  become  partakers  of  the  same  hope,  and  have  been  made  heirs 
of  the  same  salvation.  The  union  among  believers,  as  it  is  far 
more  pure  and  sacred  than  that  which  subsists  among  worldly 
men,  is  destined  to  grow  in  strength,  while  all  earthly  friendships 
decay,  and  to  endure  for  ever.  Nor,  apparently  defective  as  it  is, 
has  it  been  wholly  ineffectual  in  carrying  a  conviction  to  the  un- 
godly of  the  divine  reality  and  power  of  the  Gospel.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  example  of  Christians,  notwithstanding  the  many 
inconsistencies  with  which  it  has  been  marred,  the  "  world  "  have 
been  constrained  to  admit  the  divine  mission  and  character  of  the 
Redeemer.  But  Mr.  Mahan  seems  to  suppose  that  this  prayer  is 
not  answered  at  all,  except  with  regard  to  those  who  become  per- 
fectly sanctified  in  the  present  life.  What  must  be  the  inference  ? 
Plainly  this — that,  with  respect  to  the  great  body  of  Christians  hith- 
erto, during  their  mortal  pilgrimage,  the  prayer  of  the  Saviour  has 
been  followed  by  no  correspondent  effect.  According  to  Mr.  Ma- 
han's  interpretation,  therefore,  Christ  has  failed  to  secure  the  object 
which  he  sought ;  for  this  writer  supposes  that  comparatively  few 
of  the  saints  have  attained  to  that  perfection,  which  their  master 
prayed  they  should  possess.  But  if  the  prayer  has  failed  of  an 
answer  till  now,  with  respect  to  millions  of  Christians,  what  evi- 
dence is  there  that  it  will  not  equally  fail  in  all  future  ages  of  time  ? 
It  is  reasonable,  therefore,  to  conclude,  not  that  the  great  interces- 
sor has  prayed  in  vain,  but  that  the  Perfectionists  have  misappre- 

*  Christian  Perfection,  p.  33. 


SANCFIF1CATI0N.  421 

hended  and  misinterpreted  his  prayer.  Our  Lord  said,  "  I  pray 
not  thou  shouldst  take  them  out  of  the  world,  but  that  thou  shouldst 
keep  them  from  the  evil."  The  word  evil  may  be  understood  to 
include  both  sin  and  suffering,  as  well  as  the  temptations  and  buf- 
fetings  of  Satan.  If,  therefore,  we  forget  facts,  and  the  general 
testimony  of  the  scriptures,  in  our  exposition  of  particular  texts, 
we  may  infer  from  this  last  cited  passage,  that  all  real  believers 
have  done  with  conflicts,  and  enjoy  perfect  freedom  from  afflictions 
and  sorrows. 

Mr.  Mahan  thinks  that  Paul's  proposing  himself  as  an  example 
to  other  Christians,  "  shows  that  he  had  arrived  to  a  state  of  entire 
sanctification."* 

Paul  does  not  propose  himself  as  a  perfect  example.  He  was 
worthy  of  imitation  in  many  respects ;  and  so  are  many  other 
good  men,  who  would  be  the  last  persons  on  earth  to  claim  the 
character  of  entire  obedience.  That  Paul  was  imperfect,  and  that 
after  all  his  attainments  he  felt  himself  to  be  so,  will  fully  appear 
in  the  sequel.  As  for  the  passages  which  Mr.  Mahan  cites  to 
prove  the  perfection  of  Paul's  obedience,  they  assert  nothing  more 
than  the  sincerity  of  his  faith,  the  eminency  of  his  self-denial,  and 
his  fidelity  as  an  apostle  and  minister  of  Christ.  When  he  declared 
that  he  was  pure  of  the  blood  of  all  men,  he  referred  merely  to 
the  clearness  and  fulness  with  which  he  had  preached  the  Gospel. 
But  can  none,  save  one  who  is  perfectly  holy,  declare  to  his  hear- 
ers all  the  counsel  of  God  ? 

Some  have  considered  1  John  iii.  9,  as  proving  that  saints  may 
be  entirely  free  from  sin  in  this  life.  "  Whosoever  is  born  of  God 
doth  not  commit  sin ;  for  his  seed  remaineth  in  him,  and  he  cannot 
sin,  because  he  is  born  of  God." 

It  is  the  opinion  of  some  writers  that  the  apostle  here  refers  to 
the  sin  of  total  and  final  apostasy,  against  which  all  true  Christians 
are  secured  by  the  power  and  presence  of  God.  The  connexion, 
however,  seems  to  warrant  the  conclusion,  that  John's  object  is  to 
exhibit  one  of  the  distinguishing  evidences  of  true  religion,  which 
is  obedience.  Some  in  the  primitive  church  were  Antinomians, 
supposing,  with  many  modern  Perfectionists,  that  Christians  were 
freed  from  the  rule  of  duty,  and  were  at  liberty  to  live  according 
to  their  inclinations.  To  meet  this  impious  dogma,  as  well  as  ex- 
cite believers  to  the  diligent  pursuit  of  holiness,  the  sacred  writer 
affirms  that  regeneration  implies  the  implantation  of  a  virtuous 
"  seed,"  or  "  principle,"  which,  by  its  own  proper  tendency,  prompts 
to  all  the  works  of  faith  and  labours  of  love.  The  real  Christian, 
therefore,  cannot  be  the  committer  or  doer  of  sin,  in  such  a  sense 
as  implies  an  habitually  and  totally  depraved  character.  He  longs 
for  perfect  holiness,  and  assiduously  strives  to  keep  all  the  com- 
mandments of  God.  In  other  words,  he  is  habitually  a  new  man, 
both  in  his.  heart  and  in  the  overt  actions  of  his  life.     The  con- 

*  Christian  Perfection,  p.  39. 


422  SANCTIFICATION. 

nexion,  both  preceding  and  following  the  text,  accords  with  this 
interpretation.  The  10th  verse  is,  "  In  this  the  children  of  God 
are  manifested,  and  the  children  of  the  devil :  whosoever  doeth 
not  righteousness  is  not  of  God,  neither  he  that  loveth  not  his  bro- 
ther." Such  are  the  scope  and  design  of  the  passage.  The  other 
interpretation  is  moreover  attended  with  difficulties  not  easy  to  be 
removed. 

1.  It  overthrows  a  leading  doctrine  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
Perfectionists  (who  are  Arminians),  concerning  the  defectibility  of 
the  saints.  Here  we  learn  that  regeneration  includes  the  idea  of 
permanency  or  certain  perseverance  in  obedience,  "  His  seed  re- 
maineth  in  him."  Most  surely  then,  Wesleyans  and  other  Arme- 
nian Perfectionists  ought  not  to  cite  this  passage  as  an  evidence  of 
their  doctrine  ;  since  if  it  proves  anything  in  their  favour,  it  proves 
too  much  for  their  cause. 

2.  Admit  the  interpretation  of  the  Perfectionists,  and  it  will  fol- 
low that  none  but  the  perfectly  holy  had  been  born  of  God,  or  are 
real  Christians.  The  language  of  the  apostle  is  very  explicit: 
"  Whosoever  is  born  of  God  doth  not  commit  sin."  If  by  not 
committing  sin  here,  be  intended  absolute  perfection,  then  the 
smallest  sin,  either  external  or  internal,  is  enough  to  demonstrate 
a  professor  of  religion  to  be  a  hypocrite.  On  this  ground,  there- 
fore, the  difference  between  saints  and  sinners  must  be,  not  in  the 
nature  of  some  or  all  of  their  exercises,  but  the  perfection  of  the 
former  and  the  imperfection  of  the  latter.  The  last  part  of  the 
text  is,  if  possible,  stronger  than  the  first ;  "  He  cannot  sin,  because 
he  is  born  of  God."  If  the  meaning  be,  he  cannot  sin  at  all,  then 
of  course  no  one  who  does  sin  at  all,  has  within  him  the  smallest 
spark  of  true  religion. 

3.  The  interpretation  adopted  by  the  Perfectionists,  makes  John 
contradict  himself  in  this  very  epistle  ;  for  he  does  expressly  affirm 
that  none  of  the  children  of  men  in  this  world  are  entirely  free 
from  sin.  In  chap.  i.  ver.  8,  he  tells  us,  "  If  we  say  that  we  have 
no  sin"  (as  some  pretended  that  all  their  actions  as  believers  were 
pure),  "  we  deceive  ourselves,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  us."  In  the 
language  of  the  New  Testament,  the  affirmation  that  the  truth  is 
not  in  one,  seems  to  be  the  same  as  saying  that  he  is  not  a  real 
Christian.  Paul  speaks  of  men  of  "  corrupt  minds,  and  destitute 
of  the  truth,"  that  is,  devoid  of  the  Christian  spirit,  or  of  evangeli- 
cal piety.  John,  in  the  second  chapter  of  this  epistle,  uses  the  same 
phrase.  "  He  that  saith  I  know  him,  and  keepeth  not  his  com- 
mandments, is  a  liar,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  him."  Elsewhere  the 
same  apostle  speaks  of  the  truth  as  being  in  Christians,  as  dwelling 
in  them  ;  and  them  he  represents  as  walkers  in  the  truth.  Thus 
he  teaches  us  that  the  boast  of  perfection  indicates  not  superior 
sanctity,  but  gross  self-ignorance,  or  intentional  falsehood,  and  a 
destitution  of  the  genuine  traits  of  the  Christian  character.  In 
chap.  iii.  ver.  3,  he  says,  "  and  every  one  that  hath  this  hope  in 
him  purifieth  himself  even  as  he  is  pure."     Macknight  has  the  fol- 


SANCTIFICATION.  423 

lowing  note  on  this  passage.  "  The  apostle,  as  Beza  observes, 
doth  not  say,  hath  purified  himself,  but  purified  himself;  to  show 
that  it  is  a  good  man's  constant  study  to  purify  himself,  because  no 
man  in  this  life  can  attain  to  perfect  purity.  By  this  text,  there- 
fore, as  well  as  by  1  John  i.  8,  those  fanatics  are  condemned  who 
imagine  they  are  able  to  live  without  sin."  From  the  foregoing 
passages,  it  is  apparent  that  John  taught  a  very  different  doctrine 
from  that  of  sinless  perfection  in  this  life.  And  is  it  credible  that 
he  has  been  guilty  of  gross  self-contradiction  in  the  course  of  a 
single  brief  letter  ? 

It  may  be  said  in  favour  of  the  doctrine  of  perfection  of  the 
saints  in  this  life,  that  it  is  honourable  to  Christ,  and  implied  in  his 
all-sufficiency  as  the  Saviour  of  his  people.  Will  he  not,  it  may 
be  asked,  be  all  to  his  people  that  they  need  or  desire  1 

We  answer,  that  he  will  be  all  to  them  that  he  has  promised,  but 
that  he  will  do  nothing  for  them  contrary  to  his  own  express  de- 
clarations and  the  wisdom  of  his  general  counsels.  We  are  ill 
qualified  to  judge  what,  except  so  far  as  he  has  revealed  his  pur- 
pose in  his  word,  it  is  wisest  and  best  for  him  to  do.  There  are 
some  things  which  he  will  not  do  for  his  people.  He  will  not,  for 
example,  make  them  all  of  gigantic  stature  and  Herculean  strength ; 
nor  render  them  immortal  upon  the  earth,  nor  cause  them  to  live 
to  the  age  of  Methuselah,  nor  raise  them  at  once  in  intellect  and 
knowledge  to  an  equality  with  the  angels,  nor  free  them,  while 
they  continue  here,  from  the  universally  experienced  pains  and  ills 
of  this  mortal  existence.  To  expect  from  him  such  achievements, 
betrays  either  infidelity  or  the  utmost  extravagance  of  enthusiasm. 
That  he  will  ultimately  accomplish  the  entire  sanctification  of  his 
people  is  certain:  this  they  are  bound  to  believe;  but'to  look  to 
him  without  any  warrant  from  his  word,  for  such  a  manifestation 
of  his  grace  in  this  world,  betokens  rather  weakness  and  presump- 
tion than  suitable  confidence  in  his  faithfulness  and  power.  When 
he  assures  us  that  he  will  do  for  us  whatever  we  ask,  it  is  with  the 
express  or  implied  condition,  that  our  petitions  are  in  accordance 
with  his  purposes  as  made  known  in  the  scriptures.  Has  he  ever 
told  us  in  the  Bible,  that  he  will,  if  we  ask  him,  purify  us  from  all 
sin  in  the  present  world  ?  If  not,  it  seems  opinionated  pride  and 
ignorance,  rather  than  eminent  faith  and  holiness,  to  expect  him, 
out  of  a  regard  to  our  wishes,  thus  to  turn  aside  from  the  course 
of  his  ordinary  gracious  operations.  Besides,  so  long  as  we  con- 
tinue here,  we  must  come  to  him  as  needy,  as  empty,  as  sinners. 
But  these  are  not  the  characteristics  of  such  as  are  completely 
sanctified.  They  have  as  truly  entered  into  their  rest  as  any  of 
the  saints  with  Christ  in  Paradise. 

"  But  some  have  professed  to  be  perfectly  holy." 

Such  were  not  the  saints,  of  whom  we  have  an  account  in  the 
scriptures.  These  all  confessed  their  continual  proneness  to  sin ; 
and  depended  all  their  life  long  on  the  resources  of  rich,  free, 
superabounding  grace.     Some,  indeed,  have  claimed  perfection ; 


424  SANCTIFICATION. 

but  they  resembled  the  Pharisee  who  thanked  the  Lord  for  his 
moral  superiority  over  other  men,  much  more  nearly  than  the  con- 
trite Publican,  who  smote  upon  his  breast,  saying,  "  God  be  merci- 
ful to  me  a  sinner."  The  church  of  Rome,  too,  has  claimed  infal- 
libility. A  man's  favourable  opinion  of  himself  is  but  a  poor 
argument  to  show  that  he  is  either  good  or  >great.  "  He  that 
trusteth  in  his  own  heart  is  a  fool."  "  There  is,"  says  Solomon, 
"  a  generation  that  are  pure  in  their  own  eyes,  and  yet  are  not 
washed  from  their  filthiness."  It  is  the  self-righteous  hypocrite 
who  cries,  "  stand  by  thyself,  come  not  near  to  me,  for  I  am  holier 
than  thou."  "  These,"  says  God,  "  are  a  smoke  in  my  nose,  a  fire 
that  burneth  all  the  day."  Many  poor  enthusiasts  have  believed 
themselves  inspired,  and  capable  of  working  miracles  ;  and  some 
have  affirmed  their  possession  of  attributes  strictly  superhuman 
and  divine.  Are  the  Behmenites,  the  French  prophets,  the  disci- 
ples of  Ann  Lee,  and  the  Mormons,  then,  to  be  acknowledged  as 
the  divinely  illuminated  messengers  of  God?  "Not  he  that  com- 
mendeth  himself  is  approved,  but  whom  the  Lord  commendeth." 
When  a  man  professes  an  eminence  in  holiness,  surpassing  that 
ascribed  to  any  of  the  scripture  saints,  he  is  for  that  reason  to  be 
distrusted  ;  and  if  he  boasts  of  a  perfection  which  the  Bible  denies 
to  pertain  to  any  of  the  human  race  in  this  world,  he  is  to  be  at 
once  regarded,  without  the  trouble  of  further  examination,  either 
as  a  deceiver,  or  the  subject  of  a  morbid  fanaticism.  It  is  not  for 
a  moment  to  be  deemed  possible, — whatever  may  be  his  professed 
experimental  knowledge  of  religion,  or  his  zeal,  or  the  apparent 
blamelessness  of  his  life, — that  he  is  in  the  right,  in  opposition  to 
the  explicit  declaration  of  the  scriptures.  "  Let  God  be  true,  but 
every  man  a  liar."  "  To  the  law  and  to  the  testimony ;  if  they 
speak  not  according  to  the  word,  it  is  because  there  is  no  light  in 
them."  At  all  events,  if  one  come  to  us  with  a  professedly  new 
revelation,  he  is  not  worthy  of  attention  from  us,  until  we  find  him 
performing  works  which  are  plainly  and  incontestably  miraculous. 

It  is,  moreover,  said  by  Perfectionists,  that  the  common  ortho- 
dox doctrine  on  this  subject  is  discouraging,  and  leads  to  licentious- 
ness. 

The  same  objection  has  been  made  to  the  doctrines  of  entire 
depravity,  regeneration  by  effectual  grace,  election,  justification  by 
faith  alone,  the  atonement  of  Christ,  and  indeed  the  whole  scheme 
of  evangelical  truth  contained  in  the  Bible.  Infidels,  too,  have 
professed  to  reject  the  sacred  volume,  on  the  ground  of  the  al- 
leged evil  tendency  of  many  of  its  narratives,  precepts,  and  exhi- 
bitions of  divine  character.  Does  it  follow  then,  that  the  influence 
of  the  doctrines  of  grace  is  bad,  or  that  the  Bible  does  not  give  us 
the  most  just  and  consistent  view  of  God  ?     Certainly  not. 

He  who  needs  the  expectation  of  perfect  holiness  in  this  life  to 
stimulate  his  efforts  in  religion,  is  yet  a  stranger  to  the  ingenuous 
nature  of  that  faith  which  is  the  fruit  of  divine  grace.  The  true 
Christian  loves  holiness,  and  will,  therefore,  strive  to  make  ad- 


SANCTIFICATION.  425 

varices  in  the  divine  life.  Did  Baxter,  Brainerd,  Martyn.  and  Pay- 
son,  labour  any  the  less  diligently  for  Christ,  because  they  did  not 
expect  perfect  rest  on  this  side  of  heaven  ?  Has  any  advocate  of 
Perfectionism  ever  surpassed  those  holy  men  in  watchfulness,  in 
fervent  prayers,  in  the  most  self-denying  sacrifices,  and  in  unwea- 
ried attention  to  all  the  demands  of  duty  ?  The  common  doctrine 
concerning  the  imperfection  of  the  heart  of  the  saints  in  this  world, 
is  adapted  to  produce  and  strengthen  some  very  important  branches 
of  the  Christian  character — particularly  humility,  a  great  fear  of 
sin,  watchfulness  against  temptation,  and  habitual  active  depend- 
ence on  the  teaching  and  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit."  "  O,"  says 
the  believer,  convinced  of  this  truth,  "how  potent  must  be  my 
corruptions  ;  and  how  hopeless,  but  for  Almighty  grace,  my  state  !" 
It  teaches,  in  the  most  impressive  manner,  the  unwearied  faithful- 
ness of  the  Redeemer,  who,  inconstant  and  unworthy  as  they  all 
are,  will  never  leave  one  of  his  ransomed  people  to  perish.  How 
sweet,  how  tender  the  gratitude,  which  such  a  view  of  his  unceas- 
ing care  cannot  fail  to  inspire  !  The  doctrine,  at  the  same  time, 
serves  to  wean  the  believer  from  the  world,  where  he  is  ever  to 
bear  the  burthen  of  sin,  and  dispose  him  to  seek  with  the  most  in- 
tense desires  for  the  freedom,  rest,  and  blessedness  of  heaven.  It 
helps  to  make  welcome  the  grave  and  eternity.  To  one  who 
knows  the  evils  of  his  heart,  it  is  fitted,  when  clearly  understood, 
to  impart  a  hope  which  would  be  otherwise  impossible ;  since  it 
assures  him  that  the  struggles  he  feels  within  him  have  been  com- 
mon to  others,  who  now  love  and  adore  in  the  unclouded  vision  of 
the  Lamb.  He  is,  therefore,  animated  to  press  forward  in  his  holy 
warfare,  till  he  shall  drop  all  the  sorrows  of  his  mortal  state,  and 
lay  down  his  arms  at  the  side  of  the  grave. 

We  now  proceed  to  state  the  more  direct  evidence  of  the  sinful 
imperfection  of  all  the  saints  in  this  life. 

1.  The  first  argument  is  derived  from  the  direct  testimony  of  the 
Bible. 

Not  a  single  text  can  be  adduced,  which,  properly  understood, 
attributes  perfection  to  good  men  in  this  life.  On  the  contrary,  the 
criminal  imperfection  of  them  all  is  most  plainly  asserted.  Wit- 
ness Eccl.  vii.  20 :  "  For  there  is  not  a  just  man  upon  earth  that 
doeth  good  and  sinneth  not."  It  is  as  evident  from  this  passage 
that  no  one  on  earth  is  perfectly  holy,  as  that  any  are  imperfect. 
Prov.  xx.  9 :  "  Who  can  say,  I  have  made  my  heart  clean,  I  am 
pure  from  my  sin  ?"  Mr.  Mahan  suggests  that  reference  is  here 
had  to  a  man's  past  life  The  language,  however,  supposes  present 
imperfection.  Should  one  say,  "  I  have  made  my  heart  clean," 
the  words  would  imply,  not  that  his  heart  had  always  been  clean 
(for  that  which  has  never  been  impure,  needs  no  cleansing),  but 
that  he  had  accomplished  his  perfect  sanctification.  To  say  "  I 
am  pure  from  any  sin,"  is  equivalent  to  saying,  "  I  am  free  from 
that  depravity  which  was  once  my  character."  The  passage,  then, 
strongly  denies  the  sinless  perfection  of  any  of  the  human  race,  in 


426  SANCTIFICATION. 

this  world.  1  Kings  viii.  46 :  "  There  is  no  man  that  sinneth  not." 
Mr.  Mahan  contends  that  this  means  simply,  that  every  man  is 
peccable,  or  liable  to  sin.  If  so,  the  passage  supposes  that  all  men 
here  are  in  a  very  different  state  from  that  of  the  angels  and  saints 
in  heaven,  who  are  in  no  danger  of  apostatizing  from  God.  Is  it 
not  natural,  then,  to  conclude,  that  there  is  in  the  hearts  of  the  saints 
here,  something  which  peculiarly  exposes  them  to  sin  ?  And  what 
can  this  be  but  a  sinful  propensity  ?  Mr.  Wesley  disposes  of  the 
passage  in  a  different  manner.  "  Doubtless,"  says  he,  "  thus  it  was 
in  the  days  of  Solomon :  yea,  and  from  Solomon  to  Christ,  there 
was  no  man  that  sinned  not."  But  he  supposes  that  the  declara- 
tion is  not  applicable  to  the  times  of  the  Gospel.  With  such  as 
have  a  suitable  reverence  for  the  scriptures,  this  method  of  explain- 
ing away  the  text  requires  no  comment.  "  What,"  says  Eliphaz, 
the  Temanite,  "  is  man  that  he  should  be  clean,  and  he  which  is 
born  of  a  woman  that  he  should  be  righteous  ?"  "  If  I  say  I  am 
perfect  "  (or  sinless),  remarks  Job,  "it  shall  also  prove  me  perverse." 
"  How  does  this  declaration,"  asks  Mr.  Mahan,  "  which  Job  applies 
to  himself  and  to  no  other  person,  prove  that  all  other  saints,  and 
Christians  even,  are  imperfect  ?"  It  is  sufficient  to  reply,  that  Job 
was  one  of  the  best  men  of  his  own  or  any  other  age  ;  that  he  is 
celebrated  as  such  in  the  book  of  Ezekiel,  and  that  he  is  proposed 
to  Christians  in  the  New  Testament  as  a  model  of  distinguished 
patience.  "  And  the  Lord  said  unto  Satan,  hast  thou  considered 
my  servant  Job,  that  there  is  none  like  him  in  the  earth,  a  perfect 
and  an  upright  man  V  And  is  it  not  evidence  of  perverseness  in 
men  of  far  inferior  moral  attainments,  to  boast  of  their  perfection  ? 
"  Who,"  says  the  Psalmist,  "  can  understand  his  errors  ?  Cleanse 
thou  me  from  secret  faults."  Here  it  is  intimated  that  all  have 
errors  or  faults,  from  which  they  need  to  be  purified  by  the  grace 
of  God.  The  New  Testament  is  no  less  explicit  on  this  subject 
than  the  Old.  We  need  not  here  adduce  the  passages  already 
quoted  from  the  first  epistle  of  John,  as  they  must  be  fresh  in  the 
reader's  remembrance.  James  iii.  2  :  "  For  in  many  things  we  of- 
fend all,"  or  are  all  offended.  We  can  see  nothing  in  the  connexion, 
or  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  which  limits  this  declaration  to  any 
particular  description  of  men.  The  apostle  evidently  includes 
himself  and  his  fellow  Christians. 

2.  Many  of  the  exhortations  addressed  to  Christians,  and  the 
prayers  offered  in  their  behalf,  imply  that  they  are  not  at  present 
completely  sanctified.  They  are  required  to  make  advancement 
in  piety.  "  To  grow  in  grace."  But  where  one  is  perfect  in  holi- 
ness, he  can  "  grow  in  grace  "  only  by  an  increase  of  his  natural 
capacity.  His  whole  duty  is  done  ;  and  can  he  do  more  than  his 
duty  ?  "  Giving  all  diligence,  add  to  your  faith,  virtue,  and  to  vir- 
tue, knowledge,  and  to  knowledge,  temperance,  and  to  temperance, 
patience,  and  to  patience,  godliness,  and  to  godliness,  brotherly 
kindness,  and  to  brotherly  kindness,  charity."  Could  such  an  ex- 
hortation, with  any  propriety,  be  addressed  to  one  whose  obedience, 


SANCTIFICATION.  427 

according  to  his  capacity,  was  as  perfect  as  that  of  Gabriel  ?  A 
large  portion  of  the  precepts  written  to  Christians  in  the  New  Tes- 
tament, import  the  necessity  of  improvement,  of  progress  in  the 
divine  life.  "  Now  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  himself,  and  God,  even 
our  Father,  comfort  your  hearts,  and  stablish  you  in  every  good 
word  and  work."  Would  this  be  a  suitable  prayer  in  behalf  of 
those  already  stablished  in  perfect  goodness  ?  "  We  pray  exceed- 
ingly that  we  might  see  your  face,  and  might  perfect  that  which  is 
lacking  in  your  faith."  "  The  Lord  make  you  to  increase  and 
abound  in  love."  "  The  God  of  peace  sanctify  you  wholly." 
"  Now  the  God  of  peace  make  you  perfect  in  every  good  work  to 
do  his  will,  working  in  you  that  which  is  well  pleasing  in  his  sight." 
The  prayer  for  perfect  sanctification  supposes  that  the  blessing  has 
not  already  been  obtained ;  as  the  prayer  that  sinners  may  be  re- 
generated, assumes,  that  they  are  yet  in  an  unrenewed  state.  The 
foregoing  passages  may  serve  as  a  specimen  of  the  prayers  of  in- 
spired men  in  behalf  of  their  brethren  ;  and,  while  they  prove  the 
moral  imperfection  of  those  for  whom  they  were  presented,  they 
give  us  no  reason  to  conclude  that  a  full  answer  to  them  was  ob- 
tained on  this  side  of  the  tomb.  To  infer  the  contrary  would  be 
as  unreasonable  as  to  infer  that  a  sincere  prayer  for  the  deliverance 
of  believers  from  all  evil,  must  secure  its  object  perfectly  in  the 
present  world. 

3.  It  is  the  duty  of  all  men  daily  to  ask  of  God  the  forgiveness 
of  their  sins.  This  is  evident  from  the  form  of  prayer  which  our 
Lord  taught  his  disciples,  which  is  given  as  a  general  guide  to  our 
daily  devotions,  and  which  contains  in  substance  the  petitions  need- 
ful for  Christians  during  their  whole  life.  That  the  prayer,  as  it 
respects  the  subjects  which  it  brings  into  view,  whether  the  precise 
form  be  adopted  or  not,  is  designed  for  daily  use,  is  manifest  from 
one  of  its  petitions.  "  Give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread."  It  is 
then  added,  "  and  forgive  us  our  trespasses,  as  we  forgive  those 
who  trespass  against  us."  We  shall  all,  therefore,  need  daily  to 
pray  for  pardoning  mercy.  But  the  daily  need  of  forgiveness 
supposes  the  daily  commission  of  sins  to  be  forgiven.  The  daily 
prayer  implies  daily  confession  of  sin.  And  does  Christ  require 
us  to  confess  offences  of  which  we  are  not  guilty  1  The  insertion 
of  this  petition  among  the  rest  was  doubtless  intended  to  remind 
us  of  the  sinful  imperfection  of  all  our  services  in  the  present 
world.  Mr.  Mahan's  evasion  of  this  argument,  that  it  involves  the 
supposition  that  "  the  kingdom  of  God  will  never  come,"  and  that 
"  the  Christian  will  never  be  in  a  state  in  this  life  in  which  he  will 
not  be  subject  to  injuries  from  others,"  is  rather  confirmatory,  than 
subversive,  of  the  inference  I  have  maintained.  Mr.  Mahan  vir- 
tually allows,  then,  that  so  long  as  Christians  are  "  subject  to  inju- 
ries from  others,"  this  prayer  is  suitable  for  all  believers.  And  are 
they  not  still  "  subject  to  injuries  ?"  The  prayer,  therefore,  is  with 
propriety  used  by  Christians  at  this  day ;  and  it  remains  to  be 


428  SANCTIFICATION. 

proved,  that  it  will  cease  to  be  appropriate  to  their  circumstances 
so  long  as  the  sun  and  the  moon  endure. 

4.  The  same  doctrine  is  evident  from  the  history  which  the  Holy 
Ghost  has  given  us  in  the  scriptures,  of  the  most  eminent  saints  in 
ancient  times.  Noah  was  once  intoxicated;  Abraham  practised 
dissimulation  concerning  his  wife  ;  Isaac  indulged  sinful  partiality 
towards  Esau  ;  Jacob  sometimes  indulged  criminal  distrust ;  Lot 
was  shamefully  overcome  by  temptation ;  Moses  spoke  unadvisedly 
with  his  lips ;  Aaron  was  too  accommodating  to  the  sinful  wishes 
of  his  countrymen,  and  formed  an  image  for  idolatrous  worship  ; 
David  committed  crimes  for  which  his  holy  soul  was  afterwards 
humbled  in  the  dust;  Solomon's  old  age  was  disgraced  by  his  idola- 
tries ;  Job  and  Jeremiah  impatiently  cursed  the  day  of  their  birth. 
Shall  I  speak  of  the  faults  of  Eli,  and  Samuel,  and  Jehoshaphat,  and 
Asa,  and  Hezekiah,  and  Josiah  ?  Unpleasant  as  the  recollection 
of  their  failings  is,  it  may  be  profitable  to  impress  upon  us  the  ne- 
cessity of  continual  vigilance  and  prater.  It  is  important  to  ob- 
serve, that  to  those  holy  men,  the  remembrance  of  their  sins  was 
grievous,  and  the  burden  of  them  was  intolerable. 

Let  us  look  now  at  the  saints  of  whom  we  have  an  account  in 
the  New  Testament.  Not  one  of  them  is  presented  to  us  with  a 
faultless  character.  In  the  little  family  of  Christ  we  observe  the 
spirit  of  worldly  ambition.  We  hear  the  disciples  inquiring  among 
themselves,  who  shall  be  greatest  ?  they  were  warm  in  dispute ; 
and  carry  their  mutual  complaints  to  their  meek  and  compassionate 
Lord.  Who  can  think  of  the  confidence  of  Peter,  and  his  subse- 
quent lapse,  though  so  soon  followed  by  his  repentance,  without 
exclaiming,  "  what  are  the  holiest  men,  unaided  and  unsustained  by 
the  grace  of  God  I"  Much  as  Peter's  character  afterwards  was 
improved,  his  sanctification  was  still  imperfect.  "  But  when  Peter," 
who  was  in  that  instance  too  much  actuated  by  motives  of  carnal 
policy,  "  was  come  to  Antioch,  I,"  says  Paul,  "  withstood  him  to 
the  face,  because  he  was  to  be  blamed."  Thus,  weak  in  himself, 
and  liable  to  transgress,  was  that  great  apostle,  whose  very  name 
denotes  firmness  and  constancy.  James,  and  the  gentle,  affection- 
ate John,  actuated  by  a  spirit  of  revenge,  would  fain  have  com- 
manded fire  to  come  down  from  heaven  and  consume  the  Samari- 
tans, who  refused  to  receive  their  master.  Yet  Mr.  Mahan  thinks 
that  John  became  perfectly  holy  in  this  life.  Because  John  was 
conscious  of  the  sincerity  of  his  obedience,  it  is  inferred  that  he 
was  free  from  sin.  Paul  and  Barnabas  contended  and  divided, 
with  a  spirit  of  acrimony,  ill-befitting  their  eminent  meekness,  self- 
denial,  and  devotion  to  the  cause  of  the  Redeemer.  Yet,  in  Mr. 
Mahan's  view,  it  is  at  least  "  doubtful "  whether  Paul,  in  that  in- 
stance, deviated  in  the  smallest  degree  from  perfect  holiness.  The 
same  writer  makes  the  apostle  attest  his  own  perfection  in  a  num- 
ber of  passages,  which  simply  assert  the  reality  of  his  faith  and 
piety,  though  he  expressly  says,  "  Not  as  though  I  had  already  at- 
tained, either  were  already  perfect ;  brethren,  I  count  not  myself 


SANCTIFICATION.  429 

to  have  apprehended :  but  this  one  thing  I  do,  forgetting  those 
things  which  are  behind,  and  reaching  forth  unto  those  things 
which  are  before,  I  press  toward  the  mark  for  the  prize  of  the  high 
calling  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ."  In  the  apostolical  epistles  to  the 
churches,  faults  are  specified  and  reproved,  which  render  it  cer- 
tain that  the  religion  of  the  primitive  Christians  was  by  no  means 
such  as  dreaming  Perfectionists  claim  for  themselves.  Thus  do 
Bible  facts  on  this  subject  explain  and  establish  the  Bible  doctrine. 

5.  The  most  holy  men  mentioned  in  scripture  have  confessed, 
and  that  in  their  best  frames,  their  remaining  sinfulness.  "  Against 
thee,  thee  only,"  says  David,  "  have  I  sinned."  "  Mine  iniquities 
have  gone  over  my  head ;  as  an  heavy  burden,  they  are  too  heavy 
for  me."  "  Behold  I  am  evil,"  says  Job,  "  what  shall  I  answer 
thee?"  Nehemiah  and  Daniel  include  themselves  in  their  confes- 
sions of  the  sins  of  their  people.  Paul  again  and  again  renounces 
all  dependence  on  his  own  righteousness,  and  casts  himself,  without 
reserve,  on  the  atonement  and  perfect  obedience  of  the  Saviour. 
These  were  among  the  best  men  that  ever  lived  ;  and  if  they  felt 
themselves  to  be  still  imperfect,  is  it  not  evident  that  others  who 
regard  themselves  as  purified  from  all  sin,  are  miserably  deceived? 

6.  The  warfare  which,  the  scriptures  teach  us,  exists  through 
life  in  the  bosoms  of  good  men,  implies  the  imperfection  of  their 
obedience,  or  the  continuance  of  evil  principles,  however  mortified 
and  weakened,  in  their  hearts.  It  is  nowhere  intimated  that  any 
of  the  saints  have  arrived  at  such  a  state  that  they  have  nothing 
more  to  do  in  opposing  sin  in  their  hearts.  On  the  contrary,  they 
are  all  exhorted  to  continual  watchfulness  and  diligence,  lest  they 
be  overcome  by  temptation.  "  Be  sober,  be  vigilant."  It  is  clear- 
ly implied  in  many  exhortations,  that  Christians  will  be  obliged  to 
fight  the  good  fight  of  faith  till  they  die.  Is  it  not  plain  from  this, 
that  there  will  always  be  sin  in  them  to  resist?  Would  it  not  be 
absurd  to  direct  men  to  fight  an  enemy  already  completely  van- 
quished and  destroyed?  To  evade  this  argument, shall  we  be  told 
of  innocent  susceptibilities  to  sin,  which  render  perpetual  resistance 
necessary  ?  On  this  principle,  as  we  have  already  observed,  there 
must  be  an  inward  warfare  in  heaven  ;  since  men  carry  with  them 
their  innocent  mental  susceptibilities  into  the  regions  of  endless 
purity.  But  is  there  any  warfare  in  that  world  ?  Were  the  saints 
here  perfectly  holy,  we  see  no  reason  why  they  should  be  any 
more  troubled  with  internal  conflicts  than  are  the  glorified  spirits 
in  heaven. 

According  to  the  more  common  interpretation  of  orthodox  di- 
vines, the  apostle,  in  Rom.  vii.,  is  describing  his  own  experience, 
and  that  of  every  believer  in  this  world.  In  that  chapter  he  speaks 
of  sin  dwelling  in  him ;  of  willing  what  he  could  not  perform  ;  of  find- 
ing a  law,  that  when  he  would  do  good,  evil  was  present  with  him ; 
of  delighting  in  the  law  of  God,  after  the  inward  man,  and  yet  see- 
ing another  law  in  his  members  warring  against  the  law  of  his 
mind,  and  bringing  him  into  captivity  to  the  law  of  sin  in  his  mem- 


430  SANCTIFICATION. 

bers ;  and  he  adds  the  pathetic  exclamation,  "  O  wretched  man 
that  I  am,  who  shall  deliver  me  from  the  body  of  this  death  ?" 
He  speaks  as  if  two  distinct  persons  within  him  were  contending 
for  the  mastery ;  and  he  rests  all  his  hope  of  the  final  victory  of 
the  good  principle  over  its  opposite,  on  the  mere  grace  of  the  Re- 
deemer. "  I  thank  God,  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord.  So  then 
with  the  mind,  I  myself  serve  the  law  of  God,  but  with  the  flesh 
the  law  of  sin."  No  real  difficulty  exists  from  the  connexion,  in 
supposing  this  passage  to  be  descriptive  of  the  Christian  experience 
of  Paul  himself,  and  of  other  true  saints.  It  has  been  appropriated 
by  the  best  of  men,  as  most  happily  expressive  of  their  own  views 
of  themselves ;  while  most  of  the  opponents  in  modern  times  of  its 
application  to  true  Christians,  have  also  had  Arminian  or  Pelagian 
notions  of  the  great  doctrines  of  grace.  The  orthodox  interpreta- 
tion is  the  most  natural,  and  such  as  the  plain,  unlettered  Christian, 
who  had  no  system  to  support,  would  be  most  likely  to  adopt. 
Some  of  the  phrases  employed  express  a  state  of  feeling  which  is 
never  found  in  a  totally  depraved  sinner.  Can  such  an  one  truly 
say,  that  he  allows  not  the  evil  which  he  commits,  that  he  hates 
what  he  does,  and  that  he  delights  in  the  law  of  God  after  the  in- 
ward man  ?  The  Psalmist  represents  it  as  one  of  the  characteris- 
tics of  a  good  man,  that  "  his  delight  is  in  the  law  of  the  Lord." 
"  O  Lord,  how  love  I  thy  law !"  "  Delight  thyself  also  in  the 
Lord,  and  he  shall  give  thee  the  desires  of  thy  heart."  As  for  the 
confession,  "  I  am  carnal,  sold  under  sin,"  it  merely  expressed  the 
strong  sense  which  Paul  had  of  the  power  of  indwelling  sin,  as  it 
was  manifested  in  the  effects  which  he  noticed  in  the  following 
connexion. 

In  Gal.  v.  17,  the  apostle  speaks  of  an  inward  spiritual  conflict 
as  common  to  Christians.  "  The  flesh  lusteth  against  the  spirit,  and 
the  spirit  against  the  flesh :  and  these  are  contrary  the  one  to  the 
other,  so  that  ye  cannot  do  the  things  that  ye  would."  By  the 
flesh  here,  as  is  evident  from  what  follows,  is  intended  the  corrupt 
nature,  or  sinful  disposition  of  mankind.  This  flesh  is  affirmed  to 
exist  in  Christians,  and  to  counteract  the  impulses  of  their  new  or 
spiritual  nature.  The  combatants  being  thus  in  the  field,  the  con- 
test can  never  be  intermitted,  till  the  foe  is  finally  routed  and  de- 
stroyed. 

7.  The  temper,  represented  in  the  scriptures  as  necessary  to  ac- 
ceptable prayer,  implies,  on  the  part  of  the  offerers,  the  conscious- 
ness of  remaining  sin.  None  are  permitted  to  mention  their  own 
goodness  as  the  meritorious  ground  of  acceptance.  Humility  and 
penitence  are  indispensable  to  a  right  approach  to  the  throne  of 
grace.  We  read  of  one  who,  without  any  confession  of  sin,  boast- 
ed before  God  of  his  good  deeds ;  but  we  are  assured  by  the  su- 
preme judge,  that  this  man  found  no  favour  with  his  Maker.  Ob- 
serve Daniel's  prayer.  After  confessing  his  own  sin,  as  well  as  the 
sin  of  his  people,  he  said,  "  We  do  not  present  our  supplications 
before  thee  for  our  righteousness,  but  for  thy  great  mercies.     O 


SANCTIFICATION.  431 

Lord,  hear ;  O  Lord,  forgive ;  O  Lord,  hearken  and  do ;  defer  not, 
for  thine  own  sake,  O  my  God ;  for  thy  city  and  thy  people  are 
called  by  thy  name."  Observe  the  prayer  of  the  Psalmist.  "  Enter 
not  into  judgment  with  thy  servant ;  for  in  thy  sight  shall  no  man 
living  be  justified."  Observe  the  prayer  of  Isaiah.  "  Behold  thou 
art  wroth,  for  we  have  sinned  ;  in  thy  ways  is  continuance,  and 
we  shall  be  saved.  For  we  are  all  as  an  unclean  thing,  and  all 
our  righteousnesses  are  as  filthy  rags  ;  and  we  all  do  fade  as  a  leaf; 
and  our  iniquities,  like  the  wind,  have  taken  us  away.  And  there 
is  none  that  calleth  upon  thy  name,  that  stirreth  up  himself  to  take 
hold  of  thee  ;  for  thou  hast  hid  thy  face  from  us,  and  hast  consumed 
us,  because  of  our  iniquities.  But  now,  O  Lord,  thou  art  our 
Father ;  we  are  the  clay,  and  thou  our  potter ;  and  we  all  are  the 
work  of  thy  hand.  Be  not  wroth  very  sore,  O  Lord,  neither  re- 
member iniquity  for  ever ;  behold,  see,  we  beseech  thee,  we  are  all 
thy  people."  Here  we  see  the  church  relinquishing  all  confidence 
in  herself,  in  her  strength,  in  her  goodness,  taking  to  herself  ever- 
lasting shame,  and  reposing  all  her  hope  in  the  sovereign  mercy 
and  gracious  covenant  of  her  God.  In  the  spirit  of  this  passage, 
Jeremiah  prays,  "  Though  our  iniquities  testify  against  us,  do  thou 
it  for  thy  name's  sake,"  Of  that  penitent  submission  which  pros- 
trates the  pride  of  the  heart,  and  all  the  powers  of  the  soul  before 
the  divine  Majesty,  we  are  most  impressively  taught  the  necessity 
in  the  parable  of  the  Publican  and  Pharisee.  He  whose  prayer 
was  graciously  accepted,  had  no  good  actions  to  enumerate,  no 
apology  to  offer  for  his  transgressions.  His  only  plea  was  mercy, 
through  the  great  propitiation  provided  for  the  guilty  and  the  lost. 
The  Pharisee,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  to  regard  himself  as  per- 
fect. See  the  repenting  Prodigal.  He  tells  of  no  good  that  he  has 
done.  He  speaks  not  even  of  his  compunction,  his  sorrow,  his  long 
and  painful  journey,  to  regain  the  parental  mansion,  and  sue  for  an 
abused  parent's  love.  No,  with  shame  and  weeping,  he  cries, 
"  Father,  I  have  sinned  against  heaven  and  before  thee,  and  am  not 
worthy  to  be  called  thy  son."  The  current  language  of  the  Bible 
accords  with  these  examples.  The  Lord  fills  the  poor  with  good 
things,  but  he  sends  the  rich  empty  away.  "  He  will  regard  the 
prayer  of  the  destitute  ;  he  will  not  despise  their  prayer."  But 
what  have  such  promises  to  dp  with  those  who  believe  that  they 
have  already  attained  to  perfection  ?  Are  they  poor,  destitute  in 
their  own  eyes  1  What,  they  who  have  only  to  be  thankful  for  the 
forgiveness  of  what  is  past,  and  to  be  satisfied  with  their  present 
purity  and  worthiness  ?  This  is  pharisaism,  this  is  arrogance,  in- 
deed, if  anything  can  deserve  the  name.  "  Thou  sayest,  I  am  rich, 
and  increased  with  goods,  and  have  need  of  nothing,  and  knowest 
not  that  thou  art  wretched,  and  miserable,  and  poor,  and  blind,  and 
naked." 

8.  The  same  doctrine  is  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  those  in 
later  times,  who  have  given  the  best  evidence  of  eminent  meek- 
ness, humility,  and  a  disinterested  consecration  of  themselves  to 


432  SANCTIFICATION. 

the  service  and  cause  of  God.  In  the  confessions  and  writings  of 
the  great  Augustine,  the  power  of  indwelling  sin  is  acknowledged 
with  a  strength  and  pungency  of  expression,  which  proves  the 
depth  of  his  conviction,  and  the  intenseness  of  his  penitential  sor- 
row. The  ardent  and  intrepid  Luther  is  full  of  this  most  humiliat- 
ing subject,  that  he  may  drive  the  church  from  every  other  refuge 
to  the  atoning  sacrifice  and  the  immaculate  righteousness  of  her 
Redeemer.  Baxter,  Owen,  Flavel,  Charnock,  Bates,  Howe,  Bun- 
yan,  and  a  host  of  their  godly  contemporaries,  unite  in  their  ac- 
knowledgments of  the  exceeding  potency  of  remaining  sin  in  the 
hearts  of  the  best  of  God's  people.  Who  has  not  observed  the 
strong  language  of  Edwards,  Brainerd,  and  Payson,  as  they  con- 
fessed and  mourned  over  the  sins  that  were  mixed  with,  and  de- 
filed, their  holiest  services  ?  John  Newton,  Winter,  Scott,  Martyn, 
and  indeed  most  of  those  who  have  seemed  eminently  spiritual, 
have  been  full  and  constant  in  expressing  their  conviction  of  the 
criminal  imperfection  of  their  best  works,  the  strength  of  their  in- 
nate corruptions,  and  their  entire  dependence  on  the  power  and 
sovereign  grace  of  God  to  direct  and  uphold  them.  And  if  these 
were  not  real  saints,  who,  in  modern  times,  are  entitled  to  the  ap- 
pellation ?  Are  they,  who  profess  to  depend  on  their  good  life  for 
acceptance  with  God,  while  they  oppose,  calumniate,  and  hold  up  to 
ridicule  the  peculiar  doctrines  of  the  Gospel  ?  Are  those  zealots, 
proud,  censorious,  and  dogmatical,  who  boast  of  their  perfect  de- 
liverance from  sin  ?  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them  ;  do 
men  gather  grapes  of  thorns,  or  figs  of  thistles  ?" 

On  this  subject  the  great  and  good  Wilberforce  says :  "  To  put 
the  question  concerning  the  natural  depravity  of  man  to  the  se- 
verest test ;  take  the  best  of  the  human  species,  the  watchful,  dili- 
gent, self-denying  Christian,  and  let  him  decide  the  controversy, 
and  that,  not  by  inferences  drawn  from  the  practices  of  a  thought- 
less and  dissolute  world,  but  by  an  appeal  to  his  personal  expe- 
rience ;  go  with  him  to  his  closet,  ask  him  his  opinion  of  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  heart,  and  he  will  tell  you  that  he  is  deeply  sensible 
of  its  power,  for  that  he  has  learned  it  from  much  self-examination 
and  long  acquaintance  with  the  workings  of  his  own  mind.  He 
will  tell  you,  that  every  day  strengthens  this  conviction ;  yea,  that 
hourly  he  sees  fresh  reason  to  deplore  his  want  of  simplicity  in 
intention,  his  infirmity  of  purpose,  his  low  views,  his  selfish  un- 
worthy desires,  his  backwardness  to  set  about  his  duty,  his  languor 
and  coldness  in  performing  it ;  that  he  finds  himself  obliged  con- 
tinually to  confess  that  he  feels  within  him  two  opposite  principles, 
and  that  he  cannot  do  the  things  that  he  would.  He  cries  out  in 
the  language  of  the  excellent  Hooker,  '  the  little  fruit  which  we 
have  in  holiness,  it  is,  God  knoweth,  corrupt  and  unsound  ;  we  put 
no  confidence  at  all  in  it,  we  challenge  nothing  in  the  world  for  it, 
we  dare  not  call  God  to  reckoning,  as  if  we  had  him  in  our  debt 
books ;  our  continual  suit  to  him  is,  and  must  be,  to  bear  with  our 
infirmities,  and  pardon  our  offences.' " 


SANCTiriCATION.  433 

9.  The  Bible  teaches  us  to  look  for  the  accomplishment  of  our 
perfect  conformity  to  God,  as  a  part  of  that  peculiar  and  glorious 
reward  which  is  reserved  for  a  future  life.  "  I  shall  be  satisfied, 
when  I  awake  with  thy  likeness."  "  It  doth  not  yet  appear  what 
we  shall  be ;  but  we  know  that,  when  he  shall  appear,  we  shall  be 
like  him  ;  Hot  we  shall  see  him  as  he  is."  Is  not  the  implication 
clear  and  unanswerable,  that  our  moral  assimilation  to  Christ  will 
not  be  completed  till  we  awake  in  eternity,  and  behold  him  in  his 
unveiled  glory  ?  But,  according  to  the  scheme  of  the  Perfection- 
ists, that  which  makes  Heaven  most  attractive  to  the  pious  heart, 
may  be  fully  enjoyed  upon  earth  ;  we  may  be  as  sinless,  and,  ac- 
cording to  our  capacity,  as  much  conformed  to  the  Redeemer  here 
as  are  any  of  the  saints  in  his  immediate  presence  before  the  throne. 
Why  then  should  Christians  so  eagerly,  as  the  Bible  represents 
them  do,  fix  the  eyes  of  their  faith  and  desire  on  the  celestial 
Paradise  ?  Why  do  they  so  joyfully  anticipate  the  second  coming 
of  their  victorious  Prince  and  deliverer  ?  We  are  assured,  that 
"  the  spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect"  are  collected  together  in 
"  the  city  of  the  living  God,  the  heavenly  Jerusalem."  Why  are 
we  not  told  that  their  dwelling-place  is  upon  earth,  as  well  as  in 
the  distant  country  beyond  the  tomb  ? 

10.  God  deals  with  the  best  of  his  people  here,  as  in  a  state  of 
imperfection.  They  are  subject  to  the  discipline  of  affliction.  The 
voice  of  divine  providence,  as  well  as  of  the  word  to  them,  is, 
"  arise  ye,  for  this  is  not  your  rest ;  for  it  is  polluted."  It  is  plainly 
a  doctrine  of  scripture,  tnat  mankind  suffer  only  because  they  are 
sinners.  Sickness,  pain,  disappointments,  and  the  other  calamities 
of  life,  are,  in  innumerabble  passages,  represented  as  divine  judg- 
ments, or  expressions  of  God's  righteous  displeasure  against  the 
wickedness  of  the  world.  "  When  thou  with  rebukes  dost  correct 
man  for  iniquity,  thou  makest  his  beauty  to  consume  away  like  a 
moth."  "  There  is  no  soundness  in  my  flesh,  because  of  thine  an- 
ger ;  neither  is  there  any  rest  in  my  bones,  because  of  my  sin." 
"  For  we  are  consumed  by  thine  anger,  and  by  thy  wrath  are  wTe 
troubled."  "  Wherefore  doth  a  living  man  complain,  a  man  for 
the  punishment  of  his  sins  ?"  Our  blessed  Lord  was  exposed  to 
suffering,  in  the  capacity  of  our  substitute.  Had  he  not  acted  in 
this  character,  his  life  would  have  been  as  happy,  as  it  was  inno- 
cent and  holy.  "  The  Lord  laid  upon  him  the  iniquity  of  us  all ;" 
and,  therefore,  he  was  bruised,  tortured,  and  put  to  death  upon 
the  accursed  tree.  His  was  a  peculiar  case,  unparalleled  in  the 
history  of  our  world  ;  the  result  of  an  expedient  of  the  divine 
government  to  save  the  guilty,  in  consistency  with  the  demands  of 
righteousness,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  honor  of  God.  The 
sufferings  of  no  other  person  are  strictly  vicarious,  or  avail  to  the 
removal  of  the  divine  anger  against  transgressors. 

With  respect  to  Christians,  however  distinguished  byHheir  at- 
tainments in  piety,  afflictions  are  affirmed  to  be  fatherly  chastise- 
ments, and  proofs  of  the  paternal  faithfulness  of  their  covenant 

28 


434  SANCTIFICATION. 

God.  "  If  his  children  forsake  my  law,  and  walk  not  in  my  judg- 
ments ;  if  they  break  my  statutes,  and  keep  not  my  command- 
ments ;  then  will  I  visit  their  transgression  with  the  rod,  and  their 
iniquity  with  stripes.  Nevertheless,  my  loving-kindness  will  I  not 
utterly  take  from  him,  nor  suffer  my  faithfulness  to  fail."  From 
this  passage  it  is  plain  that  believers  are  never  visited  with  the 
"  rod,"  and  with  "  stripes,"  except  on  account  of  their  "  transgres- 
sion" and  their  "  iniquity."  "  Whom  the  Lord  loveth  he  chasten- 
eth,  and  scourgeth  every  son  whom  he  receiveth.  If  ye  endure 
chastening,  God  dealeth  with  you  as  with  sons ;  for  what  son  is  he 
whom  the  father  chasteneth  not  1  But  if  ye  be  without  chastise- 
ment, whereof  all  are  partakers,  then  are  ye  bastards  and  not 
sons."  None  of  God's  children  then,  in  this  world,  can  wholly 
escape  chastisement ;  and  the  reason  is,  they  all  need  correction. 
"  As  many  as  I  love,"  said  Christ,  "  I  rebuke  and  chasten."  He 
told  his  disciples,  that  "  in  the  world"  they  should  have  tribula- 
tion." "  We  must,"  said  Paul,  1  through  much  tribulation  enter 
into  the  kingdom  of  God."  "  For  we  that  are  in  this  tabernacle 
do  groan,  being  burdened."  "  For  they  verily  for  a  few  days 
chastened  us,  after  their  own  pleasure :  but  he  for  our  profit,  that 
we  might  be  partakers  of  his  holiness."  The  plain  doctrine  of  the 
apostle  here  is,  that  after  believers  have  become  fully  partakers  of 
the  divine  holiness,  the  end  designed  to  be  answered  by  God's 
chastisement  will  have  been  accomplished.  The  undeniable  infer- 
ence, therefore,  is,  that  then  their  sufferings  will  cease.  And  this 
is  what  we  should  have  reason  to  expect.  Is  it  credible  that  a 
wise  and  merciful  parent  will  inflict  needless  pain  on  his  own  chil- 
dren ?  Mr.  Mahan  himself  virtually  admits  the  force  of  this  rea- 
soning. "  The  rod,"  he  says,  *  properly  applied,  brings  the  child 
into  a  state  in  which  the  rod  is  no  more  needed.  So  of  the  rod  in 
the  hand  of  our  own  heavenly  Father.  Its  object  is  to  render  us 
partakers  of  his  holiness.  Till  this  end  is  accomplished,  the  rod 
will  be  used.  When  this  end  is  accomplished,  it  will  no  longer  be 
needed."*  But  we  have  already  seen  that  all  God's  people  here 
are,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  the  subjects  of  affliction.  Will 
Mr.  Mahan  pretend,  that  they  who  claim  to  be  perfect,  are  less 
liable  than  other  professors  of  religion  to  the  common  natural  evils 
of  this  life  ?  If  not,  their  claim,  according  to  the  principle  allowed 
by  himself,  can  have  no  good  foundation. 

Will  it  be  said,  that  believers  suffer  according  to  general  laws  ? 
Be  it  so  ;  but  by  whom,  I  ask,  were  those  general  laws  established, 
and  were  they  not  formed  by  their  author,  in  view  of  all  the  wants 
which  would  ever  take  place  under  their  operation  ?  Besides,  who 
does  not  know  that  the  scriptures,  in  numerous  instances,  ascribe 
all  the  calamities  which  befal  creatures,  to  the  sovereign  appoint- 
ment and  direct  agency  of  that  being,  on  whom  are  dependent  all 
>the  laws  of  nature,  and  all  the  results  to  which  they  give  birth? 

*  Christian  Perfection,  p.  66. 


SANCTIFICATION. 


435 


A  few  passages  to  this  effect  have  already  been  quoted.  It  is  ap- 
parent from  these,  and  many  other  texts,  that  the  hand  of  God  is 
as  much  to  be  acknowledged  in  the  evils  we  suffer,  as  in  those 
events  that  are  strictly  miraculous,  and  which  occur  without  the 
intervention  of  means  or  second  causes.  Since,  then,  affliction  is 
ordained  on  account  of  sin,  the  perfectly  obedient  ought  to  be  as 
exempt  from  affliction  as  are  any  of  the  saints  in  heaven.  Every  be- 
reavement, therefore,  that  the  Perfectionist  sustains,  every  pain  he 
feels,  demonstrates  the  falseness  of  his  creed.  Were  he  what  he 
professes  to  be,  this  poor,  dying  world  would  be  a  most  unsuitable 
residence  for  him ;  and  he  would,  without  doubt,  ascend  at  once 
to  join  his  kindred  in  the  skies,  and  swell  the  shouts  of  their  praise. 
The  entire  system  of  divine  providence  here  proceeds  upon  the 
assumption,  that  the  whole  human  race  are  so  depraved  as  to  need 
perpetual  restraints,  and  the  intermingling  of  painful  inflictions 
with  the  attractive  influences  of  mercy. 

We  have  now  to  show  the  great  practical  importance  of  correct 
views  of  this  subject. 

Some  have  said,  that,  if  the  doctrine  we  have  maintained  be  true, 
it  is  not  worthy  of  being  contended  for,  especially  at  the  risk  of 
peace ;  and  it  has  been  sometimes  intimated,  that  the  contrary 
scheme,  though  erroneous,  may  excite  Christians  more  powerfully 
than  the  truth  would  do,  to  the  indefatigable  pursuit  of  holiness. 
This  notion  directly  contradicts  the  Bible.  There  we  learn,  that 
believers  are  sanctified  through  the  truth ;  and  we  are  urged  to 
"  buy  the  truth  and  sell  it  not."  No  portion  of  revealed  truth  can 
be  of  little  consequence ;  since  we  are  told,  on  the  best  authority, 
that"  all  scripture  is  given  by  inspiration  of  God,  and  is  profitable." 
The  common  doctrine  here  defended,  therefore,  provided  that  it  be 
scriptural,  cannot  be  of  small  importance,  in  its  relation  to  truth 
and  duty.  Nor  has  it  been  received  as  of  small  importance,  by 
either  its  enlightened  friends,  or  its  enemies.  Great  stress  was  laid 
upon  it  by  Augustine  and  the  reformers  ;  and  it  has  been  deemed 
of  vital  moment,  by  the  most  distinguished  later  theologians  in  our 
own  country,  and  in  Europe.  While  it  has  been  held  by  the  or- 
thodox, it  has  been  strongly  opposed  by  the  wildest  and  most 
erratic  of  the  opposers  of  evangelical  doctrines.  This  fact  indi- 
cates clearly  the  tendency  of  the  different  schemes  on  this  subject. 
In  every  well-instructed  and  well-balanced  mind,  the  scriptural 
doctrine  of  the  imperfection  of  good  men  in  this  life  stands  not  as  an 
isolated  truth,  but  as  an  inseparable  part  of  a  system  of  religious 
belief,  experience  and  practice. 

The  Perfectionist,  if  consistent  with  himself,  must  have  different 
apprehensions  of  God,  from  those  which  are  possessed  by  the  ad- 
vocates of  orthodoxy.  Where  is  the  Perfectionist  who  has  clear 
and  correct  views  of  the  universality,  definiteness,  and  immutabi- 
lity of  the  divine  purposes  ?  Can  an  instance  be  found  of  such  an 
one,  who  does  not  confound  the  decrees  of  God  with  his  com- 
mands ;  thus  virtually  undermining  the  stability  of  the  divine  go- 


436  SANCTIFICATION. 

vernment,  and  taking  away  the  foundation  of  our  confidence,  in 
the  ultimate  prevalence  of  truth  and  holiness  over  error  and  wick- 
edness ?  Besides,  as  holiness  is  the  same  in  all  beings,  he,  who 
regards  himself  as  perfectly  sanctified,  must  believe  that  he  is,  in 
proportion  to  his  capacity,  as  pure  and  as  good  as  his  Creator. 
How  far  below  the  representations  of  the  Bible  must  be  such  a 
man's  views  of  the  righteousness  and  moral  glory  of  the  adorable 
Supreme  ? 

Perfectionism  explains  away,  or  virtually  repeals  God's  holy  and 
unchangeable  law.  In  some  instances,  its  advocates  directly  af- 
firm, that  the  obligations  of  the  law  have  been  abrogated,  with 
respect  to  all  believers ;  and  that  Christ  has  so  fulfilled  its  demands, 
that  his  people  are  not,  in  any  sense,  answerable  for  their  delin- 
quencies. They  are  said  to  cease  from  their  works,  and  to  "  roll 
the  responsibility  of  their  future  and  eternal  obedience  upon  the 
everlasting  arm."*  In  order  to  maintain  the  dogma  of  personal 
perfection,  it  is  necessary  to  make  it  consist  in  something  far  short 
of  the  consummate  virtue  required  in  the  word  of  God.  Hence 
real  sins  are  called  weaknesses,  frailties,  or  innocent  constitutional 
temptations.  Concupiscence  is  reduced  to  the  blameless,  though, 
when  they  become  excessive,  somewhat  dangerous  cravings  of 
physical  appetite.  Supreme  self-love  is  declared  to  be  an  essential 
characteristic  of  intelligent  moral  agency,  against  which  there  is 
no  law ;  which  is  the  spring  of  all  virtue  as  well  as  of  vice,  and 
to  which  no  more  blame  can  be  attached  than  to  the  pulsations  of 
the  heart,  or  the  vibrations  of  a  pendulum.  Affections,  as  such, 
have  no  character ;  they  are  but  the  innocent  susceptibilities  of 
our  nature,  and  their  most  violent  workings  are  innocent,  except 
so  far  as  they  are  produced  or  modified  by  a  previous  deliberate 
act  of  the  will.  In  all  other  cases,  they  are  passive  emotions,  like 
the  involuntary  impressions  made  upon  the  brain  by  the  bodily 
senses.  It  follows,  on  this  principle,  that  love  to  God  and  hatred 
of  him,  are  equally  indifferent  things  ;  and  that  they  become  praise- 
worthy or  criminal,  solely  in  consequence  of  their  connection  with 
some  previous  purpose  of  the  mind.  It  must  hence  be  inferred, 
that  when  God  commands  us  to  love  him,  he  does  not  mean  what 
he  says ;  but  that  he  is  to  be  understood  as  simply  requiring  us  to 
do  what  we  can  to  approve  of  his  character,  and  yield  obedience 
to  his  commands.  Thus  his  law,  in  his  high  and  spiritual  import, 
is  frittered  down  to  an  accommodation  to  the  taste,  or  moral  ina- 
bility of  mankind.  Observe  the  language  of  Mr.  Finney.  "It  is 
objected,"  says  he, "  that  this  doctrine  lowers  the  standard  of  holi- 
ness to  a  level  with  our  own  experience.  It  is  not  denied  that  in 
some  instances  this  may  have  been  true.  Nor  can  it  be  denied, 
that  the  standard  of  Christian  perfection  has  been  elevated  much 
above  the  demands  of  the  law  in  its  application  to  human  beings 
in  our  present  state  of  existence.     It  seems  to  have  been  forgotten, 

*  Literary  and  Theological  Review,  voL  i.,  p.  558. 


SANCTiriCATION.  437 

that  the  inquiry  is,  what  does  the  law  demand  ;  not  of  angels,  and 
what  would  be  entire  sanctification  in  them ;  nor  of  Adam,  pre- 
viously to  the  fall,  when  his  powers  of  body  and  mind  were  all  in 
a  state  of  perfect  health ;  not  what  will  the  law  demand  of  us  in 
a  future  state  of  existence  ;  not  what  the  law  may  demand  of  the 
church  in  some  future  period  of  its  history  on  earth,  when  the 
human  constitution,  by  the  universal  prevalence  of  correct  and 
thorough  temperance  principles,  may  have  acquired  its  pristine 
health  and  powers;  but  the  question  is,  what  does  the  law  of  God 
require  of  Christians  of  the  present  generation  ;  of  Christians  in 
all  respects  in  our  circumstances,  with  all  the  ignorance  and 
debility  of  body  and  mind  which  have  resulted  from  intemperance 
and  the  abuse  of  the  human  constitution  through  so  many  gene- 
rations ?" 

"  The  law  levels  its  claims  to  us  as  we  are,  and  a  just  exposition 
of  it,  as  I  have  already  said,  under  all  the  present  circumstances 
of  our  being,  is  indispensable  to  a  right  apprehension  of  what  con- 
stitutes entire  sanctification."* 

Perfectionism  often  and  directly  leads  to  the  most  gross,  palpa- 
ble and  blasphemous  forms  of  Antinomianism.  It  has  been  con- 
joined with  the  horrible  notion,  that  to  the  Christian  all  actions  are 
alike ;  that  sin  in  his  case  ceases  to  be  sin  ;  that  his  doings,  how- 
ever perverse,  are  not  his  own,  but  are  the  works  of  Jesus  Christ 
himself,  whose  will  impels  his  perfect  ones  in  all  they  think,  say  and 
do.  Hence  some  of  the  Perfectionists  have  talked  of  themselves 
as  divine ;  as  incarnations  of  the  Deity,  possessing  at  once  the 
righteousness,  strength  and  infallibility  of  the  Redeemer.  By 
many,  the  utility  and  necessity  of  all  divine  ordinances  are  denied, 
as  fit  only  for  the  uninstructed  and  carnal,  who  have  not  yet  en- 
tered into  their  rest.  In  the  writings  of  even  the  more  sober  Per- 
fectionists of  this  day,  expressions  are  found  which  seem  to  contain 
the  germ  of  these  extravagant  and  impious  pretensions. 

It  is  scarcely  needful  to  remark,  that  the  belief  in  Perfectionism 
cannot  stand  in  connexion  with  clear  scriptural  apprehensions  of 
the  total  moral  corruption  of  unregenerate  men.  Hence,  what- 
ever words  the  defenders  of  this  scheme  have  used,  they  have 
universally,  so  far  as  we  know,  denied  the  essential  difference,  as 
it  respects  the  spring  and  nature  of  their  exercises,  between  saints 
and  impenitent  sinners.  The  governing  motive,  namely,  self-love, 
or  the  desire  of  happiness,  however  it  may  vary  in  its  results,  is 
represented  to  be  the  same  in  both  classes,  or,  at  the  most,  any 
change  effected  in  this  respect,  is  to  be  attributed  simply  to  the 
operation  of  principles,  which,  though  stimulated  perhaps  by  a 
divine  influence,  are  yet  common  to  both.  With  such  philosophy, 
to  speak  of  any  as  totally  depraved,  is  to  use  words  without  mean- 
ing ;  or  to  adopt  a  phraseology,  fitted  to  bewilder  and  mislead 
those  who  are  incapable  of  reducing  doctrines  to  their  legitimate 

*  Oberlin  Evangelist,  vol.  ii.,  p.  50. 


438  SANCTIFICATION. 

and  primary  elements.  The  history  of  Perfectionism  shows,  in- 
deed, that  most  of  its  advocates  have  renounced  the  use  of  evan- 
gelical language  on  this  subject ;  and  have  maintained,  either  that 
men  are  naturally  no  more  inclined  to  evil  than  good,  or  that  a 
portion  of  the  divine  moral  image  has  been  imparted  to  the  whole 
human  race. 

Perfectionism  has  been  commonly,  as  it  is  naturally,  connected 
with  a  want  of  reverence  for  the  Bible.  Mr.  Wesley  reproves 
those,  who  infer  from  the  conduct  of  the  apostles,  that  some  are 
entirely  free  from  sin  in  this  life,  in  the  following  terms :  "  Will 
you  argue  thus,  if  two  of  the  apostles  once  committed  sin,  then  all 
other  Christians,  in  all  ages,  do  and  must  commit  sin  as  long  as 
they  live  ?  Nay,  God  forbid  that  we  should  thus  speak."  Again : 
"  What  if  the  holiest  of  the  ancient  Jews  did  sometimes  commit 
sin  ?  We  cannot  infer  from  hence  that  all  Christians  do  and  must 
commit  sin  as  long  as  they  live."*  Thus  scripture  examples  are 
made  to  prove  nothing  against  the  doctrine  of  perfection.  Mr. 
Mahan  contends  that  the  passages  in  the  Old  Testament,  which 
assert  the  imperfection  of  good  men,  ought  not  to  be  adduced  as 
evidence  that  none  under  the  Gospel  are  perfectly  holy.  His 
words  are,  "  Whatever  is  said  of  the  character  of  saints,  under  the 
old  dispensation,  cannot  be  applied  to  Christians  under  the  new, 
unless  such  application  was  manifestly  intended  by  the  sacred  writ- 
er." Speaking  of  the  declaration  in  Eccl.  viii.  20  he  says,  "  It 
was  made  with  reference  to  men  in  the  state  then  present,  and  not 
with  reference  to  their  condition  under  an  entirely  new  dispensa- 
tion."! Thus  easily  does  he  dispose  of  passages  which  contra- 
dict his  view.  Many  have  supposed  the  prophets  and  primi- 
tive Christians  to  have  been  unenlightened  and  carnal,  compared 
with  themselves.  Many  Perfectionists  have  substituted  impulses, 
or  the  inward  light,  for  the  teaching  of  the  word ;  and  have 
spoken  in  disparaging  terms  of  the  latter,  as  compared  with  the 
internal  illumination,  of  which  they  boast.  In  exemplification  of 
this  remark,  we  might  refer  the  reader  to  the  votaries  of  ancient 
Quakerism,  Shakerism,  and  Mystics  and  Quietists  of  every  de- 
scription. And  no  wonder,  that  they  who  are  perfect,  undervalue 
that  volume  which  condemns  their  creed,  and  which  was  written 
by  men  who  confessed  themselves  to  be  sinners.  What !  the  per- 
fect condescend  to  be  taught  by  those  who  are  imperfect  !  It  is 
absurd  in  the  extreme.  Besides,  it  is  natural  to  suppose,  that  they 
who  are  perfectly  holy,  should  read  the  word  of  God,  rather  on 
the  tablet  of  their  own  minds,  than  on  the  perishing  pages  of  a 
book,  printed  by  human  hands.  It  has  accordingly  been  no  un- 
common occurrence,  for  those  who  imagined  themselves  to  have 
attained  to  the  highest  degree  of  sanctification,  to  abandon  the 
reading  of  the  scriptures,  and  trust  to  the  supposed  illapses  and 

*  Wesley's  Plain  Account  of  Christian  Perfection,  pp.  19,  20. 
t  Mahan  on  Christian  Perfection,  p.  67. 


SANCTIFICATION.  439 

movings  of  the  Spirit  within  them.  And  what  is  this  but  a  spe- 
cies of  infidelity,  under  the  guise  of  a  superior  sanctity  and  devo- 
tion ?  "  Search  the  scriptures,"  says  Jesus  Christ,  "  for  in  them  ye 
think  ye  have  eternal  life ;  and  they  are  they  which  testify  of 
me." 

We  see,  then,  why  it  is,  that  Perfectionism  has  so  generally  led 
to  the  wildest  enthusiasm.  Notwithstanding  the  warnings  of  some 
of  its  more  intelligent  and  sober  champions,*  it  has  been  very  ex- 
tensively connected  with  confidence  in  impressions,  visions,  and 
unaccountable  voices,  to  the  practical  rejection  of  that  word  of 
truth,  light  and  power,  which  speaks  from  heaven.  Many  of  its 
disciples  have  professed  to  be  literally  inspired ;  and  with  the  pre- 
text of  obeying  divine  instruction,  have  committed  the  most  dis- 
graceful excesses. 

It  is  also  the  parent  and  the  offspring  of  monkish  austerities,  in- 
asmuch as  it  readily  and  almost  necessarily  attributes  the  source  of 
sin  to  the  body,  or  the  animal  appetites,  which,  though  not  wrong 
in  themselves,  will  yet  become  the  certain  occasion  of  transgress 
sion,  unless  they  be  kept  in  subjection  by  the  strictest  regimen, 
and  a  kind  of  unceasing  penance.  Most  of  the  Romish  recluses, 
who  inflicted  the  severest  castigation  upon  themselves,  and  endea- 
voured to  drive  out  sin  by  voluntary  hunger,  cold  and  nakedness, 
professed  by  these  means  to  be  seeking,  or  actually  enjoying  the 
blessing  of  unstained  purity,  and  unalloyed  communion  with  God. 
Some  of  the  Protestant  preachers  and  believers  of  the  doctrine  in 
our  own  country,  seem  to  be  verging  towards  the  same  super- 
stition ;  and  to  imagine  that  such  abstinence  and  dietetics  as  they 
inculcate,  connected  with  a  general  reception  of  their  creed,  would, 
in  the  course  of  a  few  generations,  almost  entirely  extirpate  sin 
and  its  consequences  from  our  world.  What  less  can  Mr.  Finney 
mean  when  he  says,  "  Is  it  not  true,  my  brethren,  that  the  mind  is, 
in  this  state  of  existence,  dependent  upon  the  physical  organization 
for  all  its  developments — and  that  every  transgression  of  physical 
law  tends  strongly  to  a  violation  of  moral  law?"  Again  :  "  I  am 
now  fully  convinced,  that  the  flesh  has  more  to  do  with  the  back- 
sliding of  the  church,  than  either  the  world  or  the  devil.  Every 
man  has  a  body,  and  every  man's  body,  in  this  age  of  the  world, 
is  more  or  less  impaired  by  intemperance  of  one  kind  or  another. 
Almost  every  person,  whether  he  is  aware  of  it  or  not,  is  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  a  dyspeptic,  and  suffering  under  some  form 
of  disease  arising  out  of  intemperance.  And  I  would  humbly  ask, 
is  it  understood  and  proclaimed  by  ministers,  that  a  person  can  no 
more  expect  healthy  manifestations  of  mind  in  a  fit  of  dyspepsia 
than  in  a  fit  of  intoxication  ?     Is  it  understood  and  preached  to  the 

m 

•  Wesley's  Plain  Account,  pp.  119,  120,  where  are  some  sound  and  important  re- 
marks on  this  subject.  The  Oberlin  professors  have  written  against  some  of  these 
extravagances,  yet  they  maintain  opinions  which  lead  to  the  most  pernicious  enthu- 
siasm, and  their  paper,  it  is  said,  is  read  and  admired  by  some  of  the  most  fanatical  of 
the  Perfectionists  in  the  western  country. 


440  SANCTIFICATION. 

church,  that  every  violation  of  the  physical  laws  of  the  body,  as 
certainly  and  as  necessarily  prevents  healthy  and  holy  develop- 
ments, in  proportion  to  the  extent  of  the  infraction  of  physical  law, 
as  does  the  use  of  alcohol  ?  I  am  convinced  that  the  temperance 
reformation  has  just  begun,  and  that  the  total  abstinence  principle, 
in  regard  to  a  great  many  other  subjects  besides  alcohol,  must  pre- 
vail before  the  church  can  prosper  to  any  considerable  extent."* 
To  such  an  absurd  extreme  does  this  leader  of  Perfectionism  carry 
his  notions  respecting  the  connexion  between  the  body  and  the 
soul ;  and  so  clearly  does  he  lay  down  principles  of  temperance, 
which  are  rather  Pythagorean,  Gnostical,  or  Papal,  than  conform- 
able to  the  precepts  and  maxims  of  pure  Christianity. 

Correct  views  of  this  subject  are  important,  on  account  of  their 
necessary  connexion  with  the  great  system  of  truth  and  duty  re- 
vealed in  the  scriptures.  A  number  of  errors  springing  from 
Perfectionism,  as  the  waters  from  a  fountain,  have  already  been 
noticed.  As  a  general  fact,  the  Perfectionist  is  a  Pelagian  in  his 
views  of  native  depravity,  decrees,  election,  the  divine  agency  in 
regeneration,  and  gratuitous  justification  ;  and  he  denounces  the 
doctrines  of  Paul,  according  to  their  plain  import,  as  they  are 
taught  in  his  epistles  to  the  Romans  and  the  Ephesians,  as  injurious 
to  the  interests  of  holiness,  and  in  the  highest  degree  dishonourable 
to  God.  Experience  has  proved  that  Perfectionism  peculiarly  pre- 
pares the  ground,  where  it  is  cultivated  and  flourishes,  for  an  abun- 
dant crop  of  infidelity,  and  the  most  odious  forms  of  delusion  and 
imposture. 

As  to  the  practical  fruits  of  this  error,  may  we  not  be  permitted 
to  ask,  without  subjecting  ourselves  to  the  imputation  of  uncharita- 
bleness,  do  we  not  see  enough  of  them  at  Oberlin  itself,  represented 
by  its  admirers  as  the  very  focus  of  all  moral  light  and  of  holi- 
ness, to  justify  the  severest  crimination?  What  mean  the  constant 
denunciations  against  the  church,  against  orthodox  and  faithful 
ministers,  and  against  all  who  dare  to  resist  the  dangerous  innova- 
tions which  go  forth,  like  swarms  of  locusts,  from  that  seat  of  su- 
perficial learning,  and  of  bold,  reckless  speculation  ?  What  mean 
the  complaints  which  we  hear  from  the  West  of  the  disorganizing 
spirit  and  conduct  of  the  students  and  preachers  from  that  semi- 
nary ;  the  divisions  they  have  created,  and  sought  to  create,  in 
once  powerful  churches ;  and  the  resolutions  condemnatory  of 
their  proceedings  adopted  by  ecclesiastical  bodies  formerly  be- 
lieved to  be  sufficiently  favourable  to  the  extraordinary  opinions 
and  measures,  which  have  characterized  the  theological  revolution 
of  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years  ?  What  mean  the  violent  acts 
of  some  of  the  professedly  perfect  ones,  blindfolding,  menacing, 
and  unmercifully  beating  a  yuthful  offender,  accused  of  attempting 
to  corrupt  one  of  the  female  members  of  the  school ;  and  that,  after 

*  Oberlin  Evangelist,  as  quoted  in  the  April  number  of  the  Princeton  Review,  pp. 
243, 244. 


SANCTIFICATION.  441 

they  had  themselves  deceived  him,  and  seduced  his  mind  by  a 
feigned  correspondence,  and  other  acts  of  dissimulation,  not  un- 
worthy of  the  disciples  of  Loyola  ?  What  mean  the  published  apolo- 
gies for  those  disgraceful  acts,  under  the  eye,  and  with  the  sanction 
of  the  fathers  of  the  heresy  ?  What  mean  the  apparent  conceit, 
arrogance,  dogmatism,  and  radicalism  of  not  a  few  of  the  ill- 
instructed  young  men  who  are  sent  out  from  Oberlin  to  preach 
down  dead  professors  of  religion,  and  dead  ministers,  and  ortho- 
dox creeds  and  catechisms,  and  to  proselyte  the  world  to  the  kind 
of  sanctity  taught  by  the  faculty  of  that  institution  ?  But  we  for- 
bear. It  is,  we  are  persuaded,  but  to  know  Oberlin  thoroughly,  to 
be  convinced  of  the  utter  falseness  of  all  its  pretensions  to  uncom- 
mon spiritual  mortification  and  holiness.  Perfectionism,  indeed, 
can  never  bear  a  rigid  and  impartial  scrutiny,  as  to  its  visible  ef- 
fects, any  more  than  as  to  the  radical  principles  which  produce 
them.  Its  grapes,  however  beautiful  in  the  eye  of  the  distant  or 
cursory  spectator,  are  still  the  grapes  of  Sodom  ;  and  its  clusters 
are  the  clusters  of  Gomorrah.  In  proportion  to  the  developments 
which  are  made,  new  evidence  is  afforded  that  this  heresy,  how- 
ever diversified  or  modified  by  circumstances,  is  everywhere  the 
same  in  its  essential  features,  and  in  its  tendency ;  arrayed  alike 
against  evangelical  doctrine  and  order ;  fostering  fanaticism  and 
spiritual  pride  ;  and,  whether  it  nominally  acknowledge  or  reject 
the  ordinances  of  the  Gospel,  taking  away  the  grounds  which  sup- 
port them,  and  robbing  them  of  the  salutary  influence,  which  in 
their  legitimate  use,  they  are  adapted  and  designed  to  exert. 

It  is  time  to  draw  these  extended  remarks  to  a  close. 

Reader  !  the  progress  of  this  doctrine,  the  indifference  of  many 
professedly  evangelical  men  with  regard  to  its  diffusion,  and  the 
disposition  manifested  by  not  a  few  to  apologise  for  its  propaga- 
tion, are  indications  most  unpropitious  to  the  cause  of  humble, 
meek,  spiritual  Christianity.  Perfectionism,  with  whatever  pro- 
fessions "  of  love,  tenderness,  and  devotion,"  it  may  be  accom- 
panied, is  not  the  progeny  of  light,  but  of  darkness  ;  and  as  truly 
as  Universalism  or  Socinianism,  it  should  be  viewed  and  treated 
by  ministers  and  churches  as  a  fundamental  error.  Tending  as  it 
does  to  sap  the  foundations  of. all  true  religion  and  genuine  moral- 
ity, apostasy  to  it  should  be  regarded  as  an  evidence  either  of  a 
peculiar  species  of  monomania,  a  profound  ignorance  of  the  mean- 
ing of  the  terms  employed,  or  of  the  want  of  that  humility,  with- 
out which  all  pretensions  to  piety  are  vain. 

Be  jealous  of  any  system  of  mental  philosophy,  the  principles  of 
which  naturally  lead  to  the  adoption  of  this  great  error,  so  con- 
trary to  the  word  of  God,  and  the  conscious  experience  of  the 
most  eminent  believers.  It  is  worthy  of  very  serious  inquiry  (if 
indeed  there  be  any  room  to  doubt  on  the  subject),  whether  some 
modern  speculations  concerning  moral  agency,  and  the  divine  in- 
fluence in  the  production  of  holiness,  have  not  contributed  largely 


442  SANCTIFICATION. 

to  the  existence  and  progress  of  the  peculiar  form  of  this  error, 
which  has  within  the  last  few  years  swept  like  a  simoom  over 
some  of  the  fairest  portions  of  our  Zion.  Guard  with  constant 
vigilance  the  citadel  of  truth  at  its  very  vestibule. 

Christian  reader  !  "  Be  not  carried  about  with  divers  and  strange 
doctrines  ;  for  it  is  a  good  thing  that  the  heart  be  established  with 
grace,  not  with  meats  which  have  not  profited  them  that  have  been 
occupied  therein." 

This  subject  urges  upon  you  most  impressively  the  duty  of  an 
humble  walk  with  God.  Is  it  true,  that  sin  mixes  with  and  pol- 
lutes all  your  doings — your  most  disinterested  charities,  your  ho- 
liest prayers,  your  most  grateful  praises  ?  Is  it  true,  that  you  will 
daily,  hourly,  every  moment,  need  a  fresh  pardon,  and  the  aid  of 
all-conquering  grace,  till  your  feet  shall  stand  on  the  shores  of  the 
celestial  Canaan,  with  the  harp  of  God  in  your  hand  and  the 
wreath  of  immortality  encircling  your  brows  ?  The  dust  then 
surely  becomes  you.  There  lie  and  confess  your  sins,  and  ac- 
knowledge the  justice  of  your  condemnation,  and  weep  with  in- 
genuous sorrow,  and  beg  for  mercy. 

Unite  with  fervent  prayer,  untiring  watchfulness,  and  diligence. 
To  this  your  innumerable  inward  foes,  ever  ready  for  the  assault, 
seem  continually,  vehemently,  irresistibly,  to  urge  you.  In  such  a 
situation,  can  you  sleep?  Awake,  for  the  powers  of  hell  are  near, 
and  are  eagerly  pressing  on  to  circumvent  and  destroy  you. 
"  Wherefore,  take  unto  you  the  whole  armour  of  God,  that  you 
may  be  able  to  withstand  in  the  evil  day,  and  having  done  all,  to 
stand." 

Let  not  the  reality  of  your  continual  imperfection  be  your  ex- 
cuse ;  but  rather  let  it  excite  you  to  more  ardent  exertions  to  reach 
the  crown  of  life. 

Be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  perpetual  progress  in  holiness. 
You  have  but  commenced  the  war ;  there  remaineth  yet  much 
land  to  be  possessed  ;  go  on  from  victory  to  victory,  till  not  an  inch 
of  the  promised  territory  shall  continue  in  possession  of  the  ene- 
mies of  your  Lord. 

Persevere  for  a  few  days,  and  you  will  gain  the  perfect  purity 
and  bliss  after  which  your  glowing  heart  aspires.  No  sound  of 
clashing  arms,  no  opposing  hosts,  are  in  heaven.  Its  quietude  is 
never  invaded  by  anxiety  or  fear.  Its  holiness  is  untarnished  as 
its  pure  light,  and  enduring  as  its  years.  Triumphant  termination 
of  conflicts  and  of  wars  !  Hasten,  then,  blessed  day,  so  long  de- 
sired by  the  holy  creation. 

Adore  the  grace  and  faithfulness  of  your  redeeming  God.  He 
has  not  only  forgiven  the  sins  of  your  unregenerate  days,  but  he 
has  borne  with  your  renewed  provocations  since  your  conversion 
— your  ingratitude,  your  coldness,  your  worldliness,  your  self-seek- 
ing, your  manifold  abuses  of  his  love..  Nor  will  he  leave  unfinished 
the  work  which  he  has  begun.     He  will  guide  you  by  his  counsel, 


SANCTIFICATION.  443 

and  afterwards  receive  you  to  glory.  Thus  will  he  keep,  bless, 
save,  all  the  armies  of  the  ransomed,  to  the  praise  of  his  glorious 
grace  for  ever.  What  patience,  what  condescension,  what  unfaint- 
ing,  boundless  love  !  "  O  that  men  would  praise  the  Lord  for  his 
goodness,  for  his  wonderful  works  to  the  children  of  men." 


ESSAY    XVIII. 

TRANSUBSTANTIATION* 


The  title  in  the  margin  would  seem  to  import  that  the  Catechism 
brought  into  view,  is  the  work  of  the  Council  of  Trent ;  we  are  in- 
formed in  the  preface  by  the  editor,  that  this  is  not  the  fact ;  but  it 
has  received  this  denomination]  from  the  circumstance  that  the 
fathers  of  this  synod  made  a  decree,  that  such  a  work  should  be  pre- 
pared,and  appointed  the  persons  who  were  judged  fit  to  undertake 
it.  A  translation  of  this  decree  is  prefixed  to  the  volume  now 
under  review,  in  the  following  words : 

"  That  the  faithful  may  approach  the  sacraments  with  greater  reverence  and 
devotion,  the  Holy  Synod  commands  all  bishops  not  only  to  explain  in  a  manner 
accommodated  to  the  capacity  of  the  receivers,  the  nature  and  use  of  the  sacra- 
ments, when  they  are  to  be  administered  by  themselves ;  but  also  to  see  that  every 
pastor  piously  and  prudently  do  the  same,  in  the  vernacular  language,  should  it  be 
necessary  and  convenient.  This  exposition  is  to  accord  with  a  form  prescribed 
by  the  Holy  Synod  for  the  administration  of  the  sacraments,  in  a  Catechism, 
which  bishops  will  take  care  to  have  faithfully  translated  into  the  vernacular  lan- 
guage, and  expounded  to  the  people  by  all  pastors." 

The  execution  of  this  work,  under  the  superintendence  of  the 
archbishop  of  Milan,  was  committed  to  four  persons,  three  of  whom 
were  of  the  episcopal  order.  When  completed  it  was  presented 
to  Pius  the  Fifth,  and  by  him  handed  over  for  revisal  to  a  congre- 
gation, over  which  presided  Cardinal  Sirtet,  who  is  here  character- 
ised as  "  profound  and  judicious."  The  style,  we  are  informed,  was 
retouched  by  the  learned  Manutius  ;  or,  according  to  others,  re- 
ceived its  last  improvement  from  the  classic  pen  of  Bogianus ;  and 
was  speedily  translated  into  the  languages  of  Italy,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Poland.  It  is  a  book,  undoubtedly,  on  which  great 
pains  were  bestowed  ;  and  it  has  ever  been  in  high  esteem  with  the 
Komanists  of  every  class.     Whether  the  English  translation  here 

*  Published  in  1834,  in  review  of  "  The  Catechism  of  the  Council  of  Trent.  Pub- 
lished by  command  of  Pope  Pius  the  Fifth  ;  translated  into  English,  by  the  Rev.  J. 
Donovan,  Professor,  &c,  Royal  College,  Maynooth." 


TRAN8UB8TANTIATI0N.  445 

presented  to  the  public  has  been  faithfully  made  from  the  original, 
we  have  no  opportunity  of  judging,  as  we  have  not  been  able  to 
lay  our  hands  upon  the  original  work.  The  only  circumstance 
which  has  excited  a  suspicion  that  some  things  have  been  omitted, 
is,  that  a  citation  which  we  have  met  with  in  a  late  author,  cannot 
be  found  in  this  volume.  This  may,  however,  be  a  mere  mistake  ; 
we  mean  not  to  bring  any  charge  of  unfaithfulness  against  the  edi- 
tor. Upon  a  careful  perusal  of  this  Catechism,  candour  constrains 
us  to  acknowledge  that  it  contains  more  evangelical  truth  than  we 
had  expected  to  find ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  contains  the  errors  of 
Popery,  exhibited  without  disguise.  Our  object,  in  this  review,  is 
not  to  travel  over  the  whole  ground  of  controversy,  which  would 
require  volumes,  instead  of  a  few  pages,  but  to  confine  our  atten- 
tion to  a  single  point,  namely,  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation. 
On  many  other  points,  it  is  a  matter  of  uncertainty,  or  at  least  of  dis- 
putation, what  the  Romanists  really  do  hold ;  but  here  they  avow 
their  belief,  and  profess  to  hold  all  that  their  opponents  have  ever 
charged  upon  them.  Here,  then,  the  parties  are  fairly  at  issue  ;  and 
as  this  doctrine  is  considered  by  them  to  be  fundamental,  and  as 
this  single  error  deeply  affects  their  whole  system,  it  will  probably 
answer  a  better  purpose  to  assault  this  stronghold,  than  to  run  over 
the  long  list  of  errors  which  have  been  charged  upon  that  degene- 
rate church.  If  we  should  succeed  in  demolishing  this  single  error, 
it  would  go  far  towards  the  subversion  of  their  whole  system. 
Our  object  is  to  treat  this  subject  calmly  and  dispassionately,  with- 
out having  recourse  to  ridicule,  sarcasm,  or  declamation ;  and 
much  less  to  abusive  epithets.  We  are  of  opinion  that  a  contro- 
versy with  Roman  Catholics,  as  with  all  other  persons,  should  be 
conducted  with  a  spirit  of  meekness  and  benevolence.  Truth 
needs  no  poisoned  weapons  for  her  defence ;  truth  deprecates  such 
weapons,  because  they  can  be  successfully  wielded  by  the  advo- 
cates of  error.  We  feel  ourselves  bound,  however,  to  strip  this 
monstrous  error  bare,  and  hold  it  up  to  the  view  of  all  reasonable 
and  impartial  men  as  an  absurdity  which  never  had  among  men  a 
parallel.  But  while  we  shall  endeavour  to  exhibit  this  incredible 
dogma  in  its  true  features  of  deformity,  we  will  carefully  avoid 
using  any  arguments  or  illustrations  which  appear  to  us  fallacious 
or  sophistical.  What  we  principally  fear  is,  that  most  of  our  read- 
ers will  think  that  we  use  too  many  arguments,  and  dwell  too  long 
in  the  refutation  of  an  opinion  which  needs  only  to  be  distinctly 
proposed  to  be  rejected  as  an  incredible  thing.  But  let  it  be  con- 
sidered that  this  error  has  struck  its  roots  very  deep,  and  is  sup- 
ported by  all  the  influence  of  superstition,  and  by  the  authority  of 
a  power  supposed  to  be  infallible.  We  intend  to  make  no  appeal 
to  those  termed  fathers  ;  not  because  we  believe  that  a  fair  con- 
struction of  all  that  they  have  written  would  be  unfavourable  to 
our  cause,  but  because  we  view  them  to  be  erring  and  fallible 
men  like  ourselves,  to  whose  opinions  we  are  under  no  obligation 
to  submit.     Our  appeal  is  to  reason  and  scripture  ;  and  in  the 


446  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

light  of  these,  we  hope  to  make  it  appear,  that  the  doctrine  of 
transubstantiation  involves  so  many  gross  absurdities,  that  in  order 
to  believe  it,  a  man  must  first  take  leave  of  his  reason  and  common 
sense. 

But  let  us  hear  from  their  own  authorized  formularies,  what  their 
doctrine  is.  In  the  Catechism  now  under  review,  we  have  the  fol- 
lowing explanation : 

"  The  Eucharist  becomes  a  sacrament  by  the  sole  consecration  of  the  elements. 
In  the  material  elements  of  which  the  other  sacraments  are  composed,  no  change 
takes  place ;  in  baptism,  for  instance,  the  water,  in  confirmation  the  chrism,  lose 
not  in  their  administration  the  nature  of  water  and  oil,  but  in  the  eucharist,  that 
which  before  consecration  was  bread  and  wine,  became  after  consecration  really 
and  substantially  the  body  and  blood  of  our  Lord." — P.  197. 

Again  : 

"  The  Catholic  church  firmly  believes,  and  openly  professes,  that  in  this  sacra- 
ment, the  words  of  consecration  accomplish  three  things ;  First,  that  the  true  and 
real  body  of  Christ,  the  same  that  was  born  of  the  Virgin,  and  is  now  seated  at  the 
right  hand  of  the  Father  in  heaven,  is  rendered  present  in  the  holy  eucharist. 
Secondly,  that  however  repugnant  it  may  appear  to  the  dictates  of  the  senses,  no 
substance  of  the  elements  remains  in  the  sacrament.  Thirdly,  a  natural  conse- 
quence from  the  two  preceding,  and  one  which  the  words  of  consecration  also  ex- 
press, that  the  accidents  which  present  themselves  to  the  eyes,  or  other  senses, 
exist  in  a  wonderful  and  ineffable  manner,  without  a  subject.  The  accidents  of 
bread  and  wine  we  see,  but  they  inhere  in  no  substance,  and  exist  independent  of 
any.  The  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  is  so  changed  into  the  body  and 
blood  of  our  Lord,  that  they  altogether  cease  to  be  the  substance  of  bread  and 
wine."— P.  207. 

The  decree  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  on  this  subject,  is  in  the  fol- 
lowing words : 

"  Since  Christ  our  Redeemer  has  said,  that  that  was  truly  his  own  body  which 
he  offered  under  the  appearance  of  bread,  it  has,  therefore,  always  been  believed 
in  the  church  of  God,  and  it  is  now  again  declared  by  this  holy  Council,  that  by 
the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  wine,  there  is  effected  a  conversion  of  the  whole 
substance  of  the  bread  into  the  substance  of  Christ  our  Lord,  and  the  whole  sub- 
stance of  the  wine  into  the  substance  of  his  blood,  which  conversion  is  fitly 
termed  by  the  holy  Catholic  church,  transubstantiation." — Con.  Tred.  Sess., 
xiii.,  c.  iv. 

Again  : 

"  If  any  one  shall  deny,  that  in  the  most  holy  sacrament  of  the  eucharist,  there 
are  entertained  truly,  really,  and  substantially,  the  body  and  blood,  together  with 
the  soul  and  divinity,  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ ;  or  say  that  he  is  in  it  only  as  a 
sign  or  figure,  or  by  his  influence,  let  him  be  anathema. 

"  If  any  one  shall  say,  that  in  the  adorable  sacrament  of  the  eucharist,  the  sub- 
stance of  the  bread  and  wine  remains,  together  with  the  body  and  blood  of  our 
Lord  Jesus  Christ  [referring  to  the  consubstantiation  of  the  Lutherans],  and  shall 
deny  the  wonderful  and  singular  conversion  of  the  whole  substance  of  the  bread 
into  his  body,  and  the  whole  substance  of  wine  into  his  blood,  the  appearance  only 
of  bread  and  wine  remaining,  which  conversion  the  Catholic  church  most  properly 
calls  transubstantiation,  let  him  be  anathema. 


TRANBUB8TANTIATION.  447 

"  If  any  one  shall  deny  that  in  the  adorable  sacrament  of  the  eucharist,  a  sepa- 
ration being  made,  the  whole  Christ  is  contained  in  each  element  or  species,  in  the 
separate  parts  of  each  element  or  species,  let  him  be  anathema. 

"  This  conversion,  then,  is  so  effectuated,  that  the  whole  substance  of  the  bread 
and  wine  is  changed,  by  the  power  of  God,  into  the  whole  substance  of  the  body 
of  Christ,  and  the  whole  substance  of  the  wine,  into  the  whole  substance  of  his 
blood,  and  this  without  any  change  in  our  Lord  himself;  he  is  neither  begotten,  nor 
changed,  nor  increased,  but  remains  entirely  and  substantially  the  same." — Cat. 
Con.  Trent.,  p.  215. 

Again : 

"  Our  Lord  is  not  in  the  sacrament  as  in  a  place.  The  substance  of  bread  is 
changed  into  the  substance  of  Christ,  not  into  magnitude  or  quality."  "  As  then 
the  body  of  our  Lord  succeeds  to  the  substance,  the  body  of  our  Lord  is  contain- 
ed whole  and  entire,  under  the  least  particle  of  the  bread." 

"  We  have  already  proved  that  the  body  and  blood  of  our  Lord  are  really  and 
truly  contained  in  the  sacrament,  therefore,  contrary  to  the  physical  laws,  sub- 
sist of  themselves,  inhering  in  no  subject." 

The  doctrine  of  the  Romanists  by  which  the  laity  are  restricted, 
in  the  participation  of  the  eucharist,  to  one  kind,  is  also  distinctly 
stated  in  the  Catechism  of  the  Council  of  Trent. 

"  The  law  of  the  church  restricts  its  administration  under  both  kinds  to  any  but 
the  officiating  priest,  unless  by  special  permission  of  the  church.  Christ,  it  is 
true,  as  has  been  explained  by  the  Council  of  Trent,  instituted  and  administered 
to  his  apostles,  at  his  last  supper,  this  great  sacrament  under  both  kinds,  but  it 
does  not  follow  of  necessity  that  by  doing  so  he  established  a  law  rendering  its  ad- 
ministration to  the  faithful  under  both  kinds  imperative." 

The  reasons  assigned  for  this  departure  from  the  example  of  our 
Saviour  in  the  original  institutions  are,  1.  That  the  scriptures  often 
speak  of  it  under  one  kind.  2.  This  practice  is  necessary  to  avoid 
accident  or  indignity.  3.  By  this  means  it  may  always  be  in 
readiness  for  the  sick.  4.  There  are  many  who  cannot  bear  the 
taste  or  smell  of  wine.  5.  In  many  places  wine  is  extremely 
scarce.  6.  Finally  and  chiefly,  it  was  so  ordered  to  crush  the  he- 
resy, which  denied  that  Christ,  whole  and  entire,  is  contained  under 
either  species. 

The  doctrine  of  the  sacrifice  and  adoration  of  the  mass,  is  also 
explicitly  declared. 

"  The  difference  between  the  eucharist  as  a  sacrament  and  sacrifice,  is  very 
great ;  and  is  two-fold.  As  a  sacrament,  it  is  perfected  by  consecration  ;  as  a  sa- 
crifice, all  its  efficacy  consists  in  the  oblation.  When  deposited  in  a  tabernacle 
or  borne  to  the  sick,  it  is  a  sacrament,  not  a  sacrifice.  As  a  sacrament,  it  is  to 
the  worthy  receiver  a  source  of  merit ;  as  a  sacrifice,  it  is  not  only  a  source  of 
merit,  but  of  satisfaction.    It  is  never  offered  to  any  but  God." — P.  231. 

We  have  now  seen  what  is  the  avowed  doctrine  of  the  Roman- 
ists, respecting  the  eucharist ;  in  other  cases  they  often  complain 
that  their  opinions  are  misrepresented  by  Protestant  writers  ;  but, 
on  this  point,  there  is  no  such  charge.     They  explicitly  profess  their 


448  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

belief  in  all  that  has  ever  been  attributed  to  them.  This  is  one 
reason  why  we  have  selected  this  particular  dogma  for  the  subject 
of  our  argument :  there  is  here  a  fair  issue  joined,  and  there  is  no 
medium  between  the  absolute  truth  and  falsehood  of  the  opinion 
which  they  hold.  In  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  wine  in 
the  eucharist,  these  material  substances  are  actually  and  really, 
by  a  stupendous  miracle,  converted  into  the  flesh  and  blood  of 
Christ ;  so  that  they  are  no  longer  bread  and  wine ;  although 
the  sensible  properties  of  bread  and  wine  remain,  yet  these  acci- 
dents exist  without  a  subject:  for  what  is  eaten  or  drunk  is  truly 
the  body  of  Christ,  and  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  no 
longer  exists.  This  is  the  doctrine,  concerning  the  meaning  of 
which  there  is  no  dispute :  nor  concerning  the  name,  for  the  Coun- 
cil of  Trent  has  declared  that  it  is  "  properly  and  fitly "  called 
H  transubstantiation." 

We  now  beg  the  earnest  and  impartial  attention  of  our  readers 
to  the  following  observations. 

1.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  something  very  extraordina- 
ry in  the  doctrine  of  the  Romanists.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Bible 
which  has  the  least  analogy  to  it.  In  all  other  cases  when  mira- 
cles were  wrought,  the  appeal  was  made  to  the  senses  of  the  peo- 
ple: but  here  we  are  called  upon  to  believe  that  a  miracle  is 
wrought,  when  the  testimony  of  the  senses  is  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  fact.  A  piece  of  bread,  made  out  of  wheaten  flour,  lies 
upon  the  table.  It  is  admitted  that  it  is  what  it  appears  to  be, 
bread,  and  nothing  else.  But  as  soon  as  the  priest  pronounces  the 
words  "hoc  est  corpus  meum  " — this  is  my  body,  we  are  told  that 
the  bread  is  changed,  or  transubstantiated,  into  the  body  of  Christ: 
but  after  the  pronunciation  of  these  words,  the  substance  on  the 
table  remains  the  same,  so  far  as  our  senses  can  judge.  The  ap- 
pearance is  the  same  to  the  sight ;  the  weight  is  the  same,  if  it  be 
tried  in  a  balance ;  all  the  chemical  properties  will  be  found  the 
same  upon  analysis  ;  the  feeling  is  the  same  when  handled ;  and 
the  smell  is  the  same.  It  is  admitted  that  there  is  no  sensible 
change  ;  no  change  of  any  kind,  which  we  can  discern.  Now,  we 
say  that  there  is  nothing  analogous  to  this  in  all  the  hundred  of  mi- 
racles recorded  in  the  Bible.  And  before  it  is  received  as  a  fact, 
there  must  be  strong  evidence,  indeed,  if  any  evidence  can  be  suf- 
ficient to  produce  a  rational  faith,  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  tes- 
timony of  all  the  senses. 

2.  But,  if  there  is  such  a  change  of  the  bread  and  wine  into  the 
flesh  and  blood  of  Christ,  why  are  the  properties  of  the  bread  and 
wine  left  to  impose  on  our  senses  ?  What  reason  can  be  assigned 
why  the  evidence  of  the  miracle,  as  in  all  other  cases,  is  not  made 
manifest  ?  The  only  reason  which  we  have  ever  heard  assigned 
for  this  very  extraordinary  and  unique  case,  is,  that  it  serves  to  in- 
crease the  mystery  of  the  sacrament,  and  renders  the  faith  which 
receives  the  truth,  more  mysterious.  This,  however,  is  an  expla- 
nation which  receives  not  the  least  countenance  from  scripture. 


TRANSUB8TANTIATION. 


449 


God  never,  in  any  other  recorded  case,  dealt  thus  with  his  people ; 
but  where  he  works  a  miracle,  he  makes  it  evident  to  the  senses  of 
all  who  are  his  witnesses  ;  and  why  is  there  a  departure  from  this 
rule,  here  ?  If,  on  the  third  day  after  the  crucifixion,  the  body  of 
Christ  had  remained  in  the  tomb,  an  apparently  lifeless  corpse,  and 
the  disciples  had  been  informed  that,  notwithstanding  this  appear- 
ance of  death,  he  was  alive  and  had  left  the  tomb,  as  he  had  pre- 
dicted, it  would  be  an  analogous  case.  But  if  we  were  obliged  to 
resort  to  such  an  invisible  miracle ;  and  not  only  invisible,  but  ab- 
solutely contradicted  by  the  senses  of  all,  what  a  triumph  would 
have  been  afforded  to  the  enemies  of  Christ !  and  what  a  theme  for 
ridicule  and  triumph  !  If  such  had  been  the  case  in  regard  to  the 
resurrection  of  Christ,  his  religion  would  never  have  survived  a 
single  year ;  yet  it  might  be  said  that  the  mystery  would  have  been 
greater,  and  our  faith  more  meritorious.  It  is  a  false  principle,  that 
God  creates  mysteries  to  astound  his  creatures  with  their  incom- 
prehensible nature,  where  there  is  no  need  of  them.  All  the  mys- 
teries of  revelation  arise  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  rather 
from  the  limited  capacity  of  the  human  intellect.  If  a  miracle  is 
wrought,  why  should  it  not  appear  to  be  what  it  really  is  ?  If  that 
bread  is  no  longer  bread,  but  flesh,  why  does  it  not  appear  to  be 
flesh  ?  This  change  of  substance,  while  the  properties  or  accidents 
remain,  has  too  much  the  appearance  of  deception.  It  is  unworthy 
of  the  God  of  truth  thus  to  deal  with  his  creatures.  He  gave  us 
our  senses,  and  so  formed  us,  that  we  cannot  but  credit  their  testi- 
mony ;  and  to  suppose  that  he  would  place  us  in  circumstances  in 
which  we  are  required  to  believe  that  their  information  is  false,  is 
to  subject  his  creatures  to  a  dilemma  in  which  they  must  either  act 
absurdly  or  wickedly.  If  we  believe  our  own  senses,  we  must  be 
of  opinion  that  that  substance  on  the  table  is  still  bread  ;  but  ac- 
cording to  the  religion  of  Romanists,  thus  to  believe  is  a  damnable 
sin  ;  for  this  which  appears  to  be  bread,  is  really  the  flesh  of  Christ. 
And  why,  we  ask  again,  are  we  subjected  to  this  great  difficulty  ? 
Why  does  not  the  element  manifest  its  true  nature  by  its  proper- 
ties ?  Why  does  not  the  miracle  appear  evidently,  as  in  all  other 
cases  ?  To  these  inquiries  no  satisfactory  answer  has  been  given, 
or  can  be  given. 

3.  This  is  not  all.  The  thing  proposed  to  our  faith  seems  to 
be  impossible.  Different  collections  of  material  elements,  forming 
bodies  of  various  kinds,  are  distinguished  from  each  other  by  their 
properties.  Flesh  has  properties  which  make  it  flesh  ;  and  the 
same  is  true  of  bread.  Now  to  assert  that  flesh  has  lost  all  the 
properties  which  constituted  it  flesh,  and  possesses  all  the  proper- 
ties which  belong  to  bread,  and  yet  remains  flesh  and  not  bread,  is 
a  contradiction.  It  is  a  thing  impossible.  It  is  the  same  as  to 
say,  it  ceases  to  be  flesh,  and  yet  is  flesh.  It  has  all  that  which 
constitutes  bread,  and  yet  is  not  bread.  The  notion  of  properties 
subsisting  without  a  subject,  is  repugnant  to  common  sense,  and 
involves  a  manifest  contradiction.     What  is  a  property  or  acci- 

29 


450  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

dent  ?  It  is  that  which  inheres  in  some  subject,  and  by  which  it 
is  what  it  is  ;  but  to  talk  of  properties  without  a  subject,  is  abso- 
lute nonsense.  It  is  an  absurdity  which  never  could  have  gained 
footing,  except  in  the  dark  ages,  and  under  the  influence  of  the 
false  philosophy  of  the  schoolmen.  We  know  nothing  of  essence 
or  substance  but  by  its  properties,  and  when  we  perceive  them  to 
exist,  we  are,  from  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  obliged  to  be- 
lieve that  the  substance  is  what  these  properties  manifest  it  to  be. 
But  here  it  will  be  asked,  do  you  deny  the  power  of  the  Almighty 
to  uphold  accidents  where  there  is  no  subject  ?  We  answer,  that 
God  is  not  honoured  by  attributing  to  him  absurdities  and  contra- 
dictions. Omnipotence  can  perform  whatever  is  an  object  of 
power ;  but  to  cause  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be,  at  the 
same  time,  is  not  a  possible  or  conceivable  thing  ;  so,  to  create  or 
uphold  properties  or  accidents  without  a  substance  to  which- they 
belong,  is  impossible,  because  it  involves  a  contradiction,  as  will 
appear  whenever  we  attentively  consider  the  import  of  the  terms. 
For  what  is  a  property  or  accident  ?  A  property,  as  the  word 
imports,  is  that  which  belongs  to  something  ;  but  if  it  belongs  to 
nothing,  it  is  no  property ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  every  other 
term  by  which  qualities  are  expressed.  The  very  idea  of  their 
self-existence  without  a  subject,  is  contradictory.  This  block  is 
extended,  inert  and  divisible  into  parts :  these  are  some  of  its  pro- 
perties, but  can  there  be  such  properties  created  without  a  subject ; 
or  where  the  substance  is  changed,  is  it  possible  that  the  proper- 
ties can  remain  unchanged  ?  We  feel  mortified  to  be  under  the 
necessity  of  arguing  such  a  plain  matter  of  common  sense ;  but 
our  adversaries  are  pertinacious  in  regard  to  this  very  point ;  for 
unless  they  can  maintain  themselves  here,  the  whole  fabric  of  tran- 
substantiation  must  fall.  We  must  be  indulged,  therefore,  in  some 
further  illustrations.  Matter  and  spirit  are  believed  to  be  essenti- 
ally distinct,  because  their  invariable  properties  are  not  only  dis- 
tinct but  incompatible.  God  could  easily  change  one  substance 
into  another,  and  give  to  matter  the  properties  of  spirit ;  but  to 
make  no  change  in  the  properties  of  matter,  and  yet  to  make  it 
spirit,  is  impossible,  because  it  attributes  to  the  same  substance 
qualities  manifestly  incompatible.  If  this  doctrine,  however,  be 
true,  the  substance  of  a  stone  might  be  changed  into  an  intelligent 
mind,  and  yet  the  inertness,  solidity,  and  extension  of  the  stone 
remain  as  before.  Here  is  a  dark  heavy  piece  of  ore ;  now,  as  God 
can  create  worlds  without  any  pre-existing  material,  so  he  could 
change  this  opaque  body  into  a  sun  or  star  ;  but  suppose  the  ques- 
tion to  be,  can  God  transubstantiate  this  substance  into  a  bright 
luminous  body,  and  without  sensible  weight,  while  it  continued  to 
possess  all  its  former  properties,  of  being  opaque,  heavy,  &c.  ? 
Every  man  of  common  sense  would  say,  it  is  impossible  for  this  to 
be,  because  it  involves  a  contradiction.  But  what  if  it  were  made 
an  article  of  faith,  that  this  lumpish  stone  was  now  changad  into  a 
brilliant  star,  although,  to  our  senses,  it  still  had  all  the  p  roperties 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 


451 


of  stone  ?  Would  not  every  man  say,  it  is  absurd  to  require  us  to 
believe  in  such  a  proposition  ?  He  would  say,  I  am  sure  it  is  not 
so,  for  I  see  it  to  be  the  very  same  it  was  before  you  say  the 
change  in  its  substance  took  place.  He  takes  it  in  his  hand,  and 
says,  that  which  I  thus  handle  cannot  be  a  star  ;  a  star  is  a  body 
of  vast  magnitude,  but  this  is  so  small  that  I  can  grasp  it  in  my 
hand ;  a  star  is  a  beautiful,  luminous  body,  but  this  is  a  dark  and 
unsightly  lump  of  ore.  To  which,  upon  the  principles  of  our  op- 
ponents, it  might  be  replied,  you  must  not,  in  this  case,  trust  your 
senses ;  God  is  able  to  change  the  substance  of  this  stone  into  a 
star,  and  yet  all  the  accidents  of  the  stone  may  remain  as  before ; 
and  as  his  word  declares  that  such  a  change  has  occurred,  you 
must,  on  pain  of  damnation,  believe  the  divine  declaration.  This 
is  as  precisely  analogous  to  the  case  of  transubstantiation,  as  any- 
thing we  can  imagine.  It  would  not  be  more  unreasonable  to 
insist  (nor  half  as  much  so),  that  the  stone  which  you  hold  in  your 
hand  is  a  brilliant  star  of  the  first  magnitude,  as  to  believe,  that 
the  small  wafer  of  bread  which  the  priest  puts  in  your  mouth,  is 
the  whole  body  of  Christ ;  and  not  merely  his  flesh  and  blood,  but 
his  "  soul  and  divinity."  It  would  be  in  vain  to  allege,  that  a 
small  lump  of  matter  could  not  be  a  star,  because  the  properties 
of  the  stone  might  be  said  to  remain,  while  the  substance  was 
changed  ;  and  although  to  our  senses  it  appeared  to  be  nothing  but 
a  stone,  yet,  under  these  sensible  properties,  there  lay  concealed 
the  substance  of  a  brilliant  star.  For  thus  they  pertinaciously 
insist,  that  although  this  wafer  has,  after  consecration,  all  the  pro- 
perties of  bread,  and  this  liquid  in  the  chalice  has  all  the  sensible 
properties  of  wine,  which  it  ever  had  ;  yet,  by  the  exertion  of 
divine  power,  a  great  miracle  is  wrought  every  time  the  eucharist 
is  celebrated,  and  the  bread  and  wine  are  converted  into  the  flesh 
and  blood  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  True,  it  is  admitted,  that  we 
perceive  nothing  of  flesh ;  but  we  must  believe  that  our  senses  de- 
ceive us,  and  that  that  which,  to  our  sight  and  taste  and  touch  and 
smell,  seems  to  be  a  thin  cake  of  wheaten  bread,  is  really  the  flesh 
and  blood  of  the  Son  of  God. 

4.  The  very  action  which  this  doctrine  of  transubstantiation 
supposes  to  be  performed  by  every  believing  communicant,  is  one 
which  is  shocking  to  all  the  unadulterated  feelings  of  human  na- 
ture. The  idea  of  feasting  on  human  flesh  is  so  abhorrent  to  our 
nature,  that  most  people  think  they  would  rather  perish  with  hun- 
ger, than  preserve  life  by  such  unnatural  food.  This  natural  ab- 
horrence of  devouring  our  own  species  has  for  a  long  time  ren- 
dered the  world  exceedingly  incredulous  about  the  existence  of 
cannibalism.  To  the  disgrace  of  our  kind,  the  proof  of  the  fact  has 
become  now  too  strong  to  admit  of  any  further  doubt ;  but  still, 
when  we  read  the  narrative  of  the  shocking  feasts  of  the  NewZea- 
landers,  it  thrills  us  with  horror,  and  our  blood  seems  to  be  curdled 
in  our  veins.  Now,  to  suppose  that  God  would  ordain,  that  the 
flesh  and  blood  assumed  by  his  own  eternal  Son,  should  be  eaten 


» 


452  TRANSUBSTANTIAT10N. 

and  drunk  daily,  and  that  too  as  a  part  of  our  most  solemn  wor- 
ship, is  a  thing  so  incredible  in  itself,  that  we  doubt  whether  any 
evidence  that  can  be  conceived  is  sufficient  to  render  it  so  proba- 
ble, that,  in  opposition  to  this  strong  instinctive  or  natural  aversion, 
we  should  receive  it  as  a  truth,  and  as  an  essential  part  of  the  ser- 
vice which  God  requires.  It  is  true,  our  Lord  spoke  familiarly  to 
the  Jews  about  eating  his  flesh  and  drinking  his  blood,  and  de- 
clared such  a  manducation  of  his  body  as  essential  to  eternal  life  ; 
but  he  could  not  have  been  here  speaking  of  the  eucharist,  of  which 
sacrament  no  intimation  had  yet  been  given.  And  surely  Christ  could 
not  have  discoursed  to  the  Jews  about  an  ordinance  of  which 
they  could  not  have  had  the  least  idea.  His  words  did,  however, 
contain  a  prediction  of  the  violent  death  which  he  knew  he  should 
die,  and  by  which  his  body  would  be  broken,  and  his  blood  poured 
out.  As  the  Jews  called  for  a  sign  from  heaven,  and  referred  to 
the  bread  which  their  fathers  received  in  the  wilderness,  Christ 
took  occasion  to  let  them  know,  that  the  manna,  concerning  which 
they  spoke,  was  a  lively  type  of  himself;  that  he  was  the  true 
bread  which  came  down  from  heaven  ;  and  to  teach  the  necessity 
of  faith  in  himself,  he  insists  on  the  necessity  of  eating  his  flesh 
and  drinking  his  blood,  in  order  to  eternal  life.  As  the  manna 
kept  the  people  alive  only  by  being  eaten,  so  a  participation,  by 
faith,  of  his  atonement,  was  necessary  to  the  salvation  of  men. 
Often  Christ  discoursed  to  the  Jews,  who  were  malignantly  watch- 
ing him,  in  a  highly  figurative  manner  ;  sometimes,  ihat  he  might 
lead  them  on  to  a  conclusion  by  which  they  condemned  themselves  ; 
and  at  other  times  in  just  judgment  for  their  perverseness,  "  that 
hearing  they  might  hear  and  not  understand,  and  seeing  they 
might  see  and  not  perceive."  The  Jews  had  no  idea  of  what 
Christ  meant  by  eating  his  flesh  and  drinking  his  blood ;  and  some 
of  them  understood  his  words  literally ;  but  they  were  not  agreed 
in  their  interpretations  of  them,  for  it  is  written,  "  The  Jews  there- 
fore strove  among  themselves  saying,  how  can  this  man  give  us 
his  flesh  to  eat  ?"  Our  Lord,  knowing  their  true  character,  gave 
them  no  further  explanation,  but  extended  his  former  declaration, 
"  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  you,  except  ye  eat  the  flesh  of  the  Son 
of  man,  and  drink  his  blood,  ye  have  no  life  in  you.  Whoso  eateth 
my  flesh  and  drinketh  my  blood,  hath  eternal  life ;  and  I  will  raise 
him  up  at  the  last  day."  When,  however,  he  perceived  that  they 
were  offended  with  what  he  had  said,  as  entertaining  some  gross 
and  carnal  idea  of  his  doctrine,  to  leave  them  without  excuse,  he 
intimated  to  them  with  sufficient  plainness,  that  his  language  was 
not  to  be  interpreted  according  to  the  literal  meaning.  "  It  is," 
said  he,  "  the  spirit  that  quickeneth,  the  flesh  profiteth  nothing ; 
the  jvords  that  I  speak  unto  you,  they  are  spirit,  and  they  are  life." 
Now  after  this  lucid  exposition  of  the  general  import  of  this  dis- 
course, for  any  now  to  insist  upon  a  literal  interpretation,  of  eating 
the  flesh  and  drinking  the  blood  of  the  Son  of  man,  is  to  be  more 
blind  than  the  unbelieving  Jews ;  for  it  is  not  probable  that  any  of 


TRANSUBSTANT1ATI0N.  453 

them  were  so  stupid  as  to  suppose,  that  Christ  meant  nothing  more 
by  these  expressions  than  a  natural  manducation  of  his  flesh  and 
blood  ;  for  they  knew  the  law  well  enough  to  understand,  that  all 
drinking  of  blood  was  forbidden,  and  the  reason  of  the  prohibition 
would  apply  to  human  blood  with  tenfold  force.  It  would  be  just 
as  reasonable  to  suppose,  because  Christ  calls  himself  a  shep- 
herd, and  speaks  of  his  sheep  of  different  folds,  that  he  actually 
was  engaged  in  tending  a  flock  of  sheep  ;  yea,  that  he  promised 
to  sheep  literally,  a  kingdom.  Or,  that  he  was  really  a  door,  or  a 
vine  ;  or  that  the  Holy  Spirit,  whom  he  promised  to  believers,  was 
"  a  well  of  water."  There  would  be  more  excuse  for  having  re- 
course to  these  words,  to  prove  the  fact  that  Christ's  body  must 
be  eaten  and  his  blood  drunk,  if  he  had  not  precluded  every  gloss 
of  the  kind,  by  asserting  that  "  the  flesh  profiteth  nothing."  As 
much  as  to  say,  if  you  could  literally  become  partakers  of  my 
flesh,  that  could  not  profit  you ;  and  again,  "  The  words  I  speak 
unto  you,  they  are  spirit,  and  they  are  life."  What  can  this  mean, 
but  this,  that  his  words  were  to  be  interpreted  spiritually ;  and 
that  under  the  figure  of  eating  his  flesh  and  blood,  he  had  repre- 
sented spiritual  blessings,  connected  with  eternal  life,  which  would 
be  procured  by  his  death  and  sufferings,  and  be  made  to  nourish 
unto  eternal  life  all  who  would  believe  in  his  name  ? 

5.  "  The  flesh  profiteth  nothing."  There  is  much  in  these  words 
deserving  our  attention  ;  and  which  has  a  direct  bearing  on  this 
subject.  The  eating  of  any  flesh  can  have  no  effect  to  invigorate 
the  spiritual  life  of  the  soul.  Christ's  body,  although  perfectly  free 
from  all  the  defilements  of  sin,  consisted  of  particles  of  matter, 
otherwise  it  would  not  have  been  a  body ;  and  his  body  was  de- 
rived from  his  mother  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  by  whose 
operation  it  was  produced,  otherwise  it  would  not  have  been  a 
human  body.  Some  heretics  of  old,  and  some  enthusiasts  of  mo- 
dern times,  imagined  that  Christ  did  not  receive  his  body  from  his 
mother,  but  that  the  matter  of  which  it  consisted  was  celestial,  and 
passed  through  the  womb  of  Mary,  as  water  through  a  tube  ;  but 
all  such  opinions  have  ever  been  rejected  by  every  branch  of  the 
catholic  church,  and  by  the  Romanists  as  well  as  others.  Now, 
the  body  of  Christ  being  material,  his  flesh  formed  and  configurated 
like  the  flesh  of  other  human  bodies,  and  his  blood  also  material 
and  of  the  same  qualities  as  the  blood  of  other  men,  except  that 
his  whole  body  was  uncontaminated  with  the  stain  of  original  or 
actual  sin  ;  it  plainly  follows  that,  however  the  flesh  of  such  a  body 
might,  upon  the  principles  of  nutrition,  invigorate  or  sustain  the 
life  of  the  body,  it  could  not  possibly,  by  being  carnally  eaten,  pro- 
mote the  health  and  purity  of  the  immortal  soul.  If  a  man  should 
eat  nothing  else  but  the  flesh  of  Christ,  and  drink  nothing  else  but 
his  blood  all  his  life,  it  would  never  improve  the  moral  qualities  of 
the  immortal  soul.  The  argument  which  our  Lord  uses  so  forci- 
bly, to  prove  that  that  which  enters  into  a  man's  stomach  cannot 
defile  his  soul,  is  founded  on  the  same  principle  as  the  one  which 


454 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 


we  are  now  using.  Material  causes  cannot  directly  affect  the 
mind,  either  to  purify  or  defile  it.  We  cannot  see,  therefore,  that 
the  mere  eating  of  the  flesh  of  Christ's  body,  and  drinking  his  ma- 
terial blood,  could  in  itself,  ex  opere  operato,  have  any  more  effect 
to  produce  or  increase  spiritual  life,  than  the  flesh  and  blood  of  any 
other  person.  We  do  not  deny,  however,  that  God  can  institute  a 
connexion  between  external  acts  and  the  communication  of  his 
grace  ;  and  if  he  had  made  eating  Christ's  flesh  a  means  of  grace, 
or  the  channel  through  which  he  communicated  spiritual  life,  this 
act  would  stand  precisely  on  the  same  footing  with  other  ordi- 
nances ;  the  efficacy  of  which  depends,  not  on  the  act  performed, 
but  on  the  blessing  of  God,  which  can  give  efficacy  to  that  which 
has  none  in  itself.  But  is  it  probable,  is  it  credible,  that  God 
would  ever  institute  such  an  ordinance  as  this,  by  which  we  are 
bound,  on  the  pain  of  the  loss  of  salvation,  to  devour  the  flesh  of 
the  Son  of  God  ? 

6.  Another  view  of  this  subject,  connected  with  what  has  been 
said,  is,  if  the  bread  is  converted  into  the  flesh  of  Christ,  and  is 
eaten,  and  enters  through  the  oesophagus  into  the  stomach,  and  is 
there  subjected  to  the  process  of  digestion,  it  is  a  matter  of  real 
and  serious  difficulty  to  know  what  becomes  of  it.  By  a  miracle 
it  may  immediately  be  carried  away  before  the  process  of  diges- 
tion commences,  but  then  it  may  be  asked,  what  good  is  effected 
by  eating  it  ?  Or  it  may  be  digested  like  other  food,  and  assimi- 
lated into  the  body  of  the  participant ;  but  then  the  body  of  every 
believing  communicant  would  contain  as  a  constituent  part  of  it- 
self the  whole  body  and  blood  ;  yea,  the  soul  and  divinity  of  the 
Son  of  God.  This  would  be  incorporating  Christ  with  his  disci- 
ples, not  by  a  spiritual  and  mystical  union,  but  by  a  gross  corporeal 
and  physical  union.  The  remaining  alternative,  which  is,  that  the 
body  of  Christ  received  into  the  stomach  turns,  with  other  parts  of 
unassimilated  food,  to  corruption,  presents  an  idea  so  gross,  and 
indeed  blasphemous,  that  we  are  sure  no  one  would  ever  think  of 
entertaining  it.  Now,  it  may  be  said  in  reply,  that  this  is  curiously 
to  pry  into  mysteries  which  are  inscrutable,  and  that  all  observa- 
tions of  the  kind  here  made  are  impious.  If  so,  the  whole  blame 
must  rest  on  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation ;  for  this  alone  lays 
the  foundation  of  such  remarks.  The  consequence  is  inevitable 
and  undeniable,  that  if  the  real  fleshly  body  of  Christ  is  taken  into 
the  stomach  by  eating,  it  must  be  disposed  of  in  some  way.  Let 
the  Romanist  tell  us  how — or  we  will  give  him  a  choice  of  every 
conceivable  hypothesis.  Is  there  anything  profane  in  drawing 
from  an  asserted  fact,  consequences  so  palpable  ?  We  say  again, 
if  there  is,  the  fault  is  not  in  the  inference,  but  in  the  principle 
from  which  it  is  derived. 

We  are  aware  that  the  advocate  of  transubstantiation  will  an- 
swer to  all  these  reasonings,  that  the  doctrine  is  explicitly  taught 
in  the  Gospel,  and  what  God  has  said  must  be  true,  however  much 
it  may  be  opposed  to  our  sense  and  reason.     It  is,  however,  a  rea- 


TRAN8UB8TANTIATI0N.  455 

sonable  inquiry,  whether  the  ground  assumed  for  the  proof  of  tran- 
substantiation  does  not  go  far  to  destroy  all  external  evidence  of 
divine  revelation.  This  view  of  the  subject  is  so  forcibly  given 
by  Archbishop  Tillotson,  in  his  admirable  sermon  "  On  Transub- 
stantiation," that  we  will  cite  a  few  paragraphs  on  this  point. 

1.  •'  I  shall  only  ask,"  says  the  venerable  prelate,  "  whether  any 
man  has,  or  ever  had,  greater  evidence  of  the  truth  of  any  divine 
revelation,  than  every  man  hath  of  the  falsehood  of  transubstan- 
tiation  ?  Infidelity  were  hardly  possible  to  men,  if  all  men  had 
the  same  evidence  for  the  Christian  religion  which  they  have 
against  transubslantiation  ;"  that  is,  the  clear  and  irresistible  evi- 
dence of  sense.  He  that  can  once  be  brought  to  contradict  or  deny 
his  senses,  is  at  an  end  of  certainty ;  for  what  can  a  man  be  certain 
of,  if  he  be  not  certain  of  what  he  sees  ?  In  some  circumstances 
our  senses  may  deceive  us,  but  no  faculty  deceives  us  so  little,  and 
so  seldom  ;  and  when  our  senses  do  deceive  us,  even  that  error  is 
not  to  be  corrected  without  the  help  of  our  senses. 

2.  "  Supposing  this  doctrine  had  been  delivered  in  scripture,  in 
the  very  same  words  that  it  is  decreed  in  the  Council  of  Trent,  by 
what  clearer  evidence,  or  stronger  argument,  could  any  man  prove 
to  me  that  such  words  were  in  the  Bible,  than  I  can  prove  to  him 
that  bread  and  wine  are  bread  and  wine  still  ?  He  could  but 
appeal  to  my  eyes,  to  prove  such  words  to  be  in  the  Bible  ;  and, 
with  the  same  reason  and  justice,  might  I  appeal  to  several  of  his 
senses  to  prove  to  him  that  the  bread  and  wine,  after  consecration, 
are  bread  and  wine  still. 

3.  "  Whether  it  be  reasonable  to  imagine  that  God  should  make 
that  a  part  of  the  Christian  religion,  which  shakes  the  main  exter- 
nal evidence  and  confirmation  of  the  whole  ?  I  mean  the  miracles 
which  were  wrought  by  our  Saviour,  and  his  apostles,  the  assur- 
ance whereof  did  at  the  first  depend  on  the  certainty  of  sense. 
For,  if  the  senses  of  those  who  say  they  saw  them,  were  deceived, 
then  there  might  be  no  miracles  wrought ;  and,  consequently,  it 
may  justly  be  doubted  whether  that  kind  of  confirmation  which 
God  hath  given  to  the  Christian  religion,  would  be  strong  enough 
to  prove  it,  supposing  transubstantiation  to  be  a  part  of  it ;  because 
every  man  hath  as  great  evidence  that  transubstantiation  is  false, 
as  he  hath  that  the  Christian  religion  is  true.  Suppose,  then,  tran- 
substantiation to  be  a  part  of  the  Christian  religion,  it  must  have 
the  same  confirmation  with  the  whole,  and  that  is  miracles  ;  but  of 
all  doctrines  in  the  world,  it  is  peculiarly  incapable  of  being  proved 
by. a  miracle.  For  if  a  miracle  were  wrought  for  the  proof  of  it, 
the  very  same  assurance  that  any  man  hath  of  the  truth  of  the 
miracle,  he  hath  of  the  falsehood  of  the  doctrine  ;  that  is,  the  clear 
evidences  of  his  senses.  For  that  there  is  a  miracle  wrought  to 
prove  that  what  he  sees  in  the  sacrament,  is  not  bread,  but  the  body 
of  Christ,  there  is  only  the  evidence  of  sense  ;  and  there  is  the 
very  same  evidence  to  prove,  that  what  he  sees  in  the  sacrament 
is  not  the  body  of  Christ,  but  bread.     So  that  there  would  arise  a 


456  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

new  controversy,  whether  a  man  should  rather  believe  in  his  senses 
giving  testimony  against  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  or  bear- 
ing witness  to  a  miracle  wrought  to  confirm  that  doctrine,  there 
being  the  very  same  evidence  against  the  truth  of  the  doctrine, 
which  there  is  for  the  truth  of  the  miracle." 

But  let  us  come  now  to  the  examination  of  the  scriptural  evi- 
dence, on  which  this  doctrine  is  supposed  to  be  founded  ;  and  it  is 
all  included  in  one  short  sentence  ;  the  words  of  Christ,  where  he 
says,  "  this  is  my  body."  Other  texts,  indeed,  are  brought  in  as 
auxiliaries,  but  the  stress  is  laid  upon  this  simple  declaration.  If 
this  can  be  set  aside,  all  the  others  will  fall  of  course.  Now,  let  it 
be  well  observed,  that  our  Lord  says  not  a  word  about  the  tran- 
substantiation of  the  bread.  He  never  intimates  that  he  was 
about  to  work  a  stupendous  miracle,  by  changing  the  bread  into 
his  own  body,  of  which  we  might  have  expected  that  he  would 
have  given  some  more  explicit  information.  But  having  taken  the 
Jewish  passover  with  his  disciples,  after  this  supper  was  ended, 
he  took  in  his  hand  a  piece  of  the  unleavened  cake  or  loaf,  which 
was  used  on  this  occasion,  and  said,  "  this,"  that  is,  this  bread,  "  is 
my  body  ;"  and  having  broken  it  and  blessed  it,  he  gave  it  to  his 
disciples  and  said,  "  take,  eat,  this  is  my  body ;  and  he  took  the 
cup  and  gave  thanks,  and  gave  it  to  them  and  said,  drink  ye  all  of 
it ;  for  this  is  my  blood  of  the  New  Testament,  which  is  shed  for 
many  for  the  remission  of  sins."  By  Luke  it  is  added  after  the 
words,  "  this  is  my  body,"  "  which  is  given  for  you,  this  do  in 
remembrance  of  me."  Likewise,  also,  the  cup  after  supper,  say- 
ing, "  this  cup  is  the  New  Testament  in  my  blood,  which  is  shed 
for  you."  The  account  of  this  transaction,  as  revealed  to  Paul, 
and  by  him  delivered  to  the  Corinthian  church,  accords  fully  with 
the  narrative  of  the  evangelists,  "  That  the  Lord  Jesus,  the  same 
night  in  which  he  was  betrayed,  took  bread,  and  when  he  had 
given  thanks,  he  brake  it,  and  said,  this  is  my  body,  which  is 
broken  for  you  ;  this  do  in  remembrance  of  me.  After  the  same 
manner,  also,  he  took  the  cup  when  he  had  supped,  saying,  this 
cup  is  the  New  Testament  in  my  blood  ;  this  do  ye  as  oft  as  ye 
drink  it,  in  remembrance  of  me."  It  is  undeniable,  from  all  these 
accounts,  that  Christ  does  call  the  bread  his  body,  and  the  wine  his 
blood ;  the  only  question  is,  in  what  sense  are  these  words  to  be 
understood,  literally  or  figuratively  ?  Did  the  Lord  Jesus  intend 
that  his  disciples  should  believe  that  the  piece  of  bread  contained 
literally  his  own  flesh  and  blood  ?  It  is  admitted,  that  when  he 
took  it  up,  it  was  nothing  else  but  bread ;  but  it  is  alleged,  that  at 
the  instant  when  he  said,  "  this  is  my  body,"  the  substance  was 
changed,  and  it  was  no  longer  bread,  but  the  flesh  of  our  Lord. 
Now,  the  mode  of  speaking  by  no  means  corresponds  with  this 
idea.  "  This  is  my  body,"  does  not  convey  the  meaning,  that  now 
I  change,  or  transubstantiate  this  bread  into  my  body.  But  pass- 
ing this,  we  would  remark,  that  if  the  bread  was  thus  converted 
into  the  body  of  Christ ;   and  if,  as  the  Catechism  teaches,  the 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION.  457 

whole  body  and  blood  was  contained  in  this  one  piece  of  bread, 
then  there  existed  at  one  and  the  same  time  two  complete  bodies 
of  Christ ;  the  one  the  visible  living  body,  for  no  one  will  pretend 
that  this  did  not  continue  still  to  be  the  body  of  Christ  after  the 
consecration.  Here  then  is  mystery  upon  mystery  ;  one  Christ 
stands,  or  sits,  with  a  complete  living  body  at  the  table,  and  holds 
in  his  hand  another  complete  body  of  Christ ;  and  when  the  wine 
was  changed  also,  as  each  of  the  species  contains  the  whole  body 
complete,  there  must  have  been  three  complete  bodies  of  Christ, 
two  of  which  were  eaten  by  the  disciples,  but  the  living  visible 
body  was  not  eaten  ;  and  if  Christ  partook  of  the  elements  whiph 
he  distributed,  as  seems  to  be  reasonable  to  suppose,  then  he  ate 
his  own  body,  and  drank  his  own  blood.  We  resolved,  on  enter- 
ing on  this  subject,  to  avoid  all  ridicule  ;  and  yet  we  are  apprehen- 
sive that  the  bare  statement  of  these  things  presents  a  case  so 
truly  ludicrous,  that  we  shall  be  accused  of  resorting  to  this  un- 
suitable weapon.  We  must,  however,  for  the  sake  of  truth, 
exhibit  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  with  all  its  legitimate 
absurdities.  If  some  of  these  are  monstrous  or  ludicrous,  it  is  not 
our  fault ;  the  blame  lies  with  the  doctrine  itself,  as  was  before  said. 
But  if  these  words,  "  this  is  my  body,"  must  be  taken  literally, 
to  signify  the  flesh  of  Christ,  surely,  all  the  other  expressions  in  the 
same  passage,  and  in  relation  to  the  same  sacrement,  must  be 
interpreted  in  the  same  way.  Then,  when  Christ  says  "  this  cup," 
or  chalice,  as  they  prefer  to  call  it,  "  is  the  New  Testament,"  or 
New  Covenant,  "  in  my  blood,"  we  should  understand  that  the 
vessel  in  his  hand,  which  contained  the  wine,  was  "  a  testament," 
or  covenant.  This,  however,  is  so  manifestly  absurd,  that  all  will 
be  ready  to  say,  that  he  meant  the  wine  in  the  cup,  and  not  the 
vessel ;  but  even  here  we  have  an  expression  which  cannot  be 
taken  literally  ;  the  wine,  before  or  after  consecration,  can  no  more 
be  a  testament  or  covenant,  than  the  chalice  can  be  such.  Our 
only  reason  for  bringing  forward  these  absurd  interpretations,  is 
to  show  to  what  consequences  the  principle  of  interpretation  which 
Romanists  wish  to  establish,  will  lead,  even  in  the  explication  of 
the  same  passage.  But  this  is  not  the  whole,  nor  the  chief  objec- 
tion to  this  interpretation.  Our  Lord  says, "  this  is  my  body  which 
is  broken  for  you — this  is  my  blood  which  is  shed  for  you."  Now, 
if  the  word  "  body"  must  mean  Christ's  real  flesh,  then  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  word  "  broken  "  must  also  be  so  taken ;  and  it 
will  follow,  that  Christ's  body  was  already  crucified,  and  his  blood 
poured  out  for  the  remission  of  sins.  In  fact,  therefore,  his  body 
was  broken  and  slain  before  he  was  fastened  to  the  cross.  As  the 
eucharist  is  a  real  sacrifice,  and  there  could  be  no  sacrifice  with- 
out the  death  of  the  victim,  it  is  clear  that  Christ  must  have  been 
put  to  death  at  this  time  ;  and  his  words,  taken  literally,  express 
this  fact ;  for  he  says,  "  this  is  my  body  which  is  broken  for  you — 
this  is  my  blood  which  is  shed  for  you."  But  he  was  still  alive, 
and  his  visible  and  animated  body  was  not  broken,  and  his  blood 


458  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

was  not  yet  shed  ;  therefore  his  body  was  at  the  same  time  dead 
and  alive,  or  rather,  that  body  now  produced  from  the  bread  was 
a  dead  and  broken  body ;  while  the  former  body  was  alive  and 
sound.  But  perhaps  this  idea  of  a  plurality  of  bodies  will  be  re- 
jected, as  no  legitimate  consequence  from  the  doctrine  of  transub- 
stantiation  ;  and  it  will  be  alleged,  that  when  the  bread  and  wine 
are  converted  into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ,  they  are  not 
formed  into  a  separate  body,  but  changed  into  the  same  identical 
body,  which  before  existed,  and  was  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary.  We 
are  perfectly  willing,  so  far  as  our  argument  is  concerned,  that  this 
should  be  considered  the  hypothesis  of  the  advocates  of  this  doc- 
trine. Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  at  the  moment  when  the 
change  took  place  in  the  bread  and  wine,  the  body  of  Christ  ex- 
isted, complete  in  all  its  parts ;  then'  if  these  elements  were  trans- 
muted into  the  already  existing  body,  it  must  have  been  by  substi- 
tution or  addition,  that  is,  the  former  body  must  have  been  removed 
or  annihilated,  and  this  new  body,  recently  formed,  must  have 
assumed  its  place  ;  or  the  former  body  continuing  to  exist  without 
change,  the  new  body  must  have  been  added  to  it.  The  idea  of  the 
annihilation  or  removal  of  the  body,  before  existing,  will  be  ad- 
mitted by  none  ;  therefore,  the  alternative  must  be  adopted.  The 
bread  and  wine,  then,  when  transubstantiated,  passed  into  the  living 
body  of  Christ,  and  became  identified  with  it.  To  his  body  received 
at  his  incarnation,  then,  there  was  now  added  another  recently 
formed  of  the  bread  and  wine  in  the  sacrament.  But  if  his  original 
body  was  perfect  in  all  its  parts,  where  was  there  room  for  such 
an  addition  ;  or  what  conceivable  benefit  could  arise  from  such  an 
increase  ?  When  this  change  took  place,  either  the  weight  of 
Christ's  body,  and  the  quantity  of  his  blood  was  increased,  or  it 
was  not.  If  the  former,  what  special  purpose  could  such  an  en- 
largement answer  ?  It  could  certainly  add  nothing  to  the  efficacy 
of  his  sacrifice ;  but  if  the  body  of  Christ  was  not  increased  in 
bulk  or  weight,  by  this  change,  how  can  it  be  supposed  that  any 
addition  of  a  corporeal  kind  was  made  to  it?  There  is  here  ano- 
ther difficulty.  The  disciples  ate  the  bread  which  had  just  been 
converted  into  the  body  of  Christ ;  but  if  it  had  immediately  be- 
come a  constituent  part  of  Christ's  living  body,  how  could  they  eat 
it  ?  Did  they  eat  the  living  flesh  of  Christ's  body,  and  drink  the 
warm  blood  which  was  then  flowing  through  his  arteries  and 
veins  ?  But  this  is  not  all ;  it  is  asserted  in  the  Catechism  now 
under  review,  that  the  body  of  Christ,  of  which  believers  partake 
in  the  eucharist,  is  "  the  same  that  was  born  of  the  Virgin."  Now 
to  us  this  appears  to  be  a  palpable  absurdity,  a  contradiction  as 
clear  as  can  be  expressed  in  words.  It  is  to  assert,  that  that  which 
was  not  a  fact  is  made  to  be  a  fact ;  that  a  substance  which  was 
entirely  distinct  and  separate  from  the  Virgin  Mary,  was  that  very 
body  which  was  born  of  her.  The  bread  and  wine  before  conse- 
cration, no  one  will  pretend,  was  the  body  of  Mary ;  when  the 
substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  is  changed  into  the  body  and 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION.  459 

blood  of  Christ,  that  act  of  power  by  which  it  is  changed,  cannot 
possibly  make  this  to  be  the  identical  body  born  of  the  Virgin.  It 
would  be  just  as  reasonable  to  assert  that  God,  by  an  act  of  omni- 
potence, could  make  the  child  just  born  to  be  Adam  the  first  of 
men.  Such  suppositions  are  a  disgrace  to  rational  beings  ;  the  ten- 
dency of  them  is  to  obscure  and  unsettle  all  our  firmest  and  clearest 
perceptions  of  truth.  According  to  this  philosophy,  God  might 
cause  that  which  does  exist,  never  to  have  existed  ;  and  the  being 
which  may  be  brought  into  existence  hereafter,  to  have  had  an 
existence  from  the  beginning  of  the  world.  It  is  only  necessary 
to  state  such  monstrous  absurdities  ;  their  falsehood  cannot  be 
rendered  more  evident  by  reasoning ;  for  there  is  nothing  with 
which  we  can  compare  them,  which  could  render  their  falsehood 
more  manifest.  To  make  a  substance  which,  it  is  acknowledged, 
formed  no  part  of  the  body  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  to  be  that 
identical  body,  is  certainly  one  of  the  greatest  absurdities  of  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  so  fruitful  of  absurdities  ;  and  it  is 
not  an  inference  of  ours,  but  is  explicitly  avowed  in  this  authorized 
formulary. 

Having  exhibited  some  of  the  difficulties  and  absurdities  of  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  by  considering  the  circumstances 
which  attended  the  first  institution  of  the  sacrament,  these  will  not 
be  diminished  by  extending  our  views  to  the  celebration  of  the 
eucharist  by  the  priests  of  the  Romish  church.  Here  we  find  the 
doctrine  of  the  mass,  with  all  the  superstitions  ani  idolatries  which 
accompany  it. 

The  doctrine  of  the  catechism  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  as  it  is 
called,  not  only  asserts  that  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  eucharist  is 
the  same  as  that  which  was  born  of  the  Virgin,  but  the  same  as 
that  now  glorified  in  heaven.  The  apostle  Paul,  indeed,  declares 
that  "flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 
Christ's  body,  before  entering  into  heaven,  underwent  a  glorious 
transformation,  to  fit  it  for  the  heavenly  state.  There  it  appears 
now  resplendent  with  ineffable  glory.  It  is  no  longer  a  body  of 
gross  particles  of  flesh  and  blood,  for  such  a  body,  though  suited  to 
his  condition  and  work  upon  earth,  would  be  entirely  incongruous 
with  the  heavenly  state.  Now  that  celestial  and  glorious  body  is 
complete,  and  can  neither  receive  any  addition  nor  diminution.  Al- 
though, then,  bread  and  wine  may  bv  Omnipotence  be  changed  into 
flesh  and  blood,  and  this  flesh  and  blood  may  be  received  into  the 
mouths  and  stomachs  of  communicants  ;  yet  it  cannot  be  that  this 
flesh  and  blood  should  be  the  identical  body  of  Christ,  which  is 
now  enthroned  in  glory.  It  cannot  be,  that  that  heavenly  body 
should  be  eaten  every  time  the  eucharist  is  celebrated.  The  idea 
is  so  shocking,  as  well  as  absurd,  that  we  know  not  how  it  could 
ever  have  been  received  by  any  man  in  his  senses.  If  the  merit 
of  faith  rises  in  proportion  to  the  difficulty  and  impossibility  of  the 
thing  to  be  believed,  then  is  there  nothing  more  meritorious  than 
the  faith  of  Roman  Catholics  on  this  point.     A  hundred  thousand 


460  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

priests  throughout  the  world  often  celebrate  the  eucharist  at  the 
same  hour.  In  every  one  of  these  instances,  if  the  priest  only 
have  a  right  intention,  the  body  of  Christ,  even  his  body  now  glo- 
rified in  heaven,  is  produced  by  the  repetition  of  the  form  of  con- 
secration, "  this  is  my  body."  Now  how  this  glorified  body  of  the 
Saviour  can  be  present  in  a  hundred  thousand  different  places  at 
one  and  the  same  time,  and  yet  remain  complete  and  unmutilated 
on  the  throne  of  glory  in  heaven,  is  a  thing  not  easy  to  be  believed. 
The  Lutherans  who  adopted  the  opinion  that  there  was  no  change 
of  the  bread  and  wine  into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ,  yet  main- 
tained that  the  real  body  and  blood  of  Christ  were  present  with 
these  elements,  and  were  received  by  every  communicant,  whether 
in  the  exercise  of  faith  or  not.  And  when  urged  in  controversy 
with  the  reformed,  with  the  consequence,  that  this  rendered  it  ne- 
cessary that  the  body  of  Christ  should  exist  everywhere,  they  ad- 
mitted the  inference,  and  held  the  ubiquity  of  Christ's  body  ;  but 
this  was  to  attribute  to  a  finite  and  created  nature  one  of  the  attri- 
butes of  Deity  ;  therefore,  they  adopted  the  absurd  opinion  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  hypostatical  union,  divine  attributes  were  actu- 
ally communicated  to  the  human  nature  of  Christ.  But  another 
stubborn  difficulty  attended  this  hypothesis.  It  is  the  property  of 
all  bodies  to  exclude  all  other  bodies  from  the  space  which  they 
occupy  ;  hence,  if  ubiquity  be  ascribed  to  Christ's  body,  it  will  ex- 
clude all  other  bodies  from  the  universe.  There  was  no  method 
of  obviating  this  objection,  but  by  giving  a  new  definition  of  a 
body  ;  and  here  was  opened  a  field  for  abstruse  speculation  which 
occupied  the  learning  and  labours  of  men  of  the  first  order  of  in- 
tellect ;  and  when  they  had  completed  their  theory,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  say  what  was  essential  to  body,  or  in  what  respect  they 
who  held  a  bodily  presence  of  Christ  differed  from  those  who 
maintained  that  he  was  really  but  spiritually  present. 

How  far  the  Lutherans  still  adhere  to  the  old  doctrine,  we  can- 
not certainly  say,  but  we  are  inclined  to  believe,  that  the  doctrine 
of  consubstantiation,  or  impanation,  as  some  of  their  theologians 
choose  to  express  it,  is  not  at  present  held  with  a  very  firm  grasp 
by  the  existing  Lutheran  church  ;  and  yet  they  will  not  be  forward 
to  renounce  a  dogma  to  which  Luther  clung  with  invincible  perti- 
nacity, and  which  was  originally  the  only  point  of  distinction  be- 
tween the  followers  of  the  German  and  Swiss  reformer.  The 
doctrine  of  the  ubiquity,  or  omnipresence  of  Christ's  body,  seems 
to  follow  as  certainly  from  the  Roman  Catholic  as  the  Lutheran 
doctrine  ;  but,  as  far  as  we  know,  this  consequence  has  never  been 
admitted  by  Popish  writers ;  they  have  even  impugned  with  se- 
verity the  absurd  doctrine  of  ubiquity.  They  resort  to  another 
principle  of  explanation,  which  is,  that  Christ  by  his  divine  power 
can  render  his  body  present  whenever  and  wherever  the  eucharist 
is  celebrated  ;  but,  while  they  shun  one  absurdity,  they  fall  into 
another  fully  as  incredible.  For  though  they  do  not  believe  in  the 
omnipresence  of  the  body  of  Christ,  yet  they  are  forced  to  admit 


TEANSUBSTANTIATION.  461 

that  it  may  exist  in  many  different  and  distant  places  at  one  and 
the  same  time.  It  exists  in  heaven  and  upon  earth  at  once,  and  in 
as  many  places  on  earth  as  the  mass  is  celebrated.  It  becomes 
necessary,  therefore,  for  them  as  well  as  the  Lutherans  to  resort  to 
subtle  and  abstruse  definitions  and  distinctions,  in  regard  to  matter 
and  space,  to  free  their  doctrine  from  absurdity ;  and  just  so  far  as 
they  succeed  in  clearing  away  the  difficulties  from  the  subject,  it 
is  by  removing  the  idea  of  the  palpable  presence  of  solid  resisting 
matter,  and  giving  such  views  as  render  it  difficult  to  understand 
what  they  mean  by  bodily  presence  ;  or  to  see  how  it  differs  from 
the  real,  spiritual  presence  maintained  by  Calvin  and  his  followers. 

The  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  absurd  as  it  is,  is  not  in  itself 
so  dangerous  and  impious  as  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass  which  natu- 
rally comes  out  of  it.  The  inference  is  fairly  deduced  that  if  the 
bread  and  wine,  after  consecration,  be  the  real  body  and  blood 
of  Christ ;  and  if  his  soul  and  divinity,  as  they  teach,  be  also  pre- 
sent in  these  elements  ;  then  are  they  proper  objects  of  worship. 
Accordingly,  they  are  elevated  in  imitation  of  Christ's  being  lifted 
up  on  the  cross,  and  they  are  carried  in  procession  that  all  the 
people  may  worship  them.  But  if  this  be  the  real  body  of  Christ, 
broken  for  us,  then  as  often  as  it  is  created  it  may  be  offered  as  an 
expiatory  sacrifice  to  God  for  the  living  and  the  dead ;  and  as  this 
oblation  of  Christ  is  the  most  important  part  of  the  whole  transac- 
tion, it  is  often  repeated  when  there  is  no  participation  of  the  con- 
secrated elements  by  the  people  ;  and  thus  private  masses  are 
encouraged  and  performed,  especially  for  the  relief  of  those  who 
are  supposed  to  be  suffering  the  pains  of  purgatory. 

That  we  may  exhibit  fairly  this  doctrine  of  the  mass,  we  will 
give  some  account  of  it  from  works  of  acknowledged  authority 
among  the  Romanists.  Dr.  Challoner,  in  his  Catholic  Christian 
Instructed,  p.  74,  c.  vi.,  asks  : 

"  What  do  you  mean  by  the  mass  ?"  and  among  other  things  answers,  "  The 
mass  consists  in  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and  wine  into  the  body  and  blood 
of  Christ,  and  the  offering  up  of  the  same  body  and  blood  to  God  by  the  ministry 
of  the  priests,  for  a  perpetual  memorial  of  Christ's  sacrifice  upon  the  cross,  and 
a  continuation  of  the  same  to  the  end  of  the  world. 

"Is  the  mass  properly  a  sacrifice  ?     Yes,  it  is. 

"  What  do  you  mean  by  a  sacrifice  ?  A  sacrifice,  properly  so  called,  is  an 
oblation  or  offering  of  some  sensible  thing,  made  to  God  by  a  lawful  minister. 

"  How  then  is  the  mass  a  sacrifice  ?  Because  it  is  an  oblation  of  the  body  and 
blood  of  Jesus  Christ,  offered,  under  the  outward  and  sensible  signs  of  bread  and 
wine,  to  God,  by  the  ministry  of  the  priests  of  the  church,  lawfully  consecrated 
and  empowered  by  Christ ;  and  this  oblation  is  accompanied  with  a  real  change 
and  destruction  of  the  bread  and  wine,  by  the  conversion  of  them  into  the  body 
and  blood  of  Christie. 

"  Is  the  sacrifice  of  the  cross  and  that  of  the  eucharist  the  same  sacrifice,  or 
two  distinct  sacrifices  ? 

"  It  is  the  same  sacrifice  :  because  the  victim  is  the  self-same  Jesus  Christ ;  it 
was  He  that  offered  himself  upon  the  cross ;  it  is  He  that  offers  himself  upon  the 
altar.  The  only  difference  is  in  the  manner  of  the  offering ;  because,  in  the  sa- 
crifice of  the  cross,  Christ  really  died,  and  therefore  that  was  a  bloody  sacrifice  ; 


462  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

in  the  sacrifice  of  the  altar  he  only  dies  mystically,  inasmuch  as  his  death  is  re- 
presented in  the  consecrating  apart  the  bread  and  wine,  to  denote  the  shedding  of 
his  sacred  blood  from  his  body,  at  the  time  of  his  death." 

Now  this  whole  doctrine  of  the  mass  is  without  the  slightest 
evidence  from  the  New  Testament.  There  is,  in  fact,  under  this 
dispensation  no  other  priest  but  Christ:  no  other  is  ever  men- 
tioned ;  and  the  ministers,  teachers,  and  governors  of  the  church 
are  not  invested  with  any  sacerdotal  office. 

This  notion  of  a  repeated  oblation  of  the  body  and  blood  of 
Christ  is  not  only  unauthorized  by  scripture,  but  is  in  direct  vio- 
lation of  what  Paul  testifies  in  the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  "  For 
by  one  offering  he  hath  perfected  for  ever  them  that  are  sanctified." 
"  Nor  yet  that  he  should  offer  himself  often,  as  the  high-priest 
entereth  into  the  holy  place  every  year  with  blood  of  others ;  for 
then  must  he  often  have  suffered  since  the  foundation  of  the  world  ; 
but  now  once  in  the  end  of  the  world,  hath  he  appeared  to  put 
away  sin  by  the  sacrifice  of  himself."  "  Who  needeth  not  daily, 
as  those  high  priests  to  offer  up  sacrifice,  first  for  his  own  sins,  and 
then  for  the  people's  ;  for  this  he  did  once,  when  he  offered  up  him- 
self." "  So  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many." 
"  By  the  which  will  we  are  sanctified,  through  the  offering  of  the 
body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  all." 

Now  what  Dr.  Challoner  says,  in  answer  to  the  arguments  of 
such  texts,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose.  He  alleges  that  Christ's  of- 
fering on  the  cross  is  not  injured  by  his  prayers  and  intercessions 
continually  offered  up ;  which  is  true,  but  wide  of  the  mark.  It 
furnishes  no  proof  that  there  was  need  for  his  body  and  blood  to 
be  offered  up  often.  Again :  he  says,  "  Though  the  price  of  our 
redemption  was  to  be  paid  but  once,  yet  the  fruit  of  it  was  to  be 
daily  applied  to  our  souls,  by  those  means  of  grace  which  Christ 
has  left  in  his  church,  that  is,  by  his  sacraments  and  sacrifice." 
All  this  is  very  correct,  except  the  last  word,  which  stands  directly 
opposed  to  all  Paul's  declarations,  that  the  offering  of  Christ  was 
made  but  once.  The  application  of  the  merits  of  Christ's  sacri- 
fice does  not  require  that  it  should  be  continually  renewed.  This 
renders  his  sacrifice  on  the  cross  insufficient,  like  the  sacrifice  of 
the  priests  under  the  Levitical  law ;  for  if  the  one  sacrifice  was 
complete  and  satisfactory,  why  repeat  the  oblation  continually  ? 
He  speaks  of  this,  as  an  "  unbloody  sacrifice  ;"  but  how  is  it  un- 
bloody, when  the  real  blood  of  Christ  is  on  the  altar,  as  much  as  it 
was  on  the  cross  ?  This  doctrine  of  the  mass  is,  therefore,  unscrip- 
tural,  and  highly  derogatory  to  the  one  sacrifice  of  Christ ;  be- 
sides which  the  scriptures  of  the  New  Testament  acknowledge  no 
other ;  for  if  other  expiatory  oblations  are  requisite,  call  them 
bloody  or  unbloody,  then  was  this  offering  of  Christ  imperfect. 
All  that  this  author  says  in  favour  of  such  a  repetition  of  the  sacri- 
fice of  Christ  is  irrelevant ;  and,  if  admitted,  does  not  prove  the 

ruth  of  the  doctrine  which  he  maintains, 
t 


m 

TKANSUBSTANTIATION.  463 

The  doctrine  of  the  mass,  as  laid  down  in  the  Catechism  under 
review,  is, 

"  That  the  holy  sacrifice  of  the  mass  is  not  only  a  sacrifice  of  praise  and 
thanksgiving,  or  a  commemoration  of  the  sacrifice  of  the  cross  ;  but  also  a  sacri- 
fice of  propitiation,  by  which  God  is  appeased  and  rendered  propitious." 
u  If,  therefore,  with  pure  hearts  and  a  lively  faith,  and  with  a  sincere  sor- 
row for  past  transgressions,  we  offer  in  sacrifice  this  most  holy  victim,  we  shall, 
no  doubt,  receive  from  the  Lord,  '  mercy  and  grace'  in  seasonable  aid.  So  ac- 
ceptable to  God  is  the  sweet  odour  of  this  sacrifice,  that  through  its  oblation  he 
pardons  our  sins,  bestowing  on  us  the  gifts  of  grace  and  repentance."  "  Its  bene- 
fits extend  not  only  to  the  communicant,  but  also  to  all  the  faithful,  whether  liv- 
ing or  numbered  among  those  who  have  died  in  the  Lord." 

Transubstantiation  is  not  merely  chargeable  with  bringing 
Christianity  into  disgrace  by  its  palpable  absurdities,  but  has  given 
rise  to  gross  idolatry.  No  sooner  has  the  officiating  priest  pro- 
nounced the  words  of  consecration  over  the  bread,  than  it  be- 
comes, as  the  body  of  Christ,  an  object  of  worship,  just  as  truly 
as  if  Christ  should  descend  from  heaven  and  appear  before  us  in 
all  the  glory  of  his  exaltation.  But  here  we  are  met  by  a  perplex- 
ing difficulty,  which  no  ingenuity  can  resolve.  It  is  admitted  that 
no  change  takes  place  in  the  bread  unless  the  priest  consecrates 
with  a  right  intention,  and  unless  he  is  a  regularly  ordained  minis- 
ter. Before  the  people  worship  the  host,  as  it  is  called,  there  should 
be  some  method  of  ascertaining  whether  indeed  the  bread  had 
been  actually  converted  into  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ ;  for  if, 
on  either  of  the  accounts  mentioned,  the  transubstantiation  should 
not  have  taken  place,  they  are  offering  their  supreme  worship  to  a 
piece  of  bread.  As  we  cannoi  know  the  hearts  of  priests,  and  as 
we  cannot  tell  there  may  not  have  been  some  canonical  defect  in 
their  succession  or  inordination,  we  never,  in  any  case,  can  be  sure 
that  we  are  not  guilty  of  idolatry.  Nothing  can  be  learned  from 
an  examination  of  the  elements ;  for  these  remain  the  same,  so  far 
as  our  senses  can  judge,  whether  the  miraculous  conversion  takes 
place  or  not.  The  wafer,  as  soon  as  consecrated,  becomes  a  pro- 
per object  of  worship;  and,  as  has  been  before  mentioned,  is 
carried  about  with  much  pomp  and  ceremony,  elevated  on  high, 
that  all  the  people  may  get  a  sight  of  it,  and  join  in  the  worship ; 
and,  in  countries  completely  under  Popish  dominion,  all  are  forced 
to  kneel  down  in  token  of  adoration,  as  the  pageant  passes. 

Moreover,  the  consecrated  wafer,  whether  used  or  not,  is  the 
real  body  of  Christ,  and  may  be  laid  up  in  a  pyxis  or  box,  to  be 
adored,  or  to  be  eaten,  as  the  case  may  be.  Now  suppose  it  should 
become  mouldy,  or  should  be  devoured  by  mice,  or  worms,  what 
are  we  to  think  ?  Or  suppose  before  consecration  arsenic  should 
accidentally,  or  by  design,  be  mixed  with  the  flour  of  which  the 
bread  is  made,  and  should  be  consecrated  as  a  constituent  part  of 
the  bread,  does  that  also  become  a  part  of  the  body  of  our  Lord? 
Or  would  this  bread,  after  being  changed  into  the  flesh  and  blood 
of  the  Lord  Jesus,  affect  the  health  of  the  communicant?  If  it  be 
said,  that  the  accidents  or  sensible  qualities  do  not  belong  to  the 


464  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

body  of  Christ,  then  is  there  no  use  in  eating  the  bread  or  drinking 
the  wine  ;  for  in  the  process  of  manducation  or  digestion,  nothing 
else  but  these  accidents  or  sensible  qualities  comes  at  all  in  contact 
with  the  body.  We  cannot  feel,  or  taste,  or  chew,  or  swallow,  that 
which  has  no  solidity,  no  taste,  no  material  quality  whatever.  If 
then  these  sensible  properties  are  not  the  properties  of  the  body 
of  Christ,  then  the  communicant  cannot  be  said  to  eat  his  flesh  and 
drink  his  blood ;  for  that  which  he  sees  is  no  visible  part  of  the 
body  of  Christ,  that  which  he  feels  is  no  palpable  part  of  that  body  ; 
so,  likewise,  that  which  he  tastes  and  smells  is  not  Christ's  body : 
for  these  sensible  qualities  exist  without  any  subject.  But  as  eat- 
ing and  drinking  are  corporeal  acts,  they  can  only  be  exercised  on 
that  which  has  material  qualities  ;  that  is,  the  food  which  is  eaten 
must  have  some  solidity  or  extension,  for  if  these  accidents  are 
taken  away  from  a  substance,  it  can  no  more  be  eaten  than  an  im- 
material spirit  can  be  eaten.  Upon  the  admitted  theory  of  the 
Roman  Catholic,  Christ's  body,  after  all,  is  not  eaten ;  but  only 
those  properties,  which,  though  real,  have  no  subsistence.  In  fact, 
the  partaker  of  the  eucharist,  according  to  the  hypothesis  of  Ro- 
manists, cannot  be  said  to  eat  the  bread  or  the  body  of  Christ ;  for 
he  cannot  properly  be  said  to  eat  mere  accidents  or  qualities,  with- 
out a  substance  ;  nor  is  it  possible  to  conceive  that  a  body  which 
has  no  material  qualities  can  be  eaten. 

Mr.  M'Gavin,  in  his  "  Protestant,"  tells  a  pleasant,  and  not  inap- 
propriate story. 

"  A  Protestant  lady  entered  the  matrimonial  state  with  a  Ro- 
man Catholic  gentleman,  on  condition  he  should  never  use  any  at- 
tempts to  induce  her  to  embrace  his  religion.  He  employed  the 
Romish  priest,  however,  who  often  visited  the  family,  to  use  his  in- 
fluence to  instil  his  notions  into  her  mind  ;  but  she  remained  un- 
moved, particularly  on  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation.  At 
length  the  husband  fell  ill,  and  during  his  affliction  was  recom- 
mended by  the  priest  to  receive  the  holy  sacrament.  The  wife 
was  requested  to  prepare  the  bread  and  wine  for  the  solemnity  ; 
she  did  so,  and  on  presenting  them  to  the  priest,  said,  '  This,  sir, 
you  wish  me  to  understand,  will  be  changed  into  the  real  body  and 
blood  of  Christ,  after  you  have  consecrated  them.'  '  Most  certain- 
ly,' he  replied.  '  Then,  sir,'  she  rejoined,  'it  will  not  be  possible 
for  them  to  do  any  harm  to  the  worthy  partakers  ;  for,  says  our 
Lord,  "  my  flesh  is  meat  indeed  and  my  blood  is  drink  indeed," 
and,  "  he  that  eateth  me  shall  live  by  me.'"  '  Assuredly,'  answered 
the  priest,  •  they  can  do  no  harm  to  the  worthy  receivers,  but  must 
communicate  good.'  The  ceremony  was  proceeded  in,  and  the 
bread  and  wine  were  consecrated  ;  the  priest  was  about  to  take 
and  eat  the  bread ;  but  the  lady  begged  pardon  for  interrupting 
him  and  said, '  I  mixed  a  little  arsenic  with  the  bread,  sir,  but  as  it 
is  now  changed  into  the  real  body  of  Christ,  it  cannot  of  course  do 
you  any  harm.'  The  faith  of  the  priest  was  not  strong  enough  to 
induce  him  to  eat  it.     Confused,  ashamed,  and  irritated,  he  left  the 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION.  465 

house,  and  never  more  ventured  to  enforce  on  the  lady  the  absurd 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation.'  Whether  this  anecdote  be  literally 
true,"  says  Mr.  M'Gavin,  "  is  of  little  importance  to  the  "argument. 
It  may  be  said  very  fairly  to  put  any  Papist  to  the  test  as  to  his 
belief  of  transubstantiation.  If  the  priest's  pronouncing  the  words 
of  consecration  should  have  the  power  of  expelling  the  arsenic,  as 
well  as  the  flour  and  water,  from  the  consecrated  wafer,  I  will  ac- 
knowledge a  miracle." 

We  presume  that  the  advocates  of  transubstantiation  would  say, 
in  reply  to  the  above,  that  notwithstanding  that  the  substance  of 
the  bread  is  changed  into  the  real  body  of  Christ,  the  accidents  or 
sensible  properties  remain  precisely  what  they  were  before  con- 
secration ;  and,  therefore,  the  wafer  not  only  retains  the  appear- 
ance, smell,  and  taste  of  bread,  but  also  the  nourishing  qualities  of 
wheaten  bread.  And  so  of  the  wine ;  no  one,  we  presume,  would 
pretend  that  a  large  quantity  of  strong  wine,  after  consecration, 
would  not  intoxicate.  Its  being  mixed  with  water,  is  doubtless  in- 
tended to  guard  against  any  effect  of  this  kind.  And  so  they  would  ad- 
mit, we  suppose,  that  arsenic  in  the  wafer  would  retain  its  poisonous 
quality  ;  and,  therefore,  if  a  priest,  or  any  other  communicant, 
should  be  actually  deprived  of  life  by  such  a  wafer,  it  would  not 
prove  that  the  substance  is  not  converted  into  the  body  of  Christ. 
We  do  not  know  how  else  this  case  could  be  disposed  of.  But 
still  the  explanation  does  not  remove  the  difficulty.  We  would 
like  to  see  a  logical  answer  to  the  following  plain  syllogism  : 

That  which  has  no  substance  cannot  injure  any  one  : 
But  the  transubstantiated  bread  has  no  substance  as  bread, 
Therefore,  the  bread  when  consecrated,  though  filled  with  arsenic,  cannot 
hurt  any  one. 

Or  the  following, 

Mere  accidents  or  properties  which  have  no  substance,  cannot  operate 

efficiently  on  the  body, 
But  the  sensible  qualities  of  the  bread,  after  consecration,  exist  without  any 

subject.        Ergo. 

Now  the  only  possible  escape  from  this  conclusion  must  be  by 
denying  that  these  accidents  of  bread  and  wine  can  affect  the  body, 
which  they  will  not  assert ;  or  that  that  which  has  no  existence  as 
a  body,  can,  nevertheless,  operate  as  a  body,  and  produce  effects 
on  the  body  to  nourish,  to  intoxicate,  or  to  pain.  Let  the  Romanist 
extricate  himself  if  he  can  from  this  dilemma.  To  us  it  appears 
impossible.  And  this  comes  of  holding  that  accidents  may  exist 
without  a  subject. 

Now,  after  an  impartial  view  of  all  the  difficulties  and  absurdi- 
ties which  cluster  round  this  strange  doctrine,  we  cannot  but  won- 
der that  multitudes  should  be  found  to  hold  to  it,  or  think  that  they 
believe  it ;  for  we  are  fully  persuaded,  that  in  most  cases  the  true 
nature  of  the  proposition  to  be  believed  is  not  brought  distinctly 

30 


466  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

before  the  mind.  The  imagination,  under  the  influence  of  su- 
perstitious dread,  overpowers  the  dictates  of  reason,  and,  in- 
deed, all  nice  scrutiny  into  the  subject  is  discouraged  and  for- 
bidden; and  even  the  priests  are  cautioned  against  attempts  at 
explanation.  The  language  of  the  Catechism  under  review  is,  "  to 
explain  this  mystery  in  a  proper  manner  is  extremely  difficult. 
On  the  manner  of  this  admirable  conversion,  the  pastor,  however, 
will  endeavour  to  instruct  those  who  are  more  advanced  in  the 
knowledge  and  contemplation  of  divine  things  :  those  who  are  yet 
weak  may,  it  were  to  be  apprehended,  be  overwhelmed  by  its 
greatness.  This  conversion  is  so  effectuated,  that  the  whole  sub- 
stance of  the  bread  and  wine  is  changed  by  the  power  of  God,  into 
the  whole  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ,  and  this  without  any 
change  in  our  Lord  himself."  No  wonder  that  apprehensions 
should  be  entertained  that  such  a  doctrine  might  overwhelm  the 
mind  of  the  noviciate.  Bread  and  wine  are  changed  into  the  real 
body  of  Christ,  and  yet  his  body  undergoes  no  change  whatever  ! 
Again  :  f  But  according  to  the  admonition  so  frequently  repeated 
by  the  Holy  Fathers,  the  faithful  are  to  be  admonished  against  the 
danger  of  gratifying  a  prurient  curiosity,  by  searching  into  the 
manner  in  which  this  change  is  effected.  It  mocks  the  power  of 
conception,  nor  can  we  find  any  example  of  it  in  natural  transmu- 
tations, nor  even  in  the  wide  range  of  creation.  The  change  itself 
is  the  object,  not  of  our  comprehension,  but  of  our  humble  faith  ; 
and  the  manner  of  the  change  forbids  the  temerity  of  a  too  curious 
inquiry.  The  same  salutary  caution  should  be  observed  by  the 
pastor,  with  regard  to  the  mysterious  manner  in  which  the  body  of 
our  Lord  is  contained  whole  and  entire  under  every  particle  of  the 
bread.  Such  inscrutable  mysteries  should  scarcely  ever  become 
matter  of  disquisition."  (Pp.  215,  216.)  No  wonder  that  they 
discourage  all  disquisition  on  such  a  subject.  The  last  sentence 
quoted  sets  all  reason  and  common  sense  at  defiance.  Suppose  a 
loaf  of  bread  to  be  consecrated  ;  and  we  know  that  such  a  loaf  is 
capable  of  a  continued  division  until  the  parts  become  too  small  for 
the  cognizance  of  our  senses,  and  too  numerous  for  arithmetical 
notation,  then  what  is  it  that  the  Romanist  believes  ?  That  every 
one  of  these  particles  is  the  whole  body  of  Jesus  Christ !  On  the 
absurdity  of  thus  multiplying  the  body  of  Christ,  we  have  remark- 
ed before ;  we  now  bring  up  the  subject  to  show  the  folly  of  in- 
sisting on  a  literal  interpretation  of  the  words  of  Christ,  when 
every  difficulty  is  avoided  by  interpreting  them  figuratively  ;  for 
which  we  have  hundreds  of  analogous  cases  in  the  holy  scriptures, 
which  abound  in  bold  and  striking  figures,  which,  if  they  should  all 
be  taken  literally,  would  turn  the  Bible  into  a  jargon  of  nonsense  ; 
and  we  have  shown  that,  in  this  very  passage,  we  are  forced  to 
adopt  this  mode  of  interpretation. 

And  after  all,  what  is  the  benefit  expected  from  this  doctrine  ? 
Material  flesh  and  blood  cannot  affect  the  soul ;  but  truly,  accord- 
ing to  the  hypothesis  of  the  Romanists,  it  is  only  the  essence  or 


* 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION.  467 

hidden  substance  of  Christ's  body  which  is  present ;  the  gross  sen- 
sible qualities  of  flesh  and  blood  are  not  there  ;  now  in  what  re- 
spect does  such  a  presence  of  the  body  differ  from  a  spiritual  pre- 
sence ;  and  such  an  eating  of  the  body  from  a  spiritual  eating  ? 
And  as  to  the  daily  mass  or  oblation,  it  can  do  no  good — the  sa- 
crifice of  Christ  once  offered  on  the  cross,  is  ever  before  the  throne, 
and  needs  no  new  oblation.  All  we  need  is,  that  the  exalted  Sa- 
viour and  Prince  of  life  should,  on  the  ground  of  it,  intercede  for 
us ;  and  that  we  should  exercise  a  lively  faith  in  the  efficacy  of  his 
atonement,  to  aid  us  in  which  the  eucharist  is  an  appointed  and 
powerful  means. 

Almost  the  only  reply  to  which  Romanists  resort  in  their  at- 
tempt to  obviate  the  objections  which  Protestants  make  to  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  is  to  adduce  the  doctrines  of  the 
Trinity  and  incarnation,  as  equally  contrary  to  our  reason,  and 
equally  incomprehensible.  But  truly  there  is  scarcely  any  analogy 
between  the  cases.  There  are,  in  these  doctrines  of  scripture,  we 
acknowledge,  high  mysteries,  which  greatly  transcend  our  powers 
of  comprehension  ;  but  there  is  nothing  which  contradicts  our 
senses,  or  is  repugnant  to  the  plain  dictates  of  reason,  If  this 
could  be  proved,  which  we  are  aware  has  often  been  attempted  by 
rationalists,  we  should  feel  constrained  to  give  up  these  doctrines 
as  untenable  ;  or  rather  to  give  up  the  scriptures  in  which  they  are 
so  plainly  revealed.  But  as  Archbishop  Tillotson  has  handled  this 
subject  very  perspicuously,  we  beg  leave  here  to  conclude  this  re- 
view, by  citing  a  few  passages  from  his  discourse  "  concerning  the 
unity  of  the  divine  nature." 

"  Before  I  leave  this  argument,  I  cannot  but  take  notice  of  one  thing  which 
they  of  the  church  of  Rome  are  perpetually  objecting  to  us  upon  this  occasion. 
And  it  is  this,  that  by  the  same  reason  that  we  believe  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity, 
we  may  and  must  receive  that  of  transubstantiation.  God  forbid  :  because  of  all 
the  doctrines  that  ever  were  in  any  religion,  this  of  transubstantiation  is  certainly 
the  most  abominably  absurd. 

"  However,  this  objection  plainly  shows  how  fondly  and  obstinately  they  are 
addicted  to  their  own  errors,  how  misshapen  and  monstrous  soever ;  insomuch, 
that  rather  than  the  dictates  of  their  church,  how  absurd  soever,  should  be  called 
in  question,  they  will  question  the  truth  even  of  Christianity  itself;  and  if  we  will 
not  take  in  transubstantiation,  and  admit  it  to  be  a  necessary  article  of  the  Chris- 
tian faith,  they  grow  so  sullen  and  desperate  that  they  matter  not  what  becomes 
of  all  the  rest.  And  rather  than  not  have  their  will  of  us  in  that  which  is  contro- 
verted, they  will  give  us  that  which  by  their  own  confession  is  an  undoubted  ar- 
ticle of  the  Christian  faith,  and  not  controverted  on  either  side  ;  except  only  by 
the  Socinians,  who  yet  are  hearty  enemies  to  transubstantiation,  and  have  ex- 
posed the  absurdity  of  it  with  great  advantage. 

"  But  I  shall  endeavour  to  return  a  more  particular  answer  to  this  objection, 
and  such  a  one  as  I  hope  will  satisfy  every  considerate  and  unprejudiced  mind, 
that  after  all  this  confidence  and  swaggering  of  theirs,  there  is  by  no  means  equal 
reason  either  for  the  receiving  or  for  tne  rejecting  of  these  two  doctrines  of  the 
trinity  and  transubstantiation. 

"  1st.  There  is  not  equal  reason  for  the  belief  of  these  two  doctrines.  This 
objection,  if  it  be  of  any  force,  must  suppose  that  there  is  equal  evidence  and 
proof  from  scripture  for  these  two  doctrines.     But  this  we  utterly  deny,  and  with. 


468  TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 

great  reason ;  because  it  is  no  more  evident  from  the  words  of  scripture,  that  the 
sacramental  bread  is  substantially  changed  into  Christ's  natural  body  by  virtue  of 
those  words,  '  This  is  my  body?  than  it  is,  that  Christ  is  substantially  changed 
into  a  natural  vine  by  virtue  of  those  words,  J  am  the  true  vine,  John  xv.  1  ;  or 
than  the  rock  in  the  wilderness,  of  which  the  Israelites  drank,  was  substantially 
changed  into  the  person  of  Christ,  because  it  is  expressly  said,  '  that  rock  was 
Christ ;'  or  than  that  the  Christian  church  is  substantially  changed  into  the  na- 
tural body  of  Christ,  because  it  is  in  express  terms  said  of  the  church  that  it  is 
his  body.— Eph.  i.  23. 

"But  besides  this,  several  of  their  most  learned  writers  have  freely  acknow- 
ledged that  transubstantiation  can  neither  be  directly  proved,  nor  necessarily  con- 
cluded from  scripture.  But  this  the  writers  of  the  Christian  church  did  never  ac- 
knowledge concerning  the  trinity,  and  the  divinity  of  Christ ;  but  have  always 
appealed  to  the  clear  and  undeniable  testimonies  of  scripture  for  the  proof  of  these 
doctrines.  And  then  the  whole  force  of  the  objection  amounts  to  this,  that  if  I 
am  bound  to  believe  what  I  am  sure  God  says,  though  I  cannot  comprehend  it ; 
then  I  am  bound  by  the  same  reason  to  believe  the  greatest  absurdity  in  the 
world,  though  I  have  no  manner  of  assurance  of  any  divine  revelation  concerning 
it.  And  if  this  be  their  meaning,  though  we  understand  not  transubstantiation, 
yet  we  very  well  understand  what  they  would  have,  but  cannot  grant  it ;  because 
there  is  not  equal  reason  to  believe  two  things,  for  one  of  which  there  is  good 
proof,  and  for  the  other  no  proof  at  all. 

"  2d.  Neither  is  there  equal  reason  for  the  rejecting  of  these  two  doctrines. 
This  the  objection  supposes,  which  yet  cannot  be  supposed  but  upon  one  or  both 
of  these  two  grounds  :  Either  because  these  two  doctrines  are  equally  incompre- 
hensible, or  because  they  are  equally  loaded  with  absurdities  and  contradictions. 

"  The  first  is  no  good  ground  of  rejecting  any  doctrine,  merely  because  it  is  in- 
comprehensible, as  I  have  abundantly  showed  already.  But  besides  this,  there  is 
a  wide  difference  between  plain  matters  of  sense,  and  mysteries  concerning  God  ; 
and  it  does  by  no  means  follow,  that,  if  a  man  do  once  deny  anything  concerning  God 
which  he  cannot  comprehend,  he  hath  no  reason  afterwards  to  believe  what  he 
himself  sees.  This  is  a  most  unreasonable  and  destructive  way  of  arguing,  be- 
cause it  strikes  at  the  foundation  of  all  certainty,  and  sets  every  man  at  liberty  to 
deny  the  most  plain  and  evident  truths  of  Christianity,  if  he  may  not  be  humoured 
in  having  the  absurdest  things  in  the  world  admitted  for  true.  The  next  step 
will  be  to  persuade  us,  that  we  may  as  well  deny  the  being  of  God  because  his 
nature  is  incomprehensible  by  our  reason,  as  deny  transubstantiation  because  it 
evidently  contradicts  our  senses. 

"  2d.  Nor  are  these  two  doctrines  loaded  with  the  like  absurdities  and  contra- 
dictions :  so  far  from  this,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  as  it  is  delivered  in  the 
scriptures,  and  hath  already  been  explained,  hath  no  absurdity  or  contradiction 
either  involved  in  it,  or  necessarily  consequent  upon  it.  But  the  doctrine  of  tran- 
substantiation is  big  with  all  imaginable  absurdity  and  contradiction.  And  their 
own  schoolmen  have  sufficiently  exposed  it ;  especially  Scotus,  and  he  designed 
to  do  so,  as  any  man  that  attentively  reads  him  may  plainly  discover  :  for  in  his 
disputation  about  it,  he  treats  this  doctrine  with  the  greatest  contempt,  as  a  new 
invention  of  the  Council  of  Lateran  under  Pope  Innocent  III.  To  the  decree  of 
which  council  concerning  it,  he  seems  to  pay  a  formal  submission,  but  really  de- 
rides it  as  contrary  to  the  common  sense  and  reason  of  mankind,  and  not  at  all 
supported  by  scripture ;  as  any  one  may  easily  discern  that  will  carefully  consi- 
der his  manner  of  handling  it,  and  the  result  of  his  whole  disputation  about  it. 

"  And  now  suppose  there  were  some  appearance  of  absurdity  and  contradic- 
tion in  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  as  it  is  delivered  in  scripture,  must  we  therefore 
believe  a  docfrine  which  is  not  at  all  revealed  in  scripture,  and  which  hath  cer- 
tainly in  it  all  the  absurdities  in  the  world,  and  all  the  contradictions  to  sense  and 
reason  ;  and  which  once  admitted,  doth  at  once  destroy  all  certainty  ?  Yes,  say 
they,  why  not  ?  since  we  of  the  church  of  Rome  are  satisfied  that  this  doctrine  is 
revealed  in  scripture  ;  or  if  it  be  not,  is  defined  by  the  church,  which  is  every 
whit  as  good.    But  is  this  equal,  to  demand  of  us  the  belief  of  a  thing  which  hath 


TRANSUBSTANTIATION.  469 

always  been  controverted,  not  only  between  us  and  them,  but  even  among  them- 
selves, at  least  till  the  Council  of  Trent  ?  And  this  upon  such  unreasonable 
terms,  that  we  must  either  yield  this  point  to  them  or  else  renounce  a  doctrine 
agreed  on  both  sides  to  be  revealed  in  scripture. 

"  To  show  the  unreasonableness  of  this  proceeding,  let  us  suppose  a  priest  of 
the  church  of  Rome  pressing  a  Jew  or  Turk  to  the  belief  of  transubstantiation, 
and  because  one  kindness  deserves  another,  the  Jew  or  Turk  should  demand  of 
him  the  belief  of  all  the  fables  in  the  Talmud,  or  in  the  Alcoran ;  since  none  of 
these,  nor  indeed  all  of  them  together,  are  near  so  absurd  as  transubstantiation  : 
Would  not  this  be  much  more  reasonable  and  equal  than  what  they  demand  of 
us  ?  Since  no  absurdity,  how  monstrous  and  big  soever,  can  be  thought  of, 
which  may  not  enter  into  an  understanding  in  which  a  breach  hath  been  already 
made,  wide  enough  to  admit  transubstantiation.  The  priests  of  Baal  did  not  half 
so  much  deserve  to  be  exposed  by  the  prophet  for  their  superstition  and  folly,  as 
the  priests  of  the  church  of  Rome  do  for  this  senseless  and  stupid  doctrine  of 
theirs  with  a  hard  name.  I  shall  only  add  this  one  thing  more,  that  if  this  doc- 
trine were  possible  to  be  true,  and  clearly  proved  to  be  so,  yet  it  would  be  evi- 
dently useless  and  to  no  purpose.  For  it  pretends  to  change  the  substance  of  one 
thing  into  the  substance  of  another  thing  that  is  already,  and  before  this  change 
is  pretended  to  be  made.  But  to  what  purpose  ?  Not  to  make  the  body  of 
Christ,  for  that  was  already  in  being,  and  the  substance  of  the  bread  is  lost,  no- 
thing of  it  remaineth  but  accidents,  which  are  good  for  nothing,  and  indeed  are  no- 
thing when  the  substance  is  destroyed." 


ESSAY    XIX. 

SUNDAY    MAILS.* 


We  have  frequently  been  struck,  in  reading  the  numbers  of  the 
National  Gazette,  with  the  justness  and  weight  of  its  editorial  re- 
marks on  the  responsibility  of  the  conductors  of  the  periodical 
press.  And  we  have  often  sympathized  with  its  accomplished  edi- 
tor, on  observing  the  severity  with  which  he  has  been  treated  by 
party  prints,  for  endeavouring  to  conduct  a  paper  on  national 
principles,  abstaining  equally  from  indiscriminate  commendation 
and  abuse.  We  readily  yield  the  tribute  which  is  due  to  him, 
for  the  elevated  stand  which  he  has  proposed  to  himself,  and  think 
that,  as  far  as  politics  are  concerned,  it  has  been  successfully  main- 
tained. As  it  is  universally  understood  that  the  editorial  depart- 
ments of  the  Gazette  and  of  the  American  Quarterly  Review  are 
filled  by  the  same  individual,  we  had  hoped  that  the  modera- 
tion and  fairness  which  mark  the  political  character  of  the  former, 
would  also  have  been  impressed  on  the  pages  of  the  latter.  We 
entertained  this  hope  with  the  greater  confidence,  from  the  convic- 
tion that  the  editor  had  too  much  discernment  not  to  be  aware  that 
a  responsibility  peculiarly  serious  rests  upon  the  individual  who 
undertakes  to  conduct  an  American  Review,  which  aspires,  in  its 
measure,  at  once  to  form  and  represent  American  sentiments  and 
opinions.  In  despite  of  our  sectional  partialities,  we  are  constrain- 
ed to  admit,  that  in  respect  to  candour  and  fairness,  whenever  re- 
ligion has  been  concerned,  it  has  fallen  far  below  its  great  eastern 
compeer.  In  the  very  first  number  of  the  work  there  was  an  ar- 
ticle, which,  from  the  levity  and  injustice  with  which  the  character 
of  several  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  American  clergy  was 
treated,  we  considered  of  unpropitious  omen.  This,  however,  it 
seems,  was  but  a  premonition  of  the  spirit  afterwards  to  be  exhi- 
bited. We  question  whether  the  pages  of  the  respectable  periodi- 
cal literature  of  this  country  can  furnish  an  instance  of  a  more 
uncandid  assault  on  the  character  and  opinions  of  a  large  part  of 
the  Christian  community,  than  the  recent  article  on  Sunday  Mails 
in  the  American  Quarterly  Review.     We  cannot  but  regard  the 

*  Published  in  1831,  in  reference  to  an  article  on  this  subject  in  the  American 
Quarterly  Review. 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  471 

publication  of  that  piece  as  a  high  offence  against  the  professed 
principles  of  the  work,  and  a  flagrant  breach  of  the  confidence  re- 
posed in  its  conductors.  The  public,  unquestionably,  have  a  right 
to  expect  that  works  of  this  character  should  not  avail  themselves 
of  the  power  lent  to  them  for  other  purposes,  to  disseminate  princi- 
ples which  the  mild  and  venerable  Bishop  White  pronounced  anti- 
christian  in  their  character,  and  licentious  in  their  tendency.  It  is 
no  justification  of  this  course  to  state,  there  is  a  portion  of  pro- 
fessed Christians  who  agree  with  the  leading  doctrine  of  the  article 
in  question  ;  for  the  Review  professes  not  to  be  the  virulent  and 
party  advocate  of  any  set  of  opinions  ;  much  less  does  it  claim  the 
right  of  insulting,  in  behalf  of  an  inconsiderable  minority,  the  faith 
of  nine-tenths  of  the  Christian  community  of  the  country.  The 
public,  indeed,  do  not  presume  to  pry  into  the  private  belief  of  its 
Editor,  nor  of  any  of  its  conductors  ;  but  in  consenting  to  admit 
the  work  into  their  families,  to  operate  on  the  opinions  and  charac- 
ter of  their  children,  they  surely  have  the  right  to  expect  that  it 
should  be  kept  free  from  decidedly  anti-christian  sentiments.  It 
may  well  be  that  some  of  the  contributors  to  that  Review  have  no 
faith  in  Christianity  at  all,  no  regard  for  its  institutions,  nor  respect 
enough  for  its  worship  to  induce  them  to  pass  the  threshold  of  a 
church  once  in  twenty  years.  But  would  such  persons  be  author- 
ized to  avail  themselves  of  the  access  afforded  them,  under  the 
name  and  sanction  of  American  reviewers,  into  hundreds  of  Chris- 
tian families,  to  attack  the  authority  of  our  religion,  or  to  asperse 
its  doctrines  and  institutions  ?  Assuredly  not.  And  yet  they  might 
with  too  much  truth  affirm,  that  many  of  their  readers  coincide 
with  their  views.  Or  were  they  to  appear  as  the  open  advocates 
of  Unitarianism,  the  same  justification  might  be  offered.  In  either 
case,  however,  it  is  acknowledged  that  they  would  violate  their 
contract  with  the  public,  by  appearing  in  a  different  light  from  that 
in  which  their  prospectus  and  general  object  present  them.  We 
are  utterly  at  a  loss  to  discern  how  they  can  justify  themselves  for 
having,  in  the  article  under  review,  assailed  opinions  which  they 
know  to  be  held  sacred  by  a  large  portion  of  the  community.  Let 
it  be  borne  in  mind  that  we  are  not  objecting  to  a  consideration  of 
the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of  carrying  the  mail  on  Sunday ; 
nor  even  to  a  discussion  of  the  grounds  on  which  the  religious  ob- 
servance of  that  day  is  obligatory  on  Christians  ;  but  to  the  avowal 
and  laboured  support  of  the  doctrine  that  the  Sabbath  was  not  ori- 
ginally a  day  devoted  to  the  exercises  of  religion,  and  that  it  is 
now  most  appropriately  kept  by  festivity  and  amusement.  It  is  this 
doctrine  which  we  affirm  is  abhorrent  to  the  feelings  of  nine-tenths 
of  the  serious  part  of  the  public. 

The  reviewer  asserts,  "  that  the  true  construction  of  the  Mosaic 
law  is,  that  it  (the  Sabbath)  should  be  kept  as  a  day  of  festivity  and 
gladness,  and  not  by  gloomy  lectures  and  religious  worship." — P. 
178.  In  reference  to  the  meaning  of  the  phrase,  "  to  keep  it  holy," 
he  says :  "  It  is  asserted,  on  the  other  hand,  that  we  are  command- 


472  SUNDAY   MAILS. 

ed  to  abstain,  not  only  from  labour,  but  from  our  usual  amusements, 
from  festivity,  from  social  intercourse,  such  as  is  allowable  on  every 
other  day,  and  that  we  should  devote  the  Sunday  to  the  solemn 
offices  of  religion,  to  the  worship  of  God,  public  and  private.  We 
deny  that  such  is  the  meaning  of  the  commandment,  but  the  re- 
verse."— P.  180.  "  In  short,"  as  he  quotes  from  some  "  learned  au- 
thor," "  the  Sabbath  was  celebrated,  at  first,  like  other  festivals, 
with  feasting,  dancing,  and  other  holiday  recreations." — P.  182. 

To  our  apprehension,  these  assertions  carry  the  mark  of  absurd- 
ity on  the  very  face  of  them.  They  represent  the  Sabbath  as 
standing  in  a  predicament  occupied  by  no  other  religious  institution 
in  the  world,  ancient  or  modern.  They  exhibit  it  as  being  at  utter 
variance  with  the  whole  system  of  which  it  is  a  part.  The  injunc- 
tions of  every  religion  are  certainly  to  be  understood  in  a  manner 
congruous  to  its  own  nature.  The  festivals  of  the  heathen  were 
thus  in  keeping  with  their  religion.  Those  in  honour  of  Ceres, 
Bacchus,  or  Venus,  were  attended  by  rites  adapted  to  the  charac- 
ter of  the  imaginary  power  to  which  they  were  consecrated.  But 
the  reviewer's  position  requires  us  either  to  suppose  that  the  Sab- 
bath had  nothing  in  common  with  the  system  with  which  it  was  so 
intimately  connected,  or  to  renounce  our  whole  belief  as  to  the  na- 
ture of  that  system.  It  is  so  evident  that  where  a  festival  is  en- 
joined, the  manner  of  its  observance  must  be  adapted  to  the  reli- 
gion to  which  it  belongs,  that  the  very  same  formula  of  words  must 
have  very  different  meanings,  under  different  circumstances.  When 
we  are  told  that  a  day  was  kept  among  the  heathen  as  a  time  of 
joy  and  gladness,  in  honour  of  their  gods,  we  take  it  for  granted 
that  the  nature  of  that  joy,  and  the  mode  of  its  expression,  was  de- 
termined by  the  nature  of  their  mythology.  And  when  in  the 
Bible  we  are  commanded  to  rejoice,  to  sing,  to  make  the  Sabbath 
a  delight,  we  know  just  as  surely  that  the  joy,  singing,  and  delight, 
are  to  be  of  a  spiritual  character,  adapted  to  the  religion  of  the 
Bible.  If  the  Lord's  day  is  to  be  observed,  as  we  shall  show  is  the 
faith  of  the  whole  Christian  world,  in  commemoration  of  the  re- 
surrection of  Christ,  and  of  the  pardon,  purity,  and  eternal  life 
thereby  secured,  it  is  self-evident  that  its  appropriate  celebration  is 
not  by  worldly  singing,  dancing,  and  festivity,  but  by  sincere 
thankfulness  for  these  blessings,  and  joy  adapted  to  their  nature. 
Any  man,  therefore,  who  believes  the  Bible  to  contain  a  revelation 
of  the  true  religion,  and  who  entertains  any  correct  idea  of  what 
religion  is,  must  feel  that  the  reviewer's  assertions  are  in  themselves 
incredible. 

If  the  object  for  which  any  festival  was  instituted,  determines  its 
nature,  and  the  manner  of  its  observance,  then  it  scarcely  needs 
an  argument  to  prove  that  the  Sabbath  is  to  be  religiously  celebrat- 
ed. It  was  instituted  to  keep  in  mind  the  creation  of  the  world. 
The  great  source  of  idolatry  was  ignorance  of  the  origin  of  things. 
To  preserve,  therefore,  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  God  called 
the  universe  into  existence,  and,  as  the  Creator,  was  the  only  proper 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  473 

object  of  worship,  was  the  most  effectual  means  of  preserving  the 
true  religion.  That  this  was  its  object  is  expressly  and  repeatedly 
asserted.  Thus  in  Ex.  xx.  2,  "  Remember  the  Sabbath  day  to 
keep  it  holy  ;  for  in  six  days  the  Lord  made  the  heavens  and  the 
earth,  and  all  that  in  them  is,  and  rested  on  the  seventh  day ;  where- 
fore the  Lord  blessed  the  seventh  day  and  sanctified  it."  This  as- 
suredly means,  that  the  end  for  which  the  day  was  to  be  observed 
was  to  commemorate  this  event.  When  the  Hebrews  were  com- 
manded "  on  the  first  month  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  the  month," 
to  keep  the  Passover,  "  for  in  this  self-same  day  have  I  brought 
your  armies  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt :  therefore  shall  ye  observe 
this  day  in  your  generations  by  an  ordinance  for  ever,"  it  is  evident 
that  the  object  of  the  feast  was  to  keep  in  mind  this  merciful  deliv- 
erance. And  it  is  not  less  evident  that  when  they  were  com- 
manded to  sanctify  the  seventh  day,  because  God  rested  on  that 
day,  it  was  in  commemoration  of  that  event  the  day  was  to  be 
celebrated.  This  is  so  often  recognised  as  the  end  of  the  Sabbath, 
that  it  is  not  denied  by  any  one,  as  far  as  we  are  aware,  who  has 
any  pretension  to  knowledge  on  the  subject.  It  is  so  obvious,  that 
Rosenmiiller  remarks  on  this  passage,  that  God  appointed  the  Israel- 
ites to  be  thereby  witnesses  to  all  nations,  that  their  God  was  the 
Creator  of  all  things.  "  Volebat  septimae  diei  feriis  memoriam  cre- 
ationis  mundi  conservari,  et  Israelitas  ea  re  testatos  omnibus  genti~ 
bus  facere,  ab  ipsis  coli  id  numen,  quod  omnia  creavit"  It  was 
hence  a  common  saying  among  the  ancient  Rabbins,  that  "  He  who 
violates  the  Sabbath  denies  the  creation."  Selden  de  Jure  Natu- 
rali  et  Gentium,  lib.  hi.,  p.  333.  But  if  this  was  the  object  of  the 
institution,  how  was  it  to  be  attained  ?  The  end  to  be  answered 
was  purely  a  religious  one,  the  preservation  of  correct  ideas  of 
God ;  and  will  any  one  in  his  senses  maintain  that  this  was  to  be 
done  by  festivity  and  dancing?  Can  any  one  believe  that  God 
ever  enjoined  for  such  an  end  such  means  as  these  ?  But  if  the 
day  was  to  be  spent  in  the  worship  of  this  God,  we  can  readily 
conceive  how  it  should  answer  the  end  of  its  institution.  Besides, 
if,  as  our  Reviewer  maintains,  the  object  of  the  Sabbath  was  to 
give  leisure  for  mere  amusement,  would,  even  under  the  Mosaic 
law,  the  penalty  of  death  have  been  inflicted  for  its  violation  ? 
This  is  impossible.  But  if  its  object  was  to  secure,  in  that  age  of 
idolatry,  a  weekly  recognition  of  God  as  the  only  true  God,  the 
creator  of  heaven  and  earth,  we  see  how  a  deliberate  profanation 
of  the  day  might  be  viewed  as  a  denial  of  the  truth  it  was  intended 
to  commemorate,  and  consequently  a  rejection  of  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  Jewish  economy,  which,  under  the  theocracy,  was 
an  act  of  rebellion  as  well  as  of  impiety. 

It  is  in  no  measure  inconsistent  with  the  grand  primary  object  of 
the  Sabbath,  that  in  Deuteronomy  the  Jews  are  commanded  to  ob- 
serve it,  and  to  allow  their  servants  the  necessary  cessation  from 
labour,  because  they  themselves  had  been  bondsmen  in  Egypt. 
It  has  always  been  admitted,  that  a  secondary  object  of  the  institu- 


474  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

tion  was-  the  refreshment  of  all  labourers  among  men  and  the  lower 
animals.  The  passage  referred  to,  enjoins  on  the  Hebrews  a  strict 
observance  of  this  part  of  the  command,  from  a  recollection  of 
their  former  hardships.  This,  therefore,  is  presented,  not  as  the 
principal  object  of  the  institution,  but  a  motive  to  obedience  ;  and 
it  is  one  of  constant  recurrence  in  the  law  of  Moses.  Thou  shalt 
not  oppress  a  stranger,  because  thou  wast  a  stranger  in  the  land 
of  Egypt.  All  duties  of  this  class  are  enforced  by  this  same  touch- 
ing consideration  that  God  intended  the  Sabbath  should  be  a  day 
of  rest,  therefore,  to  all  men  and  beasts,  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
its  being  properly  and  primarily  a  religious  institution,  intended  to 
commemorate  the  creation  of  the  world.  Hence,  Selden,  p.  332, 
says,  "  That  the  Hebrews  when  interrogated  concerning  the  rea- 
son of  keeping  the  Sabbath,  might  answer,  because  in  six  days 
God  made  heaven  and  earth.     But  the  seventh  they  acknowledged 

tO   be  rriv    tov  Koapov  yeviQ\iov  hpipav,  Diem  mUTldi  Tiatalem,  and  r>>  lopriiv  tov 

Koapov  yeviaiov,  Festum  natalibus  mundi  sacratum,  as  Philo  denominates 
the  Sabbath."     And  this  he  asserts  was  its  great  design. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  from  the  very  intention  of  the  Sabbath  and 
from  the  nature  of  the  religious  system  of  which  it  was  a  part,  that 
the  Reviewer's*  doctrine  as  to  the  manner  of  its  observance  is  in- 
credible and  derogatory  to  the  religion  of  the  Bible.  Let  us,  how- 
ever, hear  his  arguments  in  its  support.  They  consist  in  the  asser- 
tions that  the  phrase  "  To  keep  it  holy,"  does  not  mean  to  separate 
it  to  religion  ;  and  that  the  amplification  of  the  law  does  not  war- 
rant that  construction  here.  "  The  literal  or  proper  signification  of 
the  word  holy"  he  says,  "  as  we  shall  show,  carries  no  such  mean- 
ing ;  and  in  the  context  or  amplification  of  the  law,  we  find  not  a 
word  to  warrant  this  construction."  P.  180.  Instead  of  redeeming 
his  pledge,  and  proving  that  the  word  holy  has  not  the  significa- 
tion usually  assigned  to  it,  he  only  supports  his  own  assertion, 
which  he  of  course  could  not  expect  to  be  of  much  weight  on  such 
matters,  by  the  assertion  of  some  other  "  learned  author,"  "  that  the 
word  Ttadash  or  keep  holy,  does  not  always  signify  to  separate  a 
thing  to  religion,  as  sanctificare  does  in  Latin,  but  is  taken  for 
any  separation  whatever,  from  a  common  to  a  peculiar  use,  espe- 
cially when  that  use  is  instituted  of  God."  Now  these  two  asser- 
tions are  very  wide  apart.  The  difference  between  saying  a  word 
"  has  no  such  meaning,"  and  that  it  has  not  always  that  meaning, 
is  immense.  In  the  one  case  nothing  short  of  an  absolute  neces- 
sity, necessitas  loci,  can  authorize  its  being  so  interpreted  in  any 
given  passage :  wherea|  in  the  other,  the  strongest  reasons  should 
be  present  to  justify  a  departure  from  what,  by  the  assertion  itself, 
is  admitted  to  be  its  ordinary  meaning.  The  Reviewer's  zeal, 
therefore,  has  carried  him  much  too  far.  The  argument  resolves 
itself  into  two  parts,  the  first  relating  to  the  proper  signification  of 
the  word  kadash,  and  the  second  to  its  meaning  in  this  particular 
command. 

It.  so  happens,  that  this  word  and  its  derivatives  are  among  the 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  475 

most  frequently  recurring  in  the  Hebrew  scriptures,  and  of  course 
in  the  indefinite  variety  of  their  applications  cannot  have  always 
precisely  the  same  sense.  All  that  is  necessary  to  our  purpose  is, 
to  show  that  its  proper  and  dominant  meaning  is,  to  separate  to  a 
sacred  use.  And  this,  we  presume,  the  Reviewer's  author  would 
not  venture  to  deny.  Let  us  for  a  moment  appeal  to  authority  on 
this  point.  Gesenius,  in  the  last  edition  of  his  Hebrew  Lexicon, 
tells  us  that  in  Piel  (the  form  in  question)  it  means  1.  To  sanctify 
(heiligen),  to  consecrate,  as  any  one  to  the  priesthood,  an  altar,  and 
especially  an  offering,  Deo  consecrare.  2.  To  esteem  holy.  3. 
Declare  holy.  4.  To  perform  something  holy ;  and  5,  to  separate 
as  holy.  There  is  not  one  of  the  numerous  passages  cited  under 
these  several  heads  in  which  the  idea  of  separation  to  a  sacred 
use  is  not  included  in  the  meaning  of  the  word.  Eichhorn,  in  his 
edition  of  Simonis's  Lexicon,  says,  that  it  means  ah  usu  et  statu  com- 
muni  ad  peculiarem  et  sacrum  separare.  Rosenm  tiller  on  Gen.  ii. 
3,  defines  it,  sanctificare,  in  usum  sanctum  segregare  ut  et  Graeci 
exponunt,  d0o/>i{«*.  In  Ex.  xx.  8,  the  words  which  we  render  "  Re- 
member the  Sabbath  day  and  keep  it  holy,"  he  translates  and  ex- 
plains thus,  "  Memor  esto  diei  sabbathi,  ut  eum  sacrum  habeas,  i.  e., 
soli  Deo dictatum,  sive  sepositum ;  hoc  die  Deum  sancte colas"  We 
have  selected  these  three,  from  the  multitude  of  lexicographers  and 
commentators  whose  authority  might  be  adduced,  not  only  because 
they  are  among  the  most  distinguished  Hebraists  of  modern  days, 
but  because  they  can  be  as  little  suspected  of  reverence  for  the 
Sabbath  as  the  Reviewer  himself.  This  is  a  subject,  however,  on 
which  we  need  rest  on  no  man's  authority.  Every  one  who  is  able 
to  read  his  Bible  knows,  as  well  as  the  greatest  Hebraist  can  tell 
him,  what  the  meaning  of  the  word  is.  He  knows  that  throughout 
the  scriptures,  the  word  holy  is  predominantly  used  to  express  one 
or  the  other  of  these  two  ideas,  morally  pure,  as  when  God  is  called 
holy,  and  when  we  are  commanded  to  be  so,  or  separated  to  a  sa- 
cred use.  It  is  in  this  latter  sense  that  the  Hebrews  are  called  a 
holy  people ;  that  the  priests  and  Levites  are  called  holy ;  that  any 
place,  as  the  tabernacle,  the  temple,  Jerusalem,  Palestine,  is  called 
holy  ;  that  the  altar,  candlestick,  and  all  sacred  utensils  are  called 
holy ;  and  that  the  festivals  are  so  denominated.  In  short,  any 
person,  place,  thing,  or  portion  of  time,  devoted  to  sacred  purposes, 
is  called  holy,  and  this  is  the  only  proper  word  for  expressing  this 
idea.  This  use  of  the  term  occurs  not  once,  nor  twice,  nor  a  hun- 
dred, but  literally  thousands  of  times,  so  that  it  is  really  idle  to 
waste  words  on  such  a  subject.  The  Reviewer  never  made  a 
more  adventurous  assertion,  than  when  he  affirmed  that  this  was 
not  the  proper  meaning  of  the  word. 

But  it  is  said  the  amplification  of  the  command  gives  no  war- 
rant for  this  construction.  To  this  we  reply,  that  the  proper  and 
dominant  use  of  the  words  is  warrant  enough.  If  the  context 
presents  nothing  inconsistent  with  this  sense,  we  are  not  authorised 
to  depart  from  it.     That  there  is  no  such  inconsistency  is  perfectly 


476  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

obvious.  The  command  is,  Thou  shalt  devote  the  Sabbath  to  the 
service  of  God ;  and  the  amplification  is,  In  it  thou  shalt  do  no 
work.  Is  there  any  inconsistency  here  ?  But  the  Reviewer 
seems  to  suppose  that  the  command  to  keep  the  Sabbath  holy  is 
explained  by  what  follows,  so  that  the  whole  sanctification  con- 
sisted in  omitting  all  servile  labour.  But  this  is  not  exactly  so. 
The  reason  why  such  labour  was  to  be  omitted  was,  that  the  day 
was  holy,  i.  e.,  consecrated  unto  God.  This  is  constantly  stated 
as  the  reason.  "  Six  days  may  work  be  done,  but  the  seventh  is 
the  Sabbath  of  rest  holy  unto  the  Lord." — Ex.  xxxi.  15.  There  is 
therefore  nothing  in  the  context  to  warrant  a  departure  from  the 
ordinary  signification  of  the  word,  which  is  so  uniformly  preserved 
in  all  such  connexions,  that  the  utmost  violence  must  be  done  to 
all  just  rules  of  interpretation,  to  make  the  command  mean  any- 
thing else  than  what  it  has  usually  been  supposed  to  mean. 

This  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  all  the  notices  of  the  Sab- 
bath which  we  find  in  other  parts  of  the  scriptures.  We  are  told 
that  on  that  day  the  usual  sacrifices  were  doubled.  A  great  part 
of  the  ancient  worship  consisted  in  presenting  these  offerings,  which 
were  necessarily  attended  with  confession,  thanksgiving,  and  prayer. 
By  this  institution  alone,  the  religious  character  of  the  day  is  dis- 
tinctly marked.  In  Levit.  xxiii.  we  have  an  account  of  all  those 
feasts  on  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  people  to  assemble  for  wor- 
ship. Among  these  the  Sabbath  is  included.  "  The  seventh  day 
is  the  Sabbath  of  rest,  an  holy  convocation."  In  c.  xvi.  2,  it  is 
said,  "  Ye  shall  keep  my  Sabbaths  and  reverence  my  sanctuary," 
which  implies  that  the  day  was  to  be  observed  religiously,  from 
the  connexion  here  expressed  between  the  observance  of  the  Sab- 
bath and  the  duties  of  worship.  All  those  numerous  passages  in 
which  the  object  of  the  sanctification  of  the  seventh  day  is  stated 
to  be,  that  they  might  know  that  Jehovah  was  their  God,  prove 
the  same  thing.  Thus  Ezekiel  says  :  u  Hallow  my  Sabbaths,  that 
ye  may  know  that  I  am  the  Lord  thy  God."  Isaiah,  in  predicting 
a  happy  state  of  the  church,  says,  "  It  shall  come  to  pass,  that  from 
one  new  moon  to  another,  and  from  one  Sabbath  to  another,  shall 
all  flesh  come  to  worship  before  me,  saith  the  Lord." — Is.  xvi.  23. 
Does  not  this  imply  that  divine  worship  was  the  appropriate  duty 
of  the  day  1  Again,  Isaiah  lviii.  13,  it  is  said,  "  If  thou  turn  away 
thy  foot  from  the  Sabbath,  from  doing  thy  pleasure  on  my  holy 
day  ;  and  call  the  Sabbath  a  delight,  the  holy  of  the  Lord  honour- 
able ;  and  shalt  honour  him,  not  doing  thine  own  ways,  nor  finding 
thine  own  pleasure,  nor  speaking  thine  own  words,  then,"  &c.  Does 
this  look  like  a  description  of  a  day  devoted  to  festivity  and  danc- 
ing ?  Even  Gesenius  tells  us  that  it  means  that  all  worldly  busi- 
ness was  to  be  omitted,  and  the  day  consecrated  to  devotion. 
"  Wenn  du  den  Sabbath  nicht  durch  Umherlaufen  zu  weltlichen 
Geschaften  entweihst,  sondern  daheim  der  Andacht  weihst." — See 
Com.  on  Isaiah.     It  would,  however,  be  almost  an  endless  business 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  477 

to  gather  up  all  the  intimations  contained  in  the  old  Testament,  of 
the  religious  character  of  the  Sabbath. 

When  we  come  to  the  New  Testament,  we  find  still  clearer  evi- 
dence of  this  fact.  Everywhere  it  is  said  that  the  Sabbath  was 
the  day  on  which  the  people  met  in  the  synagogues  for  worship. 
Here  the  scriptures  were  read,  prayer  was  made,  and  religious 
instruction  communicated.  This,  it  is  asserted,  was  not  a  recent 
custom,  but  "  Moses  hath,"  it  is  said,  "  of  old  times  in  every  city 
them  that  preach  him,  being  read  in  the  synagogues  every  Sabbath 
day."  The  Reviewer,  it  is  presumed,  will  admit  that  long  con- 
tinued practice  under  a  law  is  the  best  rule  for  its  exposition.  We 
have,  however,  still  further  testimony  to  the  point  in  hand.  Philo, 
the  most  learned  of  the  Alexandrian  Jews  of  the  time  of  Christ, 
says,  De  vita  Mosis,  p.  602,  "  The  day  of  the  creation  having 
sunk  into  oblivion  was  thus  restored  of  God,  and  is  to  be  observed 
by  pious  contemplations  of  divine  things,  and  of  the  works  of  na- 
ture, and  by  no  means  in  sloth,  luxury,  or  amusement."  In  his 
Tract,  de  Cherubim,  he  draws  a  contrast  between  the  manner  in 
which  the  heathen  festivals  devoted  to  amusement  and  vice  were 
observed,  and  those  of  the  Hebrews.  Josephus,  the  most  distin- 
guished of  the  Jews  of  Palestine,  of  nearly  the  same  age,  in  his 
work  Contra  Apion,  lib.  iii.,  says,  "  This  day,  as  the  memorial  of 
the  creation,  is  to  be  piously  celebrated,  and  was  instituted  of  God 
that  the  law  might  be  publicly  read  to  the  people  and  made  known 
to  all." 

The  assertion,  therefore,  of  the  Reviewer  and  his  author,  that 
the  Sabbath  was  originally  and  properly  observed  as  a  day  of 
dancing  and  festivity,  is  not  only  entirely  gratuitous,  but  is  contra- 
dicted by  all  the  evidence  of  which  the  case  admits.  The  mean- 
ing of  the  command  is  as  plain  as  words  can  make  it,  that  the  day 
should  be  consecrated  to  religious  worship.  This  interpretation  is 
confirmed  by  the  object  of  the  institution,  by  the  nature  of  the 
system  of  which  it  is  a  part,  by  the  indubitable  declarations  of  the 
ancient  prophets,  by  the  practice  and  testimony  of  the  Jews  in  the 
time  of  Christ,  and  the  opinions  of  their  learned  men  to  the  present 
day.  And  this,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  not 
only  devout  Christians,  but  civilians,  historians,  and  infidel  antiqua- 
rians and -commentators,  have  arrived.  The  learned  Selden,  who 
was  no  clergyman,  speaking  of  the  celebration  of  this  day,  says, 
p.  316,  "  Quae  (i.  e.  celebratio  Sabbathi)  in  opere  et  laboribus, 
cultus  causa,  abstinendo,  lege  legenda,  audienda,  ac  sacrificiis  sin- 
gularibus,  maxime  cernebatur." 

We  deem  it  hardly  necessary  to  attempt  to  show,  that  among 
Christians,  the  first  day  of  the  week  was  observed  as  a  day  for 
religious  worship,  and  not  for  recreation  and  amusement.  In  the 
New  Testament,  they  are  said  to  have  met  together  "  to  break 
bread,"  that  is,  to  celebrate  the  Lord's  supper,  and  to  hear  the 
word.  As  the  Christian  Fathers  universally  say  that  the  day  was 
kept  in  commemoration  of  Christ's  resurrection  and  the  blessings 


478  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

thereby  secured,  it  is  evident  from  this  consideration  alone,  that  it 
was  a  religious  observance  :  that  the  joy  to  be  indulged  was  such 
as  flowed  from  the  contemplation  of  these  blessings,  and  the  exer- 
cises of  the  day  such  as  should  fit  us  to  appreciate  and  enjoy  them. 
Our  limits  do  not  permit  us  to  make  numerous  quotations  in  sup- 
port of  this  assertion.  The  testimony  of  Barnabas,  Ignatius,  Jus- 
tin Martyr,  Athanasius,  Tertullian,  and  many  others,  may  be  found 
in  Bingham's  Origines  Ecclesiasticae,  vol.  ix.,  c.  ii.,  or  Augusti's 
Denkwiirdigkeiten  der  Christ.  Archaelogie,  in  several  parts  of  the 
work,  particularly  the  introduction  to  the  first  vol.,  and  vol.  iii.,  p. 
345,  and  onward.  Even  the  heathen  knew  enough  of  Christianity 
to  know  that  it  was  a  religion,  and  its  festivals  religious  observ- 
ances. Pliny,  in  his  celebrated  letter  to  Trajan,  says,  "  Christianos 
stato  die  ante  lucem  solitos  con  venire  carmenque  Christo  quasi 
Deo  dicere  secum  invicem,  seque  sacramento  obstringere  non  in 
scelus  aliquod,  sed  ne  furta,  ne  latrocinia,  ne  adulteria  committe- 
rent,  ne  fidem  fallerent." 

Gregory  Nazian.  Orat.  38,  in  exhorting  Christians  to  observe 
their  sacred  days  aright,  says,  that  it  must  not  be  done  in  a  worldly 
manner,  by  adorning  their  houses,  or  gratifying  the  senses,  by  feast- 
ing, or  any  kind  of  amusement.  These  things,  he  tells  them,  should 
be  left  to  the  heathen.  "  But  we,"  he  adds,  "  who  worship  the 
word,  should  find  our  only  pleasure  in  the  scriptures  and  the  divine 
law,  and  in  narrating  the  events  which  the  feast  commemorates." 

Under  Constantine,  the  first  Christian  emperor,  laws  were  made 
respecting  the  proper  observance  of  the  Lord's  day,  and  repeated 
with  more  particularity  under  Theodosius ;  not  commanding  the 
people  to  spend  the  day  in  amusement,  but  forbidding  public  shows 
and  recreations.  "  Dominico,  qui  septimanae  totius  primus  est, — 
omni  theatrorum  atque  circensium  voluptate,  per  universas  urbes 
earundem  populis  denegata,  totae  Christianorum  ac  fidelium  men- 
tes  Dei  cultibus  occupantur." — Cod.  Theod.,  xv.,  tit.  5.  Such  ordi- 
nances were  frequently  repeated,  prohibiting  all  the  usual  business 
of  life  on  that  day,  and  all  worldly  amusements.  They  are  cited 
here  as  indisputable  evidence  of  the  opinion  of  the  early  Chris- 
tians, that  the  Lord's  day  was  to  be  devoted  exclusively  to  reli- 
gious purposes.  To  give  one  testimony  more.  Ephrem,  the 
Syrian,  in  his  discourse  De  diebus  festis,  says,  "  Festivitates  Do- 
minicas  honorare  studiose  contendite,  celebrantes  eas  non  pane- 
gyrice  sed  divine  ;  non  mundane,  sed  spiritualiter ;  non  instar 
Gentilium  sed  Christianorum.  Quare  non  portarum  frontes  coro- 
nemus  ;  non  choreas  ducamus ;  non  chorum  exornemus  ;  non  tibiis 
et  citharis  auditum  effaeminemus,  non  mollibus  vestibus  induamur, 
nee  cingulis  undique  auro  radiantibus  cingamur ;  non  commessa- 
tionibus  et  ebrietatibus  dediti  simus,  verum  ista  relinquamus  eis  quo- 
rum Deus  venter  est,  et  gloria  in  confusione  ipsorum." 

Augusti,  in  his  remarks  on  the  festivals  of  the  early  Christians, 
says,  "  The  main  idea  and  object  of  the  holy  days  and  feasts,  was 
to  keep  vividly  in  mind  the  principal  benefits  of  Christianity,  and 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  479 

the  person  of  the  Redeemer,  to  promote  gratitude  to  God,  and  the 
exercise  of  the  Christian  virtues.  It  was  common  to  prepare  for 
these  festivals  by  fastings,  but  the  festivals  themselves  were  re- 

farded  as  days  of  rejoicing ;  in  which  the  Christian,  undisturbed 
y  any  of  his  ordinary  employments,  should  devote  himself  to 
contemplations  and  exercises  of  piety.  So  far,  however,  were 
these  festivals  from  being  days  of  worldly  pleasure,  or  similar  to 
the  holidays  of  the  heathen,  that  from  the  moment  Christianity  be- 
came the  religion  of  the  state,  the  church  felt  that  she  had  no 
more  urgent  duty  to  perform,  than  to  employ  her  power  in  pro- 
tecting the  sacred  days  and  usages,  and  to  secure  the  prohibition 
of  all  public  amusements  by  which  the  sacredness  of  divine  wor- 
ship might  be  invaded." — Denkwiirdigkeiten,  vol.  p.  97.  This  is 
the  testimony  of  a  historian  and  antiquarian,  not  a  "  Sabbatarian," 
or  a  "  terrorist,"  but  of  a  German  rationalist,  respecting  the  usage, 
not  of  a  set  of  gloomy  puritans,  but  of  the  early  Christian  church 
in  general,  and  of  that  Catholic  church  which  boasts  of  being  in- 
fallible. 

With  regard  to  the  opinions  of  the  several  denominations  of 
Christians  on  this  subject,  little  need  be  said.  It  is  so  universally 
known  that  the  Church  of  England  is  one  of  the  strictest  of  Pro- 
testant churches  in  her  doctrines  respecting  the  Sabbath,  we  shall 
give  but  a  single  extract  from  her  book  of  Homilies,  "  So  if  we  be 
the  children  of  our  Heavenly  Father,  we  must  be  careful  to  keep 
the  Christian  Sabbath  day,  which  is  Sunday,  not  only  for  that  it  is 
God's  commandment,  but  also  to  declare  ourselves  to  be  loving 
children  in  following  the  example  of  our  gracious  Lord  and  Father. 
Some  use  all  days  alike.  The  other  sort  worse  ;  for  although 
they  will  not  labour  nor  travail  on  the  Sunday,  yet  they  will  not  rest 
in  holiness  as  God  commands  them,  but  they  rest  in  ungodliness  and 
filthiness,  prancing  in  their  pride,"  &c,  &c.  Volumes  might  be  filled 
with  quotations  from  her  most  illustrious  sons  to  the  same  amount. 
That  her  children  in  this  country  have  not  forsaken  her  doctrines,  on 
this  subject,  we  need  no  other  proof  than  the  "Three  Letters  address- 
ed to  the  editor  of  the  American  Quarterly  Review,"  by  the  venera- 
ble Bishop  of  Pennsylvania.  Standing  as  he  does  at  the  head  of 
the  Episcopal  Church  in  the  United  States,  his  ready  appearance 
to  vindicate  the  Lord's  Day  from  the  unworthy  attack  of  the  Re- 
viewer, entitles  him  to  the  grateful  acknowledgments  of  all  the 
Christians  in  the  country.  That  the  Congregationalists  and  Pres- 
byterians regard  the  Sabbath  as  a  day  that  should  be  devoted  to 
religion,  no  one  would  thank  us  for  proving.  The  same  is  true 
with  regard  to  the  Methodists  and  Baptists.  The  Catholics  are  as 
strict,  in  doctrine,  in  this  respect,  as  the  Protestants.  They  hold 
that  the  scriptures  teach  that  the  feasts  and  usages  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament were  not  repealed,  but  merely  spiritualized,  under  the  new 
dispensation,  and  that  this  was  especially  the  case  with  the  Sab- 
bath ;  which  the  ancient  church  merely  transferred  from  the 
seventh  to  the  first  day  of  the  week,  in  commemoration  of  the  Sa- 


480  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

viour's  resurrection.  This  is  the  Catholic  doctrine,  as  defended  by 
Bellarmin  in  his  work,  "  Adversus  hujis  temporis  haereticos ;"  i.  e., 
the  Protestants  ;  by  Durand,  "  Rationale  divinorum  officiorum  ;" 
by  Gretser,  and  all  their  leading  writers.*  The  last  named  author, 
in  his  work  "  De  festis  Christianorum,"  lib.  i.,  contends  that  the 
Christian  festivals  are  not  matters  of  mere  external  order  and  dis- 
cipline. "  Festa  Christianorum  non  solum  ratione  ordinis  et  disci- 
plinae,  sed  etiam  ratione  mysterii  celebrari :  et  esse  hos  dies  festos 
aliis  sanctiores  et  sacratiores  et  partem  quandam  divini  cultus." 
And  the  council  of  Trent  enjoins  that  these  festivals  should  be  ob- 
served, not  as  days  of  amusement,  but  "  in  a  truly  religious  and 
devotional  manner." 

The  Reviewer,  therefore,  in  denying  that  "  the  Sunday  is  to  be 
devoted  to  the  solemn  offices  of  religion,"  and  in  asserting  that  it 
is  appropriately  a  day  of  recreation  and  amusement,  has  not  as- 
sailed an  opinion  of  this  or  that  particular  sect,  but  of  the  whole 
Christian  church.     If  this  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  breach  of 
contract  with  the  public,  we  know  not  what  can  be.     Surely  no  one 
doctrine  of  our  religion,  nor  that  religion  itself,  can  be  considered 
safe  from  his  assaults,  if  this  be  deemed  a  justifiable  aggression. 
We,  of  course,  do  not  complain  of  him,  nor  of  any  other  man,  for 
publishing  his  opinions,  but  we  do  complain  that  he  should  make  a 
Literary  Review  the  vehicle  of  such   doctrines.     Believing,   as 
Christians  almost  universally,  at  least  in  this  country,  do,  that  the 
religious  observance  of  the  Lord's  day  is  one  of  the  most  essential 
means  of  sustaining  the  cause  of  religion  and  good  morals,  it  is  as 
much  a  matter  of  surprise  as  regret,  that  the  enlightened  conduc- 
tors of  the  American  Quarterly,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  an  un- 
worthy clique  against  the  religious  public,  should  allow  themselves 
to  be  betrayed  into  so  serious  an  attack  on  such  an  institution.     No 
one  appears  to  have  a  quicker  or  more  just  perception  of  the  indi- 
cations of  coming  evil,  in  this  country,  than  the  editor  of  that  Re- 
view.    He  mourns  over  the  unbridled  licentiousness  of  the  press  ; 
he  is  startled  at  the  idea  of  universal  equal  education  ;  he  regards 
with  little  complacency  the  annual  importation  of  thousands  of  un- 
educated foreigners,  to  control  our  elections,  and  vitiate  our  popu- 
lation ;    and  he  would  be  the  last  man  in  the  world  to  maintain, 
that  a  popular  government,  founded  on  ignorance  and  vice,  was 
either  possible  or  desirable.     He  seems  even  less  disposed  than  his 
neighbours,  to  rejoice  in  the  progress  of  freedom,  where  he  sus- 
pects the  requisite  intelligence  and  virtue  do  not  exist.     Recogniz- 
ing, as  he  does,  that  good  morals  are  the  only  stable  support  of 
free  institutions,  and  the  only  effectual  bulwark  of  social  order  and 
domestic  happiness,  why  is  it  he  so  pertinaciously  attacks  an  insti- 
tution, without  which  public  virtue  assuredly  never  can  be  main- 
tained 1     We  use  the  word  pertinaciously,  because  the  article  in 

See  Augusti,  vol.  i.,  p.  32. 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  481 

his  Review,  is  not  the  only  effusion  on  this  subject,  which  has  ap- 
peared under  his  auspices.  His  paper  has  been  repeatedly  made 
the  vehicle  of  nearly  the  same  sentiments  ;  culling,  from  sources 
the  most  heterogeneous,  matter  suited  to  his  purpose  ;  pardoning 
even  the  radicalism  of  the  Morning  Chronicle,  in  behalf  of  its  lati- 
tudinarianism  on  religion.  As  the  friends  of  good  morals  and  de- 
corous discussion,  we  are  very  far  from  being  insensible  to  the  me- 
rits of  the  National  Gazette.  We  cheerfully  acknowledge  that  it 
is  often  the  able  advocate  of  the  cause  of  virtue,  and  the  temper- 
ate and  dignified  rebuker  of  corrupting  publications.  This,  how- 
ever, only  increases  our  regret  that  it  should  manifest  such  hostility 
to  an  institution,  which,  as  a  means  of  promoting  public  virtue, 
stands,  in  our  view,  pre-eminent  and  unapproachable.  Whether  this 
opinion  be  correct  or  not,  it  is  entertained  by  so  large  a  portion  of 
the  community,  that  it  is  entitled  to  respectful  consideration,  and 
is,  we  think,  capable  of  being  clearly  established. 

Neither  the  editor  nor  the  reviewer  will  deny  that  some  religion 
is  essential  to  man  ;  that,  by  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  men  are 
as  necessarily  religious  as  they  are  moral  or  intellectual  beings. 
This  is  proved  by  universal  experience,  and  according  to  Cicero, 
Tusc.  I.  "  Omni  in  re  consensio  omnium  gentium,  lex  naturae  pu- 
tanda  est."  As  all  nations  have  had  some  religion,  we  must  admit 
that  it  is  a  law  of  our  nature,  that  men  should  have  some  method 
of  expressing  the  feelings  which  arise  from  their  consciousness  of 
relation  to  a  superior  being.  All  history  teaches  us  that  the  forms 
in  which  these  feelings  express  themselves,  depend  on  the  light 
communicated  to  the  understanding.  If  men  are  taught  that  they 
are  in  the  hands  of  numerous  and  conflicting  powers,  some  intent 
on  good,  others  on  evil,  we  see  them  tossed  and  agitated  with  con- 
stant fears,  busying  themselves  with  all  possible  devices  to  obtain 
favour  or  impunity.  There  is  no  more  melancholy  spectacle  than 
men  thus  struggling  under  the  pressure  of  distorted  notions  of  the 
objects  of  worship ;  notions  which  pervert  the  finest  constituents  of 
their  nature,  and  impress  their  own  deformed  image  on  the  soul. 
It  is  a  fact  established  by  experience,  and  one  easily  accounted  for, 
that  men  are  always  conformed  in  their  internal  character  to  their 
religion  ;  not  to  the  religion  which  they  may  profess,  but  to  that 
system  of  religious  opinions  which  they  really  entertain.  The  most 
important  feature  of  human  character,  therefore,  depends  on  cor- 
rect knowledge  of  God.  How  is  this  to  be  obtained  ?  Arguing 
either  from  the  Bible,  which  the  reviewer  does  not  profess  to  reject, 
or  from  experience,  it  is  clear,  that  it  never  has  been,  and  cannot 
be  secured  by  the  unaided  reason  of  man.  The  cause  of  this  lies, 
as  the  apostle  informs  us,  not  in  the  inadequacy  of  the  revelation 
which  the  works  of  God  and  our  own  constitution  make  of  the  di- 
vine character,  but  in  the  moral  state  of  the  human  soul,  which 
blinds  it  to  these  manifestations  of  divine  excellence,  and  disinclines 
it  to  the  purity  of  truth.  So  that  although  knowing  God,  men  glo- 
rify him  not  as  God,  neither  are  thankful,  but  become  vain  in  tneir 

31 


J 


I 


482  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

imaginations,  and  their  foolish  heart  is  darkened,  professing  them- 
selves to  be  wise,  they  become  fools,  and  change  the  image  of  the 
incorruptible  God  into  an  image  made  like  unto  corruptible  man, 
and  to  birds  and  four-footed  beasts  and  creeping  things.  This  is 
the  history  of  man  in  all  ages  and  countries,  and  under  all  diversi- 
ties of  culture,  where  the  light  of  revelation  has  not  been  enjoyed. 
We  might  as  well  expect  the  productions  of  the  vegetable  world 
to  unfold  in  all  their  variety  of  beauty,  in  utter  seclusion  from  the 
sun,  as  that  the  religious  feelings  of  men  should  be  developed  in 
conformity  with  truth,  where  the  rays  of  divine  knowledge  never 
visit  the  mind. 

Experience  teaches  us  another  lesson  with  equal  clearness  and 
fullness,  that  there  can  be  no  adequate  culture  of  our  moral  nature 
under  the  influence  of  a  corrupt  system  of  religion.  The  apparent 
exceptions  to  this  remark  are  few,  and  they  are  but  apparent.  Its 
correctness  as  the  statement  of  a  general  fact  cannot  be  denied* 
If  these  two  points,  resting  on  the  testimony  of  indisputable  facts, 
be  admitted,  the  necessity  of  correct  knowledge  to  the  existence  of 
true  religion,  and  the  necessity  of  religion  to  good  morals,  then  it 
is  clear,  that  to  secure  for  society  correct  religious  knowledge  is 
essential  to  preserve  it  from  the  equal  horrors  of  superstition  and 
immorality.  The  insufficiency  of  mere  speculative  knowledge  or 
general  illumination  to  accomplish  this  object  is  evident,  not  only 
from  the  limited  sphere  of  its  action,  but  from  its  want  of  adapta- 
tion to  the  end.  Only  a  few,  comparatively,  can  ever  be  made  the 
subjects  of  this  high  intellectual  culture,  and  if  they  could,  there  is 
nothing  in  the  mere  knowledge  of  facts  unconnected  with  religion, 
to  call  forth  and  form  any  man's  religious  or  moral  feelings.  These 
are  still  left  to  be  moulded  by  notions  which  enter  by  chance  and 
gain  a  lodgment  in  the  mind.  If  surrounded  by  a  society  in  which 
correct  ideas  on  these  subjects  abound,  he  may  imbibe  a  portion  of 
these,  and  thus,  in  a  measure,  be  preserved  from  the  evils  resulting 
from  that  neglect  of  religion  in  which  he  glories.  And  this,  it  may 
be  remarked,  is  the  security  of  our  modern  infidels,  or  we  should 
see  them,  after  the  manner  of  better  men  of  old,  suspending 
their  most  important  movements  on  the  flight  of  birds,  and  quaking 
at  a  raven's  croak. 

If  religious  knowledge  is  thus  essential  to  form  the  character  of 
men,  how  is  it  to  be  communicated  ?  It  does  not  come  by  imme- 
diate revelation  from  the  omnipresent  and  all  pervading  Spirit  of 
God :  and  although  traced  in  lines  of  light  and  beauty  on  his  works, 
these  have  never  been  read  with  sufficient  clearness  to  enlighten 
the  understanding  or  impress  the  heart.  But  God  has  communi- 
cated it  to  us  by  those  "  holy  men  of  old  who  spake  as  they  were 
moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost."  But  even  this  clear  and  sufficient 
revelation  of  God  and  our  duty,  which  happily  in  this  country  may 
be  in  every  man's  hands,  is  silent.  It  arrests  no  man's  attention,  it 
utters  no  remonstrance  when  neglected,  and  never  was  designed  to 
supersede  a  more  direct  and  impressive  mode  of  instruction.     We 


mm 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  483 

are  told  that  "  it  hath  pleased  God,  by  the  foolishness  of  preaching, 
to  save  them  that  believe."  And  it  is  written,  that  when  Christ  as- 
cended up  on  high,  "  he  gave  some  pastors  and  some  teachers"  for 
the  very  purpose  of  diffusing  this  knowledge  and  securing  its  effects. 
It  is,  therefore,  by  divine  appointment  that  religious  knowledge 
should  be  communicated  by  living  teachers.  But  waving  this  con- 
sideration, how  in  point  of  fact  is  it  communicated  ?  Can  it  be  de- 
nied that,  in  this  and  every  other  country,  the  great  majority  of 
men  derive  their  knowledge  on  religion  mainly  from  the  ministra- 
tions of  its  public  teachers  ?  Most  men  are  so  occupied  with  the 
concerns  of  life,  that  they  entirely  neglect  the  attainment  of  any 
regular  or  adequate  religious  knowledge  by  their  own  exertions. 
Were  it  not  for  what  they  learn  from  the  "  gloomy  lectures"  of  the 
Sabbath,  they  would  remain  as  ignorant  as  the  heathen  of  God 
and  a  future  state.  So  long  as  a  large  portion  of  society  observe 
this  day,  and  gather  enough  of  knowledge  to  imbue  the  common 
fund  with  correct  ideas,  the  evils  may  not  be  so  apparent.  But  let 
us  look  at  places  where  the  reviewer's  plan  is  fully  carried  out, 
where  religious  instruction  from  the  pulpit  is  utterly  neglected,  and 
the  Lord's  day  devoted  to  amusement,  and  we  will  find  the  most 
deplorable  ignorance  on  all  religious  subjects.  It  matters  not 
whether  such  communities  be  found  on  our  own  western  frontiers, 
among  the  polished  circles  of  Paris,  or  the  profligate  population  of 
London.  We  of  course  speak  of  general  facts.  Individual  excep- 
tions, to  which  the  mind  is  apt  to  advert,  and  which,  to  be  pro- 
perly estimated,  must  be  viewed  in  all  their  circumstances,  dis- 
prove nothing  on  this  subject.  It  is  capable  of  being  clearly 
proved  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  the  public  teaching  of  the  Sabbath 
is  a  great  source  of  religious  knowledge  to  the  mass  of  the  com- 
munity, and  consequently  if  this  be  neglected,  and  men  spend  the 
day  appropriated  for  this  purpose  in  festivity  or  idleness,  ignorance 
the  most  destructive  to  their  best  feelings  and  interests  must  be  the 
result. 

The  diffusion  of  religious  knowledge,  however,  is  not  the  only 
good  resulting  from  a  proper  observance  of  the  Sabbath.  It  is  a 
day  appointed  not  only  to  learn  our  duty  towards  God,  but  to  per- 
form it  ;  to  call  off  the  mind  from  the  objects  which  necessity 
forces  upon  it  during  the  week,  and  place  it  in  the  presence  of  God  ; 
to  awaken  from  their  torpor  those  feelings  of  adoration,  gratitude 
and  confidence,  which  the  divine  greatness  and  goodness  should 
excite.  The  regular  return  of  this  day  is  as  healthful  to  society 
as  the  showers  which  soften,  fertilize,  and  beautify  the  earth,  bring- 
ing with  them  the  influence  of  heaven.  The  good  derived  from 
such  seasons  of  devotion  is  not  confined  to  the  hour  spent  within 
the  church.  The  feelings  there  excited  are  strengthened  by  the 
exercise :  their  permanent  influence  over  the  mind  is  increased. 
The  whole  man  is  refined  and  elevated,  and  he  goes  forth  into  the 
world  better  fortified  against  its  temptations,  and  better  fitted  to 
diffuse  a  healthful  tone  into  public  sentiment  and  feeling.     These 


+  \ 


w 


484  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

stated  periods  of  public  worship,  therefore,  are  the  great  means  of 
keeping  alive  a  sense  of  religion  among  men,  of  maintaining  the 
consciousness  of  their  relation  to  the  infinite  God,  and  thus  pre- 
venting them  from  sinking  down  into  the  mere  intellectual  or 
sensual  animal.  If  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath  be  the  great 
means  of  preserving  religious  feeling  in  the  community,  the  ques- 
tion comes  to  this,  whether  it  is  desirable  that  this  feeling  should 
be  maintained  ;  whether,  if  all  sense  of  the  infinite  and  eternal,  all 
connection  with  the  pure  and  the  holy,  every  bond  with  the  invisi- 
ble and  future  world  were  destroyed,  men  would  be  either  better 
or  happier  ?  Could  civilized  society  exist  were  this  once  effected  ? 
We  think  not.  The  restraints,  which  regard  for  reputation,  a  sense 
of  honour,  or  desire  of  influence,  exercise  over  men,  derive  their 
principal  force  from  the  general  tone  of  society,  which  would, 
under  such  circumstances,  be  entirely  vitiated.  The  reviewer, 
however,  would  join  beyond  doubt  in  praising  religion  in  the  general, 
and  repeat  the  common-places  as  to  its  necessity  and  excellence, 
while  he  laboriously  advocates  a  course  which  would  more  effectu- 
ally banish  it  from  Christendom  than  any  other  he  could  devise. 
Voltaire  is  said  to  have  vowed  the  destruction  of  Christianity, 
and  tried  long  and  hard  to  effect  his  object,  but  gave  it  up  in  des- 
pair, saying,  it  was  impossible  as  long  as  people  would  assemble 
every  week  for  religious  worship.  And  this  is  true.  For  every 
religion  must  have  some  means  whereby  to  sustain  itself,  and  bring 
its  influence  to  bear  on  those  who  profess  it.  Paganism  has  its 
rites  and  its  priests  ;  Mahomedanism  has  its  mosques,  its  public 
prayers,  its  sacred  day  and  its  Koran,  their  civil  and  religious  code  ; 
and  Christianity  has  its  Sabbaths,  on  which  to  exhibit  its  claims, 
and  urge  its  duties  and  promises.  We  have  seen  that,  in  point  of 
fact,  it  is  mainly  through  this  instrumentality  its  influence  is  ex- 
erted. What  then  is  the  desecration  of  this  day,  but  the  destruc- 
tion of  its  power  ?  And  what  is  an  exhortation  to  men  to  spend 
the  day  in  idleness  and  amusement,  but  an  exhortation  to  emanci- 
pate themselves  from  its  sacred  influences  ? 

It  is  not,  however,  merely  as  a  means  of  sustaining  religion,  that 
this  day  is  of  such  incalculable  importance  ;  its  proper  observance 
is  the  only  security  of  public  morals.  This  assertion  is  not  founded 
exclusively  on  the  assumption,  however  correct,  that  religion  is 
necessary  to  virtue.  The  subject  may  be  viewed  in  another  light. 
Every  one  knows  that  the  moral  sense  acts  under  the  guidance  of 
the  understanding.  It  is  not  the  power  of  deciding  infallibly  on 
what  is  right  or  wrong,  but  it  is  the  feeling  of  approbation  or  dis- 
approbation which  rises  in  the  mind  on  the  view  of  actions  which 
it  has  been  taught,  either  from  the  constitution  of  its  nature,  or  by 
education,  to  consider  good  or  bad.  The  class  of  actions  respect- 
ing which  information  is  derived  from  the  first  of  these  sources,  as 
all  other  intuitive  truths,  is  very  small ;  and,  therefore,  although 
conscience  be  as  much  an  original  constituent  of  our  nature  as 
reason,  it  as  much  needs  culture  and  correct  information  to  secure 


rs 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  485 

its  proper  exercise.  Hence,  the  only  possible  way  to  preserve 
men  from  all  the  evils  of  a  perverted  or  hardened  moral  sense,  is 
to  have  a  correct  rule  of  duty  presented  to  them  ;  as  the  only  way 
to  save  men  from  intellectual  aberrations,  is  the  exhibition  of  truth 
and  its  evidences.  That  Christianity  contains  the  purest  system 
of  moral  truth  ever  presented  to  the  world,  is  admitted,  except  by 
infidels  of  the  very  lowest  class.  It  is  one  great  object  of  the  ex- 
ercises of  the  Sabbath,  to  exhibit  this  rule  of  duty ;  to  bring  the 
people  to  understand  its  requisitions,  and  feel  their  obligation.  And 
such  is  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  that  moral  truth  contains  its 
own  evidence.  The  ground  of  the  assent  which  we  yield  to  it,  is 
its  congruity  with  the  internal  law  of  our  nature.  Hence  this 
knowledge  does  not  rest  in  the  understanding,  but  is  imbibed  and 
becomes  an  active  principle.  It  makes  men  better  as  well  as 
wiser.  It  might  easily  be  proved,  that  the  services  of  the  Lord's 
day  are  the  great  source  of  information  and  culture  of  a  moral 
kind  to  the  people.  It  is  here  as  with  religious  knowledge,  com- 
paratively few  read  or  study  for  themselves.  If  the  Sabbath, 
therefore,  be  devoted  to  amusement,  the  people  will  assuredly  grow 
up  in  ignorance.  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  ignorance  here  is 
error.  A  man  whose  moral  sense  is  unenlightened,  has  not  the  re- 
straints nor  the  incentives  necessary  to  virtue.  What  a  society 
must  become,  where  the  moral  sense  is  thus  degraded,  every  man 
can  conceive.  Men  may  be  virtuous  though  they  know  nothing 
of  science  or  history,  but  ignorance  of  duty  is  inseparable  from 
vice.  Virtue  cannot  exist  under  it,  for  virtue  is  the  conformity  of 
heart  and  life  to  moral  truth.  It  is,  therefore,  the  height  of  incon- 
sistency for  a  man  to  be  constantly  repeating  the  truism,  that  virtue 
is  essential  to  the  well-being  of  society,  and  yet  labour  to  destroy 
the  great  source  of  that  knowledge,  without  which  virtue  cannot  exist. 
The  advantages  of  a  religious  observance  of  the  Lord's  day, 
already  referred  to,  are  sufficient  to  entitle  it  to  the  respect  and 
reverence  of  all  good  men.  There  are  others  scarcely  less  impor- 
tant, on  which  our  limits  will  not  permit  us  to  dwell.  The  regular 
congregation  of  friends  and  neighbours  on  that  day  in  the  place  of 
worship,  to  mingle  their  feelings  before  the  throne  of  God,  tends  to 
unite  them  in  the  purest  and  strongest  bands.  The  differences 
arising  from  wealth  and  other  adventitious  circumstances  here 
disappear.  The  high  are  humbled  without  being  depressed  ;  the 
low  are  exalted  without  being  elated.  The  chord,  which  vibrates 
in  one  breast,  is  felt  in  all  the  others,  awaking  the  consciousness  of 
community  of  origin  and  of  nature.  They  learn  that  God  has 
made  of  one  flesh  all  the  dwellers  upon  earth  ;  that  he  has  breathed 
one  spirit  bearing  his  own  image  into  them  ;  placed  all  under  the 
same  benevolent  laws ;  offers  the  same  glorious  immortality  to  all, 
and  has  thus  bound  them  together  as  one  great  brotherhood.  It 
is  hence  obvious,  that  of  all  institutions,  this  is  the  most  directly 
efficacious  in  promoting  peace,  charity,  justice,  sympathy,  and  all 
other  amiable  feelings.    Experience  teaches  us,  that  of  all  men, 


486  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

those  are  most  sincerely  attached  who  are  accustomed  to  worship 
together. 

The  exercises  of  the  Sabbath,  moreover,  are  among  the  most 
efficient  means  of  intellectual  culture.  The  mass  of  men  employed 
in  mechanical  occupations  have  few  subjects  on  which  their  minds 
can  be  exercised.  Their  employments  present  little  or  nothing  to 
enlarge  or  vary  their  thoughts.  For  reading  they  have  little  time 
and  less  inclination.  It  is  principally  from  attendance  on  church, 
where  other  subjects  are  presented ;  where  new  and  elevating 
ideas  are  exhibited  ;  where  their  attention  is  excited  and  minds 
tasked,  that  their  intellectual  powers  receive  their  chief  develop- 
ment. It  is  the  grand  desideratum  in  education,  to  devise  means 
to  call  forth  the  powers  of  the  mind  in  due  proportion,  without 
perverting  or  injuring  its  moral  sensibilities.  With  this  view,  en- 
lightened men  have  laboured  to  bring  down  the  abstract  principles 
of  science  to  the  level  of  the  labouring  classes.  But  these  subjects 
are  not  sufficiently  exciting  to  arouse  general  attention.  It  must 
be  admitted  that  there  is  nothing  so  well  adapted  to  the  purpose, 
as  moral  and  religious  truth.  As  objects  of  intellectual  knowledge, 
they  are  the  most  expanding  which  the  mind  can  apprehend,  while 
their  influence  on  all  the  feelings  is  correcting  and  purifying.  A 
community  in  whose  education  these  truths  are  made  mainly  instru- 
mental, will  be,  of  all  others,  the  most  adequately  cultivated ;  their 
intellectual  faculties  most  fully  developed,  and  their  moral  princi- 
ples the  most  correctly  formed.  In  support  of  this  assertion,  we 
may  again  appeal  to  experience.  It  is  a  fact  familiar  to  all  whose 
attention  has  been  turned  to  the  subject,  that  even  illiterate  and 
feeble  minded  men,  when  brought  to  take  an  interest  in  religious 
truth,  have  exhibited  a  surprising  increase  in  mental  strength. 
The  contrast  between  Pagan  and  Christian  countries,  in  respect  to 
mental  improvement,  is,  in  no  small  degree,  owing  to  the  same 
cause.  The  truths  of  Christianity  cannot  enter  the  mind  without  en- 
larging it.  To  the  same  source  may,  in  a  great  measure,  be  traced 
the  striking  difference  between  the  common  people  in  Catholic  and 
Protestant  countries.  The  religious  services  of  the  former  consist, 
almost  exclusively,  in  exercises  of  devotion.  And  even  their  wor- 
ship, conducted  in  an  unknown  language,  is  but  imperfectly  com- 
prehended. No  distinct  objects  of  mental  apprehension  are  pre- 
sented, and  consequently  their  minds  are  but  little  exercised,  although 
devout  feeling  may  be  excited.  Hence  the  religion  of  the  Catho- 
lics is,  with  the  common  people,  so  much  a  matter  of  feeling  and 
so  little  of  principle.  And  hence  the  glaring  inconsistency,  so  often 
to  be  found  among  them,  between  their  open  immorality  and  aus- 
tere devotion  ;  bandits  and  prostitutes  being  habitually  religious. 
In  Protestant  countries,  a  great  part  of  the  duties  of  the  Sabbath 
is  the  communication  of  knowledge.  The  scriptures  are  uniformly 
read,  and  discourses  delivered  by  educated  men. 

Another  advantage  of  the  religious  observation  of  the  Lord's 
day  is,  that  it  tends  to  promote  genuine  liberty.     This  necessarily 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  487 

results  from  what  we  have  already  said.  If  it  is  the  means  of 
enlightening  the  minds  of  men,  it  disenthrals  them  from  the  yoke  of 
superstition  and  the  bondage  of  the  priests.  If  it  is  the  means  of 
teaching  them  their  essential  equality  before  God,  it  destroys  the 
very  foundation  of  tyranny.  In  making  them  feel  that  they  have 
a  common  origin  and  a  common  destiny,  it  teaches  the  high  they 
have  no  right  to  oppress  the  low,  and  the  low  they  are  entitled  to 
be  recognised  as  brethren.  Hence  Christians  are  the  only  freemen 
on  the  face  of  the  globe.  The  rise  of  this  religion  was  the  era  of 
civil  liberty.  And  it  has  only  been  where  Christianity  has  been 
obscured,  and  its  truths  prevented  from  entering  the  minds  of  the 
people,  that  they  have  ever  been  reduced  to  bondage.  The  men 
to  whom  the  world  is  principally  indebted  for  civil  liberty,  were 
men  most  deeply  Christian.  The  principles  of  our  religion  are 
thus  directly  favourable  to  freedom,  and  they  are  essential  to  its 
preservation.  Anything,  therefore,  which  diminishes  their  force 
on  the  public  mind,  is  so  much  done  to  destroy  that  cause  to  which 
we  are  so  loud  in  our  profession  of  attachment.  We  do  not  now 
insist  on  the  acknowledged  necessity  of  virtue  to  freedom,  of  reli- 
gion to  virtue,  of  knowledge  to  religion,  and  of  a  regular  system 
of  instruction  to  bring  this  knowledge  to  bear  on  the  minds  of  the 
people.  These,  however,  are  obvious  truths,  and  they  go  to  show 
now  intimately  the  happiness  and  liberty,  the  knowledge  and  virtue 
of  men,  are  connected  with  the  proper  observance  of  the  Sabbath. 
There  is  still  one  other  view,  and  one  which  confers  on  this  in- 
stitution its  chief  value  in  the  eyes  of  Christians.  The  Bible  tells 
us  that  men  are  sinners ;  that  the  wages  of  sin  is  death  ;  that  Jesus 
Christ  came  into  the  world  to  deliver  men  from  the  consequences 
of  their  apostasy ;  that  the  Gospel  is  the  proclamation  of  God's 
readiness  to  pardon  and  accept  them  on  the  terms  which  it  pre- 
scribes ;  the  Sabbath  is  the  day  appointed  for  making  known  these 
offers  of  mercy  and  for  urging  their  acceptance.  Thousands  thus 
hear  these  offers,  who  would  never  hear  them  in  any  other  way. 
And  of  the  millions  who  accept  them,  few  would  do  so,  were  it 
not  for  their  being  thus  constantly  presented  and  urged.  Here,  to 
those  who  believe  the  Bible,  opens  a  prospect  which  earth  and  its 
interests  cannot  bound.  It  is  not  the  welfare,  nor  even  the  virtue 
of  men  here,  that  is  alone  concerned  ;  it  is  their  everlasting  wel- 
fare and  virtue  in  the  world  to  come,  which  the  Christian  sees  are 
intimately  connected  with  the  proper  observance  of  this  day.  He 
cannot  shut  his  eyes  to  the  evidence  of  the  fact,  that  it  is  through 
the  regular  preaching  of  the  Gospel  men  are  usually  brought  to 
accept  of  its  offers,  and  become  fitted  for  death  and  eternity.  To 
his  view,  therefore,  the  importance  of  the  Sabbath  is  beyond  all 
estimate.  And  he  cannot  but  regard  any  attempt  to  lessen  its  in- 
fluence, or  to  lead  men  to  neglect  its  duties,  as  directed  not  only 
against  all  that  is  desirable  in  human  character  in  this  world,  but 
against  their  well-being  in  the  world  to  come.  Infidels  may  sneer 
at  all  this.    But  truth  is  indestructible  by  ridicule.     And  he  must 


488  SUNDAY    MAILS. 


be  weak  indeed,  who  suffers  the  light  estimation  of  others  to  affect 
his  reverence  for  an  institution,  while  all  the  evidence  of  its  value 
remains  untouched. 

We  feel  persuaded  we  have  not  over  rated  the  importance  of 
the  Sabbath.  The  experience  of  communities  and  nations  bears 
out  our  statements.  Those  sections  of  our  own  country  where 
the  day  is  best  observed,  are  distinguished  by  superior  intelli- 
gence, piety,  good  morals  and  social  order.  Those  nations  which 
are  remarkable  for  a  regard  to  the  Sabbath,  take  the  lead  in  the 
world  in  general  cultivation,  in  sound  religion,  in  activity  and 
energy  of  character,  in  internal  stability  and  order,  and  in  external 
respect  and  power.  These  are  the  nations  which  have  been  the 
mothers  and  guardians  of  civil  and  religious  liberty,  and  are  now 
doing  almost  all  that  is  done  in  the  diffusion  of  knowledge  and 
piety  through  the  world.  Such  is  the  position  occupied  by  Great 
Britain  and  these  United  States — two  countries  distinguished 
throughout  Christendom  for  their  regard  for  the  Sabbath,  as  they 
are  distinguished  throughout  the  world  for  their  internal  prosperity 
and  their  diffusive  and  benign  influence.  That  this  favourable 
distinction  will  not  long  survive  their  regard  for  the  Sabbath,  we 
as  firmly  believe,  as  that  religion  and  virtue  are  essential  to  the 
well-being  of  society. 

We  come  now  to  inquire,  What  obligations  are  Christians  under 
to  observe  this  day  ?  And  here  we  would  remark,  that  if  what  we 
have  already  said  be  correct,  the  obligation  must  be  of  the  highest 
moral  character.  If  the  religious  observance  of  the  Lord's  day  be 
the  means  of  diffusing  religious  knowledge,  of  exciting  and  sustain- 
ing religious  feeling  and  moral  principle  in  the  community  ;  if  it 
tends  to  refine  the  character  and  promote  all  the  social  virtues  ;  if 
it  is  the  highest  means  to  multitudes  of  intellectual  culture  ;  if  it 
raises  men  to  a  sense  of  their  own  dignity,  while  it  depresses  their 
false  pride  and  arrogant  claims ;  and,  finally,  if  it  is  the  grand 
means  of  leading  them  to  the  attainment  of  eternal  life,  then  is 
every  man  bound  to  promote  this  observance  by  all  those  obliga- 
tions which  bind  him  to  promote  the  temporal  and  eternal  interests 
of  his  fellow  men.  Then,  too,  it  is  obvious,  that  all  efforts,  whe- 
ther by  argument  or  ridicule,  to  lessen  its  influence,  is  so  much 
done  to  render  men  wicked  and  miserable,  both  in  this  life  and 
that  which  is  to  come.  We  feel  almost  as  though  it  were  super- 
fluous to  inquire,  whether  God  has  added  to  an  obligation  so  obvi- 
ous and  so  imperious,  that  of  a  positive  command.  Had  no  such 
precepts  as  "  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  or  "  Thou  shalt  not  commit 
adultery,*'  been  recorded  in  the  scriptures,  the  obligation  would  be 
complete  from  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  acts  themselves. 
In  like  manner,  though  we  were  unable  to  prove  that  God  had 
commanded  us  to  keep  holy  one  day  in  the  seven,  we  think  the 
obligation  would  still  be  binding,  after  a  custom  so  salutary  had 
once  been  introduced.  There 'is,  however,  from  the  obvious  ten- 
dency of  this  observance  to  promote  the  best  interests  of  society, 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  489 

a  strong  presumption  that  God  has  enjoined  it.  We  know  that 
the  object  of  the  religion  which  he  has  revealed  is  to  promote  the 
purity  and  happiness  of  men.  And  if  there  is  an  institution,  which 
is  essential  to  the  preservation  and  influence  of  this  religion,  it  is 
surely  to  be  presumed  that  it  is  of  divine  appointment.  That  the 
observance  of  a  day  on  which  the  rites  of  this  religion  should  be 
celebrated,  its  truths  and  claims  presented,  is  of  primary  impor- 
tance, we  think  can  hardly  be  denied.  How  is  any  system  of 
truth  to  be  received  and  obeyed,  unless  presented  to  the  mind  ? 
And  how  is  this  to  be  done,  unless  time  be  appropriated  for  the 
purpose?  Will  men  of  themselves,  and  each  one  for  himself,  go 
to  the  silent  record,  and  ascertain  and  receive  all  that  God  has  en- 
joined and  promised  ?  Surely  no  other  religion  was  ever  thus 
left  without  any  means  of  accomplishing  its  object.  Besides,  if  it 
be  a  dictate  of  reason  that  we  should  worship  God,  if  this  is  to  be 
done  in  our  social,  as  well  as  individual  capacity,  and  if  this  union 
of  men  to  make  their  joint  homage  to  their  Maker  be,  in  like  man- 
ner, a  dictate  of  nature,  then  it  is  to  be  presumed,  that  in  a  re- 
vealed religion,  which  enforces  all  other  duties  which  the  law  of 
our  nature  enjoins,  this  duty  of  public  worship  is  commanded. 
And  as  it  is  a  duty  which  must  be  often  repeated,  it  is  also  to  be 
presumed,  that  its  stated  discharge  would  be  insisted  upon,  and 
time  allotted  for  the  purpose.  Nothing,  surely,  can  be  more  obvi- 
ous than  that  if  this  were  not  the  case,  the  duty  itself  would  be  in 
a  great  measure  neglected.  The  evident  importance,  therefore, 
of  the  appointment  of  a  day  for  religious  purposes,  in  order  to 
enable  the  religion  of  the  Bible  to  accomplish  the  purposes  for 
which  it  was  revealed,  and  to  secure  the  stated  discharge  of  one 
of  the  plainest  of  moral-  obligations,  creates  at  least  a  presumption 
that  the  true  religion  is  not  the  only  religion  without  its  sacred  days. 
In  turning  to  the  scriptures,  we  find  almost  on  the  first  page,  in  the 
very  history  of  the  creation,  it  is  recorded,  that  in  six  days  God  made 
heaven  and  earth,  that  he  rested  on  the  seventh  day,  "  Therefore 
the  Lord  blessed  the  seventh  day  and  sanctified  it."  The  mean- 
ing of  this  passage  admits  of  no  dispute.  When  God  is  said  to 
bless  anything,  it  implies  that  he  favourably  distinguishes  it,  in 
some  way  or  other.  The  seventh  day  was  thus  distinguished  by 
being  sanctified,  or  set  apart  for  a  sacred  use.  That  this  is  the 
meaning  of  the  term  we  have  already  proved.  If,  then,  from  the 
very  creation  of  the  world  God  commanded  men  to  consecrate 
one  day  in  seven  to  his  service,  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  this 
is  a  duty  of  universal  and  perpetual  obligation.  The  way  in 
which  the  force  of  this  passage  is  commonly  evaded,  is  not  by  de- 
nying its  obvious  import,  but  by  assuming  it  to  be  a  prolepsis,  or 
anticipation  of  an  event  which  occurred  upwards  of  two  thousand 
years  afterward.  According  to  this  idea,  Moses  does  not  mean  to 
state  that  God  did  then  sanctify  the  seventh  day,  but  merely  that 
his  having  rested  on  the  seventh  day  was  the  reason  why,  in  after 
ages,  he  selected  that  day  as  the  Sabbath.     The  objections  to  this 


490  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

assumption,  however,  appear  to  us  decisive.  In  the  first  place,  it 
takes  for  granted,  without  the  least  evidence,  that  the  book  of 
Genesis  was  not  written  until  after  the  giving  of  the  law  on  Mount 
Sinai.  Whereas,  the  probability  is  entirely  on  the  side  of  its  hav- 
ing been  written  at  an  earlier  period.  But  secondly,  it  does  evi- 
dent violence  to  the  context.  This  verse  is  obviously  a  part  of  a 
regular  narrative  of  consecutive  events.  Let  any  unprejudiced 
man  read  the  passage  and  decide  for  himself.  "  And  on  the  se- 
venth day  God  ended  his  work  which  he  had  made  ;  and  he  rested 
on  the  seventh  day  from  all  his  work  which  he  had  made.  And  God 
blessed  the  seventh  day  and  sanctified  it,  because  that  in  it  he  had 
rested  from  all  his  work."  Is  not  this  a  regular  narrative  of  facts  1 
God  created  all  things  in  six  days,  he  rested  on  the  seventh,  and 
blessed  the  seventh  day  and  sanctified  it.  There  is  not  the  slight- 
est intimation  that  the  latter  verse  refers  to  an  event,  which  did 
not  take  place  for  ages  after  those  recorded  in  the  two  immedi- 
ately preceding.  Those  who  make  so  violent  an  assumption,  are 
surely  bound  to  produce  the  strongest  reasons  in  its  justification. 

In  favour  of  taking  the  passage  in  its  obvious  sense,  it  may  be 
urged,  that  there  are  many  important  arguments  in  favour  of  the 
ante-Mosaic  origin  of  the  Sabbath.  The  day  was  appointed  in 
commemoration  of  the  creation.  Its  grand  design  was  to  preserve 
the  knowledge  of  the  true  God  as  the  creator  of  the  world.  The 
necessity  or  ground  of  the  institution,  therefore,  existed  from  the 
beginning.  There  is  in  this  consideration  alone,  a  strong  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  its  having  been  appointed  at  the  time  specified 
in  Genesis  ii.  3.  Besides,  we  know  that  a  large  portion  of  the 
laws  of  Moses  did  not  originate  with  him.  The  rites  and  usages 
of  the  Hebrews,  from  the  earliest  times,  were  incorporated  into 
his  code.  Circumcision,  sacrifices,  the  distinction  between  clean 
and  unclean  animals,  the  right  of  divorce,  the  duties  of  the  avenger 
of  blood,  the  obligation  of  a  brother  to  marry  the  widow  of  his 
deceased  brother,  and  many  other  cases  of  this  kind,  might  be 
cited.  It  was  the  object  of  Moses,  under  divine  direction,  to  em- 
body in  one  code  all  the  traditionary  knowledge  and  laws  of  his 
people,  and  to  institute  such  new  regulations  as  should  most  effec- 
tually preserve  them  distinct  from  other  nations,  and  prepare  them 
and  the  world  for  the  coming  of  Christ.  With  regard  to  the  laws, 
and  especially  the  festivals,  which  originated  with  him,  it  is  to  be 
observed,  that  they  arose  out  of  the  existing  state  of  the  people,  or 
were  intended  to  keep  in  mind  some  recent  event  in  their  history. 
This  was  the  case  with  the  Passover,  Feast  of  Tabernacles,  &c. 
When,  therefore,  there  is  an  institution,  which  betrays  no  such 
local  origin,  and  is  designed  to  commemorate  no  such  recent 
event,  the  presumption  is  strongly  in  favour  of  its  being  one  of  the 
traditionary  usages  which  make  up  so  large  a  part  of  his  laws. 
This  is  the  case  with  the  Sabbath.  This  command  is  not  enforced, 
as  the  others  are,  by  considerations  drawn  from  their  immediate 
history  ;  but  they  are  commanded  to  rest  on  the  seventh  day  be- 
cause God  rested  on  that  day  and  sanctified  it. 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  491 

The  very  form  in  which  the  command  is  given,  favours  the  idea 
of  the  previous  observance  of  the  day.  Remember  the  Sabbath 
day  to  keep  it  holy.  This  mode  of  expression  is  not  used  in  refer- 
ence to  feasts  which  he  had  but  just  established.  It  is  nowhere 
said,  remember  the  Passover,  or  any  other  festival.  Besides,  there 
is  positive  evidence  of  the  Sabbath  before  the  solemn  enactment  of 
the  law  on  Mount  Sinai.  This  did  not  occur  until  the  third  month 
after  the  departure  out  of  Egypt.  Yet  we  find  that  in  the  second 
month,  when  in  the  wilderness  of  Sin,  being  pressed  for  food,  the 
people  were  supplied  by  manna  from  heaven.  This  perishable 
article  they  were  commanded  to  gather  from  day  to  day,  and  not 
to  attempt  to  preserve  it  over  the  twenty-four  hours.  But  on  the 
sixth  day,  Ex.  xvi.  22,  the  people,  of  their  own  accord,  gathered  a 
double  portion.  The  rulers  came  and  told  Moses,  apparently  de- 
sirous to  know  whether  the  manna  would  keep,  or  whether  they 
might  not  expect  the  usual  supply  on  the  following  day.  Moses 
told  them,  the  people  were  right,  that  as  the  morrow  was  the  Sab- 
bath, no  manna  would  be  given,  but  the  double  portion  gathered 
on  the  sixth  day  would  remain  sweet  over  the  seventh.  Had  the 
people  acted  under  the  direction  of  Moses  in  this  business,  the 
rulers  could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  it,  and  would  not  have  gone 
to  him  for  instruction. 

There  is  another  remark  applicable  to  many  of  the  laws  of 
Moses  ;  in  frequent  instances  something  is  commanded,  but  the 
manner  of  the  performance  or  details  of  the  duty  are  not  specified. 
This  is  the  case,  however,  only  where  the  thing  prescribed  was 
already  familiar,  and  usage  had  fixed  the  mode  in  which  it  was  to 
be  done.  Thus,  in  regard  to  the  Sabbath,  we  find  merely  the 
general  directions,  that  the  day  was  to  be  consecrated  to  God ;  all 
labour  intermitted,  the  sacrifices  doubled,  and  a  holy  convocation 
held.  But  what  particular  things  were  prohibited  or  enjoined,  we 
find  nowhere  minutely  stated.  With  respect,  however,  to  those 
feasts  which  were  unquestionably  instituted  by  Moses,  we  find  the 
greatest  particularity  as  to  the  prescriptions.  Whence  this  differ- 
ence 1  Does  it  not  arise  from  the  fact,  that  the  Sabbath  was  one 
of  those  usages  with  which  the  people  were  familiar,  and  therefore 
did  not  need  such  particular  instructions  ? 

A  stong  confirmation  of  this  view  is  derived  from  the  division 
of  time  into  portions  of  seven  days.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  account 
of  the  deluge ;  in  the  history  of  Jacob  ;  it  is  found  among  all  an- 
cient nations,  the  Egyptians,  Greeks,  Romans,  Asiatics,  and  even 
among  the  American  Indians.  Whatever  was  the  origin  of  this 
division,  it  is  evident  that  it  must  have  been  very  ancient.  There 
are  three  methods  of  accounting  for  it.  The  first  is,  that  it  arose 
from  dividing  the  months  into  four  portions.  This  is  very  im- 
probable, because  seven  is  not  the  fourth,  either  of  twenty-nine 
and  a  half  days,  the  real  length  of  a  lunar  month,  or  of  thirty  days, 
which  was  the  number  assigned  as  early  as  the  flood.  The  other 
method  is  that  which  Selden  and  many  others  have   adopted. 


492  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

They  suppose,  the  names  of  the  seven  planets  being  given  to  the 
days  of  the  week  determined  their  number.  To  this  supposition  it 
may  be  objected,  that  the  division  existed  at  a  period  anterior  to 
any  indications  of  much  astronomical  knowledge,  and  that  affixing 
the  names  of  the  planets  to  certain  days,  was  evidently  subsequent 
to  the  introduction  of  idolatry,  and  belief  of  the  influence  of  the 
stars  over  the  affairs  of  men.  Of  the  latter,  especially,  we  have 
no  evidence  as  early  as  the  times  of  Noah.  Besides,  had  this  been 
the  true  origin  of  the  division  of  time  into  weeks,  we  should  expect 
that  the  names  of  the  planets  would  have  been  given  in  their  natu- 
ral order,  instead  of  succeeding  each  other  in  a  manner  perfectly 
arbitrary.  The  various  ingenious  answers  which  have  been  given 
to  this  difficulty,  all  suppose  such  a  degree  of  refinement  in  the 
mode  of  proceeding,  as  could  only  belong  to  an  age  far  more 
recent  than  that  in  which  the  computation  by  weeks  is  known  to 
have  existed.*  The  third  method  is  by  far  the  most  satisfactory. 
It  supposes  the  division  to  have  existed  from  the  beginning,  and  to 
have  arisen  from  the  fact  recorded  by  Moses,  that  God  created  all 
things  in  six  days  and  rested  on  the  seventh.  We  know  that  some 
obscure  knowledge  of  the  creation,  deluge,  and  dispersion,  has  been 
preserved  among  all  nations.  And,  therefore,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  so  convenient  a  distribution  of  time,  although  arbitrary,  has 
passed  from  one  nation  to  another.  If  God  did  from  the  creation 
set  apart  the  seventh  day  to  himself,  we  need  no  other  reason  to 
account  for  the  origin  and  prevalence  of  this  mode  of  computation. 
This  fact,  too,  best  accounts  for  the  sacredness  attributed  among 
almost  all  ancient  nations,  to  the  number  seven.  This  was  every- 
where a  sacred  nnmber.  The  manner  in  which  the  ancients  speak 
of  this  number  and  of  the  seventh  day,  is  •  sufficiently  remarkable, 
and  has  led  many  learned  men,  as  Theophilus  of  Antioch,  and 
Clemens  of  Alexandria,  among  the  ancients;  and  Grotius,  Huet, 
Budes,  and  many  others  among  the  moderns,  to  suppose  that  this 
day  was  held  sacred  by  all  antiquity.  The  passages  cited  on  this 
subject  may  be  seen  in  Selden,  lib.  iii.,  c.  16 — 19,  together  with  his 
answers  to  the  arguments  derived  from  them.  Admitting  all  that 
he  says,  it  is  at  least  clear  that  this  number  was  considered  sacred 
throughout  the  ancient  world. 

We  say,  then,  the  plain  meaning  of  the  narrative  in  Gen.  ii. ; 
the  very  reason  and  nature  of  the  institution  ;  the  manner  in  which 
the  law  in  Exodus  is  expressed  ;  the  observance  of  the  day  before 
that  law  was  given  ;  the  fact  that  Moses,  as  a  general  rule,  adopt- 
ed the  jus  consuetudinarium  of  his  people  ;  the  division  of  time 
into  weeks,  long  before  him ;  the  diffusion  of  this  mode  of  compu- 
tation over  the  world,  and  the  universal  sacredness  attached  to  the 
number  seven,  are  arguments  for  the  institution  of  the  Sabbath 
from  the  creation,  which  we  are  unable  to  resist. 

The  most  obvious  objection  to  this  opinion,  is  the  absence  of 

*  See,  on  this  subject,  Selden  de  Jure  Nat.  et  Gen.,  lib.  iii. 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  493 

positive  evidence  of  the  religious  observance  of  the  seventh  day 
by  the  Patriarchs.  To  this  it  may  be  replied,  there  is  not  such 
absolute  want  of  evidence  on  this  point,  as  is  often  asserted.  In 
the  history  of  Cain  and  Abel  it  is  said,  "  at  the  end  of  days"  (as 
the  Hebrew  phrase  should  be  rendered)  they  brought  their  re- 
spective offerings  unto  God.  We  cannot  decide,  with  certainty, 
what  this  expression  means  ;  but,  taken  in  connexion  with  the 
statement  immediately  preceding,  that  God  had  set  apart  to  reli- 
gion the  seventh  day,  which  was  the  close  of  a  regular  period,  the 
probability  is,  that  by  the  "  end  of  days"  we  are  to  understand  the 
end  of  the  week,  or  Sabbath.  Besides,  the  fact  already  noticed, 
that  Noah  and  the  immediate  ancestors  of  the  Hebrews  divided 
their  time  into  weeks,  renders  it  probable  there  was  some  regular 
observance  of  the  seventh  day.  But  admitting  all  the  objection 
assumes,  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  religious  observance  of 
the  Sabbath  anterior  to  Moses,  we  remark,  this  is  no  decisive  proof 
that  it  was  not  in  fact  observed ;  and  if  it  were,  its  non-observance 
would  be  no  decisive  argument  against  its  original  appointment. 
In  support  of  the  former  of  these  assertions,  that  silence  is  no 
decisive  proof  of  non-observance,  it  should  be  remembered  the 
narrative  is  very  short,  and  goes  but  little  into  detail.  The  history 
of  two  thousand  five  hundred  years  is  comprised  in  a  few  pages. 
This  circumstance  alone  almost  invalidates  the  objection.  But 
the  argument  would  prove  too  much.  From  the  time  of  Joshua 
to  that  of  David,  a  period  of  five  or  six  hundred  years,  there  is 
little  or  nothing  said  of  the  Sabbath.  Are  we  hence  to  infer  that 
it  was  not  at  all  observed  during  this  period  ?  certainly  not.  This 
is  equally  true  of  a  great  majority  of  the  laws  of  Moses  ;  their 
faithful  observance  cannot  be  historically  proved,  and  yet  we  should 
not  be  authorized  to  conclude  from  the  mere  silence  of  the  record 
that  they  were  entirely  neglected.  As  to  the  second  point,  that 
non-observance  is  no  decisive  argument  against  the  original  ap- 
pointment of  the  Sabbath,  the  case  is  still  clearer.  As  just  re- 
marked, although  we  know  that  the  Hebrew  polity  was  arranged 
by  Moses,  as  described  in  the  Pentateuch,  yet  there  are  many  of 
his  laws  of  which  there  is  no  evidence,  for  ages,  of  their  being 
actually  obeyed.  The  objection  under  consideration,  as  applied 
to  the  Sabbath,  would  require  us  to  believe  that  Moses  never  en- 
joined any  of  these  laws.  We  may  take  a  still  stronger  case.  We 
know  from  the  highest  authority,  that  God  in  instituting  marriage 
ordained  that  a  man  should  have  but  one  wife.  Yet  the  patriarchs 
were  polygamists ;  and  even  after  Moses,  a  plurality  of  wives  was 
considered  lawful  among  the  Hebrews.  This,  of  course,  cannot 
be  considered  as  any  proof  that  God  had  not  at  the  beginning 
given  a  clear  intimation  of  his  will  on  this  subject.  How,  then, 
can  it  be  inferred  from  the  fact  the  Sabbath  was  neglected,  even  if 
the  fact  be  admitted,  that  it  was  not  commanded  at  the  time  of  the 
creation  ?  The  inference  is  obviously  unauthorised ;  and  yet  this  is 
the  main  ground  on  which  the  advocates  of  the  Mosaic  origin  of  this 


494  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

institution,  rest  their  cause,  and  endeavour  to  invalidate  the  plain 
testimony  in  Gen.  ii.  3. 

Another  argument  is,  that  the  Sabbath  was  a  Jewish  institution, 
having  a  local  origin  and  design ;  that  is,  designed  to  tommemo- 
rate  an  event  in  which  they  alone  were  interested.  In  proof  of 
which  they  appeal  to  such  passages  as  Exodus  xxxi.  13,  and 
others,  in  which  the  Sabbath  is  said  to  be  a  sign  between  God  and 
his  ancient  people ;  and  to  those  in  which  Moses  is  said  to  have 
given  them  the  Sabbath,  as  in  Nehemiah  ix.  13,  14.  From  the 
former  class  it  is  inferred  that  if  the  Sabbath  was  a  sign  between 
God  and  the  Jews,  it  must  be  peculiar  to  them  and  instituted  for 
them.  But  this  inference  is  unsound.  Anything,  in  the  language 
of  the  scriptures,  is  called  a  sign  which  was  selected  by  God  to  be 
a  memorial  of  any  truth,  or  confirmation  of  any  promise.  It  mat- 
ters not  whether  the  thing  selected  be  ordinary  or  extraordinary 
in  its  character ;  .whether  it  was  previously  familiar,  or  originated 
for  the  occasion.  Thus,  God  tells  Noah  the  rainbow  should  be  a 
sign  between  him  and  the  earth  that  the  flood  never  should  return. 
This  does  not  prove  that  the  bow  of  heaven  had  never  previously 
been  seen  ;  it  only  declares  that  it  was  selected  as  the  memorial  of 
God's  gracious  determination.  In  like  manner,  though  the  Sabbath 
had  long  been  familiar  to  the  Hebrews,  God  might  have  chosen 
that  observance  as  a  standing  memorial  of  the  fact,  that  the  true 
God  was  their  God.  And  it  is  evident  that  the  selection  was,  of 
all  others,  the  most  appropriate ;  for  the  object  of  the  original  in- 
stitution of  the  Sabbath  was  to  keep  in  mind  that  God  was  the 
creator  of  the  world,  and  therefore  it  was  in  perfect  unison  with 
this  design,  that  God  said  to  the  Jews,  "  keep  my  Sabbaths"  for  a 
sign  that  your  God  is  the  true  God.  As  to  those  passages  in  which 
Moses  is  said  to  have  given  them  the  Sabbath,  the  argument  is 
still  less  conclusive.  For  Nehemiah,  in  the  passage  referred  to, 
says :  "  Thou  gavest  them  right  judgments  and  true  laws,  good 
statutes  and  commandments,  and  madest  known  unto  them  thy 
holy  Sabbath,  by  the  hand  of  Moses  thy  servant."  Were  all  these 
right  judgments  and  good  statutes,  said  to  be  given  by  Moses,  un- 
known before  his  time  ?  The  reverse  is  notoriously  the  case.  Christ 
even  says,  "  Moses  gave  unto  you  circumcision,"  though  it  was  of 
the  fathers,  and  customary  long  before  Moses  was  born.  Such 
passages  no  more  prove  that  the  Sabbath  was  instituted  by  Moses, 
than  they  prove  that  the  Hebrews  were  ignorant  of  the  many 
moral  precepts  which  he  gave  them,  or  of  the  multitude  of  usages 
which  he  adopted  and  enforced.  The  argument  from  Deut.  v.  15, 
in  which  the  Jews  were  commanded  to  keep  the  Sabbath,  because 
God  had  delivered  them  from  the  land  of  Egypt,  has  already  been  an- 
swered. They  were  to  keep  it,  not  in  commemoration  of  that  event, 
but  they  were  to  give  this  opportunity  for  rest  to  all  their  servants, 
because  God  had  thus  interposed  to  give  them  rest.  The  remem- 
brance of  their  former  sufferings  should  make  them  kind.  These 
are  the  objections  to  the  belief  that  God  "  sanctified  the  seventh 


SUNDAY   MAILS.  495 

day"  from  the  beginning.  That  they  are  of  little  force,  we  think 
must  be  admitted.  And,  therefore,  all  the  direct  evidence  in  favour 
of  the  early  origin  of  the  institution,  which  we  have  adduced,  re- 
mains unimpaired.  But  Dr.  Paley  himself  says,  "If  the  divine 
command  was  actually  delivered  at  the  creation,  it  was  addressed, 
no  doubt,  to  the  whole  human  species  alike,  and  continues,  unless 
repealed  by  some  subsequent  revelation,  binding  upon  all  who 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  it." — Moral  Philosophy,  p.  247.  That 
it  was  thus  delivered,  we  think  we  have  proved  ;  that  it  has  been 
subsequently  repealed,  it  becomes  those  who  deny  its  continued 
obligation  clearly  to  establish.  The  necessity  of  an  express  re- 
peal is  the  stronger,  because  the  principle  that  a  command  is  to  be 
considered  binding  as  long  as  the  ground  or  reason  of  it  remains, 
applies  here  in  its  full  force.  All  moral  precepts  are  immutable, 
because  the  ground  on  which  they  rest  is  immutable.  The  com- 
mands, "  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  "  Honour  thy  father  and  thy  mother," 
arising  out  of  the  unchanging  relations  of  society,  must  remain  in 
force  as  long  as  these  relations  subsist.  And  the  command  to 
love  God  must  be  binding  as  long  as  rational  creatures  are  in  be- 
ing. We  have  seen  that  the  design  of  the  Sabbath  was  to  secure 
the  continued  worship  of  the  true  God,  and  must  therefore  be 
binding  as  long  as  this  obligation  continues,  unless  it  be  shown 
that  the  command  has  been  repealed,  and  other  means  appointed 
for  securing  this  great  end. 

The  arguments  of  those  who  assert  that  the  law  of  the  Sabbath 
is  no  longer  obligatory,  are  either  derived  from  the  general  princi- 
ple that  all  Jewish  laws,  as  such,  are  repealed,  or  from  some  spe- 
cific declarations  of  the  New  Testament  writers.  The  principal 
dependence  is  placed  on  the  assumption  that  the  Sabbath  was  pe- 
culiarly a  Jewish  institution,  and  therefore  ceased  to  be  obligatory, 
when  the  law  of  Moses  was  abrogated.  .That  this  assumption  is 
unauthorised,  we  have  already  endeavoured  to  prove.  A  precept 
having  been  adopted  and  incorporated  with  the  Hebrew  laws,  did 
not  take  it  out  of  the  class  to  which  it  originally  belonged,  or 
alter  its  relation  to  other  nations.  This  is  confessedly  the  case 
with  all  moral  precepts  which  were  in  force  before  the  law  of 
Moses  enacted  them,  and  which  continue  after  that  law,  as  such, 
ceases  to  be  binding.  And  this  is  also  true  of  every  law  the  ground 
or  reason  of  which  continues.  The  remark,  therefore,  of  Dr.  Pa- 
ley,  which  the  Reviewer  quotes,  "  If  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  be 
binding,  it  is  binding  as  to  the  day,  its  duties  and  its  penalty,"  is 
evidently  unfounded.  Shall  we  say  that  the  command,  "  Thou 
shalt  not  commit  adultery,"  if  binding  at  all,  must  be  binding  as  to 
its  penalty  as  well  as  its  precept ;  and  that  every  adulterer  must 
be  punished  with  death?  Surely  not.  Whatever  was  purely 
Jewish  fell  when  that  system  fell ;  whatever  was  of  prior  obliga- 
tion remains,  unless  positively  repealed.  It  is  precisely  on  this 
f  round  Christians  place  the  law  of  the  Sabbath.  Everything  as  to 
uties  or  penalties  which  were  attached  to  it,  and  which  liad  a 


^r 


496  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

peculiar  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  the  Hebrews,  or  which 
arose  out  of  them,  is  no  longer  obligatory  on  us.  Hence  we  are 
not  bound  to  offer  sacrifices  on  that  day  as  they  were,  nor  are  we 
exposed  to  the  punishment  which  they  incurred,  for  every  violation 
of  a  fundamental  principle  of  their  theocratical  system.  Further 
than  this,  it  is  evident,  the  abrogation  of  the  Mosaic  law  cannot 
affect  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  ;  its  original  claims  remain  unaffect- 
ed. The  very  position  which  this  command  occupies  in  the  Mo- 
saic institutions,  shows  that  it  was  not  considered  as  one  of  those 
positive  or  ceremonial  enactments,  which  were  to  remain  only 
until  the  Messiah  appeared.  It  is  presented  in  the  midst  of 
moral  precepts  of  confessedly  permanent  obligation ;  it  was  in- 
scribed on  the  tables  of  stone ;  it  followed  immediately  those  pre- 
cepts which  refer  to  our  duty  to  God  as  enjoining  the  means  by  which 
the  love,  obedience  and  worship  which  belong  to  him  were  to  be 
secured  and  preserved.  It  is  thus  custos  primae  tabulae.  If  the 
Sabbath,  therefore,  be  not  a  peculiarly  Jewish  institution,  the  re- 
peal of  the  Jewish  law  does  not  impair  our  obligation  to  observe  it. 
There  are,  however,  some  passages  in  the  New  Testament  which 
are  appealed  to  as  proving  that  the  observance  of  a  day  devoted 
to  religion  is  no  longer  obligatory.  There  are  only  two  of  much 
importance.  The  one  is  Colossians  ii.  10.  "  Let  no  man  there- 
fore judge  you  in  meat,  or  in  drink,  or  in  respect  of  a  festival 
iv  wet  lopms,  or  of  the  new  moon,  or  of  the  Sabbath  days."  In  ex- 
plaining any  passage  of  this  kind,  we  must  of  course  bear  in  mind 
the  circumstances  of  the  persons  to  whom  it  was  addressed.  Al- 
most all  the  early  Christian  churches  were  composed  of  converts 
both  from  the  Jews  and  heathen.  The  former  were,  naturally,  so 
much  attached  to  their  own  law,  that  it  was  with  difficulty  they 
could  be  brought  to  relinquish  its  observance.  Hence,  in  all  the 
churches  founded  by  th,e  Apostles,  there  was  continual  difficulty  on 
this  subject.  Judaizing  teachers  abounded  everywhere,  who  in- 
sisted on  the  necessity  of  conforming  to  the  Mosaic  institutions. 
Paul  occupies  a  large  share  of  his  several  epistles  in  counteracting 
these  men.  He  exhorts  Christians  to  stand  fast  in  the  liberty 
wherewith  Christ  had  made  them  free ;  severely  reproves  those 
who  suffered  themselves  to  be  led  into  the  observance  of  Jewish 
rites  ;  and  bids  them,  as  in  this  passage  to  the  Colossians,  not  to  let 
any  man  presume  to  condemn  them  for  not  keeping  the  law  of 
Moses.  That  this  is  the  simple  and  full  meaning  of  the  passage  is 
evident,  because  this  was  the  very  subject  of  controversy  at  Co- 
losse,  and  because  the  things  here  specified,  meats,  drinks  and  fes- 
tivals, were  all  of  them  prescriptions  of 'that  law.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  from  this  passage,  that  the  Sabbath,  as  a  Jewish  festival, 
was  no  more  binding  than  the  feast  of  the  new  moon,  or  the  dis- 
tinction between  clean  and  unclean  meats.  But  this  is  saying 
nothing  more  than  all  Christians  admit ;  that  the  law  of  Moses,  as 
such,  is  no  longer  obligatory.  By  the  Sabbaths  here  mentioned 
(although  that  term  is  often  used  generally  for  all  solemn  feasts), 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  497 

is  meant  the  seventh  day  of  every  week.  The  observance  of  this 
day  no  one  holds  to  be  binding.  The  name  Sabbath  was  distinct-' 
ively  applied  to  that  day.  Hence  the  early  Christian  fathers  ear- 
nestly dehort  their  hearers  from  keeping  the  Sabbath ;  insist  upon 
it,  that  it  is  no  longer  obligatory  ;  while  they  urge  upon  them  the 
religious  observance  of  the  Lord's  day.  Thus  Ignatius'  Epis.  ad 
Magnes.,  c.  ix.  10,  says :  It  is  altogether  unfit  for  Christians  to  live 
as  do  the  Jews,  and,  therefore,  they  should  not  keep  the  Sabbath 
(f,i,Kcri  <xa/30aT({ovTct)  but  live  in  accordance  with  the  Lord's  day.  This 
is  their  constant  language.  Are  we  to  infer  from  this  that  they 
felt  themselves  free  from  all  obligation  to  devote  one  day  in  seven 
to  God's  service,  while  they  were  urging,  in  the  same  breath,  the 
observance  of  such  a  day  ?  Clearly  not.  Therefore,  while  the  pas- 
sage before  us  is  a  warrant  for  Christians  not  to  keep  the  seventh 
day,  which  was  the  Sabbath,  it  affords  no  evidence  that  the  great 
obligation  to  devote  one  day  in  seven  to  God  has  been  repealed. 

The  other  passage  is  one  of  similar  import  in  Rom.  xiv.  1,  2,  3. 
"  Him  that  is  weak  in  the  faith  receive,  but  not  to  doubtful  disputa- 
tions. For  one  believeth  that  he  may  eat  all  things ;  another,  who 
is  weak,  eateth  herbs.  One  man  esteemeth  one  day  above  another  ; 
another  esteemeth  every  day  alike.  Let  every  man  be  fully  per- 
suaded in  his  own  mind."  To  what  days  does  the  apostle  here 
refer  ?  Clearly  to  the  festivals  of  the  old  dispensation.  The  Jew- 
ish converts  thought  they  ought  to  observe  them ;  the  Gentiles 
thought  they  ought  not.  Paul  tells  them  it  was  a  matter  of  in- 
difference, that  every  man  should  be  fully  settled  in  his  own 
mind,  and  act  accordingly,  and  not  condemn  those  who  acted 
differently.  The  reviewer  has  too  much  knowledge  of  the  rules 
of  construction,  to  suppose  that  this  passage  is  to  be  taken  out 
of  its  connexion,  and  assumed  to  mean  all  that  the  words  themselves 
will  possibly  bear.  This  case  is  precisely  parallel  with  the  decla- 
ration of  Christ,  "  I  say  unto  you  swear  not  at  all,"  i.  e.,  take  no 
such  oaths  as  were  the  subject  of  discourse.  That  judicial  oaths 
were  not  intended  is  plain,  because  Christ  himself  afterwards  took 
such  an  oath,  and  so  did  his  disciples.  If  a  fair  construction  of 
the  Saviours  command  frees  it  from  the  objection  of  condemning 
what  he  sanctioned  by  his  own  example,  we  cannot  refuse  to  see, 
that  when  Paul  tells  the  Roman  Christians  the  observance  or  non- 
observance  of  particular  days  was  a  matter  of  indifference,  he 
meant  the  declaration  to  be  applied  to  the  subject  of  discourse,  and 
that  he  had  no  reference  to  a  precept  which  had  been  in  force  from 
the  creation  of  the  world.  That  he  had  no  such  reference  is  still 
clearer,  from  the  fact  that  we  find  him,  and  the  Christians  whom 
he  instructed,  actually  distinguishing  one  day  from  another,  by 
consecrating  the  Lord's  day  to  religious  services.  There  is  the 
same  evidence,  therefore,  that  Paul  did  not  mean  to  declare  the 
weekly  observance  of  a  day  for  the  worship  of  God  a  matter  of 
indifference,  as  there  is  that  Christ  did  not  mean  to  condemn  judi- 
cial oaths,  when  he  said,  "  Swear  not  at  all." 

32 


498  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

The  obligation,  therefore,  to  devote  one  day  in  seven  to  the  ser- 
vice of  our  Maker,  has  not  been  repealed  in  the  New  Testament. 
The  observance  of  the  seventh  day,  or  "  Sabbath,"  has  been  abo- 
lished. As  the  keeping  of  that  day  was  in  commemoration  of  the 
first  creation,  it  was  evidently  proper  when  the  second  or  moral 
creation  was  effected  by  Christ,  that  the  latter  event  should  be 
the  particular  object  of  commemoration.  Do  we,  then,  actually 
find  the  inspired  founders  of  our  religion,  and  the  churches  under 
their  immediate  direction,  neglecting  the  Jewish  Sabbath,  conse- 
crating the  first  day  of  the  week  to  divine  worship  ?  This  ques- 
tion even  Dr.  Paley  answers  in  the  affirmative.  Our  Saviour  rose 
from  the  dead  on  that  day,  and  twice  met  his  assembled  apos- 
tles on  "  the  first  day  of  the  week."  This  would  in  itself  be  of 
little  consequence  were  these  two  instances  of  religious  convo- 
cation not  the  first  of  a  series  continuing  unbroken  throughout 
every  age  and  section  of  the  church.  An  observance  thus  com- 
menced, and  thus  continued,  we  cannot  but  consider  as  an  au- 
thoritative declaration  that  the  great  command  to  devote  one  day 
in  seven  to  God  was  recognised  by  Christ  and  his  apostles  as 
still  obligatory  on  Christians.  We  accordingly  find  in  the  New 
Testament,  that  the  churches  of  the  apostolic  age  did  observe 
the  first  day  of  the  week.  In  Acts  xx.  7,  it  is  recorded  that  when 
Paul  was  at  Troas,  "  On  the  first  day  of  the  week,  when  the  disci- 
ples came  together  to  break  bread,  Paul  preached  to  them." 
Here  then  are  the  Christians  of  Asia  Minor  observing  this  day, 
under  the  direction  of  the  apostle.  In  the  first  epistle  to  the  Corin- 
thians, xvi.  1,  Paul  says,  "  As  I  have  given  order  to  the  churches  in 
Galatia,  so  also  do  ye.  Upon  the  first  day  of  the  week  let  every 
one  lay  by  him  in  store,"  &c.  In  this  passage,  it  is  clearly  inti- 
mated, that  both  in  Galatia  and  Corinth,  churches  founded  by  the 
apostle,  the  first  day  of  the  week  was  the  day  of  religious  con- 
vocation. In  Rev.  i.  10,  St.  John  says,  "  I  was  in  the  Spirit  on 
the  Lord's  day."  By  this  expression,  the  prevalent  one  in  the 
early  ages  for  the  first  day  of  the  week,  there  can  be  no  rea- 
sonable doubt  that  Sunday  is  intended.  The  phrase  itself  would 
seem  to  imply  that  the  day  was  consecrated  to  divine  service,  as 
in  the  expressions,  the  Lord's  supper,  the  Lord's  house,  this  idea 
is-  conveyed. 

That  this  day  was  religiously  observed  by  the  early  Christians, 
admits  of  the  most  satisfactory  proof.  Our  limits  do  not  allow  us 
here  to  adduce  the  evidence  of  this  fact  in  detail  ;  we  must  therefore 
again  refer  the  reader  to  the  works  mentioned  in  a  former  part  of 
this  article.  We  shall  cite  only  one  or  two  passages.  Barnabas, 
one  of  the  apostolic  fathers,  argues  that  even  in  the  Old  Testament, 
God  had  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  Jewish  Sabbath,  and 
by  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  and  the  temple,  proved  that  a  new 
order  of  things  was  introduced,  therefore  he  says,  "  we  observe 
the  eighth  day,  on  which  Jesus  having  arisen  from  the  dead  ascend- 
ed up  to  heaven." — C.  15.  Justin  Martyr,  Apo.  ii.,  p.  99,  says, 
"  We  all  meet  together  on  Sunday,  on  which  God  having  changed 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  499 

darkness  and  matter,  created  the  world,  and  on  this  day  Je- 
sus Christ  our  Saviour  arose  from  the  dead."  Dionysius  of 
Corinth,  speaking  of  the  first  day  of  the  week,  says,  "  To-day  we 
observe  the  Lord's  holy  day." — See  Eusebius,  lib.  iv.,  c.  23.  Ori- 
gen,  Horn.,  vii.  in  Exod.,  says,  "  That  manna  was  rained  down  from 
heaven  on  the  Lord's  day,  and  not  on  the  Sabbath,  to  show  the 
Jews  that  even  then  the  Lord's  day  was  preferred  before  it." 
Tertullian  and  John  of  Damascus  both  argue  at  length  against 
the  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  and  declare  that  Christians  conse- 
crate the  first  day  of  the  week  to  God.  The  law  of  the  Sabbath 
they  say,  Christ  in  part  repealed  (i.  e.,  as  to  the  day,  &c),  and  in 
part  spiritualized.  "  We  then,"  adds  the  latter,  "  celebrate  the  per- 
fect rest  of  the  human  race,  that  is,  the  day  of  the  resurrection,  on 
which  the  Lord  Jesus,  the  author  of  life  and  salvation,  has  intro- 
duced us  into  the  inheritance,"  &c. — De  Fide  Orth.,  lib.  iv.,  c.  24. 
Athanasius,  Opera,  torn,  i.,  p.  1060,  says,  "  Formerly  among  the 
ancients  the  Sabbath  was  honourable,  but  the  Lord  transferred  the 
Sabbath  to  the  Lord's  day."  And  soon  after  adds,  "  We  therefore 
honour  the  Lord's  day  on  account  of  the  resurrection."  It  was  a 
common  slander  against  the  e.arly  Christians,  often  repelled  by  the 
fathers,  that  they  worshipped  the  sun  because  they  kept  Sunday 
holy  :  which  Tertullian  says  they  did,  "  alia  longe  ratione  quam  de 
religione  solis."  In  allusion  to  the  consecration  of  this  day  among 
the  heathen  to  the  sun,  Ambrose,  Serm.  02,  says,  "  Dominica  nobis 
venerabilis,  atque  solennis,  quod  in  ea  Salvator  velut  sol  oriens  dis- 
cussis  inferorum  tenebris  luce  resurrectionis  emicuit :  ac  propterea 
ipsa  dies  ab  hominibus  saeculi  Dies  solis  vocatur,  quod  ortus  earn 
Sol  justitiae  Christus  illuminet."  The  first  day  of  the  week  was 
often  called  Dies  panis,  because  the  Lord's  supper  was  celebrated 
on  every  return  of  it.  It  was  also  called  the  "  Queen  of  days," 
paaiMova  r&»  hftpof.  "  Let  every  Christian,"  says  Ignatius,  "  keep  the 
Lord's  day,  the  resurrection  day,  the  queen,  the  chief  of  all  days." 
The  most  common,  and  the  most  appropriate  appellation  was  the 
Lord's  day.  This  expression,  as  used  with  emphasis  by  the  an- 
cients, imports,  says  Augusti,  vol.  iii.,  p.  351,  "  the  day  appointed 
in  place  of  the  Sabbath  by  Christ,  the  founder  of  the  new  cove- 
nant, and  '  Lord  of  the  Sabbath,'  on  which  men  could  as  well  wor- 
ship God  as  on  the  seventh  day,  which  Jewish  superstition  had 
desecrated  ;  and  on  which  men  should  joyfully  call  to  mind  the 
resurrection  of  Christ  and  the  out-pouring  of  the  Holy  Spirit." 
This  day,  according  to  the  institutions  of  the  early  church,  was  to 
be  a  day  of  religious  joy  and  thanksgiving.  No  fasting  was  ever 
allowed  on  Sunday,  for  this  was  considered  tantamount  to  a  denial 
of  the  resurrection  of  Christ ;  all  prayers  were  to  be  offered  up  in 
a  standing  posture  ;  all  public  and  private  business  was  to  be  sus- 
pended ;  all  games  forbidden  ;  religious  assemblies,  even  in  times 
of  persecution,  frequented  ;  and  even  the  previous  evening  was  to 
be  spent  religiously  as  a  preparation  for  its  sacred  duties. 
If,  then,  from  the  creation  of  the  world,  God  commanded  men 


500  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

to  devote  one  day  in  seven  to  his  worship ;  if  this  command  was 
introduced  into  the  decalogue  and  enforced  upon  the  Old  Testa- 
ment church  with  peculiar  strictness;  if  Christ  and  his  Apostles, 
the  churches  founded  and  instructed  by  their  care,  and  Christians 
in  all  ages,  have  continued  to  recognise  this  command ;  and  if  the 
institution  be  as  important  for  the  preservation  of  religion  and  good 
morals  as  we  have  endeavoured  to  show  ;  then  it  is  evident,  that 
the  neglect  or  desecration  of  this  day  is  the  violation  of  one  of  the 
strongest  of  our  obligations,  and  destructive  to  the  best  interests  of 
society. 

We  have  now  seen  that,  according  to  the  opinion  of  the  Chris- 
tian church  in  all  ages  and  among  all  important  denominations,  the 
Lord's  day  ought  to  be  devoted  to  rest  and  the  worship  of  God. 
This  rest  is  not  to  be  absolute,  for  that  some  works  are  lawful  on 
this  day,  has  never  been  questioned.  Even  the  superstitious  Jews 
admitted  this,  and,  after  one  sad  lesson,  determined  to  defend 
themselves  at  least  on  the  Sabbath.  Our  Saviour  clearly  lays 
down  the  principle  on  which  we  are  to  decide  such  cases  of  ex- 
ception, when  he  says,  "  The  Sabbath  was  made  for  man,  and  not 
man  for  the  Sabbath,"  and  again,  "  God  will  have  mercy  and  not 
sacrifice."  The  principle  contained  in  these  declarations,  and 
which  he  applies  himself  in  several  instances,  is,  that  when  two 
obligations  interfere,  the  stronger  destroys  the  weaker.  This  is  an 
universal  principle  in  morals.  As  a  general  duty,  children  are 
bound  to  obey  their  parents,  but  when  this  obedience  would  inter- 
fere with  their  duty  to  God,  the  obligation  ceases ;  so  that  it  is  no 
violation  of  filial  duty  to  refuse  to  obey  a  parent,  who  requires 
what  God  forbids.  In  like  manner  our  Saviour  teaches  us  the  ob- 
ligation to  rest  on  the  Sabbath  ceases,  when  a  higher  obligation 
requires  us  to  labour.  The  priests  in  the  temple  profaned  the 
Sabbath,  and  were  blameless.  Every  man  might  loose  his  ox  and 
lead  him  away  to  watering.  It  is  on  this  principle  that  Christ  vin- 
dicates himself  for  having  healed  the  sick,  and  his  disciples  for 
plucking  ears  of  corn  and  eating  them.  This  latitude  of  interpre- 
tation the  nature  of  the  law  requires  ;  so  that  we  are  not  allowed, 
but  bound  to  perform  works  of  necessity  and  mercy.  In  deciding 
on  the  cases  which  come  under  either  of  these  classes  of  exception, 
every  man  must  judge  for  himself,  and  on  his  own  responsibility. 
The  petitioners  to  Congress  against  carrying  the  mail  on  Sunday, 
never  pretended  to  assume  any  other  ground.  They  merely  pre- 
sented themselves  at  the  bar  of  that  body  to  say  that,  in  their  judg- 
ment, carrying  the  mail  was  not  a  work  of  necessity,  and,  there- 
fore, did  not  come  within  the  exception.  When  the  Reviewer, 
therefore,  himself  takes  this  ground,  and  presses  it  with  so  much 
coarseness  on  the  attention  of  the  petitioners,  he  gives  himself  much 
gratuitous  trouble.  They  are  as  well  aware  as  he  can  be,  that  the 
whole  question  is  one  of  construction  ;  that  the  point  at  issue  is, 
whether  the  carrying  the  mail  on  Sunday  is  a  work  of  so  much 
consequence,  that  we  are  freed  from  the  obligation  to  devote  that 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  501 

day  to  the  service  of  God,  in  order  to  effect  it.  The  petitioners 
think  not ;  and,  in  our  estimation,  for  very  sufficient  reasons. 
They  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  pressure  of  the  necessity  must 
be  proportionate  to  the  extent  of  the  interference  with  the  object 
of  the  day.  Although  rescuing  an  ox  might  be  a  sufficient  reason 
why  his  owner  should  devote  the  requisite  time  and  labour,  it 
would  be  a  very  poor  reason  why  a  whole  neighbourhood  should 
neglect  the  religious  duty  of  the  day.  Due  attention  to  this  prin- 
ciple would  have  led  the  Reviewer  to  see  there  was  little  force  or 
propriety  in  most  of  his  caustic  arguments  ad  hominem,  on  this 
subject.  The  degree  of  attention  which  Christians  devote  to  the 
decency  and  comfort  of  domestic  arrangements,  involves  so  slight 
an  interference  witht  he  duties  of  the  Sabbath,  as  to  be  fully  justi- 
fiable on  their  own  principles.  To  justify  a  work,  however,  which 
gives  constant  employment  to  thousands  in  a  manner  entirely  in- 
compatible with  its  religious  observance,  and  which  leads  to  the 
partial  employment  of  many  millions  more,  must  require  a  neces- 
sity pressing  in  the  extreme.  The  petitioners  do  not  believe  that 
any  such  necessity  exists  for  carrying  the  mail  on  Sunday ;  on  the 
contrary,  they  believe  that  incalculably  more  harm  than  good  re- 
sults from  it.  Those  who  entertain  this  opinion  amount  to  some 
millions,  unquestionably,  in  this  country — men  who  belong  to  the 
best  educated,  the  most  moral,  and  in  every  respect  most  estima- 
ble classes  of  society.  It  is  not  in  the  power  of  any  man,  by  scoffs 
and  ridicule,  to  render  the  opinion  of  such  a  body  of  men  unworthy 
of  respect ;  and  every  such  attempt  must  recoil  on  its  author. 

The  petitioners  are  confirmed  in  their  opinion  that  no  such  ne- 
cessity exists,  as  can  authorize  this  extensive  and  demoralizing  dis- 
regard of  the  Sabbath,  by  the  fact  that,  in  the  earlier  periods  of 
our  national  existence,  the  post-offices  were  closed,  and  the  mail 
was  but  partially  carried  on  Sunday,  and  yet  no  dreadful  incon- 
venience resulted.  They  know  too,  that  in  the  immense  commer- 
cial metropolis  of  England,  no  mail  departs  or  is  distributed  on 
Sunday.  Such  facts  speak  louder  than  theories  or  mere  prognos- 
tications. They  observe,  moreover,  that  our  government  is  very 
inconsistent  in  this  respect.  They  see  that  all  our  legislative  and 
judicial  proceedings  are  suspended  on  the  Sabbath  throughout  the 
whole  country ;  and  they  cannot  doubt  that  this  is  done  at  an 
immense  sacrifice  of  time  and  money  to  the  community.  Thou- 
sands are  kept  waiting  the  proceedings  of  these  bodies  ;  are  pre- 
vented receiving  what  in  justice  belongs  to  them ;  prisoners  are 
detained  in  vile  durance,  and  the  whole  march  of  business  is  ar- 
rested. They  cannot  perceive  why  it  is,  if  in  the  opinion  of  the 
community,  and  of  the  government  too,  all  these  inconveniences 
are  to  be  cheerfully  endured,  rather  than  interfere  with  the  day  de- 
voted to  religion,  the  evil  arising  from  stopping  the  mail  on  that 
day,  should  be  regarded  as  enough  to  justify  a  total  disregard  of 
it.  They  believe  the  inconvenience,  in  the  former  case,  is  much 
greater  than  it  could  be  in  the  latter.     They,  therefore,  beg  their 


502  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

representatives  to  be  consistent,  and  to  extend  the  respect  they  so 
properly  pay  to  the  Sabbath  in  all  other  departments  of  the  gov- 
ernment, to  that  of  the  post-office.  In  answer  to  this  reasonable 
request,  to  their  utter  amazement,  they  are  met  on  the  one  hand, 
with  grave  arguments  to  show  that  Congress  have  not  the  constitu- 
tional power  to  do,  in  regard  to  the  mail,  what  they  do  in  regard 
to  every  branch  of  the  government ;  and  on  the  other,  still  more 
to  their  surprise,  they  are  overwhelmed  with  injurious  reflections 
on  their  motives,  general  defamation  of  their  character,  and  insult- 
ing ridicule  and  taunts.  With  regard  to  this  latter  course,  we  shall 
say  but  little.     The  former,  alone,  deserves  consideration. 

It  has,  indeed,  somewhat  ungenerously  perhaps,  occurred  to  us, 
that  it  was  not  possible  for  such  men  as  the  chairman  of  the  com- 
mittee of  Congress,  and  the  reputed  author  of  the  article  in  the 
American  Quarterly  Review,  either  to  blind  themselves,  or  hope 
to  blind  others  by  the  sophistry  employed  on  this  subject.  We 
find,  however,  the  editor  of  the  Review,  in  a  recent  number  of  the 
National  Gazette,  gravely  recommends  the  said  article,  though  he 
gives  up  its  theology,  to  the  serious  attention  of  members  of  Con- 
gress, as  a  decisive  argument  on  the  question.  We  are  free  to 
confess  that  we  are  entirely  incapable  of  discovering  either  the 
force  or  consistency  of  the  Reviewer's  arguments.  On  page  189, 
he  says,  "  The  man,  or  set  of  men,  who  say  that  I  shall  not  ride  or 
walk  or  sail  into  the  country,  because  he  adjudges  these  things  to 
be  breaches  of  the  law,  having  thus  determined  what  I  shall  not 
do,  will  next  say  what  I  shall  do,  will  direct  that  I  shall  go  to 
church,  and  then  that  I  shall  go  to  his  church,  &c.  If  the  point 
now  disputed  be  carried  or  yielded,  the  progress  of  the  same 
power  to  the  point  suggested,  will  have  no  new  principle  or  impedi- 
ment to  overcome  in  its  way.  Everything  is  gained  over  any 
rights  of  conscience  and  religious  freedom  when  a  single  point 
is  carried  against  them."  The  argument  here  is,  that  it  is  in- 
consistent with  religious  freedom  for  the  government  to  un- 
dertake to  decide  that  the  Reviewer  shall  not  receive  his  letters  or 
papers  on  Sunday,  because  if  this  be  allowed,  it  may  order  him  to 
go  to  church,  decide  for  him  what  church,  &c.  That  there  is  a 
fallacy  somewhere  in  this  argument,  is  evident.  The  government, 
as  well  state  as  general,  does  undertake  to  tell  that  gentleman  that 
he  shall  not  hold  a  court,  if  a  judge  ;  or  plead  a  cause,  if  a  lawyer  ; 
or  prosecute  a  suit,  if  a  client,  on  that  day.  However  inconvenient 
the  delay,  he  must  wait.  The  government,  moreover,  does  tell 
merchants  and  tradesmen,  they  shall  not  buy  nor  sell  on  Sunday  ; 
that  their  stores  must  be  closed  on  that  day.  Where,  then,  is  the 
difference  between  these  cases  ?  Why  may  not  the  government 
as  well  tell  the  people  that  it  will  not  allow  its  post-masters  to  dis- 
tribute letters,  as  forbid  its  judges  to  administer  the  law  on  Sun- 
day? Where  is  the  difference  in  principle?  We  cannot  perceive 
any.  And  what  is  more  to  the  point,  the  Reviewer  cannot.  He 
entirely  abandons  the  ground  here  assumed,  of  a  constitutional 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  503 

difficulty,  in  his  answer  to  the  North  American  Review.  "  It  is 
true,"  he  says,  "  that  the  other  offices  of  government  do  generally 
suspend  their  operations  on  Sunday ;  and  that  the  post-office  does 
not.  We  have  suggested  the  reason,  which  we  shall  show  is  the 
true  one,  and  is  wholly  independent  of  any  supposed  religious  ob- 
ligation, or  imperative  command  of  Him,  who  should  be  obeyed  in 
all  things.  [A  declaration  contradicted  in  the  next  sentence.] 
The  difference  of  practice  in  these  branches  is  founded  on  the 
difference  of  their  duties,  which  allows  of  the  permitted  or  pre- 
scibed  rest  from  labour  in  the  one  case,  and  does  not  allow  it  in 
the  other."  "  Sunday  is  observed  as  a  day  of  rest  and  worship, 
unless  some  public  or  private  necessity  or  utility  warrants  a  dis- 
pensation ;  and  the  dispensation  must  be  commensurate  with  the 
necessity  or  utility  which  demands  it." — Pp.  190  and  191.  The 
Reviewer  has  here  strangely  forgotten  himself.  This  is  the  whole 
doctrine  of  the  "  terrorists ;"  the  length  and  breadth  of  Calvinistic 
rigour  on  the  subject.  There  is  not  a  man  amongst  us,  who  goes 
one  jot  beyond  this  ;  Sunday  is  to  be  observed  as  a  day  of  rest 
and  worship,  unless  necessity  or  utility  warrants  a  dispensation. 
Has  any  man  ever  maintained  that  God  requires  us  to  rest  on  the 
Sabbath,  when  necessity  requires  us  to  labour  ?  The  Reviewer, 
therefore,  in  acknowledging  (what,  indeed,  he  could  not  deny)  that 
the  government  does  respect  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest  and  worship, 
whenever  it  can  do  so,  has  entirely  given  up  the  ground  that  there 
is  any  constitutional  difficulty  in  the  case.  He  admits  that  no  new 
principle  is  to  be  recognised,  but  that  the  whole  question  is, 
whether  a  principle  already  acknowledged  shall  be  applied  to  a 
specified  case.  In  doing  this,  he  acknowledges  that  all  the  abuse 
which  he  and  others  have  heaped  upon  the  petitioners  for  applying 
for  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  power,  is  utterly  unfounded.  The 
principle  which  he  admits  is  properly  recognised  by  the  govern- 
ment, has  been  acted  upon  since  its  formation.  It  has  been  adopted  by 
every  State  in  the  Union,  and  by  every  incorporated  town  which  has 
made  any  municipal  laws  to  regulate  the  observance  of  the  Lord's 
day.  Unless  the  Reviewer  will  maintain  that  government  from 
the  first,  has  been  trampling  on  the  rights  of  conscience  and  reli- 
gious liberty,  he  must  retract  his  censures,  and  admit  the  futility 
of  his  own  arguments  and  those  of  the  chairman  of  the  post-office 
committee.  How  this  latter  gentleman,  with  any  seriousness, 
could  ask,  as  an  argument  on  this  subject,  how  government  was  to 
accommodate  all  classes  of  the  community,  Jews,  Mahometans, 
seventh  day  Baptists,  &c.  ?  we  are  at  a  loss  to  conceive.  Why 
does  he  not  wonder  how  all  these  classes  are  suited  at  present 
with  government  respecting  Sunday,  as  our  Reviewer  tells  him  it 
very  properly  does,  in  every  branch  excepting  the  post-office  ? 
Can  he  not  see  that  if  they  would  have  any  ground  of  complaint  if 
the  latter  department  was  closed  on  that  day,  they  have  the  same 
ground  already  ?  The  truth  is,  however,  they  would  have  no 
reason  to  complain  in  either  case,  as  we  shall  presently  show. 


504  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

We  are  equally  at  a  loss  to  imagine  how  a  gentleman  of  any  dis- 
crimination could  ask,  "  Why  the  petitioners  have  confined  their 
prayer  to  the  mail ;  why  they  have  not  requested  that  government 
should  be  required  to  suspend  all  its  executive  functions  on  that 
day ;  why  they  have  not  required  that  our  ships  of  war  should  not 
sail ;  that  our  armies  should  not  march  ;  that  the  officers  of  justice 
should  not  seize  the  suspected  or  guard  the  convicted  ?"  The  pe- 
titioners will  allow  our  Reviewer  to  answer  him.  Sunday  is  to  be 
observed  as  a  day  of  rest  and  worship,  unless  necessity  warrants 
a  dispensation.  Consequently,  to  ask  why  the  petitioners  think 
one  thing  is  necessary,  when  they  don't  think  another  so,  is  not  a 
very  pungent  question.  It  might  as  well  be  asked,  why  they 
think  it  wrong  to  work  on  Sunday,  if  they  think  it  right  to  take  a 
cup  of  water  ?  Yet  this  is  what  the  Reviewer  calls  a  cogent  ap- 
peal !  He  somewhere  remarks,  that  "  honest  and  sincere  men  be- 
come so  absorbed  and  infatuated  with  their  own  notions,"  as  to 
lose  all  power  of  discrimination.  If  he  wishes  the  benefit  of  this 
remark,  we  must  in  courtesy  grant  it. 

The  truth  is,  the  grand  mistake  of  the  chairman  and  the  reviewer 
in  all  their  arguments  on  this  subject  is,  they-  think  themselves 
heathen,  whereas,  they  are  Christians ;  members  of  a  Christian 
community,  and  bound  to  act  accordingly.  If  they  consider  this 
a  misfortune,  they  can  only  help  the  matter  by  making  the  majori- 
ty of  the  same  mind.  But  as  long  as  the  great  mass  of  the  people 
profess  the  Christian  religion,  so  long  must  government  respect  that 
religion.  Our  legislature,  and  every  other  governing  body,  are 
under  a  two-fold  obligation  as  it  regards  religion.  They  are  them- 
selves bound  as  individuals  and  as  legislators,  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  great  principles  of  moral  and  religious  obligation.  This 
is  a  duty  they  owe  to  God.  And  they  are,  moreover,  obliged  to 
respect  the  religion  of  those  for  whom  they  legislate.  They  have 
no  right  to  order  the  violation,  on  their  part,  of  any  of  its  precepts. 
This  latter  obligation  is  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  that  religion. 
The  British  government  in  India  has  never  pretended  to  the  right, 
nor  would  they  dare  to  assume  it,  of  requiring  the  Hindoos  to  act 
contrary  to  their  faith.  And  the  Emperor  Nicholas  is  obliged  to 
accommodate  his  laws  to  his  Mohammedan  subjects,  as  far  as  they 
are  concerned.  From  the  fact  that  our  constitution  has  wisely 
placed  religion  beyond  its  jurisdiction,  it  has  been  strangely  inferred 
that  those  who  act  under  it,  are  authorized  to  legislate  as  though 
the  people  had  no  religion.  This  is  the  fallacy  of  all  the  reviewer's 
arguments  on  this  point.  The  people,  in  reserving  the  care  of  this 
subject  to  themselves,  never  intended  thereby  to  authorize  the  go- 
vernment in  making  laws  for  them,  to  trample  on  their  religious 
opinions.  All  they  desire,  and  all  the  petitioners  desire,  is,  that 
Congress  would  let  the  matter  alone.  As  they  have  no  right 
to  pass  any  law  in  support  of  religion,  so  they  are  not  authorized 
to  make  any  which  interferes  with  it.  If  it  be  proper  for  them  to 
pass  a  law  which  requires  thousands  to  disregard  the  Sabbath,  or 


■' 


SUNDAY   MAILS.  505 

submit  to  certain  disabilities,  it  is  competent  to  them  to  pass  an  act 
which  visits  with  similar  pains  any  man  who  goes  to  church.  So 
long  as  it  cannot  be  denied  that  Congress  legislates  for  a  Christian 
people,  any  law  which  requires  the  violation  of  the  Christian  reli- 
gion is  oppressive  and  unjust.  But  it  is  asked  what  government 
is  to  do  when  the  people  are  of  different  religions  ?  We  answer, 
the  principles  which  should  regulate  the  movements  of  government 
in  such  cases,  are  perfectly  obvious.  In  the  first  place,  it  should 
interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  the  opinions  of  any  party.  It 
should  pass  no  law,  except  in  cases  of  necessity,  which  requires  the 
violation  of  the  precepts  of  any  form  of  religion  its  citizens  may 
adopt.  Secondly,  as  it  is  clearly  impossible  to  avoid  this  evil  en- 
tirely, where  there  are  Atheists,  Deists,  Christians,  and  Jews,  living 
together,  that  course  must  be  pursued  which  will  produce  the  least 
injustice.  In  a  Jewish  country,  the  Jews  are  to  be  principally  re- 
garded, and  in  a  Christian  country,  Christians.  The  plain  princi- 
ple is,  that  the  religion  of  the  country  is  to  be  respected.  By  reli- 
gion of  the  country  is  meant,  not  an  established  religion,  but  that 
which  the  mass  of  the  people  profess.  Unless  this  be  regarded, 
intolerable  oppression  must  be  the  result.  Acting  on  the  principle 
assumed  by  the  chairman  and  the  reviewer,  that  the  government 
are  to  pay  as  little  regard  to  Christianity  as  to  Judaism,  that  is,  to 
the  interests  of  thirteen  millions,  as  those  of  a  few  hundred,  would 
only  multiply  the  evil  an  hundred  fold.  It  would  disfranchise  all 
the  sincere  Christians  in  the  land,  without  the  least  benefit  to  the 
Jews.  But  the  fact  is,  no  government  could  exist  which  acted  on 
this  principle.  Our  own  has  always  been  wise  enough  to  know 
that  they  were  legislating  for  Christians,  and  to  act  accordingly. 
They,  therefore,  have,  in  practice  and  by  laws,  recognised  Christi- 
anity, and  disregarded  Judaism.  They  have  acknowledged  a  God, 
and  a  future  state  of  retribution,  to  the  confusion  of  the  Atheist  and 
the  Universalist.  These  "theological  points"  the  government 
takes  for  granted  as  embraced  in  the  religion  of  the  people,  and 
proceeds  upon  them  as  settled.  The  principle  of  the  chairman  is 
completely  and  radically  revolutionary.  It  would  change  the 
whole  practice  of  the  government,  and  overturn  it  from  its  very 
foundations.  Let  Congress  once  announce  to  the  people  that  they 
are  to  be  treated  as  Atheists ;  that  their  most  sacred  rights  and 
opinions  are  to  be  trampled  in  the  dust ;  and  our  government  is  at 
an  end.  This  recurrence  to  first  principles,  in  matters  of  govern- 
ment, and  pushing  them,  even  when  correct,  to  extremes,  is  of  all 
courses  the  most  dangerous,  and  yet  one  of  the  most  common 
with  men  of  ardent  and  inconsiderate  minds.  Because  a  man's 
religious  opinions  are  sacred,  and  the  rights  of  conscience  inviola- 
ble, it  is  inferred  that  the  government  can  pay  no  regard  to  Jews, 
Turks,  Christians,  or  Infidels,  but  drive  on  blindfold,  careless 
whether  its  laws  clash  with  the  opinions  of  the  hundred  or  the 
million.  Yet,  acting  on  this  plan  would  be  absurd  and  impossible. 
The  same  is  true  with  regard  to  the  liberty  of  the  press,  the  invio- 


506  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

lability  of  property,  and  other  essential  or  conventional  rights. 
They  are  of  necessity  limited  and  restricted,  when  men  live  in  so- 
ciety ;  and  pressing  any  of  them  to  extremes  would  ruin  any  com- 
munity in  the  world. 

Setting  aside,  therefore,  the  obligation  which  Congress,  as  Chris- 
tians, are  themselves  under  to  obey  the  precepts  of  Christianity,  it 
is  obvious  that  as  long  as  they  are  the  legislators  of  the  Christian 
people,  they  have  no  right  to  pass  a  law  which  requires  the  viola- 
tion of  any  of  its  commands.  This,  in  the  judgment  of  the  peti- 
tioners, they  have  done  ;  and  of  this  they  complain.  Is  it  a  crime, 
then,  to  represent  to  Congress,  that  by  any  law  of  theirs  they  en- 
croach upon  the  rights  of  their  constituents,  that  they  require  of 
them  what  their  religion  forbids  ?  The  reviewer,  however,  tells 
us  that  this  is  not  the  case  ;  that  every  man  is  free  to  act  as  he 
pleases.  "  He  is  not  called  upon  to  do  what  he  thinks  wrong ;  nor 
is  he  prohibited  from  doing  what  he  thinks  right."  "  No  one  re- 
quires him  to  depart  a  jot  from  his  principles,  or  to  violate  his  sense 
of  duty."  The  law  does  not  force  him  to  be  a  mail  contractor,  nor 
a  postmaster ;  neither  does  it  require  him  to  get  his  letters  or  papers 
on  Sunday.  This  is  all  true.  Let  us  apply  this  principle  to  other 
cases.  Suppose  a  law  passed  ordering  both  houses  of  Congress  to 
sit  on  Sunday  ;  the  president,  heads  of  departments,  all  clerks  and 
minor  officers,  all  judges  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  to  disre- 
gard the  Sabbath  ;  and  then  Congress  to  tell  their  Christian  con- 
stituents that  they  need  not  act  against  their  conscience  ;  the  law 
does  not  require  any  man  to  be  either  a  senator  or  a  representa- 
tive ;  nor  does  it  force  him  to  accept  of  any  office,  from  the  presi- 
dent to  a  tide-waiter.  If  any  of  them  have  a  cause  pending  in 
court,  they  need  not  prosecute  it  on  Sunday  ;  should  it  happen  to 
be  called  up,  they  can  easily  submit  to  be  non-suited.  A  lawyer 
need  not  take  a  case  likely  to  come  to  trial  on  that  day.  All  tha 
such  persons  have  to  do  is  to  renounce  all  places  of  honour,  power 
or  profit :  submit  to  be  defrauded  at  every  turn,  and  allow  those 
"  less  scrupulous  "  to  govern  them.  Strange  liberty  and  equality, 
this,  in  a  Christian  country  !  This  course,  which  would  disfran- 
chise millions  of  the  people ;  which  would  visit  religious  opinions 
with  civil  pains  and  penalties  the  most  disgraceful ;  which  would 
be  a  test-act  of  infidelity,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  review- 
er, is  true  liberty,  good  enough,  at  least,  for  petitioners.  We  rather 
suspect  those  same  Calvinists  whom  the  reviewer  beards  so  unce- 
remoniously, would  find  such  a  law  as  hard  to  bear  as  they  did  the 
stamp-act  of  old.  That  such  enactments  are  in  fact  test-acts,  needs 
no  proof.  Any  law  which  prevents  access  to  office  to  men  of  a 
certain  creed,  is  a  religious  test.  Our  reviewer  might  have  com- 
forted the  Irish  Catholics,  as  he  now  consoles  American  Christians, 
by  telling  them  they  were  "  not  required  to  do  what  they  thought 
wrong,  nor  prohibited  from  doing  what  they  thought  right."  What 
could  they  wish  more  ?  They  need  not  take  the  offensive  oath  ; 
all  they  had  to  do  was  to  stay  out  of  parliament,  and  let  the  less 


SUNDAY    MAILS.  607 

scrupulous  manage  matters  for  them.  Strange  doctrine  for  free- 
men !  Strange  instructions  for  an  American  Congress  !  It  is  un- 
deniable, that  the  post-office  law,  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  a  law  of  pro- 
scription, a  religious  test  administered  to  every  servant  of  the  de- 
partment. So  far,  therefore,  is  the  assertion,  that  the  petitioners 
apply  for  a  law  to  deprive  any  man  of  a  right,  from  being  correct, 
that  their  application  is  only  for  the  repeal  of  an  act  which  deprives 
a  large  body  of  our  fellow-citizens  of  their  rights.  But  the  re- 
viewer tells  us  he  has  a  right  to  have  his  letters  on  Sunday,  and 
therefore  a  law  forbidding  him  to  get  them  is  injurious  and  oppres- 
sive. If  he  has  this  right,  it  is  more  than  any  other  man  in  the 
land  has.  Who  gave  him  the  right  in  a  Christian  country,  to  re- 
quire the  government,  or  any  individual,  to  wait  on  him  on  Sunday  ? 
Must  other  people  violate  their  sense  of  duty  for  his  accommoda- 
tion ?  Has  he  a  right  to  have  a  cause  tried  on  Sunday  ?  Can  he 
force  Congress  to  receive  a  petition  or  perform  any  of  its  functions, 
on  that  day,  in  his  behalf?  If  not,  whence  does  he  get  the  right 
to  make  government  carry  letters  for  him,  or  to  employ  persons  to 
deliver  them  on  Sunday  ?     No  such  right  exists. 

The  fact  is,  the  reviewer  knows,  as  well  as  we  do,  that  all  his 
arguments  on  this  head  are  not  worth  a  straw.  He  cannot  help 
knowing  it ;  because  he  himself  has  placed  the  whole  subject  on 
its  proper  basis.  He  tells  us  that  Sunday,  in  this  country,  is  to  be 
respected  by  the  people  and  government,  as  a  day  devoted  to  rest 
and  worship,  except  when  public  or  private  necessity  forbids. 
And,  consequently,  the  whole  question  about  the  mail  is,  whether 
this  necessity  exists.  If  this  be  once  made  out,  there  is  not  a 
Christian  in  the  land  who  would  utter  a  syllable  of  objection.  As 
this,  according  to  his  own  showing,  is  the  real  point  at  issue,  he 
must  be  able  to  see,  that  all  arguments  to  prove  that  granting  the 
prayer  of  the  petitioners  would  be  an  interference  with  the  rights 
of  conscience,  and  requires  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  power, 
are  in  direct  contradiction  to  his  own  doctrine,  and  bear  with  all 
their  force  on  the  practice  of  government  in  all  the  other  depart- 
ments. He  must  see,  too,  that  if  his  principles  were  applied  to 
the  other  branches  of  the  State,  the  result  would  be  a  most  odious 
proscription  and  tyranny,  a  test-act  more  offensive  than  has  ever 
yet  disgraced  a  Christian  country. 

We  have  dwelt  on  this  subject  much  longer  than  we  at  first  in- 
tended. It  is,  however,  one  of  incalculable  importance.  Did  the 
petitioners  not  believe  that  the  Sabbath  was  divinely  appointed,  as 
the  great  means  of  preserving  religion  and  good  morals,  that  its 
influence  was  essential  to  the  well-being  of  society,  Congress 
would  .never  have  heard  one  word  of  remonstrance  or  complaint. 
No  selfish  motive  can,  with  the  least  semblance  of  truth,  be  im- 
puted to  them.  If  stopping  the  mail  on  Sunday  would  occasion 
all  the  inconvenience  which  is  predicted,  they  would  bear  their  full 
share  of  the  burden.  Seeking  such  an  object  as  the  best  interests 
of  their  country,  by  means  obviously  just  and  proper,  is  surely  not 


508  SUNDAY    MAILS. 

a  crime  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  justify  the  amount  of  vulgar 
abuse  which  has  been  heaped  upon  them.  So  long  as  this  was 
confined  to  papers  confessedly  hostile  to  all  religion,  and  to  many 
of  the  most  sacred  institutions  of  society,  it  was  not  a  matter  of 
suprise.  Nor  did  we  wonder  that  the  chairman  of  the  committee 
of  Congress  should  allow  himself  to  stray  from  the  real  point  in 
hand,  into  a  disquisition  on  the  diversity  of  religious  creeds,  and 
the  value  of  religious  liberty.  Such  things  are  common  in  reports. 
But  that  a  work,  of  the  standing  of  the  American  Quarterly  Re- 
view, should  present  its  readers,  not  with  a  fair  discussion  of  the 
question  at  issue,  but  with  an  article  in  which  the  religious  princi- 
ples of  a  large  part  of  the  community  are  ridiculed,  their  motives 
vilified,  and  their  general  character  defamed,  is  a  matter  of  un- 
mingled  regret.  It  would  seem  as  though,  by  a  strange  mishap, 
some  stray  sheets  from  pens  under  the  influence  of  a  nameless 
female,  had  found  their  way  into  the  mahogany  escritoir  of  the 
unsuspecting  editor.  The  tone  of  a  book  cannot  be  quoted.  A 
specimen  we  are  bound  to  give,  to  justify  a  charge  so  serious,  and 
so  derogatory  to  the  respectability  of  the  work.  On  page  186,  the 
following  passage  occurs  :  "  It  is  your  man-gods,  who  make  such 
laws,  and  impiously  assume  the  power  to  condemn  and  inflict  awful 
penalties  upon  those  they  shall  adjudge  to  violate  them  ;  while  with  a 
most  impudent  self-complacency,  they  find  an  expiatory  apology  for 
their  own  deviations.  The  stern  and  cruel  severity  with  which  these 
self-righteous  expounders  of  the  law  visit  its  utmost  rigours  upon 
all  who  dissent  from  their  opinions,  warrants  us  in  probing  their 
pretensions  to  the  quick  ;  and  in  searching  their  lives  to  see  if  the 
fruit  shows  the  tree  to  be  better  than  those  they  would  cut  down 
and  cast  into  the  fire.  Admitting  that  there  are  pure  and  bright 
examples  of  a  good  life  among  the  terrorists — not,  however,  more 
or  better  than  are  found  among  their  opponents — if  we  look  at 
them  individually,  we  shall  see  them,  generally,  as  devoted  to 
worldly  wealth  and  enjoyments  ;  as  solicitous  for  distinction  and 
influence  ;  as  easily  and  happily  puffed  with  pride  and  conceit ; 
and  as  mere  creatures  of  flesh,  as  those  they  pity  or  spurn,  be- 
cause, forsooth,  their  pretensions  to  sanctity  are  not  so  lofty — or 
their  notions  of  Christianity  so  mysterious  as  their  own  ;  nor  their 
observances  and  deportment  squared  by  the  rule  they  have  adopted. 
They  are  as  impatient  of  injuries  ;  as  vindictive  in  their  passions  ; 
as  unforgiving  in  their  temper  ;  as  sordid  and  penurious  ;  as  keen, 
close  and  avaricious  in  their  dealings  ;  as  hard  creditors  ;  as  in- 
flexible and  unpitying  in  exacting  their  rights.  But  all  this  offends 
no  law  of  the  land,  and  is  not  forbidden  by  the  Decalogue,  as  they 
interpret  it ;  but  to  step  into  a  steamboat  on  Sunday  !  that  is  the 
fatal  sin,  and  must  be  expiated  by  eternal  torments.  The  religion 
of  such  men  is  satisfied  by  a  hard  and  austere  observance  of  the 
Sabbath,  which  happens  to  fall  in  with  their  taste ;  by  professing 
a  belief  in  certain  sectarian  tenets,  which  they  do  not  understand ; 
with  occasional  ostentatious  donations  to  institutions  which  flatter 


8UNDAY    MAILS.  509 

their  vanity  by  adulatory  resolutions,  and  give  them  importance  by 
a  pompous  publication  of  their  piety  and  generosity."*  Such  lan- 
guage the  petitioners  may  well  pity,  and  will,  doubtless,  readily  for- 
give; more  readily,  we  trust,  than  the  reviewer  can  forgive  him- 
self, or  regain  his  self-respect.  Oil  page  190,  he  says,  "  Assuredly, 
a  Calvinist  would  hold  it  to  be  a  much  more  important  service  to 
religion,  to  prohibit  all  men  from  an  attendance  on  an  Unitarian  or 
Catholic  church,  than  to  stop  the  mails  and  steamboats  on  Sunday  ; 
and,  therefore,  in  his  own  principles  of  duty,  he  would  not  only  be 
willing,  but  bound  to  prevent  it,  if  he  could.  And  he  refrains 
from  the  attempt,  only  because  there  is  a  stronger  power  over  him  ; 
but  if  he  can  hoodwink  or  break  that  power  in  the  one  case,  there 
is  no  security  in  it  for  any  other  ;  and  we  shall  hold  all  these  rights, 
not  on  guarantee  of  the  Constitution,  but  at  the  discretion  of  legis- 
latures, to  be  acted  upon  by  popular  feeling  and  interests."  This 
is  a  bold  assertion,  not  with  that  boldness  which  is  required  to 
meet  danger  with  unconcern,  but  that  which  enables  a  man  calmly 
to  contradict  truth  and  history  to  the  face.  There  are  several  mil- 
lions of  Calvinists  in  this  country,  and  the  assertion  is  not  true  of  any 
one  of  them,  we  verily  believe.  Before  the  reviewer  can  prove 
that  Calvinists  are  -particularly  inclined  to  tyranny,  he  must  blot 
out  all  the  record  of  the  past.  They  have,  notoriously,  been  the 
staunch  advocates  and  champions  of  liberty.  The  Calvinist  Hamp- 
den was  pleading  and  dying  for  the  liberty  of  the  world,  while  the 
infidel  Hobbes  was  writing  and  raving  for  passive  obedience. 
The  liberty  secured  by  Calvinists  has  given  birth  to  all  the  world 
now  enjoys.  Calvinistsf  gave  the  world  the  Reformation,  and 
England  her  constitution.  They  have  ever  been  in  advance  of  the 
rest  of  the  world  in  the  principles  of  toleration.  Do  Unitarians 
suffer  from  Calvinists  here,  in  the  nineteenth  century,  what  Calvin- 
ists are  now  suffering  from  Unitarians  in  Switzerland  ?  Take 
them,  age  for  age,  with  others,  and  for  the  solitary  victim  to  their 
bigotry  you  will  find  hecatombs  of  martyrs.  No  man,  with  the 
light  of  history  before  his  eyes,  would  hesitate  to  prefer  leaving 
life,  honour,  or  property,  in  the  hands  of  the  strictest  Calvinists  of 
the  age,  rather  than  in  the  power  of  those  "  less  scrupulous"  per- 
sonages, whom  the  reviewer  has  taken  under  his  especial  favour. 

*  The  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  speaking  of  these  same  persons, 
say,  "  It  is  believed,  that  the  history  of  legislation  in  this  country  affords  no  instance 
in  which  a  stronger  expression  has  been  made,  if  regard  be  had  to  the  numbers, 
wealth,  or  the  intelligence  of  the  petitioners." 

f  In  the  sense  of  the  reviewer. 


ESSAY    XX. 

BODILY  EFFECTS  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXCITEMENT* 


During  the  years  1800,  1801,  1802,  and  1803,  a  revival  of  reli- 
gion occurred  in  the  southern  and  western  sections  of  Kentucky, 
or  what  is  generally  known  as  the  Green  River  country.  The 
principal  instruments  were  the  Rev.  Messrs.  M'Gready,  Hodge, 
Rankin,  and  M'Gee.  The  first  named  individual  was  in  the  van. 
He  was  a  devout,  evangelical,  powerful  preacher  ;  a  pupil  of  Dr. 
M'Millan,  lately  deceased.  These  men,  let  it  be  recollected,  were 
the  original  leaders  and  abettors  of  the  subsequent  irregularities 
and  disorders  of  the  Cumberland  Presbytery,  which  will  be  no- 
ticed hereafter.  Previous  to  this  revival  of  religion,  Kentucky,  and 
all  this  western  region,  was  in  a  state  of  great  coldness  and  declen- 
sion. The  country  was  new,  and  a  heterogeneous  mass  from  all 
quarters  had  pressed  into  it.  Presbyterians,  both  clergy  and  peo- 
ple, were  very  formal.  Sacramental  services  were  very  long,  and 
often  irksome,  and  apparently  unedifying,  or  rather  uninteresting, 
to  the  large  mass  of  attendants.  Communicants  were  heads  of 
families  generally  ;  rarely  was  there  to  be  seen  a  young  person  at 
the  Lord's  table.  The  services  were  conducted  on  the  plan  sug- 
gested in  our  Directory  for  Worship,  chap,  viii.,  sec.  6.  The  Sab- 
bath was  occupied  in  preaching,  fencing,  and  serving  the  tables,  as 
it  was  called,  from  five  to  eight  hours.  The  communion  was  held 
twice  in  the  year  in  those  churches  which  had  stated  pastors  or 
supplies,  and  in  many  churches  only  once  in  the  year.  Such 
was  the  state  of  things  when  the  revival  commenced,  which  was 
some  time  in  the  year  1799,  in  the  region  before  mentioned.  The 
population  there  was  sparse  at  that  time,  and  widely  scattered. 
The  work,  at  first,  was  no  doubt  a  glorious  work  of  the  Spirit  of 
God.  The  calls  for  ministerial  labour  were  so  great  and  extensive, 
that  it  was  impossible  for  the  few  clergymen,  recently  settled  there, 
to  supply  the  demand.  This  circumstance  suggested  the  idea  of 
protracted  meetings ;  that  the  ministers  might  have  the  opportuni- 

» 

*  The  article  here  reprinted  was  originally  in  the  form  of  a  letter,  from  one  who 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  facts  detailed.  These  are  highly  instructive,  and  ought 
to  be  recorded  and  remembered  for  the  benefit  of  the  coming  generation. 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  511 

ty  of  meeting  people  at  one  time  and  one  place.  There  were  then 
no  missionaries  to  go  from  place  to  place,  and  preach  to  the  scat- 
tered population.  And.  inasmuch  as  no  neighbourhood  had  a  popu- 
lation sufficient  to  support  so  many  people  as  assembled  on  those 
occasions,  this  gave  rise  to  the  plan  of  camp-meetings.  A  grove 
was  selected  ;  "  a  pulpit  of  wood,"  or,  as  we  generally  term  it,  a 
stand,  for  the  clergy,  was  erected.  The  multitude  who  intended 
to  be  stationary,  located  themselves,  with  their  wagons,  carriages, 
or  tents,  in  such  places  around  the  stand  as  their  iancy  or  conve- 
nience dictated.  The  assembly  was  often  so  great  that  secondary 
stands  were  erected :  the  congregation  divided,  so  that  three  or  four 
preachers  were  discoursing  at  the  same  time,  in  different  parts  of 
the  grove.  Here  was  the  commencement  of  disorder  and  confu- 
sion. The  sermon  had  scarcely  commenced,  when  some  one  or 
more  would  become  the  subject,  of  bodily  exercise.  This  was 
commonly  called  the  falling  exercise ;  or,  as  it  was  often  said,  such 
and  such  an  one  was  "  struck  down."  We  cannot  better  describe  this 
exercise  than  Dr.  M'Millan  has  done,  in  his  letter  to  President  Car- 
nahan.  M  It  was  no  unusual  thing  to  see  a  person  so  entirely  de- 
prived of  bodily  strength,  that  they  would  fall  from  their  feet,  or 
off  their  feet,  and  be  as  unable  to  help  themselves  as  a  new-born 
child.  We  have  seen  some  lie  in  this  condition  for  hours,  who  yet 
said  that  they  could  hear  everything  that  was  spoken,  and  felt  their 
minds  more  composed,  and  more  capable  of  attending  to  divine 
things,  than  when  their  bodies  were  not  thus  affected.  As  far  as  we 
could  observe,  the  bodily  exercise  never  preceded,  but  always  fol- 
lowed, upon  the  mind's  being  deeply  impressed  with  a  sense  of 
some  divine  truth."  Another  fac  simile,  if  we  may  so  call  it,  you 
may  find  in  Mr.  Gulick's  letter,  written  on  the  Island  of  Kauai.  See 
Miss.  Herald,  vol.  xxix.,  p.  404.  "  Some  were  seized  with  a  kind 
of  convulsive  trembling ;  and  in  a  few  cases,  overcome  by  their 
feelings,  they  fell  prostrate  on  their  faces,  and  lay  for  a  length  of 
time  weeping  in  a  most  affecting  manner.  And  what,  in  our  esti- 
mation at  least,  renders  this  work  the  more  remarkable  is,  that 
many  of  these  very  persons  who  now  felt  so  deeply,  have,  for 
years,  been  in  the  habit  of  hearing  the  most  solemn  and  alarming 
truths  in  the  Bible  without  the  least  apparent  emotion.  But  now, 
without  any  special  cause  of  excitement  or  alarm  from  us,  they  are 
thus  deeply  affected."  But  now,  as  we  conceive,  commenced  the 
principal  mischievous  measure.  When  any  one  would  become  the 
subject  of  this  bodily  exercise,  immediately  a  group  would  collect 
around,  and  commence  singing,  and  then  praying,  and  then  exhort- 
ing. Many  instances  of  this  kind  obtained  in  different  parts  of  the 
congregation  all  at  the  same  time.  Hence  it  happened,  that, 
throughout  the  assembly,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach  from  the 
stand,  there  was  a  continual  commotion  and  confused  noise  of 
preaching,  exhorting,  singing,  praying,  and  shouting,  going  on  at 
the  same  instant.  Many,  from  curiosity  or  anxiety,  were  seen  con- 
tinually running  from  one  group  to  another  ;  so  that  the  multitude 


- 


512  BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT. 

was  in  a  perpetual  state  of  commotion  and  agitation.  This  scene 
of  things  continued  day  and  night,  with  little  or  no  abatement. 
The  ministry  rather  yielded  up  the  reins  to  the  multitude,  who, 
being  carried  away  with  such  a  state  of  things,  considered  the  pul- 
pit of  little  account,  if  any  at  all.  Indeed,  preaching,  especially  of 
the  didactic  character,"was  considered  a  great  hindrance  to  the  pro- 
gress of  the  revival.  This  sentiment  was  not  confined  exclusively 
to  the  populace,  for  some  of  the  leading  and  most  popular  preach- 
ers gave  way  to  the  opinion  that  such  kind  of  preaching  was  rather 
an  interruption  to  the  great  work  that  was  then  going  on.  Hence, 
the  most  zealous,  arrogant,  and  enthusiastic  of  the  laity,  finding  the 
ministry  ready  to  surrender  their  posts,  very  naturally  took  the 
whole  management  of  the  service  out  of  their  hands,  and  controlled 
it  at  pleasure.  Moreover,  if  a  minister,  however  evangelical  in 
faith  and  practice,  did  not  come  "  fully  up  to  the  mark,"  i.  e.,  if  he 
expressed  any  disapprobation,  ministered  any  caution,  attempted  to 
correct  any  extravagances,  he  was  not  only  set  down  immediately 
as  being  hostile  to  the  revival,  but  even  interrupted  and  prevented 
from  proceeding  in  his  discourse,  by  some  of  the  multitude,  who 
commenced  singing,  or  praying,  or  exhorting,  or  shouting,  which- 
ever was,  at  the  time,  found  most  convenient,  by  the  leaders  of  such 
disorder.  It  was,  ultimately,  out  of  this  hot-bed  of  wild  enthusiasm 
and  disorder  that  there  sprung  up  that  fruitful  crop  of  heresy  and 
schism  that  afterwards  assumed  the  shape,  as  well  as  the  name,  of 
'  New  Lights,  Schismatics,  Marshallites,  Unitarians,  and  Shakers. 
By  these  heresies  the  Synod  of  Kentucky  was  deprived  of  eight 
members,  viz :  Marshall  and  Thompson  (who  afterwards  recanted 
their  errors  and  returned),  Stone,  Dunlavy,  M'Namer,  Huston, 
Rankin,  and  Bowman.  All  these,  except  Stone  and  Bowman,  be- 
came Shakers.  For  a  particular  account  and  description  of  bodily 
exercises,  as  they  were  perpetuated  and  fostered  among  the  New 
Lights,  after  they  became  a  separate  and  distinct  body,  being  ex- 
cluded from  our  church,  we  refer  to  the  "  Evangelical  Record," 
p.  217,  written  by  M'Namer,  while  one  of  that  party,  or  perhaps 
after  he  turned  Shaker.  The  description  is  indeed  ludicrous,  but 
so  far  as  our  knowledge  and  observation  extended  at  the  time,  we 
cannot  detect  anything  incorrect  in  the  statement.  We  do  not  con- 
sider it  exaggerated  or  too  highly  colored.  As  to  these  extrava- 
gances, the  Presbyterian  church  by  this  time  began  to  pause,  and 
look  on  these  scenes,  as  they  were  fully  acted  out  by  the  New 
Lights,  with  a  degree  of  wonder  and  disgust.  Still  there  was 
enough,  and  more  than  enough,  among  ourselves,  to  make  us  blush, 
on  a  review,  and  excite  in  us  a  desire  to  hide  our  mother's  naked- 
ness if  we  could.  The  work  was  conducted  by  Bishop  and  M'Chord. 
We  return  to  the  revival  scenes. 

We  have  seen  the  origin  of  camp-meetings,  which  have  so  much 
importance  now  attached  to  them.  They  originated  in  the  Presbyte- 
rian church  from  necessity ;  and  this  necessity,  perhaps,  at  the  time, 
justified  the  measure.     And  so  long  as  they  were  confined  to  the 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  518 

circumstances  which  seemed  to  call  for  them,  were  extensively  ac- 
commodating, and  thought  to  be  highly  beneficial.  The  meetings, 
at  first,  were  awfully  solemn  ;  and  no  doubt  much  good  was  done. 
But  when  they  were  extended,  and  adopted  in  the  more  populous 
parts  of  the  country,  where  they  were  attended  by  thousands  and 
tens  of  thousands,  induced  by  every  motive  good  or  bad,  together 
with  the  lax  and  irregular  management  of  them,  they  exhibited  too 
much  the  appearance  of  disorder  and  confusion,  which  baffled  and 
defied  all  description.  It  is  proper  to  remark,  however,  that  the 
form  and  arrangements  of  camp-meetings  now,  differ  very  much 
from  those  iu  former  days.  Then,  the  people  came  together  with- 
out any  shelter  but  their  wagons  and  their  tents,  erected  where  con- 
venience or  fancy  might  dictate.  They  brought  provisions  for  them- 
selves and  horses,  and  whatever  else  was  thought  necessary  to 
their  continuance  on  the  ground  for  many  days.  Now,  the  plan 
of  temporary  buildings  of  small  log  huts,  in  regular  order,  around 
the  stand,  and  the  space  where  the  congregation  is  to  assemble,  is 
adopted.  Order  and  solemnity  generally  prevail,  and  are  carefully 
inculcated  and  constantly  maintained.  Formerly,  as  we  have  seen, 
it  was  entirely  the  reverse.  As  for  the  comparative  good  or  evil 
attending  camp-meetings,  we  have  nothing  to  say,  as  my  acquaint- 
ance with  such  meetings  is  very  limited.  They  appear  to  be 
lauded  or  condemned,  according  to  the  opinions  and  prejudices  of 
their  advocates  or  opponents. 

We  confess  ourselves  much  at  a  loss  to  know  the  proper  shape  and 
size  of  the  subject  now  before  us ;  how  far  the  plan  of  this  history 
should  extend  ;  what  to  set  down,  and  what  to  omit.  To  descend 
to  particulars  and  minute  circumstances,  would  not  be  agreeable 
to  the  feelings  of  some  yet  living  ;  nor  do  we  know  that  it  would  be 
edifying.  We  will  state  a  few  facts  and  anecdotes,  connected  with 
the  subject  before  us.  The  writer  was  licensed  to  preach  in  April, 
1803 ;  both  before  and  after  which,  he  witnessed  many  things,  the 
detail  of  which  would  make  a  little  volume.  The  largest  meeting  he 
attended  was  in  June,  1801,  atCaneridge,  Bourbon  county,  where  B. 
W.  Stone  was  then  pastor.  The  exercises,  as  well  as  the  encamp- 
ment, were  such  as  are  described  above.  Many  appeared  to 
be  deeply  affected  ;  and  many  had  fallen  down.  There  was  much 
singing,  praying,  exhorting,  &c,  at  tents,  at  the  meeting-house,  and 
every  place  where  small  groups  were  assembled  around  one  or 
more  of  the  persons  who  were  "  struck  down."  Subsequently, 
during  the  years  1802 — 3,  we  witnessed  many  cases  of  bodily  exer- 
cise, the  most  of  which,  we  have  reason  to  believe,  were  entirely 
involuntary;  while  some  others,  we  thought,  were  the  reverse,  i.  e., 
either  the  persons  conceited,  or  fancied  themselves  under  exercise  ; 
or  desired  to  be,  and  therefore  sought  for  it,  and  yielded  to  the  first 
impulse,  which  might,  however,  nave  been  successfully  resisted. 
Many  persons,  within  my  knowledge,  became  hopefully  pious,  the 
most  of  whom  continue  unto  the  present,  and  many  have  fallen 
asleep  in  Jesus.     The  number  of  apostasies  was  much  fewer  than 

33 


514        BODILY  EFFECTS  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXCITEMENT. 

might  be  supposed.  Indeed,  when  we  look  back  on  those  times,  we 
greatly  wonder  that  there  were  not  ten  for  one.  The  Presbyterian 
church  suffered  greatly,  lost  many  members,  more  ministers,  pro- 
portionably,  than  others :  but  she  continued  unconsumed,  and  was 
much  better  prepared,  by  practical  knowledge,  and  dear-bought 
experience,  for  the  next  revival  than  she  was  before.  But  to  our 
narrative. 

A  contemporary  brother  minister,  by  our  request,  has  given  us, 
in  substance,  the  following  facts.  The  first  personal  knowledge 
he  had  of  any  of  the  subjects  of  the  revival  was  in  the  winter  of 
1800 — 1,  near  the  borders  of  the  State  of  Tennessee.  Shortly 
after  the  people  began  to  assemble,  two  or  three  persons  appeared 
to  swoon  away,  and  after  lying  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  appeared 
to  be  wholly  convulsed,  some  more  than  others.  His  attention 
was  particularly  called  to  a  young  female,  who,  after  some  time 
lying  apparently  motionless,  began  to  move  her  lips.  On  a  near 
approach,  he  found  himself  the  subject  of  her  prayer  ;  from  which 
it  appeared  that  she  was  under  the  impression  that  he  had  come  a 
considerable  distance,  and  from  a  cold  region,  to  see  the  great 
work  that  was  going  on  in  that  place.  And  she  prayed  fervently 
that  he  might  not  be  disappointed.  When  she  recovered,  and  re- 
sumed her  usual  posture,  and  state  of  mind,  there  was  great  solicitude 
manifested  by  her  minister,  and  others,  to  know  the  result  of  her 
exercise,  what  she  had  seen,  &c.  She  informed  them  that  she  had 
seen  that  they  were  to  have  a  glorious  meeting  that  day,  and  the 
minister  (Mr.  Rankin)  said  he  had  no  doubt  of  it.  In  that  same 
place,  there  were  others  who  saw,  during  their  exercises,  as  they 
expressed  themselves,  certain  persons  (who  were  yet  unconverted), 
in  the  act  of  preaching,  and  a  very  great  work  going  on  under  their 
ministry ;  and  they  appeared  to  expect  it  with!  as  much  certainty 
as  if  it  had  been  revealed  to  them  from  heaven.  At  that  time  and 
place,  there  was  a  considerable  mixture  of  wheat  and  chaff*.  On 
the  one  hand,  there  was  manifestly  an  anxious  disposition  to  con- 
verse on  religious  subjects,  particularly  about  the  experience  and 
exercises  of  the  heart ;  a  close  attention  to  the  preaching  of  the 
word,  with  apparent  desire  to  profit  thereby.  There  appeared 
among  many  a  docile  temper,  a  spirit  of  inquiry,  with  fervent 
prayer  and  cautious  zeal.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  a  prevailing 
sentiment,  that  the  subjects  of  the  revival  had  more  than  common 
attainments  in  evangelical  knowledge  and  piety ;  that  the  millen- 
nium was  just  at  hand,  even  at  the  door  ;  of  which  fact  these  extra- 
ordinary exercises  were  certain  precursors  and  evidences.  These 
and  such  like  extravagant  notions  were,  of  course,  attended  by  an 
arrogant  boldness  and  self-importance,  which  did  not  savour  of  the 
religion  and  spirit  of  Christ.  Social  meetings  catechetical  instruc- 
tion, &c,  were  almost,  if  not  altogether  neglected.  As  before  in- 
timated, the  intervals  between  sermons  were  occupied  by  the 
multitude  in  various  exercises.  The  ministers  took,  comparatively, 
but  little  interest  in  conducting  the  worship,  except  in  the  time  of 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  515 

preaching,  which  occupied  but  a  small  portion  of  the  twenty-four 
hours.  The  rest  of  the  time  was  spent  as  before  described,  sing- 
ing with  great  fervour  and  animation,  shaking  hands  all  through 
the  crowd,  praying  by  fifties  and  hundreds  all  at  the  same  moment. 
Such  scenes  we  have  often  witnessed.  Young  converts  were  often 
seen  passing  through  the  assembly,  and  on  the  outskirts  thereof, 
exhorting  sinners,  in  a  very  lofty  tone,  and  peremptory  manner,  to 
fly  from  the  wrath  to  come.  Others  would  pray  for  hours  together, 
until  they  were  exhausted ;  and  when  they  could  stand  up  no 
longer,  they  would  sit  down,  or  recline  on  some  other  person,  and 
then  pray,  or  exhort,  until  completely  exhausted ;  so  that  nature 
could  exert  itself  no  further.  These  exercises  were  greatly  ap- 
plauded, and  highly  approved,  as  being  not  only  certain  evidences 
of  the  gracious  state  of  the  individuals  themselves,  but,  likewise, 
as  eminently  useful  and  instrumental  in  furthering  the  revival. 
When  some  of  the  elder  brethren  were  inquired  of  about  the  expe- 
diency and  propriety  of  correcting  some  extravagancies  which 
appeared  wild  and  visionary,  their  reply  was,  in  substance,  that 
they  knew  these  things  were  not  right ;  but  should  they  interfere 
by  attempting  to  rectify  them  at  that  time,  it  might  interrupt,  if  not 
stop,  the  revival  altogether.  Here  the  ministry,  however  good  the 
intention,  was  much  at  fault.  The  surrendering  up  the  control 
and  management  of  the  religious  exercises  into  the  hands  of  mere 
novices,  or  such  as  were  unskilful  and  inexperienced,  was  the  very 
inlet  or  gateway  to  those  errors  and  extravagancies  that  soon  fol- 
lowed. There  was,  if  we  mistake  not,  one  general,  prevailing,  pro- 
minent feature  attending  this  revival  everywhere ;  it  was  the 
strange,  mistaken  disposition,  in  a  very  large  portion  of  the  jfcople, 
to  undervalue  the  public  means  of  religion,  and,  in  the  place  thereof, 
to  promote  a  kind  of  tumultuous  exercise,  in  which  themselves 
could  take  an  active  part,  if  not  become  the  principal  leaders. 
Hence,  some  of  these  would-be-leaders  have  been  known  to  lie 
down  and  sleep  in  the  time  of  preaching,  and  during  some  of  the 
most  serious  and  solemn  addresses,  and  as  soon  as  the  sermon  was 
over,  suddenly  rise  to  their  feet,  and  sing,  and  shake  hands,  and 
pray,  and  exhort,  with  all  the  apparent  energy  of  a  saint  or  mes- 
senger from  heaven.  The  wild  fanatical  notions  of  some  were 
manifested  by  their  believing  themselves  under  obligation  to  go, 
according  to  certain  impressions,  which  they  considered  to  be  from 
heaven  ;  namely,  that  they  must  go  to  certain  places,  and  say  and 
do  certain  things,  and  that  it  must  be  done  and  said  at  a  certain 
time,  &c.  Many  such  things  as  these,  which  would  be  tedious 
and  unnecessary  to  detail  here,  obtained  and  prevailed  in  this 
revival. 

We  proceed  to  relate  a  case  or  two,  respecting  the  exercise  called 
the  "jerks."  This  succeeded  sometime  after  the  falling  exercise, 
and,  I  believe,  had  its  origin  in  East  Tennessee  ;  at  least  it  was,  to 
use  a  commercial  phrase,  first  imported  into  Kentucky  from  that 
quarter.      It   affected   the  good   and  the  bad,  the  aged  and  the 


516  BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT. 

young.  It  was  entirely  involuntary,  dreaded  and  hated,  and  even 
cursed  by  some  ;  while  it  was  desired,  and  courted,  and  highly 
prized  by  others.  It  came  on  something  like  the  hiccough,  without 
any  premonitory  symptom,  and  left  the  subject  equally  without  any 
sensible  effect.  During  its  prevalence,  we  made  several  experi- 
ments; being  inexperienced  in  the  ministry,  we  knew  not  what 
to  do  with  it.  While  preaching,  we  have,  after  a  smooth  and 
gentle  course  of  expression,  suddenly  changed  our  voice,  and 
language,  expressing  something  awful  and  alarming,  and,  in- 
stantly, some  dozen  or  twenty  persons,  or  more,  would,  simul- 
taneously, be  jerked  forward,  where  they  were  sitting,  with  a 
suppressed  noise,  once  or  twice,  somewhat  like  the  barking  of 
a  dog.  And  so  it  would  either  continue  or  abate  according 
to  the  tenor  or  strain  of  my  discourse.  The  strong  sympathy, 
and  intimate  correspondence  between  the  mind  and  body,  was 
fully  manifested,  by  this  experiment  producing  the  exhibition 
which  immediately  followed.  The  first  subject  of  this  exercise 
that  attracted  our  attention,  was  the  pious  wife  of  one  of  our 
elders.  She  was  affected  by  this  operation  very  gently,  she  felt 
no  pain  whatever,  but  rather  the  reverse — a  pleasing  sensation 
— could  give  no  satisfactory  account  of  its  operation.  She  went 
to  the  country  village,  on  a  public  day,  to  do  a  little  shopping  ;  we 
accompanied  her  on  our  way  home.  She  was  entirely  free  from 
any  operation  of  the  jerks.  We  therefore  determined  to  try 
an  experiment,  conversed  freely  and  somewhat  jocularly  with  her 
on  secular  matters,  to  divert  her  mind  as  far  off  in  that  direction  as 
we  thought  necessary,  and  then  immediately  changed  the  subject  to 
that  £'  a  very  serious  and  solemn  character.  We  are  certain,  not 
two  minutes  had  elapsed,  before  she  was  considerably  affected  with 
this  exercise.  Her  body,  from  the  saddle  and  upwards,  appeared 
to  pitch  forward  half  way  to  the  horse's  neck,  six  or  eight  times  in  a 
minute.  We  were  fully  satisfied  she  could  not  prevent  it.  Our  mind 
became,  some  time  after,  greatly  perplexed  about  this  exercise.  We 
could  not  encourage  it,  and  yet,  being  a  young  minister,  we  were 
afraid  to  say  anything  against  it  publicly,  as  it  had  many  friends 
and  advocates.  At  length  it  was  found  to  be  detrimental  in  various 
ways;  besides  interrupting  public  worship,  it  deterred  many  from 
attending  altogether,  being  impressed  with  the  belief  that  it  was 
"catching."  But  it  was  not  confined  to  the  public  assembly ;  it 
invaded  the  private  and  domestic  circle,  while  engaged  in  domestic 
business,  or  travelling  on  the  road.  The  same  individual  was  fre- 
quently the  subject  of  it,  young  and  old,  male  and  female,  refined 
and  unrefined,  the  pious  and  the  wicked,  were  alike  under  its  ope- 
ration. 

Take  another  singular  case,  stated  to  us  by  Mr.  M'Gready.  A 
young  man,  son  of  an  elder,  to  avoid  attending  a  camp-meeting  in 
the  neighbourhood  with  the  family,  feigned  himself  sick.  On  the 
morning  of  the  Sabbath,  he  continued  in  bed,  until  the  family  had 
all  started  for  the  meeting ;  he  being  left  alone,  except  a  few  small 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  517 

blacks.  When  thus  alone,  he  congratulated  himself  on  his  success, 
by  the  deception  he  had  practised  on  his  parents.  He  raised  up 
his  head,  and  looking  all  around  his  room,  smiled  at  the  adventure  ; 
but  lest  it  might  not  be  complete,  lest  some  one  might  have  occa- 
sion to  linger  or  return,  and  so  he  be  detected,  he  resumed  his  clini- 
cal position,  covering  over  his  head,  and  in  a  short  time  directed 
his  thoughts  towards  the  camp  ground.  He  fancied  the  multitude 
assembling,  the  services  commenced,  the  bodily  exercises,  as  he 
had  seen  them,  now  in  operation.  He  fancied  a  certain  female 
now  in  full  exercise ;  •'  now  she's  at  it,  now  she's  at  it/'  In  a  mo- 
ment he  was  taken  with  the  same  exercise  (the  jerks),  was  hurled 
out  of  his  bed,  and  jerked  hither  and  thither,  all  around  the  room, 
up  against  the  wall,  and  in  every  fashion.  He  had  never  been 
affected  by  bodily  exercise  before,  but  now  found  himself  perfectly 
unmanageable.  He  had  heard  it  said,  and  indeed  witnessed  the 
fact,  that  praying  would  cause  the  jerks  to  cease.  He  tried  it ;  the 
desired  effect  followed  immediately.  He  felt  no  more  the  effects 
of  the  exercise  than  a  person  does  after  the  hiccough.  He  sup- 
posed it  all  a  dream,  a  mere  conceit,  illusion  or  something  of  the 
kind,  resumed  his  bed,  commenced  his  pranks  again,  and  again  was 
the  scene  acted  over,  only  a  little  worse.  The  same  remedy  was 
resorted  to,  and  he  again  became  in  statu  quo.  He  arose,  dressed 
himself,  sauntered  about  awhile,  wanted  some  employment  to  pass 
the  time  away,  bethought  himself  of  a  dog-skin  in  the  vat,  that 
needed  unhairing,  drew  it  out,  laid  it  on  the  beam,  rolled  up  his 
sleeves,  grasped  the  graining  knife,  lifted  it  up  to  make  the  first 
scrape,  when  lo,  it  was  instantaneously  flirted  out  of  his  grasp,  and 
he  was  jerked  back,  over  logs,  against  the  fence,  up  and  down,  un- 
til he  resorted  to  his  old  remedy  and  again  obtained  relief.  Feel- 
ing as  before,  perfectly  free  from  any  sensible  or  evil  effects,  as 
strong,  and  resolute,  and  determined,  and  reckless  as  ever,  he  ven- 
tured again.  He  assumed  his  instrument,  and  resumed  his  posture 
over  the  subject  of  his  intended  operation,  when  immediately,  be- 
fore] he  could  make  one  stroke,  the  whole  scene,  only  if  possible 
tenfold  worse,  was  acted  over  again ;  it  was  much  more  severe, 
and  greatly  protracted.  The  usual  remedy,  at  first,  failed ;  he  be- 
came alarmed,  thought  the  Lord  was  now  about  to  kill  him,  be- 
came deeply  convicted  of  his  great  folly  and  wickedness  ;  became 
composed  again  in  body,  but  now  greatly  agitated  and  concerned 
in  mind ;  called  a  little  black,  pointed  him  to  the  dog-skin,  which 
he  was  afraid  now  to  approach,  directed  where  to  lay  it  away,  re- 
turned to  his  room  weeping  and  crying  to  God  for  mercy,  and  in 
this  condition  was  found  on  the  return  of  the  family.  He  shortly 
afterward  obtained  a  good  hope  through  grace,  applied  for  the  privi- 
leges of  the  church,  gave  this  relation  ol  facts  to  the  session,  was 
received,  and  in  the  judgment  of  Christian  charity,  gave  satisfac- 
tory evidence  by  a  scriptural  experience,  and  godly  living,  that  he 
was  a  renewed  man  and  redeemed  sinner  saved  by  grace. 

We  shall   add  only  one  case    more.      One    evening  we  rode 


518  BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT. 

six  miles  up  Green  river,  and  preached  at  a  Mr.  M'Whorter's, 
in  a  Baptist  settlement.  The  house  was  crowded.  The  people 
were  attentive,  until  we  had  finished  the  discourse  and  had  prayed, 
and  were  about  to  sing  the  last  hymn,  but  were  forestalled  by  an 
enthusiastic  kind  of  man,  who  started  a  song  with  a  lively  tune. 
Several  young  women  began  to  jerk  backwards  and  forwards. 
The  seats  were  immediately  removed,  to  afford  room  and  prevent 
them  from  being  hurt.  One  young  woman  had  what  we  would  call 
the  whirling  exercise.  She  went  round  like  a  top,  we  think  at  least 
fifty  times  in  a  minute,  and  continued,  without  intermission,  for  at 
least  an  hour.  It  exceeded  by  far,  anything  of  the  kind  we  had  ever 
witnessed.  We  were  told  she  had  had  the  jerks  nearly  three  years. 
She  did  not  appear  exhausted ;  complained  of  pain  or  distress  if  the 
bystanders  did  not  continue  singing.  We  became  perfectly  tired,  our 
preaching  seemed  to  be  all  gone,  and  to  have  been  rather  in  the 
way,  from  what  took  place  afterwards.  We  remonstrated  with  some 
of  them,  and  cautioned  them.  Thus  you  see  this  exercise  con- 
tinued, more  or  less,  in  one  or  another  place  for  a  long  time.  It, 
however,  in  the  general,  gradually  disappeared,  especially  from 
the  Presbyterian  church ;  and  thus  afforded  us  a  very  happy  relief. 
We  were  heartily  glad  when'it  was  entirely  gone.  After  all  these 
novelties  left  us,  the  church,  like  one  enfeebled  and  exhausted,  sank 
down  into  formality  and  apathy.  After  she  had  passed  through 
the  fire,  she  came  forth  more  refined  as  to  doctrine  and  sound- 
ness in  the  faith.  For  nearly  twenty  years  afterwards  was  she 
without  a  revival.  But  blessed  be  God,  she  has  recovered,  and 
her  borders  have  been  greatly  enlarged,  and  her  stakes  strength- 
ened ;  and  we  trust  in  God  she  will  never  see  and  feel  such  another 
shock.  In  her  wisdom  and  experience,  we  believe  such  things  will 
never  find  favour  and  encouragement  again. 

The  Cumberland  business  was  the  last  difficulty  we  had  to 
struggle  with.  The  original  Cumberland  Presbytery  was  one 
of  our  own,  formed  by  the  Synod  from  Transylvania  Presbytery, 
and  shortly  after  dissolved,  being  incapable  of  transacting  business. 
M'Gready  and  Hodge  acknowledged  and  renounced  their  ecclesi- 
astical aberrations  ;  Rankin  turned  Shaker ;  M'Gee  and  M'Adam 
were  under  citation,  but  never  appeared.  The  whole  business 
was  finished  by  the  Assembly  in  1809,  and  in  February,  1810, 
the  present  Cumberland  formed  themselves  into  a  separate 
body.  By  a  subsequent  Assembly  they  have  been  recognised 
as  other  denominations,  such  as  Methodists,  Baptists,  &c.  Some 
of  their  ministers  are  more  violent  against  us  than  the  Metho- 
dists. Their  preachers  are  generally  illiterate,  and  a  little  more 
than  semi-Arminian.  They  have  carried  off,  by  their  zeal  and 
name,  many  members  of  our  church,  where  we  had  no  ministry. 
A  friend  in  whom  we  can  confide  lately  informed  us,  that  they  are 
very  friendly  in  Missoui'i ;  co-operate  with  us  heartily  in  the  Chris- 
tian enterprises  of  the  day ;  boldly  and  successfully  combat  here- 
sy ;  and  appear  to  manifest  great  anxiety  and  desire  to  become, 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  619 

in  some  way,  united  with  us.  But  this  cannot  be,  from  their  pre- 
sent aspect  as  a  body.  Their  literary  character,  as  well  as  orthodox 
standard,  is  too  low  and  uncertain.  Should  it  become  expedient 
to  branch  out,  in  extending  the  history  of  the  revival  (as  we  wrote 
of  this  before),  it  will  be  necessary  to  trace,  first,  the  New  Lights, 
the  sphere  of  whose  operations  was  in  the  eastern  section  of  Ken- 
tucky, by  Marshall,  Stone,  &c.  The  Rev.  W.  L.  M'Calla  collected 
materials  for  their  history  before  he  left  Kentucky,  but  I  know  not 
what  he  did  with  them.  Out  of  these  heretics  soon  sprung  the 
Shakers,  whose  history  is  familiar.  The  Cumberland  is  a  distinct 
branch  altogether,  gradually  rising  and  growing  out  of  the  disorders 
which  obtained  in  the  Green  River  country,  or  further  down  in  Ken- 
tucky, and  in  West  Tennessee,  called  Cumberland,  we  suppose,  from 
the  river  of  that  name,  running  by  Nashville.  This  accounts  for 
the  name  "  Cumberland  Presbytery,"  at  first  given  to  that  section 
of  our  Synod,  and  subsequently  adopted  by  the  present  Cumber- 
lands,  as  they  are  generally  called.  In  their  worship,  they  are 
considered  more  noisy  and  disorderly  than  the  Methodists.  In 
short,  to  use  a  homely  phrase,  they  have  Presbyterian  warp,  but 
Methodist  filling. 

THE  JERKS. 

As  the  facts  in  relation  to  these  bodily  agitations  are  somewhat 
remarkable,  we  deem  it  expedient  to  make  some  addition  to  what 
is  stated  above,  by  our  worthy  correspondent. 

The  phenomenon  of  swooning,  or  suddenly  falling  or  sinking 
down,  under  religious  exercises,  has  not  been  uncommon  in  times 
of  great  excitement,  and  under  very  impassioned  preaching.  Such 
occurrences  were  very  frequent  under  the  ministry  of  Whitefield 
and  Wesley ;  and  in  this  country,  during  the  great  revivals  which 
took  place  under  the  preaching  of  Whitefield,  the  Tennents,  Blairs, 
&c,  such  appearances  were  of  frequent  occurrence.  The  same 
was  remarkably  the  fact  at  Cambuslang  and  Kilsyth  in  Scotland, 
during  the  extraordinary  religious  excitement  which  took  place  in 
those  towns,  early  in  the  last  century.  We  have  also  witnessed 
such  effects  on  the  body,  as  occurring  very  commonly,  in  the 
meetings  of  the  Methodists  and  Baptists  in  the  south  and  west.  In 
the  cases  which  have  fallen  under  our  observation,  the  effect  on 
the  body  was  entirely  involuntary.  Sometimes  it  was  preceded 
by  a  universal  trembling  of  the  whole  frame;  but,  at  other  times, 
the  falling  was  as  sudden  as  if  the  person  had  been  struck  with 
lightning.  In  some  cases,  there  followed  a  convulsive  motion 
of  the  limbs  ;  but  most  frequently  the  patient  lay  motionless,  as  if 
in  a  swoon.  And  the  only  remarkable  difference  between  these 
paroxysms  and  those  of  common  syncope  is  that,  in  the  former, 
the  person  is  not  unconscious  of  what  is  said  and  done  in  his 
presence. 

But  the  bodily  agitation  called  the  jerks  is  a  very  different  afTec- 


520  BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT. 

tion  ;  and  the  only  appearance  known  to  us  which  bears  a  resem- 
blance to  it  is  the  jumping  exercise  in  Wales,  of  which  Dr.  Hay- 
garth  has  given  an  account  in  his  treatise  "  On  the  Effect  of  the 
Imagination  in  the  cure  of  bodily  diseases."  The  same  facts  are 
referred  to  in  Sidney's  Life  of  Rowland  Hill.  This  extraordinary 
nervous  agitation  commenced,  as  stated  by  our  correspondent,  in 
East  Tennessee,  at  a  sacramental  meeting ;  and  we  have  been 
informed,  that  on  that  day  several  hundreds  of  persons,  of  all  ages 
and  sexes,  were  seized  with  this  involuntary  motion.  It  was  at 
first  almost  uniformly  confined  to  the  arms,  and  the  motion  pro- 
ceeded downwards  from  the  elbow,  causing  the  arm  to  move  with 
a  sudden  jerk  or  quick  convulsive  motion,  and  these  jerks  suc- 
ceeded each  other  after  short  intervals.  For  some  time  no  reli- 
gious meeting  was  held,  in  which  this  novel  involuntary  exercise 
was  not  exhibited  by  more  or  less  of  the  audience  in  that  part  of 
the  country  where  they  originated.  And,  generally,  all  those  who 
had  once  been  the  subjects  of  it,  continued  to  be  frequently  affected, 
and  not  only  at  meeting,  but  at  home,  and  sometimes  when  entirely 
alone.  After  the  commencement  of  the  jerks,  they  spread  rapidly 
in  all  directions.  Persons  drawn  by  curiosity  to  visit  the  congre- 
gations where  they  existed,  were  often  seized,  and  when  they  re- 
turned home,  they  would  communicate  them  to  the  people  there. 
But,  in  some  instances,  they  occurred  in  remote  valleys  of  the 
mountains,  where  the  people  had  no  opportunity  of  communication 
with  the  infected.  In  East  Tennessee  and  the  south-western  part 
of  Virginia,  their  prevalence  was  the  greatest;  and  in  this  region, 
persons  of  all  descriptions  were  seized,  from  the  aged,  grey-headed 
preacher,  down  to  children  of  eight  or  ten  years  of  age.  Soon, 
however,  the  "  exercise "  began  to  assume  a  variety  of  appear- 
ances. While  the  jerks  in  the  arms  continued  to  be  the  most 
common  form,  in  many  cases  the  joint  of  the  neck  was  the  seat  of 
the  convulsive  motion,  and  was  thrown  back  and  forward  to  an 
extent,  and  with  a  celerity,  which  no  one  could  imitate,  and  which 
to  the  spectator  was  most  alarming.  Another  common  exercise 
was  dancing,  which  was  performed  by  a  gentle  and  not  ungrace- 
ful motion,  but  with  little  variety  in  the  steps.  During  the  admin- 
istration of  the  Lord's  Supper,  in  the  presence  of  the  Synod  of 
Virginia,  we  witnessed  a  young  woman  performing  this  exercise 
for  the  space  of  twenty  minutes  or  half  an  hour.  The  pew  in 
which  she  was  sitting  was  cleared,  and  she  danced  from  one  end 
to  the  other ;  her  eyes  were  shut,  and  her  countenance  calm. 
When  the  dancing  terminated,  she  fell,  and  seemed  to  be  agitated 
with  more  violent  motions.  We  saw  another  who  had  what  was 
termed  "  the  jumping  exercise ;"  which  resembled  that  of  the 
jumpers  in  Wales.  It  was  truly  wonderful  to  observe  the  violence 
of  the  impetus  with  which  she  was  borne  upwards  from  the  ground: 
it  required  the  united  strength  of  three  or  four  of  her  companions 
to  confine  her  down.  None  of  these  varieties,  however,  were  half 
so  terrible  to  the  spectator,  as  that  which  affected  the  joint  of  the 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  521 

neck.  In  this,  it  appeared  as  if  the  neck  must  be  broken  ;  and 
while  the  bosom  heaved  in  an  extraordinary  manner,  the  counte- 
nance was  distorted  in  a  disgusting  way. 

Besides  the  "  exercises  "  already  mentioned,  there  were  some  of 
the  most  curious  and  ludicrous  kind.  In  one,  the  affected  barked 
like  a  dog  ;  in  another,  they  boxed  with  fists  clenched,  striking  at 
every  body  or  thing  near  to  them.  The  running  exercise  was  also 
one  of  the  varieties,  in  which  the  person  was  impelled  to  run  with 
amazing  swiftness.  There  were  many  other  singular  motions  in 
imitation  of  persons  playing  on  the  violin,  or  sewing  with  a  needle, 
&c,  &c. 

The  most  remarkable  circumstance  in  relation  to  these  various 
exercises  was,  that  a  person  affected  with  a  peculiar  species  of  the 
jerks,  coming  into  a  congregation  where  that  had  not  been  experi- 
enced, would  commonly  communicate  it  to  those  who  had  been 
affected  with  exercises  of  a  different  kind.  Thus,  a  lady  from 
Tennessee,  who  brought  into  a  certain  part  of  Virginia  the  barking 
exercise,  immediately  was  imitated  by  certain  of  those  affected 
with  the  jerks,  who  had  never  seen  anything  of  this  sort  before. 
These  nervous  agitations  were  at  first  received  as  something  su- 
pernatural, intended  to  arrest  the  attention  of  the  careless  multi- 
tude, and  were  therefore  encouraged  and  sustained  by  many  of  the 
pious ;  but  after  a  while  they  became  troublesome.  The  noise 
made  by  these  convulsive  motions  in  the  pews  was  such,  that  the 
preacher  could  not  be  composedly  heard ;  and  in  several  of  the 
exercises  the  affected  person  needed  the  attention  of  more  than  one 
assistant.  Besides,  nervous  agitation  or  falling  was  so  easily 
brought  on  by  the  least  mental  excitement,  even  at  home,  that 
many  who  were  the  subjects  of  the  jerks  became  weary  of  it ; 
and,  in  some  cases,  avoided  serious  and  exciting  thoughts,  lest 
they  should  produce  this  effect.  It  is  remarkable,  however,  that 
they  all  united  in  their  testimony,  that  in  the  most  violent  and  con- 
vulsive agitations,  as  when  the  head  would  rapidly  strike  the 
breast  and  back  alternately,  no  pain  was  experienced ;  and  some 
asserted,  that  when  one  arm  only  was  affected  with  the  jerks,  it 
felt  more  comfortable  than  the  other,  through  the  whole  day.  Per- 
haps this  was  imagination.  In  some  places  the  persons  affected 
were  not  permitted  to  come  to  the  church,  on  account  of  the  noise 
and  disturbance  produced.  The  subjects  were  generally  pious,  or 
seriously  affected  with  religion,  but  not  universally.  There  were 
cases  in  which  careless  persons,  and  those  who  continued  to  be 
such,  were  seized.  The  dread  of  the  jerks  was  great  in  many, 
both  religious  and  careless,  and,  upon  the  whole,  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  them  was  very  unfavourable  to  the  advancement  of  reli- 
gion. All,  however,  were  not  of  this  opinion.  Some  who  had 
much  experience  of  them,  continued  to  speak  favourably  of  their 
effects. 

We  have  the  pleasure  of  annexing  to  our  account,  the  statement 
of  an  intelligent  and  respectable  physician,  who  appears  to  have 


522  BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT. 

paid  much  attention  to  subjects  of  this  kind.  The  opinion  of  such 
men  is  valuable,  as  they  are  better  acquainted  with  the  physiology 
of  man  than  other  persons. 

The  Jerks. — "  This  affection  I  have  repeatedly  witnessed  in  the 
State  of  Illinois  in  the  years  1822-3-4.  The  persons  subject  to  it 
were  principally  females  in  the  humbler  walks  of  life,  natives  of 
North  Carolina  and  Tennessee.  Young  females  (say  from  thirteen 
to  thirty  years  old)  of  sanguine  and  nervous  temperament  were 
more  addicted  to  it  than  others.  It  is  equally  prevalent  among 
Methodists  and  Cumberland  Presbyterians.  Their  discourses  are 
generally  passionate  addresses,  first  to  the  fears,  and  secondly  to 
the  sympathies  of  their  hearers.  At  the  conclusion  of  these  ad- 
dresses, hymns  are  sung  with  great  animation,  the  leaders  passing 
through  the  congregation  shaking  their  hands.  The  jerks  or  falling 
generally  commence  at  the  conclusion  of  the  sermon  and  increase 
during  the  singing.  Different  persons  are  variously  affected : 
some  rise  to  their  feet  and  spin  round  like  a  top,  while  others 
dance  till  they  fall  down  exhausted.  Some  throw  back  their  heads 
with  convulsive  laughter,  while  others,  drowned  in  tears,  break 
forth  in  sighs  and  lamentations.  Some  fall  from  their  seats  in  a 
state  of  insensibility,  and  lie  for  hours  without  consciousness,  while 
others  are  affected  with  violent  convulsions  resembling  epilepsy. 
Those  habituated  to  the  affection  are  generally  attacked  under  the 
circumstances  above  detailed,  but  I  have  seen  some  persons  who 
had  become  so  irritable  that  the  least  mental  excitement  would 
produce  the  paroxysm.  Others  appeared  to  be  affected  from  sym- 
pathy. 1  have  seen  several  young  women  of  the  same  neigbour- 
hood,  who  were  always  attacked  at  seeing  one  of  their  number 
with  the  paroxysm.  I  have  seen  others  who  would  be  instantly 
attacked  on.  seeing  any  person  with  the  affection  without  having 
any  previous  mental  excitement.  During  the  convulsive  paroxysm, 
recollection  and  sensation  are  but  little  impaired ;  after  continuing 
a  certain  period,  the  person  generally  falls  into  a  state  of  stupor 
very  much  resembling  that  subsequent  to  epilepsy.  Yet  the  ani- 
mal functions  are  not  much  impaired.  The  pulse  is  natural.  The 
temperature  that  of  health  throughout  the  paroxysm :  after  it  has 
subsided,  there  is  soreness  of  the  muscles  and  a  slight  dull  pain  of 
the  head,  which  soon  pass  away. 

"  From  the  sex  of  those  most  subject  to  the  affection,  the  time  of 
life  when  they  are  most  susceptible  of  it,  the  condition  they  occupy 
in  society,  the  causes  which  excite  it  into  action,  and  the  effect 
produced  by  the  paroxysm,  I  was  led  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
a  nervous  disease  brought  on  by  continual  mental  excitement, 
and  protracted  by  habit,  that  after  it  has  once  become  habitual 
from  long  continued  mental  excitement,  sympathy  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  call  it  into  action  without  mental  excitement. 

"  Many  of  the  subjects  of  this  affection  were  addicted  to  hys- 


BODILY    EFFECTS    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXCITEMENT.  523 

terics;  and  all,  persons  easily  affected  by  anything  exciting  the 
natural  sympathies. 

"  I  have  omitted  to  mention  one  fact  I  have  often  witnessed,  viz : 
that  restraint  often  prevents  the  paroxysm.  For  example  :  persons 
always  attacked  by  this  affection  in  churches  where  it  is  encou- 
raged, will  be  perfectly  calm  in  other  churches  where  it  is  dis- 
couraged, however  affecting  may  be  the  service,  and  however 
great  the  mental  excitement.  Some  of  them  have  told  me  that 
such  was  the  fact,  and  as  these  were  the  more  intelligent  of  those 
addicted  to  such  affections,  I  doubt  not  the  truth  of  what  they 
said." 

Reflections. — 1.  The  first  reflection  which  is  suggested  by  the 
preceding  accounts  is,  that  the  physiology  of  the  human  system  is 
very  imperfectly  understood. 

2.  The  second  is,  that  an  irregular  action  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem produces  often  very  astonishing  appearances. 

3.  Religious  excitement  carried  to  excess  is  a  dangerous  thing. 
Enthusiasm  is  the  counterfeit  of  true  religion,  and  is  a  species  of 
insanity. 

4.  In  revivals  of  religion,  badly  regulated,  there  may  be  much 
extravagance,  and  yet  the  work  in  the  main  may  be  genuine. 
The  wise  will  discriminate,  and  not  approve  or  condemn  in  the 
lump. 

5.  Pious  men  and  women  are  imperfect  in  knowledge,  and  often 
form  erroneous  opinions  which  lead  them  astray.  Bodily  affec- 
tions, however,  are  no  evidence  of  error  or  enthusiasm. 

6.  Such  bodily  affections  as  are  described  in  the  foregoing  nar- 
ratives, are  no  doubt  real  nervous  diseases,  which  do  not  destroy 
the  general  health. 

7.  All  such  things  tend  to  the  discredit  of  religion,  and  should 
be  prevented  or  discouraged. 


ESSAY    XXI. 


THE 


HISTORY    OF   THEOLOGY, 
IN  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

BY  PROFESSOR  THOLUCK  OF  HALLE.* 


Human  knowledge  is  derived  from  reflection  and  experience. 
The  latter  supplies  the  materials,  which  the  former  arranges  and 
systematises.  The  first  step,  therefore,  in  the  acquisition  of  know- 
ledge, is  the  collection  of  facts.  But,  as  our  personal  experience  is  so 
limited,  we  must  avail  ourselves  of  the  experience  of  others,  and 
as  far  as  possible  of  that  of  the  whole  race  to  which  we  belong. 
And  although  much  of  this  experience  may  not  be  immediately  ap- 
plicable to  ourselves,  it  will,  in  general,  be  found  available  to  our 
purposes,  as  all  men  are  but  one  family.  It  is  thus  the  great  ob- 
ject of  history  to  enlarge  and  perfect  our  personal  experience  by 
that  of  our  fellow  men.  Even  profane  history  furnishes  us  with  an 
abundance  of  facts,  illustrative  of  the  nature  of  man  and  his  rela- 
tion to  God,  and  from  the  history  of  the  church  we  can  learn  with 
much  greater  clearness  these  interesting  truths.  As  in  the  lives 
of  individuals  there  are  periods  in  which  they  can  learn  more  of 
themselves  and  their  relation  to  God,  than  in  others ;  so  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  church  there  are  periods  peculiarly  rich  in  instruction. 
Such,  for  example,  as  the  commencement  of  the  Christian  era,  the 
time  of  the  Reformation,  and  the  age  in  which  we  live.  From  the 
intimate  connexion  of  events,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  fix  with 
precision  the  limits  of  such  periods.  The  development  is  not  con- 
fined to  one  insulated  point :  although  its  progress  and  character 

*  This  essay  is  a  translation  made  at  Halle,  in  1827,  from  a  manuscript  copy  of  a 
course  of  lectures  delivered  by  the  author,  when  connected  with  the  university  of 
Berlin.  Any  abruptness  or  want  of  connexion  in  the  sentences,  which  may  in  some 
instances  be  observable,  will  easily  be  excused,  if  it  is  remembered  that  these  lec- 
tures were  not  intended  for  the  press,  and  that  the  manuscript  which  the  translator 
has  used,  is  a  transcript  of  notes  taken  in  the  lecture  room.  It  is  probable  that  the 
lectures  themselves  were  never  written  out  in  full. — As  Dr.  Tholuck  has  had  the 
kindness  to  read  the  translation,  however,  it  is  presumed  that  nothing  essential  has 
been  omitted. 


THOLUCKS    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY.  525 

are  more  obvious  in  some  portions  of  the  period  than  in  others. 
When,  therefore,  we  wish  to  treat  of  important  portions  of  ecclesias- 
tical history,  we  cannot  confine  our  attention  to  these  portions 
themselves,  but  must  review  those  which  preceded  them  and  trace 
the  causes  of  the  events  which  we  wish  to  record,  and  mark  their 
effect  upon  following  generations.  With  respect  to  the  history  of 
our  own  times  we  can  only  review  the  past,  and  endeavour  to  as- 
certain the  causes  of  the  events  which  we  now  behold  ;  their  con- 
sequences we  must  leave  to  others  to  examine. 

It  is  the  object  of  the  present  course  of  lectures,  to  examine  the 
causes  which  have  produced  the  present  state  of  religion  and  theo- 
logy. This  examination  will  teach  us  what  great  lesson  God 
would  have  us  learn  from  the  present  state  of  the  church.  For  it 
is  clear  from  the  review  of  the  whole  course  of  ecclesiastical  his- 
tory, that  it  is  the  object  of  divine  wisdom  to  make  every  age  in- 
culcate some  great  moral  or  religious  truth.  God  allows  the  Gos- 
pel to  come  into  conflict  with  all  the  diversified  forms  of  human 
folly  and  sin,  to  teach  us  that  it  contains  the  remedy  for  every 
possible  form  of  error  and  evil,  and  to  make  this  very  conflict  the 
means  of  rendering  more  and  more  perfect  the  manner  of  con- 
ceiving and  presenting  its  doctrines.  In  the  first  ages,  the  Chris- 
tian faith,  having  not  yet  insinuated  itself  into  the  feelings  and 
modes  of  thinking  of  the  early  Christians,  we  see  the  constant 
struggle  between  the  free  grace  of  the  Gospel  and  the  disposition 
to  depend  upon  legal  obset  vances.  In  the  second  period,  we  see 
the  Gospel  in  conflict  with  various  philosophical  systems,  some 
irreconcilably  opposed  to  it,  others  attempting  an  amalgamation 
with  it,  but  none  of  them  effecting  the  purpose  of  rendering  theo- 
logy at  once  biblical  and  philosophical.  In  the  middle  ages  we 
see  the  corrupted  faith  and  imperfect  philosophy  of  the  earlier 
periods  degenerating  into  superstition,  equally  destructive  of 
genuine  faith  and  true  philosophy.  In  the  time  of  the  Reformation, 
religion  and  knowledge  appear  anew.  The  doctrines  which  dis- 
tinguish this  period  were  truly  evangelical,  and  the  theological 
systems,  biblical,  but  not  entirely  free  from  the  fetters  of  the  old 
philosophy.  To  this  succeeded  the  period  of  strenuous  orthodoxy, 
and  vital  piety  again  declined,  leaving  nothing  but  the  mere  form 
of  biblical  knowledge;  and  even  this,  being  destitute  of  the  vital 
principle,  was  less  perfect  than  it  was  among  the  reformers.  The 
period  of  pietism  followed — and  orthodoxy  was  again  imbued 
with  life  and  restored  to  the  form  in  which  it  was  held  by  the  re- 
formers, but  not  improved.  The  next  period  was  that  of  the 
theoretical  and  practical  infidelity,  and  piety  again  declined  in  the 
Protestant  church.  Within  the  last  ten  years  it  has  been  again 
revived — and  made  to  rest  upon  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  Bible. 
Theology  is  pervaded  by  a  spirit  of  true  religion,  and  is  so  ad- 
vanced, that  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from  its  opposers. 

Through  the  experience  of  all  past  centuries,  therefore,  the  pre- 
sent age  may  derive  much  important  instruction,  and  the  almost 


526  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

universal  declension  of  the  period  of  scepticism  now  passing  away, 
has  led  theologians  more  carefully  to  examine  what  doctrines  can 
best  be  made  the  foundation  of  a  theological  system,  and  are  most 
essential  to  vital  piety  ;  and  to  endeavour  so  to  construct  their 
systems  as  to  render  them  proof  against  all  objections.  To  teach 
this  lesson  appears  to  be  the  object  of  the  age  in  which  we  live. 


I. CONFLICT  BETWEEN  ORTHODOXY  AND  PIETISM. 

Section  I. —  The  declension  of  vital  piety  into  mere  speculative 
orthodoxy. — Period  of  formal  orthodoxy. 

As  we  have  already  remarked,  in  order  to  explain  the  present 
state  of  religion  and  theology,  we  must  direct  our  attention  to  the 
preceding  period  of  scepticism  ;  for  the  extent  to  which  infidelity 
was  then  carried,  has  produced  the  reaction  which  we  now  wit- 
ness. But  the  period  of  scepticism  cannot  be  properly  understood 
without  previously  attending  to  that  of  pietism  and  orthodoxy, 
which  in  some  measure  led  to  this  infidelity.  Partly  in  that  pie- 
tism undervalued  the  defence  of  religion  by  human  learning ;  and 
partly  from  the  defective  manner  in  which  theology,  as  a  science, 
was  presented  to  the  public.  The  theology  or  formal  orthodoxy 
of  this  period  may  be  traced  to  the  Reformers.  It  was  indeed  the 
object  of  these  great  men  to  restore  the  pure  doctrines  of  the 
Bible,  and  to  reduce  them  to  a  regular  system  ;  but  there  were 
many  circumstances  in  the  age  in  which  they  lived,  which  pre- 
vented them  from  fully  effecting  this  object.  We  do  not  see  many 
in  this  period,  who  seem  to  have  been  led  to  the  renunciation  of 
the  Catholic  faith,  from  the  inward  experience  of  religion.  Those 
who  had  this  experience,  were  the  real  authors  of  all  that  was  ac- 
complished in  this  eventful  era.  Yet  there  were  many  who  re- 
nounced the  Catholic  errors  upon  nothing  more  than  speculative 
conviction ;  others  sought  only  the  liberty  of  opinion  and  of  worship ; 
others  were  influenced  by  political  motives  ;  others  were  carried 
along  by  the  general  movement,  without  knowing  why  or  whither. 
And  here  lies  the  principal  reason,  that  the  Protestant  church  at 
this  time  was  far  from  effecting  the  general  diffusion  of  true  reli- 
gion. The  Reformers  laboured  indeed  assiduously,  and  in  various 
ways,  to  purge  the  church  of  the  evils  arising  from  this  source  ; 
Luther  by  making  provision  for  the  education  of  children  and 
servants  ;  Melancthon  by  turning  his  attention  to  the  schools  and 
universities ;  Calvin  by  the  strict  church  discipline  which  he  esta- 
blished in  Geneva — a  model  of  ecclesiastical  polity. 

Their  object,  however,  was  not  attained ;  partly  on  account  of 
the  unsettled  state  of  things  produced  by  the  wars  of  that  period, 
and  partly  on  account  of  -the  numerous  controversies  in  which  the 
Reformers  and  their  successors  were  engaged  amongst  each  other. 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  527 

In  the  war  which  arose  out  of  the  league  of  Schmalcald,  Melanc- 
thon  was  obliged  to  flee  to  Brunswick,  and  afterwards  to  Magde- 
burg ;  Bucerus  to  England  ;  Chytraeus  to  Tubingen  and  Heidel- 
berg. In  this  unsettled  state,  it  is  evident  the  interests  of  the 
church  must  have  materially  suffered.  But  further  than  this,  in  the 
time  of  Luther,  the  violent  contest  between  the  Lutherans  and  Re- 
formed had  already  commenced.  Through  this  controversy  the 
parties  were  more  and  more  separated,  and  the  study  of  theology 
greatly  injured,  by  being  directed  almost  exclusively  to  the  sub- 
jects in  debate.  Besides  this,  many  parties  arose,  in  the  bosom  of 
the  Lutheran  church  itself,  which  estranged  the  feelings  of  its 
members  from  each  other,  and  fixed  their  attention  upon  matters 
of  minor  importance.  Melancthon  especially  appears  to  have  felt 
how  seriously  these  controversies  interfered  with  the  advancement 
of  religion.  It  is  known  that  he  was  accustomed  to  write  in  the 
Albums  of  his  friends,  A  covtentioso  theologo  libera  nos,  bone  Deus  ! 
A  paper  was  found  among  his  effects  after  his  death,  stating  he 
was  glad  to  leave  the  world,  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  the  rabies 
theologorum.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  clear  that  neither 
theological  knowledge  nor  true  piety  could  flourish  ;  and  this  was 
at  once  manifested  by  the  character  of  the  works  published  at  this 
period. 

The  reformers  had  clearly  taught,  that  the  exposition  of  the 
scriptures  was  the  foundation  of  all  theological  knowledge.  But  this 
principle  was  less  and  less  practically  regarded  by  their  followers, 
especially  in  the  Lutheran  church,  where  the  whole  activity  of  the 
learned  was  expended  in  polemics.  Exegesis  and  Dogmatic  were 
extended  no  further  than  the  defence  of  the  symbolical  books,  and 
were  not  scientifically  studied  for  their  own  sake.  Exegesis  par- 
ticularly sank  into  neglect.  In  the  beginning  of  the  17th  century, 
few  if  any  lectures  were  read  upon  this  subject  in  the  German 
universities.  Spener  obtained  a  command  from  the  elector  of 
Saxony,  that  exegctical  lectures  should  be  read  in  Leipzig ;  but 
when  Carpzov  commenced  reading  in  obedience  to  this  order,  he 
was  obliged  to  desist  after  the  very  first  lecture,  for  want  of 
hearers.  Spener  says,  he  knew  theologians  who  had  been  six 
years  at  the  university,  without  receiving  the  least  instruction  up- 
on this  subject.  The  exegetical  books  of  this  period  contained 
nothing  more  than  the  application  of  the  formularies  of  the  church 
to  the  explication  of  particular  passages  of  the  sacred  scriptures. 
This  was,  indeed,  not  always  the  case,  but  the  exceptions  were 
few.  The  Dogmatic  was  as  much  confined  to  the  path  marked 
out  by  the  symbolical  books  as  the  exegesis.  Melancthon's  loci 
theologici  were  thrown  aside,  and  Hutter's  loci  communes,  filled 
with  scholastic  disputations,  were  adopted  in  their  place.  Eccle- 
siastical history  was  a  defence  of  Protestantism,  and  an  account  of 
the  controversies  between  the  Calvinists  and  Lutherans..  This  de- 
partment was  almost  entirely  neglected  in  the  17th  century  in  all 
the  universities,  of  which  Spener  loudly  complained.     The  evils 


528  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

of  the  prevalent  system  were  peculiarly  manifested  in  the  prac- 
tical part  of  ministerial  duties,  and  operated  most  injuriously  on 
the  piety  of  the  common  people.  Even  in  the  sermons  of  Luther 
there  is  by  far  too  much  of  a  polemical  character,  which,  although 
it  admits  of  apology,  cannot  be  entirely  justified.  But  in  his  ser- 
mons there  was  always  a  general  practical  tendency,  which  be- 
came less  and  less  characteristic  of  those  of  his  followers.  The 
sermons  of  the  17th  century  were  generally  directed  against  here- 
tics, and  to  the  inculcation  of  a  dry  system  of  morals,  although 
the  form  of  orthodoxy  was  strictly  adhered  to.  The  manner  of 
preaching  was  equally  forced,  delighting  in  uninteresting  gram- 
matical remarks,  or  childish  playing  upon  words.  The  pastor 
Jacob  Andriae  published  a  volume  of  sermons  in  four  parts,  1568. 
The  first  part  was  devoted  to  the  papistical  controversy,  the 
second  against  the  disciples  of  Zwingle,  the  third  against  the  fol- 
lowers of  Schwenkfeld,*  and  the  fourth  against  the  Anabaptists. 
Artomedes  in  Koeningsberg  published  eight  sermons,  in  1598,  on 
the  Lord's  Supper,  filled  with  the  bitterest  rcvilings  against  the  Cal- 
vinists.  One  of  these  sermons  begins  thus,  "  Against  the  Holy  Sup- 
per, two  bands  of  the  devil  are  contending,  the  idolatrous  Papists 
and  the  concerted  Calvinists.  Even  the  poor  heathen  Ovid  was  a 
better  theologian  than  our  Calvinists."  As  an  example  of  the 
tasteless  manner  of  sermonizing  in  this  period,  we  refer  to  a  dis- 
course of  Hermann,  a  preacher  in  Brieg.  in  Silesia,  upon  Zacheus. 
His  text  was,  "  He  was  small  in  person."  He  divided  his  sermon 
in  the  following  manner: — 1st,  that  little  word  he  teaches  us, per- 
sonae  qualitatem  ;  2d,  the  little  word  was,  vitae  fravilitatem ;  3d, 
small,  staturae  parvitatem.  To  the  exegetical  part  of  the  sermon, 
followed  the  practical  part,  which  was  commonly  equally  insipid. 
Thus  the  application  made  by  Hermann  of  the  text,  just  mentioned 
was  :  1st,  that  Zacheus  was  informator  de  varietate  operum  Dei ;  2, 
consolator  parvorum ;  3,  adhortator  ut  defectum  nostrum  virtute 
compensemus.  In  the  polemical  discourses  the  application  con- 
sisted in  the  direction  of  the  subject  to  particular  heretics. 

Spener  also  complains  greatly  of  the  manner  of  studying  pur- 
sued in  the  Gymnasia.  In  his  Piis  Desideriis,  and  in  his  preface  to 
Dannhauer's  Hodogetic,  he  says,  that  in  the  schools  Latin  alone  is 
studied  ;  Greek  is  almost  neglected,  and  Hebrew  entirely  so.  The 
students  proceed  to  the  university  without  any  proper  idea  of  what 
theology  is,  which  they  regard  as  a  mere  task  for  the  memory. 
Prayer,  meditation,  and  a  holy  walk  and  conversation  are  regarded 
as  of  little  consequence.  With  respect  to  the  several  departments 
of  the  course  of  study,  he  says,  "  the  philosophy  is  nothing  more 
than  dull  scholastic  formularies,  and  yet  to  this  branch  the  great- 
est portion  of  time  is  devoted.     Philology  is  almost  unknown  ; 

*  Schwenkfeld  was  a  Silecian  nobleman,  born  in  1490,  who  separated  from  the 
Lutheran  church  and  founded  a  distinct  sect,  distinguished  by  many  mystical  doc- 
trines.— (Tr.) 


In  the  eighteenth  century.  529 

many  theologians  cannot  read  the  Greek  Testament.  Thetik,  or 
Dogmatic  in  its  most  restricted  sense,  is  regarded  as  the  most  im- 
portant branch  of  theology  ;  the  quotation  of  scripture  passages 
in  support  of  doctrines  is  little  resorted  to.  Exegesis  is  only 
studied  after  the  student  has  become  a  preacher,  and  even  then  no 
further  than  to  enable  him  to  make  out  the  exposition  of  his  text. 
Polemics  are  regarded  as  second  only  to  thetik  in  importance, 
although  it  is  difficult  to  be  ever  refuting  errors  when  we  ourselves 
know  not  the  truth.  And  if  the  necessity  of  this  branch  be  ad- 
mitted, it  does  not  follow  that  every  preacher  should  be  a  polemic. 
Ethics  are  not  taught  at  all.  Homiletics  consist  merely  in  scho- 
lastic rules  for  the  logical  construction  of  a  sermon. 

Thomasius,  a  learned  professor  of  philosophy,  published,  in  1686, 
a  work  entitled,  "  Free  ideas,  pleasant  and  serious,  on  all  kinds  of 
new  books  ;"  in  which  he  gives  the  following  description  of  a  can- 
didate of  theology.  "  He  has  studied  two  years  the  Aristotelian 
philosophy,  devoted  a  third  to  positive  theology,  the  fourth  to 
scholastic  theology,  and  the  fifth  to  polemic  theology.  He  has 
held  a  long  disputation  on  the  importance  of  metaphysics  in  refut- 
ing heretics,  is  able  to  prepare  a  well-wrought  sermon,  with  the 
help  of  philosophy,  logical  arrangement,  and  a  concordance,  and 
prepare  a  refutation  of  that  '  devilish'  book  of  Richard  Simon,  the 
'  Critical  History  of  the  Old  Testament,'  and  is  all  the  while  an 
utter  stranger  to  practical  theology." 

The  better  part  of  the  theologians  describe  also  in  dark  colours 
the  state  of  the  laity.  Thomas  Gerhard,  a  learned  and  pious  the- 
ologian, says,  "  even  the  most  constant  attendants  in  church  are 
very  immoral  in  their  lives  ;  yet,  if  any  one  questions  their  Chris- 
tian character  they  are  ready  to  commence  a  legal  prosecution 
against  him.  Whoever  becomes  a  real  Christian  is  stigmatized  as 
a  Pharisee,*  Weigelian,  or  Rosicrueian."  External  religion,  or 
the  observance  of  the  rites  of  the  church,  was  greatly  overvalued, 
and  even  the  Lord's  Supper  was  greatly  abused.  One  of  the 
friends  of  Spener,  H.  Mueller,  complains  particularly  of  what  he 
calls  the  four  dumb  idols  of  the  church ;  the  baptismal  font,  the 
pulpit,  the  confessional,  and  the  altar. 

Section  II. — The  First  Controversy  against  Formal  Orthodoxy, 
occasioned  by  the  Revival  of  Vital  Piety,  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  John  Arndt. 

In  the  period  of  which  we  have  been  speaking,  many  voices 
were  heard  lamenting  over  the  fall  of  the  church.  But  these  com- 
plaints were  generally  made  so  cautiously,  and  were  attended  with 
so  little  exertion  to  correct  the  evil,  that  they  produced  little  effect. 
The  first  impression  of  importance  was  produced  by  John  Arndt, 

*  Val.  Weigel  was  a  preacher  in  Tschopau,  born  1533.  His  writings  speak  much 
of  the  "inward  light,"  and  anointing,  which  he  made  the  great  source  of  religious 
knowledge  :  his  views  of  the  Trinity,  and  many  other  important  doctrines,  are  also 
peculiar. — (Tr.) 

34 


530  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

who  died  May  6th,  1621.  He  was  pious  from  his  youth.  During 
his  stay  at  the  university,  he  manifested  peculiar  fondness  for  exe- 
getical  studies,  which  was  then  generally  the  result  of  real  religion. 
In  Helmstadt  he  privately  interpreted  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 
As  soon  as  he  entered  upon  his  office  as  a  clergyman,  he  began  to 
preach  in  a  biblical  manner,  especially  upon  the  doctrine  of  regene- 
ration. This  was  an  exceedingly  unpleasant  subject  to  the  ortho- 
dox, who  were  accustomed  to  explain  it  as  nothing  more  than  bap- 
tism. Arndt  possessed  the  same  mildness  and  modesty  which 
adorned  the  character  of  Spener,  connected  with  more  energy  of 
mind.  Neither  his  excellence  nor  his  vigilance  were,  however, 
able  to  prevent  the  attacks  of  his  enemies,  in  which  character  the 
orthodox  very  soon  appeared.  They  complained  that  he  required 
of  men  angelic  perfection  ;  they  accused  him  of  being  an  alchy- 
mist,  and  accounted  for  his  liberality  by  saying  that  he  had  dis- 
covered the  philosopher's  stone,  and  could  therefore  well  afford  to 
dispense  his  ill-gotten  gold.  The  preachers  in  Brunswick  publicly 
warned  their  hearers  against  the  poison  he  was  disseminating. 
After  the  publication  of  his  book  upon  true  religion,  the  opposition 
became  more  violent.  (This  work  has  been  translated  into  a 
greater  number  of  languages  than  any  other  human  production, 
with  the  exception  of  Thomas  a  Kempis's  Imitation  of  Christ.) 
The  pulpits  in  every  part  of  Germany  resounded  with  denuncia- 
tions against  him  and  his  doctrines.  He  was  pronounced  a  dan- 
gerous heretic  by  John  Cordinus,  a  preacher  in  Dantzig.  His 
opposers  ridiculed  his  sermons  and  writings,  and  were  not  ashamed 
to  call  this  distinguished  servant  of  God,  "  an  ignorant  ass."  Lu 
cas  Osiander  wrote,  in  1623,  a  long  work  against  him,  entitled, 
"  Theological  Reflections  and  well-intended  Christian  Admoni- 
tions." The  author  accuses  Arndt  of  five  distinct  and  inconsistent 
heresies ;  making  him  a  follower  of  the  Pope,  of  Calvin,  of  Fla- 
cius,  of  Schwenkfeld  and  Weigel.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say,  that 
he  had  blasphemed  the  Holy  Ghost,  in  ascribing  the  work  of  the 
devil  to  God.  Tiburtius  Rango  also  wrote  a  book  against  him, 
entitled,  "  Christian  Prudence,  or  the  Method  of  treating  Errorists 
and  Heretics." 

Arndt's  work,  however,  awakened  among  all  classes  throughout 
Germany  a  spirit  of  anxious  inquiry,  and  many  were  found  willing 
to  rank  themselves  among  the  friends  of  the  author.  Among  these 
were  two  distinguished  men,  the  Superintendant  Scriver,  who  died 
in  Magdeburg,  1601,  and  H.  Mueller,  who  died  in  Rostock,  1676. 
The  most  important  of  his  followers  was  Spener,  who  was  princi- 
pally indebted  to  his  writings  for  his  knowledge  of  vital  piety. 

Section  III. — Spener  and  his  Labours. 

Spener  was  born  in  Alsace  in  1635.  His  parents  were  pious, 
and  early  devoted  their  son  to  the  sacred  ministry.  He  spent 
much  of  his  time  in  reading  the  Bible,  Arndt's  "  True  Religion,"  and 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  531 

a  few  devotional  books  in  English.  Spener  pursued  his  theologi- 
cal studies  in  Strasburg,  where  he  enjoyed  the  instructions  ot 
two  distinguished  theologians,  Danhauer  and  Sebastian  Schmidt. 
He  afterwards ,  studied  Hebrew  and  the  Oriental  languages  with 
Buxtorf,  in  Basle,  and  was  appointed  preacher  in  Strasburg  in 
1663.  In  1666  he  received  a  call  to  become  senior  pastor  in  the 
city  of  Frankfort-on-the-Main.  This  call  he  referred  to  the  ma- 
gistrates of  Strasburg,  who  decided  that  he  ought  to  accept  it. 
The  first  remarkable  effect  of  his  labours,  which  he  witnessed,  was 
in  1669.  At  this  time  he  preached  a  sermon  upon  the  righteous- 
ness of  the  Pharisees,  and  that  of  the  true  children  of  God,  which 
produced  a  powerful  impression  upon  the  whole  city.  Many  who 
nad  been  merely  formally  orthodox  were  brought  to  the  true  love 
of  Christ,  while  others  declared  they  would  never  enter  the  church 
again.  Spener  now  appointed  those  meetings  for  social  worship 
which,  on  account  of  the  attention  which  they  excited  and  the 
controversy  to  which  they  gave  rise,  deserve  to  be  particularly 
noticed.  These  meetings,  which  at  a  later  period  he  held  in  his 
own  house,  were  of  a  conversational  character,  in  which  he  spoke 
to  the  persons  present  on  the  state  of  religion  in  their  own  hearts, 
questioned  them  in  reference  to  the  exercises  of  the  Sabbath,  and 
endeavoured  to  ascertain  how  far  his  public  discourses  had  been 
understood.  As  these  meetings  were  very  soon  attacked,  Spener 
appealed  to  the  symbolical  books  and  the  articles  of  Schmalcald. 
In  the  third  part  of  the  4th  article  it  is  said,  "  Brotherly  conver- 
sation among  the  members  of  the  church  on  the  word  of  God,  is 
an  important  means  of  Christian  edification."  The  theological 
faculties  of  the  several  universities,  to  whom  a  reference  upon  this 
subject  had  been  made,  returned  answers  merely  requiring  that 
nothing  should  be  undertaken  in  those  meetings  against  the  evan- 
gelical church.  The  answer  from  the  university  of  Kiel  was  pe- 
culiarly favourable.  Benedict  Carpzov,  in  Leipzig,  afterwards 
Spener's  greatest  enemy,  early  declared  himself  in  their  favour. 
He  says  in  his  work,  "  Select  Moral  Sentences,"  "  No  one  can  tell 
how  useful  these  meetings  may  be,  especially  when  the  people 
have  an  opportunity  of  conversing  with  their  pastor,  for  it  is  cer- 
tain that  many  will  learn  in  an  hour  thus  spent  more  than  they 
would  from  ten  sermons."  After  some  time  many  of  the  most  re- 
spectable inhabitants  requested  that  these  meetings  should  be  held 
in  the  church.  This  was  accordingly  done  ;  but  Spener  com- 
plains, that  from  this  time  the  blessing  which  had  attended  them 
ceased  :  the  people  were  not  disposed  to  converse  freely  in  so  pub- 
lic and  solemn  a  place. 

The  next  important  effort  of  Spener  in  the  promotion  of  piety, 
was  the  publication  of  his  Pia  Desideria,  which  fell  like  a  spark 
of  fire  upon  a  parched  field.  If  ever  a  work  was  written  with 
moderation,  humility,  and  love,  so  as  completely  to  close  the  mouths 
of  opposers,  it  was  this.  That  the  so  called  orthodox  became  so 
violent  against  such  a  work,  is  one  of  the  most  melancholy  exhibi- 


532  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

tions  of  the  character  of  this  period.  In  this  book  Spener  says, 
that  those  in  authority  appeared  in  general  to  know  nothing  of  real 
religion,  and  that  they  seldom  did  more  than  endeavour  to  maintain  the 
form  of  orthodoxy  ;  that  frequently  truly  pious  persons  were  per- 
secuted ;  that  a  reformation  among  the  clergy  was  absolutely  ne- 
cessary ;  that,  as  the  case  then  stood,  a  man  could  hardly  with  a 
safe  conscience  enter  the  ministry  ;  that  religion  was  a  mere  form  ; 
that  many  of  the  clergy  were  openly  irregular  in  their  lives  ;  that 
he  who  required  that  Christians  should  walk  agreeably  to  their 
professions  was  denounced  as  a  Papist  or  Quaker ;  that  a  most  in- 
ordinate degree  of  importance  was  placed  upon  learning ;  that  the 
clergy  were  regarded  as  a  priesthood  and  differed  little  in  their 
conduct  from  the  Catholic  priesthood,  and  that  there  was  no  pater- 
nal connexion  between  them  and  the  laity.  All  this  Spener  said, 
not  in  a  tone  of  reproach  but  of  lamentation,  and  hence  it  sunk 
deeply  into  many  hearts.  He  received  innumerable  letters  filled 
with  expressions  of  gratitude  for  benefit  derived  from  his  work. 
Many  theologians  also  at  the  universities,  and  among  others,  Carp- 
zov,  expressed  their  approval  of  this  publication.  From  this 
time  all  eyes  in  Germany  were  directed  towards  Spener,  and,  as 
might  be  expected,  many  opponents  took  the  field  against  him,  who 
accused  him  of  holding  anti-lutheran  and  heretical  principles. 
Dilefeld,  Diaconus  in  Nordhausen,  wrote  a  work  against  him  in 
1697,  entitled,  "  Theosophia  Horbio-Speneriana."  The  passage  in 
Spener's  book  which  gave  most  offence  was  the  declaration  that 
there  could  be  no  true  knowledge  of  divine  truth  without  regene- 
ration. Dilefeld  maintained  the  contrary,  and  asserted  that  Spe- 
ner's doctrine  led  to  mysticism.  Spener  defended  his  opinions  in 
the  book,  "  General  Theology,"  in  which  he  makes  the  experience 
of  practical  religion  the  foundation  of  all  true  theological  know- 
ledge. 

Gradually  the  good  work  which  he  had  effected  in  Frankfort 
began  to  decline  ;  tares  became  mingled  with  the  wheat,  which 
gave  occasion  to  the  good  to  be  evil  spoken  of.  At  this  period 
Spener  was  visited  with  a  sickness  which  confined  him  seven 
months,  and  led  him  to  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of  his  own 
heart,  and  of  divine  truth.  In  1686  he  was  called  as  court  preacher 
and  member  of  the  Upper  Consistory  to  Dresden.  The  decision 
respecting  this  call  he  submitted  to  the  magistrates,  who  were  very 
desirous  of  retaining  him  in  Frankfort ;  but  having  consulted  with 
several  of  the  clergy  whose  opinions  were  in  favour  of  his  accept- 
ance, they  decided  accordingly,  and  Spener  proceeded  to  Dresden. 
In  his  first  discourse  he  brought  forward  what  was  then  the  most 
important  subject,  the  difference  between  a  dead  and  living  faith. 
Within  three  weeks  after  his  arrival  many  were  aroused  from  their 
former  security.  Even  the  Elector,  who  was  openly  immoral, 
although  strenuous  in  his  orthodoxy,  was  much  affected  by  his 
preaching.  Spener  was  entirely  free  from  the  pride  which  distin- 
guished the  clergy  of  this  period,  and  which  led  them  either  to  a 


«• 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  533 

vain  display  of  their  learning,  or  an  exclusive  association  with  the 
higher  ranks  of  society.  They  were  ashamed  to  condescend  to 
the  humble  duties  of  catechetical  instruction.  Spener  immediately 
undertook  this  labour,  and  saw  it  crowned  with  the  most  obvious 
blessing.  Many  of  the  clergy  ridiculed  him  on  this  account,  and 
said  that  the  Elector  had  got  a  schoolmaster  instead  of  a  court 
preacher.  Through  his  influence,  however,  this  mode  of  instruc- 
tion was  introduced  throughout  Saxony.  He  also  induced  the 
Elector  to  order  that  exegetical  lectures  should  be  read  in  the  uni- 
versities. In  these  and  various  other  ways  the  changes  which  he 
effected  were  very  considerable.  In  Dresden  he  had  many  friends 
warmly  attached  to  him ;  but  the  Elector  became  gradually  discon- 
tented with  his  earnest  preaching,  and  threatened  not  to  attend  his 
church  ;  a  threat  he  finally  executed.  Spener  at  this  time  took  a 
step  for  which  he  would  have  been  entirely  inadequate,  if  it  were 
not  for  the  assistance  of  the  Spirit  of  God.  He  was  by  nature 
exceedingly  timid  and  bashful,  but  the  grace  of  God  made  him 
bold  ;  and  it  is  the  tendency  of  all  minds,  whatever  may  be  their 
natural  temperament,  to  come  up  to  the  same  standard  when  influ- 
enced by  this  grace.  He  undertook  to  address  a  serious  remon- 
strance to  the  Elector  upon  his  mode  of  life.  The  Elector  was  at 
this  period  entirely  estranged  from  him,  and  never  attended  his 
preaching.  In  1691  Spener  was  called  to  Berlin,  as  member  of 
the  Upper-Consistory  and  provost  of  the  church  of  St.  Nicholas. 
As  the  Elector  was  desirous  to  be  freed  from  him,  Spener  accepted 
the  call.  The  opposition  to  him  in  Saxony,  supported  by  the 
Prince,  was  becoming  every  day  more  violent.  Carpzov  wrote 
two  treatises  against  him,  and  excited  all  the  clergy  to  withstand 
his  efforts.  The  enmity  of  Carpzov  arose  partly  from  envy  of  the 
station  which  Spener  occupied,  and  partly  from  his  disapprobation 
of  the  changes  which  he  had  introduced.  The  labours  also  of 
Spener  were  producing  an  effect  in  Leipzig  with  which  Carpzov 
was  by  no  means  pleased.  Franke,  Anton,  and  Schade,  who  were 
private  teachers  attached  to  the  university,  began  to  hold  meetings 
for  the  practical  exposition  of  the  Bible,  which  Carpzov  did  not 
approve. 

Spener's  influence  in  Berlin  was  still  greater  than  that  which  he 
had  attained  in  Saxony.  The  Elector  of  Brandenburg,  although  a 
rough  man,  was  very  favourable  to  the  promotion  of  religion,  and 
was  himself  easily  impressed  by  the  truth.  Spener's  most  impor- 
tant service  was  giving  a  proper  direction  to  the  infant  university 
of  Halle.  Until  this  period,  the  Prussian  youth  frequented  princi- 
pally the  university  of  Wittenberg,  where  they  were  filled  with  a 
bitter  spirit  of  opposition  to  the  reformed.  The  Elector,  who  was 
exceedingly  opposed  to  controversy  about  unessential  points,  was 
very  desirous  that  the  two  communions  should  live  in  peace.  To 
promote  this  object,  he  wished  to  found  a  university  within  his 
own  territories,  and  furnish  it  with  professors  of  a  better  spirit. 
Halle  was  at  this  time  a  military  academy  for  noblemen,  where 


* 


534  tholuck's  history  of  theology 


Thomasius,  distinguished  by  his  bold  and  independent  spirit  of 
investigation,  executed  the  office  of  a  teacher.  Here  the  Elector 
determined  to  found  his  university.  In  the  selection  of  the  profes- 
sors, he  submitted  principally  to  the  direction  of  Spener,  prescrib- 
ing only  that  they  should  not  be  polemics.  The  providence  of 
God  so  directed  the  efforts  of  Spener,  that  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 
pious  men  to  fill  these  important  offices.  Breithaupt,  senior  pastor 
in  Frankfort,  and  Francke,  professor  of  the  oriental  languages,  and 
pastor  of  the  Glaucha  church  in  Halle,  were  particularly  distin- 
guished for  their  religious  zeal.  In  1694,  the  university  was  fully 
organized. 

Spener  wrote  many  devotional  books,  excited  those  in  authority 
to  improve  the  school  and  church  system,  received  students  into 
his  own  house,  gave  regular  biblical  instructions,  and  exerted  his 
influence  to  have  proper  persons  appointed  to  office.  The  only 
trial  connected  with  his  situation  in  Berlin,  was  the  desire  of  a  part 
of  his  congregation  to  separate  from  his  charge.  This  arose  prin- 
cipally from  the  influence  of  Dr.  Schade,  the  second  preacher  in 
the  same  church.  He  was  greatly  distressed  at  seeing  the  num- 
bers who  came  to  the  communion,  without  appearing  to  be  really 
Christians.  His  anxiety  upon  this  subject  was  such,  that,  days 
before  the  administration  of  the  ordinance,  his  peace  was  entirely 
destroyed,  and  he  would  spend  the  night  in  weeping  and  prayer. 
Spener  in  vain  endeavoured  to  compose  his  mind,  and  remove  his 
difficulties.  He  very  unexpectedly  published  a  most  intemperate 
book  upon  the  subject,  in  which  he  called  the  confessional  "  the 
seat  of  Satan,"  and  "  the  pit  of  hell."  Many  theologians  espoused 
his  cause  ;  he  was  however  displaced,  and  Spener  was  obliged  to 
join  in  the  effort  to  effect  his  removal.  Spener  died  in  1705,  February 
5th.  The  evening  before  his  death  he  caused  the  prayer  of  our 
Saviour,  in  the  twenty-fifth  chapter  of  John,  to  be  read  to  him. 
He  had  never  preached  upon  this  passage  of  scripture,  as  he  said 
he  could  not  understand  it,  and  that  its  contents  could  not  be  com- 
prehended in  this  world.  But  now,  said  he,  I  am  going  where  all 
will  be  explained. 

Spener  was  not  distinguished  for  his  natural  endowments.  He 
had  acquired  considerable  information,  particularly  of  a  historical 
kind,  as  is  evinced  by  his  work  on  Heraldry ;  but  still  he  was  not 
preeminent  for  learning.  He  was,  however,  possessed  of  a  clear 
judgment,  by  which  he  discriminated  in  every  department  what 
was  of  most  value,  and  took  an  impartial  view  of  every  subject. 
He  had  none  of  that  force  of  character  which  distinguished  other 
reformers.  Not  impelled  by  the  ardour  of  his  own  feelings,  he 
could,  perhaps,  the  more  purely  act  under  the  influence  of  an  im- 
pulse which  came  from  a  purer  source :  and  that  he  was  thus 
influenced  from  above,  is  evident  from  his  great  and  effectual  exer- 
tions, notwithstanding  the  natural  softness  of  his  character.  This 
mildness  was,  in  his  situation,  of  peculiar  importance,  as  the  ortho- 
dox, from  their  superior  numbers  and  power,  would  have  been  able 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  535 

effectually  to  suppress  a  more  virulent  opponent.  But  as  it  was, 
all  who  were  not  entirely  devoted  to  the  opposite  party,  and  espe- 
cially the  Elector,  were  disposed  to  espouse  his  cause.  Spener  never 
permitted  himself  to  think  that  he  was  acting  the  part  of  a  reformer. 
He  says,  in  his  "  Answers  to  Cases  of  Conscience,"  "  I  never 
dreamt  of  the  folly  of  undertaking  a  reformation.  I  am  too  sensU 
ble  of  my  own  weakness,  and  that  I  have  neither  the  wisdom  nor 
power  requisite  for  such  a  work.  I  content  myself  with  exciting 
those  to  effect  the  reformation  whom  God  has  called  to  the  work." 
And  in  another  place  he  says,  "  I  find  a  great  deficiency  in  learn- 
ing, and  other  qualifications  in  myself,  of  which  I  have  abundant 
reason  to  be  conscious,  in  the  discharge  of  the  ordinary  duties  of 
my  office ;  so  that  I  am  often  ashamed  of  my  inability  to  give  even 
advice.  What  should  I  then  do,  if  I  should  undertake  so  great  a 
work  ?  Especially  am  I  deficient  in  faith,  which,  alas  !  is  so  weak, 
as  to  be  hardly  sufficient,  even  in  matters  of  small  moment,  to  over- 
come my  natural  timidity,  much  less  to  make  me  equal  to  enter- 
prises which  would  require  the  spirit  of  a  hero ;  when  the  Lord 
will  restore  his  church  to  its  proper  state,  he  will  choose  far  differ- 
ent men  than  such  as  I  am." 

The  enemies  of  Spener  opposed  him  with  unexampled  virulence. 
The  'most  important  work  written  against  him  was,  "  The  Unani- 
mous Judgment  of  the  University  of  Wittenberg,"  1698  ;  or,  with 
the  fuller  title,  "  Christian-Lutheran  Doctrines  according  to  the 
Word  of  God,  and  the  Symbolical  Books  in  opposition  to  Dr.  Spe- 
ner ;  by  the  Theologians  of  Wittenberg."  In  this  book,  two 
hundred  and  sixty-four  heretical  expressions  are  ascribed  to  Spener ; 
such  for  example,  "  that  believers  are  free  from  all  human  author- 
ity ;  that  in  a  future  world  we  shall  be  able  perfectly  to  under- 
stand the  nature  of  God ;  that  withdrawing  from  the  world  pro- 
motes peace  of  mind  ;  that  a  holy  life  is  necessary  to  entitle  a  man 
to  be  called  a  Christian  ;  that  we  can  learn  much  from  the  Papists 
and  Quakers  ;  that  all  baptized  persons  are  not  regenerated." 
The  great  ground  of  objection  was,  that  Christians  were  partakers 
of  salvation  even  in  this  world.  After  his  death,  the  expression  of 
disapprobation  became  still  more  general,  and  it  was  a  matter  of 
dispute  in  the  universities,  whether  it  was  proper  to  say,  Beatus 
Spener.  Professor  Fecht,  of  Rostock,  published  a  book,  "  De  Be- 
atitudine  Mortuorum  in  Domino,"  of  which  he  devotes  the  34th 
section  to  the  inquiry,  whether  this  blessedness  can  be  predicated  of 
Spener,  and  decides  Quod  Non. 

The  influence  and  example  of  Spener  called  forth  the  exertions 
of  many  others.  Prayer-meetings  were  established  in  various 
places.  Spener  had  particularly  opposed  the  ambition  of  the  Lu- 
theran clergy,  and  defended  the  rights  of  the  laity,  and  exhorted 
them  to  apply  to  the  holy  scriptures  for  instruction.  This  gave 
rise  to  the  formation  of  many  private  religious  meetings,  which 
must  be  taken  into  view,  in  order  to  form  a  proper  idea  of  the  his- 
tory of  this  period.     Such  meetings  were  instituted  in  Augsburg, 


536  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

Essen  and  Darmstadt,  after  Spener  had  introduced  them  in  Frank- 
fort ;  when  he  removed  to  Saxony,  they  were  introduced  there 
also,  although  with  much  opposition.  In  1686,  certain  private 
teachers  in  Leipzig,  as  before-mentioned,  formed  a  society  for  read- 
ing the  scriptures,  and  for  promoting  the  study  of  the  original 
languages  of  the  Bible.  In  this  society,  the  most  distinguished 
members  were  August.  H.  Francke,  John  C.  Schade,  Paul  Anton, 
Gottfried  Arnold.  In  1686,  Franke  visited  Dresden,  and  continued 
there  some  time  with  Spener,  from  whom  he  received  a  strong 
desire  to  engage  in  the  work  of  promoting  true  religion  among  the 
people.  On  his  return  to  Leipzig,  he  established  a  biblical  lecture 
for  the  students.  Schade  and  others  followed  his  example.  These 
meetings  were  continued  several  months,  without  exciting  any 
attention.  But  Francke  was  at  last  accused  of  having  said  that 
men  might  be  perfect  in  this  world ;  that  philosophy  was  of  little 
use,  and  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  contend  against  heretics.  The 
students  shared  in  these  reproaches,  and  it  was  said  that  they  so 
far  undervalued  the  instructions  of  their  professors,  that  they  burnt 
the  notes  they  had  taken  from  their  lectures.  Yet,  among  the 
learned  men  of  the  university,  there  were  some  who  endeavoured 
to  counteract  this  opposition,  and  who  maintained  that  the  term 
Pietism,  which  had  been  given  in  derision,  would,  in  its  best  sense, 
be  applied  to  Francke  and  his  associates  ;  of  this  number  was  Fel- 
ler, the  professor  of  eloquence  ;  his  poem,  entitled,  "  The  Pietist," 
which  gives  a  correct  exhibition  of  the  spirit  of  this  period,  is  well 
known.  The  name  Pietist,  from  this  time,  became  general  in  its 
application  to  the  friends  of  true  religion.  In  opposition  to  this 
name,  the  adversaries  of  Spener  assumed  that  of  Orthodox.  The 
attention  of  the  court  in  Dresden  was  soon  attracted  to  the  contro- 
versy, and  issued  in  1689,  an  order  to  institute  an  investigation 
into  what  was  called  "  the  New  Sect."  Francke  and  Schade  were 
called  to  undergo  an  examination,  and  many  witnesses  were  sum- 
moned against  them.  Nothing,  however,  was  testified  to  their  dis- 
advantage. The  university,  therefore,  informed  the  court  that 
nothing  improper  had  there  occurred.  Thomasius  was  particularly 
active  in  the  defence  of  Francke.  Nevertheless,  Francke  was  for- 
bidden to  continue  his  lectures,  and,  in  1690,  was  called  away  from 
Leipzig  upon  private  business.  Schade  was  still  permitted  to 
pursue  his  course  of  biblical  instructions,  which  were  attended  by 
about  a  hundred  hearers.  Some  of  the  citizens  wished  to  attend 
these  lectures,  but  as  they  were  intended  only  for  the  students,  and 
as  disorder  might  arise  from  their  attendance,  Schade  discouraged 
it.  The  citizens,  therefore,  formed  a  society  for  themselves,  in 
which  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  much  that  was  irrregular 
occurred,  and  gave  rise  to  a  new  alarm.  In  1690,  therefore,  all 
such  meetings  were  forbidden.  The  university  of  Wittenberg 
united  with  that  of  Leipzig,  in  sending  a  petition  to  the  elector  for 
the  entire  suppression  of  pietism.  In  consequence  of  this  petition, 
rules  and  regulations  were  adopted  worthy  of  a  popish  hierarchy. 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTUEY.  537 

All  was  now  suppressed  ;  the  pietistical  students  were  obliged  to 
relinquish  their  stipendia,  and  were  given  to  understand,  that  those 
who  attended  any  meetings  for  devotional  purposes,  should  receive 
no  appointment  to  any  office.  The  testimonials  for  good  conduct, 
due  to  them  from  the  universities,  were  also  withheld.  But  in  order 
not  to  be  unjust  to  the  opposite  party,  we  ought  to  inquire  whether 
much  which  was  really  fanatical  had  not  occurred  in  the  meet- 
ings complained  of.  This  is  in  itself  not  improbable  ;  but  if  any- 
thing of  this  kind  had  really  taken  place,  we  should  expect  that 
some  distinct  statement  of  the  fact  would  appear  in  the  official 
records  of  the  investigations  which  were  instituted  by  the  public 
authorities.  But  these  records  contain  no  allegations  against  the 
pietists  of  this  nature ;  they  contain  no  charges  which  are  not 
either  evidently  founded  upon  perversions,  or  for  preaching  what 
we  believe  to  be  purely  evangelical.  A  student  by  the  name  of 
Lange  is  particularly  mentioned,  to  whom  the  pulpit  was  for  some 
time  forbidden.  In  hopes  of  his  reformation  he  was  again  per- 
mitted to  preach,  and  selected  for  his  text  Romans  viii.  3.  In  his 
sermon,  he  said  "  that  a  penitent  heart  will  perceive  a  light  in 
itself,  by  which  it  will  be  led  to  acknowledge  Jesus  as  its  greatest 
good  in  heaven  and  earth,  and  burn  and  beat  with  love."  For 
such  fanatical  expressions  as  these,  the  pulpit  was  again  forbidden. 
It  was  particularly  objected  to  the  pietistical  students,  that  they 
presented  themselves  as  models  of  Christian  character,  which  was 
regarded  as  a  great  breach  of  modesty.  Christianity  was  then 
considered  as  something  merely  speculative,  not  to  be  applied  to 
the  character  and  conduct  of  every  individual.  This  controversy 
gave  rise  to  many  publications.  In  1691,  Benedict  Carpzov  pub- 
lished a  treatise,  in  which  he  styled  the  defence  of  Francke,  "  a 
sinful  book."  In  another  treatise,  published  in  1695,  he  went  so  far 
as  to  call  Spener  "  procellam  ecclesiae,"  "  turbinem  religionis," 
"tempestatem  pacis,"  and  even  "  a  disciple  of  Spinoza." 

Beyond  the  limits  of  Saxony,  we  also  find  that  strenuous  oppo- 
sition was  made  to  the  religious  movement  of  the  day.  In  Erfurdt, 
the  elector  of  Mayence  lbrbade,  under  a  penalty  of  a  fine  of  a 
hundred  dollars,  every  meeting  for  prayer  and  reading  the  Bible. 
The  professor  Manjus,  in  Giessen,  had  been  accustomed  to  hold 
such'  meetings  with  some  of  the  students,  for  which  he  was  so  seri- 
ously attacked  by  his  colleagues  that  he  was  obliged  to  claim  the 
protection  of  the  magistrates.  In  Jena,  professor  Sagittarius  un- 
dertook the  defence  of  Francke,  and  said  that  pietism  was  nothing 
more  than  vital  Christianity ;  on  which  account  the  elector,  John 
George  III.,  wrote  to  the  duke  of  Weimar  that  he  had  a  disorderly 
professor  of  theology,  whom  he  ought  to  visit  with  merited  pun- 
ishment. In  Wolfenbuttel  several  preachers  had  united  to  read  the 
Bible ;  the  duke  sent  them  word  that  if  they  did  not  discontinue 
their  meeting  they  should  be  deposed.  But  in  Hamburg,  more 
than  in  any  other  place,  was  the  violence  of  this  opposition  to  true 
religion  manifested.    (We  mention  particular  cases,  in  order  to  give 


538  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

a  more  impressive  exhibition  of  the  spirit  of  this  period.)  The 
author  of  the  opposition  in  Hamburg  was  the  learned  John  F. 
Meyer,  who  had  been,  at  an  earlier  period,  a  professor  of  theology 
in  Wittenberg,  whence  he  removed  to  Hamburg,  and  from  thence 
to  Griefswalder,  where  he  died.  He,  as  many  other  of  the  ortho- 
dox, praised  Spener,  as  long  as  they  themselves  were  left  undis- 
turbed. But  when  Spener,  in  virtue  of  his  office,  as  counsellor  in 
the  Upper-Consistory  at  Dresden,  admonished  him  on  account  of 
the  inconsistency  of  his  life  with  his  orthodox  principles,  the  hatred 
of  this  wrathful  and  arrogant  man  became  unspeakably  violent 
against  him.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  he  should  oppose  him- 
self to  the  efforts  made  by  Spener  and  his  friends.  In  Hamburg 
there  were  two  or  three  ministers  more  or  less  favourable  to  piet- 
ism— Horbius,  brother-in-law  to  Spener,  Winkelman,  the  learned 
editor  of  the  Koran,  and  Winkler.  When  Meyer  perceived  that 
they  were  inclined  to  Spener's  principles  his  enmity  arose  against 
them,  which  he  endeavoured  to  vent  in  the  following  manner.  He 
drew  up  an  agreement  or  declaration,  to  be  signed  by  the  preach- 
ers in  Hamburg,  containing  a  condemnation  of  all  lax  theology  ;  a 
profession  of  adherence  to  the  standards  of  the  church ;  a  rejec- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  the  millennium  in  all  its  forms,  and  a  con- 
demnation of  the  works  of  Jacob  Boehme.  (Spener  did  not  utterly 
proscribe  the  writings  of  Boehme,  and  with  regard  to  the  millen- 
nium, he  only  wished  to  exclude  the  grosser  and  more  worldly 
ideas  often  connected  with  the  doctrine.)  Horbius  would  not  sub- 
scribe this  declaration,  for,  although  he  said  he  considered  the 
doctrine  of  the  millennium  an  error,  he  was  not  prepared  to  con- 
demn all  who  adopted  it.  The  dispute  arising  from  this  source 
widened  the  breach  between  the  parties.  An  innocent  circum- 
stance contributed  to  increase  the  difficulty.  Poiret,  a  mystic  of 
the  Netherlands,  had  written  a  little  work  upon  the  education  of 
children,  called  "  The  Wisdom  of  the  Just."  This  book,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  mystical  expressions,  is  throughout  evangelical. 
Horbius  presented  it  as  a  new  year's  gift  to  the  parents  in  his  con- 
gregation. Meyer  immediately  published  the  following  little  work 
against  him  :  "  A  Hastily  Composed  Warning  for  the  City  of  Ham- 
burg, founded  upon  the  Word  of  God."  He  represented  the  book 
distributed  by  Horbius,  as  containing  seven  distinct  heresies — So- 
cinianism,  Arminianism,  Quakerism,  Schwenkfeldianism,  Weigeli- 
anism,  Popery,  and  Petersenism.  He  complained,  that  not  content 
with  recommending  the  Lord's  Prayer  as  useful  for  children,  the 
author  had  attached  the  following  remarks  to  the  recommendation. 
First,  that  God  must  be  praised  in  the  heart ;  second,  that  the  heart 
must  testify  its  sincerity  by  obedience ;  third,  that  the  grace  of 
God  must  nourish  the  soul  ;  fourth,  must  free  us  from  past  sins  ; 
fifth,  and  preserve  us  from  sinning  in  future.  The  blinded  zealot 
then  exclaims,  that  it  was  degrading  the  word  of  God,  and  a  ca- 
lumny against  it,  to  attach  such  conditions  to  its  use.  His  pharisai- 
cal  pride  and  want  of  charity  induced  him  to  endeavour  to  have 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY.  539 

Horbius  immediately  displaced.  The  magistrates,  wishing  to  assist 
the  latter  out  of  the  difficulty,  advised  him  to  give  them  an  expla- 
nation. He  accordingly  declared  his  entire  satisfaction  with  the 
doctrines  of  the  symbolical  books,  and  promised  he  would  not 
recommend  the  work  of  Poiret  any  further,  but  would  advise  those 
to  whom  he  had  given  it,  to  discontinue  using  it.  This  was  far 
from  satisfying  Meyer.  He  informed  the  magistrates  that  he  felt 
in  conscience  bound  to  preach  against  Horbius,  as  an  arch-deceiver 
and  fanatic.  He  called  the  three  clergymen  mentioned  above, 
"  lying  prophets,  and  priests  of  Baal."  The  people  took  part  with 
the  orthodox,  who  made  the  way  to  heaven  as  easy  as  the  catho- 
lics. They  surrounded  Horbius,  when  coming  out  of  church, 
shouting  Quaker,  fanatic,  enthusiast,  and  endeavoured  to  overturn 
his  carriage,  and  assailed  him  with  abusive  language.  Meyer 
preached  against  him,  and  endeavoured  to  present  him  in  a  ridicu- 
lous light  to  the  people.  The  innocent  Horbius  was  at  length 
obliged,  as  a  criminal,  to  fly  by  night  from  the  orthodox  Lutheran 
city  of  Hamburg.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  Reformed  never 
went  to  such  extremes ;  they  retained  more  piety  and  more  learn- 
ing than  the  Lutherans. 

Section  IV. — The  Struggle  of  Piety  against  the  Orthodox,  pro- 
ceeding from  the  University  of  Halle. 

We  have  already  described  the  low  state  of  learning  at  this  time 
in  the  universities.  The  state  of  religion  was  not  more  favourable. 
It  was  rare  to  meet  with  any  who  connected  prayer  with  their 
studies,  or  who  read  the  Bible  with  any  proper  feeling  of  their  need 
of  its  precious  doctrines.  Heinrich  Mueller,  of  Rostock,  in  a  letter 
written  in  1695,  says,  "We  wish  to  heal  Babel ;  oh  that  she  was 
willing  to  be  healed  !  The  physician  must  proceed  from  the  uni- 
versities, but,  alas  !  how  many  universities  are  Babels  themselves, 
and  are  not  willing  to  be  healed.  When  I  think  of  the  dreadful 
state  of  these  institutions,  my  heart  sinks  within  me."  In  Giessen, 
John  G.  Arnold  was  professor  of  Ecclesiastical  History.  He  ear- 
nestly desired  to  promote  the  revival  of  true  religion.  But  the 
rough,  unbridled  and  worldly-minded  temper  of  the  students  affect- 
ed him  so  much,  that  he  said  he  could  no  longer  bear  to  look  on 
hundreds  of  the  future  shepherds  of  souls,  who  had  never  felt  the 
least  concern  for  their  own.  He  therefore  resigned  his  office,  a 
step  which  cannot  be  justified,  since  what  is  impossible  with  man 
is  possible  with  God;  and  a  favourable  change  very  soon  actually 
took  place. 

When  this  melancholy  state  both  of  religion  and  learning  was 
thus  widely  extended,  God  erected,  through  the  agency  of  Spener, 
an  altar  in  Halle  for  true  theological  knowledge,  not  mere  empty 
trifling  speculations  on  the  form  of  doctrines.  Three  men  were 
called  to  this  university  from  whom  this  new  spirit  proceeded  ; 
Francke,  Breithaupt,  and  Anton. 


540  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

A  Brief  View  of  the  History  of  A.  H.  Franche. 

He  was  born  in  1663,  in  Lubeck  ;  as  early  as  his  tenth  year  he 
had  serious  religious  impressions.  When  a  child  he  used  to  pray 
that  God  would  place  him  in  that  situation  in  which  he  could  be 
most  entirely  devoted  to  his  service.  In  1679  he  went  to  the  uni- 
versity of  Keil,  where  he  enjoyed  the  society  of  professor  Korthold. 
In  1682  he  went  to  Hamburg,  in  order  to  study  Hebrew  with  the 
famous  proselyte  Edzardi.  In  1684  he  proceeded  to  the  university 
of  Leipzig,  and  united  himself  with  those  private  teachers  of  theo- 
logy who  felt  as  he  did  on  the  subject  of  religion.  But  at  this  time 
he  knew  nothing  of  the  essence  of  real  Christianity.  He  has  left 
us  a  history  of  his  religious  experience,  which  is  published  in  the 
work  edited  by  Knapp  and  Niemeyer,  "  Institutions  of  Francke," 
vol.  ii.,  p.  420.  He  gives  the  following  narrative  of  his  feelings. 
He  says  his  attention  was  first  particularly  arrested  by  reflecting 
upon  the  nature  of  theology.  It  occurred  to  him  that  there  should 
be  a  coincidence  between  the  feeling's  and  objects  of  the  theolo- 
gians of  the  present  time  and  those  of  the  apostles.  But  when  he 
compared  his  feelings  and  objects  with  those  of  the  first  servants 
of  Christ,  he  discovered  that  they  were  entirely  different,  that  he 
was  actuated  only  by  a  desire  of  worldly  honour  and  learning.  He 
determined,  therefore,  to  follow  more  faithfully  the  example  of  the 
apostles.  During  this  period  he  appeared  to  himself  as  a  child  en- 
deavouring to  contend  with  a  giant.  Having  torn  himself  from  all 
the  pleasures  of  the  world,  he  went  to  Luneburg.  Here,  after  a 
few  weeks,  he  was  invited  to  preach  upon  John  xx.  31  :  "  These 
things  are  written  that  ye  might  believe  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ,  the 
Son  of  God,  and  that  believing  ye  might  have  life  through  his 
name."  By  meditating  on  the  passage,  he  found  that  although  he 
did  not  doubt  the  truths  of  the  Gospel,  he  did  not  believe  them  with 
his  whole  heart.  This  produced  a  struggle  which  became  con- 
stantly more  and  more  distressing,  until  at  length  he  was  brought 
to  question  not  only  the  divinity  of  Christ,  but  the  very  existence 
of  God.  His  peace  was  effectually  destroyed,  and  he  determined 
not  to  preach  in  the  state  of  mind  in  which  he  then  was.  In  the 
greatest  agony  he  uttered  the  prayer,  "  If  there  be  a  God  and  Sa- 
viour let  him  manifest  his  existence,  that  I  may  be  delivered  from 
this  misery  which  I  cannot  longer  sustain."  After  this  prayer  he 
experienced  such  a  peace  of  mind,  and  so  much  joy,  that  all  his 
doubts  vanished,  and  he  preached  with  a  conviction  of  the  truth  to 
which  he  had  before  been  a  stranger.  After  obtaining  this  living 
faith  in  Christ,  he  visited  Dresden,  and  after  remaining  there  two 
months  with  Spener,  he  went  to  Leipzig  and  commenced  his  lec- 
tures upon  the  Bible.  When  the  difficulties  arose  there  he  removed 
to  Erfurdt.  and  became  the  pastor  of  one  of  the  congregations  of 
that  city.  He  proceeded  upon  the  principles  of  Spener,  and  insti- 
tuted religious  meetings  among  his  people.  This  occasioned  a  per- 
secution from  his  colleagues  and  the  magistrates,  and  he  was  or- 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTUBT.  541 

ays.  It  was  a  remarkable  in- 
terposition of  Providence,  that  upon  the  very  day  upon  which  he 
received  this  command,  and  knew  not  where  to  go,  he  received  the 
invitation  of  Spener  to  join  him  in  Berlin.  He  went,  and  took  up 
his  abode  in  Spener's  house,  and  in  a  few  days  was  appointed  to  his 
station  in  Halle. 

Paul  Anton,  the  second  theologian  mentioned  above,  was  one  of 
those  who  had  visited  Spener  in  Frankfort,  and  there  received  his 
first  serious  impressions.  In  Leipzig,  whither  he  afterwards  went, 
he  took  part  in  the  biblical  lectures.  From  Leipzig  he  was  called 
to  Eisenach,  as  court  preacher,  and  afterwards  to  Halle,  as  pro- 
fessor and  consistorial  counsellor.  Breithaupt  also  first  received 
his  impressions  from  Spener  in  Frankfort.  In  Erfurdt  he  was  a 
colleague  of  Francke  ;  and  formed  an  intimate  friendship  with  him. 
These  three  men  formed  the  theological  faculty  in  Halle  until  1709. 
In  this  year  two  others  were  added  to  their  number,  of  the  same 
sentiments,  although  perhaps  less  zealous  and  less  distinguished  for 
talents.  These  were  John  H.  Michaelis  and  Joachim  Lange.  The 
course  pursued  by  this  faculty,  both  in  reference  to  the  mode  of 
teaching  and  their  manner  of  acting  towards  the  students,  was  dif- 
ferent from  that  adopted  by  any  other.  In  both  these  respects  they 
followed  the  views  of  Spener,  notwithstanding  the  outcry  of  the 
theologians  of  Saxony.  We  shall  attend  to  their  plans  in  reference 
to  learning,  and  then  to  the  practical  part  of  their  labours.  The 
divine  blessing,  notwithstanding  all  opposition,  manifestly  attended 
their  efforts.  The  desire  of  such  a  mode  of  instruction  as  they 
adopted,  was  so  generally  felt,  that  notwithstanding  the  great  fame 
of  the  university  of  Wittenberg,  the  number  of  students  received 
at  Halle  from  1694  to  1724  amounted  to  6,032. 

The  chief  object  of  Franke's  attention  was  exegesis  and  herme- 
neutics.  In  almost  all  his  lectures  he  referred  to  these  subjects.  As 
early  as  the  year  1693  he  published  his  "  Manuductio  ad  lectionem 
Scripturae  Sacrae ;"  a  work  which  has  been  often  reprinted.  In 
1695  he  commenced  his  "  Observations  Biblicae,"  which  were  con- 
tinued for  a  series  of  years.  In  this  work  he  displayed  the  great- 
est boldness  in  exhibiting  and  correcting  the  errors  of  the  Lutheran 
interpretations.  It  was  furiously  attacked  by  Dr.  Meyer,  in  a  book 
entitled,  "  On  the  work  of  A.  H.  Francke,  that  attempt  of  the  Devil 
still  further  to  injure  the  everywhere  persecuted  church."  Francke, 
however,  was  not  deterred  from  continuing  his  work.  His  princi- 
ples of  interpretation  were  adopted  and  cultivated  by  others,  espe- 
cially by  his  pupil,  J.  J.  Rambach,  in  his  "  Institutiones  Sacrae  Her- 
meneuticae."  Francke  also  raised  the  miserably  degraded  and  ne- 
glected study  of  the  oriental  languages.  He  founded  the  Collegium 
Orientalc,  in  which  the  more  advanced  students  had  an  opportunity 
of  exercising  themselves  in  these  languages. 

Breithaupt  was  engaged  in  the  Dogmatic.  He  published  two 
systems,  one  larger  and  the  other  smaller,  upon  an  entirely  different 
plan  from  the  scholastic  method  of  Hutter's  text  book.     These 


542  THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY 

works,  and  Freylinghausen's  "  Foundation  of  Theology,"  had  great 
influence  in  promoting  the  study  of  the  Bible. 

Ethical  study  was  entirely  neglected  by  the  orthodox.  The  school 
of  Calixt  pursued  this  subject  in  a  very  unprofitable  manner, 
considering  it  as  distinct  from  Dogmatic,  with  which  it  is  as 
intimately  connected  as  the  effect  with  the  cause,  or  the  blossoms 
with  the  tree.  The  theologians  of  Halle  proceeded  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  all  Christian  virtues  are  the  result  of  living  faith  in  God, 
and  thus  took  the  proper  ground  for  viewing  the  whole  subject. 
They  were  particularly  led  to  the  investigation  of  the  dSiayopa  or 
things  indifferent.  The  orthodox  had  permitted  Ethics  to  sink 
to  the  mere  heathenish  form  of  rules  of  duty.  They  confined 
their  attention  to  gross  and  open  sins,  paying  little  regard  to  those 
which  consist  in  a  state  of  mind  not  conformed  to  the  Gospel 
standard.  They  were  thus  led  to  maintain  that  many  things  in  the 
Christian  life  were  perfectly  indifferent,  and  did  not  come  within 
the  view  of  a  teacher  of  morals.  In  this  class  they  included  all 
the  common  occupations  of  life,  eating,  drinking,  playing,  dancing. 
The  school  of  Spener,  on  the  other  hand,  taught  that  nothing  was 
indifferent ;  that  the  most  common  things  may  assume  a  moral 
character,  their  being  good  or  evil  depending  on  the  state  of  mind 
in  which  they  are  performed. 

Paul  Anton  read  upon  Polemics,  which  was  then  considered  too 
important  a  subject  to  admit  of  its  being  excluded  from  a  regular 
course.  He,  however,  in  a  beautiful  and  useful  manner,  endeav- 
oured to  show  how  even  heresy  arose  from  the  corrupt  fountain 
of  the  heart.  He  said  we  must  regard  those  who  have  departed 
from  the  faith  as  diseased,  and  ourselves  as  labouring  under  a  dif- 
ferent form  of  the  same  great  malady.  When  we  endeavour  to 
correct  the  errors  of  men  as  diseases,  we  shall  do  it  after  the  true 
Christian  manner. 

Ecclesiastical  history  was  at  this  period  neglected,  although 
Spener  and  Francke  had  very  correct  views  of  its  importance. 
The  efforts  of  this  school  in  regard  to  Homiletics  are  peculiarly 
worthy  of  attention.  The  perverted  method  of  preaching  of  the 
]7th  century  had  become  more  fixed  and  reduced  to  rule  in  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth.  The  text  was  first  grammatically, 
historically  and  polemically  explained,  and  then  in  a  five-fold  man- 
ner practically  applied.  This  five-fold  application,  however,  among 
the  orthodox,  was  generally  nothing  more  than  so  many  attacks 
upon  the  followers  of  Spener.  The  preacher  indulged  in  the  most 
silly  metaphors  and  triflings,  and  dissipated  the  whole  power  of 
the  discourse  in  a  multitude  of  subtle  divisions.  Carpzov,  in  his 
Homiletics,  gives  a  hundred  different  methods  of  arranging  the  body 
of  a  sermon.  Some  of  these  methods  have  particular  names,  as 
the  Koenigsberg  method,  the  Leipzig  method,  &c.  The  preach- 
ers became  emulous  to  present  the  greatest  possible  variety  in  the 
manner  of  discussing  the  same  text.  The  most  skilful  made  out  to 
give  sixty  distinct  methods.     Spener  endeavoured  to  oppose  this 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  543 

kind  of  trifling,  but  his  own  manner  of  preaching  was  dry.  The 
efforts  of  Francke  and  Freylinghausen  were  more  successful.  They 
recalled  the  principles  of  Luther,  particularly  such  as  that  con- 
tained in  the  following  passage  :  "  When  I  preach  in  Wittenberg  I 
descend  from  my  elevation.  I  do  not  regard  the  doctors  and  teach- 
ers who  may  happen  to  be  present,  who  cannot  amount  to  more 
than  forty,  but  the  young  people,  the  children  and  servants ;  it  is  to 
them  I  address  myself,  and  regulate  my  discourse  according  to 
their  wants.  If  the  others  do  not  like  it,  the  door  is  always  open." 
Francke  referred  to  these  and  similar  expressions  in  his  Paraenetic 
lectures,  and  expresses  himself  in  the  following  excellent  manner  : 
"  We  should  not  be  orators,  but  fathers.  Preachers  should  be  like 
those  trees,  which,  although  fully  grown,  spread  out  their  branches 
and  let  them  droop  upon  the  ground,  that  those  who  cannot  ascend 
them,  may  yet  reach  their  fruit.  It  is  a  peculiarly  injurious  princi- 
ple, that  we  must  accommodate  ourselves  to  our  learned  hearers. 
When  our  Saviour  had  the  Pharisees  before  him,  he  had  also 
learned  auditors,  but  he  addressed  them  in  the  simplest  manner 
possible." 

We  must  also  notice  the  lectures  to  which  we  have  just  referred. 
These  Paraenetic  lectures  were  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the 
difficulties  and  aids  for  the  study  of  theology  ;  Francke  commenced 
them  in  1693.  At  first  he  had  very  few  hearers,  but  the  number 
rapidly  increased,  and  at  last,  upon  the  hour  in  which  he  read  all 
the  other  professors  omitted  their  lectures.  In  the  preface  to  the 
second  part  of  these  lectures,  he  says,  that  he  had  never  seen  so 
visible  a  blessing  attending  any  of  his  university  labours,  as  these 
discourses ;  because  in  them  he  could  be  more  pointed  and  per- 
sonal. He  had  no  fixed  plan,  but  selected  whatever  subject  ap- 
peared best  adapted  to  the  state  of  students.  He  sometimes  dis- 
cussed the  character  of  particular  books,  or  single  passages  of 
them  ;  at  others,  the  subjects  were  more  practical,  as  the  difference 
between  a  mere  knowledge  of  the  doctrines  of  salvation  and  a 
living  faith  in  them,  the  fear  of  men,  the  nature  of  conversion,  &c, 
&c.  He  published  two  volumes  of  these  lectures  in  1726-7,  and 
his  son  published  the  remainder  in  five  parts  in  1736.  Francke 
held  also  devotional  meetings  on  the  Sabbath  afternoon,  in  which 
he  delivered  discourses  upon  the  duties  of  ministers  as  servants  of 
the  church.  He  preached  in  rotation  with  the  other  professors  in 
the  university  church,  and  regularly  for  one  of  the  congregations 
in  the  town.  He  held  prayer  meetings  in  the  orphan-house  on 
Wednesdays  and  Saturdays,  the  great  object  of  which,  he  said,  was 
to  guard  the  students  against  permitting  their  studies  to  turn  their 
hearts  from  the  "  one  thing  needful."  Besides  these  various  efforts 
to  promote  religion,  the  professors  had  weekly  meetings  which  the 
students  were  at  liberty  to  attend,  and  consult  their  teachers  as 
fathers  upon  any  subject  on  which  they  wished  advice,  such  as 
the  means  of  their  support,  difficulties  in  their  studies,  the  state  of 
their  hearts,  &c.     The  professors  also  united  for  prayer  and  mu- 


544  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

tual  counsel,  that  they  might  so  regulate  their  conduct  as  to  be- 
come models  for  their  students. 

Various  institutions  were  founded  in  order  to  increase  the  salu- 
tary influence  exerted  by  the  university.  Such  was  the  orphan- 
house,  with  its  various  schools,  which  Francke  designed  as  a  nur- 
sery of  true  piety,  and  a  means  of  supporting  the  students,  by 
affording  them  an  opportunity  of  acting  as  teachers.  The  number 
of  scholars  increased  so  much  in  this  establishment,  that  two  thou- 
sand received  instruction,  six  hundred  were  supported,  and  a  hun- 
dred and  thirty  students  of  the  university  employed  in  teaching. 
Connected  with  the  orphan-house  was  an  extensive  book-store,  de- 
signed principally  to  circulate  pious  books  at  the  lowest  possible 
prices.  The  profits  were  all  devoted  to  the  institution.  Besides 
this  was  the  Bible  institution,  founded  by  the  Baron  of  Canstein  for 
the  same  purpose.  This  institution  his  printed  and  circulated 
1,700,000  copies  of  the  scriptures,  and  900,000  copies  of  the  New 
Testament.  Books  were  also  printed  in  the  Ethnish,  Lettish,  Rus- 
sian, and  Malabar  languages.  A  missionary  institution  was  also 
founded  with  a  particular  reference  to  the  Malabar  coast,  and  at 
a  later  period  a  missionary  society  for  the  Jews.  Through  the 
information  circulated  by  these  institutions,  and  the  residence  of 
missionaries  in  Halle,  the  desire  of  promoting  the  spread  of  the 
Gospel  was  greatly  increased  among  the  students.  Francke  lived 
to  see  the  fruit  of  his  labours.  He  says,  in  reference  to  this  sub- 
ject, that  he  had  enjoyed  the  happiness  to  see,  in  a  threefold  respect, 
the  effect  of  his  efforts.  First,  in  the  real  conversion  of  many  of 
the  students,  who  gave  up  the  riches  and  honours  of  the  world, 
and  who  were  little  disturbed  even  by  its  contempt.  Second,  that 
the  students  in  their  intercourse  with  each  other,  manifested  a  holy 
Christian  love  in  submitting  to  each  other,  and  living  for  their  mu- 
tual advantage.  Third,  that  in  their  walk  and  conversation  they 
were  an  example  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  many  of  whom 
by  their  means  were  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  true  religion. 
And  besides  this,  that  after  leaving  the  university,  many  of  them 
had  the  happiness  of  producing  revivals  in  their  congregations  ; 
that  those  who  had  been  fellow  students  united  themselves  when 
in  office  to  work  conjointly  in  doing  good  ;  and  that,  by  their 
means,  many  formal  preachers  were  aroused  from  their  slumbers. 
Francke,  however,  complained  towards  the  close  of  his  life,  that  the 
good  work  appeared  to  be  declining'.  In  one  of  his  lectures  in 
1709,  he  remarks,  how  different  the  students  then  were  from  what 
they  had  been  some  years  previous.  "  By  this  time"  (about  the 
middle  of  August  this  lecture  was  delivered),  he  says,  "the  seed 
sown  in  the  spring  began  to  make  the  fields  green.  For  after  the 
students  who  entered  the  university  at  Easter,  had  been  here  a 
quarter  of  a  year,  their  hearts  began  to  be  affected,  and  tfiey  would 
come  to  us  to  declare  the  effect  the  truth  had  produced  upon  their 
hearts."  After  the  death  of  Francke,  his  influence  was  long  con- 
tinued, partly  by  the  institutions  which  he  had  founded,  and  partly 


C 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  545 

by  the  men  who  had  more  or  less  imbibed  his  spirit ;  among  these 
were  Benedict  Michaelis,  Gottlieb  Francke,  the  younger  Freyling- 
hausen,  the  elder  Knapp,  Callenberg,  and  Siegmund  Baumgarten. 
It  may  also  be  said  that  Francke's  influence  was  perpetuated  by  the 
Moravians,  as  it  was  from  him  and  Spener  that  Zinzendorf  de- 
rived the  idea  of  founding  this  society. 

Section  V. — The  Fanaticism  which  connected  itself  with  this 

Revival. 

In  great  revivals  of  religion,  it  is  almost  always  the  case  that 
perversions  and  abuses  occur.  The  truth  is  always  attended  by 
error.  Two  kinds  of  errors  are  in  such  seasons  peculiarly  com- 
mon, Fanaticism  and  Hypocrisy.  Fanaticism  proceeds  from  a 
pure  excitement  which  gradually  comes  under  the  dominion  of  the 
imagination.  The  most  beneficial  truths  are  then  caricatured,  and 
if  the  heart  be  not  sanctified,  it  avails  itself  of  the  truths  thus  de- 
formed, to  cover  and  justify  its  evils.  It  also  often  happens,  that 
unconverted  men,  coming  in  contact  with  the  truth,  are  deeply 
affected  by  it,  but  not  being  willing  to  give  up  their  former  opi- 
nions and  modes  of  thinking,  endeavour  to  unite  them  with  the 
Gospel,  and  are  thus  led  into  various  fanatic  errors. 

In  the  time  of  Spener  the  excitement  was  almost  universal ;  the 
greater  perhaps,  on  account  of  the  preceding  coldness.     When 
Spener  said  the  laity  were  the  "  Christian  Priesthood,"  and  should 
be  allowed  greater  influence  in  the  church,  a  real  and  genuine 
anxiety  about  divine  things  was  excited,  which,  in  some  instances, 
was  perverted.     This  perversion  was  partly  intellectual  and  partly 
practical.     The  first  indication  of  a  fanatical  spirit  was  the  ap- 
pearance, in  various  places,  of  persons  pretending  to  be  inspired 
and  to  be  illuminated  with  a  better  and  more  perfect  knowledge 
of  divine  truth  than  that  contained  in  the  Bible.     The  first  exam- 
ples of  this  kind  occurred  in  Halberstadt  and  Quedlinburg.     Cir- 
cumstances   similar  to   those   which   have   more   recently   been 
ascribed  to  animal  magnetism,  are  said  to  have  attended  the  exer- 
cises of  these  people.     Many  young  clergymen  and  others  visited 
the  persons  thus  affected,  as  though  these  were  the  most  decisive 
and  conspicuous  examples  of  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
Spener  manifested  upon  this  occasion  his  usual  moderation.     He 
advised  that  no  notice  should  be  taken  of  these  people,  and  that  no 
attempt  should  be  made  to  put  them  down  by  authority.     He  said 
he  would  not  undertake  to  say  that  it  was  the  work  of  the  Spirit, 
nor  was  he  prepared  to  pronounce  it  the  work  of  the  flesh.     The 
most  injurious  consequence  was,  that  many  distinguished  men,  by 
their  writings,  turned  the  public  attention  in  this  direction,  instead 
of  leading  the  people  to  attend  to  their  own  hearts.     Such,  for  ex- 
ample, was  Dr.  Petersen,  a  man  of  distinguished  talents,  who  had 
studied  theology,  and  became  professor  of  Eloquence  in  Rostock. 
He  not  only  read  the  works  of  Spener,  but  those  of  Ichtel,  Jacob 

35 


546  THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY 

Boehme  and  Breckling,  which  gave  him  a  tendency  to  fanaticism. 
Spener  had  adopted  in  its  purer  form  the  doctrine  of  the  Millen- 
nium, and  comforted  himself  with  contemplating  the  period  when 
the  kingdom  of  God  would  be  purified  from  every  evil.  Petersen 
seized  upon  this  idea,  and  carried  it  to  an  extravagant  length,  teach- 
ing the  doctrine  of  the  O7ro*ard»ra<nr,  or  final  restoration  of  all  things. 
His  wife  also,  who  shared  in  his  fanatical  principles,  gave  herself 
out  for  a  prophetess,  and  published  several  books.  Others  of  these 
pretended  inspired  persons  spoke  of  the  kingdom  of  a  thousand 
years,  which  Petersen  appealed  to,  as  a  proof  that  the  doctrine 
must  be  true.  He  had  many  other  peculiar  opinions,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  Son  of  God  before  his  incarnation  assumed  a 
body  of  light — a  nature  between  God  and  man.  He  was  at  last 
deprived  of  his  office,  and  removed  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Mag- 
deburg, and  died  1727. 

Another  distinguished  man  of  this  class  was  Gottfried  Arnold, 
the  ecclesiastical  historian.  He  was  mentioned  above  as  taking 
part  in  the  Biblical  lectures  in  Leipzig.  He  had  been  led  by 
Spener  into  the  right  way.  He  amassed  a  great  store  of  learning, 
as  is  evinced  by  his  works.  He  was  appointed  professor  in  Gies- 
sen,  and,  as  already  related,  resigned  his  office  on  account  of  the 
character  of  the  students.  In  1707,  he  became  a  preacher  in  Ber- 
leberg,  and  died  in  1714.  His  influence,  through  his  writings,  was 
remarkably  great.  He  wrote,  among  others,  the  following  works  : 
"  The  first  Love,  or  Description  of  the  early  Christians,"  a  book 
still  of  much  value  ;  "  Martyrology,  or  History  of  the  first  Mar- 
tyrs." "The  History  of  the  Church  and  of  Heresy,"  2  vols.  4to. 
A  learned  work,  but  too  much  a  defence  of  these  heresies.  "  Ho- 
milies of  St.  Macarius,"  "The  Secrets  of  Divine  Wisdom,"  "  The 
Lives  of  the  Patriarchs,"  "  History  and  Description  of  Mystical 
Theology."  He  always  insisted  upon  the  conversion  of  the  heart, 
as  the  principal  point  in  religion,  but  lost  sight  of  the  doctrine  of 
Redemption,  and  embraced  more  and  more  an  ascetic  system,  re- 
commending celibacy  and  retiring  from  the  world. 

John  Conrad  Dippel.  This  extraordinary  man  studied  theology, 
and  was  at  first  strenuously  orthodox.  He  early  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  mystical  subjects,  as  Alchymy  and  Chiromancy.  Through 
the  writings  of  Spener  he  became  acquainted  with  true  religion, 
but  embraced  the  doctrines  without  feeling  their  power.  He  at 
last  became  an  unbeliever  and  devoted  to  superstition,  giving 
himself  up  to  alchemy,  exorcism,  and  the  art  of  finding  hidden 
treasures.  He  not  only  denied  the  Trinity,  but  the  personality  of 
God,  and  was  greatly  instrumental  in  scattering  the  seeds  of  infi- 
delity and  scepticism.  He  appears  gradually  to  have  embraced 
an  obscure  system  of  Pantheism.  The  principal  objects  of  his 
hostility  were  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  and  Justification,  with 
regard  to  both  of  which,  however,  he  retained  the  usual  expres- 
sions, employing  them  in  an  entirely  different  sense  from  that  com- 
monly attached  to  them. 


* 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  547 

Ernest  Christian  Hochmann,  another  of  the  fanatics  of  this  pe- 
riod, seems  to  have  had  much  more  serious  feeling  than  the  one 
last  mentioned.  In  1699  he  published  a  circular  letter  to  the  Jews, 
exhorting  them  to  repentance.  He  travelled  about  with  a  great 
deal  of  pomp,  professing  to  exercise  magical  arts.  He  was  put 
into  prison,  and  when  liberated  resided  principally  in  the  district 
of  Hanover.  In  a  confession  of  faith,  which  he  published,  he  ex- 
plained the  Trinity  as  three  different  names  of  the  Deity  ;  declared 
baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper  unnecessary  symbols,  and  that  men 
must  be  perfect.  The  principal  seat  of  fanaticism,  at  this  time,  was 
in  Berleberg  and  Schwarzenau,  in  the  territory  of  Count  Casimir 
of  Wittgenstein,  who  invited  the  fanatics  to  fix  their  residences  in 
these  places.  Dippel  was  in  connexion  with  this  society  in  the  lat- 
ter part  of  his  life,  and  thence  spread  abroad  his  doctrines.  Ano- 
ther was  John  H.  Haug,  of  Strasburg.  He  was  particularly 
remarkable  for  his  knowledge  of  the  oriental  languages.  Dr.  Carl, 
a  man  of  considerable  learning,  also  belongs  to  this  class ;  and, 
lastly,  Frederick  Rock,  a  shoemaker,  who  was  by  no  means  an  or- 
dinary man.  He  was  the  chief  of  the  inspired  who  formed  them- 
selves into  a  distinct  sect.  The  works  of  these  fanatics  which 
produced  the  greatest  effect  were  the  two  following :  the  first,  the 
Berleberg  Bible,  a  translation  of  the  scriptures  and  remarks,  by 
Haug,  in  seven  folio  volumes.  This  work  manifests  no  little  talent 
and  learning,  but  the  interpretations  are  generally  made  upon  very 
false  principles,  and  the  remarks  are  filled  with  the  doctrines  of  the 
Mystics.  The  second  work  was  the  Spiritual  Fama,  a  periodical 
work,  principally  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  Carl.  Its  object  was 
to  communicate  all  the  new  occurrences  in  the  kingdom  of  God, 
which  it  presented  in  a  form  best  adapted  to  affect  the  imagination, 
making  everything  a  wonder. 

This  fanaticism  was  most  extravagant  in  two  sects,  one  of  which 
derived  its  name  from  a  woman  called  Ursula  Maria  Butler,  and 
her  daughter.  This  sect  was  distinguished  by  many  mystical  doc- 
trines, as  the  necessity  of  separating  the  soul  from  the  influence  of 
everything  external,  withdrawing  from  the  world,  the  indifference 
of  outward  actions  if  the  heart  was  turned  to  God,  &c.  The  lat- 
ter principle,  as  might  be  expected,  led  to  the  greatest  licentious- 
ness, and  the  sect  sunk  into  the  worse  form  of  Carpocratian  doc- 
trine. Their  chief  scat  was  in  Paderborn  in  Westphalia.  Their 
founder  was  publicly  executed  in  1705.  The  other  sect  was  that 
of  Ronsdorf  in  the  duchy  of  Berge.  Its  founder  was  Elias  Eller, 
a  riband- weaver.  This  man  began  his  course  by  devoting  him- 
self to  the  study  of  the  Apocalypse.  His  wife  seconded  all  his 
views.  They  published  an  explication  of  some  of  the  predic- 
tions of  this  book,  making  themselves  the  principal  personages 
alluded  to  in  the  prophecy.  They  said  that  the  new  kingdom  of 
God  was  at  hand,  that  the  New  Jerusalem  was  to  be  founded  at 
Ronsdorf,  and  that  they  were  appointed  to  be  the  leaders.  These 
pretensions  they  endeavoured  to  support  by  various  artifices,  and 


548  THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY 

succeeded  in  bringing  many  persons  under  their  influence.     Eller 
appealed  particular^  to  the  prosperous  state  of  the  congregation  in 
their  external  affairs.     The  town,  enjoying  the  favour  of  the  Prus- 
sian government,  rapidly  increased  in  business  and  population. 
Eller  was  proclaimed  burgomaster,  and  made  the  representative 
of  the  Reformed  in  the  province  of  Cleve  and  Berge.     By  this 
means  he  obtained  an  influence  with  the  government,  which  ena- 
bled him  to  come  out  with  boldness,  and  add  fraud  to  his  fanaticism. 
He  now  declared  himself  the  vicar  of  Jesus  Christ,  to  his  congre- 
gation ;  when  he  went  out  he  caused  the  cry  to  be  made  before 
him,  "  Hosanna  to  him  who  comes  in  the  name  of  the  Lord."     He 
had  two  velvet  thrones,  for  himself  and  wife,  erected  in  the  church 
over  the  seat  of  the  magistrates.     He  commanded  the  people  to 
pray  to  God,  in  his  name,  if  they  wished  their  prayers  to  be  heard. 
His  children,  he  said,  were  to  rule  in  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  he 
required  them  to  be  worshipped.     In  secret  he  gave  himself  up  to 
intemperance  and  vice.     There  were  two  clergymen  belonging  to 
the  village  at  this  time ;  the  one  whose  name  was  Wulfing  was  of 
a  hypocritical  disposition,  and  co-operated  fully  with  Eller  in  all 
his  views.     All  that  he  publicly  preached  he  told  the  people  pri- 
vately was  meant  to  apply  to  Eller.     The  other  preacher  was 
Schleiermacher.     He  was  at  first  blinded  by  this  deceiver,  and 
dared  not  oppose  him.     But  his  eyes  were  gradually  opened,  and 
upon  a  certain  Sabbath  he  preached  a  sermon  upon  the  words, 
"  Thou  art  weighed  in  the  balances  and  found  wanting."    This  ser- 
mon set  everything  into  commotion.      Eller,  however,  had  art 
enough  to  make  it  believed  that  the  preacher  was  bewitched,  and 
the  tyranny  was  such  that  no  one  dared  to  apply  to  him  for  the 
discharge  of  any  of  his  ministerial  functions.     He  was  at  last  at- 
tacked in  his  house,  plundered,  and  driven  with  his  family  out  of 
the  town.     This  brought  the  whole  nest  of  iniquity  to  light.     Eller 
died,  however,  before  anything  could  be  undertaken  against  him, 
in  1750  ;  Wulfing  was  deposed,  and  died  in  misery,  although  with 
hypocritical  joy  and  satisfaction. 

Section  VI. — The  Spirit  of  Legal  Righteousness  and  Hypocrisy 
which  connected  itself  with  this  Revival. 

Hypocrisy  is  a  pretending  to  something  we  do  not  possess.  It 
may  arise  either  from  design  or  from  self-deception.  The  former 
adopts  the  form  of  external  sanctity  to  obtain  certain  ends,  and  is 
only  found  where  religion  is  respected.  The  latter  may  exist 
among  formal  as  well  as  real  Christians.  Among  the  former  it 
occurs  when  persons  who  have  no  real  experience  of  religion  in 
their  own  hearts,  being  brought  into  contact  with  real  Christians, 
adopt  their  language,  which  they  use  in  a  very  different  sense,  and 
yet  imagine  themselves  to  feel  all  that  this  language  is  intended 
to  express.  Among  real  Christians  it  exists  when  they  continue 
he  observance  of  forms,  or  the  use  of  expressions,  which  are  no 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  549 

longer  expressive  of  the  real  state  of  their  feelings.  Both  kinds  of 
hypocrisy  are  often  found  in  connexion  with  true  revivals  of  reli- 
gion ;  and  it  argues  great  ignorance  of  the  subject,  when  on  this 
account  such  revivals  are  condemned  as  evil.  In  the  period  of 
which  we  are  speaking,  intentional  hypocrisy  occurred  most  fre- 
quently at  the  courts  of  those  Princes  who  were  favourable  to 
piety.  Of  this  number  was  Henry  II.  of  Reuss,  the  Count  of 
Stolberg-Wernegeroda,  Duke  Ernest  of  Saalfeld,  Prince  Augustus 
of  Mecklenburg,  and  the  king  of  Denmark.  Not  only  clergymen, 
but  also  laymen,  found  that  they  could  more  easily  obtain  advance- 
ment in  these  courts  when  they  adopted  the  language  of  Christians. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  many  would 
adopt  this  language  without  any  real  piety.  This  was  particularly 
the  case  at  the  court  of  Wernegeroda :  the  Count  was  no  sooner 
dead  than  the  whole  court  assumed  a  different  tone.  The  same 
was  also  the  case  in  that  of  the  Duke  of  Saalfeld.  Semler  says, 
that  his  father,  who  was  a  preacher  at  this  court,  was  at  first  not 
inclined  to  accommodate  himself  to  its  religious  tone,  but  when  he 
was  to  be  sent  to  the  university  in  order  to  secure  a  stipend  for 
him,  his  father  saw  fit  to  adopt  the  prevalent  phraseology.  Even 
in  the  university  at  Halle,  there  was  a  temptation  to  the  same  evil. 
Whenever  the  students  wished  to  obtain  places  in  the  gift  of  the 
professors,  they  adopted  the  language  which  they  knew  would 
most  effectually  recommend  them. 

Secondly,  the  hypocrisy  arising  from  self-deception.  Instances 
of  this  kind  of  deception  may  be  remarked  in  the  history  of  the 
university  of  Halle,  both  among  the  professors  and  students.  Of 
this,  the  otherwise  highly  respectable  Professor  Baumgarten  appears 
to  have  been  an  example.  This  man,  who  appeared  to  live  a  pious 
life,  seems  yet  not  to  have  had  that  decided  experience  of  religion 
which  distinguished  his  colleagues.  Study  seems  to  have  rendered 
him  cold  and  indifferent  to  more  vital  subjects ;  yet  he  adopted  the 
pious  languages  and  usages  of  those  around  him.  In  the  latter 
part  of  his  life,  however,  he  departed  considerably  from  both. 
With  respect  to  the  students,  it  is  clear  from  the  lives  of  Michaelis, 
Semler,  and  Noesselt,  that  they  used  the  expressions  most  expres- 
sive of  religious  experience,  when  possessing  nothing  more  than  a 
general  respect  for  the  subject.  It  seems,  also,  that  the  terms,  con- 
verted, regenerated,  and  the  like,  were  often  applied  to  those  who 
were  merely  moral  and  respectful  in  their  deportment. 

In  every  considerable  revival  the  excitement  assumes  something 
of  a  peculiar  individual  character.  The  character  of  the  revival 
produced  by  Spener  may  be  viewed  in  a  three-fold  light.  First,  in 
reference  to  the  language  and  modes  of  expression  adopted.  These 
were  throughout  biblical,  and  adapted  to  the  age.  Among  the  Mo- 
ravians as  among  the  Catholics,  this  was  not  so  much  the  case,  as 
their  language  is  more  mystical,  and  more  accommodated  to 
the  New  Platonic  Philosophy.  Secondly,  in  reference  to  the  means 
of  edification.     These  consisted  principally  in  meetings  for  reading 


550  tholuck's  history  of  theologt 

the  scriptures,  prayer,  and  singing  ;  making  the  Bible  a  constant 
companion  and  adviser ;  regular  family  worship,  and  frequent  at- 
tendance upon  church.  All  this  is  according  to  the  scriptures. 
Among  the  Moravians,  as  in  the  class-meetings  of  the  Methodists, 
there  were  departures  from  the  examples  set  us  in  the  Bible ;  but 
it  must  be  remarked,  that  on  account  of  the  change  of  circum- 
stances, it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  everything  of  this  nature  can 
always  be  regulated  precisely  according  to  the  scripture  model. 
Thirdly,  in  reference  to  the  form  which  the  spirit  of  Christian  en- 
terprise assumed.  This  was  marked  negatively  by  the  rejection  of 
all  amusements,  expensive  either  of  time  or  money  ;  by  an  anxious 
desire  to  prevent  learning  gaining  an  ascendency  over  piety  in  the 
hearts  of  the  students,  and  by  discountenancing  everything  incon- 
sistent with  the  greatest  simplicity  and  moderation  in  all  the  habits 
of  life.  Positively,  by  a  constant  desire  to  win  souls  to  Jesus  Christ, 
zeal  to  promote  the  Gospel  among  the  Jews  and  heathens,  and  the 
erection  of  benevolent  and  pious  institutions. 

It  will  be  instructive  to  examine  how  far  in  all  these  three  re- 
spects perversions  and  abuses  occurred.  First,  in  regard  to  the 
language.  Francke  and  Spener  are  by  no  means  chargeable  with 
laying  upon  this  point  too  much  importance.  They  freely  acknow- 
ledged what  was  good  in  the  writings  of  the  mystics,  although  the 
language  in  which  it  was  conveyed  was  entirely  different  from  that 
which  they  had  adopted.  But  the  followers  of  these  good  men  are 
in  many  cases  open  to  the  accusation  of  having  had  a  partial  and 
exclusive  fondness  for  their  own  peculiar  phraseology.  Gotthilf, 
Francke,  and  Bogatzky,  are  marked  examples  of  this.  They  reject- 
ed too  freely  the  language  of  the  Moravians,  and  condemned  un- 
necessarily many  expressions  of  the  orthodox  school,  which  they 
said  sounded  too  morally.  The  same  was  the  case  with  the  language 
of  the  mystics.  From  this  arose,  among  other  Christians,  a  great 
dislike  to  what  was  called  the  Halle  phraseology.  In  regard  to  the 
means  of  edification,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  were  many 
abuses.  Too  much  stress  was  laid  upon  private  meetings  for  de- 
votion, and  upon  always  mingling  religion  in  common  conversation, 
which  gave  rise  to  a  great  deal  of  hypocrisy.  In  Halle  it  was 
often  the  case  that  from  the  desire  of  bringing  young  men  just  ar- 
rived at  the  university  to  the  knowledge  of  religion,  they  were 
called  upon  to  attend  all  the  devotional  meetings.  Too  much 
nourishment  produced  satiety.  Many  who  attended  these  exercises 
had  no  real  love  to  religion,  and  were,  therefore,  rather  repulsed 
than  attracted  by  this  frequency.  This  excess  of  meetings  was  pe- 
culiarly great  upon  the  Sabbath.  There  was  a  devotional  meeting 
in  the  morning  for  the  citizens,  another  in  the  afternoon  in  the 
houses  of  the  professors,  and  in  the  evening  in  private  families,  be- 
sides three  regular  services  in  the  church.  The  spirit  of  devotion 
could  not  easily  be  sustained  through  all  this.  The  exegetical  lec- 
tures also  were  always  more  or  less  practical  and  devotional.  The 
students  found  it  difficult  to  pursue  their  studies,  and  if  they  omit- 


IN    THE   .EIGHTEENTH    OENTURT.  551 

ted  any  of  the  meetings,  with  a  view  of  gaining  more  time  for  this 
purpose,  they  were  looked  upon  with  an  evil  eye.  In  some  places 
it  was  carried  so  far,  that  threats  and  stratagems  were  employed  to 
secure  the  attendance  of  the  young  people.  Semler  says  that  when 
he  was  a  student  in  the  Gymnasium  in  Saalfeld,  he  was  induced  by 
threats  and  cunning  to  attend  these  meetings,  and  as  soon  as  he 
had  done  so,  congratulations  were  sent  to  his  father  upon  his  con- 
version. The  duty  of  prayer  also  was  often  made  too  mechanical. 
The  orthodox  party  were  accustomed  to  written  forms,  but  the 
Halle  school  recommended  extempore  prayer.  This  was  soon 
abused,  and  the  ability  to  make  a  long  extempore  prayer  was  re- 
garded as  the  best  evidence  of  piety.  The  Duke  of  Coburg  made 
the  boys  in  the  Gymnasium  pray  before  him,  one  after  another,  to 
see  which  of  them  were  really  converted  and  worthy  of  receiving 
a  stipend  for  the  university.  We  may  also  under  this  head  speak 
of  a  perversion  in  reference  to  the  character  of  the  inward  religious 
exercises,  which  arose  out  of  the  doctrines  of  Spener  and  Francke. 
These  good  men  had  opposed  the  view  taken  of  the  doctrine  of 
atonement  by  the  orthodox,  which  allowed  a  man  to  live  as  he 
pleased,  and  yet  hope  for  its  benefits.  In  Halle,  this  doctrine  and 
that  of  the  law  were  united,  but  without  the  legal  spirit  which  after- 
wards gradually  arose.  When  the  mode  of  teaching  theology 
adopted  the  strict  logical  form,  the  religious  feelings  were  also  made 
a  matter  of  rule,  and  the  law  became  more  and  more  predominant. 
Whilst  this  legal  spirit  was  gradually  gaining  the  ascendency  in 
Halle,  the  Moravians  pursued  a  different  course,  recommending  a 
simple  and  exclusive  regard  to  the  great  doctrines  of  the  cross  by 
which  the  feelings  were  continually  cherished  ;  in  Halle  the  great 
motive  to  everything  was  duty,  and  those  who  partook  most  of  the 
evil  of  which  we  are  speaking,  came  at  last  to  consider  mere  ex- 
ternal piety  the  fulfilling  of  the  commands  of  the  Gospel.  With 
the  Moravians,  on  the  other  hand,  a  personal  intercourse  with  the 
Saviour  was  required,  Christ  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  friend  of 
the  soul,  love  to  him  was  to  be  the  source  of  all  duties.  This  sys- 
tem was  doubtless  more  conducive  to  real  heartfelt  piety. 

Abuses  also  arose  out  of  the  principles  adopted  with  regard  to 
external  conduct.  It  might  be  expected,  from  what  has  been  said 
of  the  desire  of  the  Halle  professors  to  render  learning  subordinate  to 
piety,  that  learning  would  sink  into  disrespect.  This,  however,  at 
least  with  them,  was  not  the  case.  They  were  really  learned  men, 
but  the  connexion  which  they  affected  between  learning  and  reli- 
gion was  not  intimate  ;  they  were  learned  and  pious,  but  their  re- 
ligion (so  to  speak)  was  not  learned.  There  was  a  difference  in 
their  character,  also,  in  this  respect ;  some  of  them,  as  Baumgarten, 
were  devoted  almost  exclusively  to  learning,  whilst  others,  who 
partook  more  of  the  spirit  of  Spener,  laid  upon  it  less  importance. 
Had  they  succeeded  in  making  their  religion  more  scientific,  it  is 
probable  that  Semler  would  not  have  taken  the  course  which  he 
afterwards  pursued.     The  principles  of  the  Halle  teachers,  re- 


552  THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OP  .THEOLOGY 

specting  worldly  amusements,  were,  that  a  Christian  who  was 
really  desirous  of  devoting  himself  to  the  service  of  God,  could 
have  no  time  for  these  amusements  ;  that  the  command,  be  not  con- 
formed to  the  world,  which  should  regulate  all  the  conduct  of  the 
Christian,  was  inconsistent  with  their  enjoyment,  and  that  every- 
thing should  be  performed  with  prayer  and  joyful  confidence  in 
God.  These  principles  are  purely  evangelical,  and  by  no  means 
lead  to  the  universal  condemnation  of  every  enjoyment.  By  the 
followers  of  Spener  and  Francke,  they  were  carried  too  far,  and 
perverted.  On  the  one  hand  these  amusements  were  regarded 
as  more  dangerous  than  they  really  were,  and  on  the  other,  neglect- 
ing them  was  made  a  merit  of.  What  Francke  had  recommended 
upon  evangelical  principles,  became  a  legal  yoke.  Many  were 
excluded  from  the  Lord's  Supper,  if  detected  in  playing  cards  or 
dancing.  The  Count  Henry  of  Reuss  commanded  all  the  preachers 
within  his  territories  to  act  upon  this  principle ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  orthodox  carried  their  boldness  in  regard  to  these  subjects  to 
a  great  length.  An  orthodox  preacher  published  a  form  of  prayer, 
for  card-players,  to  teach  them  to  pray  for  success.  The  Swiss 
Mystic,  Nicholas  von  der  Fliihe,  expressed  himself  in  the  follow- 
ing excellent  manner  upon  this  subject,  when  a  gay  vain  young 
man,  gaudily  dressed,  came  to  him  and  asked  him  how  he  liked 
him.  The  wise  man  answered  him,  "  Is  your  heart  good,  so  are 
your  clothes  good ;  but  if  your  heart  were  good  you  would  not 
wear  such  clothes."  The  moderation  in  the  use  and  enjoyment  of 
the  things  of  this  world,  recommended  by  the  Pietists,  was  not 
monkish,  but  evangelical.  The  elder  Knapp  was  a  beautiful  ex- 
ample of  this  Gospel  simplicity.  Noesselt,  in  his  life,  says  of  him 
with  propriety,  "  Vita  ejus  erat  commentatio  aeternitatis."  Of  abuse 
in  this  respect  we  have  nothing  to  remark. 

We  have  said,  that  the  spirit  of  Christian  enterprise  was  also 
marked  by  an  earnest  desire  to  bring  others  to  the  knowledge  of 
Christ,  not  only  nominal  Christians,  but  also  the  heathen.  This 
desire  the  Moravians  richly  inherited.  In  the  second  generation 
we  notice  a  two-fold  perversion  of  this  feeling.  We  find,  in  regard 
to  many,  it  ceased  to  be  a  real  inward  desire,  but  was  regarded  as 
a  mere  duty ;  and  that  they  thought  they  had  fulfilled  this  duty,  as 
far  as  nominal  Christians  were  concerned,  when  they  had  merely 
introduced  religious  conversation.  And  secondly,  we  remark  in 
many  a  spirit  of  self-sufficiency  which  led  them  to  forget  that 
they  could  only  point  out  the  way  ;  and  the  Gospel  was  often  urged 
so  unseasonably  upon  careless  persons,  as  to  drive  them  further 
than  ever  from  religion.  In  conducting  the  missionary  establish- 
ments we  have  nothing  in  the  way  of  abuse  to  remark,  excepting 
that  some  of  the  latter  missionaries  renounced  the  faith  and  be- 
came deists.  It  was  from  these  establishments  that  the  distin- 
guished Ziegenbalg  and  Schwarz  proceeded,  who  laboured  with 
such  success  among  the  heathen.  The  Jewish  institution,  con- 
ducted by  Professor  Callenberg,  produced  the   celebrated   mis- 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  553 

sionary  Stephen  Schulze,  a  man  of  distinguished  talents  and  learn- 
ing, uniting  zeal  and  great  self-denial.  He  rejected  every  ofTer  of 
professional  preferment,  and  restricted  himself  to  the  life  of  a  me- 
chanic, that  he  might  preach  the  Gospel  to  the  Jews.  His  work, 
entitled,  "  The  Leadings  of  God  through  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa," 
contains  the  results  of  his  observations,  made  during  his  twenty 
years'  travelling  through  these  countries,  and  is  replete  with  in- 
teresting information.  Another  manifest  action  of  the  spirit  of  re- 
ligious activity,  which  we  mentioned,  was  the  erection  of  orphan 
houses  and  asylums  for  the  poor.  The  Orphan  House  in  Halle 
was  conducted  by  the  elder  Freylinghausen  and  the  elder  Knapp. 
Many  similar  establishments  were  formed  in  various  parts  of  Ger- 
many, where  the  students  of  Halle  were  settled.  No  abuse  arose 
from  this  source. 

We  close  this  review  with  a  few  reflections,  which  are  natu- 
rally suggested  by  the  history  we  have  given.  The  view  we  have 
taken  of  this  period,  teaches  us  how  the  various  systems  of  the- 
ology may  become  hostile  to  vital  piety,  not  merely  unbelief  in  its 
diversified  forms,  but  orthodoxy  itself  and  supranaturalism,  which 
assumes  a  position  of  hostility  whenever  it  is  nothing  more  than 
mere  speculative  knowledge.  Of  this  truth  this  period  affords  us 
remarkable  examples.  It  teaches  us  further,  that  the  revival  of 
religion  and  the  outpouring  of  the  spirit,  as  in  the  days  of  the 
apostles,  is  possible  in  our  times,  if  Christianity  be  only  properly 
exhibited  in  the  life  and  from  the  pulpit.  And  it  teaches  us  also,  how 
great  may  be  the  influence  of  a  few  pious  men.  The  Halle  school 
spread  its  doctrines  to  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  even  to  Greece.  And, 
finally,  in  comparing  the  revival  of  this  period  with  that  which 
exists  in  our  own  days,  we  may  remark  some  points  in  which  the 
latter  has  an  advantage  over  the  former.  It  is  more  guarded  from 
the  perversions  which  usually  attend  seasons  of  religious  excite- 
ment. Religion  is  now  less  restrained,  and  therefore  more  va- 
riously developed,  and  is  more  intimately  connected  with  learning, 
so  that  we  may  hope  to  see  theology  as  a  science  so  regularly 
constructed  and  guarded,  as  to  preserve  it  from  those  attacks  which 
proved  fatal  to  the  former  systems.  It  is  at  the  same  time  true, 
that  these  advantages  may  easily  be  perverted  ;  an  event  which 
can  be  prevented  only  by  our  laying  to  heart  the  great  lesson 
taught  us  by  the  period  under  review,  which  is,  that  a  proper 
knowledge  of  the  truths  of  Christianity  cannot  be  obtained  without 
a  sanctified  state  of  the  feelings,  an  experience  of  their  vital  influ- 
ence upon  our  own  hearts.  The  perversion  to  which  we  are 
most  exposed  is,  that  the  knowledge  of  religion  will  come  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  mere  affair  of  the  intellect,  that  the  truths  through  which 
men  are  to  be  sanctified  and  saved  will  be  calmly  discussed,  as  a 
source  of  intellectual  enjoyment,  without  being  brought  into  the 
heart,  or  made  to  operate  upon  the  life. 


554  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

ii. history  of  the  conflict  between   faith  and  infidelity. 

Section  I. — Introdifctory  Remarks  on  Faith  and  Infidelity. 

We  introduce  these  remarks  with  an  expression  of  Goethe, 
which,  if  he  himself  did  not  fully  understand,  becomes  so  much 
the  more  important  for  those  who  have  learned  from  personal  ex- 
perience, what  faith  and  infidelity  really  are.  In  his  "  West  Oest- 
licher  Divan,"  page  224,  he  says,  that  "  the  great  and  deepest 
theme  of  the  history  of  the  world  and  of  man,  is  the  conflict  be- 
tween faith  and  unbelief."  Those  who  can  fully  comprehend  these 
words,  will  feel  their  truth.  Man  finds  himself  in  this  world  on  an 
isolated  point,  he  knows  not  whence  he  comes  nor  whither  he 
goes :  he  knows  nothing  but  the  spot  upon  which  he  awoke,  and 
upon  which  he  is  soon  to  close  his  eyes  for  ever.  Were  he  not  by 
faith  able  to  rise  above  himself  and  this  dreary  life,  he  would  have 
nothing  to  do,  but  with  high-minded  calmness  to  resign  all  hope  of 
attaining  the  end  to  which  his  nature  prompts  him  to  aspire.  As 
the  world  and  God,  time  and  eternity,  annihilation  and  salvation, 
are  the  great  conflicting  points  upon  which  human  life  turns,  the 
ground  and  centre  of  the  conflict  lies  in  the  struggle  between  faith 
and  unbelief.  The  contemplation  of  this  struggle,  therefore,  must 
either  have  the  tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  more  elevated  conscious- 
ness of  the  high  destiny  to  which  God  has  called  us,  or  to  the  ex- 
pectation of  that  bottomless  abyss  of  unconscious  existence  which 
is  the  result  of  all  logical  infidelity.  Infidelity,  in  its  widest  sense, 
is  a  disposition  which  leads  us  to  admit  nothing  as  true  which  is 
not  the  result  of  our  own  reasonings  or  deduction : — faith,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  that  disposition  which,  influenced  either  by  an  out- 
ward or  inward  necessity,  admits  as  true  what  is  not  merely  by 
logical  inference  rendered  certain.  The  great  question  here  pre- 
sents itself,  What  is  the  result  to  which  we  are  led  when  we  logi- 
cally pursue  the  path  of  scepticism  ?  that  is,  when  we  are  deter- 
mined to  form  a  logical  system  respecting  human  and  divine  things 
with  no  other  guide  than  speculation.  There  is  something  in  the 
heart  of  man  which  leads  him  to  believe,  whether  he  wishes  it  or 
not.  But  there  is  also  something  in  the  fallen  nature  of  man  which 
prompts  to  scepticism.  And  as  the  evil  in  our  nature  (until  restored 
by  Christ)  prevails  over  the  good,  the  tendency  to  unbelief  is  more 
powerful  than  the  tendency  to  faith.  Yet  the  disposition  to  faith 
constantly  opposes  itself  to  the  contrary  disposition.  Hence  it  is 
that  very  few  pursue  their  scepticism  to  its  legitimate  results,  and 
that  there  are  so  few  thorough  systems  of  infidelity  in  the  world. 
For  the  biblical  Christian,  however,  it  must  ever  appear  safer  and 
better  that  the  system  should  be  carried  out,  instead  of  being 
checked  in  its  course,  and  moulded  into  a  form  which  floats  be- 
tween heaven  and  earth,  and  can  justify  itself  neither  at  the  tribu- 
nal of  philosophy,  nor  that  of  the  Bible.  Superficial  men  content 
themselves  with  such  a  system,  which  satisfies  their  more  common 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  555 

feelings,  but  which  lulls  them  into  a  dangerous  security.  A  system 
which  is  throughout  consequent,  and  is  prepared  to  win  or  lose  all, 
is  more  worthy  of  respect,  and  at  the  same  time  safer,  as  it  affords 
more  hope  of  return,  since  the  necessity  of  having  something  to 
believe  is  too  deeply  seated  in  the  human  heart  to  permit  us  to  rest 
satisfied  with  the  terrible  results  of  consequent  scepticism.  Schcl- 
ling,  therefore  (see  the  preface  to  the  first  volume  of  his  philoso- 
phical works),  has  reason  to  reproach  those  with  cowardice  who, 
having  raised  themselves  above  external  things  and  committed 
themselves  to  the  guidance  of  speculation,  shrink  back  from  the 
legitimate  consequences  of  such  a  course.  From  what  has  been 
said,  it  is  evident  that  there  are  various  grades  of  sceptical  philo- 
sophy, from  that  which  has  most  thoroughly  followed  out  its  prin- 
ciples, to  that  which  is  most  inconsequent  and  nearest  allied  to  faith. 
We  can,  however,  distinguish  these  systems  into  two  classes,  the 
consequent  and  inconsequent :  the  former  is  Pantheism  in  its  diver- 
sified forms,  the  latter  is  Deism. 

Pantheistical  System. 

We  have  proposed  the  question,  What  is  the  result  of  all  logical 
speculation  when  we  have  resolved  to  follow  no  other  guide  ? 
The  speculation  which  proceeds  by  deduction  must  commence 
with  some  first  principles  or  intuitive  truths  which  are  supplied  by 
our  own  consciousness.  The  point  from  which  it  starts  is  the  con- 
sciousness of  existence.  But  this  is  not  a  consciousness  of  inde- 
pendent existence,  but  of  an  existence  depending  and  grounded 
upon  something  else.  Hence  the  speculator  in  the  consciousness 
of  his  own  existence  is,  at  the  same  time,  conscious  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  original  existence  (Vrseyn)  upon  which  his  own  is 
founded.  First,  from  this  consciousness — the  consciousness  of  per- 
sonal existence,  including  that  of  the  original  existence,  proceeds 
the  speculation  or  argument;  for  to  this  point  all  is  assumed  as  in- 
tuitively true.  As  soon  as  the  argumentation  is  commenced,  a 
dilemma  presents  itself,  which,  according  as  the  one  or  the  other 
side  is  assumed,  decides  upon  all  divine  and  human  things.  This 
dilemma  is  as  follows  :  first,  my  being  presents  itself  as  a  person, 
that  is,  as  possessed  of  self-efficiency;  for  if  it  be  a  person  it  is 
self-active,  having  no  other  ground  of  its  actions  than  itself:  but, 
secondly,  I  am  conscious  that  my  being  and  actions  are  dependent 
and  restricted,  that  the  remote  ground  of  my  activity  is  not  in  my- 
self, but  in  the  original  existence.  How  can  these  things  be  recon- 
ciled ?  If  there  be  an  original  existence,  unlimited  and  independ- 
ent, which  conditions  all  other  existences,  there  can  be  no  agent 
out  of  him  which  has  in  itself  the  last  ground  of  its  actions.  For 
if  the  original  existence  is  the  necessary  condition  of  the  actions 
of  other  existences,  it  is  the  only  agent. 

Since  this  original  existence  is  active,  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  the 
condition  of  other  existences,  it  is  not  a  mere  lifeless  substratum, 


556  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

but  is  the  living  active  principle  in  all  that  is  : — and  all  independ- 
ent active  existence  out  of  the  original  existence  is  an  impossi- 
bility. On  the  other  hand,  when  I  assume  as  incontrovertible  that 
my  individual  personal  existence,  if  I  regard  every  individual  as  a 
being  which  has  in  itself  the  last  ground  of  its  actions,  is  self- 
efficient,  then  the  original  existence  is  not  unrestricted,  since  the 
individual  efficients  necessarily  limit  and  restrict  the  efficiency  of 
the  original  existence,  each  after  its  own  way  conditioning  its  ac- 
tivity. Hence  it  appears,  that  the  speculator  is  encountered  at 
the  very  outset  by  the  riddle  of  individual  personality.  If  he  will 
neither  renounce  this  personality,  nor  the  illimitableness  of  God's 
efficiency,  he  must  either  consent  to  hold  both  sides  of  a  contra- 
diction, or  turn  believer,  that  is,  receive  something  as  true  which 
is  not  the  result  of  speculation  or  argumentative  deduction ;  but 
this  is  inconsistent  with  the  goal  which  he  has  placed  before  him- 
self. The  consequent  speculator  therefore  adopts  the  following 
course,  as  he  cannot  solve  the  riddle  which  every  man  carries  in 
his  own  bosom — the  consciousness  of  personality,  and  the  illimita- 
ble nature  of  God ;  he  denies  human  personality,  and  presents  the 
following  view  of  the  subject.  Since  God  cannot  be  unlimited,  if 
the  personality  of  men  be  considered  real,  this  personality  can  only 
be  apparent.  The  original  unlimited  existence  which  pervades  the 
universe  strives  through  its  own  activity  to  become  objective  to 
itself,  that  is,  to  arrive  at  self-consciousness  ;  the  infinite  becomes 
objective  to  itself  when  it  reveals  itself  in  the  finite,  and  when  this 
finite  revelation  is  conscious  of  its  unity  with  the  infinite.  Hence, 
from  the  stone  to  the  angel,  individuality  is  merely  apparent, 
being  nothing  more  than  the  various  modifications  of  the  infi- 
nite first  principle.  Human  individuals  realize  to  the  greatest 
perfection  the  effort  of  the  infinite  principle  to  come  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  itself;  because  men,  through  the  faculty  of  thought,  feel- 
ing, or  imagination,  clearly  conceive  themselves  as  manifestations 
of  the  infinite.  This  is  the  manner  in  which  the  consequent  specu- 
lation endeavours  to  destroy  all  individual  personality.  With  the 
rejection  of  the  personality  of  the  finite  existences  is  necessarily 
connected  the  rejection  of  the  personality  of  the  infinite.  For  as 
the  infinite  unlimited  God  arrives  at  self-consciousness  only  through 
the  creation  of  the  finite  individual,  so  it  is  clear,  that  if  we  in  any 
sense  ascribe  personality  to  him,  it  can  be  only  the  apparent  per- 
sonality which  belongs  to  the  finite  individual, — this  is  his  life. 
Other  consequences,  equally  shocking,  flow  from  these  principles. 
If  God  be  the  only  and  universal  agent  in  all  being,  then  is  good 
and  evil  equally  the  act  of  God,  and  the  objective  difference  be- 
tween good  and  evil  falls  to  the  ground.  The  view  presented  of 
this  subject  is  as  follows  :  since  the  infinite  remains  inactive,  hav- 
ing no  self-manifestation,  excepting  so  far  as  it  is  manifested  in  the 
finite,  it  follows  necessarily  that  God  is  limited  in  the  world,  that  is, 
is  but  imperfectly  developed.  But  this  limitation  is  not  in  itself 
evil,  lying  in  the  very  necessity  of  the  infinite,  and  in  the  infinite 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  557 

nothing  necessary  can  be  evil.  Hence  all  evil  which  is  but  im- 
perfect development  is  incipient  good,  for  every  limitation  in  the 
finite  by  virtue  of  its  unity  with  the  infinite  is  virtually  removed. 
If  evil  be  only  limitation,  it  is  only  negation,  and  is  necessary  to 
the  exciting  of  life,  or  effort  at  developing,  since  if  there  were  no 
limitation  there  could  be  no  progressive  pervading  of  the  limited, 
and  all  would  remain  dead.  The  individual  must  acknowledge  the 
evil  in  itself  so  far,  that  it  must  endeavour  to  remove  the  limitation, 
that  is,  endeavour  to  render  the  pervading  of  the  finite  by  the  in- 
finite perfect,  but  this  limitation  (evil)  is  in  itself  necessary,  since 
without  it  there  could  be  no  development  of  life. 

This  system  with  its  consequences  presents  undoubtedly  a  series 
of  regular  logical  deductions,  but  it  contradicts  so  entirely  the 
deepest  feelings,  nay,  the  very  nature  of  the  soul,  that  only  a  few 
at  any  period  have  been  able  to  embrace  it  in  all  its  results.  Yet 
even  among  the  ancients  we  find  regularly  constructed  pantheisti- 
cal systems,  partly  ideal  and  partly  materialistical.  The  most  im- 
posing is  that  of  Xenophanes,  and  that  of  the  later  Platonists.  We 
find  also  among  the  heathen  some  who,  although  they  admitted 
the  truth  of  these  systems,  felt  their  annihilating  effect  on  human 
life.  There  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  Historia  Naturalis  of 
Pliny,  lib.  ii.  cap.  7,  where  he  says — "  There  is  so  muchun  certain 
in  human  life,  that  among  all  uncertainties,  that  which  is  most  cer- 
tain is,  that  there  is  nothing  certain,  and  that  there  is  nothing  more 
miserable  than  the  thing  called  man.  In  all  his  misery  his 
greatest  consolation  is,  that  God  is  not  Almighty,  since  he  cannot 
deprive  himself  of  life,  which  is  the  greatest  good  in  this  wretched 
state."  This  system  has  also  in  later  times  appeared  in  various 
forms.  When  speculation  became  more  thorough  and  consequent, 
Pantheism  appeared  under  two  shapes,  as  idealism  and  material- 
ism. The  latter,  denying  the  existence  of  spirit,  refers  everything 
to  matter  and  its  laws.  This  system  was  principally  defended  by 
the  French  academicians  at  the  close  of  the  last  century.  The 
grossest  work  on  this  subject  is  "  L'homme  Machine ;"  and  the 
boldest  defender  of  the  system  the  infamous  La  Mettrie,  court 
physician,  and  afterwards  court-fool  to  Frederick  the  Great.  The 
principal  forms  of  the  ideal  Pantheism  are  Spinozism  and  the 
nature-philosophy.  By  Spinoza  the  system  is  but  imperfectly  pre- 
sented ;  the  nature-philosophers  are  more  thorough  and  definite. 
The  coarsest  advocate  of  these  doctrines  is  Goerres.  In  his  My- 
thology of  Asia  he  speaks  with  the  greatest  boldness  of  the  per- 
sonality, divinity,  and  morality  of  the  earth. 

The  other  kind  of  infidelity  of  which  we  spoke,  was  the  incon- 
sequent or  Deism. 

The  deist  assumes  the  existence  of  the  moral  law  in  the  breast 
of  man,  the  existence  of  personal  deity,  and  of  course  the  doctrine 
of  providence,  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishment,  and  im- 
mortality. This  system  is  found  in  antiquity,  although  held  with  a 
very  unstable  hand,  as  by  Cicero,  who  properly  was  a  deist ; 


558  THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY 

with  more  precision  and  beauty  by  Pindar,  Socrates,    and  Plu- 
tarch, who  presented  the  truth  in  a  manner  more  analogous  to 
Christian  deism.     It  may  be  asked  in  what  way  the  heathen  at- 
tained this  knowledge  ?     We  may  say  that  the  necessity  of  such 
truths  lies  so  deep  in  the  human  heart,  that  a  thorough  examina- 
tion of  the  human  soul  must  have  led  to  their  discovery  and  adop- 
tion.     But  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  fallen  nature  of  man 
would  ever  have  arrived  at  this  knowledge,  if  it  had  not  been  aid- 
ed by  tradition  and  history.     It  is  far  more  probable,  from  a  re- 
view of  the  whole  history  of  the  human  mind,  that  although  this 
necessity  really  exists,  man  would  never,  unassisted,  have  attained 
to  the  discovery  of  these  truths.     At  least  the  three  distinguished 
men  just  mentioned  are  far  from  founding  their  opinions  merely 
upon   speculation ;  they  appeal   to  tradition, — to  the   fathers — to 
earlier  revelations  of  God,  which  had  gradually  become  corrupted. 
In  modern  times  deism  has  assumed  a  more  perfect  and  better  sus- 
tained form,  and  endeavoured  to  found  its  claims  upon  the  general 
reason  of  man.     It  maintains  that  human  reason  is  necessarily  led 
to  the  above-mentioned  truths  by  mere  speculation.     If  this  sys- 
tem did  not  oppose  itself  to  divine  revelation  it  would  be  liable  to 
only  one  objection.     It  is  perfectly  correct  in  saying  that  the  ne- 
cessities of  the  human  heart  lead  to  the  adoption  of  these  truths, 
and  that  when  these  necessities  are  not  suppressed.,  the  feelings  of 
every  man  will  urge  their  admission.     But  deism  denies  the  influ- 
ence of  history  upon  itself.     Were  it  not  for  what  it  derives  from 
history  it  would  be  nothing,  it  is   ungrateful  to  Christianity  to 
which  it  is  indebted  for  all  its  clearness  and  stability.     It  presents 
itself  in  opposition  to    revelation,  and  pretends  to  be  a  system 
which  can  justify  itself  as  such  at  the  bar  of  truth,  and  to  which 
philosophy  lends  its  sanction ;  whereas  the  doctrines  of  revelation 
are  opposed  to  reason,  and  are  to  be  rejected  as  doctrines  to  which 
philosophy  does  not  conduct.     As  soon  as  deism  takes  this  ground 
it  presents  itself  as  a  system  of  philosophy.     It  will  only  admit 
what  is  within  the  reach  of  human  reason,  what  it  can  by  argu- 
ment establish.     In  this  light  it  is  a  system  utterly  unsatisfactory. 
We  have  already  seen,  that  when  human  reason  will  admit  no- 
thing but  what  it  can  comprehend,  it  is  led  at  the  very  first  step  to 
a  riddle  which  it  cannot  solve.     That  speculation,  if  it  will  be 
worthy  of  the  name,  is  necessarily  led  to  deny  the  personality  and 
liberty  of  man  ;  but  this  deism,  as  admitting  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, cannot  do.     If  therefore  it  be  not  blind,  it  must  admit  that  in 
reference  to  all  its  leading  doctrines  it  stands  upon  the  ground  of 
faith,  that  it  can  neither  render  these  doctrines  comprehensible,  nor 
support  them  by  logical  argument.     It  must  admit  that  it  adopts 
what  it  cannot  defend  at  the  tribunal  of  speculation,  the  personali- 
ty and  liberty  of  man.     The  deist  believes  these  truths  merely 
upon  the  ground  of  experience,  and  can  neither  explain  nor  prove 
them.     But  if  he  is  obliged  in  reference  to  his  most  important 
truths  to  rely  upon  experience,  and  merely  believes  them,  he  can 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  559 

no  longer  object  to  the  believer  in  the  Bible.  If  he,  in  reference  to 
other  facts,  appeals  also  to  experience,  and  receives  truths  which 
he  cannot  explain  and  cannot  by  speculation  support,  but  which 
he  has  experienced  in  his  own  heart ;  the  consequence  of  this  is, 
that  we  are  brought  to  admit  that  argument  is  not  the  only  way  for 
attaining  a  knowledge  of  the  truth.  Hence  the  great  Hamann  re- 
marks profoundly  and  truly,  in  his  correspondence  with  Jacobi, 
page  19, — "  I  have  repeated  it  to  satiety  that  it  is  with  the  philoso- 
phers as  with  the  Jews,  neither  know  what  either  the  law  or  rea- 
son is.  Reason,  as  the  law,  is  given  for  the  knowledge  of  sin  and 
ignorance,  and  not  of  grace  and  truth.  The  latter  must  be  re- 
vealed ;  they  can  neither  be  found  out  by  speculation  nor  received 
from  others,  nor  inherited." — In  other  words,  the  object  of  philo- 
sophising can  only  be  to  show  that  we  are  thus  led  to  conclusions 
which  pointedly  contradict  our  nature  and  consciousness,  that  we 
are  brought  into  dilemmas  which  involve  us  in  inextricable  contra- 
dictions. Speculation  thus  brings  us  to  a  sense  of  our  ignorance 
and  helplessness,  and  we  are  forced  to  seek  some  other  way  for 
arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  divine  things.  This  other  way  is  his- 
tory. In  the  external  history  the  truths  of  God  are  communicated 
as  facts,  in  the  history  of  the  heart  the  truth  has  the  testimony  of 
experience,  and  thus  we  are  brought  to  believe  in  revelation. 

Section  II. — Infidelity  in  the  Romish  Church. 

Since  the  existence  of  Christianity,  there  has  always  been  infi- 
delity in  the  world,  which  the  most  vigorous  church  discipline  is 
insufficient  to  suppress.  As  the  necessities  of  the  human  heart 
will  ever  have  a  tendency  to  lead  men  to  faith,  pride  will  as  con- 
stantly lead  to  infidelity.  We  have  no  accurate  knowledge  of  the 
extent  of  infidelity  in  the  Romish  Church,  where  it  must  lie  con- 
cealed ;  but  we  can  designate  two  forms  in  which  it  has  displayed 
itself.  A  spirit  of  profound  speculation  led  to  mysticism,  and 
through  mysticism  to  pantheism  ;  the  spirit  of  frivolous  indifference 
led  to  the  rejection  of  the  superstitions  and  the  doctrines  of 
the  church.  To  the  former  class  belong  John  Scotus  Erigena, 
Almarich  of  Bena,  and  Dinant  in  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth 
century.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  rejected  what  was  super- 
stitious, threw  away  also  what  was  true.  Of  this  we  have  early 
examples,  as  Simon  of  Tournay,  1200,  Professor  of  Paris.  Of  the 
same  class  was  the  Emperor  Frederick  I.  and  the  disciples  of  the 
Arabian  philosopher  Averroes.  These  latter  held  private  meet- 
ings, in  which  they  ridiculed  the  truths  of  the  Bible.  Infidelity 
greatly  increased  at  the  time  of  the  restoration  of  letters.  In  this 
period  many  learned  men  appeared  who  were  either  deists  or  athe- 
ists, as  for  example,  the  famous  Angelus  Politianus,  who  said,  "I 
have  once  read  the  New  Testament,  sed  nunquam  tempus  pejus 
collocavi;"  and  the  Cardinal  Bembo,  who,  when  he  found  that 
the  learned  Sadoletus  was  engaged  in  a  commentary  on  the  Ro- 


I 


•     • 


560  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

mans,  said  to  him,  "  Mitte  tales  nugas,  non  enim  decent  virum 

fravem."     Other  examples  may  be  seen  in  the  letters  of  Marsilius 
'icinus,  who  was  a  disciple  of  the  New  Platonic  philosophy,  which 
led  to  his  embracing  Christianity. 

Section  III. — Of  the  Infidelity  which  manifested  itself  at  the  time 
of  the  Reformation. 

The  Reformation  excited  an  universal  spirit  of  investigation. 
Among  those  who  came  under  the  influence  of  this  spirit  were 
many,  whose  religious  feelings  were  very  weak,  and  who  were 
thus  soon  led  astray  ;  such  as  Valentin  Gentilis,  Servetus,  John 
Campanus,  and  others.  To  this  class  also  belong  the  Socinians, 
who  formed  a  system  essentially  different  from  that  of  the  Gospel. 
Of  many  we  know  nothing,  as  at  this  period  it  was  dangerous  to 
declare  such  sentiments.  Yet  in  the  south  of  France  we  find  that 
a  regular  society  of  deists  was  formed,  and  that  many  denied  even 
the  immortality  of  the  soul.  See  on  this  subject  the  Institutions 
Chretiennes  of  Viret,  1563.  These  cases,  however,  are  compara- 
tively few ;  the  mass  of  the  Protestants  adhered  to  the  faith  of  the 
Bible.  The  first  indication  of  anything  like  general  infidelity 
manifested  itself  in  England  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, and  far  more  clearly  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
From  thence  it  spread  to  France  ;  even  Voltaire  availed  himself  of 
the  English  writers,  to  find  objections  against  Christianity.  Eng- 
land and  France  united  to  spread  the  influence  to  Germany,  and 
Germany  spread  it  to  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Russia. 

Section  IV. — Infidelity  in  the  Protestant  Church  in  England. 

We  must  for  a  moment  attend  to  the  circumstances  under  which 
it  arose,  and  the  situation  of  the  English  church  in  the  latter  half 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  This  period  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant in  the  whole  course  of  ecclesiastical  history.  It  is  a  re- 
markable fact,  that  in  so  small  a  portion  of  Christendom,  and  in  so 
limited  a  period,  such  various  forms  of  opinions  arose.  This  pe- 
riod has  never  been  sufficiently  studied  ;  we  find  here  all  the  doc- 
trines which  have  ever  appeared  in  the  Christian  church.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  greatest  latitudinarianism  in  theory  and  practice  ; 
on  the  other,  the  most  bigoted  adherence  to  the  Catholic  church 
— the  greatest  looseness  and  the  most  ascetic  strictness — separa- 
tists and  independents  who  would  recognise  no  church,  and  those 
who  advocated  the  strictest  alliance  between  the  church  and  state 
— profound  and  learned  theologians,  theosophers,  and  mystics, 
who  rejected  all  theology — the  warmest  and  most  active  practical 
Christians  who  scattered  blessings  around  them — and  little  nar- 
row sects  who  gave  themselves  up  to  every  irregularity. 

Amidst  such  discordant  elements  it  is  not  wonderful  that  those 
who  sought  the  truth,  without  having  any  deep  feeling  on  the 


ft  «  *i 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  561 

V  - 
subject,  should  be  led  into  infidelity.  In  no  country  was  the  Re- 
formation so  much  affected  by  external  circumstances  as  in  Eng- 
land. This  arose  partly  from  the  tyrannical  authority  with  which 
the  houses  of  Tudor  and  Stuart  forced  their  opinions  upon  the 
people,  and  partly  from  the  fact  that  many  who  wished  to  promote 
the  Keformation  knew  so  little  of  the  religion  of  the  heart.  Hence, 
when  the  government  changed  their  opinion,  there  was  a  similar 
change  effected  in  the  church — the  parties  became  violent  in  their 
hostility  to  each  other,  and  forgot  to  govern  their  proceedings  by 
the  rule  of  the  Gospel.  Under  Elizabeth  the  parties  became  more 
distinct,  and  separated  themselves  into  the  three  principal  classes, 
Catholics,  Episcopalians,  and  Puritans.  The  Episcopalians  re- 
quired the  government  of  the  church  by  bishops — regarded  the 
king  as  the  head  of  the  church — and  wished  to  retain  many  of  the 
Catholic  ceremonies.  The  Puritans  borrowed  their  principles  from 
the  strict  Geneva  system.  They  demanded  the  entire  rejection  of 
everything  which  could  call  the  Popish  church  to  mind — that  the 
church  should  be  disconnected  from  the  state, — that  it  should  be 
governed  by  Presbyters — that  the  pastors  should  be  chosen  by  the 
congregations — that  a  strict  church  discipline  should  be  introduced, 
&c.  In  many  respects  they  were  more  ascetic  than  evangelical, 
demanding  too  much  external  exhibition  of  piety.  As  under 
Mary  when  the  Catholics  gained  the  ascendency — thousands  of 
Protestants  bled  upon  the  scaffold,  or  were  left  to  languish  in 
prison — while  the  churches  were  possessed  by  Catholic  clergymen ; 
so  under  Elizabeth  the  Episcopal  party  commenced  a  similar 
course  of  tyranny.  Every  citizen  was  obliged  to  attend  church 
at  least  once  a  month  upon  the  pain  of  imprisonment.  Under 
Cromwell  the  Puritans  obtained  the  reins — all  worldly  amusements 
were  forbidden — the  theatres  were  abolished — the  Episcopal  ritual 
was  curtailed — in  the  court  and  army  prayer  meetings  were  intro- 
duced, &c.  This  period  of  Cromwell's  ascendency  presents  a 
remarkable  spectacle.  Cromwell  himself  manifests  in  life,  such  a 
mixture  of  religion  and  hypocrisy,  that  it  is  difficult  to  form  a  clear 
idea  of  his  character.  It  seems  clear  that  this  remarkable  man 
had  experienced  the  grace  of  God  upon  his  heart.  He  was  in  his 
early  youth  immoral — reformed,  and  led  a  pious  life — he  connected 
himself  with  the  Puritans — studied  diligently  the  Bible — avoided 
everything  which  could  give  offence,  and  distinguished  himself  by 
his  benevolence.  When  the  war  broke  out,  he  appeared  in  public 
life.  As  a  Puritan,  he  felt  called  upon  to  make  war  upon  the  king 
and  the  Episcopal  church.  After  the  execution  of  the  king  he  be- 
came Protector.  During  this  period  the  form  of  religion  was 
spread  among  the  people  to  an  unexampled  degree — in  most  cases, 
however,  it  was  merely  form.  The  soldiers  held  prayer  meetings 
with  Cromwell :  when  the  army  took  the  field,  it  was  always 
amidst  the  singing  of  hymns;  and  the  commanders  excited  the 
soldiers  by  repeating  passages  from  the  Bible.  Every  irregularity 
was  severely  punished — every  soldier  carried  his  Bible  with  him. 

36 


562  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

The  Episcopal  party  was  given  to  licentiousness  ;  out  of  hatred 
to  the  Puritans  they  sung  immoral  songs  in  entering  battle  ;  inde- 
cent plays  were  everywhere  acted,  and  immodest  books  circulated. 
In  reference  to  Cromwell  himself,  it  is  true,  that  after  his  entrance 
upon  public  life,  he  showed  himself  very  ambitious,  but  that  he 
was  cruel  cannot  be  said.  And  it  should  be  recollected  that  his 
party,  feeling  themselves  bound  to  act  according  to  the  examples 
given  in  the  Old  Testament,  acted  from  a  sense  of  duty  "  in  root- 
ing out  the  Canaanites,"  as  they  expressed  it.  It  is  common  to 
ascribe  the  king's  death  to  Cromwell,  but  this  is  not  correct,  the 
real  author  of  the  king's  death  was  Ireton.  Even  the  enemies  of 
Cromwell  bear  testimony  to  the  goodness  of  his  life — the  court 
physician  of  Charles  I.  and  II.  says,  that  "  in  the  court  of  Crom- 
well no  immoral  person  was  endured."  And  the  venerable  Bax- 
ter says,  "  that  until  he  attained  to  honour,  he  possessed  the  pure 
fear  of  God."  Many  of  his  expressions  also  are  still  preserved, 
which  seem  to  prove  his  knowledge  of  religion.  But  as  true  piety 
among  the  Puritans  was  mingled  with  so  many  serious  errors — 
piety  itself  soon  sunk  into  suspicion.  Immediately  after  this  puri- 
tanical period,  one  of  an  entirely  different  character  was  intro- 
duced. When  Cromwell  was  removed  from  the  stage,  his  strict 
laws  ceased  to  operate;  and  the  restoration  of  Charles  II. .pro- 
duced a  complete  change.  Charles  was  a  frivolous,  licentious 
man — of  religion  he  had  nothing  but  superstitious  fear,  which  led 
to  his  turning  Catholic";  a  fact  which  he  was  afraid  to  avow,  but 
which  became  known  after  his  death.  After  that,  around  Crom- 
well, men  had  collected  who  had  the  Bible  ever  in  their  hands 
and  in  their  mouths,  and  the  voice  of  prayer  had  been  heard  upon 
every  hand — of  a  sudden,  we  find  a  very  different  race  figuring 
upon  the  stage.  The  licentious  part  of  the  nobility  formed  the 
court  of  Charles  II. — plays,  the  most  of  them  immoral,  and  all 
similar  amusements  were  again  introduced.  Connected  with  this, 
many  were  secretly  inclined  to  the  Catholic  faith.  The  principal 
personages  at  the  court  of  Charles,  were  the  Duke  of  Buckingham, 
and  the  profligate  earl  of  Rochester ;  the  latter,  indeed,  was  con- 
verted upon  his  death-bed,  and  died  a  Christian. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances,  that  the  various  sects  which 
mark  the  history  of  England  in  this  period  made  their  appearance. 
An  account  of  many  of  them  may  be  seen  in  the  work  of  William 
Boehme,  "  Eight  Books,  upon  the  Reformation  of  the  Church  in 
England."  Altona,  1734.  The  principal  of  these  are  the  follow- 
ing :  1.  The  Familists,  who  maintained  that,  in  order  to  present 
Christianity  in  its  proper  light,  all  Christians  should  be  reduced  to 
one  family  :  they  opposed  themselves  to  all  church  forms.  2.  The 
Ranters.  3.  Antinomians.  4.  Muggletonians.  5.  Seekers.  The 
Baptists  and  Quakers  also  arose  in  this  period.  There  was  also  a 
sect,  who  professed  to  be  the  followers  of  Jacob  Boehme,  whose 
leader  was  Pordage,  a  physician ;  and  the  Angel  Brothers,  or  Phila- 
delphians,  who  also  adopted  the  mystical  doctrines  of  Boehme — 


4 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTUEY.  563 

their  leader  was  Johanna  Leade.  Besides  this,  there  were  the 
Latitudinarians,  many  of  whom  embraced  Platonic  principles  and 
sought  to  establish  Christianity  upon  this  basis.  To  this  class  be- 
longs the  celebrated  Cudworth,  whose  work,  the  "  Intellectual  Sys- 
tem," is  a  treasury  of  various  erudition.  The  Deists  also  made  their 
appearance  in  this  age — of  this  latter  class  the  first  and  the  most 
respectable  was  Lord  Herbert,  who  died  1648.  His  most  impor- 
tant works  are :  "  De  Veritate,  prout  distinguitur  a  Revelatione,  a 
verisimili,  a  possibili  et  a  falsa,"  and  "  De  Religione  Gentilium." 
Lord  Herbert  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  a  man  of  no  common 
talents — he  has  a  great  resemblance  to  our  philosopher  Jacobi,  and 
was  indeed  the  Jacobi  of  his  age.  He  possessed,  what  was  not 
then  very  common,  an  honest  heart,  and  sought  the  truth  with 
much  earnestness.  He  seems  to  have  been  led  to  his  deistical  prin- 
ciples by  the  bitter  contentions  of  the  various  sects — the  arrogance 
of  the  Puritans  and  the  haughtiness  of  the  Catholic  and  Episcopal 
clergy.  This  first  excited  his  doubts  upon  the  subject  of  Revela- 
tion, and  he  investigated  the  subject  in  a  manner  which  showed  he 
was  desirous  of  arriving  at  some  firm  foundation.  He  wished,  in 
the  first  place,  to  ascertain  the  principle  of  truth  in  man — and  found, 
upon  reflecting  upon  the  nature  of  the  understanding,  that  it  could 
be  no  sure  means  of  attaining  a  knowledge  of  divine  things  ;  since 
it  was  so  apt  to  draw  false  conclusions,  and  was  so  easily  blinded 
by  the  corrupt  state  of  the  feelings.  He  hence  assumed  as  the 
ground  of  truth,  what  he  called  instinct.  There  is,  he  said,  a  cer- 
tain instinct  in  man,  which  testifies  to  the  truth  of  certain  things, 
about  which  it  is  useless  any  further  to  reason.  Such  truths  are : 
1.  the  existence  of  God  ;  2.  that  man  is  dependent  on  God,  and  is 
bound  to  reverence  him ;  3.  that  piety  is  the  harmony  of  all  the 
human  faculties ;  4.  that  there  is  an  essential  difference  between 
good  and  evil ;  and  5.  there  is  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments. These  principles,  he  said,  include  all  religion;  that  this 
is  the  fact,  he  maintained  was  not  only  proved  by  instinct,  but  by 
the  consensus  gentium.  In  so  far  as  Lord  Herbert  acknowledges 
these  doctrines,  he  suffered  himself  to  be  led  by  that  deeply  seated 
feeling  of  the  human  heart,  which  testifies  to  their  truth.  He  over- 
looked, however,  the  fact,  that  this  feeling  is  never  developed  with- 
out historical  influence ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  these  truths  are 
never  discovered  or  acknowledged  beyond  the  influence  of  Chris- 
tianity. He  also  overlooked  the  fact,  that  these  doctrines  are 
empty  and  powerless,  as  soon  as  they  are  conceived  in  any  other 
manner  than  that  in  which  they  are  presented  in  the  Christian  re- 
ligion. God  is  only  for  men  a  living  God,  when,  according  to  the 
Gospel,  he  is  regarded  as  the  author  of  a  plan  of  salvation ; 
and  when  he  has  historically  (not  merely  through  the  under- 
standing) revealed  himself  to  his  creatures  The  difference  be- 
tween good  and  evil  cannot  be  effectively  known,  when  man  is 
not,  agreeably  to  the  Christian  system,  regarded  as  fallen:  and 
piety,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  is  only  possible,  when  men. 


{ 


'% 


564  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

without  self-righteousness  are  willing  to  be  saved  by  grace,  Lord 
Herbert,  therefore,  should  have  acknowledged  that  his  five  truths 
would  remain  pure  abstractions,  unless  more  definitely  presented, 
and  confirmed  by  a  revelation, — and  this  would  have  led  him  back 
to  Christianity,  to  which  he  was  really  indebted  for  these  five  doc- 
trines. 

Charles  Blount,  who  died  1697,  was  one  of  Lord  Herbert's  fol- 
lowers. He  professed  himself  a  deist,  and  yet  acknowledged  that 
deism  could  have  no  authority  over  men,  if  it  did  not  rest  upon  an 
historical  basis  in  Christianity.  He  at  first  directed  his  attacks 
against  particular  points  in  the  Christian  religion,  upon  historical 
and  critical  principles,  endeavouring  particularly  to  render  the  au- 
thority of  the  four  Evangelists  suspicious.  He  maintained  there 
was  but  little  difference  between  the  history  of  Christ  and  that  of 
Apollonius  of  Tyana. 

The  most  important  deistical  writer  of  this  period  was  John 
Toland,  who,  while  he  brought  many  acute  historical  and  critical 
objections  against  Christianity,  was  led  by  his  speculating  turn  of 
mind  to  Pantheism.  Toland  was  born  in  1671  of  Catholic  parents. 
He  seems  early  to  have  imbibed  an  abhorrence  of  the  superstitions 
of  the  Catholic  church,  and  soon  joined  the  sect  of  the  Puritans. 
He  went  to  Holland  to  pursue  his  studies,  under  the  celebrated 
Arminians,  Limborch  and  Clericus.  The  spirit  of  inquiry  was 
here  awaked  in  his  mind,  which  does  not  appear  to  have  been  of 
the  purest  character ;  he,  as  the  French  deists,  was  mainly  influ- 
enced by  vanity.  When  he  returned  to  England  he  appeared  as 
the  defender  of  deism,  and  endeavoured  in  public  societies,  coffee 
houses  and  other  places  of  general  resort,  to  make  proselytes  to 
his  opinions.  In  his  20th  year  he  published  his  work  against  the 
Lutheran  Clergy,  under  the  title,  "  The  Tribe  of  Judah."  We  see 
that  the  corruption  of  the  clergy  was  one  of  the  causes  which  led 
to  his  hostility  to  Christianity.  His  principal  work,  which,  both 
from  its  contents  and  influence,  is  deserving  of  attention,  is  "Chris- 
tianity without  Mystery,"  which  he  published  in  1696.  This  book 
is  written  with  a  great  deal  of  talent,  as  is  confessed  by  Leibnitz, 
who  wrote  a  refutation  of  it.  The  modern  rationalists  are  neither 
so  acute  nor  so  original.  He  attacked  few  particular  points,  but 
rather  wished  to  establish  general  principles.  In  the  Introduction 
he  speaks  of  the  excommunicating  and  persecuting  spirit  of  the 
clergy.  If,  says  he,  you  are  opposed  to  the  Catholics,  and  yet  dif- 
fer in  the  smallest  point  from  the  Lutherans,  the  latter  condemn 
you ;  if  you  are  against  the,  Lutherans,  and  yet  differ  from  the 
Catholics,  the  Catholics  condemn  you ;  if  you  are  equally  indiffer- 
ent to  both,  you  are  sure  to  be  condemned  by  both.  His  manner 
of  reasoning  is  as  follows  :  He  first  defines  what  he  means  by  Rea- 
son ;  he  understands  by  it  in  its  wider  sense,  the  understanding,  in 
a  more  restricted  sense,  the  power  of  judgment  and  deduction. 
He  then  presents  the  position,  that  there  can  be  nothing  in  Reve- 
lation contrary  to  Reason,  which  he  thus  proves  :  Reason  is  as  much 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  565 

from  God  as  the  Revelation  can  be, — if  the  one  contradicts  the 
other,  God  contradicts  himself.  He  maintains  also  that  it  is  not 
proper  to  say,  that  Reason  has  been  corrupted  by  the  fall,  since  by 
the  fall  we  have  not  lost  the  power  to  judge  and  draw  inferences. 
In  this  respect  reason  is  not  corrupted ;  it  is  only  so  far  corrupted 
as  it  is  blinded  by  our  evil  feelings.  This  reasoning  is  true  or 
false  just  as  it  is  explained  and  applied.  If  what  we  decide  to  be 
contrary  to  our  reason,  falls  completely  within  the  reach  of  our 
understanding,  so  that  it  can  be  fully  comprehended  and  the  con- 
trariety clearly  made  out,  then  it  is  impossible  that  a  revelation  can 
teach  it.  It  cannot  be  said  in  a  revelation  that  Jericho  is  only  a 
day's  journey,  and  yet  a  thousand  miles  from  Jerusalem.  But  a 
revelation  may  contain  what  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  reconcile  with 
our  reason  and  what  apparently  contradicts  it;  as  for  example,  the 
personality  of  man  and  the  absoluteness  of  God,  or  the  free  agency 
of  man  and  the  agency  and  government  of  God  ;  the  understanding 
would  decide  that  one  or  the  other  must  be  given  up,  yet  both  are 
facts  which  rest  upon  our  own  consciousness  and  experience.  The 
whole  difficulty  is,  that  the  subject  lies  beyond  our  reach,  the  under- 
standing is  not  competent  to  its  comprehension.  The  distinction 
therefore  between  what  is  contrary  to  reason  and  what  is  above  it, 
although  it  has  been  much  controverted,  is  perfectly  just.  When 
I  say  that  certain  truths  are  above  reason,  I  mean  that  they 
lie  in  a  region  for  which  the  understanding  has  no  organ.  But  if  I 
say  that  a  thing  is  contrary  to  reason,  I  acknowledge  the  under- 
standing as  competent  to  judge  of  the  subject,  or  in  other  words 
as  having  an  organ  therefor. 

Toland's  second  position,  that  a  revelation  can  contain  no  contra- 
dictions, rests  upon  the  same  ground  ;  if  the  subject  falls  within  the 
reach  of  the  understanding  and  the  contradiction  be  clear,  a  reve- 
lation cannot  communicate  it.  What  is  a  contradiction  in  this 
sense,  is  a  non-ens,  a  nothing.  But  care  must  be  taken  to  observe 
whether  the  subject  be  not  presented  with  conditions,  which  re- 
move it  beyond  the  limits  of  our  experience. 

His  third  position  is,  that  it  is  a  perversion  of  ideas  to  say  that, 
what  cannot  be  believed  upon  grounds  furnished  by  reason,  must 
be  believed  because  it  is  revealed.  He  maintained  that  the  revela- 
tion contains  nothing  but  the  objects  of  faith ;  believing  them  de- 
pends upon  the  grounds  which  reason  can  present  in  their  support. 
The  matter  is  thus,  The  first  point  to  be  ascertained  is,  whether 
what  presents  itself  as  a  revelation,  be  really  from  God :  is  that 
ascertained,  the  revelation  is  not  only  the  object  but  the  ground  of 
faith,  since  anything  being  revealed  is  obviously  the  best  possible 
ground  for  believing  it.  This  work  of  Toland  excited  great  atten- 
tion, it  was  read  in  England,  France,  and  Germany.  No  less  than 
fifty  refutations  of  it  were  published,  the  best  is  that  by  Leibnitz, 
"  Annotatiunculae  subitanae  ad  Tolandi  Librum,"  1701  ;  and  the 
interesting  work  by  the  same  author,  "  Discours  sur  la  conformity 
de  la  Raison  et  de  la  Foi."    Toland  continued  his  efforts  to  promote 


566  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

his  doctrines,  and  published  several  other  not  unimportant  works. 
The  most  interesting  is  his  last,  in  which  he  acknowledges  himself 
a  Pantheist.  The  title  is  "  Pantheisticon,  sive  formula  celebrandae 
sodalitatis  Socraticae,"  1720.  In  this  book  he  presented  the  pan- 
theistical doctrines  in  the  form  of  the  English  Liturgy.  An  alter- 
nate chant  is  thus  given,  between  a  moderator  and  chorus.  "  Mode- 
rator— Profanum  arcete  vulgus.  Chorus — Clusa  tutaque  sunt 
omnia.  Moderator — In  mundo,  omnia  sunt  unum,  unumque  est 
omne  in  omnibus.  Chorus — Quod  omne  in  omnibus  Deus  est, 
aeternus  et  immensus,  neque  genitus  neque  interiturus." 

The  next  deistical  author  whom  we  shall  mention,  is  the  well- 
known  philosopher,  Thomas  Hobbes,  who  died  1679.  His  philo- 
sophical system  is  an  entirely  peculiar  exhibition  of  the  human 
mind,  with  which  his  religious  opinions  are  only  partially  connect- 
ed. He  maintained  that  God  and  the  angels  were  not  spirits,  and 
denied  the  liberty  of  man.  He  acknowledged  a  revelation,  and 
made  the  well-grounded  distinction  of  a  two-fold  criterion  of  a 
communication  from  God,  the  one  for  those  to  whom  the  revelation 
was  immediately  made,  and  the  other  for  those  to  whom  it  was  by 
these  messengers  of  God  communicated.  He  maintained,  as  a 
main  point,  that  a  revelation  must  teach  fidelity  to  the  king,  which, 
in  the  time  of  the  Jewish  theocracy,  was  God.  At  present,  mo- 
narchs  are  the  representatives  of  Christ,  and  that  those  who  com- 
municate a  revelation  must  perform  miracles.  The  scriptures  are 
the  conclusion  of  all  revelation,  and  are  the  representatives  of  all 
the  prophets.  He  was  moderate  and  proper  in  all  he  said  in  refer- 
ence to  the  relation  between  reason  and  revelation.  Reason,  he 
said,  was  not  opposed  to  the  Bible,  but  it  must  be  humble,  and  not 
presume  to  penetrate  too  far.  The  expression,  "  to  bring  every 
thought  into  subjection  to  the  obedience  of  Christ,"  does  not  mean 
that  we  must  renounce  the  use  of  reason,  but  that  we  must  be  obe- 
dient, and  not  assume  authority.  The  mysteries  of  faith,  he  said, 
might  be  compared  to  medicines,  which  must  be  taken  just  as  they 
are,  and  after  they  have  mingled  themselves  in  the  system  manifest 
their  power.  He  also  directed  his  investigations  to  the  criticism 
and  language  of  the  ..scriptures.  Here,  however,  he  is  often  per- 
fectly arbitrary  ;  he  denied  the  authenticity  of  the  Pentateuch,  of 
Joshua,  Judges,  and  Samuel ;  and  endeavoured  to  justify  his 
doubts,  by  remarks  which  were  not  altogether  destitute  of  founda- 
tion. His  materialism  led  him  into  very  gross  ideas  of  the  doc- 
trine of  inspiration,  and  that  respecting  the  angels.  Denying  the 
existence  of  spirit,  he  made  the  angels  nothing  more  than  fine 
aetherial  beings,  yet  maintained  that  in  all  probability  they  never 
appeared  to  men,  considering  all  accounts  of  their  appearance 
founded  upon  deceptions  of  the  imagination.  Inspiration,  he  said, 
could  be  nothing  else  than  the  infusion  of  a  kind  of  subtle  air ; 
when  spoken  of  in  reference  to  the  Bible,  it  must  mean  a  mode  of 
communication  analogous  to  breathing  into.  The  idea  of  the  king- 
dom of  God  is  not  metaphorical,  according  to  his  doctrine,  neither 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY. 

is  this  an  invisible  kingdom,  but  kings  are  the  representatives  of 
God,  until  the  coming  of  Christ.  They  were  also  to  be  regarded 
as  lords  of  our  faith,  and  authoritative  interpreters  of  scripture. 
Miracles,  he  said,  were  natural  events,  designed  to  answer  some 
important  purpose.  Of  the  doctrine  of  redemption  he  gave  much 
the  same  representation  as  that  presented  by  Grotius.  God  is  a 
moral  governor,  men  cannot  make  satisfaction  for  sins,  God  can 
set  what  price  he  sees  fit  for  our  redemption  ;  under  the  Old  Testa- 
ment he  sets  sacrifices,  under  the  New,  Christ  and  his  death. 
Christians,  as  the  subjects  of  this  king,  must  cordially  submit  to  this 
arrangement  Hobbes,  properly  speaking,  made  no.  proselytes,  but 
his  materialism  produced  for  a  time  considerable  effect,  the  doctrine 
of  human  liberty  and  the  existence  of  spirits  were  rendered  doubt- 
ful in  the  minds  of  many,  and  even  a  species  of  atheism  became  to 
a  certain  extent  prevalent. 

Lord  Shaftesbury  died  in  1773.  This  man  was  a  fine 
writer  and  a  polished  man  of  the  world  ;  and  his  manner  of  rea- 
soning was  such  as  common  men  of  the  world  usually  adopted. 
Through  his  talents  and  popular  style  of  argument,  he  attained 
considerable  influence ;  his  writings  in  twenty  years  passed  through 
seven  editions.  They  were,  as  might  be  expected,  principally 
read  by  persons  of  rank;  in  1760-80  they  were  also  much  circu- 
lated in  France  and  Germany.  The  character  of  what  he  has 
written  upon  the  subject  of  religion  is  such  as  might  be  expected 
from  a  worldly  man,  who  feared  to  acknowledge  the  solemn  truths 
of  the  Bible,  and  who  wished  to  reduce  theology  to  the  level  of  all 
other  sciences.  His  principal  works  are  his  "Characteristics,"  3  vols., 
"  Miscellaneous  Treatises,"  and  "  The  Moralist."  In  the  first  mention- 
ed work  there  is  a  treatise  on  fanaticism,  in  which  his  religious  views 
are  principally  presented.  The  following  circumstance  gave  oc- 
casion to  this  discourse.  There  were  a  number  of  enthusiasts  who 
went  to  England  from  the  continent  to  claim  the  protection  of  the 
government  under  the  persecutions  to  which  they  were  exposed. 
They  were  subject  to  bodily  agitations  and  ecstasies.  The  people 
turned  them  into  ridicule,  and  made  puppets  which  imitated  their 
motions.  Shaftesbury  embraced  this  occasion  to  publish  his  gene- 
ral principle,  that  ridicule  is  the  best  test  of  truth;  what  is  really 
holy  and  reverend  remains  such,  however  much  it  maybe  derided  ; 
but  what  cannot  stand  this  test  can  be  neither  holy  nor  reverend. 
This  is  a  principle  which  to  a  certain  extent  is  true.  Ridicule 
cannot  destroy  the  respect  of  a  pious  man  for  the  truth,  but  its  in- 
fluence upon  worldly  men  may  be  entirely  different.  He  appealed 
to  the  example  of  Socrates,  and  said  that  the  greatest  service  ever 
rendered  that  philosopher,  was  the,  ridicule  of  Aristophanes  ;  which 
only  drove  away  what  was  extravagant,  whilst  what  was  truly  ex- 
cellent will  remain  to  be  held  in  admiration  by  all  generations.  He 
also  maintained  that  man  would  never  arrive  at  the  truth  if  he  gave 
way  to  melancholy;  ihat  cheerfulness  was  necessary  for  the  dis- 
covery and  perception  of  the  truth.     It  was,  therefore,  a  great  per- 


I 


.^^^t 


68  tholuck's  history  of  theology 


r 


version  to  consider  that  as  truth,  which  was  declared  upon  a  death- 
bed to  be  such,  when  the  patient  was  surrounded  by  so  many  cir- 
cumstances adapted  to  render  him  sorrowful.  Hence  he  contend- 
ed against  all  abstruse  doctrines,  maintaining  that  plain  honest  mo- 
rality and  belief  in  God  was  all  that  men  need.  Revelation  and 
inspiration  are  merely  fanaticism.  Their  advocates  indeed  say  that 
the  former  is  a  real  influence  of  God  upon  the  soul,  the  latter  false  and 
pretended,  but  the  expression  of  both,  he  said,  was  so  much  the  same 
that  to  make  the  distinction  was  no  easy  task.  Philosophical  spe- 
culation, to  be  properly  directed,  must  always  be  connected  with 
wit,  which  produces  the  greatest  excitement.  In  his  miscellaneous 
works  he  speaks  of  revealed  religion.  He  lamented  that  the  Jew- 
ish religion  was  so  melancholy.  David,  particularly,  was  a  great  hy- 
pochondriac, yet  he  loved  dancing  and  music,  and  introduced  them 
into  the  service  of  religion.  The  Old  Testament,  too,  contains 
many  pleasant  stories,  such  as  that  of  Jonah.  He  was  even  pro- 
fane enough  to  apply  his  witticisms  to  Jesus  Christ.  On  the  whole, 
he  thought  the  heathen  religion  entitled  to  the  praise  of  being  the 
most  cheerful.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  such  frivolity  might  produce 
considerable  effect  upon  a  certain  class  of  men  who  desire  nothing 
more  than  to  rid  themselves  of  the  serious  and  threatening  doc- 
trines of  religion. 

Anthony  Collins,  who  died  1729,  was  a  man  of  exemplary  life, 
and  distinguished  by  many  estimable  qualities.  His  writings, 
which  are  distinguished  by  great  acuteness,  contain  much  which 
modern  rationalists  have  brought  forward  as  new  ;  whole  sections 
maybe  found  translated  in  the  modern  dogmatical  works — "Priest- 
craft in  Perfection/'  "  An  Essay  on  Freethinking,"  and  "  The 
Grounds  and  Reasons  of  Christianity,"  are  his  principal  works.  In 
the  second  work  he  says,  nothing  can  be  true  which  cannot  stand 
the  test  of  free  investigation  ;  the  truth  must  be  impregnable,  and 
that  it  is  only  when  every  man  is  allowed  freely  to  present  his 
opinions,  that  we  can  hope  to  arrive  at  the  truth,  as  every  man 
views  the  subject  through  a  different  glass.  Scepticism  can  only 
be  effectually  controverted,  when  allowed  to  present  all  its  objec- 
tions. In  the  "  Grounds  and  Reasons,"  he  presents  many  weighty 
and  important  thoughts ;  his  attack  was  directed  to  the  point  in 
which  Christianity  is  most  assailable,  although  he  did  not  make  the 
most  of  its  advantages.  His  object  was  to  prove  that  Christianity 
was  founded  upon  Judaism.  This,  those  who  admit  the  Jewish 
revelation  would  of  course  allow,  since  Judaism  is  represented  as 
preparation  for  Christianity,  the  Jewish  theocracy  containing,  in 
external  rites,  what  is  more  explicitly  taught  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment. Hence  those  who  cannot  believe  in  the  Old  Testament, 
must  reject  the  New,  if  Christianity  be  nothing  but  reformed  Juda- 
ism. Collins  however  wished  to  prove  that,  admitting  the  author- 
ity of  the  Old  Testament,  Christianity  must  be  given  up,  as  it 
rested  upon  a  wrong  interpretation  and  application  of  the  Old 
Testament  prophecies.     The  predictions  of  a  Messiah  cannot  be 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  569 

made  to  refer  to  Jesus  Christ,  of  whose  life  no  historical  circum- 
stance is  clearly  foretold.  The  prophecies,  commonly  explained 
of  Christ,  really  refer  to  other  persons,  as  Isaiah  liii.  to  Jeremiah ; 
Daniel  ix.  4  to  the  high  priest  Onias.  With  regard  to  miracles,  he 
maintained  they  could  never  be  produced  as  evidences  of  the  truth 
of  doctrines,  such  external  facts  and  doctrines  were  of  an  entirely 
different  nature,  and  it  was  therefore  a  ptTaPaott  tU  d\\o  ynos  when  we 
would  argue  from  one  to  the  other ;  an  objection  which  Lessing 
has  presented  more  fully.  There  is  something  of  truth  in  this 
argument,  at  least,  we  may  admit  that  the  defence  of  Christianity 
was,  at  this  time,  rested  too  exclusively  upon  miracles  and  prophe- 
cies. Collins,  however,  was  entirely  wrong  in  the  manner  in  which 
he  argued  about  the  prophecies  of  the  Old  Testament,  requiring 
all  the  distinctness  and  precision  of  historical  narration.  But  it 
seems  to  lie  in  the  very  nature  of  prophecy,  that  it  should  be  less 
plain  than  history,  and  it  therefore  cannot  be  expected  that  when 
God  communicated  the  knowledge  of  the  future,  he  should  make 
it  as  clear  as  the  present  or  the  past.  He  was  also  arbitrary^  in 
his  interpretation  of  those  predictions  in  which  the  greatest  par- 
ticularity  is  to  be  found,  as  Isaiah  liii.,  and  Micah  iv.  With  regard 
to  miracles  it  may  be  admitted,  that  they  cannot  be  produced  as 
evidence  of  doctrines  which  contain  contradictions  ;  but  they  prove 
that  they  who  perform  them,  stand  in  more  immediate  connexion 
with  God,  and  when  they  are  at  the  same  time  teachers,  their 
miracles  are  evidence  of  the  truth  of  what  they  communicate. 

Thomas  Wollaston  died  1733.  He  was  a  professor  in  the  uni- 
versity of  Cambridge,  though  subsequently  displaced  from  his 
office.  From  reading  the  works  of  Origen  he  was  led  to  adopt 
the  opinion,  that  the  miracles  of  the  New  Testament  were  not 
facts,  but  merely  a  symbolical  method  of  teaching  some  particular 
truth.  This  was  not  in  itself  absolutely  inconsistent  with  faith  in 
the  Gospel  ;  but  it  led  him  to  endeavour  to  discover  historical  ob- 
jections to  the  account  of  the  miracles  ;  and  these  objections  were 
employed  by  others  to  discredit  everything  of  a  miraculous  cha- 
racter in  the  Bible. 

Thomas  Morgan,  who  died  in  1743,  is  distinguished  as  being  the 
most  accurate  among  the  English  deists,  in  the  historical  and  cri- 
tical objections  which  he  advanced  against  Christianity.  His 
objections  are  directed  against  many  particular  passages,  and  he 
has,  in  many  points,  anticipated  the  infidels  of  France  and  Germany. 
What  he  says  also  of  a  doctrinal  character  is  not  deficient  in  acute- 
ness,  and  all  his  writings  are  marked  by  great  frankness  and  open- 
ness. He  appears  to  have  been  led  to  his  sceptical  views  by  the 
doctrine  then  prevalent  in  the  church  of  England,  that  Christianity 
was  susceptible  of  demonstration,  an  opinion  which,  in  our  own 
and  in  every  age,  has  led  to  error.  He  did  not  recollect,  that  in 
so  far  as  revelation  supposes  the  existence  of  faith,  it  can  only 
through  experience  be  felt  to  be  true,  that  its  best  evidence  must 
be  sought  in  the  experience  of  the  heart.     Morgan,  in  his  search 


570  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

for  truth,  was  led  from  one  sect  to  another  ;  he  was  a  Presbyterian 
preacher,  then  Arian,  then  Socinian,  then  Quaker,  then  Deist.  He 
called  himself  a  moral  philosopher.  His  attacks  were  principally 
directed  against  Judaism,  which  he  said  was  full  of  deceit  and 
fanaticism,  containing  very  injurious  representations  of  God. 
Christianity,  he  said,  was  nothing  more  than  sublimated  Judaism, 
containing  indeed  many  excellent  moral  precepts ;  but  if  we  com- 
pare the  incredible  portions  with  those  worthy  of  credit,  the  former 
will  be  found  greatly  to  predominate.  Miracles  he  said  were  fool- 
ish. His  investigation  of  the  account  of  the  resurrection  of  Christ 
is  distinguished  by  extraordinary  acuteness.  He  maintained  also 
that  the  apostles  differed  in  their  doctrines  from  each  other.  He 
was  not  only  open  in  avowing  his  opinions,  but  also  offensive,  as 
when  he  says,  that  if  God  condemns  all  those  who  cannot  believe 
the  miraculous  accounts  contained  in  the  Bible,  he  must  adopt  the 
prayer,  Oh  God  !  why  hast  thou  not  created  me  as  stupid  as  other 
people,  that  I  also  might  believe  and  be  saved.  And  in  another 
place,  he  says,  that  revealed  religion  is  a  serpent  in  the  bosom  of 
man,  which  poisons  his  whole  nature. 

Infidelity  assumed  a  bolder  form,  in  the  celebrated  Lord  Boling- 
broke,  secretary  of  state  under  Queen  Anne.  His  life,  which  was 
that  of  a  libertine,  is  an  index  to  his  doctrines.  He  boasted  that 
he  had  tasted  every  pleasure  it  was  possible  for  him  to  enjoy ;  and 
died  as  he  had  lived,  cursing  religion  and  those  around  him.  He 
first  published  his  "  Letters  on  the  Study  and  Utility  of  History," 
which  is  in  many  respects  a  valuable  work.  In  his  third  letter,  he 
speaks  particularly  against  the  Jewish  history,  and  asserted  it  was 
a  blasphemy  against  God,  to  say  that  he  had  inspired  the  Old  Tes- 
tament. The  Pentateuch  is  as  much  a  romance  as  Don  Quixote, 
and  every  page  of  the  Old  Testament  is  full  of  the  most  palpable 
errors.  He  committed  the  great  mistake,  in  opposition  to  his  own 
better  knowledge  as  a  historian,  of  regarding  and  treating  Moses 
and  Aaron  precisely  as  though  they  had  lived  and  acted  under  the 
same  circumstances  with  men  of  his  own  time.  In  his  "  Essays 
and  Fragments,"  he  attacked  Christianity  from  various  sides.  He 
made  a  distinction  between  Christianity  as  taught  by  Paul,  and  as 
taught  by  Christ  himself.  Many  of  the  doctrines  he  said  were 
nonsensical ;  and  the  doctrine  of  Redemption,  which  was  the  main 
point  in  Christianity,  was  a  heathen  doctrine.  Christ  and  his 
apostles  were  all  fanatics.  He  also  attacked  the  law  of  marriage, 
as  allowing  but  one  wife,  and  not  admitting  divorce.  He  seems, 
on  the  whole,  to  have  approached  very  near  to  materialistical  athe- 
ism, denying  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  and  admitting  only  his 
wisdom  and  power.         v 

We  must  also  mention  a  tradesman,  Thomas  Chubb,  who  entered 
the  lists  against  Christianity.  He  was  a  tallow-chandler,  but  early 
obtained  considerable  knowledge.  His  writings  are  far  from  bring 
unworthy  of  notice ;  he  attacked  many  points  with  adroitness  and 
talent.     He  agrees  most  with  Morgan,  excepting  that  he  more  ex- 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  571 

plicitly  opposed  the  morality  of  the  New  Testament.  He  accuses 
Christianity  of  favouring  fanaticism,  and  of  not  inculcating  patriot- 
ism. He  questioned  the  doctrines  of  Providence  and  a  future  state 
of  retribution.  He  proceeded  at  last  from  deism  to  materialism. 
It  is,  from  his  example,  obvious  to  what  deism  leads  when  it  is  not 
checked  by  a  strong  sense  of  morality. 

Most  oi  the  writers  hitherto  mentioned,  directed  their  attacks 
principally  against  the  doctrines,  rather  than  the  practical  part  of 
Christianity.  One  of  the  English  deists  wrote  a  work,  however, 
in  which  he  endeavoured  to  turn  the  practical  part  of  our  religion 
into  ridicule  ;  this  was  Berhard  Mandeville,  a  man  of  French  de- 
scent, who  died  in  London,  after  a  dissolute  life,  in  1733.  He 
represented  the  morality  of  the  New  Testament  as  so  strict  that, 
if  followed  out,  it  would  necessarily  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the 
state.  The  great  defect  of  the  Christian  system  was  that  it  con- 
demned pride  and  ambition,  which  were  far  more  powerful  motives 
to  good  than  religion.  In  his  "  Fable  of  the  Bees,"  he  represents  a 
community  of  bees,  which,  although  abounding  in  vices,  continued 
to  flourish ;  for  vice  itself,  to  continue,  must  have  some  regard  to 
the  interests  of  the  community.  The  bees  suddenly  took  the 
notion  to  bring  about  a  high  state  of  virtue  in  order  to  arrive  at  a 
still  more  prosperous  condition.  The  gods  heard  their  prayer,  but 
the  state  soon  went  to  pieces.  The  soldiers  were  disbanded  be- 
cause there  was  no  war,  the  lawyers  were  idle  because  there  was 
no  contention,  refinement  and  learning  disappeared  because  there 
was  no  ambition."  He  hence  drew  the  conclusion  that  vice  is 
absolutely  essential  to  the  good  of  the  state ;  all  that  is  requisite  is 
to  keep  it  within  certain  bounds. 

The  writers  hitherto  mentioned,  attacked  Christianity  in  detail, 
or  endeavoured  to  establish  some  few  general  principles,  without 
attempting  to  erect  a  regular  system  of  Deism.  This  was  first 
effected  by  Matthew  Tindal,  in  his  "  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Crea- 
tion," published  in  1760;  a  work  which  has  been  called  the  Deisti- 
cal  Bible.  Tindal  was  employed  in  the  service  of  James  II.,  and 
became  on  this  account  a  Catholic.  Under  William  III.  he  turned 
Protestant,  apparently  from  conviction.  He  appears,  in  general, 
to  have  been  honest  and  sincere  in  his  opinions,  and  in  his  opposi- 
tion to  Christianity.  The  contents  and  arrangement  of  his  work 
are  the  following :  Man  needs  no  outward  positive  revelation,  but 
if  such  should  be  given  him,  it  can  contain  nothing  but  what  he  has 
already  in  his  own  reason  (an  idea  presented  by  Kant  and  Fichte 
in  a  different  form).  It  can  contain  nothing  but  a  moral  system, 
whatever  else  it  may  communicate  must  be  regarded  merely  as 
symbols.  He  maintained  that  God  could  not  wish  that  men  should 
ever  be  without  religion,  or  possess  only  such  as  was  inadequate. 
If,  therefore,  we  will  not  charge  God  with  injustice,  we  must  admit 
that  man  has  had,  from  the  beginning,  a  religion  sufficient  for  his 
purpose.  The  revelation,  which  is  original  and  universal,  consists 
in  two  truths :  first,  the  existence  of  God  ;  and  second,  that  we  are 


572  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

created,  not  for  God's  sake  but  our  own.  This  latter  truth  is 
adapted  to  fill  us  with  gratitude  to  God,  and  lead  us  to  follow  his 
benevolent  example  (a  bold  conclusion).  If  it  be  asked  how  we 
are  to  attain  the  happiness  which  God  has  led  us  to  desire  ?  I  an- 
swer, that  the  happiness  of  every  being  consists  in  its  perfection — 
man  is  perfect  when  he  lives  according  to  the  dictates  of  reason. 
If  a  revelation  be  communicated,  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  de- 
mand more  than  this,  since  it  would  be  unreasonable  and  cruel  in 
God  to  demand  more  than  was  requisite  to  our  perfection.  If, 
then,  we  admit  that  there  is  a  law  written  upon  the  heart  of  man 
worthy  of  confidence,  we  must  either  acknowledge  that  nothing 
can  be  revealed  not  contained  in  this  law,  or  maintain  that  God  is 
mutable,  and  increasing  in  knowledge.  Upon  the  same  ground 
that  the  Christian  regards  the  Gospel  as  the  most  perfect  revela- 
tion, must  the  Deist  regard  the  religion  of  reason,  which  men  have 
always  possessed,  in  the  same  light.  But  how  can  the  Deist  prove 
the  existence  of  such  a  perfect  law  in  the  heart  of  man,  when  the 
whole  ancient  world  is  filled  with  superstition  and  idolatry,  and 
when  this  religion  of  reason  is  to  be  found  nowhere  in  existence  ? 
The  Deist  borrows  all  this  from  Christianity,  and  cheats  his  own 
soul  in  thus  taking  what  in  itself  is  meager  and  impotent,  and 
leaving  all  from  which  it  can  derive  life  and  power.  If  a  revela- 
tion, asks  Tindal,  should  contain  new  doctrines,  how  could  we  have 
any  certainty  of  their  truth  ?  To  be  of  use  they  must  be  ascer- 
tained as  the  two  original  truths  mentioned  above,  but  this  is  im- 
possible when  the  revelation  is  external,  made  in  a  strange  language 
admitting  of  so  many  different  interpretations,  and  filled  with  ob- 
scurities. Besides  these  a  priori  principles,  Tindal,  in  the  latter 
part  of  his  work,  attacked  Christianity  more  in  detail.  He  endea- 
voured to  show  that  the  principal  personages  of  the  Bible,  par- 
ticularly those  mentioned  in  the  Old  Testament,  are  unworthy  of 
respect ;  that  many  of  the  doctrines  and  expressions  of  the  Bible 
(for  example,  that  God  hardens  the  heart)  lead  to  the  grossest 
errors.  This  work  was  extensively  circulated  both  in  England  and 
Germany,  as  it  was  at  once  logically  and  mildly  written.  There 
appeared  a  hundred  and  six  refutations  of  it. 

After  all  these  works  had  been  written  and  published,  the  tend- 
ency to  Deism  was  deeply  and  widely  spread  among  the  people  ; 
in  the  church  it  could  not  be  openly  acknowledged,  although  it 
was  secretly  entertained.  In  Scotland,  where  the  discipline  was 
severe,  preachers  had  in  many  places  their  private  meetings  for 
discussing  deistical  opinions.  The  orthodox,  theologians  did  not 
take  the  proper  course  in  defending  religion,  and  therefore  only 
increased  the  evil.  They  either  strongly  insisted  upon  the  church 
doctrines,  and  required  a  forced  acceptance  of  them,  or  they  en- 
deavoured to  effect  a  reconciliation  by  softening  down  the  doc- 
trines of  the  Bible,  until  little  was  left  worth  contending  for.  This 
was  the  case  with  Teller  and  Spalding.  Lessing  compared  this 
class  of  theologians  to  a  master  of  a  house  who  kept  railing  at  a 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY.  573 

set  of  thieves,  and  yet  threw  out  to  them  all  his  goods,  which  they 
had  nothing  to  do  but  to  carry  away. 

We  have  yet  to  mention  one  other  opposer  of  Christianity  nearer 
to  our  own  times,  a  man  distinguished  ior  his  talents,  and  interest- 
ing to  us,  as  having  given  occasion  to  the  philosophy  of  Kant. 
This  is  David  Hume,  equally  celebrated  as  a  historian  and  phi- 
losopher. He  was  first  intended  for  the  law  ;  but  devoted  himself 
to  philosophy  and  belles  lettres.  In  1763  he  was  secretary  of  the 
English"  legation  in  Paris.  From  1769  he  lived  independently,  and 
died  in  1776.  The  most  worthy  of  attention,  in  a  theological 
view,  of  his  writings,  are  his  "  Essays,"  in  four  volumes.  Of  these 
two  particularly  are  deserving  of  remark,  that  on  the  Natural  His- 
tory of  Religion,  and  that  on  Miracles.  Besides  these  his  "  Dia- 
logues on  Natural  Religion,"  which  is,  perhaps,  the  most  able  work 
ever  written  on  the  side  of  deism. 

In  his  "  Essay  on  the  Natural  History  of  Religion,"  the  leading 
idea  is  that  the  foundation  of  all  religion  must  be  sought  in  man 
himself,  and  that  the  result  of  a  careful  examination  of  the  subject 
is,  that  the  essence  of  religion  consists  in  the  admission  of  God 
and  morality.  On  these  points  all  nations  are  agreed,  but  in  re- 
spect to  the  attributes  of  God  and  other  doctrines,  they  differ.  In 
the  Essay  on  Miracles  he  presents  the  following  views,  which 
were  afterwards  widely  adopted  in  Germany.  "  All  faith,"  he  says, 
"rests  upon  experience  or  testimony.  The  former  of  these  is  far 
surer  than  the  latter,  especially  when  one  contradicts  the  other. 
With  respect  to  the  miracles  of  the  New  Testament,  the  case  is 
thus :  certain  persons  assert  that  about  eighteen  centuries  ago 
these  miracles  occurred.  It  may  be  admitted  that  nothing  can  be 
urged  against  the  credibility  of  these  witnesses.  But  my  own  ex- 
perience gives  me  no  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  miracles.  I 
see  cause  and  effect  so  connected,  that  within  the  range  of  my  ex- 
perience no  miracles  have  occurred,  and  the  experience  of  4000 
years  teaches  me  the  same.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  that  the 
testimony  of  these  good  people  can  stand  against  my  experience 
and  that  of  4000  years."  We  remark  merely  on  the  form  of  this 
argument.  That  miracles  do  not  occur  every  day  and  come  under 
the  experience  of  every  man,  lies  in  the  very  idea  of  a  miracle, 
for  in  the  biblical  sense,  they  are  events  which  only  occur  when 
God  has  a  particular  purpose  to  answer  for  the  benefit  of  men. 
Hence  no  one  can  demand  that  miracles  should  constantly  take 
place.  In  regard  to  the  experience  of  4000  years,  it  is  no  way 
opposed  to  admission  of  miracles,  for  in  this  period  multitudes  have 
testified  to  their  occurrence.  The  only  question  is,  whether  the 
testimony  of  such  persons  is  historically  true.  In  this  objection  of 
Hume,  however,  there  is  some  truth ;  that  is,  that  the  mind  can- 
not by  the  testimony  of  any  number  of  credible  witnesses,  be  ab- 
solutely necessitated  to  believe  that  a  miracle  has  actually  occurred. 
A  certain  disposition  or  state  of  feeling  is  necessary  to  lead  us  to 
place  our  faith  in  such  testimony.     But  this  is  not  only  true  in  re- 


574  tholuck's1  history  of  theology 

lation  to  historical  testimony  in  favour  of  miracles,  but  to  all  his- 
torical testimony,  and  even  in  reference  to  our  own  experience  of 
external  events.  For  if  we  had  the  positive  testimony  of  our  senses, 
in  favour  of  a  supernatural  event,  and  yet  had  no  disposition  to  be- 
lieve it,  it  would  fail  to  command  our  faith.  Hence  Voltaire  de- 
clares, that  if  in  clear  daylight  in  the  view  of  thousands,  and  in  his 
own  sight,  a  miracle  should  occur,  he  would  still  be. more  inclined 
to  doubt  the  soundness  of  his  senses,  than  to  admit  its  reality. 
When  the  state  of  the  mind  is  once  fixed  it  cannot  be  changed  by 
such  external  occurrences.  Hence,  in  the  scriptures,  faith  is  re- 
presented as  a  virtue.  The  most  important  work  of  Hume,  is  his 
"Dialogues  on  Natural  Religion;"  they  contain  many  remarks  which 
later  Deists  have  overlooked.  His  object  is  to  controvert  all  those 
who  profess  to  be  able,  by  argument,  to  establish  any  religious 
doctrine  whatever — Deists  as  well  as  Christians.  Under  the  de- 
istical  dogmatists  he  understood,  those  who  maintained  that  the 
principles  of  Natural  Religion  were  susceptible  of  proof.  Under 
the  Christian,  those  who  founded  their  doctrines  upon  a  sense  of 
guilt  and  the  longing  after  divine  communication  implanted  in  our 
nature.  He  endeavoured  to  show,  that  neither  could  defend  their 
principles.  His  conclusion  is,  that  all  doctrines  on  divine  things 
are  doubtful ;  the  divine  existence  may  indeed  be  admitted,  but  we 
cannot  show  how  far  it  is  analogous  to  our  own.  Providence  and 
immortality  can  neither  be  proved  nor  believed.  (What  remains  of 
the  idea  of  God  after  this,  is  empty ;  and  it  is  indifferent  on  these 
principles  whether  there  be  a  God  or  not.)  Against  the  deistical 
dogmatists  he  objected,  that  they  argued  from  the  order  and  ar- 
rangement of  the  world  for  an  intelligent  author.  A  conclusion 
from  effect  to  cause  is  just.  But  in  arguments  of  this  kind,  when 
we  draw  the  conclusion  of  the  existence  of  similar  causes,  the  ef- 
fects must  be  similar.  But  in  the  comparison  of  the  world  with  a 
piece  of  human  mechanism,  the  difference  of  the  things  compared 
is  immense.  When  we  dive  into  the  depths  of  nature  we  find  so 
much  that  is  wonderful  and  unaccountable,  that  we  can  no  longer 
compare  the  world  with  anything  which  is  the  result  of  human  art. 
The  difference  is  so  great,  that  we  should  be  led  to  conclude,  that 
the  world  owed  its  existence  to  an  author  entirely  different  from 
the  author  of  any  piece  of  human  ingenuity.  It  may  be  admitted 
that  the  work  of  God,  as  to  quantity,  may  be  compared  to  that  of 
man,  but  not  as  to  quality.  In  the  world  we  find  no  dead  mecha- 
nism, but  an  ever-living,  creating  power — so  that  a  man  deeply 
initiated  into  the  mysteries  of  nature,  must  admit  that  the  world  is 
more  like  a  plant  or  an  animal,  than  a  watch  or  a  loom.  If  this 
be  true,  and  we  argue  for  like  causes  from  like  effects,  we  should 
arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  author  of  the  world  is  an  infinite 
vegetative  power.  If  it  be  said  that  this  gives  no  explanation  of 
the  intelligence  and  design  manifested  by  this  productive  power,  it 
may  be  answered  that  when  you  demand  of  me,  whence  from  all 
eternity  the  intelligence  of  this  productive  power  is  derived,  I  can 


■ 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  575 

demand  of  you  whence  comes  from  eternity  the  intelligence  of  God 
as  n  personal  being.  It  is  more  natural  to  rest  satisfied  with  the 
first  conclusion,  and  admit  the  intelligence  of  the  world,  than  to 
assume  the  existence  of  a  personal  Being.  In  this  way  Hume 
showed  that  speculation,  instead  of  leading  to  Theism,  leads  to 
Pantheism. 

Against  the  believing  theologian  who  takes  part  in  the  dia- 
logue, and  who  rejoices  over  the  refutation  of  the  deist,  Hume 
says,  you  see  that  on  the  ground  of  speculation  deism  is  utterly 
incapable  of  proof,  but  maintains  that  a  sense  of  our  miseries  must 
lead  us  to  admit  a  divine  revelation.  Here  the  Deist  denies  the 
greatness  of  human  misery,  and  endeavours  in  his  way  to  disprove 
the  necessity  of  a  revelation.  But  Hume  admits  that  the  amount 
of  human  misery  is  indeed  immense.  Think  of  the  outward 
afflictions  of  poverty,  sickness,  and  misfortunes  of  every  kind.  Of 
the  inward  sorrows  of  grief,  care,  and  remorse.  Think  not  only 
of  the  miseries  of  man,  but  of  the  destruction  carried  on  in  the 
animal  and  vegetable  world.  We  see  everywhere,  a  war  of  all 
against  all.  If  we  suppose  a  heavenly  Being  alighted  on  our 
world,  shown  our  prisons  filled  with  criminals,  hospitals  crowded 
with  sick,  fields  of  battle  strewn  with  slain,  the  sea  covered  with 
wrecks,  whole  regions  wasted  by  disease  and  famine,  who  should 
demand  where  was  all  our  boasted  happiness,  and  we  should  show 
him  our  societies,  theatres,  masquerades,  &c,  would  he  not  mourn- 
fully smile,  and  say  we  were  only  showing  him  the  other  side  of 
our  miseries.  All  this,  says  Hume,  cannot  be  denied,  but  the  dif- 
ficulty is  to  reconcile  all  this  with  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  an 
Almighty  and  merciful  God.  If  he  be  good  and  Almighty,  what 
prevents  his  changing  this  miserable  state  of  his  creatures  ?  Verily, 
he  exclaims,  the  mechanism  has  much  in  its  favour,  and  still  more 
the  opinion,  that  if  there  be  a  God,  he  has  no  perception  of  either 
good  or  evil.  Even  in  this  reasoning  of  Hume  there  is  truth,  in  so 
far  as  that  it  is  impossible  to  prove  the  mercy  and  love  of  God 
from  the  present  state  of  the  world,  and  it  requires  no  little  faith  to 
retain,  amidst  all  the  sorrows  and  trials  of  the  present  life,  our  con- 
fidence in  a  benevolent  Providence.  It  is  on  this  account  that  faith 
is  represented  in  the  scriptures  as  something  so  great,  and  noble, 
and  difficult ;  and  he  who  has  gone  through  the  mazes  of  specu- 
lation will  learn  to  estimate  its  excellence. 


Section  V. — Infidelity  in  France. 

It  is  exceedingly  interesting  to  remark,  how  the  diversity  of 
national  character  has  modified  the  various  systems  of  Infidelity. 
The  Englishman  is  in  his  whole  disposition  practical;  with  this  dis- 
position is  connected  a  desire  of  certainty  and  a  high  appreciation 
of  what  is  morally  good.  Hence  we  remark  among  the  English 
deists  a  desire  to  arrive  at  some  fixed  and  stable  truths,  and  an 
avoiding  of  useless  speculations  which  lead  to  no  solid  results, 


576  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

connected  with  a  dread  of  consequences  dangerous  to  morals. 
We  observe,  however,  a  deficiency  in  depth  of  speculation,  which 
prevented  their  arriving  at  the  result  of  all  logical  scepticism. 
The  Germans  have  not  the  practical  disposition  of  the  English. 
In  them  feeling  and  speculation  predominate  over  the  will.  Hence 
they  seek  less  in  their  systems  what  is  useful,  not  forming  their 
theories  to  use  them,  or  apply  them  to  common  life,  but  for  the 
sake  of  having  them.  The  German,  as  the  Englishman,  seeks  for 
the  truth,  for  something  positive  and  sure,  but  this  arises  in  the 
former  not  so  much  from  a  practical  disposition,  as  the  desire  to 
have  a  well  constructed  theory.  Infidelity  in  Germany,  therefore, 
has  always  endeavoured  to  form  itself  into  a  system:  and  hence, 
whilst  it  has  deviated  more  from  what  is  morally  and  practically 
important,  it  has  been  more  logical  and  consequent  among  the 
English  :  the  Germans  have  carried  both  the  truth  and  the  false- 
hood further.  Among  the  French  we  see  much  less  a  desire  to 
arrive  at  any  certain  and  positive  results  than  among  either  of  the 
other  nations.  They  permitted  themselves  to  be  more  influenced 
by  transient  circumstances ;  and  were  superficial  or  profound 
without  stopping  to  consider  the  consequences.  French  infidelity 
never  endeavoured  to  form  a  system  which  presented  itself  as 
truth.  It  was  more  desirous  to  destroy  than  to  build  up  for  itself. 
Most  of  the  French  Deists  had  indeed  something  of  a  materialis- 
tical  system,  but  they  did  not  always  bring  it  forward,  and  seemed 
only  intent  upon  destroying  the  public  confidence  in  existing  insti- 
tutions and  received  doctrines.  We  shall  therefore  have  little  to 
say  of  French  systems,  but  shall  regulate  our  remarks  according 
to  the  importance  of  the  several  works. 

At  the  close  of  the  17th  and  commencement  of  the  18th  centu- 
ries, many  irreligious  books  had  been  brought  into  circulation,  but 
these,  on  account  of  the  strict  censorship  at  that  time  exercised 
over  the  press  in  France,  were  generally  printed  in  Holland.  The 
most  important  work  was  "  Bayle's  Historical  and  Critical  Diction- 
ary." Bayle  was  an  original  thinker,  as  acute  on  philosophical  as 
he  was  critical  on  historical  subjects.  He  attacked  the  received 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  and  raised  doubts  upon  many  historical 
points,  which,  till  then,  had  not  been  questioned  upon  the  continent. 
His  scepticism  upon  the  more  thinking  class  of  the  public  produced 
considerable  effect,  so  that  many  persons  of  distinction  applied  to 
Leibnitz  to  refute  his  objections.  The  first  completely  deistical 
work  proceeded  from  a  female,  which  is  much  more  systematical 
than  most  that  followed  it.  Mary  Huber,  who  died  in  Lyons, 
in  1759,  is  the  name  of  the  author.  In  her  early  life  she  mani- 
fested a  strong  tendency  to  inward  religion,  and  formed  an  ac- 
quaintance with  the  writings  of  the  mystics.  It  was  through  their 
influence  apparently,  that  she  was  led  to  an  indifference  respecting 
the  doctrines  of  Christianity,  and  to  make  everything  to  turn  on 
the  question,  whether  the  soul  was  in  connection  with  God,  and 
fulfilled  his  commands.     The  title  of  her  work,  which,  although 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  577 

not  distinguished  for  acuteness,  is  more  methodical  than  other 
French  works  of  the  kind,  is,  "Letters  diverses  sur  la  Religion  es- 
sentielle  a  l'homme,  distingue  de  ce  qui  n'est  qu'accessive."  This 
lady  also  made  herself  remarkable  by  holding  religious  deistical 
meetings. 

The  men  who  had  the  most  decisive  and  extensive  influence  in 
promoting  deistical  principles  not  only  in  France,  but  also  in  Ger- 
many and  Russia,  were  Voltaire  and  Rousseau  ;  two  very  different 
men ;  each  having  his  distinct  public  upon  which  he  operated  to 
the  injury  of  religion.  Voltaire  was  born  in  1694.  He  manifested, 
as  early  as  his  sixteenth  year,  by  the  publication  of  his  CEdipus, 
his  hatred  against  the  hierarchy.  In  various  other  poetical  and 
prose  works  he  gave  full  play  to  his  satire  against  the  Catholic 
church,  which  naturally  raised  him  a  great  many  enemies.  In 
1725,  in  consequence  of  some  private  disputes,  he  left  France  and 
went  over  to  England.  Here  he  collected  the  weapons  which  he  af- 
terwards directed  against  Christianity,  principally  from  the  writings 
of  Morgan  and  Tindal.  In  1748,  he  went  to  the  court  of  Stanislau 
the  deposed  king  of  Poland,  and  in  1750  was  invited  to  Berlin,  b 
Frederick  the  Great.  After  his  removal  to  Berlin,  the  admir 
tion  entertained  for  him  throughout  Europe  became  extravagantly 
great ;  as  he  was  looked  upon  not  merely  as  a  writer  of  distin- 
guished talents,  but  as  the  bosom  friend  of  Frederick.  His  splendid 
course  here,  however,  was  soon  ended.  Through  various  in- 
stances of  misconduct  he  ruined  his  character,  and  lost  the  confi- 
dence of  his  patron,  who  could  no  longer  remain  blind  to  his 
avarice  and  ambition.  He  got  involved  in  controversy  with 
Maupertuis,  the  president  of  the  Berlin  Society,  whom  he  consi- 
dered as  his  rival,  and  whom  he  endeavoured,  by  all  manner  of 
cabals,  to  displace.  Neglecting  the  frequent  commands  of  the 
king  to  put  an  end  to  these  attempts,  and  publishing  a  scandalous 
satire  against  Maupertuis,  which  was  burnt  by  the  common  hang- 
man, he  was  compelled  to  leave  the  country.  The  circumstances 
connected  with  his  departure  were  still  more  dishonourable.  The 
king  had  entrusted  him  with  many  of  his  manuscripts  which  Vol- 
taire carried  off  with  him  ;  probably  with  a  view  of  selling  them  at 
an  enormous  price  to  some  bookseller.  He  was,  however,  pursued 
and  arrested  at  Frankfort,  and  not  only  forced  to  restore  the  manu- 
scripts he  had  purloined,  but  deprived  of  the  order  by  which  he 
had  been  decorated  by  the  king.  After  this  he  determined  to 
settle  in  Geneva.  "Here  he  wished  to  introduce  a  company  of 
players  ;  but  as  the  severe  laws  introduced  by  Calvin  against 
theatres  were  still  in  force,  he  was  unable  to  effect  his  purpose. 
To  remain  without  a  play-house  was  to  him  intolerable ;  he 
therefore  removed  to  the  little  state  of  Gex,  and  purchased  an 
estate,  and  gratified  his  pride  by  appearing  as  lord  of  the  manor. 
He  built  a  church  here  with  the  inscription  "  Deo  Voltaire."  In 
his  old  age,  he  could  not  resist  the  impulse  of  his  vanity,  to  present 
himself  to  the  admiration  of  the  public  in  Paris.     His  reception 

37 


578 


THOLUCK  S    HISTORY    OF    THEOLOGY 


was  attended  by  every  circumstance  of  the  most  extravagant 
flattery,  and  he  seems  literally  to  have  lost  his  life  through  the 
quantity  of  incense  burnt  in  his  praise:  a  mode  of  adulation  little 
suited  to  his  weak  nerves,  and  which  is  thought  to  have  occasioned 
the  illness  of  which  he  died  in  1778.  What  Voltaire  has  written 
against  religion  can  appear  in  its  proper  light  only  when  viewed 
in  connexion  with  his  character.  Very  few  authors  have  con- 
trived so  completely  to  tarnish  their  reputation.  In  Berlin  he 
manifested  the  most  inordinate  ambition,  which  sought  by  every 
device  to  attain  its  object.  Every  one  who  was  not  a  servile  flat- 
terer was  in  his  eyes  condemned.  With  this  was  connected  the 
most  insatiable  avarice,  which  led  to  every  form  of  dishonesty. 
He  endeavoured,  upon  false  representations  of  his  poverty,  to 
secure  grants  of  money  from  the  king ;  he  sold  his  manuscripts 
over  and  over  to  booksellers,  was  involved  in  a  lawsuit  with 
some  Jews,  whom  he  attempted  to  defraud  of  a  large  sum.  His 
licentiousness  poisons  all  his  writings,  but  is  particularly  mani- 
fested in  his  Maid  of  Orleans.  He  was,  besides  all  this,  a  hypo- 
crite ;  as  soon  as  he  was  brought  into  any  danger  for  his  opinions, 
he  professed  implicit  faith  in  all  the  doctrines  of  the  Catholic  church. 
He  was  accustomed  to  conclude  all  discussions  on  this  subject 
with  the  expression,  As  I  confess  my  ignorance,  I  submit  myself 
entirely  to  the  holy  church.  In  Tournay  he  subscribed  a  Catholic 
confession  of  Faith,  and  afterwards  published  his  "  Questions  sur 
l'Encyclopedie,"  in  which  the  Christian  religion  is  violently  at- 
tacked. In  such  a  character  it  is  evident  there  could  be  no 
honest  search  after  the  truth.  In  regard  to  philosophy,  he  was  a 
sceptic.  In  his  work  "  Sur  le  Philosophe  Ignorant,"  he  declares 
himself  doubtful  of  the  truth  of  deism.  Providence  and  immor- 
tality he  denied ;  the  soul  is  material,  thought  mechanical.  He 
acknowledged  a  God,  but  one  who  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
world.  He  recommended  the  argument,  ab  utili  et  a  tuto,  saying, 
it  could  do  no  harm  if  any  one  chose  to  believe  in  a  God,  and  it 
was,  at  least  good  for  the  police.  His  attacks  on  revelations  are 
mere  rhapsodies.  He  takes  up  a  particular  doctrine,  a  historical 
fact,  a  passage  of  scripture,  or  a  portion  of  ecclesiastical  history, 
and  endeavours  to  present  it  in  the  most  ridiculous  light  possible. 
He  not  only  perverts  facts,  and  makes  false  quotations,  but  brings 
forward  passages  as  contained  in  the  Bible,  which  are  nowhere  to 
be  found  in  it.  Having  quoted  a  passage  as  from  the  Prophet 
Habakkuk,  a  pedantic  German  scholar  once  waited  on  him,  and 
after  many  apologies  for  presuming  to  question  the  correctness  of 
his  quotation,  said,  he  was  obliged  to  confess  that,  notwithstand- 
ing all  his  diligence  in  searching  the  original  and  ancient  versions, 
he  was  unable  to  find  the  passage  referred  to :  Voltaire  contented 
himself  with  the  reply,  "  Monsieur  Abakuk  est  capable  de  tout." 
Citing  only  the  Vulgate,  he  is  often  led  into  mistakes,  yet  his  wor- 
shippers received  without  questioning  everything  he  said.  The 
morality  of  Epictetus  and  Cicero,  he  maintains,  is  absolument  la 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  579 

meme  with  the  Christian.  He  wrote  against  the  Pentateuch 
without  knowing  what  it  was,  for  he  speaks  of  le  livre  de  Moyse 
et  Josua  et  la  reste  du  Pentateuque  !  Ninus  and  Belus,  he  main- 
tains, could  never  have  existed,  as  Asiatic  names  could  never  end 
in  us  I  Messiah  is  a  Hebrew  word,  which  in  Greek  is  expressed 
by  "  KtXofitvot  "  what  he  meant  to  say  is  not  easy  to  divine.  He 
often  asserted  that  before  the  time  of  Theodosius  no  respectable 
heathen  became  a  Christian.  He  maintained  also,  that  the  fabu- 
lous Jewish  book,  Toldoth  Jeshu.  was  an  authentic  source  of 
information  respecting  Christ  and  his  apostles.  His  principal  writ- 
ings directed  against  religion,  are  his  Candide,  L'Evangile  de 
Jour,  and  Les  Questions  sur  TEncyclop^die.  The  first  is  a 
Romance,  which  contains  the  history  of  a  man  driven  about  by  all 
manner  of  misfortunes,  and  in  which  the  author  endeavours  to 
show  that  the  sources  of  consolation  commonly  applied  to  in  afflic- 
tion are  vain  and  ridiculous.  The  object  of  the  work  is  to  ridicule 
the  doctrine  of  a  Providence.  The  writings  of  Voltaire  have  been 
spread  even  to  Siberia,  where,  it  is  said,  they  are  still  much  read 
by  persons  of  property.  The  Governor  of  Siberia  replied  to  some 
one,  who  urged  him  to  take  these  books  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
people,  that  "  to  us  it  is  not  commanded  to  root  out  the  tares,  but 
to  sow  the  wheat." 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  was  born  in  Geneva,  1712.  After  a  dis- 
turbed and  unsettled  life  he  died  in  1778.  Rousseau  had  as  little 
of  system  in  his  infidelity  as  Voltaire.  In  the  latter,  scepticism 
was  the  result  of  vanity  and  frivolity ;  in  the  former,  of  a  morbid 
sensibility,  which  through  vanity  degenerated  into  mere  caprice. 
The  leading  features  of  his  character  were  sentimentality  and  ca- 
pricious vanity.  The  former  was  deeply  seated  in  his  nature,  and 
the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  thrown  served  to  increase  it. 
His  education  was  effeminate,  and  his  youth  devoted  to  reading 
novels.  A  particular  circumstance  excited  in  him  a  love  of  para- 
dox which  fed  his  vanity.  The  academy  of  Dijon  proposed  the 
question,  whether  science  and  civilisation  were  serviceable  to 
morality  and  human  happiness.  Rousseau,  who  determined  to 
write  on  the  question,  first  intended  to  give  an  affirmative  answer, 
but  a  friend  suggesting  that  he  could  never  distinguish  himself  by 
such  an  every  day  reply,  decided  him  to  take  the  opposite  side. 
This  paradoxical  turn  his  vanity  led  him  to  retain,  and  prompted 
him  to  advance  new  and  peculiar  views  both  in  religion  and  poli- 
tics. In  the  latter  he  became  an  advocate  for  liberty  and  equality, 
and  in  his  work  "  Sur  le  Contrat  Social,"  published  the  doctrine 
that  the  authority  of  rulers  rests  only  upon  the  consent  of  the  peo- 
ple. In  religion  this  bent  of  mind  should  have  led  him  to  come 
out  as  the  decided  enemy  of  all  positive  doctrines,  but  here  his 
sensibility  stood  in  his  way,  and  he  felt  so  much  what  was  elevated 
in  Christianity,  that  he  declared,  such  was  the  power  and  sublimi- 
ty of  the  scriptures,  that  God  only  could  be  their  author.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  while  he  allowed  that  the  feelings  led  to  such  a 


580  tholuqk's  history  of  theology 

conclusion,  he  maintained  that  the  understanding  could  not  admit 
a  revelation  ;  and  that  there  were  so  many  contradictions,  so  much 
that  was  incredible  in  the  Bible,  as  to  render  the  idea  that  they 
had  been  immediately  communicated  from  God  inadmissible.  He 
called  his,  therefore,  an  involuntary  scepticism.  Yet  in  general  he 
speaks  with  great  reverence  of  the  Bible  and  of  Christ,  extolling 
particularly  his  mildness  and  humility.  Even  if  any  one,  he  said, 
could  live  and  die  as  Christ  did,  he  could  not  do  it  with  the  same 
humility.  He  instituted  a  comparison  between  Christ  and  Leoni- 
das,  Epaminondas  and  Socrates,  and  adds  that  if  Socrates  lived 
and  died  like  a  wise  man,  Christ  lived  and  died  like  a  God.  He 
maintained  that  in  every  religion,  we  could  only  admit  for  truth 
what  had  in  its  favour  the  testimony  of  our  own  hearts.  In  his 
"  Lettres  de  la  Montagne,"  he  denied  that  miracles  could  be  ad- 
vanced as  a  proof  of  Christianity,  and  says,  that  Christ  himself  ap- 
pealed to  his  doctrines  and  not  to  his  miracles,  in  support  of  his 
claims.  His  principal  work  is  the  one  on  Education,  four  vols.  In 
this  work  a  confession  of  faith  is  put  into  the  mouth  of  a  vicar, 
which  expresses  Rousseau's  own  views.  His  influence  was 
equally  injurious  with  that  of  Voltaire.  The  vulgarity  of  the  lat- 
ter could  not  affect  persons  of  feeling  and  worth,  but  the  influence 
of  Rousseau  extended  over  those  who  had  some  regard  for  reli- 
gion and  morality.  He  presented  his  doubts  in  a  way  which  was 
best  adapted  to  give  them  effect  on  such  individuals  ;  constantly 
professing  his  willingness  to  believe  if  the  difficulties  could  only  be 
taken  out  of  the  way.  The  source  of  Rousseau's  infidelity  is 
clearly  to  be  learned  from  his  character,  as  he  has  himself  drawn 
it  in  his  Confessions.  It  is  plain  that  vanity  and  pride  were  so  pre- 
dominant in  him,  that  his  better  feelings  could  exert  but  little  influ- 
ence. It  is  useful  to  compare  the  Confessions  of  Rousseau  with 
those  of  Augustin,  as  the  one  teaches  us  the  state  of  mind  which  is 
suited  to  the  discovery  of  the  truth,  and  the  other  that  which  is  in- 
consistent with  its  perception. 

The  writings  of  these  two  men  had  so  filled  France  with  infi- 
delity, that  even  during  their  lives  numerous  authors  appeared 
who  went  further  than  their  masters.  It  became  the  fashion  in 
the  higher  circles  to  ridicule  religion,  and  it  was  considered  a 
mark  of  bon  ton  to  laugh  at  the  priests  as  blockheads  and  de- 
ceivers ;  and,  unfortunately,  everything  found  objectionable  in  the 
Catholic  system  was  referred  to  Christianity  itself.  The  infidel 
party  soon  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  attempt  to  operate 
upon  a  larger  scale.  This  was  undertaken  in  a  work  designed  to 
throw  light  upon  every  department  of  knowledge — the  "  Encyclo- 
pedic Universelle.  ou  Dictionnaire  Universelle  des  Sciences,  des 
Arts,  et  des  Metiers  ;"  an  edition  of  2000  copies  of  this  was 
greedily  bought  up  in  a  single  year.  The  editors  were  D'Alem- 
bert  and  Diderot ;  both  atheistical  sceptics.  The  former  seemed 
rather  inclined  to  conceal  his  atheism,  and  said  he  merely  wished 
to  ascertain  the  truth  and  present  a  fair  view  of  both  sides  of  the 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  581 

question.  But  the  arguments  for  the  truth  were  stated  in  the 
weakest  manner  possible,  those  against  it  in  the  strongest. 
Diderot  was  more  open.  In  his  "Pensees  l'hilosophiques,"  he  en- 
deavoured to  show,  that  belief  in  God's  existence  was  not  only 
feebly  supported,  but  altogether  unnecessary,  and  that  it  was  bet- 
ter not  to  trouble  ourselves  about  it.  He  said  the  same  respecting 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  even  of  moral  truths.  The  influ- 
ence of  this  man  was  very  considerable  ;  and  when  called  to  the 
court  of  Catherine  II.  of  Russia,  he  succeeded  in  poisoning  the 
higher  ranks  of  society  with  his  opinions.  He  was  active  in 
making  proselytes,  endeavouring  to  convince  those  around  him 
how  unhappy  the  belief  in  God  made  man,  by  keeping  him  in  con- 
stant fear  of  his  justice.  He  did  not  fully  present  his  system,  but 
materialism  lay  at  its  foundation. 

Many  other  works  appeared  in  this  period  which  spoke  out  with- 
out the  least  reserve.      Julian  de  la  Mettrie,  a  physician,  who  spent 
the  latter  part  of  his  life  as  wit  in  the  court  of  Frederick  II.,  was 
one  of  those  who  were  the  most  gross  in  his  materialism.     See  his 
"  L'Homme  Machine,"and  "  Traites  de  la  Vie  Heureuse."  In  the  lat- 
ter (Amsterdam  edition,  vol.  i.,  p.  46),  he  says,  "  L'univers  ne  sera 
jamais  heureux  a  moins  qu'il  ne  soit  athee :" — but  if  atheism  could  be 
once  fully  propagated,  religion  would  be  destroyed  root  and  branch  ; 
nature  then  inoculated  as  with  a  holy  principle,  would  maintain  its 
rights  and  its  purity.     Deaf  to  every  other  voice,  the  peaceful  mor- 
tal would  follow  no  other  rule  than  the  dictates  of  his  own  nature. 
This  man  died  as  he  had  lived,  like  a  brute  ;  he  killed  himself  by 
eating  immoderately  of  a  preparation  of  mushrooms.     Frederick 
II.,  who  had  so  honoured  him  when  alive,  had  a  very  sarcastic  epi- 
taph inscribed  upon  his  tomb.     The  influence  of  these  and  other 
works  of  a  similar  character,  was  to  produce  throughout  France, 
not  only  an  indifference  to  religion,  but  also  to  morality.     The  poi- 
son descended  from  the  higher  to  the  lower  classes,  and  its  progress 
was  far  more  rapid  than  in  Germany.     The  result  and  the  acme 
of  these  doctrines  are  presented  in  the  French  Revolution.     The 
rapid  progress  of  infidelity  at  this  period  is  not,  however,  to  be 
exclusively  attributed  to  the  influence  of  these  writings.      Many 
other  causes  combined  to  produce  this  effect ;  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant of  these  was  the  general  immorality  which  prevailed  at  the 
court  of  Louis  XV.,  and  the  priesthood  endeavouring  to  uphold 
religion  by  mere  external  means.     The  political  state  of  France 
also  was  such ;  there  were  so  many  impositions  and  irregularities, 
that  the  people  became  far  more  interested  in  politics  than  in  reli- 
gion.    Even  before  decided  hostility  was  declared  against  religion, 
the  services  of  the  church  had  sunk  into  general  contempt.     The 
open  war  against  all  that  is  holy  commenced  in  1793.      Christiani- 
ty was  then  even  in  externals  disregarded,  the  Sabbath  was  abo- 
lished, marriage  and  baptism,  as  merely  civil  affairs,  were  brought 
under  the  cognizance  of  the  magistrates.     The  storm  broke  out, 
particularly  in  the  month  of  November,  when  the  government  de- 


582  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

termined  to  plunder  the  churches  to  replenish  the  exhausted  re- 
sources of  the  state.  This  step  was  in  many  places  hailed  with 
the  greatest  applause.  At  this  time  many  of  the  clergy  came  for- 
ward, and  solemnly  renounced  at  once  religion  and  their  offices. 
The  Bishop  of  Paris,  Gobet,  appeared  before  the  bar  of  the  na- 
tional convention,  with  the  clergy  of  his  diocese,  and  made  the  fol- 
lowing declaration:  "I  have,  as  long  as  I  possessed  any  influence, 
used  it  to  promote  the  love  of  liberty  and  equality.  The  revolu- 
lution  is  approaching  its  conclusion  with  rapid  strides;  nothing  can 
now  exist  but  liberty  and  equality.  May  my  example  serve  to 
confirm  the  authority  of  these  two  goddesses.  Long  live  liberty 
and  equality  !" 

The  president  of  the  convention  replied,  "  The  confession,  citi- 
zen, which  you  have  made,  proves  that  philosophy  has  made  the 
greatest  advances.  It  is  the  more  worthy  of  praise  as  you  are  the 
Bishop  of  the  capital,  as  thus  Paris  has  the  triumph  of  being  the 
first  proclaimer  of  reason."  He  then  saluted  him  with  the  kiss  of 
brotherhood,  and  presented  him  the  Jacobin  cap.  Julien,  a  Pro- 
testant minister  from  Toulouse,  then  rose  and  said,  "  How  glorious 
is  it  to  make  such  a  declaration  under  the  auspices  of  reason,  phi- 
losophy, and  the  constitution  !  I  have,  for  twenty  years,  been 
clothed  with  the  office  of  a  Protestant  minister ;  but  I  now  declare 
that  I  will  no  longer  retain  it.  Henceforth,  the  laws  shall  be  my 
temple — liberty  my  God — my  country  my  worship — the  constitu- 
tion my  Gospel."  Amidst  this  despicable  insanity,  it  is  delightful 
to  hear  the  voice  of  truth,  which  was  yet  strong  and  bold  enough 
to  make  itself  heard.  Gregoire,  Bishop  of  Blois,  arose  in  his  place 
and  spoke  with  much  effect,  until. he  was  forcibly  driven  from  the 
tribune.  "  I  rise,"  he  said,  "  because  I  had  a  very  indistinct  idea 
of  what  had  happened  before  my  arrival.  I  hear  men  speak  of 
sacrifices  for  the  country  ;  to  these  I  am  accustomed.  Of  proofs 
of  devotion  to  the  country ;  these  have  I  given.  Is  the  question  of 
income  ?  I  resign  it  to  you.  Is  the  question  of  religion  ?  That  is 
beyond  your  power.  I  hear  much  about  fanaticism  and  supersti- 
tion ;  these  have  I  ever  opposed.  But  if  the  words  be  explained, 
it  will  be  seen  that  religion  itself  is  intended.  As  for  me,  I  have 
received  my  office  neither  from  you  nor  from  the  people  :  I  consent- 
ed to  bear  the  burden  of  a  bishoprick,  I  was  urged  to  accept  it, 
and  now  I  am  urged  to  lay  it  aside  : — but  I  bid  you  defiance ;  I 
will  remain  a  bishop  and  scatter  blessings  around  me."  The  tumult 
became  so  great  that  he  was  obliged  to  desist;  and,  although  he 
appealed  to  the  liberty  of  worship  which  had  been  established,  he 
was  hurled  from  the  tribune,  but  was  happy  enough  to  escape  the 
fury  of  the  mob.  The  conduct  of  the  capital  was  a  signal  for  the 
provinces  ;  congratulations  were  received  from  all  quarters,  from 
clergymen,  who  hastened  to  resign  their  offices,  and  pray  to  be  re- 
garded as  citizens,  and  taken  into  political  employment  Something 
was  now  to  be  placed  in  the  room  of  discarded  Christianity ;  and 
the  convention  determined  to  establish  the  worship  of  Reason.     A 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  583 

representative  of  Reason  was  accordingly  selected  (her  character 
may  be  easily  imagined) — the  cap  of  liberty  was  placed  upon  her 
head,  a  blue  mantle  was  thrown  over  her  shoulder,  and  her  arm 
rested  upon  a  spear.  Thus  arrayed,  she  was  introduced,  amidst 
the  shouts  of  the  people,  into  the  hall  of  the  convention,  and  placed 
opposite  the  president,  who  addressed  her  in  the  following  terms : 
*'  Fanaticism  is  at  last  departed,  and  has  left  its  place  to  reason,  jus- 
tice, and  truth.  The  feeble  eyes  of  superstition  could  no  longer  en- 
dure the  light  of  the  present  illumination.  We  have  brought  to-day 
an  offering  into  the  temple  of  reason,  not  to  a  soulless  idol,  but  to  a 
woman,  who  is  a  master-piece  of  nature.  This  holy  image  has  in- 
flamed all  our  hearts  ;  but  one  wish,  but  one  prayer,  is  now  heard  ; 
no  longer  any  priest,  and  no  longer  any  other  Gods  than  those 
which  nature  gives  us."  After  this,  the  goddess  was  placed  upon 
the  seat  of  the  president,  and  received  from  the  secretary  the  usual 
salutation,  amidst  the  shouts  of  the  Jacobins.  The  crowd  thence 
proceeded  to  the  church  of  St.  Denis,  which  was  desecrated  with 
songs  to  liberty  and  nature.  The  church  received  the  name  of 
"  Temple  de  la  Raison."  The  rage  against  religion  became  now 
more  open  and  furious  ;  the  clergy  were  forced  to  give  up  their 
offices ;  and  if  they  refused,  were  sent  out  of  the  country.  The 
inscription  "  Temple  de  la  Raison"  was  affixed  to  the  churches, 
and  "  La  mort  est  un  sommeil  eternel "  to  the  cemeteries  in  various 
places  throughout  the  country.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered 
at,  that  many  Christians  in  Germany  should  think  that  this  was  the 
predicted  period  of  Antichrist ;  for  in  no  period  of  history  was  the 
insane  opposition  to  religion  carried  to  such  extravagant  lengths. 
From  this  time  one  enormity  and  murderous  outrage  followed  ano- 
ther, until  the  bloody  Robespierre  stepped  forward  as  the  advocate 
of  relig  on.  In  the  beginning  of  the  year  1794  he  proposed  to  the 
convention  to  acknowledge  a  Supreme  Being,  and  the  immortality 
of  the  soul ;  and  to  appoint  festivals  in  honour  of  this  Being.  The 
convention  agreed  to  the  proposition,  and  made  the  proclamation, 
"  Le  peuple  Francais  reconnoit  des  aujourd'hui  un  etre  supreme  et 
i'immortalite'  de  Tame  ;"  which  was  posted  upon  the  churches. 
Thirty-six  festivals  were  appointed,  which  were  little  else  than 
days  devoted  to  amusement.  Among  these  were  the  following : 
the  festival  of  the  Supreme  Being — of  rights  and  of  nature — of  the 
human  race — of  the  hatred  of  tyrants,  &c.  On  the  first  celebra- 
tion of  the  first  mentioned  festival,  which  occurred  in  the  spring, 
Robespierre  delivered  an  inflated  discourse  in  honour  of  the  Su- 
preme Being,  and  a  hymn  was  sung,  in  which  the  following  pas- 
sage occurs  :  u  To  thee,  from  whom  the  free  Frenchman  has  de- 
rived his  existence,  does  he  lift  up  his  voice,  proud,  if  he  must  obey 
a  king,  to  have  thee  for  a  sovereign."  It  is  the  common  opinion 
that  this  despot  acted  the  part  of  a  hypocrite  in  all  this  business, 
merely  to  gain  credit  with  those  who  still  retained  some  little  re- 
gard for  religion.  But  it  is  more  probable  that  he  acted  from  a 
species  of  conviction,  and  had  some  feeling  on  the  subject.     It  is 


584  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

possible  that  he  wished  in  this  way  to  quiet  his  conscience,  which 
must  constantly  have  upbraided  him  for  the  multitude  of  his  bloody 
crimes ;  and  it  is  known  that  in  the  latter  part  of  his  life  he  was 
tormented  by  remorse,  until  his  ignominious  execution  closed  his 
career.  This  deistical  worship  obtained  no  consistency,  the  festi- 
vals were  merely  a  kind  of  theatrical  exhibitions.  In  1797  the 
Catholic  religion  was  again  introduced,  on  the  condition  that  the 
priests  should  be  dependent  on  the  stale,  and  not  on  the  pope. 
Many,  however,  who  had  imbibed  the  principles  of  Rousseau,  and 
had  some  regard  for  religion,  were  unfavourable  to  the  restoration 
of  the  Catholic  worship.  They  formed  themselves,  therefore,  into 
a  distinct  society,  and  assumed  the  name  Theophilanthropists. 
Their  main  principles  were,  love  to  God  and  man,  and  belief  in  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  The  directory  favoured  their  object,  in 
order  to  have  something  to  oppose  the  Catholics.  Their  religious 
service  consisted  in  moral  discourses — singing  hymns,  mostly  bor- 
rowed from  the  Psalms  ;  and  certain  symbolical  ceremonies,  such 
as  crowning  with  wreaths  of  flowers,  presenting  fruit  on  wooden 
dishes,  &c.  In  1798  they  had  ten  churches  in  their  possession,  and 
in  most  of  the  cities  of  the  provinces  there  were  societies  formed 
after  the  model  of  that  existing  in  Paris.  In  1799  the  society  was 
in  the  most  flourishing  state,  but  the  people  found  the  service  so 
dry  and  uninteresting  that  in  1802  it  was  almost  dissolved.  The 
consuls  took  from  thenf  their  church,  and  they  soon  entirely  disap- 
peared. The  deistical  worship  established  in  London,  by  Williams, 
shared  a  similar  fate.  Frederick  II.  discovered  his  penetration, 
when  he  replied  to  the  Marquis  d'Argenson,  who  wished  to  esta- 
blish a  worship  of  the  same  kind  in  Potsdam,  "  that  he  must  take 
subscriptions  for  ten  years."  The  Catholic  religion  regained  its 
ascendency :  Bonaparte  concluded  a  concordat  with  the  Pope ; 
and  this  fanaticism  of  infidelity  passed  away  as  a  meteor.  The 
seeds  of  infidelity  doubtless  still  remain  ;  but  many  of  the  greatest 
zealots  against  religion,  as  it  is  proved  by  decisive  examples,  were 
really  converted.  Of  this  number  was  Julien,  the  Protestant  mi- 
nister who  publicly  renounced  religion,  but,  before  his  death,  he  re- 
turned to  the  faith  of  the  Bible. 

Section  VI. — History  of  Infidelity  in  Germany. 

The  character  of  infidelity  in  Germany,  and  the  manner  of  its 
development,  is,  in  a  three- fold  respect,  different  from  that  which 
it  assumed  in  other  countries.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  much 
more  consequent ;  and  hence,  the  German  infidels  proceeded  more 
and  more  to  Pantheism,  which  is  the  logical  result  of  sceptical 
speculation. 

2.  It  displayed  itself  more  gradually,  and  advanced  more  order- 
ly, step  by  step,  and  hence  took  a  deeper  hold  on  the  very  life  of 
the  people.  In  no  country  has  infidelity  pervaded  every  depart- 
ment of  society,  as  in  some  portions  of  Germany. 

3.  In  other  lands  the  clergy  stood  as  watchmen  and  guardians 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  595 

against  the  attacks  of  scepticism  ;  as  was  the  case  particularly  in 
Protestant  England,  where  the  clergy  were  found  faithful  to  their 
trust.  But  Germany  saw,  what  never  had  been  seen  before,  that 
those  who  were  appointed  to  teach  and  defend  the  truths  of  reve- 
lation, should  step  forward  to  oppose  them.  On  the  same  grounds, 
and,  in  part,  with  the  same  tendency,  as  Lucian  and  Celsus,  from 
among  the  heathen,  attacked  Christianity,  did  many  of  the  German 
theologians  array  themselves  against  the  religion  of  which  they 
were  the  servants.  Most  of  this  class  sought,  through  a  regular 
analysis  of  the  general  truths,  or  ideas  of  religion,  by  scientific  in- 
vestigation, to  prove  the  falsity  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Bible.  It 
is  clear,  that  in  proportion  as  this  disposition  prevailed  among  the 
clergy,  must  infidelity  extend  and  deepen  itself  in  the  hearts  of 
the  people.  Various  circumstances  conspired  to  favour  the  spread 
of  this  sceptical  spirit  among  the  German  theologians.  Of  this 
nature  we  may  notice  the  following  as  among  the  most  important: 

1.  Many  circumstances  connected  with  the  reign  of  Frederick 
II. ;  as  the  residence  of  so  many  gay  despisers  of  religion  at  his 
court,  who  extended  their  influence  over  most  persons  of  rank  in 
the  country  ;  the  great  liberty  of  opinion  which  Frederick  admit- 
ted, to  an  extent  which  had  never  before  been  allowed. 

2.  The  extended  admiration  of  French  literature,  which  pro- 
duced at  this  period  little  else  than  works  ridiculing  religion.  For 
even  those  which  did  not  expressly  treat  of  the  subject,  yet  had  a 
tincture  of  the  reigning  spirit.  We  must  mention  also  the  love  of 
the  English  literature,  particularly  at  the  close  of  the  last  century. 
Most  of  the  freethinking  works  were  translated  into  German  ;  and 
although  the  refutations  of  these  works  were  also  translated,  as 
translating  was  the  order  of  the  day,  yet,  as  the  Chancellor  PfafF, 
of  Tubingen,  remarked,  "  these  refutations  were  not  of  such  value 
as  to  compensate  for  the  evil." 

3.  The  influence  of  a  literary  periodical  work,  established  in 
Berlin,  conducted  by  Nicolai,  which  systematically  recommended 
all  works  written  in  opposition  to  religion,  and  neglected  or  con- 
demned those  in  its  favour.  This  work  was  commenced  in  17G5, 
and  increased  to  118  volumes.  The  influence  of  this  work  was 
far  greater  than  any  such  review  could  have  at  present. 

4.  The  influence  of  the  philosophy  of  Wolf,  out  of  which  the 
Popular  Philosophy  arose.  Wolf's  philosophy  contained  a  princi- 
ple which  operated  fatally,  not  only  against  revelation,  but  against 
inward  piety.  It  pretended  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  the  truths 
of  revelation  in  a  mathematical  manner  upon  principles  of  reason, 
which  subjected  these  truths  to  the  spirit  of  speculation.  It  made 
also  the  broadest  distinction  between  natural  and  revealed  religion. 
It  did  not  indeed  deny  the  latter,  but  it  accustomed  the  people  to 
consider  them  as  different ;  and  as  the  truths  of  natural  religion 
were  represented  as  so  firmly  grounded,  many  were  induced  to 
embrace  them  as  sufficient.  It  operated  also  against  Christianity, 
by  its  cold  syllogistical  method  of  reasoning,  which  tended  to  de- 


586  tiioluck's  history  op  theology 

stroy  everything  that  was  vital,  not  merely  the  religion  of  the 
heart,  but  every  finer  feeling  which  was  not  satisfied  with  dull  ab- 
stract forms.  It  was  from  this  system,  as  before  remarked,  the 
Popular  Philosophy  arose,  which  undertook  to  prove,  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  Reason,  the  truths  of  Natural  Religion.  Without  resting 
satisfied  with  the  views  proposed  by  Wolf,  it  turns  them  all  to  its 
advantage.  To  this  school  belong  Jerusalem,  Garve,  Reimarus, 
Eberhardt,  Moses  Mendelssohn,  &c  The  worst  thing  about  this 
system  was  that  it  laid  claim  to  the  name  of  philosophy,  when  it 
was,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than  a  set  of  arbitrary  opinions.  Its 
defenders,  who  were  but  weak  thinkers,  stood  in  breathless  amaze- 
ment when  Kant  and  others  appeared  upon  the  field.  Thus  Ja- 
cobi,  in  his  latter  years,  said,  when  the  works  of  Hegel  appeared, 
that  he  had  been  able  to  understand  all  other  philosophical  works, 
but  these  were  too  abstruse  for  him :  and  Mendelssohn  could  not 
understand  Jacobi,  nor  Garve,  Mendelssohn. 

The  opposition  among  the  theologians  to  the  truths  of  revelation 
was  at  first  by  no  means  decided ;  as  a  first  step  we  must  regard 
the  influence  of  some  theological  writers  who  were  not  themselves 
enemies  of  these  truths,  but  prepared  the  way  for  their  rejection, 
and,  without  intending  it,  forged  weapons  for  those  who  should 
come  after  them.  The  occasion  of  this  lay  in  the  degraded  state 
of  theology  in  the  beginning  of  the  18th  century.  Such  men  as 
Calvin,  Melancthon,  Chytraeus  and  many  others,  were  profoundly 
learned,  and  knew  how  to  employ  their  learning  in  the  service  of 
theology  without  weakening  their  faith  in  the  doctrines  of  the  Bi- 
ble :  their  erudition  enlarged  their  views  without  injuring  either 
their  faith  or  piety.  But  the  situation  of  theology,  especially  in  the 
Lutheran  church,  at  the  period  referred  to,  was  exceedingly  low  ; 
it  consisted  in  little  more  than  establishing  and  illustrating  the  doc- 
trines of  the  church  ;  all  the  main  ideas  in  the  several  departments 
rested  upon  tradition  ;  the  study  of  theology  was  a  work  of  memo- 
ry ;  few  giving  themselves  the  trouble  to  examine  how  far  the 
doctrines  they  had  received  from  their  fathers  agreed  with  the 
sacred  scriptures.  Learning,  properly  speaking,  was  not  wanting, 
for  such  men  as  Calov  and  Carpzov  among  the  orthodox,  and  Ram- 
bach  and  Buddeus  among  the  Pietists,  may  be  compared  with  any 
of  the  learned  men  of  the  present  day,  and  even  excelled  them  ; 
it  was  not  learning,  therefore,  but  a  scientific  spirit  that  was  want- 
ing. The  situation  of  profane  literature  was  much  the  same,  for 
here  also  was  wanting  an  independent  self-formed  character  :  what 
was  received  was  transmitted.  But  about  the  middle  of  the  pre- 
ceding century,  a  new  spirit  was  introduced  into  this  department. 
In  philosophy,  Wolf  and  his  disciples  excited  a  new  and  lively  in- 
terest, which  rapidly  spread  itself  over  Germany,  and  at  the  same 
time  introduced  an  entirely  different  method  of  treating  the  sub- 
ject. In  history  a  new  era  was  formed  by  Thomasius,  and  the 
various  translations  of  English  historical  works  increased  the  in- 
terest which  he  had  excited.      In  philology  a  new  school  was 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  587 

formed  by  Ernesti,  Reiske  and  others,  who  adopted  a  method  much 
superior  to  that  pursued  by  the  philologians  of  Holland.  As  all 
these  departments  are  more  or  less  connected  with  theology,  it 
could  not  fail  that  the  impulse  should  be  communicated  to  it.  Se- 
veral distinguished  men  appeared  at  this  period,  as  Baumgarten  in 
Halle,  Ernesti  in  Leipzig,  and  John  David  Michaelis  in  Gottingen, 
who  pursued  with  ardour  the  study  of  profane  literature,  and  en- 
deavoured to  effect  a  connexion  between  this  literature  and  the- 
ology, and  to  enrich  the  latter  with  the  results  of  the  former,  and 
this  was  the  first  step  to  neology. 

It  is  an  interesting  and  important  question,  whether  this  connex- 
ion of  profane  literature  with  theology  has  a  necessary  tendency 
to  neology.  That  in  the  Lutheran  church  it  obviously  had  this 
tendency,  cannot  be  denied.  And  something  of  the  same  kind 
may  be  seen  in  the  Reformed  Church,  especially  among  the  Armi- 
nians.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  history  shows  that  this  is  not  neces- 
sarily the  case.  Calvin,  Melancthon,  Chytraeus,  and  Bucerus  were 
profoundly  versed  in  these  studies,  without  manifesting  the  least 
tendency  to  infidelity.  Hence  it  appears  that  it  depends  upon  the 
manner  of  treating  the  subject,  and  the  way  in  which  profane  and 
sacred  literature  are  united.  There  is  in  theology  a  two-fold  ele- 
ment, the  one  human,  the  other  supernatural ;  by  the  one  it  is  con- 
nected with  every  department  of  human  knowledge,  and  hence  an 
accurate  acquaintance  with  human  science  must  have  a  salutary 
influence  upon  the  study  of  theology.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
is  something  supernatural,  which  is  to  be  found  in  no  human  sci- 
ence ;  and  which  no  human  science  can  either  explain  or  illus- 
trate. If,  therefore,  the  theologian  does  not  know  this,  by  his  own 
living  experience  ;  if  he  be  not  connected  by  faith  with  the  invisi- 
ble world,  with  him  the  study  of  profane  literature  and  its  connex- 
ion with  theology  must  prove  injurious.  If  a  theologian  be  with- 
out faith  and  without  profane  literature,  as  was  the  case  with  many 
of  the  orthodox  party  in  the  Lutheran  church,  he  will  deliver 
Christianity  to  his  successors  as  he  found  it,  without  understanding 
it  himself  but  a  means  of  blessing  to  those  who  did,  as  actually  oc- 
curred among  the  orthodox.  But  were  he  better  acquainted  with 
profane  literature,  he  would  be  led,  while  he  retained  the  earthly 
part  of  theology,  to  endeavour  to  explain  what  was  supernatural 
by  his  profane  science  ;  placing  human  and  profane  ideas  in  the 
place  of  the  divine,  and  thus  his  knowledge  would  prove  destruc- 
tive. This  remark  is  particularly  illustrated  by  the  history  of 
Semler.  Those,  therefore,  who,  in  the  period  of  which  we  speak, 
first  connected  the  study  of  profane  literature  with  theology,  and 
introduced  a  scientific  spirit  into  this  department,  although  not 
avowed  enemies  to  what  was  supernatural  in  Christianity,  yet 
knew  it  not  in  its  depths,  and  thus  worked  without  intending  it,  to 
remove  the  very  essence  of  the  system. 

Baumgarten  in  Halle,  who  died  in  1757,  was  the  first  who  raised 
a  third  party  in  the  Lutheran  church.     He  was  sincerely  subject 


"A 


' 


**H  <** 


-7 


588  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

to  the  truths  of  Christianity,  but  inordinate  in  his  love  of  human 
learning,  which  produced  an  injurious  effect  upon  his  theological 
views.  He  operated  upon  his  students  and  his  contemporaries  in 
giving  a  new  tendency  to  their  minds,  partly  by  the  introduction  of 
various  English  theological  works,  which  were  of  a  superficial  cha- 
racter, and  were  more  or  less  deistical.  He  also  introduced  many 
English  historical  works,  especially  the  "Universal  History,"  by 
Guthrie  and  Gray,  which  excited  a  desire  for  the  study  of  profane 
literature  among  the  theologians  of  Halle,  and  partly  also  by 
adopting  the  logical  demonstrative  method  of  Wolf,  insisting  upon 
the  most  accurate  division  and  subdivision  of  every  subject ;  a  me- 
thod which  he  did  not  confine  to  the  dogmatic,  but  applied  also  to 
exegesis.  He  exhorted  his  students  to  throw  off  the  trammels  of 
tradition  and  apply  their  own  understandings.  Connected  with 
this,  however,  he  chilled  their  hearts,  and  softened  down  the  genu- 
ine Christian  doctrines.  It  is  indeed  impossible  to  present  these 
doctrines  in  such  strict  logical  forms ;  divine  things  are  in  them- 
selves simple,  but  they  cannot  by  speculation  and  subtle  logic  be 
placed  in  the  light,  and  every  effort  to  express  these  peculiar  ideas 
in  precise  forms  stifles  their  spirit.  Many  of  the  students  of  Baum- 
garten  were  led  by  his  method  to  a  cold,  intellectual,  but  lost  the 
inward,  knowledge. 

The  influence  of  John  August  Ernesti  was  far  more  extensive. 
He  was  made  professor  of  Leipzig  in  1759.  Ernesti  was  a  man 
of  profound  and  extensive  learning ;  he  retained  his  faith  in  the 
divine  truths,  and  was  very  cautious  in  all  his  undertakings.  He 
had  already  made  himself  so  extensively  known  by  his  philological 
works,  that  those  which  he  published  upon  theology  excited  the 
greater  attention,  and  students  flocked  from  all  quarters  to  attend 
his  lectures.  His  principal  object  was  to  make  his  philosophical 
knowledge  useful  in  exegesis,  and  he  applied  the  same  rules  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  sacred  scriptures  which  he  had  applied  to  the 
classics.  His  most  important  work  is  his  "  Institutio  Interpretis 
Novi  Testamenti ;"  the  shortest  and  most  useful  compend  of  Her- 
meneutics.  Before  the  time  of  Ernesti,  the  department  of  sacred 
philology  had  long  lain  fallow.  He  was  joined  in  these  labours  by 
his  colleague,  Professor  Fischer,  who,  however,  went  much  fur- 
ther. Fischer  was  the  first  to  apply  the  new  philology  to  the  Lexi- 
cography of  the  New  Testament,  in  his  work,  "  De  Vitiis  Lexico- 
rum  Nov.  Testam."  It  was  already  clearly  manifested  in  these 
works,  particularly  those  of  Fischer,  how  much  evil  results  from 
the  unenlightened  connexion  of  profane  literature  with  theology. 
The  peculiar  Christian  ideas  were  brought  more  or  less  to  the 
standard  of  mere  deistical  notions  ;  thus  avaXewvon  was  made  to 
mean,  emendatio  per  Religionem  Christianam,  the  doctrine  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  was  reduced  to  the  notion  of  praiseworthy  qualities, 
obtained  by  divine  assistance.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  these  ideas 
lead  to  neology.  Regeneration  was  with  many,  merely  a  recep- 
tion into  a  religious  community.    The  phrase  "  are  one,"  (as  used  by 

* 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  580 

Christ  in  reference  to  himself  and  the  Father)  was  explained  of  a 
unity  of  feeling  and  will. 

John  David  Michaelis,  who  was  the  third  learned  man  to  whom 
reference  has  been  made,  was  appointed  Professor  in  Gottingen 
in  1745,  and  died  in  1791.  He  was  the  son  of  the  excellent  J.  P. 
Michaelis,  of  Halle,  where  he  was  educated  in  the  society  of  the 
pious  professors  of  the  University.  But  (to  use  his  own  words) 
ne  was  too  light-minded  to  give  himself  up  to  the  pietistical  spirit 
which  then  reigned  in  Halle.  In  Gottingen  he  freed  himself  from 
his  early  trammels  both  in  respect  to  doctrine  and  practice.  The 
principal  objects  of  his  attention  were,  profane  history,  geography, 
antiquities,  and  the  oriental  languages.  He  seems  not  to  have  had 
so  much  religion  as  Baumgarten  or  Ernesti.  and  therefore  his  man- 
ner of  treating  theology  was  much  more  injurious.  He  did  not, 
indeed,  deny  any  essential  doctrines,  but  softened  them  down,  made 
what  was  internal  merely  external,  much  to  the  detriment  of  what 
constitutes  the  essence  of  Christianity.  Thus  to  make  the  opposi- 
tion between  i««)i«  and  <raP|  nothing  more  than  the  opposition  be- 
tween reason  and  sensuality,  must  necessarily  be  destructive  in  its 
operation,  for  if  this  be  all,  the  Christian  religion  does  not  differ 
from  the  philosophy  of  Plato.  The  grounds  also  upon  which  he 
rested  the  authority  of  Christianity  were  superficial ;  he  said  that 
were  it  not  for  the  miracles  and  prophecies  he  would  not  believe 
in  the  scriptures,  and  that  he  had  often  read  the  Bible,  but  never 
found  the  testimonium  spiritus  sancti.  In  his  writings  we  remark 
a  great  want  of  delicacy,  which  was  still  more  observable  in  lec- 
tures which  were  sometimes  disgraced  by  downright  obscenities. 
The  influence  and  mode  of  operation  of  these  three  men  may  be 
best  learnt  from  the  following  works :  that  of  Baumgarten,  from 
the  autobiography  of  Semler ;  that  of  Ernesti  (and  also  Fischer) 
from  the  autobiography  of  Bahrdt ;  that  of  Michaelis  from  his 
own  life,  and  the  autobiography  of  John  von  Miiller,  who  speaks 
of  the  exceedingly  improper  manner  of  his  lecturing. 

Until  this  period  the  basis  of  Christianity  had  not  been  attacked, 
the  main  doctrines  yet  stood  firm,  although  doubts  had  been  here 
and  there  excited.  The  method  of  treating  these  subjects  was  very 
arbitrary  ;  the  manner  in  which  the  church  had  presented  the  lead- 
ing doctrines  was  laid  aside  ;  many  of  the  passages  before  relied 
upon  in  their  support  were  rejected,  and  the  manner  of  proving 
them  was  changed ;  the  arguments  being  drawn  from  general  de- 
istical  principles  or  profane  literature.  The  most  important  prac- 
tical doctrines  also  were  so  much  explained  away,  as  to  lose  their 
nature.  The  students  of  these  men  came  out  in  a  spirit  essentially 
different  from  that  of  their  teachers.  Semler  was  the  pupil  of 
Baumgarten,  Morus  of  Ernesti,  Koppe  and  Eichhorn  of  Michaelis, 
and  by  them  neology  was  established.  Among  these  founders  of 
neology,  the  most  important,  and  its  real  author,  is  Semler,  an  ori- 
ginal thinker,  which  is  what  we  rarely  meet  with  among  the  neolo- 
gists.     Semler  had  been  brought  up  in  Halle  in  contact  with  vital 


590  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

piety,  where  he  received  impressions,  which  he  could  never  en- 
tirely obliterate,  and  which  in  his  old  age  revived.  Possessed  of  a 
very  sanguine  temperament,  and,  as  he  complains  himself,  light- 
minded,  he  renounced  entirely  the  party  of  the  Pietists,  who,  it 
must  be  admitted,  were  deficient  in  learning,  and  defective  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  defended  their  doctrines  ;  and  connected 
himself  with  Baumgarten.  It  was  not  the  personal  character  of 
Baumgarten,  which  was  dry  and  logical,  which  formed  the  attrac- 
tion for  Semler,  but  his  great  learning  and  his  fine  library  to  which 
he  gave  his  friend  free  access.  Semler,  under  these  circumstances, 
acquired  extensive  erudition,  and  as  his  master  had  freed  himself 
from  the  form  at  least  in  which  the  church  presented  the  Christian 
doctrines,  Semler  went  further  and  adopted  opinions  entirely  new. 
Baumgarten,  perceiving  the  creative  talents  of  this  sanguine  man, 
said  to  him  :  "  Theology  stands  in  need  of  a  new  reformation,  I  am 
too  old  to  undertake  the  business ;  this  you  must  do,"  and  this  he 
did.  Semler  was  first  Professor  of  History  in  Altdorf,  and  was 
thence  called  as  professor  of  theology  to  Halle  in  1752.  With  re- 
gard to  the  powers  of  his  mind,  it  may  be  said,  that  they  were  on 
the  one  hand  very  great,  and  on  the  other,  very  deficient.  He  had 
an  astonishing  memory,  and  was  able  at  any  time  to  recall  what 
he  had  ever  learnt.  His  mind  was  also  acute,  when  the  field  of 
investigation  was  small,  and  his  imagination  active  and  vivid, 
which  led  him  easily  to  form  new  combinations.  But  he  was  de- 
ficient in  all  the  qualifications  of  a  philosopher,  as  well  dialectical 
as  contemplative,  and  hence  he  never  formed  any  system,  although 
he  produced  a  multitude  of  new  thoughts  which  he  neither  ex- 
panded nor  arranged,  but  cast  them  out  in  the  greatest  disorder. 
His  works  are  on  this  account  very  difficult  to  read,  there  is  no 
connexion  in  the  ideas  and  no  logical  arrangement.  He  retained , 
in  all  his  investigations,  the  fear  of  God,  which,  joined  with  his 
want  of  a  philosophical  spirit,  prevented  him  from  seeing  whither 
the  principles  he  adopted  naturally  led ;  and  when  he  saw  in 
others  the  consequences  of  the  course  upon  which  he  had  entered, 
he  sincerely  repented  that  he  had  gone  so  far.  This  led  to  the 
firm  opposition  which  he  made  to  Bahrdt,  whose  conduct  gave 
him  real  distress.  In  his  latter  days,  Semler  wished  to  remedy 
the  evils  he  had  occasioned,  and  published  some  very  singular 
views  by  which  he  endeavoured  to  reconcile  scepticism  and  ad- 
herence to  the  doctrines  of  the  church.  He  said  there  was  a  pub- 
lic and  private  religion  for  the  theologian ;  in  public  he  was  not  au- 
thorized to  reject  any  received  doctrine,  but  in  private  he  might 
believe  what  he  pleased.  And  when  the  preacher  spoke  of  the 
u  Son  of  God,"  it  was  no  harm  if  one  part  of  his  audience  regard- 
ed him  as  really  God,  another  as  merely  a  man,  and  the  third  en- 
tertained the  Arian  doctrine,  all  this  was  consistent  with  unity. 
The  revolution  which  Semler  produced,  was  principally  by  his 
exegesis.  Ernesti  had  recommended  the  principle  that  the  lan- 
guage and  history  of  the  particular  period,  in  which  the  several 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  591 

sacred  books  were  written,  should  be  applied  to  their  explication. 
This  principle  is  unquestionably  correct,  but  improperly  applied 
leads  to  decided  neology.  Semler  acted  upon  this  principle,  and  was 
for  explaining  everything  from  the  circumstances  of  that  age,  and 
reducing  the  general  notions  of  the  Bible  to  more  precise  ideas. 
In  this  way  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  scriptures  were  brought 
down  to  mere  temporary  ideas ;  and  the  spirit  of  the  Bible,  which 
should  ever  attend  and  give  it  life,  was  lost,  and  it  became  a  book 
for  the  age  in  which  in  was  written.  Eapf  and  vvtvpa  he  explained 
from  the  peculiar  opinions  of  that  period ;  *ap|  was  the  narrow 
notion  of  the  Jews  respecting  Christianity,  against  which  Paul 
wrote  and  contended ;  nvt^a  was  a  free  and  liberal  idea  of  Chris- 
tianity. 

On  this  principle  he  divided  the  books  of  the  New  Testament 
into  those  in  which  the  oap$  predominated,  and  those  in  which  the 
irvtvpa  prevailed.  The  Gospels  were  written  for  the  aa^uoi ;  Paul's 
Epistles  for  the  yvaoriKoi :  the  Catholic  Epistles,  too,  united  both 
parties,  and  the  Apocalypse  for  the  Fanatics.  In  this  way  he  must 
necessarily  lose  the  proper  view  of  the  Bible.  In  the  Epistle  to 
the  Romans  he  overlooked  what  is  the  main  point  in  the  whole 
discussion,  justification  by  grace,  in  opposition  to  that  by  works ; 
according  to  him,  Paul's  object  was  to  combat  the  narrow  views 
of  the  Jews,  who  believed  that  they  alone  could  be  saved;  where- 
as, Paul  wished  to  extend  salvation  to  the  heathen  as  well  as  the 
Jews.  It  is  plain  that  if  these  principles  of  Semler,  when  applied 
to  the  New  Testament,  were  so  injurious,  they  must  be  much  more 
so  when  applied  to  the  Old.  If  the  Old  Testament  is  to  be  ex- 
plained according  to  the  views  entertained  of  it  in  the  age  in  which 
it  was  written,  then  it  must  lose  its  important  meaning.  Semler 
did  not  hesitate  to  say,  therefore,  that  it  was  useless  for  Christians : 
that  Jesus  laid  stress  upon  it  merely  because  the  Jews  thought  that 
they  had  eternal  life  therein  ;  but  Paul  has  directly  attacked  it. 
Only  such  parts  which,  on  account  of  their  moral  excellence,  were 
still  valuable,  could  be  of  any  use  to  Christians  of  the  present  day. 
Semler  was  thus  brought  by  his  historical  criticism  to  precisely  the 
same  results  as  the  Popular  Philosophy.  Semler  was  particularly 
learned  in  the  patristical  and  ecclesiastical  history ;  and  most  of 
his  writings  refer  to  these  departments.  His  scepticism  and  want 
of  religious  experience  are  here  also  clearly  displayed.  In  the  his- 
tory of  the  Christian  doctrines,  he  could  not  distinguish  the  true 
from  the  false  ;  and  thought  everything  was  full  of  contradictions, 
because  he  was  not  able  to  see  the  ground  of  coincidence.  His 
want  of  religious  feeling  led  him  also  to  condemn  Augustin  and 
justify  Pelagius,  and  his  view  on  this  subject  became  every  day 
more  general. 

There  arose  a  man  by  the  side  of  Semler,  in  Halle,  who  not 
only  united  the  various  scattered  neological  doubts  which  he  had 
cast  out,  but  connected  with  them  many  of  his  own  arbitrary  yet 
destructive  doctrines.     A  man  who  attacked  not  only  the  doctrines 


592  tiioluck's  htstory  of  theology 

of  the  church,  but  those  of  the  Bible,  and  whose  life  was  as  inju- 
rious as  his  writings.  This  was  the  famous  Dr.  Bahrdt.  His  father, 
a  professor  of  theology  at  Leipzig,  was  a  strictly  orthodox  man. 
The  son  manifested  from  the  first,  a  great  degree  of  light-minded- 
ness, which  his  father  did  not  properly  attempt  to  correct.  He 
rather  sought  to  conceal,  than  eradicate  the  faults  of  his  son.  His 
education,  therefore,  produced  a  very  bad  effect  upon  his  mind  ; 
observing  on  the  one  hand  such  strict  orthodox  principles,  and  on 
the  other  such  a  laxity  of  practice,  he  got  the  idea  that  orthodoxy 
was  altogether  an  affair  of  the  head,  and  that  the  heart  was  go- 
verned by  entirely  different  principles.  He  was  early  Privat  Docent 
and  preacher  in  Leipzig  ;  but  his  gross  misconduct  and  licentious- 
ness forced  him  to  resign  his  office  to  avoid  deposition.  He  re- 
tired to  Erfurdt,  where  he  was  made  professor,  and  continued  his 
abandoned  mode  of  life ;  thence  he  removed  to  Giessen,  and  from 
thence  to  Maschlintz,  to  an  institution  of  Herr  von  Salis.  Thence 
he  went  to  Turkheim,  in  the  territory  of  the  Count  of  Leiningen, 
where  he  was  made  General  Superintendent.  It  was  here  he  pub- 
lished his  New  Testament,  under  the  title,  "  Newest  Revelation  of 
God,"  1779.  In  his  translation  he  endeavoured  to  give  a  new- 
fashioned  dress  to  everything,  and  introduced  all  the  personages 
speaking  and  acting,  as  though  they  had  been  Saxons  or  Prussians 
living  in  the  year  1779.  In  his  interpretations,  whatever  was  most 
perverse  and  unnatural,  was  sure  to  be  adopted  as  true.  This 
book  produced  such  a  sensation  that  an  imperial  order  was  issued 
from  Vienna  condemning  the  work,  and  urging  that  the  author 
should  be  displaced.  The  Count  of  Leiningen  consented,  and 
Bahrdt  was  obliged  to  remove.  He  went  now  to  the  land  of  illu- 
mination, to  Prussia,  and  applied  to  the  minister,  Von  Zedlitz,  for 
employment,  who  was  very  willing  to  secure  him  a  situation. 
Bahrdt  came  to  Halle,  and  would  probably  have  been  made  a  pro- 
fessor, had  not  the  faculty  objected.  Semler  was  particularly  ac- 
tive in  this  affair,  making  the  manner  of  Bahrdt's  life  the  ground  of 
his  opposition  to  his  appointment.  The  minister,  therefore,  only 
allowed  him  to  read  lectures  in  the  Philosophical  Faculty.  He  ac- 
cordingly announced  that  he  would  lecture  on  rhetoric  and  decla- 
mation ;  but  let  it  privately  be  known,  that  he  really  meant  to  read 
on  pastoral  theology.  It  is  said  that  900  persons  were  assembled 
in  the  great  auditorium  of  the  university  to  hear  him.  His  manner 
was  that  of  a  charlatan  ;  he  endeavoured  to  show  how  the  feelings 
of  an  audience  could  be  excited,  and  sought  to  make  the  manner  of 
preaching  usually  adopted  ridiculous.  These  lectures,  however, 
did  not  bring  him  in  enough  money,  which  was  his  principal  object. 
The  poor  man,  therefore,  proposed  to  read  a  course  of  lectures  on 
morals,  which  citizens  as  well  as  students  might  attend.  He  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  a  considerable  number  of  hearers — students, 
citizens,  and  officers ;  and  endeavoured  to  exercise  his  theatrical 
talents  upon  this  mixed  audience.  But  he  soon  found  this  activity 
too  troublesome  and  too  little  productive,  and,  therefore,  retired  to 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  593 

a  farm  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Halle,  and  opened  a  coffee-house, 
"  a  course,"  he  said,  "  his  health  demanded."  Before  his  death  he 
was  cast  into  prison  in  Magdeburg,  on  account  of  a  comedy  which 
he  wrote  against  the  government.  He  sought  by  all  manner  of  lies 
to  avoid  arrest,  but  in  vain,  and  died  in  1792.  With  regard  to  the 
views  of  this  man  we  may  say,  as  we  said  regarding  those  of  Vol- 
taire, that  his  character  renders  them  undeserving  of  regard.  Even 
his  own  description  of  himself  is  sufficient  to  show  that  he  was 
destitute  of  principle ;  but  this  was  made  still  more  apparent  by 
the  publication  of  a  collection  of  his  letters.  All  kinds  of  deceit 
were  to  him  equal  if  he  could  but  gain  money.  His  talents  were 
such  as,  had  they  been  turned  to  a  good  account,  might  have  been 
made  really  serviceable ;  he  had  particularly  the  talent  of  writing 
in  a  clear  and  easy  style,  and  a  creative  fancy.  His  views  gradu- 
ally formed  themselves  ;  he  said  that  when  he  came  to  Halle  he 
had  renounced  all  doctrines  contrary  to  reason,  excepting  those  of 
inspiration  and  of  divine  influence.  How  he  came  to  discover  that 
these  also  were  unreasonable,  he  thus  describes :  "  The  historical 
arguments  of  Semler,  and  the  philosophical  reasoning  of  Eberhardt, 
had  made  a  great  impression  on  me ;  it  only  failed  to  bring  my 
feelings  to  reject  these  doctrines :  this  was  effected  by  my  being 
laughed  at  for  holding  them  ;  this  touched  my  pride,  and  I  let  them 
go  as  contrary  to  reason."  He  still  retained  the  doctrine  of  God's 
existence,  and  the  immortal  soul.  The  contents  of  his  writings, 
so  far  as  they  are  his  own,  are  of  a  romantic,  extravagant  charac- 
ter ;  he  endeavours  in  every  way  to  represent  everything  of  a  mi- 
raculous nature  recorded  in  the  Bible,  as  mere  natural  occurrences. 
His  works,  however,  from  the  novel-like  style  in  which  they  were 
written,  were  extensively  circulated  and  read. 

The  university-theologians  of  this  period,  after  Semler  came 
out,  divided  themselves  into  three  classes :  some  few  remained 
orthodox ;  others  sought  to  retain  the  form  of  the  Bible  doctrines, 
but  soften  down  the  leading  ideas,  representing  them  as  unimpor- 
tant, and  turning  their  chief  attention  upon  the  moral  portions  of  the 
scriptures  ;  some  rejected  particular  doctrines  of  the  Bible  :  few  new 
ideas  were  advanced  by  either  party.  Of  those  who  belonged  to 
the  second  class,  we  may  mention  the  following  as  the  most  dis- 
tinguished. Noesselt,  in  Halle,  died  1807.  He  had  formed  him- 
self principally  upon  the  writings  of  the  English  theologians,  and 
hence  received  the  tendency  not  to  attack  openly  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity,  but  rather  to  present  them  in  a  softer  light.  In  the 
early  part  of  his  life  he  had  defended  these  doctrines  in  his  Apolo- 
gie,  but  as  his  faith  grew  weaker,  in  the  last  edition  he  only  pub- 
lished the  first  part  ol  the  work,  which  contains  the  general  defence 
of  Christianity,  feeling  no  longer  any  disposition  to  undertake  the 
defence  of  the  several  doctrines. 

Morus,  successor  to  Ernesti,  in  Leipzig,  from  the  year  1775,  died 
1792.  He  also  never  decidedly  attacked  the  Christian  doctrines  ; 
but  he  endeavoured  to  show  that  it  was  very  difficult  to  establish 

38 


594  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

the  details  of  any  of  these  doctrines  upon  a  sure  basis ;  and  that, 
therefore,  we  need  only  hold  to  that  which  promotes  moral  im- 
provement. Many  of  his  students,  however,  rejected  the  doctrines 
themselves  of  their  own  accord. 

Of  those  belonging  to  the  third  class  are  :  1.  Eichhorn,  in  Got- 
tingen.  He  published  his  "  Introduction  to  the  Old  Testament," 
1780  ;  his  "  Universal  Library  for  Biblical  Literature,"  1787  ;  his 
"  Introduction  to  the  New  Testament,"  1804.  He  carried  the  prin- 
ciples of  Semler  fully  out,  and  renounced  entirely  the  orthodox 
faith.  He  treated  Judaism  as  a  mere  human  institution,  which 
was  no  more  under  the  direction  of  Providence  than  all  other 
religions  are.  Christianity  also  was  a  mere  local  appearance,  and 
all  the  distinguishing  Christian  ideas  were  explained  away.  He 
particularly  manifested  his  bold  and  reckless  criticism  in  his  work 
on  the  Old  Testament. 

2.  Steinbart,  of  the  University  of  Frankfort  on  the  Oder,  died 
1809.  He  published  a  work  against  what  he  called  the  "  Language 
of  the  Schools,"  by  which,  however,  he  understood  the  doctrines 
respecting  faith,  good  works,  conversion,  &c.  His  principal  work 
is  his  "  System  of  Pure  Philosophy  and  Happiness,"  1768.  He 
proceeds  upon  the  plan  to  which  we  alluded  when  speaking  of  the 
English  theologians,  of  attempting  to  reconcile  Christianity  and 
natural  religion.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  this  was  to  be 
effected  by  bringing  the  former  down  to  the  standard  of  the  latter. 
He  first  advanced  the  idea,  in  Germany,  that  there  is  nothing  in 
Christianity  above  the  reach  of  reason.  In  this  work  Christ  is 
represented  as  a  mere  man  ;  the  doctrines  of  original  sin  and  atone- 
ment as  the  vain  notions  of  Augustine. 

3.  The  Abbot  Henke,  of  the  University  of  Helmstadt.  He  ob- 
tained extensive  influence,  as  well  by  the  periodical  works  which 
he  conducted  as  by  his  "  Ecclesiastical  History."  The  titles  of 
the  former  are,  "  Magazine  for  Religion  and  Philosophy,"  1793 — 
1802.  "  Magazine  for  Exegesis  and  Ecclesiastical  History,"  six 
volumes.  "  Archives  of  Modern  Ecclesiastical  History,"  and 
"  Eusebea." 

4.  Gabler,  who  was  a  pupil  of  Eichhorn,  was  at  first  settled  in 
Altdorf,  and  afterwards  in  Jena.  His  influence  was  principally 
maintained  by  his  "  New  Theological  Journal,"  1798—1801. 

5.  Paulus,  in  Heidelberg,  whose  "  Commentary  on  the  New  Tes- 
tament" has  been  circulated  in  two  large  editions.  The  evil  which 
this  work  has  produced  has  not  arisen  so  much  from  the  exposi- 
tions which  he  gives,  for  these  are  so  forced  and  unnatural  that 
every  one  can  see  they  are  false,  as  from  the  low  spirit  which 
reigns  throughout  the  work  ;  by  which  everything  exalted  and 
divine  is  reduced  to  the  level  of  everv  day  occurrences.  Paulus 
published  his  "  Memorabilia,"  from  1787—1796. 

Besides  these  learned  men,  belonging  to  the  universities,  many 
pastors  took  part  in  the  work  of  reforming  theology,  and  obtained 
an  extensive  influence.     There  were  particularly  many  preachers 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  595 

and  philosophers  in  Berlin,  whose  efficiency  in  this  enterprise  de- 
serves remark.  Berlin  was  at  this  time  the  chief  seat  of  the  popu- 
lar philosophers,  Mendelssohn,  Engel,  Sulzer,  Nicolai,  and  others, 
whose  works  were  everywhere  read  and  admired  ;  these  men 
stood  in  an  intimate  connexion  with  the  then  famous  preachers 
Spalding  and  Teller.  There  was,  indeed,  a  secret  society  formed 
in  Berlin,  of  which  not  only  these  philosophers,  but  also  several 
preachers  were  members.  It  was  called  the  "  Society  for  Light 
and  Illumination,"  although  it  had  another  name  taken  from  the 
day  of  the  week  on  which  it  held  its  meetings.  The  author  of  this 
society  was  the  librarian,  Biester,  whose  object  was  to  introduce  a 
new  system  of  religion.  Their  proceedings,  however,  were  kept 
in  profound  secresy.  Spalding  and  Teller  conducted  themselves 
with  great  caution  and  prudence  ;  they  wished  gradually  to  pros- 
trate all  the  positive  doctrines  of  religion,  and,  therefore,  those  who 
came  out  too  boldly,  and  pushed  on  the  work  too  rapidly,  were 
checked  and  kept  within  more  moderate  bounds.  They  endea- 
voured to  effect  their  object  by  making  morality  the  great  point, 
and  representing  the  positive  doctrines  as  of  less  importance. 
They  substituted  new  ideas,  general  Deistical  notions,  in  the  place 
of  the  true  biblical  ideas,  extracting  the  nerve  and  essence  of  the 
latter.  Thus  Spalding,  opposing  the  doctrine  of  immediate  divine 
influence,  exchanged  the  important  doctrine  of  the  operations  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  for  the  dry  notion  of  moral  effort  for  improve- 
ment, under  the  aid  of  God's  providence.  He  and  Teller  both 
opposed  the  use  of  what  they  called  the  figurative  language  of  the 
east,  and,  therefore,  proposed  to  substitute  for  regeneration,  the 
purpose  of  leading  a  new  life  ;  for  sanctification,  reformation  ;  for 
being  filled  with  the  Holy  Spirit,  to  live  reasonably,  &c.  Spald- 
ing's influence,  through  his  works,  "  Worth  of  the  Feelings  in 
Religion,"  and  the  "  Usefulness  of  the  Office  of  a  Minister,"  was 
very  great. 

Teller's  Dictionary  of  the  New  Testament,  which  has  passed 
through  six  editions,  contains  everywhere  these  mere  moral  ideas 
in  the  place  of  the  true  Christian  doctrines.  Christianity  was  to 
be  more  and  more  explained  away  until  it  ceased  to  be  a 
doctrinal  system  altogether,  and  became  a  mere  code  of  morals ; 
men  should  constantly  become  more  intellectual  in  their  reli- 
gion, a  course  in  which  they  could  not  advance  too  far,  but 
should  not  advance  too  rapidly.  We  have  yet  to  mention 
two  other  clergymen,  viz.,  Loeffler,  from  the  year  1785,  gene- 
ral superintendent  in  Gotha.  He  published  the  work  of  Sou- 
veren  on  the  Platonism  of  the  Fathers,  and  in  the  discourse  which 
he  affixed  to  it  opposed  the  doctrines  of  the  Deity  of  Christ,  and 
the  atonement ;  and  Basedow,  a  zealot  in  the  cause  of  illumination. 
He  adopted  a  system  of  education  which  was  a  flat  imitation  of 
that  proposed  by  Rousseau.  He  did  not  wish  to  be  regarded  as  a 
decided  enemy  of  the  positive  doctrines  of  Christianity,  but  as 
only  desiring  to  render  them  agreeable  to  sceptics.  He  found 
thirty-two  errors  in  Christianity,  such  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Tri- 


« 


I 


596  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

nity,  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  two-fold  nature  of 
Christ,  &c.,  &c.     . 

The  Wolfenbiittel  Fragmentist.  There  was  for  a  long  time  a 
debate  who  the  author  of  this  work  really  was  ;  but  Samuel  Reima- 
rus,  professor  in  Hamburg,  acknowledging  himself  as  the  author, 
on  his  death-bed,  has  set  the  matter  at  rest.  He  sent  the  several 
papers  to  Lessing,  by  whom  they  were  published.  The  first  Frag- 
ment was  on  the  Toleration  of  Deists ;  then  followed  five  on  the 
Old  Testament,  then  those  on  the  Resurrection  of  Christ,  the  possi- 
bility of  a  Revelation,  and  the  most  shameful  of  all,  that  on  the 
object  of  Christ  and  his  apostles.  The  author  says,  Christ  wishes 
to  establish  an  earthly  kingdom,  but  failing  in  his  enterprise  made 
the  despairing  exclamation  on  the  cross.  Everything  which  this 
author  wrote  is  marked  by  the  most  decided  spirit  of  infidelity, 
which  he  feared,  however,  fully  to  declare.  His  arguments,  there- 
fore, are  not  those  of  a  calm  investigator  but  of  a  passionate  enemy. 
He  was  entirely  deficient  in  the  true  historical  spirit,  though  in 
other  respects  not  wanting  in  talents.  Riem,  a  preacher  in  Berlin 
in  1782:  he  died  in  Paris,  1795,  on  the  theatre  of  the  revolution. 
He  was  a  fanatical  enemy  of  revealed  religion,  which  he  mani- 
fested in  an  open  and  profane  manner  in  his  "  Religion  of  the 
Children  of  Light,"  Berlin,  1789,  and  in  his  "Christ  and  Reason," 
Brunswick,  1792. 

Among  all  these  authors,  with  the  exception  of  Semler,  there  is 
not  one  who  produced  anything  new ;  we  have  now,  however,  to 
mention  two  men,  who,  in  connexion  with  Semler,  hold  the  most 
important  rank  in  the  history  of  this  period.  The  first  of  these  is 
Lessing,  born  1729.  He  was  originally  designed  by  his  father  for 
theology,  and  for  this  purpose  was  sent  to  Leipzig,  to  pursue  his 
studies ;  but  taking  no  interest  in  the  lectures  there  delivered,  he 
devoted  himself  to  belles  lettres.  He  lived  privately  in  Berlin 
until  1769,  then  acted  as  director  of  the  theatre  for  some  time  in 
Hamburg,  and  thence  removed  to  Wolfenbiittel  as  librarian.  Theo- 
logy was  not  his  profession,  but  his  attention  was  directed  to  va- 
rious subjects,  and  among  others  to  this.  He  examined  the  various 
systems  both  of  philosophy  and  theology,  but  his  mind  found  con- 
tentment nowhere  :  the  doctrines  of  Spinoza  were  most  to  his  taste. 
He  was  far  too  sceptical  to  admit  of  his  believing  in  revelation, 
and  too  much  devoted  to  pleasure  to  be  capable  of  a  moral  inves- 
tigation :  a  life  of  pleasure,  he  said,  was  better  than  a  holy  end. 
Yet  he  had  too  much  head  and  too  much  heart,  not  to  see  and 
feel  that  real  practical  Christianity  was  far  more  worthy  of  re- 
spect and  far  more  elevating  than  the  neological  systems.  Al- 
though he  had  no  experience,  he  was  able  to  respect  it,  which 
gives  importance  to  what  he  says.  His  most  important  works 
are,  1,  the  "  Wolfenbiittel  Fragmentist,"  of  which  he  was  the  pub- 
lisher. His  object  was  to  perplex  and  drive  into  a  corner  the  or- 
thodox theologians,  who  were  proud  of  their  systems.  But  he  said 
he  should  be  sorry  to  have  thought  that  he  had  published  this 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  597 

work  out  of  enmity  to  Christianity.  The  learned  theologian  might 
be  troubled  by  it,  but  not  the  Christian  ;  the  former  might  be  per- 
plexed in  seeing  his  props  of  Christianity  thus  shattered,  but  what 
has  the  Christian  to  do  with  the  hypothesis  and  the  arguments  of 
the  theologian  ?  the  Christianity  in  which  he  feels  himself  so  happy 
is  still  there. 

2.  His  smaller  theological  discourses  contained  in  the  seventh 
volume  of  his  works.  In  one  of  these  he  defends  deism  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner  : — 

The  Christian  religion,  he  said,  was  the  religion  which  Christ 
possessed,  and  this  every  man  should  endeavour  to  attain,  although 
it  is  difficult  to  state  precisely  what  it  is.  He  assumed  a  natural 
religion,  in  the  same  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  natural  rights,  but 
when  men  come  together  they  must  endeavour  to  agree  upon  cer- 
tain points,  and  thus  arises  a  positive  religion  in  the  same  way  as 
positive  rights.  His  discourse  also  on  the  Moravians  is  worthy  of 
remark,  in  which  the  warm  piety  of  this  sect  is  cordially  approved 
and  defended  against  the  objections  of  the  orthodox.  Also  his  dis- 
course, "  Christianity  and  Reason,"  in  which  Christianity  is  ex- 
plained by  Pantheism. 

3.  "  His  work  on  the  Education  of  the  Human  Race."  This, 
although  a  small  work,  is  rich  in  matter.  It  admits  of  a  two-fold 
interpretation  in  one  view  it  seems  to  be  a  refutation  of  neology, 
but  in  another  it  is  an  attack  on  all  revealed  religion,  and  an  apolo- 
gy for  Pantheism. 

It  was  then  common  to  urge  against  Judaism  these  two  objec- 
tions :  first,  that  it  was  too  particular  and  confined  ;  and  secondly, 
that  it  did  not  contain  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
These  objections  Lessing  answers  in  a  masterly  manner,  although 
not  altogether  on  principles  which  a  Christian  can  adopt.  "  Juda- 
ism," he  says,  "is  to  be  justified  on  the  ground  of  God's  condescen- 
sion to  human  weakness.  If  God  wished  to  lead  men  in  the  way 
of  truth,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  place  them  under  a  course 
of  education  which  implies  gradual  instruction;  and  it  was  always 
necessary  that  this  course  should  be  restricted  to  a  single  and  se- 
cluded people  that  the  difference  between  them  and  others  might  be 
apparent.  He  further  remarks,  that  if  Christianity  contains  the 
results  to  which  reason  leads,  it  is  no  proof  that  it  is  not  a  revela- 
tion ;  as  in  the  arithmetic  for  children,  the  result  is  stated  before 
the  investigation  commences.  Under  these  views,  however,  lies 
hid  a  Pantheistical  system.  The  "  Collection  of  Frederick 
Schlegel"  contains  "  Lessing's  Thoughts  and  Opinions  ;"  Leipzig, 
1804,  three  vols.  From  this  work  we  give  the  following  leading 
ideas :  He  endeavours  to  show  that  it  was  by  no  means  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  Christianity,  that  the  popular  philosophers  had  reduced 
it  down  to  the  standard  of  natural  religion,  in  order  to  make  it  ac- 
ceptable to  sceptics.  "  Formerly,"  as  he  remarks,  "  there  was  a 
distinction  between  theology  and  philosophy,  and  each  could  pur- 
sue their  course  undisturbed  :  but  the  philosophers  break  down  the 


598  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

separating  wall ;  and,  under  pretence  of  making  us  reasonable 
Christians,  make  us  unreasonable  philosophers."  Leibnitz,  he  says, 
was  of  the  opinion,  that  only  to  believe  Christianity  on  the  ground 
of  reason,  was  not  to  believe  it  at  all ;  and  that  the  only  book 
which,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  words,  ever  has  been  or  ever  can 
be,  written  on  the  truths  of  the  Bible,  is  the  Bible  itself.  Lessing, 
therefore,  properly  remarks,  that  it  is  the  province  of  reason  to  de- 
cide whether  the  Bible  be  a  revelation  or  not ;  but  if  this  be  settled 
in  the  affirmative,  its  containing  things  which  we  cannot  under- 
stand, is  rather  a  proof  for,  than  against  it.  Another  of  his  re- 
marks, equally  well  founded,  is,  that  faith  in  the  truths  of  revela- 
tion is  not  to  be  obtained  by  the  separate  examination  of  the  several 
distinct  points,  historical  and  doctrinal ;  that  no  one  ever  would 
become  a  believer  in  Christianity,  if  he  endeavoured  to  make  every 
fact  and  every  doctrine  certain  beyond  dispute,  before  he  adopted 
it  as  a  revelation.  So  far  from  this,  they  only  can  admit  the  seve- 
ral points  to  whom  the  holy  contents  of  the  entire  Gospel  has  com- 
mended itself  as  truth  which  sheds  light  upon  all  the  particulars. 
In  this  he  agrees  with  Lord  Bacon,  who  compares  the  defenders 
of  Christianity  who  act  upon  the  principle  referred  to,  to  those  who 
place  a  candle  in  every  corner  of  a  large  hall,  instead  of  hanging 
a  large  chandelier  in  the  middle  of  it,  which  would  shed  its  light  to 
the  darkest  recesses.  Lessing  expresses  the  same  idea  in  another 
form,  when  he  compares  the  Christian  to  the  confident  victor,  who, 
disregarding  the  frontier  fortifications  of  a  land,  seizes  hold  of  the 
country  itself;  while  the  theologian  is  like  a  timid  soldier  who 
wastes  his  strength  in  the  boundary,  and  never  sees  the  land. 

The  other  individual  whom  we  mentioned  as  ranking  with  Sem- 
ler  was  Herder,  born  in  Morungen,  in  East  Prussia,  1741.  Herder 
was  educated  under  the  care  of  Christian  parents,  and  by  a  pious 
clergyman,  whose  name  was  Trescho.  The  impressions  made  by 
his  early  education  he  never  lost  ;  he  always  endeavoured  to 
defend  what  had,  in  his  youth,  appeared  to  him  as  true  and  holy. 
As  imagination  and  feeling  were  the  leading  characteristics  of  his 
mind,  his  views  of  Christianity  were  rather  of  a  sentimental  cast, 
his  knowledge  of  it  was  not  deep  and  practical.  The  austerity  of 
his  teacher  conspired  to  render  the  manner  in  which  he  regarded 
the  subject  unpleasant  to  Herder!s  feelings.  In  his  attendance  on 
the  university,  he  devoted  himself  particularly  to  classical  litera- 
ture and  belles  lettres,  with  which  he  connected  the  study  of  the- 
ology. When  we  consider  the  effect  of  these  studies,  in  connexion 
with  what  we  have  said  of  his  disposition  and  his  early  education, 
we  shall  be  able  to  explain  his  future  course.  His  early  impres- 
sions determined  him  from  the  first  to  appear  as  the  defender  of 
Christianity,  which  he  really  wished,  to  be.  But  as  he  was  not 
fully  acquainted  with  what  practical  Christianity  really  was,  and 
as  he  had  received  a  prejudice  against  austerity,  and  as  the  belles 
lettres  had  fastened  on  his  affections,  his  defence  never  proceeded 
upon  the  principles  on  which  our  religion  either  can  or  should  be 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  599 

defended.  He  did  not  represent  Christianity  as  the  only  means  of 
salvation  for  men  sunk  in  sin  and  misery  ;  not  as  the  narrow  path 
in  which  men  must  walk  to  secure  eternal  life  ;  but  he  endeavoured 
to  recommend  it  for  its  beauty  and  amiability;  to  present  the 
scriptures  in  an  attractive  light  as  "  belles  lettres  "  productions  ;  to 
recommend  the  sacred  personages  of  the  Bible  for  their  moral 
loveliness.  Such  a  justification  as  this  can  never  be  of  much  avail. 
Amidst  all  the  temptations  of  life,  and  the  difficulties  with  which 
our  faith  is  assaulted,  we  must  have  some  better  foundation  than 
this.  And  Herder  is  himself  an  example  how  little  a  faith,  resting 
on  such  grounds,  can  affect  the  life. 

He  was  called,  as  general  superintendent,  to  Weimar,  where  he 
was  brought  into  connexion  with  the  first  authors  of  Germany,  and 
he  himself  praised  and  caressed  as  one  of  her  best  poets.  The 
various  temptations  to  vanity  and  worldly  enjoyments,  by  which 
he  was  surrounded,  he  was  unable  to  withstand.  He  endeavoured 
to  become  less  and  less  offensive  to  the  world,  whilst  he  retained 
his  character  as  defender  of  Christianity.  But,  though  apparently 
its  defender,  he  gradually  relinquished  all  its  doctrines,  by  repre- 
senting all  definite  ideas  upon  them  as  doubtful.  Everything  was 
merged  in  a  magic  obscurity,  over  which  he  could  poeticise  at 
pleasure ;  but  he  left  his  readers  entirely  at  a  loss  to  determine 
what  was  to  be  retained  and  what  rejected.  Hence  Garve  said, 
"  his  writings  were  like  a  distant  cloud,  of  which  no  man  could  tell 
whether  it  was  merely  a  cloud,  or  a  city  involved  in  obscurity  yet 
filled  with  inhabitants."  In  his  early  writings  there  is  much  that 
is  useful,  with  good  feeling,  and  many  correct  views.  To  this 
class  belongs  his  "Oldest  Records  of  the  Human  Race,"  his  "  Let- 
ters on  the  Study  of  Theology,"  and  his  "  Remarks  on  the  New 
Testament,  from  a  newly  opened  Oriental  Source."  His  later 
works,  on  "The  Redeemer,"  and  "The  Resurrection  of  Christ," 
have  more  or  less  of  the  character  of  obscurity  of  which  we  have 
spoken ;  in  reality  they  are  neological.  Of  his  "  Ideas  on  the  Phi- 
losophy of  the  History  of  Man,"  John  von  Miiller  says,  "I  find 
everything  there  but  Christ,  and  what  is  the  history  of  the  world 
without  Christ?" 

Section  VII. — On  the  Influence  of  the  New  Philosophy. 

The  philosophy  which  prevailed,  until  the  latter  half  of  the  last 
century,  had  pretended  to  be  able  to  present  a  regular  mathemati- 
cal demonstration  on  all  the  subjects  of  which  it  treated.  This 
philosophy  of  Wolf,  although  professing  to  defend  Christianity,  had 
been  the  means  of  exciting  in  many  minds  the  spirit  of  scepticism. 
Many  profound  thinkers,  striving  in  a  wrong  way  to  attain  a 
knowledge  of  the  truth,  were  at  last  brought  to  the  conviction  that 
this  knowledge  was  unattainable.  Besides  this,  Wolf  had  sepa- 
rated so  completely  natural  and  revealed  religion,  that  many  of 


600  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

the  advocates  of  his  system  contented  themselves  with  the  former; 
and  this  gave  rise  to  what  is  called  the  popular  philosophy. 

In  the  former  part  of  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
therefore,  the  philosophers  were  divided  into  those  who  thought 
they  could  demonstrate  all  the  truths  of  natural  and  revealed  reli- 
gion, and  those  who  had  separated  some  few  leading  doctrines, 
which  they  thought  were  alone  susceptible  of  demonstration. 
But  a  great  revolution  was  at  hand  ;  the  philosophy  of  Kant  ap- 
peared in  decided  opposition  to  everything  which  had  previously 
passed  under  that  name.  Kant  was  excited,  by  the  scepticism  of 
Hume,  to  investigate  the  ability  of  the  human  powers  to  attain  to 
a  knowledge  of  invisible  things.  This  was  something  new,  for  the 
German  philosophers  had  been  accustomed  to  speculate,  with  in- 
quiring whether  reason  was  adequate  to  the  discovery  of  the  truth. 
The  result  of  Kant's  investigations  was,  that  man  was  entirely 
incompetent  to  the  task  of  attaining  to  a  knowledge  of  invisible 
things,  and  that  the  demonstrations  of  Wolf  amounted  to  nothing. 
He  was  not,  however,  willing  entirely  to  give  up  metaphysics,  and 
as  he  could  not  found  a  system  on  demonstration,  he  attempted  to 
erect  one  on  postulates  of  practical  reason.  The  hinge  upon  which 
his  system  turns,  is  the  categorical  imperative  in  man ;  that  is,  the 
consciousness  that  we  should  be  and  do  what  the  moral  law  re- 
quires. This  categorical  imperative  cannot  be  denied,  as  every 
man  carries  it  in  his  own  bosom.  But  if  this  be  not  self-contra- 
dictory, impelling  us  to  an  object  which  does  not  exist  or  which 
cannot  be  attained,  there  must  be  a  metaphysics  which  contains 
these  three  truths,  the  existence  of  God,  the  liberty  of  man,  and 
the  immortality  of  the  soul.  For  if  this  imperative  be  not  deceit- 
ful, man  must  have  the  power  of  realizing  the  object  to  which  it 
impels,  and  this  is  his  liberty.  But  the  excellence  to  which  it 
urges  us  is  in  this  world  never  fully  attained  ;  there  must,  therefore, 
be  a  future  state  in  which  it  may  be  completely  realized.  There 
must  also  be  a  governor  who  has  this  excellence  in  himself,  and 
who  can  distribute  rewards  in  proportion  to  virtue,  hence  a  God. 
Within  these  limits,  and  to  explain  and  illustrate  these  three  truths, 
Kant  confined  the  whole  of  metaphysics.  With  regard  to  this 
system  it  may  be  remarked,  that  its  negative  part  contains  more 
truth  than  its  positive  portion.  He  is  right  in  denying  the  possi- 
bility of  reason  attaining  a  knowledge  of  the  infinite  ;  that  there  is 
a  gulf  here  over  which  no  bridge  can  be  built,  it  must  be  leapt. 
He  should,  therefore,  have  been  led  to  acknowledge  a  revelation, 
which  the  Christians  of  that  day  expected  he  would  do.  How 
this  necessarily  follows  from  his  principles,  is  proved  in  a  work 
entitled  "  Immanuel,  a  book  for  Jews  and  Christians,"  written  by 
a  distinguished  statesman.  In  reference  to  the  positive  part,  what 
is  new  therein  is  not  true,  and  what  is  true  is  not  new.  The  truth 
is  that  the  moral  feelings  of  man  will,  amidst  all  his  doubts,  urge 
him  to  believe  in  another  world ;  but  the  peculiar  form  in  which 
Kant  sought  to  present  this  subject  is  false.     His  argument  is,  that 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  601 

if  this  imperative  be  not  self-contradictory  there  must  be  a  God, 
human  liberty,  and  immortality ;  but  this  imperative  is  not  false, 
therefore  these  three  truths  must  be  admitted.  But  in  this  argu- 
ment there  is  a  petitio  principii.  It  takes  for  granted  that  the 
world  is  created  and  exists  for  a  definite  object.  But  this  the  most 
consequent  philosophical  systems  deny.  They  say  the  idea  of  an 
object  is  a  gross  anthropomorphism  ;  that  he  who  proposes  an  end 
to  himself  must  employ  means  to  attain  that  end ;  but  this  implies 
that  the  end  cannot  be  immediately  attained,  and,  therefore,  that 
the  being  who  proposes  to  himself  an  end  or  object  must  be  im- 
perfect; in  the  world,  therefore,  no  such  striving  after  an  end  can 
be  admitted,  but  the  working  of  an  absolute  necessity.  When 
Kant,  therefore,  takes  for  granted  that  the  world  has  an  object,  he 
assumes,  what  was  to  be  proved,  the  existence  of  an  intelligent 
personal  Deity.  The  form  of  his  argument  is  hence  false.  It  may 
further  be  remarked  that,  according  to  Kant's  system,  these  three 
important  doctrines  are  made  very  subordinate,  in  that  they  are  ad- 
mitted, not  on  the  ground  of  their  own  evidence,  but  upon  the 
ground  of  this  categorical  imperative.  In  this  view  man  becomes 
a  law  to  himself.  God  only  distributes  the  amount  of  happiness 
which  has  been  merited.  Holiness  is  also  presented  in  a  very 
subordinate  light,  because,  according  to  this  manner  of  conceiving 
of  it,  it  must  receive  its  happiness  from  without,  which  is  a  false 
idea  of  the  subject,  against  which  even  Socrates  had  opposed  him- 
self; this  is  the  most  deficient  point  in  the  system.  With  regard 
to  the  effects  produced  by  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  it  may  be  re- 
marked, that  they  were  both  salutary  and  injurious.  It  prostrated 
the  pride  of  those  who  pretended  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  every- 
thing, and  it  aroused  the  mind  from  the  drowsiness  which  had  been 
produced  by  the  popular  philosophy.  Its  evil  effects  were,  that  a 
cold  frigid  spirit  was  thrown  over  its  advocates,  who  employed 
themselves  about  dry  morality  and  barren  intellect,  rejecting  all 
deep  feeling  as  fanaticism  ;  even  prayer  itself  was  rejected.  Hence 
all  the  sciences  to  which  this  philosophy  extended  its  influence  lost 
their  vitality,  and  assumed  a  pedantic,  scholastic,  schoolmaster-like 
aspect.  This  was  especially  the  case  with  theology  and  history. 
They  were  only  estimated  so  far  as  they  solved  the  problem  of 
the  Kantish  morals ;  what  was  individual  and  characteristic  was 
not  regarded.  Christ  himself  was  estimated  only  for  having  taught 
a  system  of  morals  analogous  to  those  of  Kant.  This  philosophy 
spread  itself  more  rapidly  than  any  had  ever  done  before  it. 
Among  the  theologians  its  defenders  were  Staiidlin,  Schmidt,  and 
Tieftrunk,  although  the  former  at  last  gave  it  up.  Even  those  who 
did  not  formally  adopt  the  system,  were  obliged  to  conform  them- 
selves to  it,  as  was  the  case  with  the  popular  philosophers  in  Berlin, 
Nicolai,  Garve,  and  Mendelssohn  ;  they  complained  much,  that  the 
new  philosophy  had  occasioned  so  much  trouble  and  difficulty,  where 
everything  was  quite  clear  before.  Reinhard,  although  he  did  not 
embrace  the  system  of  Kant,  allowed  himself  to  be  so  far  influ- 


602  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

enced  by  it  as  to  introduce  many  of  his  principles  in  his  system  of 
morals.  All  men,  however,  of  much  feeling  opposed  a  philosophy 
which  was  so  dry  and  scholastic ;  of  this  number  were  particu- 
larly Hamann  and  Herder — see  Kant's  "  Religion  within  the  limits 
of  Pure  Reason,"  and  Tieftrunk's  "  Censure  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
Protestant  Church." 

Another  crisis  in  the  history  of  philosophy  was  at  hand.  The 
system  which  Kant  had  erected,  was  destroyed  by  one  of  his  own 
pupils  (Fichte).  Fichte  followed  a  different  path  from  that  pur- 
sued by  his  predecessor.  Kant  had  shown  that  man  was  not  able 
to  attain  to  a  distinct  knowledge  of  sensible  things,  that  the  predi- 
cates which  we  attribute  to  things  arise  only  from  the  categories 
of  our  own  minds,  but  what  it  is  without  us,  which  occasions  the 
perception  of  these  attributes  or  predicates,  we  cannot  know  ;  it  is 
an  unknown  power,  X.  But  Fichte  proposed  the  question,  that  if 
we  know  nothing  of  the  essence  of  things,  if  they  be  an  unknown 
X,  and  their  predicates  categories  of  our  own  minds,  what  evi- 
dence have  we  that  the  things  themselves  exist  ?  what  are  they  ? 
and  how  can  they  come  in  contact  with  our  minds  ?  His  conclu- 
sion is,  that  the  external  world,  the  X  of  Kant,  has  no  existence  ; 
the  qualities  alone  exist,  and  these  merely  as  laws  of  the  human 
mind.  The  material  world  is  nothing,  there  is  nothing  out  of  our- 
selves, it  is  only  from  the  laws  of  the  mind  that  the  world  appears 
to  exist.  We  thus  attain  an  object  which  all  philosophy  aims  at, 
the  removal  of  the  difference  between  matter  and  spirit,  as  in  this 
view  there  is  no  such  thing  as  matter.  Fichte's  view  of  the  hu- 
man soul  was  the  following :  God  the  infinite  ens  comes  to  existens, 
in  that  he  exists  in  the  activity  of  finite  thinking  spirits  ;  the  activity 
or  thinking  of  these  finite  thinking  principles  is  the  existence  of 
the  infinite  ens.  Whence  come  then  the  external  appearances? 
If  the  finite  thinking  principle  was  confined  entirely  within  itself, it 
would  merge  in  the  infinite,  and  become  nothing.  That  this  prin- 
ciple should  have  reality  and  life,  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  have 
an  object  within  itself;  hence  the  infinite  thinking  principle  when 
it  comes  to  existence  in  the  finite,  places  at  the  same  time  with  the 
finite  thinking  principle  a  limitation  ;  therefore  this  limitation  is  the 
apparently  existing  material  world  ;  and  hence  with  every  ego 
there  is  placed  a  non  ego.  The  activity  and  life  of  every  finite 
thinking  principle  of  every  ego  consists  in  breaking  through  this 
limitation.  This  occurs  in  a  two-fold  manner,  first,  when  the  hu- 
man spirit  pervades  and  thinks  through  the  objects  opposed  to  it, 
so  that  they  pass  over  into  the  spirit  and  become  one  with  it,  and 
secondly,  when  the  thinking  principle  raises  itself  above  all  laws  of 
the  non  ego,  and  lives  free  according  to  its  own  laws.  This  sys- 
tem of  Fichte  was  more  consequent  than  that  of  Kant,  but  it  failed 
to  solve  the  problem,  the  removal  of  the  difference  of  matter  and 
spirit ;  dualism  remains  in  this  system  as  well  as  in  the  other. 
The  problem  is  indeed  apparently  solved  by  denying  the  existence 
of  matter,  but  the  opposition  is  only  removed  to  the  mind  itself, 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  603 

where  a  limitation  is  placed.  This  philosophy  is  in  one  view  a 
very  active  living  one,  but  its  life  is  only  abstract,  as  it  concerns 
itself  only  with  abstract  thinking,  and  neglects  every  other  depart- 
ment and  faculty  of  the  soul.  Its  influence  was  so  far  beneficial, 
as  it  excited  in  many  a  great  degree  of  mental  activity,  and  in 
others  produced  great  moral  strictness.  The  evils  which  it  pro- 
duced were  also  great.  All  the  material  sciences  were  despised, 
and  importance  attributed  only  to  abstract  speculations.  A  degree 
of  freedom  also  was  ascribed  to  men  which  belongs  only  to  God, 
which  excited  the  greatest  self-sufficiency.  The  most  important 
works  on  this  system  are  Fichte's  "  Appeal  to  the  public  on  the 
charge  made  against  him  of  Atheism,"  Jena,  1801.  "  Instructions 
for  a  Happy  Life,"  Berlin,  1806.  In  these  writings,  this  philoso- 
phy came  into  more  immediate  contact  with  religion  ;  see  also,  "  An 
exhibition  of  the  true  character  of  the  nature-philosophy  for  the 
improvement  of  the  doctrines  of  Fichte,"  Tubingen,  1806. 

Schelling  followed  Fichte.  He  proposed  for  his  object  the  actual 
removing  of  all  opposition  between  matter  and  spirit;  according 
to  his  system,  an  existence  is  ascribed  as  much  to  the  material 
as  the  immaterial  world  ;  the  former  being  only  a  different  mode 
of  expression  or  manifestation.  The  spirit  which  thinks  through 
these  material  objects,  frees  them  from  their  bonds  by  freeing  the 
spirit  which  is  in  them.  In  so  far,  however,  as  the  laws  of  matter 
are  the  expressions  of  the  spirit,  the  latter  only  finds  itself  again 
when  it  thinks  through  the  matter  and  appropriates  it  to  itself. 
The  only  object,  therefore,  of  speculation  on  the  external  world  is 
to  come  to  a  full  knowledge  or  consciousness  of  ourselves ;  that  is, 
to  find  without  us  what  we  have  in  ourselves.  According  to  these 
views,  God  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  mere  l»,  since  this  would  be 
lifeless.  If  God  be  living  he  must  have  an  opposition  in  himself, 
the  removal  of  which  is  his  life ;  hence  the  unity  of  God  has  ever 
manifested  itself  in  multitude  and  variety.  The  spirit  manifested 
itself  in  matter,  that  the  variety  may  reach  the  unity,  and  matter 
be  freed  and  raised  to  spirit.  This  is  the  eternal  activity  of  God. 
The  whole  business  of  philosophy  is  concerned  with  this  point,  the 
coming  of  God  to  self-consciousness. 

This  philosophy  had  the  effect  of  spreading  through  Germany 
an  element  different  from  any  which  had  previously  prevailed.  It 
produced  a  deep  feeling  and  consciousness  of  a  living  and  infinite 
principle  in  the  world  and  in  men,  in  nature  and  in  spirit.  It  de- 
stroyed the  lifeless  idea  of  a  God,  who  stood  behind  the  world 
without  having  any  real  unity  with  it.  It  aroused  men  to  strive 
after  knowledge,  in  a  deeper  and  more  effectual  manner,  because 
it  did  not  employ  itself  with  abstract  speculations,  but  with  intui- 
tive views ;  in  this  respect  it  greatly  exceeded  the  popular  philoso- 
phy, or  that  of  Wolf  or  Kant.  Its  influence  on  theology  therefore 
was  very  great ;  whilst  the  popular  philosophy  and  that  of  Kant 
sought  to  expunge  everything  above  the  reach  of  reason,  that  of 
Schelling  again  awakened  the  feelings  for  the  infinite.     Schelling's 


604  tholuck's  history  op  theology 

philosophical  works  were  published  together  in  1809,  including  the 
Treatise  on  Human  Liberty ;  see  also  Bruns  on  the  Principle  of 
Divine  and  Human  things,  Berlin,  1802 ;  Philosophy  and  Religion, 
Tubingen,  1804;  a  monument  to  the  work  of  Jacobi  on  Divine 
things,  Tubingen,  1812 ;  Controversial  works  on  this  subject — 
Susskind's  Examination  of  the  Doctrine  of  Schelling  respecting 
God,  the  Creation  and  Liberty,  1812  ;  Jacobi  on  Divine  things  and 
their  Revelation,  1811. 

These  two  philosophers  were  opposed  by  a  man  whose  influ- 
ence was  not  only  great  during  his  life  but  continues  to  the  present 
time.  This  was  Frederick  Henry  Jacobi.  He  opposed  the  specu- 
lations of  Kant  as  well  as  those  of  Fichte  and  Schelling ;  he  ad- 
mitted with  regard  to  the  latter  two,  that  they  were  consequent, 
as  well  as  Spinoza,  but  the  result  he  could  not  embrace.  He  could 
not  prevail  on  himself  to  renounce  his  faith  in  human  liberty,  a 
personal  God,  personal  immortality,  and  the  objective  nature  of 
evil. 

He,  therefore,  opposed  to  these  systems,  the  inward  conscious- 
ness we  have  of  divine  things,  and  maintained  it  was  impossible, 
by  speculation,  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  these  subjects ;  there 
must  be  an  immediate  and  intuitive  knowledge  of  them,  whether 
this  intuitive  perception  be  called  reason  or  consciousness.  This 
intuitive  feeling  teaches  us  that  there  is  a  God,  who  stands  as  thou 
before  our  ego — something  different  from  man.  It  teaches  also 
the  liberty  of  man ;  personal  immortality  and  the  objective  nature 
of  evil.  Whilst  Jacobi  presented  these  views,  he  appeared  at  the 
same  time  in  hostility  against  revealed  religion.  He  said  that  his- 
torical experience  was  as  much  mediate  as  speculation,  and,  there- 
fore, history  was  as  unfit  as  speculation  to  afford  a  true  knowledge 
of  divine  things.  Man  cannot  believe  in  an  eternal  free  God,  by 
merely  hearing  a  relation  concerning  him  ;  the  ground  of  this 
must,  therefore,  lie  in  the  soul  itself.  These  views  are  principally 
expressed  in  the  introduction  to  his  work  on  divine  things,  in  which 
he  appears  as  the  opponent  of  Claudius. 

Jacobi  overlooked  two  important  points  :  first,  he  did  not  con- 
sider that  it  might  be  asked  him,  where  faith  in  his  four  doctrines 
is  to  be  found  beyond  the  limits  of  Christianity  ?  The  whole  east 
is  destitute  of  it — the  western  philosophy  knows  as  little  about  it ; 
only  weak  echoings  of  this  truth  are  anywhere  to  be  heard.  Only 
a  few  individuals  among  the  most  cultivated  of  mankind,  have  had 
an  indistinct  knowledge  of  them  in  any  period  of  the  world.  Ja- 
cobi himself  borrowed  them  from  historical  Christianity,  though 
he  was  ungrateful  enough  to  deny  his  obligation.  He  cannot  ex- 
press himself  upon  this  subject,  except  in  terms  borrowed  from  the 
Bible.  It  cannot,  indeed,  be  said,  that  we  believe  these  truths 
merely  because  they  have  been  historically  communicated  to  us, 
but  because  we  are  related  to  God ;  and  this  relation,  even  in  our 
present  fallen  state,  is  not  entirely  destroyed,  although  the  fall  has 
blinded  and  obscured  our  knowledge :  tradition  alone,  therefore, 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  605 

is  not  the  foundation  of  our  faith,  but  this  feeling  of  our  relation 
to  God.  We  find  nowhere  beyond  the  influence  of  the  Gospel, 
the  humble  temper  of  a  servant  represented  as  the  ideal  of  mora- 
lity. We  find  no  such  character  as  that  of  the  humble  Redeemer ; 
we  never  meet  the  idea  that  true  greatness  consists  in  poverty  of 
spirit.  However  strongly  a  man  may  believe  on  the  ground  of 
his  own  consciousness,  yet  he  must  admit  if  God  had  not  revealed 
himself  we  should  never  have  arrived  at  a  knowledge  of  true  hap- 
piness, and  that  a  revelation  was  necessary  to  render  these  doc- 
trines definite  and  secure.  But  Christianity  contains  something 
more  than  these  four  truths  of  Jacobi ;  it  contains  the  plan  of  re- 
demption ;  a  knowledge  of  the  purposes  of  God  cannot  be  obtain- 
ed by  intuition,  yet  here  is  faith  essential.  Even  admitting,  there- 
fore, the  possibility  of  learning  the  truths  referred  to,  from  a  differ- 
ent source,  it  does  not  destroy  the  necessity  of  a  historical  revela- 
tion. See  the  works  of  Jacobi  published  by  Fleischer,  particularly 
the  second  volume  of  his  work  on  "  Divine  Things." 

After  philosophy,  in  connexion  with  various  other  causes,  had 
exercised  such  an  influence  on  theology,  a  theological  system  was 
formed  as  the  result  of  all  these  efforts  at  illumination.  To  this 
system  the  name  of  rationalism  has  been  given  ;  a  name  first  ap- 
plied by  Reinhard.  The  system  is,  in  fact,  the  same  which  was 
previously  called  deism.  This  system  not  only  sought  to  obtain 
stability  for  itself,  but  appeared  in  decided  hostility  to  Christianity. 
As  to  its  tenability,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  rationalist  must 
either  undertake  to  support  his  doctrines  on  the  ground  of  reason 
and  argument,  or  found  them  upon  feeling.  If  he  takes  the  first 
course,  he  must  do  it  after  the  method  of  the  philosophy  of  Wolf; 
for  that  alone  undertakes  to  establish  in  a  demonstrative  way  the 
doctrines  of  God,  freedom  and  immortality.  But  the  weakness  of 
this  philosophy  has  long  since  been  proved.  If  the  rationalist  gives 
this  up,  he  must  place  himself  on  the  foundation  of  feeling,  on  the 
principle  of  Jacobi ;  and  this  is  the  fact  with  the  most  of  them. 
When  he  takes  this  ground  he  loses  all  right  to  contend  against  a 
believer  in  the  Bible.  For  he  can  no  longer  demand  of  him,  that 
doctrines  which  are  beyond  the  reach  of  reason,  should  be  reduced 
to  its  standard  and  justified  before  its  tribunal.  The  rationalist 
must  acknowledge  that  he  cannot  do  this  for  his  own  doctrines  of 
the  personality  of  God,  human  liberty,  &e.  With  the  same  wea- 
pons, therefore,  with  which  he  contends  against  the  believer  he  is 
attacked  by  the  Pantheist,  against  whom  he  cannot  maintain  his 
ground.  The  Pantheist  declares  his  proofs  mere  subjective  decep- 
tion, and  his  doctrines  anthropomorphic  views.  The  believer  in 
the  Bible  can  also  object  to  the  rationalist,  that  his  deistical  doc- 
trines are  drawn  from  Christianity,  although  deprived  of  their  glo- 
ry and  power.  And  further,  that  his  system,  excluding  the  ideas 
of  a  revelation,  divine  government,  and  redemption,  presents  a 
problem  which  does  not  admit  of  a  solution.  The  idea  of  God 
which  rationalism  contains,  is  borrowed  from  the  Bible;  but  if  God 


606  tholuck's  history  of  theology 

really  possesses  all  the  attributes  here  ascribed  to  him,  it  would  ap- 
pear necessary  that  so  wise  and  good  a  Being  should  have  a  nearer 
relation  to  his  creatures,  and  give  them  some  surer  guide  in  refer- 
ence to  divine  things  than  human  reason,  which  teaches  so  many 
various  and  inconsistent  doctrines,  and  which,  beyond  the  limits  of 
Christianity,  has  never  yet  presented  the  idea  of  God  which  Chris- 
tian deism  contains.  The  rationalist  acknowledges  the  objective 
nature  of  morality  ;  but  for  his  certainty  on  this  point  he  is  indebt- 
ed to  revelation,  and  yet  arbitrarily  rejects  the  doctrines  of  the  fall 
and  of  redemption  through  Jesus  Christ.  In  this  way  he  is  led  into 
another  difficulty.  Whence  is  evil  ?  the  rationalist  is  obliged  to 
refer  it  to  God,  that  through  the  struggle  between  good  and  evil 
the  former  might  be  promoted.  Whilst  the  denier  of  a  revelation 
makes  God  the  author  of  evil,  he  gives  no  explanation  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  evil  can  be  rooted  out  of  the  heart  of  man.  His 
blindness  on  this  point  arises  from  his  having  no  deep  and  proper 
knowledge  of  good  or  evil.  The  positive  part  of  rationalism  thus 
consisting  of  Christian  doctrines  deprived  of  their  glory  and  con- 
sistency, is  equally  unsatisfactory  for  the  human  heart  and  human 
understanding,  particularly  in  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  evil. 

The  rationalist  undertakes,  however,  to  prove,  not  only  that 
Christianity  is  improbable,  but  that  it  is  contrary  to  reason,  and  en- 
tirely inadmissible.  In  this  effort  its  weakness  is  most  clearly  ex- 
posed. It  proceeds  from  the  principle  that  God  never  works  with- 
out the  intervention  of  secondary  causes,  and  therefore  an  imme- 
diate revelation  is  impossible.  Revelation  can  only  be  mediate, 
and  consist  in  a  development  of  what  already  lies  in  the  nature  of 
man.  Hence  arises  the  distinction  between  naturalism  and  super- 
naturalism  ;  the  former  regarding  every  religious  communication 
as  mediate,  consisting  in  the  development  of  what  is  in  man,  the 
latter  maintaining  an  immediate  communication  of  divine  truth,  not 
derived  from  the  human  mind  itself.  The  rationalist  assumes  that 
God,  at  the  beginning,  formed  the  world  as  a  machine,  with  whose 
powers,  having  once  set  them  in  motion,  he  never  interferes.  This 
view  is  in  the  first  place  false,  but  admitting  its  correctness,  the 
conclusion  drawn  from  it  by  the  rationalist  is  by  no  means  neces- 
sary. For,  granting  that  God  does  not  interfere  with  the  world,  it 
does  not  follow  that  he  cannot  and  will  not.  At  most,  the  impro- 
bability, but  not  the  impossibility,  of  an  immediate  revelation  fol- 
lows from  this  view. 

But  the  view  itself  is  false  ;  God  is  not  a  machinist,  who,  having 
finished  his  work,  retires  behind :  the  life  in  the  universe  cannot  be 
regarded  as  absolutely  distinct  from  the  life  of  God.  God  conti- 
nues and  supports  the  world  by  a  continual  creation,  for  such  in 
fact  is  preservation.  The  life  of  the  world  is  the  breath  of  Jeho- 
vah ;  its  active  powers,  the  working  of  its  omnipresence;  the  laws 
of  nature  are  not  therefore  fixed  once  and  for  ever.  Augustine 
says,  Lex  naturae  est  voluntas  Dei,  et  miraculum  non  fit  contra  na- 
turam,  sed  contra  quam  est  nota  natura.     The  laws  of  nature  are 


IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.  007 

mere  abstractions,  which  men  make  from  the  usual  operations  of 
God.  It  can,  therefore,  by  no  means  be  said,  that  his  unusual  ope- 
rations, as  in  immediate  revelations  and  miracles,  are  violations  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  There  is  no  essential  difference  between  im- 
mediate and  mediate  operations  ;  it  is  merely  the  difference  between 
unusual  and  usual.  And  if  God  would  reveal  himself  as  a  living 
and  personal  Being,  these  extraordinary  operations  of  his  power 
are  essential,  as  they  contain  the  proof  that  nature  is  not  a  piece  of 
dead  mechanism. 

But  the  rationalist  also  endeavours  to  show  the  improbability  of 
a  revelation  upon  moral  principles  He  says  it  would  prove  that 
God  had  made  man  imperfect,  if  later  communications  and  revela- 
tions were  necessary.  But  in  this  objection  it  is  overlooked  that 
man  is  not  now,  as  he  was  originally  created.  In  his  primitive 
state,  an  immediate  revelation  might  not  have  been  necessary,  but 
in  his  fallen  state  the  case  is  essentially  different.  The  rationalist 
further  demands,  why  was  the  revelation  not  made  immediately 
after  the  fall,  before  so  many  generations  had  passed  away  ?  To 
this  we  may  answer,  that  God  appears  to  have  determined  to  con- 
duct and  educate  the  whole  race  as  an  individual,  and  in  the  idea 
of  education  lies  that  of  gradual  progress. 

Finally,  it  is  objected  that  the  revelation  is  not  universal.  In  an- 
swer to  this  we  may  say,  that  the  difficulty  presses  the  deist  as 
much  as  the  Christian,  because  it  affects  the  doctrine  of  providence. 
The  deist  makes  religion  and  refinement  the  greatest  blessings  of 
men  ;  but  why  has  God  left  so  many  ages  and  nations  destitute  of 
these  blessings  ?  If  the  deist  must  confess  his  ignorance  upon  this 
point,  why  may  not  the  Christian  ?  Besides  this,  Christians  them- 
selves are  to  blame,  that  the  revelation  has  not  been  more  exten- 
sively spread  ;  why  have  they  only  within  a  few  years  awaked  to 
the  importance  of  this  work  ?  And  why  do  the  rationalists,  of  all 
others,  take  the  least  interest  in  it  ?  It  may  further  be  remarked, 
that  the  New  Testament  does  not  teach  that  those  who  have  never 
heard  the  Gospel  are  (on  this  account)  to  be  condemned.  The 
apostle  says  that  God  winked  at  the  times  of  ignorance,  that  those 
who  sin  without  law  shall  be  judged  without  law.  And  it  may  be 
hoped,  as  Christ  is  the  only  means  of  salvation,  that  those  who 
have  not  heard  the  Gospel  here,  may  hear  it  hereafter.  Peter  says 
that  the  Saviour  communicated  the  knowledge  of  his  redemption 
to  those  who  had  died  before  his  appearance. 

See  in  answer  to  Roehr's  Letters  on  Rationalism,  Zoellich's  Let- 
ters on  Supranaturalism,  1821  ;  and  see  Tittmann  on  Naturalismus, 
Supernaturalismus,  and  Atheismus;  Leipzig,  1810. 

Bockshammer's  Revelation  and  Theology,  Stuttgart,  1820. 


ESSAY    XXII. 

TRANSCENDENTALISM  * 


It  is,  we  think,  undeniable,  that  since  the  death  of  Doctor  Tho- 
mas Brown  of  Edinburgh,  metaphysical  research  has  been  at  a 
stand  in  Great  Britain.  In  the  southern  part  of  the  island  this  had 
been  the  case  for  a  much  longer  period,  but  the  sharp  and  scepti- 
cal enterprise  of  the  Scotch  kept  philosophical  debate  in  motion 
for  a  time,  so  that  a  sect  was  formed,  and  we  speak  as  familiarly 
of  the  Scotch  school  as  we  do  of  the  Pythagorean  or  the  Eleatic. 
But  that  line  seems  to  have  reached  its  term,  and  the  few  who 
publish  at  this  time  are  either  the  lowliest  compilers  from  Stewart 
and  Brown,  or,  as  is  more  frequently  the  case,  such  as  have  gone  off 
in  a  direction  altogether  different,  in  search  of  a  profounder  philo- 
sophy. Of  the  latter  sort  there  are  some  among  ourselves,  and  we 
have  it  now  in  view  to  point  out  some  of  the  causes  which  may 
account  for  the  essays  to  introduce  a  modified  transcendentalism 

In  America,  the  earliest  school  of  metaphysics  was  founded  by 
the  followers  of  Locke ;  and,  with  the  clew  of  this  great  inquirer 
in  his  hand,  Jonathan  Edwards  ventured  into  a  labyrinth  from 
which  no  English  theologian  had  ever  come  out  safe.  By  the  just 
influence  of  his  eminently  patient,  and  discriminating,  and  conclu- 
sive research,  this  greatest  of  modern  Christian  metaphysicians  put 
his  contemporaries  and  their  descendants  upon  a  sort  of  discourse 
which  will  perhaps  characterise  New  England  Calvinism  as  long 
as  there  is  a  fibre  of  it  left.  In  speaking  of  Edwards,  we  distinctly 
avow  our  conviction  that  he  stands  immeasurably  above  many  who 
have  followed  in  his  steps,  and  attempted  his  methods.  If  the  spe- 
cies of  reasoning  which  he  introduced  into  American  theology  is 
susceptible  of  easy  abuse,  and  if,  in  fact,  it  has  been  abused  to 

*  Published  in  1839,  in  review  of  the  following  works  : — 

1.  "  Elements  of  Psychology,  included  in  a  Critical  Examination  of  Locke's  Essay 
on  the  Human  Understanding,  with  Additional  Pieces.  By  Victor  Cousin,  Peer  of 
France,  Member  of  the  Royal  Council  of  Public  Instruction,  Member  of  the  Insti- 
tute, and  Professor  of  the  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy  in  the  Faculty  of  Litera- 
ture. Translated  from  the  French,  with  an  Introduction  and  Notes,  by  the  Rev.  C. 
S.  Henry,  D.  D." 

2.  "  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Philosophy.  By  Victor  Cousin,  Professor  of 
Philosophy  of  the  Faculty  of  Literature  at  Paris.  Translated  from  the  French,  by 
Henning  Gottfried  Linberg." 

3.  "  An  Address  delivered  before  the  Senior  Class  in  Divinity  College,  Cambridge, 
Sunday,  15th  July,  1S3S.     By  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson." 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  609 


disastrous  ends,  we  rejoice  to  acquit  this  great  and  holy  man  of 
willingly  giving  origin  to  the  evil.  And  in  what  wc  shall  curso- 
rily remark  concerning  New  England  theology,  we  explicitly  pre- 
mise that  we  do  not  intend  our  Congregational  brethren  indiscrimi- 
nately, but  a  defined  portion  of  them,  well  known  for  many  years 
as  daring  speculators.  The  theology  of  this  school  has  always 
been  in  a  high  degree  metaphysical ;  but  the  metaphysics  is  of  a 
hyperborean  sort,  exceedingly  cold  and  fruitless.  In  the  conduct 
of  a  feeble  or  even  an  ordinary  mind,  the  wire-drawing  processes 
of  New  England  theologizing  become  jejune  and  revolting.  Taught 
to  consider  mere  ratiocination  as  the  grand  and  almost  sole  func- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  the  school-boy,  the  youth,  and  the  pro- 
fessor, pen  in  hand,  go  on,  day  after  day,  in  spinning  out  a  thread 
of  attenuated  reasoning,  often  ingenious,  and  sometimes  legiti- 
mately deduced,  but  in  a  majority  of  instances  a  concatenation  of 
unimportant  propositions.  It  has  too  often  been  forgotten  by  the 
disciples  of  this  school,  that  a  man  may  search  in  useless  mines, 
and  that  it  is  not  everything  that  is  worth  being  proved.  Hence 
the  barrenness  and  frigidity  of  the  sermons  which  were  heard  from 
the  pulpits  of  New  England  during  the  latter  half  of  the  last  cen- 
tury. Many  of  these,  and  many  of  the  dissertations  and  treatises 
which  poured  from  the  press,  were  proofs  of  remarkable  subtilty 
and  patience  of  investigation,  and  showed  how  easy  it  is  to  draw 
forth  an  endless  line  from  the  stores  of  a  single  mind.  For,  in  this 
operation,  it  was  remarkable  that  the  preacher  or  philosopher  re- 
lied almost  exclusively  en  his  own  stores.  There  was  little  con- 
tinued unfolding  of  scriptural  argument,  and  little  citation  of  the 
great  reasonings  of  ancient  or  modern  philosophy.  Each  meta- 
physician spun  by  himself  and  from  his  own  bowels.  The  web  of 
philosophical  argument  was  dashed  with  no  strong  woof  from 
natural  science,  embroidered  with  no  flowers  of  literature.  Where 
this  metaphysics  was  plied  by  a  strong  hand,  as  was  that  of  Presi- 
dent Edwards,  it  was  noble  indeed ;  deriving  strength  and  honour 
from  its  very  independence  and  self-sufficiency.  In  the  hands  of 
his  son,  Dr.  Edwards,  there  were  equal  patience,  equal  exactness, 
equal  subtilty,  but  no  new  results  :  still  there  were  undeniable 
marks  of  genius  ;  as  there  were  also  in  the  controversy  which 
then  began  to  be  waged  among  the  dwindled  progeny  of  the  giants, 
on  the  great  questions  of  liberty  and  necessity,  moral  agency,  and 
the  nature  of  virtue. 

But  when  the  same  products  were  sought  in  a  colder  climate, 
and  from  the  hands  of  common  and  unrefined  men  ;  when  every 
schoolmaster  or  parish  clergyman  found  himself  under  a  necessity 
of  arguing  upon  the  nature  of  the  soul,  the  nature  of  virtue,  and 
the  nature  of  agency ;  when  with  some  this  became  the  great 
matter  of  education,  to  the  neglect  of  all  science  and  beautiful  let- 
ters, then  the  consequences  were  disastrous  ;  and  a  winter  reigned 
in  the  theologv  of  the  land,  second  only  to  that  of  the  scholastic 

39 


610  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

age,  and  like  that  dispersed  only  by  the  return  of  the  sun  of  vital 
religion. 

In  the  hands  of  a  subtle  errorist,  such  as  Emmons,  these  meta- 
physical researches  led  to  gross  absurdities,  some  of  which  still 
survive.  We  believe  a  few  of  the  elder  and  less  sophisticated 
preachers  of  New  England  are  to  this  day  teaching,  and  that  their 
staring  auditors  are  to  this  day  trying  to  believe,  that  the  soul  is  a 
series  of  exercises  ;  that  God  is  the  author  of  sin  ;  and  that  in 
order  to  escape  damnation,  one  must  be  willing  to  be  damned. 
Others,  running  away  with  an  error  less  innocent  because  lying 
nearer  the  source  of  moral  reasoning,  and  less  alarming  in  its 
guise,  reasoned  themselves  and  their  hearers  into  the  opinion,  that 
all  sin  is  selfishness,  and  that  all  holiness  is  the  love  of  being  in 
general.  Taking  the  premises  of  the  great  Edwards,  they  de- 
duced a  system  of  false  theology,  which  under  its  first  phase  as 
Hopkinsianism,  and  under  its  second  phase  as  Taylorism,  has  been 
to  our  church  the  fons  et  origo  malorum,  and  which,  in  union  with 
the  Epicureanism  of  the  Paley  school,  has  assumed  the  name  of 
Calvinism  to  betray  it  to  its  enemies. 

It  is  only  great  wisdom  which  can  avoid  one  extreme  without 
rushing  to  the  other.  The  golden  mean,  so  much  ridiculed  by 
zealots,  is  precisely  that  which  imbecility  could  never  maintain.  In 
philosophy,  as  well  as  in  common  life  and  religion,  we  find  indi- 
viduals and  bodies  of  men  acting  on  the  fallacy  that  the  reverse  of 
wrong,  as  such,  is  right.  Human  nature  could  not  be  expected  to 
endure  such  a  metaphysics  as  that  of  New  England.  It  was  not 
merely  that  it  was  false,  and  that  it  set  itself  up  against  our  con- 
sciousness and  our  constitutional  principle  of  self-love  ;  but  it  was 
cheerless,  it  was  arctic,  it  was  intolerable  :  a  man  might  as  well 
carry  frozen  mercury  in  his  bosom,  as  this  in  his  soul.  In  a  word, 
it  had  nothing  cordial  in  it,  and  it  left  the  heart  in  collapse.  If  it 
had  remained  in  the  cells  of  speculative  adepts  it  might  have  been 
tolerated ;  but  it  was  carried  into  the  pulpit,  and  doled  forth 
to  a  hungry  people  under  the  species  of  bread  and  wine.  No 
wonder  nature  revolted  against  such  a  dynasty.  No  wonder  that, 
in  disgust  at  such  a  pabulum,  men  cast  about  for  a  substitute,  and 
sought  it  in  tame  Arminianism  or  genteel  Deism. 

The  calculating  people  of  our  country,  in  certain  portions  of  it, 
have  long  been  enamoured  of  a  system  of  ethics  wiiich  is  reduci- 
ble to  the  rules  of  loss  and  gain.  It  is  much  more  level  to  the 
apprehensions  of  such  to  say  that  two  and  two  make  four,  or  that 
prodigality  makes  poor,  or  that  doing  good  makes  profit,  or  that 
gain  is  godliness,  or  that  virtue  is  utility,  than  to  plead  for  an  im- 
perative law  of  conscience,  or  for  an  eternal  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong.  The  former  systems  came  home  to  the  business 
and  bosoms  of  the  calculator.  Though  he  had  learned  to  speak 
evil  of  Epicurus,  yet  he  clasped  Paley  to  his  bosom  ;  and  as  all 
men  admitted  that  this  philosopher  and  divine  was  a  mighty  rea- 
soner,  and  a  fascinating  writer,  so  the  calculator  went  further,  and 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  Gil 

adopted  his  ethical  heresy  as  the  basis  of  all  morals.  Some,  who 
could  not  take  the  system  in  its  gross  form,  received  it  under  that 
modification,  which  appears  in  the  theology  of  President  Dwight. 
Long,  therefore,  before  the  mask  was  completely  cast  away  by 
Bentham,  Mill,  and  the  Utilitarians  of  England,  there  were  hun- 
dreds of  young  men  who  had  imbibed  the  quintessence  of  the  poi- 
son through  their  college  text-books,  or  through  the  introduction 
of  the  same  principles  into  the  received  authorities  of  law-schools 
and  courts  of  justice.  We  think  it  possible  to  show,  that  the  pre- 
valence of  this  degrading  view  of  the  nature  of  holiness,  namely, 
the  view  which  allows  to  virtue  no  essence  but  its  tendency  to 
happiness,  has  directly  led  to  a  laxity  in  private  morals,  to  a  sub- 
tlety of  covert  dishonesty,  to  an  easy  construction  of  church  sym- 
bols and  of  other  contracts,  and  to  that  measurement  of  all  things 
divine  and  human  by  the  scale  of  profit,  which  is  falsely  charged 
upon  our  whole  nation  by  our  foreign  enemies.  We  think  it  pos- 
sible to  show  that  such  is  the  tendency  of  Utilitarianism.  And 
such  being  its  tendency,  we  should  despair  of  ever  seeing  any  re- 
turn from  this  garden  of  Hesperides,  with  its  golden  apples,  were 
it  not  for  a  safe-guard  in  the  human  soul  itself,  placed  there  by  all- 
wise  Providence.  For  the  system  runs  counter  to  nature.  Reason 
about  it  as  you  will,  the  soul  cannot  let  so  monstrous  an  error  lie 
next  to  itself;  the  heart  will  throb  forth  its  innate  tendency,  and 
conscience  will  assert  its  prerogative.  Nor  will  men  believe  con- 
cerning virtue,  any  more  than  concerning  truth,  that  it  has  no 
foundation  but  its  tendency  to  happiness ;  even  though  such  ten- 
dency be  as  justly  predicable  of  the  one  as  of  the  other.  The 
very  consideration  of  what  is  involved  in  the  monosyllable  ought, 
is  sufficient  to  bring  before  any  man's  consciousness  the  sense  of  a 
distinction  between  virtue  and  utility,  between  that  which  it  is 
prudent  to  do,  and  that  which  it  is  right  to  do.  In  process  of  time, 
as  more  adventurous  and  reckless  minds  sailed  out  further  upon 
this  sea  of  thought,  especially  when  some  theologians  went  so 
boldly  to  work  as  to  declare,  that,  in  turning  to  God,  we  regard 
the  Supreme  Being  in  no  other  light  than  as  an  infinite  occasion  of 
personal  happiness  to  ourselves ;  when  this  began  to  be  vented, 
thoughtful  men  were  taken  aback.  They  queried  whither  they 
were  going.  They  remembered  that  their  religious  emotions  had 
included  other  elements.  They  reconsidered  the  grounds  of  the 
adhesion  they  had  given  in  to  Paley,  to  Epicurus,  and  to  self. 
They  paused  in  their  rapid  career  and  looked  at  the  system  of 
general  consequences.  And  in  a  good  number  of  instances,  they 
were  ashamed  of  the  way  in  which  they  had  been  trepanned  out 
of  their  original  ideas,  and  sought  for  something  to  put  in  the 
place  of  the  idol  they  were  indignantly  throwing  down.  We  know 
such  men ;  we  know  that  they  will  read  these  pages ;  men  who 
have  gone  down  after  their  guides  into  the  vaults  of  the  earth- 
born  philosophy,  hoping  to  see  treasures,  and  gain  rest  to  the  crav- 
ings of  their  importunate  inquiring,  but  who  have  come  up  again 


612  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

lamenting  their  error,  and  mortified  that  they  had  been  abused. 
These  things  we  have  said  concerning  the  Utilitarian  ethics,  now 
prevailing  under  different  forms  in  America,  and  chiefly  in  the 
Northern  and  Eastern  States,  as  furnishing  an  additional  reason 
for  the  eager  search  that  undeniably  exists,  after  a  more  spiritual, 
elevating,  and  moral  philosophy. 

In  tracing  the  irresistible  progress  of  thought  and  opinion,  as  it 
regards  philosophy,  we  have  seen  two  sources  of  that  dissatisfac- 
tion which,  for  several  years,  has  prevailed  with  respect  to  hitherto 
reigning  metaphysics  ;  namely,  a  disrelish  for  the  coldness,  heart- 
lessness,  and  fruitlessness  of  the  New  England  methods,  and  a 
dread  of  the  doctrine  of  Utilitarianism.  It  might  have  been  happy 
for  us,  if  the  proposal  for  a  change  had  come  ab  intra,  if  one  of 
our  own  productive  minds  had  been  led  to  forsake  the  beaten  track, 
and  point  out  a  higher  path.  But  such  has  not  been  the  case.  It 
has  so  happened,  that  no  great  native  philosophical  leader  has  as 
yet  arisen  to  draw  away  one  scholar  from  the  common  routine. 
This  has  been  very  unfortunate.  If  we  are  to  make  experiment  of 
a  new  system,  we  would  fain  have  it  fully  and  fairly  before  our 
eyes,  which  can  never  be  the  case  so  long  as  we  receive  our  phi- 
losophemata  by  a  double  transportation,  from  Germany  via  France, 
in  parcels  to  suit  the  importers  ;  as  fast  as  the  French  forwarding 
philosopher  gets  it  from  Germany,  and  as  fast  as  the  American 
consignee  can  get  it  from  France.  There  is  a  great  inconvenience 
in  the  reception  of  philosophical  theories  by  instalments ;  and  if 
our  cisatlantic  metaphysicians  import  the  German,  article,  we  are 
sometimes  forced  to  wait  until  they  have  learned  the  language  well 
enough  to  hold  a  decent  colloquy  in  it.  Such,  however,  is  pre- 
cisely the  disadvantage  under  which  the  young  philosophers  of 
America  now  labour.  We  hear  much  of  German  philosophy,  and 
of  the  revelations  which  have  been  made  to  its  adepts  ;  much  very 
adroit  use  of  certain  disparaging  terms,  easily  learned  by  heart, 
and  applied  to  the  old  system,  as  "  flat,"  "  unspiritual,"  "  empirical," 
and  "  sensuous ;"  we  hear  much  of  the  progress  made  in  ontologi- 
cal  and  psychological  discovery,  in  the  foreign  universities.  But, 
if  we  hear  truth,  the  hierophants  of  the  new  system  among  us  are 
not  so  much  more  intimate  with  the  source  of  this  great  light  than 
some  of  their  silent  readers,  as  to  give  them  any  exclusive  right 
to  speak  ex  cathedra  about  transcendental  points.  Some  of  them 
are  busily  learning  French,  in  order  to  read  in  that  language  any 
rifacimento  of  Teutonic  metaphysics  which  may  come  into  their 
hands.  Some  are  learning  German  ;  others  have  actually  learnt 
it.  He  who  cannot  do  either,  strives  to  gather  into  one  the  Sibyl- 
line oracles  and  abortive  scraps  of  the  gifted  but  indolent  Cole- 
ridge, and  his  gaping  imitators ;  or  in  default  of  all  this,  sits  at  the 
urn  of  dilute  wisdom,  and  sips  the  thrice-drawn  infusion  of  English 
from  French,  and  French  from  German. 

It  might  have  been  happy  for  us,  we  say,  if  the  reformation  in 
our  philosophy  had  some  root  of  its  own  in  our  own  soil.     But 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  613 

what  is  this  vaunted  German  philosophy,  of  which  our  young  men 
have  learned  the  jargon  ?  We  shall  endeavour  to  give  an  intelligi- 
ble answer  to  so  reasonable  an  inquiry.  In  attempting  to  offer  a 
few  satisfactory  paragraphs  on  this,  it  is  far  from  our  purpose  to 
profess  to  be  adepts.  We  have  seen  a  little,  heard  a  little,  and 
read  a  little  respecting  it.  We  have,  even,  during  the  last  fifteen 
years,  turned  over  one  or  two  volumes  of  German  metaphysics, 
and  understood,  perhaps,  almost  as  much  as  some  who  have  be- 
come masters  ;  yet  we  disclaim  a  full  comprehension  of  the  seve- 
ral systems.  The  Anglo-Saxon  dummheit,  with  which  Germans 
charge  the  English,  reigns,  we  fear,  in  us,  after  an  inveterate  sort. 
We  have  tried  the  experiment,  and  proved  ourselves  unable  to  see 
in  a  fog.  Our  night-glasses  do  not  reach  the  transcendental.  In 
a  word,  we  are  born  without  the  Anschauungsvermogen :  and  this 
defect,  we  are  persuaded,  will  "  stick  to  our  last  sand."  We  once 
said  to  a  German  friend,  speaking  of  Schleiermacher,  "  But  we  do 
not  understand  his  book."  "  Understand  it ! "  cried  the  other,  with 
amazement,  "  what  then,  but  do  you  not  feel  it  ? "  We  deem  our- 
selves competent,  nevertheless,  to  give  the  plain  reader  some 
notices  of  the  progress  of  transcendental  philosophy. 

The  German  philosophers  whose  names  are  most  frequently 
heard  in  this  country,  and  who  indeed  mark  the  regular  succession  of 
masters,  are  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  It  would  be  easy 
to  multiply  names,  but  these  are  the  men  who  have  carried  for- 
ward the  torch,  from  hand  to  hand.  Though  there  were  German 
metaphysicians  before  Kant,  it  is  needless  to  name  them,  as  he 
borrowed  nothing  from  them,  and  certainly  has  the  merit  of  stand- 
ing forth  to  propagate  a  system  altogether  underived  from  his 
countrymen.  Perhaps  the  best  way  to  put  our  readers  in  posses- 
sion of  the  peculiar  tenets  of  Kant,  would  be  to  direct  them  to  an 
able  syllabus  of  his  system,  by  Professor  Stapfer,  translated  for 
the  Biblical  Repertory  for  the  year  1828.  But  to  maintain  the 
connexion  of  our  remarks,  we  shall  furnish  further  information ; 
and  if  we  enter  somewhat  more  into  detail  here  than  in  what  fol- 
lows, it  is  because  the  transition  to  Kant,  from  his  predecessors,  is 
more  abrupt  than  from  this  philosopher  to  any  who  succeeded  him. 
In  order  to  get  a  glimpse  of  what  he  taught,  we  must,  as  far  as 
possible,  lay  aside  all  the  prepossessions  of  the  British  school.  We 
must  not  only  cease  to  attribute  all  our  knowledge  to  sensation 
and  reflection,  as  our  fathers  were  taught  to  do,  but  we  must  lay 
aside,  as  unsatisfactory,  all  the  explanations  of  Reid  and  his  follow- 
ers respecting  first  truths  and  intuitive  principles.  We  must  no 
longer  regard  philosophy  as  a  science  of  observation  and  induc- 
tion, and  must  dismiss  all  our  juvenile  objection  to  a  purely  a  priori 
scheme  of  metaphysics.  It  is  the  first  purpose  of  Kant,  in  his 
own  terms,  to  inquire  "how  synthetical  judgments  a  priori  are 
possible,  with  respect  to  objects  of  experience  ;"  as,  for  example, 
how  the  idea  of  necessary  causal  connexion  arises,  when  it  is  con- 
ceded that  nothing  is  given  by  experience  but  the  mere  succession 


614  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

of  events.*  Indeed,  it  was  Hume's  speculations  on  cause  and 
effect  which,  as  Kant  tells  us,  first  "  broke  his  dogmatic  slumbers." 
Proceeding  from  this  to  all  the  other  instances  in  which  we  arrive 
at  absolute,  necessary,  universal,  or  intuitive  truths,  he  proves  that 
these  are  not  the  result  of  experience.  No  induction,  however 
broad,  can  ever  produce  the  irresistible  conviction  with  which  we 
yield  ourselves  to  the  belief  of  necessary  truth.  "  Experience  (and 
this  is  the  concession  of  Reid  himself)  gives  us  no  information  of 
what  is  necessary,  or  of  what  ought  to  exist."f  In  such  proposi- 
tions as  the  following :  "A  straight  line  is  the  shortest  between  two 
points :  There  is  a  God :  The  soul  is  immortal,"  &c,  there  is  an 
amalgamation  (synthesis)  of  a  subject  with  an  attribute,  which  is 
furnished  neither  by  the  idea  of  the  subject,  nor  by  experience. 
These  synthetical  judgments  therefore  are  a  priori,  or  independent 
of  experience  ;  that  is,  there  is  something  in  them  beyond  what  ex- 
perience gives.  There  is,  therefore,  a  function  of  the  soul  prior  to 
all  experience,  and  to  investigate  this  function  of  the  soul  is  the  pur- 
pose of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  "  Let  us,"  says  Stapfer,  in 
a  happy  illustration,  "  imagine  a  mirror  endued  with  perception,  or 
sensible  that  external  objects  are  reflected  from  its  surface ;  let  us 
suppose  it  reflecting  on  the  phenomena  which  it  offers  to  a  specta- 
tor, and  to  itself.  If  it  come  to  discover  the  properties  which 
render  it  capable  of  producing  these  phenomena,  it  would  find  itself 
in  possession  of  two  kinds  of  ideas,  perfectly  distinct.  It  would 
have  a  knowledge  of  the  images  which  it  reflects,  and  of  the  pro- 
perties which  it  must  have  possessed  previous  to  the  production  of 
these  images.  The  former  would  be  its  a  posteriori  knowledge  ; 
whilst  in  saying  to  itself,  "  my  surface  is  plain,  it  is  polished,  I  am 
impenetrable  to  the  rays  of  light,"  it  would  show  itself  possessed 
of  a  priori  notion,  since  these  properties,  which  it  would  recognize 
as  inherent  in  its  structure,  are  more  ancient  than  any  image  re- 
flected from  its  surface,  and  are  the  conditions  to  which  are  attached 
the  faculty  of  forming  images,  with  which  it  would  know  itself  en- 
dowed. Let  us  push  this  extravagant  fiction  a  little  further.  Let 
us  imagine  that  the  mirror  represented  to  itself,  that  external 
objects  are  entirely  destitute  of  depth ;  that  they  are  all  placed 
upon  the  same  plane  ;  that  they  traverse  each  other,  as  the  images 
do  upon  its  surface,  &c,  and  we  shall  have  an  example  of  objec- 
tive reality  attributed  to  modifications  purely  subjective.  And  if 
we  can  figure  to  ourselves  the  mirror  as  analysing  and  combining, 
in  various  ways,  the  properties  with  which  it  perceived  itself  in- 
vested (but  of  which  it  should  have  contented  itself  to  establish 
the  existence  and  examine  the  use) ;  drawing  from  these  combina- 
tions conclusions  relative  to  the  organization,  design,  and  origin  of 
the  objects  which  paint  themselves  on  its  surface  ;  founding,  it  may 
be,  entire  systems  upon  the  conjectures  which  the  analysis  of  its 

*  Kritik  d.  reinen  Vernunft.     Leipzig,  1818,  p.  15. 

t  Essay  on  the  Active  Powers.     Edinb.  quarto,  1788,  p.  31,  p.  279,  also  Intellectual 
Powers,  Essay  vi  ,  c.  6. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  615 

properties  might  suggest,  and  which  it  might  suppose  itself  capable 
of  applying  to  an  use  entirely  estranged  from  tneir  nature  and  de- 
sign ;  we  should  have  some  idea  of  the  grounds  and  tendency  of 
the  reproaches  which  the  author  of  the  critical  philosophy  addresses 
to  human  reason,  when  forgetting  the  veritable  destination  of  its 
laws,  and  of  those  of  the  other  intellectual  faculties ;  a  destination 
which  is  limited  to  the  acquisition  and  perfecting  of  experience,  it 
employs  these  laws  to  the  investigation  of  objects  beyond  the  do- 
main of  experience,  and  assumes  the  right  of  affirming  on  their 
existence,  of  examining  their  qualities,  and  determining  their 
relations  to  man." 

Instead  therefore  of  examining  the  nature  of  things,  the  objec- 
tive world  without  us,  Kant  set  himself  to  scrutinize  the  micro- 
cosm, to  learn  the  nature  of  the  cognitive  subject.  In  pursuing 
this  inquiry,  he  finds,  not  that  the  mind  is  moulded  by  its  objects, 
but  that  the  objects  are  moulded  by  the  mind.  The  external 
world  is  in  our  thoughts,  such  as  it  is,  simply  because  our 
thoughts  are  necessarily  such  as  they  are.  The  moulds,  so 
to  speak,  are  within  us.  We  see  things  only  under  cer- 
tain conditions ;  certain  laws  restrain  and  limit  all  our  functions. 
We  conceive  of  a  given  event  as  occurring  in  time  and  in  space; 
but  this  time  and  this  space  are  not  objective  realities,  existing 
whether  we  think  about  them  or  not :  they  are  the  mere  forms  a 
priori.  Our  minds  refuse  to  conceive  of  sensible  objects,  except 
under  these  forms.  Time  and  space  therefore  are  not  the  results 
of  experience,  neither  are  they  abstract  ideas ;  for  all  particular 
times  and  spaces  are  possible,  only  by  reason  of  this  original  con- 
stitution of  the  mind.* 

According  to  this  system,  all  that  of  which  we  can  be  cognizant 
is  either  necessary  or  contingent.  That  which  is  necessary  is  a 
priori,  and  belongs  to  the  province  of  pure  reason.  That  which 
is  contingent  is  a  posteriori,  and  belongs  to  the  province  of  experi- 
ence. The  former  he  calls  pure,  the  latter  empirical ;  and  it  is  the 
circle  of  knowledge  contained  in  the  former  which  constitutes  the 
far-famed  Transcendental  Philosophy.! 

Every  English  and  American  reader  must  fail  to  penetrate  even 
the  husk  of  German  and  mock-German  philosophy,  unless  he  has 
accepted  the  distinction  between  the  reason  and  the  understanding. 
We  are  not  aware  that  the  distinction  ever  obtained  any  footing 
in  our  modern  English  science,  until  the  time  of  Coleridge,  who  in 
several  of  his  works  has  striven  pugnis  et  calcibus  to  instal  it  into 
our  philosophical  terminology.  "  The  understanding,"  says  Kant, 
"  is  the  faculty  judging  according  to  sense."  "  Reason,"  says  Cole- 
ridge, "  is  the  power  of  universal  and  necessary  convictions,  the 
source  and  substance  of  truths  above  sense,  and  having  their  evi- 
dence in  themselves."J     Resuming,  then,  the  thread  which   we 

•  Kritik  d.  R.  V.,  pp.  3S— 43.  t  Ibid.,  p.  19. 

\  Even  in  German,  this  distinction  between  Ver$tand  and  Vernunft  was  not  al- 
ways recognised.  See  a  philological  analysis  of  the  latter  term  in  Herder's  Meta- 
kritik,  vol.  ii,  p.  11.     See  Kritik  d.  R.  V.  Elementari.,  ii.  Th.,  ii.  Abth.,i.  Buch. 


4 


616  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

have  dropped,  the  Prussian  philosopher  dissected  the  cognitive 
subject  or  soul  into  three  distinct  faculties :  viz.  1st.  Sense,  or 
Sensibility.     2d.  Understanding.     3d.  Reason. 

Sense  receives  and  works  up  the  multiform  material,  and  brings 
it  to  consciousness.  This  it  accomplishes  partly  as  a  mere  "recep- 
tivity," passively  accepting  sensations,  and  partly  as  an  active 
power  of  spontaneity.  The  understanding  is  a  step  higher  than 
sense.  What  sense  has  apprehended,  the  understanding  takes  up, 
and  by  its  synthetizing  activity  (die  synthetisirende  Thatigkeit), 
presents  under  certain  forms  or  conditions,  which,  by  a  term  bor- 
rowed from  logic,  are  called  categories.  These  are  twelve,  classi- 
fied under  the  heads  of  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  and  Modality. 
Of  Quantity:  1.  Unity ;  2.  Plurality;  3.  Totality.  Of  Quality: 
4.  Affirmation,  or  Reality  ;  5.  Negation,  or  Privation ;  6.  Limita- 
tion. Of  Relation :  7.  Substance  and  Accident ;  8.  Cause  and 
Effect;  9.  Action  and  Reaction.  Of  Modality:  10.  Possibility 
and  Impossibility ;  11.  Existence  and  Non-Existence ;  12.  Neces- 
sity and  Contingency.*  Whatsoever  now  the  understanding  takes 
cognizance  of,  it  knows  under  some  of  these  forms ;  and  every  in- 
tellection receives  the  object  as  connected  with  at  least  four  of 
these  categories  at  once,  from  the  four  different  classes.  Kant  at- 
tributed to  the  understanding  the  function  of  reducing  multiplicity 
to  unity.  The  result  of  this  reduction  to  unity,  in  our  conscious- 
ness, is  a  conception  (Begriff).  All  possible  conceptions  are  pro- 
duced under  the  twelve  categories  as  their  necessary  forms. 
These  are  therefore  the  conditions  of  all  thought ;  yet  they  afford 
no  knowledge  of  the  objects  per  ss ;  and  have  not  the  slightest 
significancy  independent  of  time  and  space.  Time  and  space  are 
the  ways  or  forms  under  which  objects  are  made  sensible  ;  and  the 
categories  are  the  ways  or  forms  under  which  the  same  objects  are 
understood  (begriffen). 

The  reason,  finally,  is  the  sublime  of  human  spontaneity.  It 
takes  cognizance  of  that  which  is  self-evident,  necessary,  absolute, 
infinite,  eternal.  Its  objects  are  beyond  the  sphere,  not  merely  of 
time  and  space,  but  of  all  ratiocination  :  and  it  is  among  these  ob- 
jects, "  above  the  stir  and  smoke  of  this  dim  spot  which  men  call 
earth,"  that  the  transcendental  philosophers  have  most  successfully 
expatiated.  While  the  understanding  is  discursive,  and  collects 
proof,  and  deduces  judgments,  referring  to  other  faculties  as  its  au- 
thority, the  reason  is  self-sufficient,  intuitive,  immediate  and  infalli- 
ble in  all  its  dictates.  In  the  pure  reason,  there  reside,  a  priori, 
three  ideas,  viz.  1.  Of  that  which  is  absolute  and  of  itself,  whether 
subjective  or  objective  ;  the  former  being  the  theme  of  psycholo- 
gy, the  latter  of  ontology.  2.  Of  a  supreme  and  independent  real 
cause  of  all  that  is  ;  namely,  of  God:  this  being  the  object  of  the- 
ology. 3.  Of  an  absolute  totality  of  all  phenomena ;  namely,  the 
universe,  r*  na»  ,•  being  the  object  of  cosmology. 

*  Kritik  derreinen,  v.,  p.  7S. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  617 

The  eagerness  of  the  philosophical  public  to  discover  how  these 
principles  might  legitimately  affect  the  interests  of  ethics  and  the- 
ology, led  Kant  to  publish,  in  1787,  his  Critique  of  Practical  Reason. 
In  this,  as  in  several  other  similar  works  indicated  in  our  volume 
for  1828,  he  declared  himself,  to  a  certain  extent ;  still  leaving  it  a 
matter  of  dispute  among  his  adherents  whether  he  was  a  Deist  or 
a  Christian.  His  adversaries  assert  that  his  argument  for  the  being 
of  a  God  is  inconsistent  with  his  system,  and  unworthy  of  being 
admitted  ;  and  even  his  friends  admit  that  he  never  gave  his  assent  to 
the  supernatural  origin  of  Christianity.  Nothing,  however,  in  the 
whole  system  is  more  striking  than  the  foundation  which  it  gives 
to  morals ;  for  here,  and  nowhere  else,  Kant  forsakes  the  character 
of  a  mere  critic,  and  lays  down  absolute  and  final  dictates  of  rea- 
son. There  is,  he  teaches,  an  original  and  invariable  law,  residing 
in  the  depths  of  human  consciousness,  and  commanding  what  is 
right.  This  he  calls  the  categorical  imperative.  It  urges 
man  to  act  virtuously,  even  at  the  expense  of  happiness.  Trans- 
lated into  words,  it  runs  thus ,  "  Act  in  such  a  manner,  that  the 
maxim  of  your  will  may  be  valid  in  all  circumstances,  as  a  princi- 
ple of  universal  legislation."*  Proceeding  from  this  he  builds  his 
natural  theology  on  his  ethics ;  argues  the  necessity  of  another 
life  and  an  almighty  and  omniscient  Judge.  The  three  "  postulates 
of  the  Practical  Reason,"  are  God,  freedom,  and  immortality.f 
It  is  now,  we  believe,  generally  conceded,  that  these  moral  and 
theological  speculations  are  an  after-thought,  a  supplement  to  the 
main  structure,  and  scarcely  worthy  of  reverence  for  their  consis- 
tency, however  interesting  as  proofs  of  the  strong  leaning  of  their 
author  towards  the  faith  of  his  childhood.  It  was  the  desire  of 
Kant  to  appear  favourable  to  Christianity.  At  his  day  infidelity 
had  not  grown  so  bold  as  it  has  since  done ;  and  it  is  especially 
worthy  of  consideration,  that  whenever  Kant  speaks  of  the  Divine 
Being,  he  distinctly  conveys  the  idea  of  a  personal  God,  objectively 
existing,  separate  from  nature,  and  independent  of  the  cognizance 
of  finer  spirits.^ 

It  deserves  to  be  noticed  that  Kant,  in  pursuance  of  his  voca- 
tion as  a  critical  rather  than  a  constructive  philosopher,  did  not  at- 
tribute to  reason  those  divine  and  active  powers  which  later  phi- 
losophers have  assumed,  and  which  are  claimed  for  her  by  some 
of  our  American  imitators,  who,  we  would  gladly  believe,  are 

*  Handle  so  dass  die  Maxima  deines  Willes  jederzeit  zugleich  als  Princip  einer 
aHgemeinen  Gesetzgebung  gelten  koenne.  Kritik  der  Practischen  Vernunft.  5te 
Aufl.  Leipz.,  1818,  p.  54. 

t  Kritik  d.  P.  V.  p.  213,  ff. 

X  Those  who  choose  to  pursue  this  subject  further  will  find  satisfaction  in  the  fol- 
lowing works,  viz.  Kant's  Religion  innerhalb  der  Ideen  d.  Menschl.  Vernunft,  2te 
Aufl.  1762,  and  the  reply  to  it,  by  Sartorious.  Die  Religion  ausserhalb  der  Grenzen 
der  blosen  Vernunft,  u.  s.  w.  Marburg,  1822.  In  this  work  (p.  62),  he  quotes  from 
Vincent,  the  following  observation,  which  is  not  here  out  of  place  :  "  Who  can  re- 
frain from  a  smile,  at  beholding  Christ  and  his  apostles  brought  into  the  train  of  phi- 
losophy, and  made  successively  Wolfians,  Crusians,  Kantians,  Fichteans,  and  Schel- 
lingeans !" 


618  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

ignorant  of  the  apotheosis  of  reason  which  they  thus  subserve. 
The  genuine  Kantians  have  always  maintained  that  in  what  their 
master  delivered  concerning  the  absolute  and  the  infinite,  he  simply 
meant  to  attribute  to  pure  reason  the  power  of  directing  the  cog- 
nitive energy  beyond  its  nearer  objects,  and  to  extend  its  research 
indefinitely  ;  but  by  no  means  to  challenge  for  this  power  the  di- 
rect intuition  of  the  absolute,  as  the  veritable  object  of  infallible 
insight. 

The  chief  objection  which  was  made  to  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  and  to  the  other  works  of  the  same  author,  was  that  they 
were  purposely  obscure ;  and  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  in  addition 
to  the  inherent  intricacy  of  the  subject,  the  reader  is  greatly  per- 
plexed by  a  multiplicity  of  new-coined  words,  and  still  more  by  an 
arbitrary  wresting  of  familiar  terms  to  meanings  remote  from  their 
common  acceptation.  It  is  partly  for  this  reason,  that  Kant,  like 
another  great  innovator  of  the  age,  Jeremy  Bentham,  has  been 
best  represented  by  the  pens  of  his  disciples ;  and  that  aid  which 
Bentham  owed  to  Dumont,  was  afforded  to  Kant  by  Schulze,  a 
chaplain  of  the  king  of  Prussia.*  This  writer  acknowledges,  how- 
ever, that  at  the  time  when  he  wrote,  that  is  in  1791,  the  dic- 
tion of  his  master  still  remained  a  hieroglyphic  to  the  public.f  In 
1798,  when  Coleridge  was  in  Germany,  he  heard  much  the  same 
statement  from  the  venerable  Klopstock.  "  He  said  the  works  of 
Kant  were  to  him  utterly  incomprehensible  ;  that  he  had  often 
been  pestered  by  the  Kantians,  but  was  rarely  in  the  practice  of 
arguing  with  them.  His  custom  was  to  produce  the  book,  open  it, 
and  point  to  a  passage,  and  beg  they  would  explain  it.  This  they 
ordinarily  attempted  to  do,  by  substituting  their  own  ideas.  I  do 
not  want,  I  say,  an  explanation  of  your  own  ideas,  but  of  the  pas- 
sage which  is  before  us.  In  this  way  I  generally  bring  the  dis- 
pute to  an  immediate  conclusion.";];  Coleridge,  however,  declares 
that  in  that  very  year  almost  all  the  professors  in  Germany  were 
either  Kantians,  or  disciples  of  Fichte,  whose  system  is  built  on 
the  Kantian ;  and  in  the  twelfth  chapter  of  the  work  just  cited,  he 
vindicates  Kant  from  the  charges  of  needless  obscurity.  At  the 
same  time  he  tells  us  that  the  disciples,  during  their  master's  life- 
time, quarrelled  about  the  meaning  of  his  dicta,  and  that  the  old 
philosopher  used  to  reply  to  their  appeals :  "  I  meant  what  I  said, 
and  at  the  age  of  near  four  score,  I  have  something  else  and  more 
important  to  do,  than  to  write  a  commentary  on  my  own  works." 

In  spite  of  this  obscurity,  however,  the  Critical  Philosophy  as- 
sumed the  empire  in  the  German  universities ;  but  not  without 
opposition  from  the  highest  sources.  The  celebrated  John  George 
Hamann  uttered  a  touching  caveat  against  the  irreligious  tendency 
of  Kant's  system.     He  declared,  in  his  letters  to  Jacobi,  and  else- 

*  Erlauterungen  ueber  des  Herrn  Professor  Kant  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft :  von 
Johann  Schulze,  u.  s.  w.  Koenigsberg,  1791. 
t  Schulze,  p.  6. 
j  Biographia  Literaria,  vol.  ii.,  p.  160,  N.  Y.  edition. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  G19 

where,  that  the  new  philosophy  owed  many  of  its  deductions  to  a 
mere  play  on  words,  and  perplexed  its  readers  in  a  maze  of  un- 
wonted expressions  ;  that  the  Kantian  n  s»  was  a  mere  conception, 
of  which  the  objective  existence  or  non-existence  could  not  be  de- 
termined by  reason.  He  warned  the  student  of  philosophy  against 
a  system  of  delusion,  in  which  man  is  made  everything  and  God 
is  made  nothing  ;  a  warning  infinitely  more  appropriate  as  applied 
to  the  systems  which  have  succeeded  Kant,  and  which  are  prof- 
fered to  the  credulous  complaisance  of  the  American  public*  In 
1799  the  still  more  celebrated  Herder  entered  the  field  as  an  an- 
tagonist, in  his  Metakritik.-f  Like  Hamann,  he  brings  the  charge  of 
perplexed  language,  and  the  misunderstanding  and  abuse  of  ab- 
stractions. He  characterises  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  in  gene- 
ral, as  transcendental  mist  (transcendentalen  Dunst),  a  fog  of  fine- 
spun verbiage  (nebelichtes  Wortgcspinnst),  calculated  by  means  of 
dialectical  sorcery  to  confound  the  very  implement  of  reason, 
namely,  language.  The  attention  of  the  reader  is  the  rather  called 
to  this  judgment,  as  it  is  common  to  attribute  the  obscurity  of  our 
philosopher  to  some  accidents  of  his  vernacular  tongue,  rather 
than  to  his  own  phraseology ;  but  here  is  the  verdict  of  a  German, 
a  scholar,  a  philosopher,  and  a  pupil  of  his  own.  If  space  were 
allowed,  we  might  go  much  further,  and  dilate  upon  the  denuncia- 
tion of  the  Kantian  idealism,  by  a  number  of  eminent  men,  such 
as  Garve,  Eberhard,  Tiedemann,  Tittel,  Nicolai,  and  Jacobi :  of 
whom  the  first  two  were  formally  answered  by  Kant,  while  the 
last  is  the  sole  representative  of. a  system  which  founds  all  philoso- 
phy in  an  affectionate  religious  faith,  independent  of  revelation.  J 

But  it  is  time  we  should  leave  Kant,  and  consider  his  great  suc- 
cessor. John  Theophilus  Fichte,  who  was  born  in  1762,  and  died 
in  1814,  is  thought  by  the  initiated  to  have  carried  philosophy  for- 
ward from  its  critical  towards  its  scientific  condition.  He  was  fa- 
miliar with  Kant,  and  wrote  in  his  manner,  so  that  his  first  impor- 
tant work,  published  in  1792,  was  attributed  to  the  great  master. 
Kant  had  set  out  with  a  critical  analysis  of  understanding,  reason, 
and  judgment.  Some  of  his  followers,  especially  Reinhold,  had 
started  with  the  phenomenon  of  consciousness.  Fichte  simplified 
a  step  further,  and  began,  not  with  a  thing  or  a  faculty,  but  an  act. 
Fichte,  say  his  admirers,  leaves  us  at  the  apex  of  the  pyramid.§ 
True  enough,  but  then  the  pyramid  is  upside  down:  the  apex  and 
support  being  the  monosyllable  I.  The  notion  of  a  thought  which 
is  its  own  object,  and  the  notion  of  I,  are  identical.    The  Ego  looks 

*  Jacobi's  Schriften,  vol.  i.,  1781,  pp.  371—390;  vol.  iv.,  p.  31.  Goethe's  Dich- 
tung  und  Wahrheit ;  Werke,  vol.  xxvi. 

f  Verstand  und  Erfahrung:  eine  Metakritik  zur  Kritik  d.  r.  Vernunft;  von  J.  G. 
Herder,  Leipzig,  1799. 

X  See  Jacobi  von  den  Gottlichen  Dingen  und  ihrer  Offenbarung,  2te  Aufl.  Leipzig, 
1822;  see  also  Rixner's  Handbuch  d.  Geschichte  d.  Philosophic;  Sulzbach,  1829, 
vol.  iii.,  §  143,  114. 

§  See  a  similar  expression  in  Mr.  Linberg's  note  to  Cousin's  Introduction,  p.  455. 


620  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

at  itself;  and  thus  we  have  the  idea  of  Ego  as  knowing,  and  Ego 
as  known,  the  intelligent  and  the  existent  I.     This  Ego,  absolute 
and  free,  has  regard  to  an  object,  or  Non-Ego  :  it  creates  this  Non- 
Ego  by  its  own  activity  :  in  a  word,  it  creates  objective  nature.* 
The  whole  of  the  Fichtean  philosophy  is  a  following  out  of  this 
track.     It  creates  the  world  out  of  the  mind's  act ;  and  it  regards 
the  outward  universe  as  nothing  but  a  limit  of  our  being,  on  which 
thought  operates ;  a  limit,  moreover,  springing  from  the  mind's  cre- 
ative power.f     In  such  a  system  as  this,  what  place  is  found  for  the 
Great  Author  of  the  universe  ?     Fichte  replies,  that  the  being  of 
the  Godhead  (which  he  holds  to  be  identical  with  the  active  and  . 
moral  ordo  mundi)  is  an  object  not  of  theoretical  knowledge,  but 
of  rational  faith  ;  and  that  this  faith  is  purely  moral.     On  a  certain 
occasion,  we  are  told  by  Madame  de  Stael,  he  said  to  his  auditors 
that  in  the  following  lecture  he  would  proceed  to  create  God  ;  an 
expression  in  perfect  harmony  with  his  principle,  but  one  which 
gave  just    offence  to  the  public.      "  According  to  Fichte,"  says 
Cousin,  in  his  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Philosophy,  "  God  is 
nothing  but  the  subject  of  thought  conceived  as  absolute :  he  is 
therefore  still  the  I.     But  as  it  is  repugnant  to  human  thought,  that 
the  I  of  man,  which  might  indeed  be  transferred  into  nature,  should 
be  imposed  upon  God,  Fichte  distinguished  between  a  twofold  I, 
the  one  phenomenal,  namely,  the  I  which  each  of  us  represents ; 
the  other  is  itself  the  substance  of  the  I,  namely,  God  himself. 
God  is  the  absolute  I."J     Even  Coleridge,  who  regarded  Fichte  as 
giving  the  first  idea  of  a  system  truly  metaphysical,  admits  that  it 
"  degenerated  into  a  crude  egoismus,  a  boastful  and  hyperstoic  hos- 
tility to  Nature,  as  lifeless,  godless,  and  altogether  unholy  ;  while 
his  religion  consisted  in  the  assumption  of  a  mere  ordo  ordinans, 
which  we  were  permitted  exoterice  to  call  God."§ 

In  a  seeming  ecstasy  of  admiration,  the  translator  of  Cousin's 
Introduction  says  of  this  system  :  "  Fichte  has,  in  arriving  at  this 
point,  indeed  reached  the  very  summit  of  the  pyramid  of  human 
science  ;  and  if  the  man  lives,  or  has  lived,  who  has  as  yet  disco- 
vered a  flaw  in  the  chain  of  reasoning  which  leads  to  this  point,  I 
am  ignorant  of  the  fact."||     It  may  be  observed  of  many  of  the 

*  That  our  syntax,  as  well  as  our  philosophy,  is  becoming  a  new  affair,  may  be 
seen  from  the  following  specimen  of  Dr.  Henry's  English  :  "  The  fundamental  fact 
of  consciousness  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  composed  of  three  terms :  first,  the  me 
and  the  not  me,"  &c— Introduction,  p.  20.  Now,  if  we  must  have  nonsense,  we  feel 
that  it  is  our  privilege,  as  descendants  of  Englishmen,  to  have  it  in  good  grammar. 
Apropos  of  this,  we  find  some  of  our  contemporaries  quoting  Plato  in  Cousin's  ver- 
sion :  surely  our  scholarship  must  be  near  its  ebb  !  If  the  Greek  is  absolutely  unin- 
telligible, and  if  we  have  neither  Sydenham  nor  Taylor,  let  us  get  a  friend  to  English 
it  for  us.  It  is  quite  in  the  style  of  the  French  pulpit,  when  we  find  Dr.  Henry  cit- 
ing the  Vulgate  (page  22).  "  It  is  the  Logos,  the  Word  of  St.  John,  which  J  light- 
eth  every  man  that  cometh  into  the  world  :'  « illuminat  omnem  hominem  venientem 
in  hunc  mundum.' "  The  reader  must  be  left  to  divine  why  Dr.  Henry  here  quotes 
Latin. 

t  Biographie  Universelle,  vol.  xiv.,  p.  48G.     Rixner,  vol.  iii.,  p.  337,  ff. 

X  Linberg's  Translation,  p.  398. 

§  Biographia  Literaria,  vol.  i.,  p.  95. 

||  Cousin's  Introduction,  by  Linberg.     Boston,  1832,  p.  454-5. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  621 

systems  with  which  it  is  sought  to  render  our  youth  gradually  fa- 
miliar, that  at  the  first  approach  they  have  a  horrid  aspect  of  athe- 
ism ;  but  that  the  adepts  have  the  most  ingenious  method  imagina- 
ble of  correcting  this  impression.  There  is  probably  not  a  Pan- 
theist in  America  who  will  own  the  name  ;  nor  is  there  a  greater 
certainty  concerning  things  future,  than  that  the  free  ingress  of 
transcendentalism  will  smooth  the  way  for  the  denial  of  all  that  we 
adore  and  love  in  the  august  idea  of  God.  Fichte  was  at  first  re- 
puted to  be  an  atheist ;  and  one  of  his  works  was  instantly  confis- 
cated with  rigour  throughout  all  Saxony.  As  is  usual  in  such 
cases,  he  and  his  abettors  wrote  appeals  and  apologies.  Herder, 
then  vice-president  of  the  Weimar  consistory,  took  part  against 
him.  All  Germany  rang  with  the  quarrel.  It  was  at  this  memo- 
rable crisis  that  Schelling  arose  in  opposition  to  Fichte,  in  behalf 
of  a  system  still  more  transcendental ;  of  which  more  hereafter. 
He  became  the  fashionable  philosopher  of  Jena,  for  there  are 
fashions  in  philosophy,  especially  in  Germany.  Poor  Fichte  fought 
as  he  could,  but  the  public  having  tasted  a  more  intoxicating  bever- 
age, could  not  return  to  the  flatter  metaphysics.  Fichte  is  supposed 
to  have  advanced  in  his  later  years  to  a  more  consistent  idealism. 
He  always  declared  that  the  Kantians  did  not  comprehend  their 
master's  system :  we  believe  as  much  ourselves :  but  he  added,  that 
in  the  new  system  of  idealism  he  was  only  giving  consistent  deve- 
lopment to  the  principles  of  Kant. 

It  was  reserved  for  other  hands  to  complete  the  structure ;  or  if 
we  acknowledge  that  the  pyramid  was  now  complete,  it  afforded  a 
test  for  the  flight  of  more  consistent,  or  more  adventurous  minds, 
into  the  transcendental  empyrean.  It  was  Frederick  William  Jo- 
seph Schelling,  who,  to  use  the  phrases  of  his  admirers,  brought 
philosophy  to  its  perfection,  as  the  science  of  the  Absolute.  Kant 
had  scrutinized  the  cognitive  subject,  and  determined,  except  in  re- 
gard to  the  moral  imperative,  that  absolute  knowledge  is  unattain- 
able. Fichte  followed  him,  and  out  of  the  productive  Ego  created 
the  objective  world,  still  giving  countenance,  however,  to  the  fig- 
ment of  a  seeming  dualism,  and  discriminating  between  the  thinker 
and  that  which  is  thought.  But  Schelling,  with  a  boldness  une- 
qualled in  every  previous  attempt,  merged  all  in  one,  and  declared 
as  the  great  discovery  of  the  age,  and  first  truth  of  absolute  wis- 
dom, that  subject  and  object  are  one,  that  the  Ego  and  Non-Ego 
are  identical.  Knowledge  and  Being  are  no  longer  different.  His 
system  was,  therefore,  expressively  called  the  system  of  identity,  or 
the  philosophy  of  the  absolute.* 

Here,  as  in  a  former  case,  we  ask  what  place  is  left  for  the  Most 
High  ?  Schelling  is  at  no  loss  for  an  answer.  God  is  in  truth  the 
very  object  of  all  philosophy ;  but  it  is  God  revealing  himself  in 
the  universe.  The  divine  being,  once  hidden,  has  a  perpetual  ten- 
dency to  self-revelation ;  a  process  of  evolution  which  is  for  ever 

•  Rixner,  vol.  iii.,  §  167. 


622  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

going  onward,  and  producing  the  world,  or  nature.  It  is  this  de- 
velopment which  we  see  and  feel,  and  of  which  we  are  a  part. 
The  universe,  therefore,  becomes  as  important  a  portion  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  Schelling,  as  that  of  the  ancient  Gnostics,  or  of  Spi- 
nosa.*  We  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  comprehending  this 
profane  modification  of  atheism,  for  we  almost  tremble  while  we 
write  ;  we  will  not  say  the  notions,  but  the  expressions  of  men  who 
treat  of  the  genesis  of  divinity  as  coolly  as  Hesiod  of  the  birth  of 
gods :  yet  we  will  proceed.  In  the  absolute  philosophy,  God  is  a 
principle,  not  personal,  but  tending  to  personality,  becoming  per- 
sonal (eine  werdende  Personlichkeit) ;  a  tendency  manifested  in,  and 
producing,  the  phenomena  of  the  universe.  This  eternal  develop- 
ment is  a  mighty  effort  towards  self-consciousness ;  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  human  reason  is  indeed  the  consciousness  of  God ;  a 
state  in  which  the  absolute  spirit  views  itself,  f 

This,  we  need  scarcely  say,  is  a  highly  flattering  illusion  to  the 
soaring  mind.  The  infinite  chasm  between  heaven  and  earth  is  no 
more.  Human  action  is  the  action  of  the  infinite.  Man  can  know 
the  infinite  by  immediate  insight,  because  he  is  himself  infinite. 
God  is  all  things,  and  all  things  are  God  :  we  are  ourselves  in  God 
and  God  in  us.  And  here  the  happy  language  of  a  writer  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review  for  1829,  whose  article  on  Cousin  is  highly 
praised  and  largely  quoted  by  Dr.  Henry,  may  be  cited  by  us, 
though  with  an  intention  very  different  from  that  of  the  latter.  "  In 
this  act  of  knowledge,  which,  after  Fichte,  Schelling  calls  the  Intel- 
lectual Intuition,  there  exists  no  distinction  of  subject  and  object — 
no  contrast  of  knowledge  and  existence — all  difference  is  lost  in  ab- 
solute indifference — all  plurality  in  absolute  unity.  The  intuition 
itself — reason — and  the  absolute — are  identical.  The  absolute 
exists  only  as  known  by  reason,  and  reason  knows  only  as  being 
itself  the  absolute.";};  As  a  natural  consequence,  this  direct  cogni- 
tion of  the  absolute,  the  unconditioned,  and  the  infinite,  implies  the 
annihilation  of  consciousness ;  for  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of  con- 
sciousness to  conceive  of  the  object  of  thought  as  separate  from  its 

*  In  the  new  philosophy  there  is  little  reference  had  to  the  distinction  between  matter 
and  spirit ;  in  this  respect  the  grand  error  of  the  ancient  Greeks  reappears,  and  the 
inevitable  result  is  an  inextricable  tangle  of  physics  with  metaphysics.  Material 
images  are  always  dangerous  aids  in  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  ;  but  the  Germans 
are  so  far  from  being  aware  of  this,  that  a  large  part  of  their  statements  are  merely 
transformation  of  sensible  images  into  expressions  of  pure  thought.  By  running 
away  with  analogies,  a  puerile  imagination  may  see  resemblances  between  material 
and  immaterial  objects,  which  a  puerile  judgment  may  stamp  as  verities.  Hence,  in 
the  system  of  Schelling,  galvanism,  electricity,  and  magnetism,  have  place  in  the 
very  midst  of  psychology.  Hence,  in  the  system  of  Cousin,  expansion  and  concen- 
tration become  elements  of  mental  analysis.  Hence,  also,  England  being  an  island, 
her  philosophers  cannot  be  transcendental.  The  ridiculous  passage  in  which  this 
truly  French  statement  is  conveyed,  is  too  striking  to  be  omitted  :  "  England,  gentle- 
men," says  M.  Cousin,  "  is  a  very  considerable  island  ;  in  England  everything  stops 
at  certain  limits  ;  nothing  is  there  developed  on  a  great  scale  " — Introduction,  p.  380. 

t  See  Bretschneider,  Ueber  die  Grundansichten  der  Theologischen  Systeme  der 
Proff.  Schleiermacher  und  Marheineke.     Leipzig,  1828,  p.  5. 

$  Edinburgh  Review,  Oct.,  1829,  Art.  xi.,  p.  208. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  623 

subject.  It  is  a  further  consequence  that  there  can  be  no  personal 
immortality  of  the  soul ;  the  hope  of  which  he  characterizes  as  a 
vain  solace  (eitle  Freude)  :*  in  return  for  which  fond  illusion, 
Schelling  cheers  us  with  an  immortality  in  which  the  qualities  of 
the  soul  re-enter  into  the  universal  mass :  "  An  immortality,"  says 
Madame  de  Stael,  "  which  terribly  resembles  death :  since  physical 
death  itself  is  nothing  but  universal  nature  reclaiming  the  gifts  she 
had  made  to  the  individual."! 

Such  is  the  philosophy  which  up  to  this  very  hour  is  taught  in 
several  of  the  German  universities  by  Protestant  teachers  of  reli- 
gion, and  to  which,  more  alarming  still,  a  goodly  number  among 
our  neophytes  in  metaphysics  are  endeavouring  to  attain.  But  M. 
Cousin  somewhat  sneers  at  our  apprehension  of  the  "  bugbear " 
Pantheism,  and  we  may  yet  be  called  upon  by  American  clergy- 
men to  abandon  all  belief  in  a  personal  God,  or  any  Deity  but  the 
universe.  It  is  very  true,  as  we  shall  see,  that  M.  Cousin  does  not 
avow  himself  to  be  a  disciple  of  Schelling.  It  is  further  true  that 
he  diverges  from  him  in  important  particulars,  and  earnestly, 
though,  as  we  think,  vainly,  endeavours  to  wrest  his  own  system 
into  a  conformity  with  revelation ;  yet  his  whole  scheme  is  a  con- 
duit from  the  stream  of  German  transcendentalism  at  the  most  cor- 
rupt part  of  its  current ;  and  his  works  abound  with  expressions 
which  savour  too  strongly  of  doctrines  more  prononcees  than  those 
which  he  has  avowed.  In  the  following  sentences  we  know  not  to 
what  school  he  can  allude,  if  not  to  that  of  Schelling,  Oken,  or  He- 
gel :J  "  Fichte  died  in  1815,  and  even  before  his  death,  a  new  phi- 
losophy, unable  to  stop  at  the  system  of  absolute  subjectivity,  and 
the  summit  of  the  pyramid  of  the  me,  has  re-descended  to  the 
earth,  and  returned  to  nearer  views  of  actual  reality.  The  con- 
temporaneous German  philosophy,  which  now  exerts  as  great  an 
influence,  and  possesses  as  high  an  authority  in  Germany,  as  ever 
did  that  of  Kant  or  Fichte,  bears  the  title  of  the  philosophy  of  na- 
ture.    The  title  alone  indicates  some  return  towards  reality."^ 

We  have  sometimes  been  strongly  tempted  to  suspect  that  many 
of  the  enthusiastic  admirers  of  Coleridge's  prose  works  are  entirely 
unaware  of  the  extremes  to  which  their  master's  principle  of  phi- 
losophizing would  legitimately  lead  them.  None  can  be  more  open 
than  ourselves  to  impressions  from  the  great  genius  and  inimitable 
diction  of  this  philosopher  and  poet ;  we  have  felt  its  fascinations, 
and  in  hanging  over  his  pages,  and  especially  his  noble  denuncia- 
tions of  the  utilitarian  ethics,  we  have  almost  forgotten  how  inde- 
terminate and  fruitless  are  most  of  his  reasonings,  and  how  rotten 
the  foundation  of  his  scheme.  After  our  declaration  that  the  sys- 
tem of  Schelling  is  a  system  of  Pantheism,  or  that  sort  of  Atheism 
which  denies  the  personality  of  God,  many  will  be  startled  when 

*  Bretsohneider,  ubi  supra,  p.  12. 

t  De  l'Aliemagne,  t.  iii.,  p.  114,  ed.  Paris,  1814. 

X  Cousin's  Introduction  to  Hist,  of  Philosophy,  p  427.     Boston. 

§  The  title  of  one  of  Schelling's  works,  Ideen  zur  Naturphilosophie ;  1797. 


624  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

we  assure  them  that  Coleridge  maintained  the  great  principles  of 
this  very  school.  We  disclaim  indeed  the  intention  of  represent- 
ing this  learned  man  as  having  coincided  with  the  German  Panthe- 
ist in  all  the  remote  consequences  of  his  theory,  however  legitimate. 
But  that  the  system  of  Coleridge  and  the  system  of  Schelling  are 
the  same  in  their  leading  principles  will  be  denied  by  no  one  who 
is  familiar  with  both.  Nay,  we  have  Coleridge  himself  making  the 
most  ample  avowal  of  this  coincidence,  for  the  purpose,  as  it  should 
seem,  of  escaping  the  charge  of  plagiarism  from  the  German  phi- 
losopher. Let  us  hear  himself:  "In  Schelling's  '  Natur-Philoso- 
phie,'  and  the  *.  System  des  Transcendentalen  Idealismus,'  I  first 
found  a  genial  coincidence  with  much  that  I  had  toiled  out  for  my- 
self, and  a  powerful  assistance  in  what  I  had  yet  to  do."  And  then, 
as  if  to  account  for  the  somewhat  singular  fact  that  the  dissertation 
in  the  "  Biographie  Litteraire,"  on  the  reciprocal  relations  of  the 
esse  and  the  cogitare,  is  a  literal  translation  from  the  Introduction 
to  a  work  of  Schelling,  he  proceeds  to  say:*  "  We  had  studied  in 
the  same  school ;  been  disciplined  by  the  same  preparatory  philo- 
sophy, namely,  that  of  Kant ;  we  had  both  equal  obligations  to  the 
polar  logic  and  dynamic  philosophy  of  Giordano  Bruno,"  &c,  &c. 
And  again :  "  To  me  it  will  be  happiness  and  honour  enough,  should 
I  succeed  in  rendering  the  system  itself  intelligible  to  my  country- 
men, and  in  the  application  of  it  to  the  most  awful  of  subjects  for 
the  most  important  of  purposes."f  After  reading  these  avowals, 
and  after  having  learned  the  ravages  of  this  very  philosophy  among 
the  present  generation  of  clergymen  in  Germany,  we  are  heartily 
thankful  that  Coleridge  never  summoned  sufficient  energy  to  give 
us  anything  more  than  fragments ;  while  we  are  filled  with  amaze- 
ment at  the  sight  of  Christian  ministers  among  ourselves,  men  of 
education  and  piety,  either  subscribing  to  statements  which  they 
do  not  comprehend,  or  giving  the  weight  of  their  authority  to  the 
conclusions  which  by  the  best  theologians  even  of  Germany  are 
denounced  as  incompatible  with  the  fundamentals,  we  say  not  of 
Christianity,  but  of  natural  religion.  Let  our  young  metaphysi- 
cians learn  from  Coleridge  and  Cousin  to  tolerate  and  admire  Schel- 
ling, and  they  will  soon  learn  from  Schelling  himself  that  God  is 
everything.;}; 

*  This  seeming  plagiarism  is  set  in  the  best  light  of  which  the  facts  admit,  in  the 
preface  to  the  "  Specimens  of  the  Table  Talk,"  New  York,  1835,  p.  25,  ff.  But  the 
whole  vindicatory  argument  is  singular  in  the  history  of  literary  borrowing.  See,  on 
the  same  topic,  the  British  Magazine  for  January,  1835. 

t  Biographie  Litteraire,  vol.  i.,  pp.  95,  97.  The  reader,  in  order  to  do  justice,  at 
once,  to  us,  in  bringing  so  grave  a  charge,  and  to  the  memory  of  Coleridge,  should 
not  fail  to  consult  the  work  here  cited.  On  page  169  will  be  found  this  pregnant  de- 
claration :  "  We  begin  with  the  J  know  myself  in  order  to  end  with  the  absolute  / 
am.  We  proceed  from  the  self,  in  order  to  lose  and  find  all  self  in  God."  See  also 
"  The  Friend,"  Essay  xiii.,  p.  76,  note;  likewise  p.  451,  ed.  Burlington,  1831 ;  like- 
wise "  Aids  to  Reflection,"  note  50,  p.  284,  ed.  1829. 

X  In  all  that  we  have  written  about  Schelling,  we  have  had  reference  to  his  pub- 
lished systems.  What  changes  have  taken  place  in  his  way  of  thinking  within  the 
last  ten  years,  we  have  not  been  in  a  situation  to  know.  It  is,  however,  said  that  he 
has  abandoned  some  of  his  anti-Christian  notions. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  62& 

We  almost  shrink  from  the  attempt  to  conduct  our  readers  any 
lower  down  in  the  circling  vaults  of  German  wisdom  ;  we  have  not 
yet  reached  the  end.  for  in  the  lowest  deep  a  lower  deep  still1 
opens  wide,  in  the  system  of  Hegel  and  his  followers.*  When  we 
speak  of  this  professor,  we  shall  not  be  scrupulous  in  distinguish- 
ing between  iris  own  opinions  and  those  of  his  immediate  and 
acknowledged  followers ;  and,  this  being  premised,  it  may  be  said 
that  his  was  the  system  prevailing  in  Germany  on  the  arrival  of 
the  last  steamer. 

George  Frederick  William  Hegel  was  born  in  1770,  and  died 
within  the  last  three  or  four  years.  He  was  professor,  first  at 
Jena,  and  afterwards  at  Heidelberg  and  at  Berlin  ;  in  the  last  of 
which  chairs  he  succeeded  Fichte,  in  1818.  His  system  purported 
to  be  an  improvement  on  that  of  Schelling.  It  is  said  by  the 
Hegelians,  that  in  contradistinction  from  that  of  Fichte,  which  was 
a  subjective  idealism,  and  from  that  of  Schelling,  which  was  an 
objective  idealism,  the  scheme  of  Hegel  takes  the  true  position  as 
an  absolute  idealism.f  Hegel,  no  less  than  Schelling,  maintained 
universal  identity,  or  that  all  things  are  the  same  :  but  while  the 
former  postulated  this  as  an  intellectual  intuition,  the  latter  pro- 
ceeded to  prove  it  by  a  scientific  process.!  Both  teach,  but  with 
the  same  difference  as  to  the  origin  of  the  dogma,  that  thought  and 
being  are  identical.  In  his  earliest  work,  Hegel  undertook  to 
show  how  the  I,  through  manifold  and  multiform  self-evolutions, 
comes  to  be,  first,  Consciousness,  then  Self-Consciousness,  then  Rea- 
son, and,  finally,  Self-Comprehending  and  Religious  Spirit.^ 

All  philosophy,  according  to  Hegel,  is  but  an  attempt  to  answer 
a  simple  question,  viz.,  Quid  est  ?  And  the  answer  to  this  involves 
all  Truth,  all  Reason:  for  whatever  is,  is  Reason.  All  reality  is 
reasonable,  all  that  is  reasonable  is  real.  Hence  the  only  real  ex- 
istence is  the  ideas  of  Reason.  All  reality  (Wirklichkeit)  being 
thoroughly  rational,  is  also  divine  ;  yea,  is  God  revealing  himself 
or  developing  himself.  Nature  is  God  coming  to  self-conscious- 
ness.||  God  reveals  himself  in  creation,  or  in  the  universe,  by  a 
series  of  eternal  unfoldings,  some  in  matter,  some  in  mind ;  and 
thus  the  Deity  is  in  a  perpetual  effort  towards  self- realization. H 
The  history  of  Physics  is,  therefore,  the  necessary  career  of  divine 
self-evolution  ;  indeed,  God  thinks  worlds,  just  as  the  mind  thinks 
thoughts. 

In  order  to  philosophize  aright,  we  must  lose  our  own  person- 
ality in  God,  who  is  chiefly  revealed  in  the  acts  of  the  human 
mind.  In  the  infinite  developments  of  divinity,  and  the  infinite 
progress  toward  self-consciousness,  the  greatest  success  is  reached 

*  Io  sono  al  terzo  cerchio  della  piova 
Eterna,  maladetta,  fredda,  e  greve. 

Dante,  Inferno,  Canto  vi. 
t  Conversations-Lexikon,  Art.  Hegel. 

t  Rixner,  vol.  iii.,  p.  437.     Marheineke :  Dogmatik,  §§  1 — 68. 
§  Die  Phaenomenologie  des  Geistes,  Bamberg,  1807. 
||  Baur  :  Christl.  Gnosis,  p.  672.  IF  Rixner,  p.  444. 

40 


626  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

in  the  exertions  of  human  reason.  In  men's  minds,  therefore,  is  the 
highest  manifestation  of  God.  God  recognises  himself  best  in  hu- 
man reason,  which  is  a  consciousness  of  God  (Gottesbewusstseyn). 
And  it  is  by  human  reason  that  the  world  (hitherto  without 
thought,  and  so  without  existence,  mere  negation)  comes  into  con- 
sciousness ;  thus  God  is  revealed  in  the  world.* 

God  is  the  Idea  of  all  Ideas,  or  the  absolute  Idea :  hence  our 
ideal  thought  is  divine  thought,  and  this  is  no  other  than  reason.f 
"  The  doctrine  of  the  being  of  God  is  no  other  than  that  of  the 
revelation  of  himself  in  the  Idea  of  him."J  "  God  exists  only  as 
knowledge  (Wissen)  ;  in  this  knowledge,  and  as  such,  he  knows 
himself,  and  it  is  this  very  knowledge  which  is  his  existence."^ 
We  may  therefore  say  with  truth  God  exists  as  an  Idea.|| 

After  thus  arriving  at  an  ideal  God,  we  learn  that  Philosophy 
and  Religion  draw  us  away  from  our  little  selves,  so  that  our  sepa- 
rate consciousness  is  dissolved  in  that  of  God.  Philosophy  is  Reli- 
gion ;  and  "  true  Religion  frees  man  from  all  that  is  low,  and  from 
himself,  from  clinging  to  I-hood  (Ichheit)  and  subjectivity,  and 
helps  him  to  life  in  God  as  the  Truth,  and  thereby  to  true  life."H 
In  this  oblation  of  personal  identity,  we  must  not  claim  property 
even  in  our  own  thoughts.  By  a  step  beyond  Emmonism,  Hegel 
teaches  that  it  is  God  who  thinks  in  us  ;  nay,  that  it  is  precisely 
that  which  thinks  in  us,  which  is  God.  Marheineke  himself  mani- 
fests tokens  of  alarm,  when  he  states  this  doctrine.**  The  pure 
and  primal  substance  manifests  itself  as  the  subject ;  and  "  true 
knowledge  of  the  absolute  is  the  absolute  itself."  There  is  but  a 
step  to  take,  and  we  arrive  at  the  tenet,  that  the  universe  and  God 
are  one.ff  The  Hegelians  attempt  to  distinguish  this  from  the  doc- 
trine of  Spinosa,  but  their  distinctions  are  inappreciable;  ''tis  the 
same  rope  at  either  end  they  twist :'  their  scheme  is  Pantheism. 
And  as  God  is  revealed  by  all  the  phenomena  of  the  world's  his- 
tory, he  is  partly  revealed  by  moral  action,  and  consequently  by 
sin,  no  less  than  by  holiness.  Sin  is,  therefore,  a  part  of  the  neces- 
sary evolution  of  the  divine  principle  ;  or  rather,  in  any  sense 

♦Marheineke,  Dogmatik,  §  229.  ff.  Bretschneider,  u.  s.,  p.  49. 

t  Bretschneider,  u.  s.,  p.  40. 

j  Marheineke,  §  147,  p.  87. 

§  Marheineke,  §  1 53,  as  cited  by  Bretschneider ;  but  in  our  edition,  the  third,  these 
words  do  not  occur,  but  we  read  "  Das  Seyn  Gottes  also  ist  selbst  noch  etwas  anders, 
als  dessen  Bestimmtheit  selber  oder  das  Wissen."  It  will  not  seem  strange  to  any 
one  familiar  with  the  present  condition  of  philosophy,  that  we  cite  Marheineke  as 
an  authentic  expounder  of  Hegel ;  it  is  just  so  to  regard  him,  and  we  may  presume 
that  those  points  of  the  system  which  are  anti-christian  will,  to  say  the  least,  not  be 
exaggerated  by  a  theological  professor. 

||  Marheineke,  Dogmatik,  §  174,  apud  Bretschneider's  Grandansichten,  p.  43. 

5  Bretschneider,  p.  45.  Marheineke,  p.  83.  See  also  Hegel's  Encyklopaedie,  p.  593. 
ff.  Baur's  Gnosis,  p.  672. 

**  Dogmatik,  p.  67. 

ft  Bretschneider,  Grundansichten,  p.  50.  Rixner,  himself  a  devotee  to  this  German 
Budhism,  cites  what  follows:  "  The  knowledge  of  the  absolute  identity  of  God  and 
the  Universe  (des  Alls)  is  Reason :  the  crown  and  perfection  of  self-recognising  and 
self-comprehending  Reason  is  philosophy."— Vol.  hi.,  p.  392. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  627 

which  can  affect  the  conscience,  there  is  no  evil  in  sin — there  is  no 
sin.  This  is  a  part  of  the  philosophy  of  Hegel,  which  has  given 
great  pain  to  pious  men  in  Germany,  who  have  repeatedly  com- 
plained of  it  as  subverting  the  first  principles  of  morality,  not 
merely  in  theory  but  in  practice  ;  and  begetting  a  fatalism  which 
threatens  alike  the  foundations  of  religion  and  of  state.  A  late 
pantheistic  poet  teaches  us,  that  all  which  we  regard  as  sin,  is  ne- 
cessary, and  therefore  good,  and  may,  to  other  intelligences,  justly 
appear  most  lovely  !*  But  there  are  conclusions  of  the  new  philoso- 
phy still  more  surprising,  for  which  our  inchoate  metaphysicians 
should  be  getting  ready.  It  is  well  said  by  an  acute  writer  already 
quoted,  that  when,  according  to  the  demands  of  Schelling,  we  anni- 
hilate first  the  object,  and  then  the  subject,  the  remainder  is  zero.f 
Though  Schelling  is  not  known  to  have  admitted  this,  his  critics 
were  not  slow  to  perceive  it.  Schulze,  in  particular,  declared  that, 
according  to  his  system,  Everything  is  Nothing,  and  Nothing  is 
Everything  ;J  and  Koppen  called  this  the  philosophy  of  Absolute 
Nothing.  It  was  reserved  for  Hegel  to  abandon  all  the  scruples 
of  six  thousand  years,  and  publish  the  discovery — certainly  the 
most  wonderful  in  the  history  of  human  research — that  Something 
and  Nothing  are  the  same  !  In  declaring  it,  he  almost  apologizes, 
for  he  says,  that  this  proposition  appears  so  paradoxical,  that  it 
may  readily  be  supposed  that  it  is  not  seriously  maintained.^  Yet 
he  is  far  from  being  ambiguous.  Something  and  nothing  are  the 
same.  The  Absolute  of  which  so  much  is  vaunted  is  nothing.|| 
But  the  conclusion  which  is,  perhaps,  already  anticipated  by  the 
reader's  mind,  and  which  leaves  us  incapacitated  for  comment,  is 
this — we  shudder  while  we  record  it — that  after  the  exhaustive 
abstraction  is  carried  to  infinity  in  search  of  God,  we  arrive  at 
nothing. T[     God  himself  is  nothing  ! 

The  German  philosophy  was  first  made  known  to  the  French 
by  the  Allemagne  of  Madame  de  Stael.  It  attracted  some  attention 
as  an  extravaganza  of  the  German  mind,  but  it  made  few  prose- 
lytes until  it  was  taken  up  by  M.  Cousin.  It  was  in  the  year 
1816  that  he  first  commenced  the  importation  of  the  German  meta- 
physics. He  had  been  at  that  time  recently  appointed  assistant 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  Faculty  of  Literature  at  Paris.  He 
continued  to  lecture  until  1820,  when  he  incurred  the  disapproba- 
tion of  the  French  government,  and  his  lectures  were  suspended. 
In  1827,  he  was  restored  to  the  exercise  of  his  functions  as  a  Pro- 

*  Schefer.  |*i~  j\ 

t  Edinb.  Rev.,  Oct.  1829,  p.  208. 

X  Schulze's  Aphorismen,  p.  141  of  Rixner. 

§  Hegel's  Encyclopaedic,  3te  Ausg.,  p.  103.    "  Seyn  und  Nichts  ist  dasselbe." 

||  lb.,  p.  101. 

IT  lb.,  p.  102.  ff.  The  same  is  expressly  taught  by  Marheineke,  Dogmatik,  §  125, 
and  as  our  allegation  is  too  important  to  be  left  without  evidence,  here  are  his  words: 
"  In  dieser  Unbestimmtheit  ist  Gott  das  Gedankenlose,  die  noch  in  sich  selbst  behar- 
rende,  unmittelbare  Einheit  des  Seyns  und  Nichtseyns  und  kann  Allcs,  was  von  Gott 
bejaht  tcird,  ebenso  sehr  verncint  werden." 


628  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

fessor  of  the  Faculty  of  Literature,  and  continued  to  lecture  until 
1832,  when  he  was  made  a  Peer  of  France.* 

The  principal  original  works  which  M.  Cousin  has  published 
are  his  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Philosophy,  comprising  the 
course  of  Lectures  delivered  by  him  in  1828  ;  and  the  History  of 
Philosophy  of  the  18th  Century,  containing  his  Lectures  for  1829. 
His  other  contributions  to  philosophy  have  been  given  in  the  form 
of  prefaces  and  notes  to  various  translations  which  he  has  pub- 
lished. The  first  of  the  above  named  works  has  been  translated 
for  us  by  Mr.  Linberg ;  and  Dr.  Henry  has  translated  and  pub- 
lished, under  the  title  of  Elements  of  Psychology,  that  part  of  the 
other  which  contains  M.  Cousin's  criticisms  upon  the  philosophy  of 
Locke. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  define  precisely  how  far  the  philosophi- 
cal system  which  Dr.  Henry  is  seeking  to  domiciliate  among  us, 
agrees  with  the  mis-shapen  phantasies  which  we  have  brought 
before  the  notice  of  our  readers.  When  language  has  ceased  to 
be  the  representative  of  ideas,  it  is  not  easy  to  tell  what  are  in- 
tended to  be  equivalent  forms  of  speech.  M.  Cousin,  moreover, 
professes  to  discard  the  phraseology  of  Kant,  even  where  he 
adopts  his  ideas,  and  deprives  us  thus  far  of  the  means  of  recogni- 
tion. But  unhappily  we  do  not  find  that  the  "  way  in  which  men 
express  themselves  in  France  "  is  any  more  intelligible  than  the 
dialect  of  "  Konigsberg."  Even  Mr.  Linberg,  "  the  accomplished 
translator  "  and  admirer  of  Cousin,  finds  it  difficult  occasionally  to 
understand  what  M.  Cousin  precisely  means.-j-  and  M.  Cousin  him- 
self now  and  then  betrays  an  obscure  consciousness  of  having 
"  reached  a  height,  where  he  is,  as  it  were,  out  of  sight  of 
land."J 

We  are  farther  embarrassed  in  the  interpretation  of  his  system, 
by  the  material  consideration,  that  no  full  exposition  of  it  has  as 
yet  been  given  to  the  world.  Though  it  is  now  twenty-three 
years  since  he  "  first  faltered  the  name  of  Eclecticism,"  and  entered 
upon  the  establishment  of  a  new  school  in  philosophy,  we  are  still 
left  to  gather  its  principles  as  they  lie  scattered  in  Fragments,  Pre- 
faces, Programmes  of  Lectures,  and  Historical  Criticisms.  While 
the  system  has  only  this  fragmentary  existence,  it  is  too  early  to 
pronounce  of  it,  as  Dr.  Henry  does,  "  that  it  is  a  distinct  scientific 
theory,  having  its  method,  its  principle,  and  its  consequences."^ 

*  Dr.  Henry,  who  seems  anxious  to  give  his  readers  an  exalted  idea  of  the  philoso*- 
phic  temperament  of  M.  Cousin,  says,  that  "he  rarely  speaks  in  the  Chamber  of 
Peers — that  he  takes  part  in  the  discussions  of  that  body  only  where  some  question 
relating  to  public  instruction  is  before  the  Chamber  ;  or  on  extremely  rare  occasions, 
when  no  good  citizen  should  keep  silence."  Dr.  Henry  calculates  rather  largely  upon 
the  ignorance  of  his  readers  as  to  the  transactions  and  debates  of  the  French  Cham- 
ber of  Peers.  We  need  only  refer,  in  illustration  of  the  philosophic  elevation  of  M. 
Cousin,  to  one  of  the  most  disgraceful  scenes  that  ever  occurred  in  any  legislative 
body,  in  which  this  gentleman,  in  the  course  of  a  debate  upon  the  question  of  Spanish 
intervention,  gave  the  lie  direct  to  Count  Mole,  one  of  the  ministry. 

f  Cousin's  Introd.,  p.  450.  |  Cousin's  Introd.,  p.  123. 

§  Dr.  Henry  may  have  sources  of  information  that  are  not  open  to  the  public.     He 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  629 

We  do  not  feel  ourselves  competent  to  decide  upon  the  coherency 
and  completeness  of  a  system  of  philosophy,  which  has  as  yet 
received  only  a  partial  development  "  in  its  applications,  by  history 
and  criticism;"  nor  are  we  willing  to  defer  in  this  matter  to  the 
judgment  of  Dr.  Henry,  unless  some  of  the  letters  of  M.  Cousin 
"  to  the  present  translator"  contain  a  more  full  and  systematic  ex- 
position of  the  principles  of  eclecticism,  than  is  to  be  found  in  his 
published  writings.  There  seems  to  be  evidence  that  the  trans- 
lator has  gained  light  from  some  quarter  during  the  interval  be- 
tween the  two  editions  of  his  work.  In  the  first,  when  he  had 
received  no  letters  from  M.  Cousin,  he  says,  "  we  come  now  to  an 
important  point — the  fundamental  peculiarity  of  M.  Cousin's  sys- 
tem ;  this  is  the  two-fold  development  of  reason."  He  then  pro- 
ceeds to  explain  the  distinction  between  the  spontaneous  and  re- 
flective reason,  which  he  again  tells  us,  "  constitutes  and  deter- 
mines the  peculiar  system  of  M.  Cousin."*  But  in  his  second 
edition  we  are  told  that  it  is  "  M.  Cousin's  attempt  to  fix  the  infi- 
nite as  a  positive  in  knowledge,  which  constitutes  the  chief  and 
fundamental  peculiarity  of  his  system."f  And  again  he  says, 
"  the  position  taken  by  Cousin  upon  this  subject  (the  positive  idea 
of  the  infinite)  constitutes  the  chief  pretension  and  systematic 
peculiarity  of  his  philosophy  ."J 

The  applications  of  M.  Cousin's  philosophy  are  to  us,  however, 
more  valuable  than  the  scientific  exposition  of  his  principles.  The 
formulas  of  transcendentalism  are  in  most  cases,  as  Berkeley  styled 
the  vanishing  ratios  of  the  modern  mathematical  analysis,  "the 
mere  ghosts  of  departed  quantities  ;"  but  when  the  truths  which 
they  are  supposed  to  contain  are  applied  to  morals  and  religion, 
they  assume  a  more  substantial  form.  Here  at  least  we  can  try 
the  spirits  by  the  test  of  what  we  already  know  to  be  true.  Our 
only  elements  for  a  judgment  upon  the  trackless  path  of  German 
philosophy  are  afforded  by  its  line  of  direction  while  within  the 
scope  of  our  vision. 

We  class  M.  Cousin  with  the  German  school,  because  the  chief 
part  of  his  philosophy,  as  far  as  he  has  developed  it  incidentally  in 
its  applications  to  history  and  criticism,  is  evidently  derived  from 
that  source.  In  a  passage  already  cited  by  us,  he  avows  his  sym- 
pathy with  a  particular  contemporary  school  in  Germany,  in  terms 
which  draw  all  regards  to  his  personal  friend  Hegel,  and  to  those 
of  his  followers  who  have  attempted  to  bridge  over  the  gulf  be- 
tween transcendental  chaos  and  the  world  wfe  live  in  ;  and  every 
page  of  his  works  shows  that  he  has  been  "  plunged  in  the  womb 

has  taken  care  not  to  leave  his  readers  ignorant  that  he  is  in  correspondence  with  M. 
Cousin.  It  was  hardly  necessary  to  inform  the  public  that  he  was  "  indebted  to  M. 
('mi  sin  himself  for  a  copy"  of  the  highly  eulogistic  memoir,  from  which  he  has  com- 
piled his  biographical  notices  of  this  philosopher. 

*  Elements  of  Psychology,  1st  edition,  pp.  21  and  22. 

t  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  31. 

%  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  110. 


* 


4L 

m 


630  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

of  unoriginal  Night  and  Chaos  wild."  But  mindful  of  the  famous 
saying  of  Fontenelle,  he  has  opened  just  as  many  fingers  of  his 
handful  of  truth  as  he  finds  convenient.  He  glories  in  the  name 
of  Eclectic,  and  claims  to  be  the  founder  of  a  new  school  which  is 
to  comprehend  and  supersede  all  others.  "  Our  philosophy,"  he 
says,  "  is  not  a  gloomy  and  fanatical  philosophy,  which  being  pre- 
possessed with  a  few  exclusive  ideas,  undertakes  to  reform  all 
others  upon  the  same  model :  it  is  a  philosophy  essentially  optimis- 
tical, whose  only  end  is  to  comprehend  all,  and  which,  therefore, 
accepts  and  reconciles  all."*  It  is  a  fundamental  position  with  M. 
Cousin  that  every  form  of  belief  that  has  existed  contains  within 
it  some  truth,  and  he  seems  to  be  equally  strong  in  the  faith,  that 
in  his  philosophical  alembic  every  creed  will  part  with  its  error. 
He  finds  in  the  18th  century  four  philosophical  schools  which  he 
designates  as  the  Sensual,  the  Ideal,  the  Sceptical,  and  the  Mysti- 
cal. Each  of  these  schools  has  existed,  and  therefore  truth  is  to 
be  found  in  each,  and  can  only  be  entirely  obtained  by  effecting  a 
composition  between  them  all.  But  where  are  we  to  find  the  test 
that  will  separate  the  elements  of  truth  and  error  combined  in  each 
of  these  systems  ?  And  where  the  principle  of  unity  which  is  to 
group  together  the  particular  truths  disengaged  from  each  ?  These 
can  only  be  found  in  a  new  system.  But  this  system,  according 
to  M.  Cousin's  reasoning,  as  it  exists  in  common  with  many  others, 
can  contain  only  a  portion  of  truth,  and  the  skimming  process  must 
be  applied  to  this  in  common  with  the  rest.  We  see  no  end  to 
this  method  of  exhaustions.  M.  Cousin's  philosophy  has  in  truth 
no  belter  claim  to  the  name  and  character  of  eclectic  than  any 
other  system.  It  accepts  what  agrees  with  its  own  principles,  and 
rejects  what  does  not,  and  this  is  precisely  what  every  other  sys- 
tem does. 

If  further  evidence  were  wanting  of  the  affectation  and  charla- 
tanry of  this  title,  it  might  be  abundantly  found  in  the  additional 
reasons  which  M.  Cousin  assigns  for  assuming  it.  One  of  these  is 
that  consciousness  demands  eclecticism.  And  the  case  is  thus 
made  out.  "  Being,  the  me,  and  the  not-me,  are  the  three  inde- 
structible elements  of  consciousness  :  not  only  do  we  find  them  in 
the  actual  development  of  consciousness,  but  we  find  them  in  the 
first  facts  of  consciousness  as  in  the  last ;  and  so  intimately  are 
they  combined  with  each  other,  that  if  you  destroy  but  one  of  these 
three  elements  you  destroy  all  the  rest.  There  you  behold  eclec- 
ticism within  the  limits  of  consciousness,  in  its  elements,  which  are 
all  equally  real,  but  which,  to  form  a  psychological  theory,  need  all 
to  be  combined  with  each  other,  f  Another  reason  is  that  "  even 
logic  demands  eclecticism,"  for  all  systems  of  logic  turn  either  upon 
the  idea  of  cause,  or  that  of  substance  ;  and  from  the  alternate 
neglect  of  one  or  other  of  these  ideas,  we  have  the  "  two  great 

*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  416.  f  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  418. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  631 

systems  which,  at  the  present  day,  are  distinguished  by  the  names 
of  theism  and  pantheism."  Of  these  systems,  the  author  adds,  that 
"  both  the  one  and  the  other  are  equally  exclusive  and  false."* 
Hence  even  logic  demands  eclecticism.  But  the  most  amusing  ar- 
gument which  M.  Cousin  urges  in  behalf  of  eclecticism  is  that 
which  he  draws  from  the  spirit  and  tendencies  of  the  age.  We 
cannot  follow  him  through  it,  as  it  is  spread  over  seventeen  octavo 
pages.  He  rejects  from  consideration  England  and  Scotland,  on 
the  ground  of  their  lack  of  philosophy,  and  pronounces  Germany 
and  France  to  be  the  only  two  nations  worthy  of  notice.  He 
passes  in  review  the  general  state  of  philosophy  and  of  society  in 
these  two  nations,  declaims  upon  the  French  monarchy,  the  revo- 
lution, and  the  Chartef — and  at  length  arrives  at  this  conclusion  ; 
"  If  all  around  us  is  mixed,  complex,  and  mingled,  is  it  possible 
that  philosophy  should  be  exempt  from  the  influence  of  the  general 
spirit?  I  ask  whether  philosophy  can  avoid  being  eclectic  when 
all  that  is  around  it  is  so ;  and  whether,  consequently,  the  philoso- 
phical reformation  which  I  undertook  in  1816,  in  spite  of  every 
obstacle,  does  not  necessarily  proceed  from  the  general  movement 
of  society  throughout  Europe,  and  particularly  in  France? "J 
There  is  something  in  all  this  that  is  either  above  or  below  our 
comprehension.  We  can  readily  conceive  that  they  who  see  and 
feel  its  force,  would  find  no  impediment  to  glorying  in  the  fancied 
possession  of  the  culled  wisdom  of  all  other  sects. 

Before  dismissing  this  point,  it  is  right  that  we  should  hear  Dr. 
Henry's  account  of  the  boastful  title  of  the  new  school  in  philoso- 
phy. "  Its  eclectic  character  consists  precisely  in  the  pretension  of 
applying  its  own  distinctive  principles  to  the  criticism  of  all  other 
systems,  discriminating  in  each  its  part  of  truth  and  its  part  of 
error — and  combining  the  part  of  truth  found  in  every  partial,  ex- 
clusive, and  therefore  erroneous  system,  into  a  higher,  compre- 
hensive system."§  If  we  rightly  apprehend  the  writer's  meaning 
here,  it  involves  a  strange  confusion  of  ideas.  Eclecticism,  he 
maintains,  is  a  distinct,  scientific  theory,  possessing  its  own  method 
and  principles,  and  of  course  reduced  to  a  system.  And  yet  its 
method  and  principles  are  applied  to  all  existing  systems,  to  gather 
from  them  the  materials  for  a  higher  and  comprehensive  system, 
which  is  to  embrace  the  whole.     The  test  to  be  applied,  implies 


*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  419. 

t  The  following  passage,  which  occurs  in  this  connexion,  will  give  our  readers 
some  idea  of  M.  Cousin's  method  of  applying  his  philosophy  to  history.  "  You 
know  that  it  is  not  the  masses  of  population  which  appear  upon  fields  of  battle,  but 
the  ideas,  the  causes  for  which  they  combat.  Thus,  at  Leipzig  and  Waterloo,  the 
ideas  which  encountered  each  other  were  those  of  paternal  monarchy  and  military 
democracy.  Which  prevailed,  gentlemen  ?  Neither  the  one,  nor  the  other.  Which 
was  the  conqueror  ?  Which  was  the  vanquished  at  Waterloo  ?  Gentlemen,  none 
was  vanquished.  No!  I  protest  that  none  was  vanquished;  the  only  conquerors 
were  European  Civilization,  and  the  Charte."  We  assure  our  readers  that  this  is  a 
fair  average  sample. 

X  Int.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  440.  §  Elem.  of  Psychology,  p.  xxx. 


632  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

the  existence  of  a  philosophical  creed,  and  yet  this  creed  is  still  to 
be  formed  from  the  parts  of  truth  extracted,  by  the  application  of 
itself,  to  all  others !  The  system  of  M.  Cousin  has,  in  truth,  no 
more  claim  to  the  title  of  Eclectic,  than  any  other  that  has  ever 
existed.  It  is  quite  as  Procrustean  in  its  character  as  others,  stretch- 
ing or  lopping  off  to  suit  its  own  dimensions,  and  differing  from 
them,  in  this  respect,  only  in  its  catholic  pretensions. 

We  cannot,  for  reasons  already  given,  undertake  to  put  our 
readers  in  possession  of  M.  Cousin's  complete  system.  But  one  of 
its  chief  peculiarities,  in  the  judgment  of  Cousin  himself,  and  of  his 
translator,  is  to  be  found  in  the  distinction  which  he  draws  between 
the  spontaneous  and  the  reflective  reason,  and  this  we  will  endea- 
vour to  explain.  The  fundamental  fact  of  consciousness,  accord- 
ing to  M.  Cousin,  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  composed  of  three 
terms,  namely,  the  me,  and  the  not  me,  limited,  bounded,  finite  ; 
then  the  idea  of  something  different  from  these,  of  the  infinite,  of 
unity,  &c. ;  and  again  the  relation  of  the  me  and  the  not  me,  that 
is,  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  which  contains  and  unfolds  it ;  these 
are,  therefore,  the  three  terms  of  which  the  fundamental  fact  of 
consciousness  is  composed.  Every  man  who  bends  his  thoughts 
inwards,  and  penetrates  only  his  own  consciousness,  will  find  there 
each  of  these  three  elements.  If  one  of  these  terms  is  given,  the 
others  are  given  also,  nor  is  it  in  the  power  of  any  man  to  deny 
any  one  of  them.  Such  is  now  the  case,  but  was  it  always  thus  ? 
The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  every  phenomenon,  as  now 
manifested  in  the  consciousness,  is  the  conviction  of  having  tried 
to  deny  its  truth,  and  the  discovery  of  an  inability  to  do  so.  But 
intelligence  could  not  originally  commence  with  such  a  denial, 
seeing  that  every  denial  supposes  an  affirmation  of  denying.  Nor 
do  we  commence  with  reflection,  since  reflection  supposes  an  ope- 
ration anterior  to  itself,  and  cannot  add  any  terms  to  those  which 
are  given  by  that  operation.  Reflection  adds  itself  to  that  which 
was,  it  throws  light  upon  that  which  is,  but  it  creates  nothing. 
There  must  have  been,  therefore,  an  instinctive  development  of 
intelligence,  a  perception  of  truth  prior  to  reflection,  and  independ- 
ent of  the  will,  a  pure  affirmation  not  yet  mingled  with  any  nega- 
tion. This  primitive  intuition  contains  all  that  will,  at  a  later 
period,  be  contained  in  reflection :  the  me  and  the  not  me,*  the 
infinite  and  the  finite,  unity  and  variety,  substance  and  phenome- 
non, are  contained,  though  obscurely,  in  the  first  flashing  forth  of 
spontaneity.  This  is  the  spontaneous  reason  as  distinguished  from 
the  reflective.     The  spontaneous  reason  seizes  upon  truth  at  first 

*  We  quote  M.  Cousin's  description  of  a  man's  finding  himself.  "  We  do  not 
commence  with  seeking  ourselves,  for  this  would  imply  that  we  already  know  that 
we  exist;  but,  on  a  certain  day,  at  a  certain  hour,  at  a  certain  moment, — a  moment, 
solemn  in  existence  ! — without  having  sought  ourselves,  we  find  ourselves  : — thought, 
in  its  instinctive  development,  discloses  to  us  that  we  are  ;  we  affirm  our  existence 
with  profound  assurance,— with  an  assurance  unmingled  with  any  negation  what- 
ever."— Int.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  1G4. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  633 

sight ;  comprehends  and  receives  it,  without  asking  why  it  does 
so.  It  is  independent  of  the  will,  and  therefore  impersonal.  It 
does  not  belong  to  us  :  though  in  us,  it  is  not  of  us,  it  is  not  ours. 
It  is  absolute,  and  gives  pure  truth,  and  in  all  men  the  same  truth. 
But  in  the  reflective  reason,  our  own  voluntary  activity  is  con- 
cerned, and  here  is  found  the  source  of  difference  and  error.* 

Such  is,  substantially,  M.  Cousin's  account  of  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  spontaneous  and  the  reflective  reason.  He  claims  it  as 
a  discovery  of  his  own,  which  he  lighted  upon  "  in  the  recesses  of 
consciousness,  and  at  a  depth  to  which  Kant  did  not  penetrate." 
Kant  paused  at  the  apparent  relativeness  and  subjectivity  of  the 
laws  of  thought,  but  by  diving  deeper  M.  Cousin  "  detected  and 
unfolded  the  fact,  instantaneous  but  real,  of  the  spontaneous  per- 
ception of  truth — a  perception  which,  not  reflecting  itself  imme- 
diately, passes  without  notice  in  the  interior  consciousness,  but  is 
the  actual  basis  of  that  which,  at  a  subsequent  period,  in  a  logical 
form,  and  in  the  hands  of  reflection,  becomes  a  necessary  concep- 
tion." 

We  can  now  show  the  reader  the  ground  which  M.  Cousin's 
philosophy  affords  him  for  a  belief  in  the  objective  existence  of  the 
world,  and  God.  The  system  of  Kant  led  to  scepticism,  inasmuch 
as  it  taught  that  all  the  laws  of  thought  are  altogether  subjective, 
and  the  evil  consequence  was  remedied  only  by  assigning  an  illo- 
gical office  to  the  practical  reason.  But  M.  Cousin  has  gained  the 
same  end,  and  saved  his  logic.  "  All  subjectivity  expires  in  the 
spontaneity  of  perception.  Reason,  it  is  true,  becomes  subjective 
by  its  relation  to  the  free  and  voluntary  me,  the  seat  and  type  of 
all  subjectivity  ;  but  in  itself  it  is  impersonal ;  it  belongs  to  no  one 
individual  .rather  than  another,  within  the  compass  of  humanity  ; 
it  belongs  not  even  to  humanity  itself."  Reason,  therefore,  being 
impersonal,  it  follows  that  it  is  absolute,  and  that  the  truths  it  gives 
are  absolute  truths.  Here  is  the  only  resting-place  given  us  for 
our  belief  in  the  objective  existence  of  the  finite  or  the  infinite — 
the  spontaneity,  hence  the  impersonality,  and  hence  the  absolute 
character  of  reason.  He  who  does  not  "  possess  the  strength  to 
penetrate  deeply  into  the  recesses  of  his  own  mind,  to  pierce 
through  reflection  (we  know  not  with  what  instrument),  in  order  to 
arrive  at  the  basis  of  all  reflection,"  or  who,  when  he  has  arrived 
at  this  deep  place,  is  not  fortunate  enough  to  find  there  "  a  pure 
affirmation,  nqt  vet  mingled  with  any  negation,  and  containing  in 
it  all  that  has  subsequently  been  given  by  reflection,"  has  no  proper 
evidence  for  the  spontaneity  of  reason  upon  which  this  solution  of 
the  problem  of  the  objective  rests.  It  is  to  this  pure  affirmation, 
sometimes  represented  as  "  so  pure  that  it  escapes  notice,"  so  bright 

*  The  preceding  account  of  the  two-fold  development  of  reason  is  drawn  chiefly 
from  the  sixth  Lecture  of  the  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Philosophy  :  it  is,  per- 
haps, a  work  of  supererogation  to  say  that  it  is  given  in  the  author's  own  phraseology, 
though  abridged,  since  we  are  sure  our  readers  will  acquit  us  of  the  ability  to  con- 
struct it  ourselves. 


634  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

that  we  cannot  see  it,  that  the  appeal  is  made  in  proof  of  what  is 
styled  the  spontaneous  reason.  We  must,  therefore,  find  this 
"  pure  affirmation  "  in  our  consciousness,  or  must  admit,  in  defer- 
ence to  M.  Cousin's  logic,  that  it  exists  there,  though  so  brightly 
that  we  cannot  see  it,  before  we  can  believe  in  any  objective  ex- 
istence. That  is,  unless  we  have  strength  enough  to  make  the 
discovery  in  the  recesses  of  our  own  minds,  a  task  to  which  M. 
Cousin  acknowledges  that  but  few  men  are  equal,  we  must  admit 
that  there  exists  in  our  consciousness  something  of  which  we  are 
nevertheless  not  conscious,  in  order  to  be  satisfied  of  the  objective 
existence  of  either  the  world  or  God  ;  and  we  regard  this  as  so 
uncertain  a  path  for  arriving  at  certainty,  that  we  believe  few,  on 
this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  will  trust  their  feet  in  it : 

Whom  shall  we  find 
Sufficient  ?    Who  shall  tempt  with  wandering  feet 
The  dark  unbottom'd  infinite  abyss, 
And  through  the  palpable  obscure  find  out 
His  uncouth  way  ? 

There  are  some  other  results  of  the  non-subjectivity  of  the 
spontaneous  reason  which  are  more  startling.  It  is  the  pure  affir- 
mation, the  spontaneous  perception  of  the  reason,  which  gives  us 
the  finite  and  the  infinite.  Whence  comes  this  reason  which  en- 
lightens us,  but  does  not  belong  to  us  ?  "  This  principle,"  M.  Cou- 
sin says,  "  is  God,  the  first  and  last  principle  of  all  things."  Hu- 
man reason  therefore  "  becomes  divine  in  its  own  eyes."  "  Reason 
is  literally  a  revelation,  a  necessary  and  universal  revelation  which 
is  wanting  to  no  man,  and  which  enlightens  every  man  on  his 
coming  into  the  world.  Reason  is  the  necessary  mediator  between 
God  and  man,  the  Logos  of  Pythagoras  and  Plato,  the  Word  made 
flesh,  which  serves  as  the  interpreter  of  God  and  the  teacher  of 
man,  divine  and  human  at  the  same  time."  There  is  no  hesitation 
on  the  part  of  M.  Cousin  in  drawing  from  this  the  conclusion  that 
"  humanity  is  inspired, — the  divine  breath  which  is  in  it  always 
and  everywhere  reveals  to  it  all  truths  under  one  form  or  another 
according  to  the  place  and  the  time."  "  Every  man  thinks,  every 
man  therefore  thinks  God,  if  we  may  so  express  it."  "  Every- 
where present,  he  (God)  returns  as  it  were  to  himself  in  the 
consciousness  of  man,  of  which  he  indirectly  constitutes  the  me- 
chanism and  phenomenal  triplicity  by  the  reflection  of  his  own 
nature  and  of  the  substantial  triplicity  of  which  he  is  the  absolute 
identity."*  In  human  reason  there  are  found  three  ideas,  a  tripli- 
city in  unity ;  the  infinite,  the  finite,  and  the  relation  which  subsists 
between  them ; — the  passage  from  these  ideas  to  God,  says  M. 
Cousin,  is  not  difficult,  "  for  these  ideas  are  God  himself."  We 
earnestly  call  attention  to  this  as  one  of  the  most  hideous  heads  of 
the  pantheistical  hydra.  The  dogmatic  theologians  of  this  sect 
have  put  it  in  the  place  of  the  incarnation,  and  the  poets  of  "  Young 

*  Elem.  of  Psychol.,  p.  400.     See  Marheineke  Dogm.,  §§  229,  rT.     Bretschneider, 
ubi  supr.,  p.  49. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  635 

Germany"  are  teaching  the  intoxicated  youth  to  regard  themselves 
as  sublime  realizations  of  the  divine  reason.  So  Schefer,  in  his 
passionate  verses,  designates  man  as  the  Son  of  God,  as  godlike, 
nay,  as  the  God-man  ;  and  in  a  phrenzy  of  self-apotheosis  pro- 
ceeds to  call  the  human  head  the  city  of  the  gods ! 

But  to  resume  our  thread :  as  in  human  consciousness  there  are 
found  only  two  ideas  and  their  connexion,  forming  three  elements, 
so  in  nature,  two  corresponding  laws,  and  their  connexion,  govern 
the  material  universe.  We  find  in  the  world  the  same  triplicity  in 
unity  as  in  ourselves.  "  The  world  accordingly  is  of  the  same 
stuff  with  ourselves,  and  nature  is  the  sister  of  man."  And  here 
we  find  in  God,  man,  and  the  world,  the  triplicity  in  unity  again, 
which  figures  so  largely  in  the  Eclectic  philosophy.  The  unity  of 
the  three  is  not  obscurely  taught  in  the  following  passage.  "  The 
interior  movement  of  the  energies  of  the  world,  in  the  necessary 
progress  of  their  development  from  degree  to  degree,  from  king- 
dom to  kingdom,  produces  that  wondrous  being  whose  fundamental 
attribute  is  consciousness,  and  in  this  consciousness  we  have  met 
with  precisely  the  same  elements  which,  subject  to  different  condi- 
tions, we  had  already  found  to  exist  in  nature  : — the  same  elements 
which  we  had  recognised  in  God  himself."*  M.  Cousin  has  not 
permitted  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  to  rest  upon  the  pantheistical 
tendency  of  his  philosophy.  "  God,"  he  tells  us,  "  is  at  once  true 
and  real,  at  once  substance  and  cause,  always  substance  and  al- 
ways cause,  being  substance  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  cause,  and 
cause  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  substance,  that  is  to  say,  being  absolute 
cause,  one  and  many,  eternity  and  time,  space  and  number,  es- 
sence and  life,  indivisibility  and  totality,  principle,  end  and  centre, 
at  the  summit  of  being  and  at  its  lowest  degree,  infinite  and  finite 
together,  triple  in  a  word,  that  is  to  say,  at  the  same  time  with  God, 
nature,  and  humanity.  In  fact,  if  God  be  not  everything,  he  is 
nothing ;  if  he  be  absolutely  indivisible  in  himself,  he  is  inaccessible ; 
and  consequently  he  is  incomprehensible,  and  his  incomprehensi- 
bility is  for  us  the  same  as  his  destruction."!  M.  Cousin  has  at- 
tempted to  forestall  the  charge  of  pantheism,  by  pronouncing  it 
the  bugbear  of  feeble  imaginations.  This  is  a  very  common,  and 
not  a  very  creditable  artifice.  But  we  trust  that  there  is,  in  our 
country  at  least,  enough  of  this  feebleness  of  imagination  to  be 
affrighted  by  the  bugbear,  and  to  shrink  back  with  horror  from 
such  a  philosophical  aliment  as  is  offered  by  an  infidel  philosophy ; 
and  the  more  so  when  we  see  in  every  new  arrival  of  European 
journals,  that  there  is  scarcely  a  doctrine  of  orthodox  Christianity 
on  which  these  harpies  have  not  descended,  claiming  it  as  their 
own,  and  so  defiling  it  by  impious  misuse  as  to  give  us  poison  un- 
der the  shape  of  food. 

No  sincere  and  earnest  inquirer  after  truth,  humble  and  reverent 
in  his  self-distrust  as  he  must  needs  be,  can  fail  to  take  offence  at 

*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  15S.  t  Elem.  of  Psychol.,  p.  399. 


636  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

the  bold  and  confident  tone  in  which  M.  Cousin  settles  all  questions ; 
and  especially  will  the  pious  mind  recoil  from  his  unhallowed  in- 
trusions upon  the  nature  and  essence  of  the  Deity.  He  professes 
indeed  to  believe  and  teach  the  existence  of  God.  He  professes, 
too,  sad  omen  at  the  outset,  thoroughly  to  comprehend  his  nature 
and  essence.  He  does  not  pretend  to  deny,  he  pleads  guilty  to,  the 
accusation  of  seeking  "  to  penetrate  into  the  depths  of  the  Divine 
Essence,  which  common  opinion  declares  to  be  incomprehensi- 
ble."* "  So  little  is  God  incomprehensible,  that  his  nature  is  con- 
stituted by  ideas — by  those  ideas  whose  nature  it  is  to  be  intelligi- 
ble." "  The  measure  of  the  comprehensibility  of  God  is  the 
measure  of  human  faith."  They  who  falter  and  draw  back  from 
this  rushing  in  of  fools  where  angels  dare  not  tread,  are  reproached 
with  "  pusillanimous  mysticism."  He  admits  that  God  "is  incom- 
prehensible as  a  formula,  and  in  the  schools,"  but  we  should  con- 
sider that  "  mysticism  is  the  necessary  form  of  all  religion" — "  the 
symbolical  and  mystical  form  is  inherent  in  religion" — and  "  to  speak 
plainly,  the  religious  form  and  the  philosophical  form  are  different 
from  each  other."  Though  religion,  therefore,  must  of  necessity 
present  truths  under  a  mysterious  and  incomprehensible  form,  it  is 
the  right  of  philosophy  to  penetrate  this  form,  and  disengage  the 
ideas  ;  it  is  its  duty  "  to  comprehend  nothing,  and  to  admit  nothing 
but  in  so  far  as  it  is  true  in  itself,  and  in  the  form  of  ideas."  God 
exists  only  so  far  as  we  comprehend  him.  His  nature  is  consti- 
tuted by  ideas,  and  those  ideas  are  wholly  within  the  stretch  and 
compass  of  our  reason.  "  I  will  speak,"  says  our  author,  "  plainly 
and  unequivocally  upon  this  point.  Mystery  is  a  word  which 
belongs  not  to  the  vocabulary  of  philosophy,  but  to  that  of  reli- 
gion."! 

*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  132. 

t  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  134.  There  is  an  admirable  contrast  between  the 
pert  self-sufficiency  of  M.  Cousin,  and  the  humble  truth-loving  spirit  of  the  illustri- 
ous Descartes,  who  is  honoured  and  lauded  as  the  author  of  the  Psychological  Me- 
thod, and  the  founder  of  the  Ideal  School  of  Philosophy.  Cousin  calls  himself  one 
of  the  sons  of  Descartes.  Degenerate  son  of  a  noble  sire  !  Compare  the  modest 
caution  of  the  one  with  the  all-embracing  arrogance  of  the  other.  "  Quod  ut  satis 
tuto  et  sine  errandi  periculo  aggrediamur,  ea  nobis  cautela  est  utendum,  ut  semper 
quam  maxime  recordemur,  et  Deum  auctorem  rerum  esse  ihfinitum,  et  nos  omnino 
finitos.  Ita  si  forte  nobis  Deus  de  se  ipso,  vel  aliis  aliquid  revelet,  quod  naturales  in- 
genii  nostri  vires  excedat,  qualia  jam  sunt  mysteria  Incarnationis  et  Trinitatis,  non 
recusabimus  ilia  credere,  quamvis  non  clare  intelligamus;  nee  ullo  modo  mirabimur 
multa  esse,  turn  in  immensa  ejus  natura,  turn  etiam  in  rebus  ab  eo  creatis,  quae 
captum  nostrum  excedant." — Princ.  Phil.,  §  xxv. 

Another  truly  great  man,  of  the  same  age,  in  urging  the  use  of  reason  in  theology, 
addresses  to  those  who  employ  this  noble  talent  in  all  other  matters, but  hide  it  under 
a  bushel  when  they  come  to  the  study  of  God  and  of  his  word,  the  expostulation, 
"  Cave,  cave,  ne  quondam  a  te  rigide  satis  rationes  exigantur  tam  male  collocati  tui 
talenti."  But  he  immediately  adds,  **  Scio  quam  maxime,  nee  opus  est  ut  monear, 
plurima  esse,  quae  Deus  in  verbo  suo  nobis  revelavit,  captum  nostrum  infinities  su- 
perantia,  qualia  sunt  momentosissima  fidei  capita  de  S.  S.  Trinitate,  de  eterna  gene- 
ratione  filii,  de  ejus  incarnatione,  de  resurrectione  mortuorum, — haec  sane  credidi, 
credo,  et  per  gratiam  Dei  semper  credam,  quia  ea  revelare  mihi  dignatus  est." — Joh. 
Bernouilli,  Opera,  vol.  i.,  p.  196. 

We  could  quote  much  to  the  same  effect  from  Leibnitz,  to  whom  M.  Cousin  does 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  637 

With  this  for  his  point  of  departure,  it  is  not  surprising  that  M. 
Cousin  should  be  led  to  reject  entirely  the  God  of  the  scriptures, 
and  substitute  in  his  stead  a  shadowy  abstraction.  In  place  of  the 
mysterious  and  incomprehensible  Jehovah,  whose  infinite  perfec- 
tions will  be  the  study  and  delight  of  an  eternity,  we  have  a  God 
whose  nature  and  essence  we  can  now,  while  seeing  through  a 
glass  darkly,  thoroughly  comprehend,  and  to  whom  faith  is  not 
permitted  to  attribute  anything  of  excellence  or  glory  beyond 
what  the  human  intellect  can  clearly  discern.  In  place  of  the  God 
of  Abraham,  of  Isaac,  and  of  Jacob,  the  God  to  whom  his  people, 
in  all  ages,  have  fled  for  refuge,  crying,  do  Thou  deliver  me  and 
save  me,  we  are  presented  with  a  vague  personification  of  abstract 
principles,  with  a  God  who  is  described  as  the  reason ;  thought, 
with  its  fundamental  momenta  ;  space,  time,  and  number  ;  the  sub- 
stance of  the  me,  or  the  free  personality,  and  of  the  fatal  not  me 
or  nature  ;  who  returns  to  himself  in  the  consciousness  of  man  ; 
of  whose  divine  essence  all  the  momenta  pass  into  the  world,  and 
return  into  the  consciousness  of  man  ;  who  is  everything,  and  it 
might,  with  equal  significancy,  be  added,  nothing. 

With  this  notion  of  God  no  one  will  contradict  the  position  fre- 
quently assumed  by  M.  Cousin,  that  Atheism  is  impossible.  Who 
can  deny  the  existence  of  reason,  of  thought,  of  the  world  ?  And 
if  he  cannot  deny  these,  he  cannot  deny  God,  for  these  are  God. 
It  is  substantially  upon  this  ground  that  M.  Cousin  rests  the  impos- 
sibility of  Atheism.  "  Every  man  believes  in  his  own  existence, 
every  man,  therefore,  believes  in  the  existence  of  the  world,  and 
God.  Every  man  thinks  ;  every  man,  therefore,  thinks  God.  Every 
human  proposition  contains  God ;  every  man  who  speaks,  speaks 
of  God,  and  every  word  is  an  act  of  faith  and  a  hymn.  Every  as- 
sertion, even  though  negative,  is  a  judgment  which  contains  the 
idea  of  being,  and  consequently,  God  in  his  fullness."*  To  the 
same  effect  we  are  told  "  that  all  thought  implies  a  spontaneous 
faith  in  God,  and  natural  Atheism  has  no  existence."  Every  man 
who  believes  that  he  exists,  believes  all  that  is  necessary.  "  If  he 
believes  this,  I  am  satisfied  ;  for  if  he  believes  that  he  exists,  he 
then  believes  that  his  thought, — that  he  believes  his  existence — is 
worthy  of  faith  ;  he,  therefore,  places  his  faith  in  the  principle  of 
his  thought; — now,  there  is  God."f  Even  the  sceptic  who  doubts 
everything,  is  not  to  be  brought  as  an  objection  to  this  doctrine. 
For  does  he  deny  that  he  denies  ?  Does  he  doubt  that  he  doubts  ? 
If  he  only  affirms  that  he  doubts,  in  that  affirmation  there  is  in- 
cluded faith  in  himself  and  in  God.  Behold,  then,  all  men  con- 
verted into  believers — respect  humanity,  for  all  its  members  ac- 
knowledge the  same  God  ; — impute  Atheism  to  no  man,  for  every 

homage  "  as  the  greatest  authority  among  modern  philosophers."  These  were  men 
who  were  seeking,  with  passionate  earnestness,  after  truth  :  they  were  not  founding 
new  schools  in  philosophy.  They  were  men  of  large  powers  and  large  attainments, 
and  could  afford  to  confess  ignorance,  where  it  is  folly  to  be  wise. 

*  Elem.  of  Psych.,  pp.  401,  402.  f  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  PhiL,  p.  174. 


638  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

man  speaks,  and  each  word  is  an  act  of  faith  in  God ;  every  man 
believes  in  his  own  consciousness,  and  it  is  in  human  consciousness 
that  God  returns  to  himself;  "human  consciousness  is  like  the 
divine  essence  which  it  manifests."  Such  is  the  practical  conclu- 
sion of  this  philosophy.  And  we  admit  its  justness  ;  it  is  logically 
connected  with  the  premises.  With  the  notion  of  God  given  us 
by  M.  Cousin,  Atheism  is  indeed  impossible.  And  so  it  is  impos- 
sible under  any  scheme  of  idolatry  which  assumes  an  object  in  the 
existence  of  which  all  men  must  of  necessity  believe,  as  its 
God.  The  African,  having  established  that  his  fetish  is  God,  will 
have  no  difficulty  in  proving  that  all  men,  or  as  many  at  least  as 
believe  in  the  evidence  of  their  senses,  believe  in  God.  Atheism 
is  a  term  that  bears  relation  to  the  true  God  revealed  in  the  Bible, 
to  the  God  that  is  found  under  the  "  venerable  form  of  religion," 
and  the  philosophy  that  approaches  this  form  to  disengage  the  idea 
of  God,  and  change  it  to  a  new  one,  though  it  comes  with  many 
expressions  of  "  profound  respect  and  veneration,"  and  with  all  the 
deferential  and  smirking  politeness  of  a  French  petit  maitre,  is  es- 
sentially atheistic  in  its  character,  and  as  such  should  be  held  in 
equal  abhorrence  with  the  open  and  frontless  denial  of  God.  M. 
Cousin,  to  do  him  justice,  never  fails  in  polite  respect  towards  re- 
ligion ;  he  even  refers,  with  evident  approbation,  to  the  pious  po- 
liteness "  of  the  octogenary  author  of  the  Systeme  du  Monde  (an 
Atheist),  who  bowed  and  uncovered  his  head,  whenever  God  was 
named."  But  when  a  man  robs  us  of  our  God,  it  is  but  little  mat- 
ter whether  he  does  it  with  an  open  and  rude  violence,  or  with  a 
smooth  and  complaisant  legerdemain. 

The  idea  of  creation  is  of  necessity  modified  by  the  idea  of 
God.  What  is  it  to  create  ?  After  stating  and  repudiating  the 
"  vulgar  definition,  which  is,  to  make  something  out  of  nothing," 
M.  Cousin  proceeds  to  seek  the  true  conception  of  this  act  among  the 
facts  of  consciousness.  "  To  create,"  he  says,  "  is  a  thing 
which  it  is  not  difficult  to  conceive,  for  it  is  a  thing  which 
we  do  at  every  moment ;  in  fact  we  create  whenever  we  perform 
a  free  action.  Here  is  the  type  of  a  creation.  The  divine  crea- 
tion is  the  same  in  its  nature.  God,  if  he  is  a  cause,  can  create  ; 
and  if  he  is  an  absolute  cause,  he  cannot  but  create ;  and  in  cre- 
ating the  universe  he  does  not  draw  it  forth  from  nothingness,  but 
from  himself.  God,  therefore,  creates  ;  he  creates  by  virtue  of  his 
creative  power ;  he  draws  forth  the  world,  not  from  nothingness, 
which  is  not,  but  from  him  who  is  absolute  existence.  An  abso- 
lute creative  force,  which  cannot  but  pass  into  act,  being  eminently 
his  characteristic,  it  follows,  not  that  creation  is  possible,  but  that  it 
is  necessary :  it  follows  that  God  is  creating  without  cessation  and 
infinitely,  and  that  creation  is  inexhaustible,  and  sustains  itself  con- 
stantly."* M.  Cousin,  on  one  occasion,  intimates  that  he  knows 
"  he  is  speaking  in  1828,  and  not  in  1850,"  and  we  presume  a  de- 

*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  pp.  136—142. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  639 

cent  regard  for  the  prejudices  of  the  age  in  which  his  lot  is  cast, 
prevented  him  from  stating  an  immediate  inference  from  the  prin- 
ciples here  laid  down.     If  it  be  the  most  eminent  characteristic  of 
God  that  he  is  an  absolute  creative  force  that  cannot  but  pass  into 
act,  we  are  driven  to  believe  in  the  eternal  creation  of  the  world, 
or  rather  in  the  eternal  co-existence  and  oneness  of  God,  and  the 
universe.     The  possibility  of  a  creation,  in  the  strict  and  proper 
sense  of  the  term,  is  denied  by  M.  Cousin  at  the  outset.     He  says 
that  "  Leucippus,  Epicurus,  Bayle,  and  Spinosa,  and  indeed  all  others 
whose  powers  of  thought  are  somewhat  exercised,  demonstrate, 
that  out  of  nothing,  nothing  can  be  drawn  forth  ;  that  out  of  no- 
thing, nothing  can  come  forth  ;  whence  it  follows  that  creation  is 
impossible.     Yet  by  pursuing  a  different  route  our  investigations 
arrive  at  this  very  different  result,  viz.,  that  creation  is,  I  do  not 
say,  possible,  but  necessary."     And  what  is  this  different  route 
which  conducts  from  the  same  premises  to  so  opposite  a  conclu- 
sion ?     It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  by  changing  the  meaning  of  the 
word.     It  is  by  narrowing  the  term  to  signify  only  what  we  every 
moment  do,  what  every  cause,  now  in  action,  does.     By  confound- 
ing creation  with  causation,  and  defining  God  to  be  a  creative 
force  that  could  not  but  pass  into  act,  either  Leucippus  or  Spinosa 
might  have  proved  as  clearly  as  M.  Cousin  has  done,  that  creation, 
so  far  from  being  impossible,  is  both  possible  and  necessary.    That 
they  did  not  arrive  at  this  "  different  result,"  should  be  imputed 
perhaps  rather  to  their  candour,  than  to  their  want  of  penetration. 
If  the  maxim  "  nihil  posse  creari  de  nihilo"  be  received  as  uni- 
versally true,  and  applied  in  limitation  of  the  divine  power,  as 
well  as  human,  creation  is  of  course  impossible.     Creation  is  the 
making  of  something  out  of  nothing,  and  if  this  cannot  be  done 
there  can  be  no  creation.     We  find  matter  now  in  existence.     Un- 
less it  had  existed  eternally,  there  was  a  time  when  it  did  not  exist. 
It  must  then  have  been  formed  either  of  something  already  exist- 
ing, which,  by  hypothesis,  is  not  matter,  that  is,  of  spirit,  or  it  must 
have  been  formed  of  nothing.     But  matter  cannot  be  a  modified 
form  of  spiritual  existence,  and  according  to  M.  Cousin,  it  cannot 
be  drawn  forth  from  nothing.     The  only  legitimate  conclusion  to 
which  we  can  arrive  from  these  premises  is,  that  matter  does  not 
now  exist,  or  that  it  has  had  an  independent  existence  from  eternity, 
or  that  it  is  an  emanation  from  the  Deity.     The  latter  opinion 
seems  to  be  the  one  held  by  M.  Cousin.     The  material  universe, 
he  teaches  us,  was  not  formed  out  of  nothing ; — "  God  drew  it  forth 
from  himself;  therefore,  he  creates  with  all  the   characteristics 
which  we  have  recognised  in  him,  and  which  pass  necessarily  into 
his  creation."*     We  find,  too,  the  following  passage  in  his  preface 
to  the  second  edition  of  the  Philosophical  Fragments,  translated 
by  Dr.  Henry,  and  appended   to  the  Elements  of  Psychology. 
"  God  exists  for  us  only  in  the  relation  of  cause  ;   without  this, 

•  Introd.,  p.  142. 


640  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

reason  would  not  refer  to  him  either  humanity  or  the  world.  He 
is  absolute  substance  only  inasmuch  as  he  is  absolute  cause  ;  and 
his  essence  consists  precisely  in  his  creative  power."*  M.  Cousin's 
theory  of  Cosmogony  is  now  quite  plain.  The  essence  of  God  is 
his  creative  power.  He  is  an  absolute  force,  subjected  to  a  neces- 
sity of  acting,  and  of  developing  in  its  effects  those  characteris- 
tics and  those  alone  which  are  found  in  itself.  God  is  made  the 
mere  living  force,  the  vis  viva,  of  the  universe,  and  all  things  are 
but  the  radiations  and  effluxes  of  this  primary  and  interior  energy. 
This  is  the  theory  taught,  if  we  may  credit  the  Hermetic  Frag- 
ments, by  the  ancient  Egyptians,  and  which  is  at  this  day  held  both 
by  the  Brahmins  and  Buddhists  of  the  East.  Among  all  the  an- 
cients, unless  the  Tuscans  be  an  exception,  the  creation  of  some- 
thing out  of  nothing  was  held  to  be  a  palpable  absurdity.  It  was 
a  common  article  in  all  the  different  creeds  of  Grecian  and  Roman 
philosophy,  that  "  gigni  de  nihilo  nil,  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti." 
This  led  to  two  different  theories  of  the  origin  of  the  visible  uni- 
verse, either  of  them  exclusive  of  a  creation  properly  so  called. 
The  one,  that  of  most  of  the  Greek  schools,  which  taught  the  eter- 
nity, and  independent  existence  of  matter ;  the  other,  that  of  the 
oriental  systems,  which  represented  the  universe  as  an  emanation 
from  within  the  Deity.  Thus  in  the  Yajur  Veid,  as  translated  by 
Du  Perron,  it  is  said :  "  The  whole  universe  is  the  Creator,  pro- 
ceeds from  the  Creator,  exists  in  him,  and  returns  to  him.  The 
ignorant  assert  that  the  universe,  in  the  beginning,  did  not  exist  in 
its  author,  and  that  it  was  created  out  of  nothing.  Oh,  ye  whose 
hearts  are  pure,  how  could  something  be  made  out  of  nothing  ? 
This  first  Being  alone,  and  without  likeness,  was  the  all  in  the  be- 
ginning :  he  could  multiply  himself  under  different  forms ;  he  cre- 
ated fire  from  his  essence,  which  is  light,"  &c.  This  doctrine  was 
early  carried  into  Greece,  and  adopted  by  many  of  their  philoso- 
phers. It  is  found  in  the  Orphic  remains,  especially  in  the  poem 
de  Mundo,  as  quoted  by  Aristotle  and  Proclus,  in  Aeschylus-,  and 
in  most  of  the  Greek  poets.  It  seems  to  have  special  affinities  for 
poetry.  In  modern  times  it  has  made  its  reappearance  in  the  po- 
lished periods  of  Pope's  Essay  on  Man,  and  it  runs  through  the 
wild  and  impious  imaginations  of  Shelley.f  Under  the  poetic  dress 
this  system  is  more  tolerable,  because  we  can  ordinarily  make  such 
deductions  for  poetic  imagery  as  will  bring  it  within  the  compass 
of  truth.  But  when  in  the  grave  language  of  didactic  philosophy 
we  are  told  that  the  very  essence  of  God  is  his  creative  power  ; 
that  he  is  a  force  that  was  compelled  to  act  and  to  pass  with  all 
his  characteristics  into  the  visible  world ;  and  that  nothing  now 
exists  which  has  not  from  eternity  existed  in  God ;  we  are  con- 

*  Elem.  of  Psych.,  p.  408. 

•f  Wordsworth  occasionally  borders  on  the  very  extreme  of  poetic  license  upon 
this  subject.  The  philosophical  principles  of  the  Essay  on  Man  were  dictated  by 
Bolingbroke,  and  it  is  supposed  that  Pope  was  not  himself  sufficiently  aware  of  their 
tendency. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  641 

cerncd,  we  are  alarmed.  This  necessary  transfusion  of  God  into 
the  universe  destroys  our  very  idea  of  God.*  He  is  made  the 
substratum,  the  substance  of  all  existence  ;  and  we  are  only  bub- 
bles thrown  up  upon  the  bosom  of  the  mighty  all,  to  reflect  the 
rainbow  colours,  in  our  brief  phenomenal  existence,  and  then  be 
absorbed  again  into  the  ocean  from  which  we  came.f 

It  will  have  been  already  anticipated  from  the  exposition  we 
have  given,  that  M.  Cousin's  philosophy  makes  sad  havoc  with 
Christianity.  He  is  indeed  studiously  polite  to  Christianity  as  well 
as  to  natural  religion.  "  He  knows  that  he  is  speaking  in  1828, 
and  not  in  1850."  This  knowledge  it  is,  doubtless,  that  draws 
forth  his  kind  and  forbearing  indulgence  towards  Christianity, — his 
patience,  with  its  slowness  of  movement, — nay,  his  condescending 
patronage.  "Christianity  is  the  philosophy  of«the  people.  He 
who  now  addresses  you  sprang  from  the  people,  and  from  Chris- 
tianity ;  and  I  trust  you  will  always  recognise  this,  in  my  profound 
and  tender  respect  for  all  that  is  of  the  people  and  of  Christianity. 
Philosophy  is  patient ;  she  knows  what  was  the  course  of  events 
in  former  generations,  and  she  is  full  of  confidence  in  the  future  ; 
happy  in  seeing  the  great  bulk  of  mankind  in  the  arms  of  Chris- 
tianity, she  offers,  with  modest  kindness,  to  assist  her  in  ascending 
to  a  yet  loftier  elevation." J  And  again,  he  says,  "  I  believe  that  in 
Christianity  all  truths  are  contained ;  but  these  eternal  truths  may 
and  ought  to  be  approached,  disengaged,  and  illustrated  by  philo- 
sophy. Truth  has  but  one  foundation ;  but  truth  assumes  two 
forms,  mystery  and  scientific  exposition;  I  revere  the  one,  I  am 
the  organ  and  interpreter  of  the  other."§  Infidelity  has,  in  most 
cases,  assumed  this  guise  of  philosophical  explanation  of  the  truths 
of  Christianity.  Hume  proposed  only  to  place  faith  upon  its  pro- 
per foundation ;  and  even  Voltaire  and  the  French  Encyclopedists 
professed  to  be  rendering  true  service  to  Christianity,  while  they 
were  seeking  to  sap  its  foundations  and  overwhelm  it  with  utter 
ruin.  But  unless  it  be  to  blind  the  eyes,  and  evade  the  arm  of  the 
ecclesiastical  power,  which  in  Catholic  countries  holds  watch  over 
the  press,  we  see  not  what  good  purpose  can  be  effected  by  so  thin 
a  disguise  as  that  assumed  by  M.  Cousin.||     He  surely  cannot  ima- 

*  If  La  Place  had  only  personified  under  the  name  of  God,  the  forces  with  which 
the  attenuated  matter  of  his  nebular  hypothesis  was  supposed  to  he  endowed,  he 
might,  with  as  much  justice  as  M.  Cousin,  have  escaped  the  imputation  of  atheism. 

t  The  fittest  symbolical  form  that  has  ever  been  given  to  this  creed  is  that  of  an 
oriental  sect,  who  represent  the  Deity  as  an  immense  spider  seated  at  the  centre  of 
the  universe,  and  spinning  forth  all  things  from  his  own  body. 

\  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  57.  §  Ibid.,  p.  442. 

||  Among  those  v»  horn  we  look  to  as  readers  of  such  articles  as  this  there  are  some 
who  are  turning  their  steps  to  the  enchanted  ground  of  German  literature,  either  in 
its  primitive  or  its  secondary  and  Gallicized  division.  Let  us,  with  all  the  earnest- 
ness of  disinterested  dread,  caution  the  young  American.  Under  the  disguises  of  ro- 
mance and  poesy,  he  will  learn  to  tolerate  the  hell-born  dogmas  of  the  young  Germa- 
ny;  the  mingled  lust  and  blasphemy  of  Heine,  PQckler  Muskau,  and  Schefer;  or, 
if  he  wander  in  these  domains  as  a  theologian,  the  Iscariot  Christianity  of  the  disci- 
ples of  Schelling,  Hegel,  and  Daub. 

41 


<* 


642  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

gine  that  the  most  ordinary  intelligence  could  fail  to  penetrate  the 
flimsy  hypocrisy.  He  comes  down  from  the  heights  of  philosophy, 
to  meet  Christianity  in  her  helplessness  and  aid  her  in  ascending  to 
a  loftier  elevation  !  Though  tolerant  of  her  past  slowness,  yet 
knowing  that  she  must  move  more  rapidly  to  meet  the  wants  of 
the  future,  he  comes,  with  modest  kindness,  to  disburden  her  of 
her  mysteries,  and  quicken  her  steps  !  He  presents  himself  as  an 
interpreter,  in  scientific  exposition,  of  a  revelation  from  God,  and 
the  canon  which  he  brings  in  his  hand  and  openly  exposes,  is  to 
admit  nothing  which  this  revelation  contains  as  truth,  unless  by  fall- 
ing back  upon  our  own  pure  reason  we  find  it  to  be  true  in  itself 
and  in  the  form  of  ideas  !  In  his  solution  of  the  mystery  of  the 
Incarnation,  in  which  Reason  is  declared  to  be  the  Word  made 
flesh,  we  have  both  proof  and  warning  of  the  kind  of  assistance 
which  Christianity  may  expect  at  his  hands.  All  the  sacred  mys- 
teries of  revelation  dwindle,  in  like  manner,  under  his  profane 
touch,  into  the  stale  truths  of  our  own  consciousness.  Locke  en- 
counters the  sneers  of  M.  Cousin  because  he  had  not  discovered 
this  mode  of  making  Christianity  easy.  Speaking  of  the  appeals 
made  by  Locke  to  Christianity,  to  revelation,  and  to  faith,  he  says, 
"  By  faith,  however,  and  by  revelation,  he  does  not.  understand  a 
philosophical  faith  and  revelation.  This  interpretation  did  not 
exist  in  the  age  of  Locke.  He  understands  faith  and  revelation, 
in  the  proper  orthodox,  theological  sense."*  If  we  have  a  just 
idea  of  the  temper  of  Locke,  he  would  have  scorned  to  avail  him- 
self of  this  slippery  and  deceptive  interpretation.  It  is  an  ungra- 
cious task  to  be  alarmists,  and  we  should  shun  the  office  if  only 
some  specialties  of  this  or  that  sect  were  at  stake,  and  not,  as  we 
believe,  the  very  basis  of  all  religion  and  morals.  Socinianism  is 
evangelical  when  compared  with  the  newest  theology  of  Germany. 

M.  Cousin's  patronage  of  Christianity  becomes  sometimes  ludi- 
crous. He  declares,  with  gravity,  that  "  it  is  the  best  of  all  reli- 
gions, and  it  is  the  most  accomplished  of  all."  He  assigns  a  reason 
for  its  accomplishments.  It  is  this,  "  that  the  Christian  religion  is 
that  which  of  all  other  religions  came  last ;  and  it  is  unreasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  religion  which  came  last  should  not  be  better 
than  all  others,  should  not  embrace  and  resume  them  all."f  The 
perfectibility  of  the  human  species  is  a  cardinal  doctrine  with  M. 
Cousin.  Humanity  is  ever  in  the  right ;  and  its  progress  is  stea- 
dily onward  and  upward.  Each  age  is  an  improvement  on  its 
predecessor,  and  every  new  system  is  superior  to  all  that  have 
gone  before  it.  The  inferiority  of  Christianity  will  therefore  be 
demonstrated,  should  the  general  apostasy,  which  some  predict, 
take  place  after  its  universal  prevalence. 

We  need  not  seek  in  the  remote  deductions  and  results  of  M. 
Cousin's  philosophy  for  evidence  of  its  irreconcilable  hostility  to 
Christianity.  In  its  first  principles  it  overthrows  the  foundation  of 
divine  revelation.     The  spontaneous  reason,  we  are  told  by  M. 

*  Elem.  of  Psych.,  p.  213.  f  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  339. 

^* 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  643 

Cousin,  is  God,  and  the  truths  given  by  it  are  "  literally  a  revela- 
tion from  God."  And  since  this  reason  is  found  in  all  men,  "  hu- 
manity is  inspired."  The  original  fact  of  affirmation,  which  is  found 
by  M.  Cousin  in  human  consciousness,  benekth  reflection,  and 
anterior  to  all  negation,  and  upon  which  he  relies  for  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  spontaneous  reason,  "  this  fact  it  is,  which  the 
human  race  have  agreed  to  call  inspiration."  This  inspiration  is 
attended  always  by  enthusiasm.  "  It  is  the  spirit  of  God  with  us  : 
it  is  immediate  intuition  as  opposed  to  induction  and  demonstration: 
it  is  the  primitive  spontaneity  opposed  to  the  ulterior  development 
of  reflection."*  As  neither  the  senses  nor  the  will  are  concerned 
in  this  primitive  act  of  pure  apperception,  we  cannot  refer  it  to 
ourselves.  Therefore,  "  when  man  is  conscious  of  the  wondrous 
fact  of  inspiration  and  enthusiasm,  feeling  himself  unable  to  refer  it 
to  himself,  he  refers  it  to  God  ;  and  gives  to  this  original  and  pure 
affirmation  the  name  of  revelation.  Is  the  human  race  wrong  ?f 
When  man,  conscious  of  his  feeble  intervention  of  the  fact  of  inspi- 
ration, refers  to  God  the  truths  which  he  has  not  made,  and  which 
rule  over  him,  does  he  deceive  himself?  No,  certainly  not;  for 
what  is  God  ?  I  have  told  you  ;  he  is  thought  in  itself,  with  its 
fundamental  momenta ;  he  is  eternal  reason,  the  substance  and  the 
cause  of  the  truths  which  man  perceives.  When  man,  therefore, 
refers  to  God  that  truth  which  he  cannot  refer  either  to  this  world, 
or  to  his  own  personality,  he  refers  it  to  him  to  whom  he  ought  to 
refer  it ;  and  this  absolute  affirmation  of  truth,  without  reflection, — 
this  inspiration, — enthusiasm, — is  veritable  revelation."!  All  men 
are  inspired,  and  all  are  inspired  in  an  equal  degree.  This  spon- 
taneity of  reason,  which  is  to  all  men  a  veritable  revelation  from 
God,  "  does  not  admit  of  essential  differences."  It  gives  pure 
truth,  and  in  all  men  the  same  truth.  "  Everywhere,  in  its  instinc- 
tive and  spontaneous  form,  reason  is  equal  to  itself,  in  all  the  gene- 
rations of  humanity,  and  in  all  the  individuals  of  which  these  dif- 
ferent generations  are  composed."^  It  is  too  plain  for  argument, 
that  these  principles  destroy  all  that  is  peculiar  and  valuable  in  the 
sacred  scriptures.  The  distinctive  claim  which  they  put  forth,  of 
containing  a  revelation  from  God,  is  set  aside  by  a  similar  claim 
on  behalf  of  every  man.  Humanity  is  inspired  in  all  its  members, 
and  revelations  of  truth  are  made  to  all  men  in  nearly  equal  degree. 
When  holy  men  of  God  spake  of  old,  as  they  were  moved  by  the 
Holy  Ghost,  they  were  but  giving  utterance  to  the  visions  of  the 
spontaneous  reason,  and  the  truths  declared  by  Christ  and  his 
apostles  were  from  God  only  in  the  same  sense  in  which  all  our 

*  Elem.  of  Psych.,  p.  301. 

t  The  deification  of  collective  humanity  is  regarded  by  many  in  Germany  as  the 
regenerative  principle  of  our  age.  The  fashionable  pantheism  of  Berlin  teaches  tliit 
*  whatever  is  (in  politics)  is  right ;'  a  blessed  creed  for  the  courtiers  of  an  absolute 
monarch  ;  and  which,  when  applied  to  morals,  forbids  us,  as  does  a  living  poet,  to 
dim  our  mind's  eye  with  any  tears  of  penitence  ;  for  all  hatred  is  only  love  seen  on 
the  wrong  side  ! 

J  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  pp.  165,  166  §Introd.,p.  17  4. 


644  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

own  intuitions  of  truth  are  from  God.  The  Koran  is  of  equal  au- 
thority with  the  Bible  ;  all  pretended  revelations  have  one  and  the 
same  authority,  that  is,  the  self-evidence  of  the  truths  which  they 
contain.  The  Gospel  of  Christ  is  thus  stripped  of  its  high  prero- 
gative as  a  special  message  from  God;  and  holy  prophets  and 
apostles,  nay,  our  Saviour  too,  were  deceived  in  supposing  that 
they  had  any  other  kind  of  communication  with  God  than  that 
which  every  man  enjoys.  No  special  revelation  could,  according 
to  this  philosophy,  be  accredited  to  the  world.  No  messenger  or 
interpreter  could  be  furnished  for  a  divine  mission  among  men. 
The  truths  revealed  to  any  man  through  the  operations  of  his  in- 
stinctive reason,  and  by  him  proclaimed  to  others,  cannot  be  re- 
ceived except  by  such  as  find  the  same  truths  in  their  own  spon- 
taneity of  reason.  And  the  only  way,  therefore,  by  which  God 
could  make  known  his  will,  and  give  it  authority  among  men, 
would  be  by  enlarging  the  spontaneous  reason  of  every  man.  At 
precisely  this  point  the  extremes  of  flat  Rationalism  and  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  Absolute  come  together.  Their  osculation  is  seen 
in  Strauss's  "Life  of  Jesus,"  which  has  almost  convulsed  the  reli- 
gious world  in  Germany.  Marheineke  and  Rohr,  like  Herod  and 
Pilate,  agree  only  when  the  Son  of  God  is  to  be  crucified.  Would 
to  God  that  our  fellow  Christians  in  America,  before  abandoning 
as  shallow  the  philosophy  of  the  great  English  fathers,  would  take 
the  trouble  to  examine  the  issues  of  the  paths  on  which  they  are 
entering  !  Let  us  have  any  philosophy,  however  shallow,  that 
leaves  us  in  quiet  possession  of  the  Gospel,  rather  than  the  dark 
and  hopeless  bewilderment  into  which  we  are  thrown  by  the  deep 
metaphysics  of  M.  Cousin.  We  say  to  him  and  to  Dr.  Henry,  in 
the  language  of  Edmund  Burke,  "  If  our  religious  tenets  should 
ever  want  a  further  elucidation,  we  shall  not  call  on  infidelity  to 
explain  them.  We  shall  not  light  up  our  temple  from  that  unhal- 
lowed fire.  It  will  be  illuminated  with  other  lights.  It  will  be 
perfumed  with  other  incense,  than  Jhe  infectious  stuff  which  is  im- 
ported by  the  smugglers  of  adulterated  metaphysics." 

They  who  are  accustomed  to  look  to  the  sanctions  of  religion 
for  the  chief  support  of  morality,  will  naturally  surmise  that  M. 
Cousin  is  not  unduly  strict  in  his  ethical  code.  When  God  is 
made  to  be  thought,  reason,  space,  time,  and  number,  there  is  not 
much  room  left  for  the  commission  of  any  serious  offences  against 
him.  If  humanity  is  inspired,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that 
humanity  will  always  be  in  the  right.  We  accordingly  find,  that 
under  the  cheerful  philosophy  of  M.  Cousin,  it  is  a  crime  to  "blas- 
pheme humanity."  Forms  of  government  or  of  religion,  which 
have  extensively  prevailed,  could  not  have  subsisted  without  the 
consent  of  humanity,  and  though  it  is  our  privilege  to  criticise,  we 
are  taught  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  condemn  them.  The  spirit 
of  each  particular  age,  the  temper  of  each  system  of  philosophy, 
in  short,  everything  which  has  existed  through  the  occurrence  of 
humanity,  is  right ;  "  it  has  its  apology  in  its  existence."     We  are 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  645 

warned  not  to  "  accuse  humanity,"  by  condemning  religious  or 
political  laws  which  have  had  the  confidence  and  sympathy  of  the 
masses  of  mankind.  "  To  imprecate  power  (long  and  lasting 
power),  we  are  told,  is  to  blaspheme  humanity ;  to  bring  accusa- 
tions against  glory,  is  nothing  less  than  to  bring  accusations 
against  humanity,  by  which  it  is  decreed.  What  is  glory,  gentle- 
men ?  It  is  the  judgment  of  humanity  upon  its  members ;  and 
humanity  is  always  in  the  right."*  No  appeal  can  be  taken  from 
the  judgment  of  humanity,  for  "  its  judgment  is  infallible."! 

We  are  led  to  a  conclusion  which  M.  Cousin  does  not  scruple  to 
avow  and  apply,  that  success  is  the  criterion  of  moral  excellence. 
He  sets  it  down  as  "  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  a  great  man, 
that  he  succeeds."  He  proves  that  in  every  battle  which  has  ever 
taken  place,  "  the  vanquished  party  deserved  to  be  vanquished — 
that  the  victorious  party  was  the  better,  the  more  moral  party ; 
and  that,  therefore,  it  was  victorious/'^  This  singular  demonstra- 
tion may  be  summed  up  in  a  single  sentence,  which  we  extract : — 
"  Courage  is  a  virtue  which  has  a  right  to  the  recompense  of  vic- 
tory,— weakness  is  a  vice,  and,  inasmuch  as  it  is  so,  it  is  always 
punished  and  beaten."§  Examination  and  reflection,  we  are  told, 
will  convince  us,  in  every  case,  that  "  the  vanquished  ought  to 
have  been  vanquished,"  and  that  our  sympathy  and  applause 
should  be  "  on  the  side  of  the  victor,  for  his  is  the  better  cause." 

We  have  never  seen  the  odious  maxim,  Whatever  is,  is  right, 
pressed  to  a  more  insane  extent,  than  is  given  to  it  in  M.  Cousin's 
philosophy.  It  is  this  abominable  principle  which  breathes  into 
his  system  the  cheerful  inspiration  upon  which  he  so  much  loves 
to  dwell.  We  may,  indeed,  thus  learn  to  be  cheerful  under  any 
aspect  of  affairs,  we  may  bow  the  knee  to  any  religion,  we  may 
cordially  embrace  any  lbrm  of  government,  we  may  shout  in  the 
procession  of  any  conqueror,  we  may  rejoice  with  the  successful 
oppresser,  and  insult  the  oppressed  with  the  truth  that  he  deserves 
to  suffer, — but  at  what  expense  do  we  purchase  this  easy  and 
cheerful  temper  !  What  a  sacrifice  of  the  tender  charities  of  our 
nature,  what  a  dreadful  perversion  of  truth  and  conscience  does  it 
involve !  We  must  first  learn  to  believe  what  M.  Cousin  indeed 
distinctly  teaches,  that  prudence,  courage  and  strength,  though 
united  with  ambition,  revenge,  cruelty  and  rapacity,  constitute  a 
moral  excellence  that  deserves  to  triumph  over  imprudence  and 
weakness,  though  associated  with  the  greatest  mildness,  forbear- 
ance, and  benevolence.  We  would  rather  weep  sometimes  with 
those  that  weep,  than  have  our  tears  thus  stayed. 

There  is  to  us  a  dark  and  dreary  fatalism  pervading  M.  Cousin's 
system,  of  which  symptoms  have  already  appeared  in  the  extracts 
we  have  given.  He  does  not  indeed  teach  what  is  commonly 
meant  by  fatalism.  He  is  a  strenuous  advocate  for  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  and  talks  much  of  our  free  personality.     But  then  this 

*  Introd.,  p.  309.  f  Ibid.,  p.  310.  J  Ibid.,  p.  2S2.  §  Ibid.,  p.  233. 


646  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

freedom  itself  is  but  one  of  the  products  of  a  deeper  fatalism 
which  pervades  the  universe,  and  works  out  its  results  in 
all  things.  The  mechanical  theory  of  the  French  atheists, 
which  was  the  product  of  the  philosophy  of  sensation,  and 
the  ideal  theory  of  the  Transcendentalists,  arrive,  in  this  respect, 
though  by  different  routes,  at  much  the  same  conclusion.  And 
though  each  brings  with  it  somewhat  of  the  dust  of  the  road  by 
which  it  has  come,  there  is  not  much  to  choose  between  them. 
The  one  is  indeed  more  refined  and  spiritual  than  the  other.  We 
hear  less  of  the  working  and  grinding  of  the  machinery.  It  is  an 
abstract  and  ideal  mechanism  to  which  it  subjects  us,  but  still  a 
mechanism.  All  things  are  moved  on  by  a  resistless  destiny.  Even 
God  is  represented  as  a  creative  force,  which  could  not  but  pass 
into  act.  And  again,  we  are  told,  "  God  could  not  remain  in  a  state 
of  absolute  unity  ;  that  absolute  unity,  that  eternal  substance,  being 
a  creative  force,  could  not  but  create.*  Cousin  teaches  us  that 
every  man  who  exists  is  but  the  exponent  of  some  pre-existing  ne- 
cessity ;  that  every  book  that  is  written  is  but  the  realization  of  an 
idea  that  must  needs  take  this  form,  and  that  everything  which 
occurs  represents  an  idea  which  could  not  but  be  represented  at 
that  precise  time,  and  in  that  very  manner.  After  a  full  exposi- 
tion of  the  a  priori  demand  for  Universal  History,  he  concludes, 
"  hence  the  necessity  of  Bossuet."  The  idea  had  been  ripening 
for  some  time,  and  at  length  there  was  an  imperative  necessity  for 
it  to  put  on  a  concrete  form,  and  it  immediately  assumed  it  in  the 
person  of  the  Bishop  of  Meaux.  Nor  is  this  all.  It  was  not  only 
necessary  that  Bossuet  should  come  into  existence  at  this  precise 
moment,  and  that  he  should  write  a  Universal  History,  but  his 
plan  also  was  subject  to  necessity.  After  a  full  account  of  the  a 
priori  urgency  of  an  idea  upon  this  subject,  we  are  told,  "  hence, 
gentlemen,  the  necessity  of  Bossuet's  plan."  We  have  then  an 
account  of  the  necessity  which  called  into  being  and  set  at  work, 
in  their  respective  functions,  Vico,  Herder,  Tenneman,  and  others. 
It  would  seem  as  if  there  had  been  some  difficulty  in  finding  con- 
crete habitation  for  the  abstract  necessities  of  the  Cartesian  phi- 
losophy. Descartes  himself  was  the  product  of  a  necessity  which 
grew  out  of  the  dependence  and  subjection  of  the  scholastic  sys- 
tems. It  was  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  revolution,  in 
which  reason  might  shake  off  the  shackles  of  authority  and  enter 
upon  the  true  method  of  philosophizing.  And  Descartes  came  to 
represent  this  idea.  But  then  Descartes  was  a  gentleman  and  a 
soldier ;  Malebranche  was  a  monk,  Berkeley  an  eminent  bishop, 
Spinosa  a  recluse,  and  Leibnitz  a  statesman.  There  was,  there- 
fore, a  necessity,  in  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  for  a  great  profes- 
sor :  "  this  was  the  place  and  destiny  of  Wolff 

*  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  303. 

t  Introd.,  p.  240.  The  inference  is  obvious:  there  still  remained  a  necessity  in  the 
philosophy  of  the  age  for  a  "peer  of  France."  Quere  :  Does  the  same  principle  of 
necessary  emanation  from  the  age  and  circumstances  hold  in  the  case  of  translations  ? 
Or  could  M.  Cousin,  by  an  inverse  method,  declare  the  horoscope  of  his  admirers  ? 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  647 

There  is  a  wider  domain  and  a  stricter  rule  given  by  M.  Cousin, 
to  this  destiny,  than  is  conceded  by  most  even  of  fatalists.  Not 
only  do  all  men,  and  especially  great  men,  represent  ideas  which 
it  was  necessary  should  find  their  representation  in  them,  but 
"  every  place  represents  an  idea."  There  is  nothing  in  the  world 
which  has  not  its  necessity  for  existing,  and  which  does  not,  there- 
fore, represent  an  idea.  "  Yes  !  gentlemen,"  says  our  author,  "give 
me  the  map  of  any  country,  its  configuration,  its  climate,  its  waters, 
its  winds,  and  the  whole  of  its  physical  geography ;  give  me  its 
natural  productions,  its  flora,  its  zoology,  <fec,  and  I  pledge  myself 
to  tell  you,  a  priori,  what  will  be  the  quality  of  man  in  that  coun- 
try, and  what  part  its  inhabitants  will  act  in  history — not  accident- 
ally, but  necessarily,  not  at  any  particular  epoch,  but  in  all : — in 
short — what  idea  he  is  called  to  represent."  The  philosophy  which 
denies  that  "  all  things  hold  and  bind  each  other  together,"  which 
emancipates  man  in  any  degree  from  the  laws  of  brass  and  iron, 
which  works  so  effectually  upon  him  even  through  nature,  that  "  the 
existence  of  a  particular  country  determines  the  existence  of  a  par- 
ticular people,"  is  branded  as  a  "sentimental  and  pusillanimous  spi- 
ritualism, which,  though  well  enough  adapted  to  the  minds  of  chil- 
dren and  women,  would  not  be  less  fatal  to  science  than  material- 
ism itself."* 

M.  Cousin  has  a  reason,  aside  from  the  principles  of  his  philoso- 
phy, for  being  a  fatalist.  "  All  great  men,"  he  says,  "  have  been 
fatalists."  And  as  he  has  provided  the  way,  in  all  other  respects, 
for  his  being  a  great  man,  it  would  hardly  answer  for  him  to  fail 
here.  "  A  great  man,"  he  informs  us,  "  is  a  general  idea,  concen- 
trated in  a  strong  individuality,  so  that  its  generality  may  appear 
without  suppressing  his  individuality."  From  this  definition  of  a 
great  man  he  infers  that  no  priest,  prophet,  or  pontiff,  can  be  great, 
since  their  existence  consists  in  their  relation  to  the  God  whom 
they  announce:  with  them  "  God  is  everything,  and  man  is  nothing;" 
"  sacerdotal  castes  destroy  individuality,  for  in  them  nothing  ap- 
pears but  the  name  of  the  caste,  and  the  name  of  the  caste  is  the 
name  of  its  God."  Therefore,  it  appears  that  no  priest,  and  by  pa- 
rity of  reason,  no  religious  man,  in  whom  the  idea  of  the  infinite 
prevails  over  the  finite,  and  to  whom  "  God  is  everything,  and  man 
nothing,"  can  be  a  great  man.  War  and  philosophy  are  the  only 
two  lines  of  life  which  are  favourable  to  the  development  of  great 
men.  "  Who  are  they,"  he  asks,  "  who  have  left  the  greatest  names 
among  men?  They  are  those  who  have  done  their  countrymen 
the  greatest  good,  who  have  served  them  most  effectually  ;  that  is, 
who  have  made  the  greatest  conquests,  for  the  ideas  which  in  their 
century  were  called  to  dominion,  and  which  then  represented  the 
destinies  of  civilisation ;  that  is,  who  have  gained  the  most  battles."f 
But  M.  Cousin  is  not  a  warrior,  except  in  the  bloodless  conflict  of 
ideas,  and  it  would  not  do  to  limit  greatness  to  war.     We  have,  in 

*  Introd.,  p.  242.  f  lb.,  p.  321. 


648  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

consequence,  another  demonstration,  concluding,  "  Therefore,  the 
great  philosopher  is,  in  his  time  and  country,  the  ultimate  perfec- 
tion of  all  other  great  men,  and,  together  with  the  great  captain,  he 
is  the  most  complete  representation  of  the  people  to  whom  he  be- 
longs."* The  way  is  therefore  open  to  M.  Cousin.  But  it  is  "  the 
peculiar  mark  of  a  great  man  that  he  succeeds."  And  M.  Cousin 
has  succeeded:  for  the  "  name  of  eclecticism,  whether  chosen  well 
or  ill,  begins  for  some  time  since  to  be  somewhat  spread  abroad, 
and  to  resound  in  France  and  elsewhere."!  Does  not  all  the 
world,  too,  know  that  M.  Cousin  has  been  made  a  peer  of  France? 
Without  doubt  he  has  succeeded.  What  is  further  necessary  ? 
Why,  "  all  great  men  have  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  been  fatal- 
ists." J  And  he  has  given  sufficient  proof  that  he  labours  under  no 
lack  of  this  qualification. 

Let  us  again  pause  for  a  little  season,  and,  looking  back  upon 
our  dreary  way,  take  in  at  one  retrospective  survey  so  much  of  the 
field  as  may  include  the  German,  the  French,  and  the  mongrel  phi- 
losophies. They  are  districts  of  the  same  kingdom,  alike  in  arro- 
gance, in  nonsense,  and  in  impiety. 

Campbell  has  a  chapter  in  his  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  intended 
to  point  out  the  cause  of  the  fact  that  nonsense  so  often  escapes 
being  detected,  both  by  the  writer  and  by  the  reader ;  but  he  did 
not  live  to  see  what  we  have  seen.  Grosser  absurdities  than  those 
which  may  be  selected  from  the  German  and  the  mock-German 
metaphysics,  we  believe  the  world  never  beheld  ;  and  these  not  in 
scattered  places,  but  for  page  after  page,  and  chapter  after  chapter. 
The  Germans  of  the  transcendental  school  complain  that  we  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race  are  dull,  terrestrial,  and  shallow ;  their  defect  is 
equally  unfortunate,  for  no  one  of  them  has  the  faculty  for  descry- 
ing an  absurdity,  as  such.  The  grossest  and  most  drivelling  non- 
sense, which  could  be  expressed  in  a  jargon  of  words,  would  pro- 
bably to  a  transcendentalist  exhibit  nothing  ridiculous,  and  perhaps 
something  august.  Except  the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute,  few 
things  can  be  imagined  more  ludicrously  and  disgustingly  absurd, 
than  the  revelations  of  Bohme,  or  Jacob  Behmen,  as  we  more  fa- 
miliarly call  him.  Yet,  these  ravings  of  the  inspired  shoemaker 
are  regarded  with  "  affectionate  reverence,"§  not  only  by  Schelling, 
but  by  Coleridge  ;  and,  more  amazing  still,  have  conduced  in  no 
small  degree  to  the  introduction  of  the  modern  philosophy,  as  has 
been  proved  and  acknowledged.|| 

In  the  land  of  their  prevalence  these  systems  have  been  frequent- 
ly compared  to  the  dreams  of  the  early  Gnostics,  and  the  resem- 
blance is  too  striking  to  escape  any  one  versed  in  church  history ; 

*  Introd.,  p.  323.  t  lb.,  p.  414.  J  lb.,  p.  305. 

§  Thus  Coleridge  speaks  of  Jacob  Behmen,  Biogr.  Liter.,  vol.  i.,  p.  96  ;  see  also 
p,  90.  Baur's  Gnosis,  pp.  557 — 611.  Heinroth  :  von  d.  Grundfehlern  der  Erzie- 
hung,  1828,  p.  415. 

||  We  observe  two  new  biographies  of  Jacob  Bohme,  among  the  latest  German 
works. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  649 

as  has  been  to  our  knowledge  admitted  by  some  of  those  concern- 
ed. The  very  name  Gnosis  reminds  one  of  the  claim  to  direct 
knowledge  of  the  absolute  ;  but  the  parallel  may  be  carried  out  in 
almost  every  particular  of  the  two  classes  of  opinion.  This  has 
been  done  in  a  profound  manner  by  the  learned  Baur,'in  his  work 
on  the  Gnosis  of  the  Christian  church.  He  has  traced  out  at  full 
length  the  horrid  pictures  of  the  Valentinians  and  the  Ophites ;  of 
Marcion  and  the  admirers  of  the  Pseudo-Clementine  Homilies ;  he 
has  set  over  against  this  the  portraiture  of  Bohme,  of  Fichte,  of 
Schelling,  and  of  Hegel ;  and,  comparing  their  respective  linea- 
ments, has  revealed  a  likeness  as  striking  as  it  is  frightful.  This 
he  does  moreover  not  as  an  enemy,  but  as  an  adoring  devotee  of 
the  new  theogony.  He  shows  the  remarkable  coincidence  between 
Schelling  and  Bohme,  and  between  both  and  the  Gnostics :  and  he 
makes  the  analogy  no  less  apparent  in  the  case  of  Hegel.*  In  all 
these  schemes,  the  initiated  are  invited  to  an  esoteric  vision  of  truth, 
a  Gnosis  which  the  common  herd  cannot  attain :  in  all,  the  promise 
is,  Your  eyes  shall  be  opened,  and  ye  shall  be  as  gods,  knowing 
good  and  evil.  The  conflicting  sects  agree  in  this,  and  in  a  conse- 
quent contempt  for  what  they  call  popular,  experimental,  or  empi- 
rical philosophy.f  As  there  are  certain  limits  to  intellectual  pow- 
ers, which  the  immortal  Locke  endeavoured  to  ascertain,  and  be- 
yond which  we  float  in  the  region  of  midnight,  so  those  who  have 
forgotten  these  cautions  have  in  their  most  original  speculations 
only  reproduced  the  delirium  of  other  times,  which  in  the  cycle  of 
opinion  has  come  back  upon  us  "  like  a  phantasma  or  a  hideous 
dream." J  In  the  French  imitation,  no  less  than  the  German  origi- 
nal, there  is  a  perpetual  self-delusion  practised  by  the  philosopher, 
who  plays  with  words  as  a  child  with  lettered  cards,  and  combines 
what  ought  to  be  the  symbols  of  thought,  into  expressions  unmean- 
ing and  self-contradictory.§     And  as  in  this  operation  he  cannot 

*  Die  christliche  Gnosis,  oder  die  christliche  Religions-Philosophie  in  ihrer  ge- 
schichtlichen  Entwickelung.  Von  Dr.  Ferdinand  Christian  Baur.  Tubingen,  1835. 
In  this  elaborate  work  of  Professor  Baur,  nearly  two  hundred  pages  are  devoted  to 
the  exhibition  of  the  parallel  between  the  modern  seers  and  the  frantic  Ophites  and 
other  transcendentalists  of  the  primitive  age.  Let  the  reader  suspend  his  judgment 
until  he  shall  have  inquired  into  the  justice  of  this  comparison. 

t  Hegel  gives  himself  great  amusement  at  the  English  acceptation  of  the  word 
Philosophy.  He  alludes  to  Lord  Brougham's  having,  in  a  speech  in  parliament,  spo- 
ken of  "  the  philosophical  principles  of  free  trade."  He  attributes  a  similar  expres- 
sion to  Canning;  and  gives  the  following  as  the  title  of  a  recent  English  book,  viz., 
"  The  Art  of  Preserving  the  Hair,  on  Philosophical  Principles." — Hegel's  Encyklo- 
paedie,  pp.  11,  12. 

J  When  we  look  at  the  prodigious  speculations  of,  the  schoolmen,  we  find  expres- 
sions highly  transcendental.  Even  Hegel  is  shorn  of  his  originality,  and  Pantheism 
is  discovered  among  the  lucubrations  of  the  dark  ages.  Thus,  Joannes  Erigena  says 
of  the  divine  nature  :  "  Deus  est  omne  quod  vere  est;  quoniam  ipse  facit  omnia,  et 
fit  in  omnibus ;  omne  enim  quod  intelligitur  et  sentitur,  nihil  aliud  est,  nisi  non  ap- 
parentis  apparitio,  occulti  manifestatio,  negati  affirmatio,  etc." — De  Divisione  Na- 
turae, lib.  ii.,  p.  80.  Here  we  have  Pantheism.  Again,  "Per  nihilum  ex  quo  om- 
nia creata  esse  scriptura  dicit,  intelligo  inefTabilem  et  incomprehensibilem  divinae 
naturae  inaccessibilemque  claritatem,  omnibus  intellectibus  sive  humanis  sive  ange- 
licis  inaccessibiliter  incognitam."     Lib.  iii.,  p.  127,apud  Rixner,  vol.  ii.,pp.  13 — 15. 

§  "  Little  did  Leibnitz,  Wolf,  &c  ,  believe  that  the  language  of  science  would  be- 


■ 


650  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

but  be  aware  that  these  expressions  are  the  exponents  of  no  con- 
ceptions of  the  intellect,  he  demands,  as  the  only  possible  prop  of 
his  system,  a  specific  faculty  for  the  absolute,  the  unconditioned, 
and — may  we  not  add — the  absurd  !  Thus  Fichte  asked  of  all 
such  as  would  aspire  to  his  primary,  free  and  creative  act  of  the 
Ich  or  Ego,  a  certain  power  called  the  Anschauungsvermogen. 
It  is  the  want  of  these  optics,  alas !  which  spoils  us  for  philoso- 
phers. Reinhold,  who  often  combated,  and  sometimes  rallied, 
his  old  friend,  avowed  that  he  was  utterly  destitute  of  this  sense  ;  a 
misfortune,  adds  M.  Degerando,  common  to  him  with  all  the  rest 
of  the  world.*  It  is,  however,  the  happy  portion  of  the  absolute 
Philosophers,  the  Behmenites,  the  Gnostics,  the  Soofies,  the  Bud- 
dhists, and  a  few  of  the  Americans. 

It  would  afford  a  subject  for  many  more  pages  than  we  can 
allot  to  this  whole  discussion,  to  compare  the  new  philosophy  with 
that  of  the  oriental  mystics.  We  look  with  amazement  at  the 
exact  reproduction  of  almost  every  eastern  error  in  the  musings 
of  Europe.  It  should  seem  that  no  form  of  profane  absurdity  can 
ever  finally  die  out  of  the  world,  until  the  great  suggester  of  them 
all  shall  be  cast  into  hell.  Pantheism  has  by  some  been  regarded 
as  the  mother  of  Polytheism  ;  but  mother  and  daughter  have  loved 
to  dwell  together,  and  the  parent  has  in  many  cases  survived  the 
child.  This  form  of  error  prevails  widely  among  the  Soofies  of 
Persia,  and  the  Buddhists  of  the  remoter  east,  as  well  as  in  count- 
less minor  sects  in  that  nursery  of 

All  monstrous,  all  prodigious  things, 
Abominable,  inutterable,  and  worse 
Than  fables  yet  have  feigned,  or  fear  conceived, 
Gorgons,  and  Hydras,  and  Chimaeras  dire. 

Two  valuable  works  of  Tholuck  relate  to  this  subject :  the  one 
being  a  treatise  on  the  Pantheism  of  Persia,-]-  the  other  an  Antho- 
logy of  Oriental  Mystic  Poems.J  There  is  scarcely  a  page  of 
these  volumes  which  does  not  show  something  to  identify  the  an- 
cient and  eastern  with  the  modern  Pantheism.  The  resemblance 
is  declared  by  the  learned  and  pious  author,  who  has  a  decided 
leaning  towards  the  mystical  philosophy.  Hegel  himself  cites  this 
Anthology,  with  acknowledgment  of  the  same  truth,  compliment- 
ing Tholuck  for  his  genial  disposition  towards  profound  philosophy, 
and  at  the  same  time  lamenting  his  still  remaining  prejudice  and 
narrowness.^  Among  these  Mohammedan  heretics,  the  Soofies, 
we  find  the  declaration  that  God  is  everything  ;  nihil  esse  praeter 

come  a  witch-jargon  (Hexensprache)  which  we  should  learn  like  parrots."  —Herder 
Metakritik,  ii.,  74. 

*  Life  of  Fichte,  by  M.  Eyries. 

t  Ssufismus :  sive  Theosophia  Persarum  Pantheistica,  etc.  Frid.  Aug.  Deofidus 
Tholuck.     Berolini,  1821. 

%  Bluethensammlung  aus  der  Morgenlandischen  Mystik,u.  s.  w.  von  F.  A.  G.  Tho- 
luck.    Berlin,  1825. 

§  Encyclopaedie,  p.  592,  note. 

■  t 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  651 

Deum*  We  have  also  the  mental  gaze  of  intuition,  the  absolute 
Anschauung.j  We  have  creation  represented  as  a  necessary 
emanation  from  the  divinity.J  We  have  the  absorption  of  all  self 
in  God.§  We  have,  ever  and  anon,  the  same  glorification  of  ni- 
hility, das  Nichts ;  \\  and,  as  if  no  plague-spot  of  the  pestiferous 
philosophy  should  be  wanting,  we  have  complete  Hegelianism  in 
the  doctrine  that  sin  is  no  evil,  nay,  from  one  sect  of  transcendental 
Persians,  that  sin  is  even  preferable  to  holiness.lf 

Every  reader  of  the  common  religious  news  is  informed  that 
millions  of  the  Indian  and  Indo-Chinese  people  are  Pantheists. 
Hegel  dwells  on  this,  and  quotes  the  Bhagavad  Gita,  in  which 
Krishna  is  introduced  thus  speaking :  "  I  am  the  breath  which 
dwells  in  the  body  of  the  living ;  I  am  the  beginning,  and  the  midst 
of  the  living,  and  also  their  end.  I  am,  under  the  stars,  the  radiant 
sun,  under  the  lunar  signs,  the  moon,"  &c,  &c.  He  denies,  how- 
ever, that  in  this  there  is  proper  Pantheism,  as  he  also  denies  it  of 
his  own  system.**  It  would  be  difficult  to  deny  it  of  the  books  of 
the  Vedam.  "  The  school  of  Vedantam,"  say  the  Roman  Catholic 
missionaries  in  China,  "  has  an  authority  superior  to  that  of  all 
the  others.  It  professes,  as  the  fundamental  principle  of  its  doc- 
trine, the  opinion  of  the  simple  unity  of  one  existing  essence,  which 
is  nothing  but  the  Ego,  or  soul.  Nothing  exists  except  this  Ego 
in  its  simple  unity  ;  this  essence  is  in  some  sort  trine,  by  its  exist- 
ence, by  its  infinite  light  and  supreme  joy ;  all  is  here  eternal,  im- 
material, infinite.  But  because  the  inner  experience  of  the  Ego  is 
not  conformed  to  this  beautiful  idea,  they  admit  another  principle, 
but  purely  negative  [das  Nichts],  and  which,  consequently,  has  no 
reality  of  being  ;  this  is  the  Maya  of  the  Ego,  that  is,  the  error. 
The  key  for  the  deliverance  of  the  soul  is  in  these  words,  which 
these  false  philosophers  have  to  repeat  incessantly,  with  a  pride 
beyond  that  of  Lucifer  :  /  am  the  Supreme  Being,  Aham  ava  param 
Brahma."ff  We  could  not  ask  a  more  lucid  or  comprehensive  view 
of  the  modern  German  system  ;  for  even  if  the  missionaries  in- 
vented what  they  say,  they  have,  in  their  invention,  anticipated 

*  Ssufistnus,  p.  222. 

t  Bluthensammlung,  p.  116.  See  also  p.  198,  where  Tholuck  says,  "Here  we 
have  in  simple  terms  the  results  of  the  loftiest  speculations  of  modern  times.  From 
contrast  and  comparison  the  infinite  can  never  be  learned." 

1  Ssufismus,  p.  173,  ff. 

§Ib.,  p.  64.  "  Dixit  aliquando  Bustami  Deo  :  Quamdiu,  mi  Deus,  inter  Egoitatem 
et  Tuitatem  me  manere  vis,  remove  Egoitatem  et  Tuitatem  ut  Ego  nihil  flam."  And 
in  the  Bluthensammlung,  Mewlana  Dschelaleddin  Rumi,  a  Persian  poet,  "follows 
(says  Tholuck)  the  pantheistic-mystic  view,  that  all  revelations  in  all  religions  are 
alike  true,  as  being  different,  gradual,  evolutions  of  God,"  &c. — P.  69.  So  at  pp.  87, 
88,  89,  are  exhibitions  of  the  blindest  pantheistic  fatalism. 

||  Bliithens.,  p.  66,  note  1. 

IT  Bluthensammlung,  p.  123,  note  1,  p.  134,  note  1,  where  Tholuck  controverts  this 
absurd  doctrine  with  proper  warmth. 

•*  Hegel's  Encyk.,  p.  586. 

tt  Choix  des  Lettres  £difiantes,  Paris,  1809,  t.  iv.,  p.  246,  ap.  Tholuck's  Ssufismus, 
p.  214. 


652  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

fthe  grandest  result  of  Schelling  and  Hegel.*  And  the  Luciferian 
pride  engendered  in  the  Chinese  is  precisely  the  temper  which  is 
manifested  by  those  of  the  Indo-Germanic  school  who  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  God  never  arrives  at  so  high  a  degree  of 
self-consciousness  (to  use  their  jargon)  as  in  their  own  minds. 
When  applied  to  the  doctrines  of  revealed  Christianity,  these  dog- 
mas produce  a  portentous  mixture.  We  then  learn  that  the  Mes- 
siah, or  God-man,  is  self-developing  humanity — the  race  at  large. 
On  this  topic  many  illustrations  might  be  offered  ;  one  of  these, 
from  a  popular  poet  of  genius,  we  throw  into  the  margin,  as  nei- 
ther caring  nor  daring  to  translate  it :  "  but  let  him  that  readeth 
understand."! 

So  far  as  M.  Cousin  is  concerned,  we  are  ready  to  concede  to 
him  the  possession  of  learning  and  genius.  But  his  philosophy,  as 
far  as  he  has  developed  it,  is  to  the  last  degree  superficial  and  con- 
ceited. Making  great  pretensions  to  extraordinary  profoundness, 
it  does  in  truth  but  skim  the  surface  of  things,  and  then  fly  off  into 
thin  and  unmeaning  abstractions.  The  "  witch 'jargon"  which  it 
employs,  when  you  have  taken  infinite  pains  to  penetrate  it  in  a 
given  case,  is  often  found  to  contain  only  some  old  truth,  swathed  and 
bandaged  in  this  hieroglyphic  dress.  And  one  known  truth  thus 
prepared,  is  then  "  made  use  of,  to  pass  off  a  thousand  nothings 
with."  There  is  not,  and  in  consistency  with  the  first  principles 
of  this  philosophy  there  cannot  be,  any  attempt  at  ratiocination. 
It  is  a  string  of  assumptions,  and  of  assertions  of  the  most  unquali- 
fied and  dogmatic  kind.  The  reader  cannot  have  failed  to  remark, 
in  the  extracts  we  have  given,  the  peculiar  kind  of  generalization 
in  which  M.  Cousin  habitually  indulges.  Because  England  is  an 
island,  therefore  everything  in  England  stops  short  of  its  proper 
development,  and  England  can  make  no  valuable  contributions  to 
science.  Because  in  religion,  God  is  everything  and  man  is  no- 
thing, therefore  no  religious  man  can  be  a  great  man.  Thus  on 
all  occasions  he  takes  but  a  single  step  from  the  narrowest  possi- 
ble premises,  from  vague  analogies,  and  sometimes  from  nothing 
more  solid  than  verbal  puns,  to  the  most  wide  and  peremptory 

*  We  should,  perhaps,  have  said  before,  that  Kant  is  altogether  exempt  from  the 
charge  of  Pantheism,  representing  God  as  "  not  by  any  means  a  blind,  acting,  eternal 
Nature,  the  Root  of  all  things,  but  a  supreme  Being,  who  by  understanding  and  free- 
dom is  the  author  of  all  things. — See  Jacobi,  u.  s.,  p.  114. 
f   Drum  bitt'  ich,  vor  der  Hand  den  Prediger 

Auf  seinem  Berge  ungekriinkt  zu  lassen, 

Doch  dass  beschwor'  ich,  so  gewiss  das  Aire 

Der  Alten  nicht  mehr  neulebendig  wird : 

Der  Mann,  in  welchem  Gott  war — Gott  wird  leben  ! — 

Der  Mann,  wer  er  dereinst  zu  euch  herabsteigt, 

Und  zweifach,  dreifach,  millionenfach 

Bei  euch  als  Mensch,  als  alle  Menschen  lebt : 

Er  wird  nicht  dreifach  goldne  Kronen  tragen, 

Er  wird  in's  Knopflock  keinen  Orden  kniipfen, 

Er  wird  der  Herr  von  Bethlehem  nicht  heissen, 

Er  wird  nicht  weibesbaar  im  Kloster  singen,  u.  s.  w. 

Laienbrevier  von  Leopold  Schefer.     Berlin,  1835. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  653 

conclusions.     A  hundred  times,  in  passing  over  his  pages,  we  have 
been  constrained  to  ask,  is  this  philosophy,  or  is  it  poetry  ?     It  can 
surely  make  no  pretensions  to  the  one,  and  it  is  but  sorry  stuff'  if' 
meant  for  the  other. 

But  the  philosophical  defects  of  this  system  do  not  constitute  its 
chief  point  of  repulsion.  We  have  a  wide  charity  for  what  seems 
to  us  nonsense,  and  we  can  even  extend  an  amiable  and  silent 
tolerance  to  the  pretensions  of  those  who  utter  it,  to  be  the  depo- 
sitories of  all  wisdom.  But  when  this  nonsense  begins  to  ape  the 
German  impiety,  when  it  openly  professes  to  cast  off  all  subordi- 
nation to  religion,  and  prates  in  dogmatic  superiority  to  divine  re- 
velation, we  cannot  but  lift  up  our  solemn  protest  against  it.  It 
has  been  made  sufficiently  evident  that  the  philosophy  of  M.  Cousin 
removes  the  God  of  the  Bible,  and  substitutes  in  his  stead  a  philo- 
sophical abstraction  ;  that  it  rejects  the  scriptures,  and  thus  robs 
us  of  our  dearest  hopes ;  and  that,  in  common  with  other  like  sys- 
tems, it  erects  a  false  standard  in  morals,  and  confounds  the  dis- 
tinction between  right  and  wrong.  We  cannot,  therefore,  behold 
in  silence  the  efforts  which  are  making  to  introduce  this  system  of 
abominations  among  us. 

It  has  already  made  some  progress.  The  "  Introduction  to  the 
History  of  Philosophy"  was  translated  and  published  in  1832,  by 
M.  Linberg.  The  first  edition  of  the  "  Elements  of  Psychology" 
was  published  in  1834,  and  having  been  adopted,  as  the  translator 
informs  us,  "  as  a  text-book  in  several  of  our  most  respectable  col- 
leges and  universities,"  a  new  edition  is  now  issued  which  has  been 
expressly  "  prepared  for  the  use  of  colleges."  It  might  be  well  if 
the  names  of  these  most  respectable  colleges  and  universities  were 
made  known  to  the  public.  We  should  like  to  know  which  of  our 
public  seminaries  of  education  has  so  far  distinguished  itself  in 
point  of  science  as  to  take,  for  its  text-book  on  mental  philosophy, 
an  immethodized  set  of  criticisms  upon  Locke.  The  work  of  M. 
Cousin  does  not  pretend  to  the  order  and  method  of  a  scientific 
treatise ;  it  only  claims  to  be  a  criticism  upon  the  defects  and  er- 
rors of  the  sensual  Philosophy.  It  formed  a  part  of  the  author's 
regular  course  of  lectures  upon  the  History  of  Philosophy  of  the 
18th  century.  And  has  it  really  come  to  this  pass  with  any  of  our 
most  respectable  colleges  and  universities,  that  they  are  using 
fragments  of  historical  treatises  as  text-books  upon  science  ?  Do 
they  also  learn  the  Newtonian  Philosophy  from  Clarke's  criticisms 
upon  Rohault's  Physics  ?  And  is  Varignon's  reply  to  Rolle  their 
text-book  upon  the  Differential  Calculus? 

But,  for  more  urgent  considerations  than  those  of  science,  is  it 
important  that  these  most  respectable  colleges  and  universities 
should  be  known  to  the  public.  Most  of  the  extracts  which  we 
have  given  from  M.  Cousin  have  been  taken  from  his  Introduction 
to  the  History  of  Philosophy,  and  yet  it  will  be  seen  that  some  of 
the  worst  of  them  have  been  furnished  by  what  Dr.  Henry  has 
dignified  with  the  title  of  Elements  of  Psychology.      And  this 


654  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

latter  work  implicitly  contains  them  all,  since  it  teaches,  in  their 
application  to  criticism  upon  Locke,  the  same  principles  which,  in 
other  modes  of  their  application,  yield  the  results  which  we  have 
exhibited.  It  should  be  known,  therefore,  what  college  or  university 
dares  assume  the  responsibility  of  instilling  the  principles  of  this 
book  into  the  minds  of  the  young  men  committed  to  its  care. 
Where  are  these  literary  institutions  that  are  so  ambitious  to  com- 
mence the  work  of  flooding  the  land  with  German  infidelity  and 
pantheism  ?  If  they  are  willing  to  undertake  the  work,  they  will 
doubtless,  in  a  measure,  succeed.  There  is  something  in  this  new 
philosophy  which  will  recommend  it  to  many,  and  especially  to 
young  men.  It  has  the  charm  of  novelty.  It  affects  to  be  very 
profound.  It  puts  into  the  mouths  of  its  disciples  a  peculiar  lan- 
guage, and  imparts  to  them  a  knowledge  which  none  others  can 
attain.  It  gives  them  the  privilege  of  despising  all  others,  and 
makes  them  incommensurable  with  any  standard  of  criticism  but 
their  own.  If  pursued  and  pressed  by  argument,  they  have  but 
to  rail,  as  their  master  does,  at  "  the  paltry  measure  of  Locke's 
philosophy,"  and  ridicule  the  bounded,  insular  character  of  all  sci- 
ence except  that  in  which  they  are  adepts.  It  flatters  the  pride  of 
the  youthful  heart,  it  takes  captive  the  imagination,  and,  a  still 
more  dangerous  recommendation,  it  tends  to  lighten  and  remove 
the  restraints  of  passion.  It  recognises  no  standard  of  right  and 
wrong  but  the  reason  of  man,  and  permits  no  appeal  from  the  de- 
cisions of  humanity  to  the  authority  of  the  one  living  and  true 
God.  While  it  retains  the  name  of  God,  and  does  not  therefore 
at  once  startle  and  shock  the  feelings  like  open  atheism,  it  teaches 
its  disciples  to  deify  themselves  and  nature,  and  to  look  upon  all 
phenomena  alike,  whether  of  the  material  universe  or  of  the  mind 
of  man,  as  manifestations  of  the  Deity.  Every  emotion  of  the 
heart  is  an  acting  forth  of  God,  and  every  indulgence  of  a  passion, 
however  depraved,  becomes  an  act  of  worship.*  The  man  who 
exercises  in  any  way,  according  to  his  inspired  impulses,  his  body 
or  his  mind,  even  though  God  is  not  in  all  his  thoughts,  is  really 
rendering  to  Him  as  acceptable  service,  as  if  his  heart  were  filled 
with  emotions  of  adoration  and  reverence.  The  forge  of  every 
smithy,  as  Thomas  Carlyle  has  taught  us,  is  an  altar,  and  the 
smith,  labouring  in  his  vocation,  is  a  priest  offering  sacrifice  to 
God. 

Such  being  the  recommendations  of  this  philosophy,  it  cannot 
be  doubted  that  it  will  find  many  willing  disciples,  some  attracted 
by  one  set  of  its  charms,  and  some  by  another.  If  any  of  our 
most  respectable  colleges  have  engaged  in  teaching  it,  they  will 
not  find  refractory  pupils.      But  we  warn  them  that  when  this 

*  See  ample  evidence  of  this  base  and  diabolical  tendency  of  the  doctrine  of  Pan- 
theism, in  an  article  in  Professor  Hengstenberg's  Journal  for  November,  1836,  en- 
titled, Bericht  iiber  ein  Pantheistisches  Trifolium.  For  example,  as  we  have  said 
elsewhere,  we  learn,  that  Schefer  and  his  compeers  teach  "  that  sin  is  the  hither 
aspect  of  that  which,  on  the  other  side  of  the  heart,  is  entirely  laudable." 


4 


t  jit  *ew  •..  * 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  655 

system  shall  have  worked  out,  as  work  it  must,  its  pernicious  and 
loathsome  results ;  when  our  young  men  shall  have  been  taught  to 
despise  the  wisdom  of  their  elders,  and  renounce  the  reverence 
and  submission  which  the  human  intellect  owes  to  God  ;  when,  in 
the  pride  and  vainglory  of  their  hearts,  they  shall  make  bold 
question  of  the  truths  which  their  fathers  have  held  most  dear  and 
sacred  ;  when  the  Holy  Bible  shall  be  treated  as  the  mere  play- 
ground of  antic  and  impious  fancies,  and  an  undisguised  Pantheism 
shall  spread  its  poison  through  our  literature ;  then  shall  they  who 
have  now  stepped  forth  to  introduce  this  philosophy  among  us,  be 
held  to  a  heavy  responsibility.  Are  these  idle  fears  ?  They  are 
at  least  real.  We  believe ;  therefore  do  we  speak.  And  we  point 
the  incredulous  to  the  gradations  of  folly  and  wickedness,  through 
which  this  same  philosophy  has  led  the  German  mind.  If  neither 
the  internal  evidence  of  the  system,  nor  the  lights  of  ancient  and 
modern  experience,  are  sufficient  for  conviction,  we  can  only  ap- 
peal to  the  verdict  that  time  will  give.  In  the  meanwhile  every 
parent  and  guardian  in  the  land  has  an  interest  in  knowing  which 
of  our  colleges  are  making  experiment  of  the  effects  of  this  philo- 
sophy upon  the  minds  of  the  young  men  entrusted  to  their  care.* 
We  have  another  alarming  symptom  of  its  progress  among  us, 
in  the  Address  delivered  in  July  last,  by  the  Rev.  Ralph  Waldo 
Emerson,  before  the  Senior  Class  in  Divinity,  at  Harvard  Univer- 
sity. This  address  is  before  us.  We  have  read  it,  and  we  want 
words  with  which  to  express  our  sense  of  the  nonsense  and  im- 
piety which  pervade  it.  It  is  a  rhapsody,  obviously  in  imitation 
of  Thomas  Carlyle,  and  possessing  as  much  of  the  vice  of  his 
mannerism  as  the  author  could  borrow,  but  without  his  genius. 
The  interest  which  it  possesses  for  us  arises  from  its  contain- 
ing the  application  of  the  Transcendental  Philosophy,  in  the 
form  of  instruction  to  young  men  about  to  go  forth  as  preachers 
of  Christianity.  The  principles  upon  which  Mr.  Emerson  pro- 
ceeds, so  far  as  he  states  them,  are  the  same  with  those  of  M. 
Cousin.  We  find  the  same  conception  of  the  Deity  as  the  substra- 
tum of  all  things,  the  same  attributes  assigned  to  the  reason,  and 
the  same  claim  of  inspiration  for  every  man.  But  here  we  have 
a  somewhat  more  distinct  avowal  of  the  results  to  which  these 
principles  lead,  in  their  application  to  Christianity,  than  M.  Cousin 

*  How  the  writers  of  "  Young  Germany  "  regard  the  religious  tendencies  of  their 
coevals,  may  be  gathered  from  the  extravagant  and  wicked  writings  of  Heine.  After 
saying,  in  his  "  Allemagne,"  that  Pantheism  was  the  ancient  faith  of  the  Teutons, 
and  that  "  man  parts  not  willingly  with  what  has  been  dear  to  his  fathers,"  he  says 
(we  ask  that  it  may  be  duly  noted),  "  Germany  is  at  present  the  fertile  soil  of  Pan- 
theism ;  that  is  the  religion  of  all  our  greatest  thinkers,  of  all  our  best  artists — and 
Deism  is  already  destroyed  there  in  theory.  You  do  not  hear  it  spoken  of — but  every 
one  knows  it.  Pantheism  is  the  public  secret  of  Germany.  We  have  in  fact  out- 
grown Deism."  Again  :  "  Deism  is  a  good  religion  for  slaves,  for  children,  for  Gene- 
vese,  for  watch-makers."—"  Pantheism  is  the  hidden  religion  of  Germany  ;  and  this 
result  was  well  foreseen  by  those  German  writers  who,  fifty  years  ago,  let  loose  such 
a  storm  of  fury  against  Spinosa." — See  Quarterly  Review,  vol.  lv.,  for  December, 
1S35,  pp.  7,  8,  12. 


656  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

has  seen  fit  to  give  us.  What  we  had  charged  upon  the  system, 
before  reading  this  pamphlet,  as  being  fairly  and  logically  involved 
in  its  premises,  we  have  here  found  avowed  by  one  of  its  own  ad- 
vocates. Thus  we  have  said  that  if  the  notion  which  it  gives  us 
of  God  is  correct,  then  he  who  is  concerned  in  the  production  of 
any  phenomenon,  who  employs  his  agency  in  any  manner,  in  kind- 
ling a  fire  or  uttering  a  prayer,  does  thereby  manifest  the  Deity, 
and  render  to  him  religious  worship.  This  consequence  is  frankly 
avowed  and  taught  by  Mr.  Emerson.  Speaking  of  the  "  religious 
sentiment,"  he  says  :  "  It  is  a  mountain  air.  It  is  the  embalmer  of 
the  world.  It  is  myrrh,  and  storax,  and  chlorine,  and  rosemary. 
It  makes  the  sky  and  the  hills  sublime,  and  the  silent  song  of  the 
stars  is  it."  And  again,  he  tells  us  :  "  Always  the  seer  is  a  sayer. 
Somehow  his  dream  is  told.  Somehow  he  publishes  it  with  solemn 
joy.  Sometimes,  with  pencil  on  canvass,  sometimes  with  chisel 
on  stone ;  sometimes  in  towers  and  aisles  of  granite,  his  soul's 
worship  is  builded."  He  even  admonishes  us  that  the  time  is  com- 
ing when  men  shall  be  taught  to  believe  in  "  the  identity  of  the 
law  of  gravitation,  with  purity  of  heart."  To  show  that  this  tree 
of  knowledge  resembles  that  in  Eden  in  one  respect,  that  it  has  a 
tempter  beside  it,  we  have  but  to  quote  at  random  from  Mr.  Em- 
erson's Address.  "  Man  is  the  wonder-worker.  He  is  seen  amid 
miracles.  The  stationariness  of  religion  ;  the  assumption  that  the 
age  of  inspiration  is  past,  that  the  Bible  is  closed  ;  the  fear  of  de- 
grading the  character  of  Jesus  by  representing  him  as  a  man, 
indicate  with  sufficient  clearness  the  falsehood  of  our  theology.  It 
is  the  office  of  a  true  teacher  to  show  us  that  God  is,  not  was : 
that  he  speaketh,  not  spake.  The  true  Christianity — a  faith  like 
Christ's  in  the  infinitude  of  man — is  lost.  None  believeth  in  the 
soul  of  man,  but  only  in  some  man  or  person  old  and  departed." 
He  complains  grievously  of  this  want  of  faith  in  the  infinitude  of 
the  soul ;  he  cries  out  because  "  man  is  ashamed  of  himself,  and 
skulks  and  sneaks  through  the  world :"  and  utters  the  pathetic 
plaint,  "  In  how  many  churches,  and  by  how  many  prophets,  tell 
me,  is  man  made  sensible  that  he  is  an  infinite  soul ;  that  the  earth 
and  the  heavens  are  passing  into  his  mind  ;  that  he  is  drinking  for 
ever  the  soul  of  God  ?"  Miracles,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word, 
are  of  course  discarded.  "  The  very  word  miracle,  he  tells  us,  as 
pronounced  by  Christian  churches,  gives  a  false  impression.  It  is 
Monster ;  it  is  not  one  with  the  blowing  clover  and  the  falling 
rain."  And  when  Christ  spoke  of  miracles,  it  was  only  because  he 
knew  "  that  man's  life  was  a  miracle,  and  all  that  man  doth." 
Jesus  Christ  is  made  the  mere  symbol  of  a  man  who  had  full  faith 
in  the  soul,  who  believed  in  the  infinitude  of  our  nature,  and  who 
thus  assists  in  admonishing  us  "  that  the  gleams  which  flash  across 
our  minds,  are  not  ours,  but  God's."  Any  man  may  now  become 
Christ,  for  "  a  true  conversion,  a  true  Christ  is  now,  as  always,  to 
be  made  by  the  reception  of  beautiful  sentiments."*     There  is  not 

*  "  Our  world,"  says  Lichtenberg,  a  witty  German  philosopher,  "  will  yet  grow 
so  refined,  that  it  will  be  just  as  ridiculous  to  believe  in  a  God,  as  now-a-days  in 


i 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  657 

a  single  truth  or  sentiment  in  this  whole  Address  that  is  borrowed 
from  the  scriptures.  And  why  should  there  be  ?  Mr.  Emerson, 
and  all  men,  are  as  truly  inspired  as  the  penmen  of  the  sacred 
volume.  Indeed  he  expressly  warns  the  candidates  for  the  minis- 
try, whom  he  was  addressing,  to  look  only  into  their  own  souls 
for  the  truth.  He  has  himself  succeeded  thus  in  discovering  many 
truths  that  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  Bible  ;  as,  for  instance,  "  that 
the  gift  of  God  to  the  soul  is  not  a  vaunting,  overpowering,  exclud- 
ing sanctity,  but  a  sweet  natural  goodness  like  thine  and  mine,  and 
that  thus  invites  thine  and  mine,  to  be,  and  to  grow."  The  present 
mode  of  interpreting  Christianity,  even  under  the  form  of  Unitari- 
anism,  he  abhors  as  utterly  repugnant  to  reason,  and  insufficient 
for  the  wants  of  our  nature  ;  he  stigmatizes  it  as  a  historical  tradi- 
tional Christianity,  that  has  its  origin  in  past  revelations,  instead  of 
placing  its  faith  in  new  ones  ;  and  "  like  the  zodiac  of  Denderah, 
and  the  astronomical  monuments  of  the  Hindoos,  it  is  wholly  insu- 
lated from  anything  now  extant  in  the  life  and  business  of  the  peo- 
ple." He  treats  Christianity  as  a  Mythos,  like  the  creeds  of  Pagan 
Greece  and  Rome,  and  does  not  even  pay  it  sufficient  respect  under 
this  aspect  to  be  at  the  trouble  of  interpreting  for  us  more  than  a 
few  of  the  hidden  meanings  that  lie  concealed  under  its  allegorical 
forms.  In  a  word,  Mr.  Emerson  is  an  infidel  philosopher,  who 
nevertheless  makes  use,  in  the  esoteric  sense  of  the  new  philoso- 
phy, of  the  terms  and  phrases  consecrated  to  a  religious  use.*  We 
have  at  least  to  thank  him,  on  behalf  of  those  whose  eyes  might 
not  otherwise  have  been  opened,  for  giving  us  so  distinct  and 
ample  an  illustration  of  the  kind  of  service  which  M.  Cousin  pro- 
fesses himself  willing  to  render  to  Christianity  by  means  of  his 
philosophy.  We  would  call  public  attention  to  this  Address,  as 
the  first  fruits  of  transcendentalism  in  our  country.  We  hold  it 
up  as  a  warning  evidence  of  the  nature  of  the  tree  which  has  pro- 
duced it. 

We  know  not  with  what  degree  of  favour  Mr.  Emerson's  rhap- 
sody was  received  by  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed  ;  but  we 
are  pleased  to  learn  that  it  was  offensive  to  the  authorities  of  the 
university.     Professor  Ware  has  since  delivered  and  published  a 

Ghosts.  And  then  after  a  while,  the  world  will  grow  more  refined  still.  And  so  it 
will  go  on,  with  great  rapidity,  to  the  utmost  summit  of  refinement  Having  at- 
tained the  pinnacle,  the  judgment  of  the  wise  will  be  reversed ;  knowledge  will 
change  itself  for  the  last  time.  Then— and  this  will  be  the  end— then  shall  we  be- 
lieve in  nothing  but  ghosts.  We  shall  ourselves  be  like  God.  We  shall  know  that 
essence  or  existence  is  and  can  be  nothing  but— a  phantom." — Vermischte  Schriften, 
b.  l,s.  166. 

*  It  is  within  the  compass  of  the  transcendental  philosophy  to  accommodate  itself 
to  any  form  of  religion,  and  appropriate  its  language.  Sc  helling  himself,  and  some 
of  his  disciples,  who  had  been  educated  in  the  Protestant  faith,  embraced,  it  is  said, 
the  Romish  religion,  and  formed  within  its  pale,  a  sort  of  inner  church,  whose  sym- 
bol and  watchword  was  the  name  of  the  Virgin  Mary.  We  have  shown  it  among  the 
Ophites,  the  Soofies,  and  the  Chinese.  Mr.  Bancroft  has,  with  distinctness,  laid  it 
open  in  the  scheme  of  early  Quakers  (History,  vol.  ii  ,  chap.  16),  and  it  is  now  prof- 
fered to  us  by  a  clergyman  of  a  church,  to  say  the  least,  as  little  tinctured  with  this 
sort  of  poison  as  any  in  Christendom. 

42 


658  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

sermon,  containing  an  earnest  and  strong  defence  of  the  personality 
of  the  Deity.*  In  obvious  allusion  to  Mr.  Emerson,  he  thus  ex- 
presses his  opinion :  "  Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  Christian  ears 
that  have  been  accustomed  to  far  other  expressions  of  the  Divinity, 
there  have  been  those  who  maintain  this  idea ;  who  hold  that  the 
principles  which  govern  the  universe  are  the  Deity ;  that  power, 
wisdom,  veracity,  justice,  benevolence,  are  God  ;  that  gravitation, 
light,  electricity,  are  God."  We  noticed  too,  some  months  since, 
in  one  of  our  public  papers,  a  severe  rebuke  of  Mr.  Emerson, 
which  was  attributed  to  another  of  the  Professors  of  the  univer- 
sity, f  This,  then,  cannot  be  one  of  "  the  most  respectable  colleges 
and  universities,"  which  have  adopted  the  Elements  of  Psychology 
as  their  text-book  on  mental  science.J 

It  is  suited  to  excite  a  feeling  of  surprise,  not  unmingled  with 
sorrow,  that  a  system  of  philosophy,  which,  in  its  immediate  and 
natural  results,  is  indignantly  repudiated  by  Unitarians,  should  be 
urged  upon  us,  with  high  praise  of  its  merits,  by  an  accredited 
minister,  and  a  Doctor  in  Divinity,  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church.  We  are  willing  to  believe  that  he  knows  not  what  he  is 
doing ;  that  fascinated  by  the  first  charms  of  the  new  philosophy, 
or  perchance  dazzled  by  the  brilliancy  of  a  correspondence  with  a 
Peer  of  France,  and  the  great  founder  of  Eclecticism,  he  is  not 
able  to  see  the  end  from  the  beginning.  But  this  excuse,  the  only 
one  that  we  can  make  for  him,  increases  our  apprehension.  M. 
Cousin  informs  him,  in  a  letter  which  has  been  given  in  several 
different  forms  to  the  public,  that  he  "  shall  watch  with  the  live- 
liest interest,  the  progress  of  philosophy  in  America,"  and  that  in 
one  of  the  works  which  he  intends  yet  to  publish,  he  "  will  endea- 
vour to  be  useful  to  America."  In  the  meantime,  he  says  to  Dr. 
Henry,  "  it  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  see  you  resolved  to  esta- 
blish yourself  in  the  State  of  New  York,  where  public  instruction 
is  so  far  advanced,  but  where  philosophy  is  yet  so  very  languish- 
ing :  it  will  be  your  duty  to  re-animate  it,  to  give  it  a  strong  im- 
pulse." Dr.  Henry  has  taken  care  to  inform  the  public  that  he  has 
been  honoured  with  this  commission  from  the  great  head  of  the 
sect ;  it  has  been  published  and  re-published  until  the  whole  nation 
have  learned  that  he  has  been  consecrated  by  no  less  a  personage 

*  The  Personality  of  the  Deity.  A  Sermon,  preached  in  the  Chapel  of  Harvard 
University,  September  23,  1838.  By  Henry  Ware,  Jr.,  Professor  of  Pulpit  Elo- 
quence and  the  Pastoral  Care.  Published  at  the  request  of  the  members  of  the 
Divinity  School.     Boston  :  1838. 

t  A  paragraph  has  fallen  under  our  eye,  while  writing  this,  which  informs  us  that 
this  same  Mr.  Emerson  has  received  so  much  encouragement  for  what  are  softly 
called  "  his  daring  and  imaginative  speculations,"  from  the  people  of  Boston,  that  he 
is  now  engaged  in  the  delivery  of  a  course  of  public  Lectures  upon  them. 

X  Since  the  body  of  this  article  was  completely  written,  we  have  received  the 
Christian  Review,  of  Boston,  in  which  there  is  a  notice  of  the  system  of  Cousin. 
We  are  encouraged  by  these  signs  of  healthful  resistance,  and  corroborated  in  our 
judgment,  by  finding  that  the  author  of  this  sound  and  conclusive  review,  who  has 
evidently  seen  the  monster  in  its  native  German  forests,  recognises  its  tracks  in  the 
attempts  of  M.  Cousin. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  659 

than  M.  Cousin,  to  the  duty  of  re-animating  our  philosophy.  Can 
he  now  abandon  this  work,  and  leave  the  duty  assigned  him  to  be 
performed  by  any  meaner  hand  ?  We  fear  not.  We  fear  that  if 
any  misgivings  should  cross  his  mind,  they  will  give  place  to  as- 
surance with  the  arrival  of  the  next  packet  that  shall  bring  a  letter 
and  a  presentation  copy  of  some  new  work  from  M.  Cousin,  or 
even  at  the  very  thought  of  such  an  arrival. 

If  our  augury  should  prove  right,  we,  too,  will  watch  his  la- 
bours. We  read  the  Introduction  to  the  "  History  of  Philosophy," 
and  the  "  Elements  of  Psychology,"  upon  their  first  appearance,  but 
we  kept  silence  because  we  did  not  wish  in  any  degree  to  draw 
public  attention  to  them  until  evidence  was  afforded  that  they  were 
read.  We  now  have  this  evidence,  and  have  felt  it  our  duty  to  be 
no  longer  silent.  But,  having  done  so,  we  gladly  desist  from  the 
attempt  to  trace  the  pedigree  or  indicate  the  family  traits  of  these 
various  systems.  Be  they  Indian,  Teutonic,  or  French,  we  regard 
them  alike  with  fear,  as  if  some  demon  were  bent  on  playing  fan- 
tastic tricks  with  poor,  proud,  purblind  man.  We  pretend  not,  as 
we  have  said,  to  comprehend  these  dogmas.  We  know  not  what 
they  are :  but  we  know  what  they  are  not.  They  are  not  the 
truth  of  God  ;  nay,  they  gainsay  that  truth  at  every  step.  They 
are,  if  anything  can  be,  profane  and  vain  babblings,  and  opposi- 
tions of  science  falsely  so  called.*  So  far  as  received,  they  rob 
us  of  our  most  cherished  hopes,  and  take  away  our  God.  No  one 
who  has  ever  heard  such  avowals  can  forget  the  touching  manner 
in  which  pious  as  well  as  celebrated  German  scholars  have  some- 
times lamented  their  still  lingering  doubts  as  to  the  personality  of 
God.  But  while  these  systems  rob  us  of  our  religious  faith,  they 
despoil  us  of  our  reason.  Let  those  who  will  rehearse  to  us  the 
empty  babble  about  reason  as  a  faculty  of  immediate  insight  of  the 
infinite ;  we  will  trust  no  faculty  which,  like  eastern  princes, 
mounts  the  throne  over  the  corpses  of  its  brethren.  We  cannot 
sacrifice  our  understanding.  If  we  are  addressed  by  appeals  to 
consciousness,  to  intuition,  we  will  try  those  appeals.  If  we  are 
addressed  by  reasoning,  we  will  endeavour  to  go  along  with  that 
reasoning.  But  in  what  is  thus  offered,  there  is  no  ratiocination  ;f 
there  is  endless  assertion,  not  merely  of  unproved,  but  of  unrea- 
sonable, of  contradictory,  of  absurd  propositions.  And  if  any, 
overcome  by  the  prestige  of  the  new  philosophy,  as  transatlantic,  or 
as  new,  are  ready  to  repeat  dogmas  which  neither  they  nor  the 
inventors  of  them  can  comprehend,  and  which  approach  the  dia- 

*  The  original  is  pregnant:  rat  0t0>'i\o»t  Ktvofywvias  xal  \vnQlwut  rijj  if/evivtv/to* 
yvaiaccof. 

t  Bretschneider,  though  a  German,  seems  to  have  felt  this.  "  It  would  be  unrea- 
sonable," says  he  of  Schelling,  "  to  demand  a  proof  of  such  a  system.  For  as  to 
prove,  means  but  this — to  deduce  something  true,  from  something  else  previously 
known  as  true,  there  can  here  be  no  such  thing  as  proof  from  higher  principles,  since 
we  seek  theirs*  truth  from  which  all  others  are  deduced."  Bretsch.  Grundasnicht, 
p.  7. 


660  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

lect  of  Bedlam,  we  crave  to  be  exempt  from  the  number,  and  will 
contentedly  abstain  for  life  from  "  the  high  priori  road."  The 
more  we  have  looked  at  it,  the  more  we  have  been  convinced  of 
its  emptiness  and  fatuity.  It  proves  nothing ;  it  determines  no- 
thing ;  or  where  it  seems  to  have  results,  they  are  hideous  and 
godless.  Moreover,  we  think  we  speak  the  sentiment  of  a  large 
body  of  scholars  in  our  country,  when  we  say,  that  if  we  must 
have  a  transatlantic  philosophy,  we  desire  to  have  it  in  its  native 
robustness  and  freshness.  We  do  not  wish  to  have  it  through  the 
medium  of  French  declaimers,  nor  of  the  French  language,  than 
which  no  tongue  is  less  fit  to  convey  the  endless  distinctions  of  the 
German.  We  wish  to  have  it  before  it  has  undergone  two  or  three 
transmutations ;  not  from  subalterns,  but  from  masters.  We  do 
not  wish  to  have  a  philosophy  already  effete,  long  since  refuted 
and  heartily  denounced  by  the  best  men  in  ihe  country  of  its  ori- 
gin ;  and  above  all,  we  do  not  wish  to  have  a  philosophy  which 
shall  conduct  our  young  scholars  into  the  high  road  to  Atheism. 
We  learn  with  pain  that  among  the  Unitarians  of  Boston  and  its 
vicinity,  there  are  those  who  affect  to  embrace  the  pantheistic 
creed.  The  time  may  not  be  far  off,  when  some  new  Emerson 
shall  preach  Pantheism  under  the  banner  of  self-styled  Calvinism  ; 
or  when,  with  formularies  as  sound  as  those  of  Germany,  some 
author  among  ourselves  may,  like  Dinter,  address  his  reader 
thus,  O  thou  Son  of  God  !  For  the  tendency  of  German  philoso- 
phizing is  towards  impious  temerity.  We  have  long  deplored  the 
spread  of  Socinianism,  but  there  is  no  form  of  Socinianism,  or  of 
rational  Deism,  which  is  not  immeasurably  to  be  preferred  to  the 
German  insanity.  In  fine,  we  cleave  with  more  tenacity  than 
ever  to  the  mode  of  philosophizing  which  has  for  several  genera- 
tions prevailed  among  our  British  ancestors ;  and  especially  to 
that  Oracle  in  which  we  read,  what  the  investigation  of  this  sub- 
ject has  impressed  on  us  with  double  force,  that  God  will  destroy 
the  wisdom  of  the  wise,  and  bring  to  nothing  the  understanding  of 
the  prudent;  that  the  foolishness  of  God  is  wiser  than  men,  and 
that  when  men  change  the  truth  of  God  into  a  lie,  he  will  give 
them  over  to  a  reprobate  mind. 


Our  readers  are  probably  aware  that  the  Unitarian  clergymen 
of  Boston  and  its  vicinity,  priding  themselves  in  the  name  of  liberal 
Christians,  have  never  professed  to  agree  entirely  among  them- 
selves in  their  doctrinal  views.*    Of  late,  however,  a  portion  of 

*  The  remaining  portion  of  this  essay  originally  appeared  as  a  separate  article,  in 
review  of  a  work  entitled,  "  A  Discourse  on  the  Latest  Form  of  Infidelity,  de- 
livered at  the  request  of  the  Association  of  the  Alumni  of  the  Cambridge  Theological 
School,  on  the  19th  of  July,  1839,  with  notes.    By  Andrews  Norton." 

"  A  Letter  to  Mr.  Andrews  Norton,  occasioned  by  his  Discourse  before  the  Asso- 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  661 

their  number  have  advanced  sentiments  which,  in  the  appre- 
hension of  the  rest,  exceed  even  the  limits  of  the  most  liberal 
Christianity.  Hence  Mr.  Norton's  Discourse  on  the  Latest  Form  of 
Infidelity.  The  pamphlets  before  us  do  not  enable  us  to  ascertain 
precisely  what  this  new  form  of  infidelity  is,  nor  how  far  it  is  em- 
braced by  the  Boston  clergy.  We  know,  indeed,  that  it  has  its 
origin  in  German  philosophy,  and  that  the  Rev.  Mr.  Emerson  de- 
livered an  address  before  the  same  association  which  listened  to 
Mr.  Norton's  discourse,  which  was  a  rhapsodical  oration  in  favour 
of  Pantheism.  We  know,  also,  that  that  oration  called  forth  an 
earnest  remonstrance  and  disclaimer  from  some  of  the  friends  and 
officers  of  the  Cambridge  school  of  theology.  The  public  papers 
moreover  informed  us  that  Mr.  Emerson  delivered,  with  some  ap- 
plause, a  series  of  popular  lectures  on  the  new  philosophy,  to  the 
good  people  of  Boston.  We  are,  however,  ignorant  both  as  to  the 
number  of  those  who  embrace  this  new  philosophy,  and  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  they  carry  it.  It  may  be  inferred  from  Mr.  Nor- 
ton's discourse,  that  he  considered  his  opponents  as  denying  either 
the  possibility  of  a  miracle,  or  the  truth  of  the  New  Testament 
history  in  reference  to  the  miracles  of  Christ.  Why  else  should 
he  make  the  truth  of  the  evangelical  history,  and  the  absolute  ne- 
cessity of  a  belief  in  miracles  in  order  to  faith  in  Christianity,  the 
burden  of  his  discourse  ?  *  The  latest  form  of  infidelity,"  he  says, 
"  is  distinguished  by  assuming  a  Christian  name,  while  it  strikes 
directly  at  the  root  of  faith  in  Christianity,  and  indirectly  of  all 
religion,  by  denying  the  miracles  attesting  the  divine  mission  of 
Christ."*  On  another  page,  he  says,  "  Christianity  claims  to  reveal 
facts,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  essential  to  the  moral  and  spiritual 
regeneration  of  men,  and  to  offer  in  attestation  of  those  facts,  the 
only  satisfactory  proof,  the  authority  of  God,  evidenced  by  mira- 
culous displays  of  his  power."f  Again  :  "  If  it  were  not  for  the 
abuse  of  language  that  has  prevailed,  it  would  be  idle  to  say,  in 
denying  the  miracles  of  Christianity,  the  truth  of  Christianity  is 
denied.  It  has  been  vaguely  alleged,  that  the  internal  evidences 
of  our  religion  are  sufficient,  and  that  the  miraculous  proof  is  not 
wanted ;  but  this  can  be  said  by  no  one  who  understands  what 
Christianity  is,  and  what  its  internal  evidences  are."J 

These  quotations  are  sufficient  to  exhibit  the  two  prominent  doc- 
trines of  the  discourse,  viz.,  that  miracles  are  the  only  satisfactory 
evidence  of  a  divine  revelation ;  and  that  the  denial  of  the  mira- 
cles of  Christianity  is  a  denial  of  Christianity  itself.  These  doc- 
trines are  not  necessarily  connected.  For,  although  it  is  certain 
that  if  the  former  is  true,  the  latter  must  be  true  also  ;  it  does  not 
follow  that  if  the  former  is  false,  the  latter  must  be  false.     It  may 

ciation  of  the  Alumni  of  the  Cambridge  Theological  School,  on  the  19th  of  July, 
1339.     By  an  Alumnus  of  that  School." 

*  Discourse,  p.  It.  f  Ibid»  P-  18-  t  Ibid»  P-  21- 


662  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

be  incorrect,  as  it  doubtless  is,  to  make  miracles  the  only  satisfac- 
tory proof  of  Christianity,  and  yet  it  may  be  perfectly  correct  to 
say  that  a  denial  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  is  a  denial  of  the  Gos- 
pel ;  not  because  the  only  sufficient  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  Gos- 
pel is  denied,  but  because  the  miraculous  character  of  the  Gospel 
enters  into  its  very  essence.  The  advent,  the  person,  the  resur- 
rection of  Christ,  were  all  miraculous.  He  cannot  be  believed 
upon,  without  believing  a  miracle.  Revelation  is  itself  a  miracle. 
All  the  words  of  Christ  suppose  the  truth  of  his  miracles.  They 
can,  therefore,  no  more  be  separated  from  his  religion  than  the 
warp  and  woof  can  be  separated,  and  yet  the  cloth  remain  entire. 
The  apostle  expressly  teaches  us,  that  if  the  resurrection  of  Christ 
be  denied,  the  whole  Gospel  is  denied.  While,  therefore,  we  dis- 
sent from  Mr.  Norton  as  to  his  first  proposition,  we  fully  agree 
with  him  as  to  the  second. 

The  obvious  objection  to  the  doctrine,  that  miracles  are  the  only 
adequate  proof  of  divine  revelation,  is,  that  the  great  majority  of 
Christians,  who  are  incapable  of  examining  the  evidence  on  which 
the  miracles  rest,  are  thus  left  without  any  sufficient  ground  of 
faith.  This  objection  does  not  escape  Mr.  Norton's  attention.  His 
answer  is  the  same  as  that  given  by  Catholic  priests  and  high 
churchmen  everywhere,  viz.,  they  must  believe  on  trust,  or  as  he 
prefers  to  express  it,  on  the  testimony  of  those  who  are  competent 
to  examine  the  evidence  in  question.  As  they  are  forced  to  be- 
lieve a  thousand  things,  without  personal  examination,  on  the  testi- 
mony of  others,  he  thinks  it  not  unreasonable  that  they  should 
receive  their  religion  on  the  same  terms.  If  they  believe  that  the 
earth  turns  round  because  astronomers  tell  them  so,  why  may  they 
not  believe  that  the  Gospel  is  true  because  learned  men  vouch  for 
the  fact  ?  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  remark,  that  every  Christian 
knows  that  such  is  not  the  foundation  of  his  faith :  he  has  firmer 
ground  on  which  to  rest  the  destiny  of  his  soul.  He  does  not  be- 
lieve Grotius  or  Paley ;  he,  believes  God  himself,  speaking  in  his 
word.  The  evidence  of  the  truth  is  in  the  truth  itself.  The  pro- 
position, that  the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part,  is  believed  for  its 
own  sake.  And  to  higher  intellects,  truths,  at  which  we  arrive  by 
a  laborious  process,  appear  in  their  own  light,  as  axioms  appear  to 
us.  So  also  with  regard  to  morals.  There  are  some  propositions 
which  every  human  being  sees  to  be  true,  the  moment  they  are 
announced.  There  are  others  which  must  be  proved  to  him.  And 
the  higher  the  moral  cultivation  or  purity  of  the  soul  is  carried, 
the  wider  is  the  range  of  this  moral  intuition.  So  also  with  regard 
to  religious  truth.  That  God  is  a  spirit,  infinite,  eternal,  and  un- 
changeable in  his  being,  wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness, 
and  truth  ;  that  he  is  not  a  Jupiter,  or  a  Moloch,  is  believed  with 
an  intimate  conviction  which  no  argument  nor  external  evidence 
can  possibly  produce.  It  is  believed  for  its  own  sake.  It  cannot 
be  understood  or  perceived  in  its  own  nature  without  the  persua- 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  663 

sion  of  its  truth  rising  in  the  mind.  No  man  believes  that  malig- 
nity is  wrong  on  external  authority ;  and  no  man  believes  that 
God  is  good,  because  it  can  be  logically  demonstrated.  The 
ground  of  faith  in  moral  truth,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  is  the 
perception  of  the  nature  of  the  truth  believed.  It  is  seen  and  felt 
to  be  true.  That  one  man  does  not  see  a  proposition  in  morals  to 
be  true,  can  have  no  effect  upon  him  who  does  perceive  it.  And 
the  only  way  to  produce  conviction  in  the  mind  of  him  who  doubts 
or  disbelieves,  is  to  remove  the  darkness  which  prevents  the  per- 
ception of  the  truth  to  be  believed.  If  seen  in  its  true  nature,  it  is 
believed  ;  just  as  beauty  is  believed  as  soon  as  seen.  "  Faith  is  no 
work  of  reason,  and  therefore  cannot  be  overthrown  by  it,  since 
believing  no  more  arises  from  arguments  than  tasting  or  seeing."* 
It  is  very  true  that  the  great  majority  of  men  have  no  such  per- 
ception of  the  peculiar  truths  of  the  Gospel  as  produces  this  unwa- 
vering faith.  The  only  belief  that  they  have  rests  on  tradition,  or 
prejudice,  or,  in  the  learned  few,  on  the  external  evidences  of  the 
Gospel.  The  reason  of  this  fact,  however,  is  not  that  the  doctrines 
in  question  do  not  contain  the  evidence  of  their  own  truth,  but  that 
the  minds  of  the  majority  of  men  are  not  in  a  state  to  perceive  it. 
What  is  the  reason  that  savages  do  not  perceive  many  things  to  be 
wrong,  the  moral  turpitude  of  which  is  to  us  a  matter  of  intuition  ? 
The  reason  lies  in  the  state  of  their  minds.  So,  also,  the  "  natural 
man  receiveth  not  the  things  of  the  Spirit  of  God ;  for  they  are 
foolishness  unto  him :  neither  can  he  know  them,  for  they  are  spi- 
ritually discerned.  But  he  that  is  spiritual  discerneth  all  things." 
The  spiritual  man,  then  (that  is,  the  man  under  the  influence  of  the 
Spirit  of  God),  discerns  the  excellence  of  the  things  of  the  Spirit  ; 
and  he  receives  them  because  he  does  discern  them.  He  sees  the 
excellence  of  the  divine  character ;  the  glory  of  God  as  it  shines 
in  the  face  of  Jesus  Christ ;  the  perfection  of  the  divine  law ;  the 
accordance  of  the  declarations  of  God  with  his  own  experience  ; 
the  suitableness  of  the  plan  of  salvation  to  his  necessities,  and  to 
the  perfections  of  God.  He  feels  the  power  which  attends  these 
truths  in  his  own  soul,  and  his  faith,  therefore,  rests  not  on  the  wis- 
dom of  man,  but  on  the  power  of  God.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  Bible  is  a  whole.  The  believer  sees  these  doctrines  every- 
where, and  he  therefore  believes  the  whole.  One  portion  of 
scripture  supposes  and  confirms  another.  The  authority  of  the 
ancient  prophets,  of  Christ,  and  of  the  apostles,  is  one  and  indivi- 
sible. As  the  prophets  testified  of  Christ,  so  he  testified  of  them. 
As  Christ  testified  to  the  apostles,  so  did  they  testify  of  him.  The 
object  of  the  believer's  faith,  therefore,  is  the  whole  Bible.  He 
sees  everywhere  the  same  God,  the  same  law,  the  same  Saviour, 

*  Der  Glaube  ist  kein  Werk  der  Vernunft,  kann  also  auch  keinen  Angriffen  dersel- 
ben  unterliegen,  weil  Glauben  so  wenig  durch  Griinde  geschieht,  als  Schmecken  und 
Sehen. 


664  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

the  same  plan  of  redemption.     He  believes  the  whole,  because  it 
is  one  glorious  system  of  effulgent  truth. 

As  this  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Bible  on  this  subject,  so  it  is  also 
the  doctrine  of  the  church.  Were  it  our  present  object  to  establish 
this  point,  the  correctness  of  the  above  statement  could  be  easily 
proved.  We  cannot  forbear,  however,  to  quote  the  following  beau- 
tiful passage  from  the  Westminster  Confession :  "  We  may  be 
moved  and  induced,"  says  that  venerable  symbol,  "  by  the  testimo- 
ny of  the  church,  to  an  high  and  reverend  esteem  for  the  holy  scrip- 
ture ;  and  the  heavenliness  of  the  matter,  the  efficacy  of  the  doc- 
trine, the  majesty  of  the  style,  the  consent  of  all  the  parts,  the  scope 
of  the  whole  (which  is  to  give  all  glory  to  God),  the  full  discovery 
which  it  makes  of  the  only  way  of  man's  salvation,  the  many  other 
incomparable  excellencies,  and  the  entire  perfection  thereof,  are  ar- 
guments whereby  it  doth  abundantly  evidence  itself  to  be  the  word 
of  God ;  yet,  notwithstanding,  our  full  persuasion  and  assurance  of 
the  infallible  truth  and  divine  authority  thereof  is  from  the  inward 
work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  bearing  witness  by  and  with  the  truth  in 
our  hearts." 

Owen  wrote  a  treatise  on  this  subject  which  bears  the  impress 
of  his  sound  and  vigorous  understanding,  as  well  as  of  his  intimate 
acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  true  religion.*  In  his  Treatise  on 
the  Reason  of  Faith,  he  says :  "  The  formal  reason  of  faith,  divine 
and  supernatural,  whereby  we  believe  the  scriptures  to  be  the  word 
of  God,  in  the  way  of  duty,  as  it  is  required  of  us,  is  the  authority 
and  veracity  of  God  alone,  evidencing  themselves  unto  our  minds 
and  consciences  in  and  by  the  scripture  itself.  And  herein  con- 
sisteth  that  divine  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which,  as  it  is  a 
testimony,  gives  our  assent  unto  the  scripture  the  general  nature  of 
faith,  and,  as  it  is  a  divine  testimony,  gives  it  the  especial  nature  of 
faith  divine  and  supernatural. 

"  This  divine  testimony  given  unto  the  divine  original  of  the  sa- 
cred scriptures,  in  and  by  itself,  wherein  our  faith  is  ultimately  re- 
solved, is  evidenced  and  made  known,  as  by  the  character  of  the 
infinite  perfections  of  the  divine  nature,  which  are  in  and  upon  it ; 
so  by  the  authority,  power,  and  efficacy,  over  and  upon  the  souls 
and  consciences  of  men,  and  the  satisfactory  excellence  of  the 
truths  contained  therein,  wherewith  it  is  accompanied." 

This  view  of  the  ground  of  faith  is  confirmed  by  the  experience 
and  testimony  of  the  people  of  God  in  all  ages. 

It  is  a  monstrous  idea  that  the  thousands  of  illiterate  saints  who 
have  entered  eternity  in  the  full  assurance  of  hope,  had  no  better 
foundation  for  their  faith  than  the  testimony  of  the  learned  to  the 
truth  of  the  Bible.  Let  the  advocates  of  such  an  opinion  ask  the 
pious  believer  why  he  believes  the  word  of  God,  and  they  will  find 

*  See  his  work  on  the  Divine  Authority,  Self-Evidencing  Light  and  Power  of  the 
Scriptures,  with  an  answer  to  the  inquiry,  How  we  know  the  Scriptures  to  he  the 
word  of  God  ? 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  665 

he  can  give  some  better  reason  for  the  hope  that  is  in  him  than  the 
faith  or  testimony  of  others.  Let  them  try  the  resources  of  their 
philosophy,  empirical  or  transcendental,  on  a  faith  founded  on  the 
testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  and  with  the  truth ;  let  them  try 
the  effect  of  demonstrating  that  such  and  such  doctrines  cannot  be 
true  ;  they  will  assuredly  meet  with  the  simple  answer,  "  One  thing 
I  know,  whereas  I  was  blind,  now  I  see." 

It  is  by  no  means  intended  to  undervalue  the  importance  of  the 
external  evidences  of  a  divine  revelation,  whether  derived  from 
miracles,  prophecy,  or  any  other  source,  but  simply  to  protest 
against  the  extreme  doctrine  of  Mr.  Norton's  Discourse  :  that  such 
evidence  is  the  only  proof  of  a  divine  revelation,  and  that  all  who 
cannot  examine  such  evidence  for  themselves  must  take  their  reli- 
gion upon  trust.  The  refutation  of  this  doctrine  occupies  much 
the  larger  portion  of  the  Letter  of  the  Alumnus  of  the  Cambridge 
Theological  School,  the  title  of  which  is  given  in  this  arti- 
cle. The  argument  of  the  Alumnus,  as  far  as  it  is  a  refutation, 
is  perfectly  successful.  With  his  own  doctrine  we  are  as  little  sa- 
tisfied as  with  that  of  Mr.  Norton.  "  The  truths  of  Christianity," 
he  tells  us,  "  have  always  been  addressed  to  the  intuitive  percep- 
tions of  the  common  mind."*  He  quotes,  with  much  commenda- 
tion, the  following  passage  from  Prof.  Park,  of  Andover :  "  The 
argument  from  miracles  is  not  the  kind  of  proof  to  which  the  major- 
ity of  cordial  believers  in  the  Bible  are,  at  the  present  day,  most 
attached.  They  have  neither  the  time  nor  the  ability  to  form  an 
estimate  of  the  historical  evidence  that  favours  or  opposes  the  actual 
occurrence  of  miracles.  They  know  the  Bible  to  be  true,  because 
they  feel  it  to  be  so.  The  excellence  of  its  morality,  like  a  mag- 
net, attracts  their  souls ;  and  sophistry,  which  they  cannot  refute, 
will  not  weaken  their  faith,  resulting,  as  it  does,  from  the  accord- 
ance of  their  higher  nature  with  the  spirit  of  the  Bible."  This 
language,  as  coming  from  Professor  Park,  if  it  be  anything  more 
than  a  specimen  of  the  affectation  of  expressing  a  familiar  truth 
in  a  philosophical  form,  is  something  far  worse.  If  this  "higher 
nature  "  of  man,  which  thus  accords  with  the  spirit  of  the  Bible,  is 
his  renewed  nature — his  nature  purified  and  enlightened  by  the 
Holy  Spirit — then  we  have  a  solemn  truth  disguised  and  bedecked 
in  order  to  gain  favour  with  the  world.  But  if  this  "  higher  na- 
ture "  be  the  nature  of  man,  in  any  of  its  aspects,  as  it  exists  before 
regeneration,  then  is  the  language  of  Professor  Park  a  treasonable 
betrayal  of  the  scriptural  truth.  The  doctrines  of  depravity,  and 
of  the  necessity  of  divine  influence,  are  virtually  denied.  "  That 
which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh ;  unless  a  man  be  born  of  the 
Spirit,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom'of  God ;  the  carnal  mind  is  en- 
mity against  God  ;  the  natural  man  receiveth  not  the  things  of  the 
Spirit  of  God,  for  they  are  foolishness  unto  him ;  we  preach  Christ 
crucified,  unto  the  Jews  a  stumbling-block,  and  the  Greeks  foolish- 

*  Letters,  &c.,  p.  116. 


666  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

ness,  but  unto  them  which  are  called  (and  to  them  only)  Christ  the 
power  of  God,  and  the  wisdom  of  God."  To  assert,  therefore,  the 
accordance  of  the  higher  nature  of  unrenewed  men  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Bible,  is  to  contradict  one  of  the  primary  doctrines  of  the 
word  of  God.  It  contradicts,  moreover,  universal  experience. 
Does  the  character  of  God,  as  a  being  of  inflexible  justice  and 
perfect  holiness  ;  do  the  doctrines  of  Christ  crucified,  of  the  cor- 
ruption of  man,  of  the  necessity  of  regeneration  by  the  power  of 
the  Holy  Ghost,  and  of  eternal  retribution,  commend  themselves  to 
the  hearts  of  unrenewed  men  ?  Are  they  not,  on  the  contrary, 
rejected  and  blasphemed  by  those  who  delight  to  talk  of  the  ac- 
cordance of  their  higher  nature  with  the  spirit  of  the  Bible  ? 

If  the  passage  on  which  we  are  commenting  refers  to  nothing 
more  than  the  accordance  between  the  ethics  of  the  Bible  and  the 
moral  sense  of  men,  and  between  its  general  representations  of 
God  and  human  reason,  it  is  still  more  objectionable.  It  supposes 
that  all  that  is  peculiar  to  the  Gospel,  all  that  distinguishes  it  from 
a  system  of  natural  religion,  may  be  left  out  of  view,  and  yet  its 
spirit,  its  essential  part,  remain.  Is  the  spirit  of  a  system  which 
makes  Christ  a  mere  man,  which  denies  the  apostasy  of  our  race, 
which  rejects  the  doctrines  of  atonement  and  regeneration,  the  spi- 
rit of  the  Bible  ?     Then,  indeed,  has  offence  of  the  cross  ceased. 

In  every  view,  therefore,  which  we  are  able  to  take  of  this  lan- 
guage of  Professor  Park,  it  excites  the  strongest  feelings  of  disap- 
probation. If  he  believes  what  all  evangelical  Christians  have 
ever  believed  on  this  subject,  why  use  language  to  express  that  be- 
lief which  those  who  deny  the  essential  doctrines  of  the  Gospel 
seize  upon  with  avidity,  as  expressing  their  own  views  ?  On  the 
other  hand,  if  he  does  not  agree  with  evangelical  Christians  on 
these  points,  why  does  he  call  himself  by  their  name  ?  Why  does 
he  march  under  their  banner  ?  We  sincerely  believe  that  the  cause 
of  Christ  is  in  more  danger  from  the  treason  of  friends  than  from 
the  open  opposition  of  foes.  While  the  Infidels  of  Germany,  and 
the  Unitarians  of  this  country,  are  employing  Christian  language 
to  convey  anti-Christian  doctrines,  professing  Christians  are  using 
the  language  of  an  infidel  philosophy  in  treating  of  the  mysteries  of 
God.  Whether  this  results  from  mere  vanity,  or  from  secret  unbe- 
lief, the  result  is  the  same.  The  truth  is  buried  or  betrayed. 
Statements  are  made  of  Christian  doctrine  in  a  form  which  those 
who  deny  the  doctrine  readily  adopt.  Thus  common  ground  is 
obtained,  on  which  friends  and  foes  of  the  Gospel  can  stand  side 
by  side,  in  seeming  concord.  The  distinction  between  truth  and 
error  is  done  away,  and  Christians  and  infidels  come  to  speak  the 
same  language.  A  more  effective  device  than  this,  to  destroy  the 
power  of  the  Gospel,  cannot  be  conceived.  The  new  philosophy 
promises  to  be  a  universal  solvent,  reducing  all  forms  of  opinion 
into  vague  formulas,  into  which  every  man  may  insinuate  what 
sense  he  pleases. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  667 

While,  therefore,  we  dissent  from  Mr.  Norton's  doctrine,  that 
miracles  are  the  only  adequate  proof  of  a  divine  revelation  and 
that  those  who  cannot  examine  that  proof  for  themselves  must 
believe  upon  the  testimony  of  others,  we  dissent  no  less  earnestly 
from  the  doctrine  of  his  opponent,  that  Christianity  is  addressed  to 
the  intuitive  perceptions  of  the  common  mind ;  that  it  is  embraced 
because  of  the  accordance  of  its  spirit  with  the  higher  nature  of 
man.  We  believe  the  external  evidence  of  the  Bible  to  be  per- 
fectly conclusive ;  we  believe  its  internal  evidence  (that  is,  its 
majesty,  its  purity,  its  consistency,  its  manifold  perfections)  to  be 
no  less  satisfactory  ;  but  we  believe  also,  that  the  ultimate  founda- 
tion of  the  Christian's  faith  is  the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by 
and  with  the  truth  in  our  hearts. 

Though  the  author  of  the  Letter  to  Mr.  Norton  devotes  most  of 
his  attention  to  the  refutation  of  the  doctrine  above  stated,  respect- 
ing miracles,  the  feature  of  the  discourse  which  seems  to  have 
given  him  and  his  friends  the  greatest  umbrage,  is  its  denuncia- 
tory character ;  that  is,  its  venturing  to  assert,  that  those  who 
deny  the  miracles  of  Christianity  are  infidels.  This,  it  appears, 
was  considered  singularly  out  of  taste  and  incongruous,  seeing  the 
Discourse  was  delivered  before  an  association  of  liberal  theologi- 
ans. Its  members,  it  is  said,  "  agree  in  the  rejection  of  many  arti- 
cles of  faith  which  have  usually  been  held  sacred  in  the  church ;  a 
traditional  theology  has  taken  no  strong  hold  of  their  minds ;  they 
deem  the  simple  truths  of  Christianity  more  important  than  the 
mysteries  that  have  been  combined  with  them  ;  but  the  principle 
of  their  union  has  never  been  made  to  consist  in  any  speculative 
belief;  no  test  has  been  required  as  a  condition  of  fellowship ;  the 
mere  suggestion  of  such  a  course  would  be  met  only  with  a  smile 
of  derision."  The  Association  "is  composed  of  the  Alumni  of  a 
theological  school,  which  has  always  claimed  the  favour  of  the 
community,  on  account  of  its  freedom  from  an  exclusive  spirit ;  its 
confidence  in  the  safety  and  utility  of  thorough  inquiry  in  all  mat- 
ters of  faith ;  its  attachment  to  the  principles  of  liberal  theology  ; 
and  its  renunciation  of  the  desire  to  impose  articles  of  belief  on  the 
minds  of  its  pupils."*  That  the  exclusive  principle  should  be 
adopted  in  a  discourse  before  such  an  audience  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected. By  this  principle  is  meant,  "  the  assumption  of  the  right 
for  an  individual,  or  for  any  body  of  individuals,  to  make  their 
own  private  opinions  the  measure  of  what  is  fundamental  in  the 
Christian  faith.  As  liberal  Christians,"  it  is  said,  "  we  have  long 
protested  against  this  principle,  as  contrary  to  the  very  essence  of 
Protestantism.  It  was  not  because  our  exclusive  brethren  made  a 
belief  in  the  Trinity  a  test  of  allegiance  to  Christ,  that  we  accused 
them  of  inconsistency  with  the  liberty  of  the  Gospel ;  but  because 
they   presumed   to  erect  any  standard  whatever,  according  to 

*  Letter,  &c.,  pp.  5  and  6. 


668  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

which  the  faith  of  individuals  should  be  made  to  conform  to  the 
judgment  of  others.  It  was  not  any  special  application  of  the 
principle  that  we  objected  to,  but  the  principle  itself;  and,  as- 
suredly, the  exercise  of  this  principle  does  not  change  its  charac- 
ter, by  reason  of  the  source  from  which  it  proceeds."* 

This  strikes  us  as  very  good  declamation,  but  very  poor  reason- 
ing.    There  may  be  just  complaint  about  the  application  of  the 
exclusive  principle ;  but  to  complain  of  the  principle  is  certainly 
very  unreasonable.     The  author  of  this  Letter  is  just  as  exclusive 
as  Mr.  Norton,  and  Mr.  Norton  as  the  Trinitarians.     They  draw 
the  line  of  exclusion  at  different  places  ;  but  all  must  draw  it  some- 
where.    An  infidel  is  a  man  who  denies  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
religion.     That  religion  is  certainly   something.     Different   men 
may  have  different  views  of  what  it  consists  of,  or  what  is  essen- 
tial to  it.     But  all  must  regard  it  as  embracing  some  doctrines,  or 
it  would  cease  to  be  a  religion  ;  and,  consequently,  they  must  re- 
gard those  who  reject  those  doctrines  as  infidels,  whether  they  say 
so   or  not.     This   Alumnus   would   hardly   call   Mohammedans 
Christians,  though  they  reckon  Abraham  and  Christ  among  the 
prophets,  and  believe  in  God  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
Would  he  then  call  him  a  Christian  who  denies  the  divine  mission 
of  Christ,  the  being  of  an  intelligent  God,  and  the  existence  of  the  . 
soul  after  death,  merely  because  he  lives  in  a  Christian  country, 
and  assumes  the  Christian  name  ?     This  would  be  to  make  libe- 
rality ridiculous.     Yet  such  claimants  of  the  Christian  name  are 
beginning  to  abound.     Mr.  Norton,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  blamed, 
even  as  "  a  liberal  theologian,"  for  the  adoption  of  the  exclusive 
principle.     He  may  have  drawn  the  line  in  an  inconvenient  place  ; 
he  may  have  violated  the  code  of  Unitarian  etiquette,  in  making 
a  belief  in  miracles  essential  to  a  belief  in  Christianity,  and  thus 
justly  exposed  himself  to  the  charge  of  a  breach  of  privilege  ;  but 
he  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  making  the  belief  of  something  neces- 
sary to  entitle  a  man  to  the  name  of  a  Christian.     We  have  no 
doubt  his  real  offence  was  in  drawing  the  line  of  exclusion  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  cast  out  of  the  pale  of  even  liberal  Christianity, 
some  who  were  not  disposed  to  be  thus  publicly  disowned.     This 
is,   indeed,   distinctly   stated.     "You   declare,"   says   the  author 
of  the  letter,  to  Mr.  Norton,  "  that  a  certain  kind  of  evidence,  in 
your  view,  establishes  the  truth  of  Christianity,  and  that  he  who 
rests  his  faith  on  any  other  is  an  infidel,  notwithstanding  his  earnest 
and  open  professions  to  the  contrary.     You  thus,  in  fact,  denied 
the  name  of  Christian  to  not  a  few  individuals  in  your  audience, 
although  you  avoid  discussing  the  grounds  by  which  their  opinions 
are  supported.     For  it  is  perfectly  well  known,  that  many  of  our 
most  eminent  clergymen — I  will  not  refrain  from  speaking  of  them 
as  they  deserve  on  account  of  my  personal  sympathy  with  their 

*  Letter,  &c,  pp.  23  and  24. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  669 

views — repose  their  belief  on  a  different  foundation  from  that  which 
you  approve  as  the  only  tenable  one."*  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that 
the  offensive  exclusiveness  of  Mr.  Norton's  Discourse  consisted  in 
denying  the  Christian  name  to  those  who  denv  the  miracles  of 
Christ. 

It  appears  to  us,  however,  that  the  writer  of  this  letter  does  Mr. 
Norton  great  injustice.  He  accuses  him  of  confounding  "  two 
propositions  which  are  essentially  distinct :  a  belief  in  a  divine 
revelation,  and  a  belief  in  the  miracles  alleged  in  its  support.  You 
utterly  confound,"  it  is  said,  "  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity,  and 
a  certain  class  the  proofs  of  its  divine  origin." — P.  34.  Mr.  Norton 
does  not  confound  these  two  things  ;  nor  does  he,  as  represented 
by  this  writer,  pronounce  all  those  to  be  infidels  whose  faith  rests 
on  any  other  foundation  than  miracles.  He  declares  those  to  be 
infidels  who  deny  the  miracles  of  the  New  Testament,  but  this  is 
a  very  different  affair.  Many  who  feel  the  force  of  other  kinds  of 
evidence  much  more  than  that  of  miracles,  and  whose  faith,  there- 
fore, does  not  rest  on  that  foundation,  admit  their  truth.  Mr.  Nor- 
ton's doctrine  is,  that  the  miraculous  accounts  contained  in  the  New 
Testament  are  so  interwoven  with  all  the  other  portions  of  the 
history,  and  enter  so  essentially  into  the  nature  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem of  Christianity,  that  they  cannot  be  denied  without  denying 
what  is  essential  to  the  Christian  religion.  There  is  no  confusion 
here  of  the  thing  to  be  proved,  and  the  proof  itself.  It  is  true,  he 
teaches  that  miracles  are  the  only  proof  of  a  divine  revelation. 
But  this  is  only  one  of  his  reasons  for  maintaining  that  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  miracles  of  Christianity  is  a  rejection  of  Christianity 
itself.  We  believe  this  latter  proposition,  though  we  do  not  believe 
the  former.  We  believe  that  miracles  are  essential  to  Christianity, 
though  we  do  not  believe  that  they  are  the  only  sufficient  proof  of 
its  divine  origin. 

The  Alumnus,  moreover,  censures  Mr.  Norton  severely,  for  call- 
ing Spinosa  an  Atheist  and  Pantheist.  The  propriety  of  this  cen- 
sure depends  on  the  sense  given  to  the  terms  employed.  An 
Atheist  is  one  who  denies  the  existence  of  God.  But  what  is  God  ? 
If  the  term  be  so  extended  as  to  include  even  a  blind  vis  formativa 
operative  through  the  universe,  then  there  never  was  an  Atheist. 
But  if  the  term  is  used  in  its  true  scriptural  sense  ;  if  it  designates  an 
intelligent  and  moral  being,  distinct  from  his  creatures,  whose  essence 
is  not  their  essence,  whose  acts  are  not  their  acts,  and  especially  whose 


*  Letter,  &c.,  p.  25.  On  a  previous  page,  however,  complaint  is  made  against  Mr. 
Norton,  for  proposing  to  speak  of  prevailing  opinions,  and  then  opposing  "  the  doc- 
trine of  the  impossibility  of  miracles,"  which,  the  writer  says,  "  is  not  known  to  have 
an  advocate  among  our  theologians."  And  on  page  32,  he  says,  though  many  excel- 
lent Christians  doubt,  "  whether  Jesus  Christ  performed  the  miracles  ascribed  to  him 
in  the  New  Testament,"  he  "  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion,  that  the  miracles  related 
in  the  Gospels,  were  actually  wrought  by  Jesus."  The  author,  therefore,  though  he 
belongs  to  the  class  whose  faith  does  not  rest  on  miracles,  neither  denies  their  possi- 
bility nor  their  actual  occurrence. 


670  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

consciousness  is  not  their  consciousness,  then  Spinosa  was  an  Atheist. 
He  acknowledges  no  such  being.  The  universe  was  God ;  or 
rather  all  creatures  were  but  the  phenomena  of  the  only  really- 
existing  being.  It  may,  indeed,  seem  incongruous  to  call  a  man 
an  Atheist,  of  whom  it  may  with  equal  truth  be  said,  that  he  be- 
lieved in  nothing  but  God.  But  in  the  sense  stated  above,  which 
is  a  correct  and  acknowledged  sense  of  the  term,  Spinosa  was  an 
Atheist. 

"  We  come  now,"  says  the  Alumnus,  "  to  a  still  more  extraordi- 
nary mistake,  which  arose  probably  from  the  habit,  too  prevalent 
among  us,  of  grouping  together  theologians  who  have  scarcely 
anything  in  common,  but  the  language  in  which  they  write.  You 
class  Schleiermacher  with  the  modern  German  school,  whose  dis- 
ciples are  called  Rationalists  or  Naturalists." — P.  133.  This,  he 
says,  is  as  whimsical  a  mistake  as  if  a  foreigner  were  to  describe 
the  celebrated  Dr.  Beecher  as  one  of  the  most  noted  of  the  Unita- 
rian school,  in  New  England.  This  mistake  is  not  quite  as  whim- 
sical as  the  author  supposes.  The  term  Rationalist  is,  indeed,  com- 
monly employed  to  designate  those  who,  making  reason  the  source 
as  well  as  the  standard  of  religious  truth,  deny  all  divine  revelation. 
Have  the  Pietists,  says  Rohr,  the  superintendent  of  Weimar,  yet 
to  learn  that  we  admit  no  other  revelation  in  Christ  than  such  as 
occurred  in  Socrates  or  Plato  ?  Of  such  Rationalists,  who  are  in 
Germany  just  what  the  Deists  were  in  England,  Schleiermacher, 
and  all  the  transcendental  school,  were  the  determined  and  contempt- 
uous opponents.  In  another  sense,  however,  the  term  Rationalist  is 
applicable,  and  is  in  fact  applied,  to  the  Transcendentalists  of  the 
highest  grade.  Under  the  head  of  the  Mystisch-spekulative  Ra- 
tionalismus,  Tholuck  includes  the  gnosticism  of  the  first  centuries, 
the  Pantheists  of  the  middle  ages,  and  of  modern  Germany.*  To 
this  class  of  mystical  Rationalists,  Schleiermacher  undoubtedly 
belonged.  As,  however,  the  term  is  generally  applied  to  the  de- 
istical  opposers  of  a  supernatural  revelation,  with  whom  he  was 
ever  in  controversy,  it  certainly  produces  confusion  to  call  Schlei- 
ermacher himself  a  Rationalist.  As  to  the  question,  whether  he 
was  a  Pantheist,  as  it  is  a  matter  about  which  his  learned  contem- 
poraries in  his  own  country  are  at  variance,  we  may  stand  in  doubt. 
Few  unbiassed  readers  of  his  "Reden  iiber  die  Religion,"  however, 
could  regard  him-  in  any  other  light,  when  those  discourses  were 
written.  They  are,  to  be  sure,  a  rhapsody,  full  of  genius  and  feel- 
ing, but  still  a  rhapsody,  in  which  the  meaning  is  a  very  secondary 
concern,  which  the  reader  is  not  expected  to  understand,  but 
simply  to  feel.  Such  a  book  may  betray  a  man's  sentiments,  but 
is  hardly  fit  to  be  cited  in  any  doctrinal  controversy.  Schleierma- 
cher was  a  very  extraordinary  man.  Though  he  placed  far  too 
little  stress  on  historical  Christianity  (i.  e.,  on  the  religion  of  Christ, 
considered  as  objective  revelation,  recorded  in  the  New  Testa- 

*  Tholuck's  Glaubwiirdigkeit  der  Evangel.  Geschichte,  &c.,  ch.  1. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  671 

ment),  yet  as  he  made  Christ  the  centre  of  his  mystical  system, 
exalting  him  as  the  perfect  manifestation  of  God,  he  exerted  an 
extraordinary  influence  in  breaking  down  the  authority  of  those 
deistical  Rationalists,  who  were  accustomed  to  speak  of  Christ  as 
altogether  such  an  one  as  themselves.  He  was  once  a  Moravian, 
and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  interior  life  of  his  soul  ex- 
isted, after  all,  more  under  the  form  thus  originally  impressed  upon 
it,  than  under  the  influence  of  his  subsequent  speculations.  It  was 
no  uncommon  thing  for  him  to  call  upon  his  family  to  join  with 
him  in  singing  some  devout  Moravian  hymn  of  praise  to  Christ ; 
and  though  his  preaching  was  of  a  philosophical  cast,  yet  the 
hymns  which  he  assigned  were  commonly  expressive,  in  a  high 
degree,  of  a  devotional  feeling  and  correct  sentiment.*  Such  a 
worshipper  of  Christ  ought  not  to  be  confounded  with  such  heart- 
less Deists  as  Paulus,  Wegscheider,  and  Rohr. 

The  Alumnus  makes  another  objection  to  Mr.  Norton's  discourse, 
the  justice  of  which  we  admit.  It  does  not  fulfil  the  expectations 
which  the  annunciation  of  his  subject  excites.  It  is  not  a  discourse 
on  tho)  latest  form  of  infidelity ;  it  is  a  mere  consideration  of  one 
subordinate  feature  of  that  form,  viz.,  the  denial  of  the  miracles  of 
the  New  Testament.  And  this  feature  is  by  no  means  character- 
istic of  the  system,  as  this  denial  was  as  formally  made  by  Paulus 
as  it  is  now  by  Strauss,  men  who  have  scarcely  any  other  opinion 
in  common.  Mr.  Norton's  discourse  gives  us  little  insight  into  the 
form  which  infidelity  has  recently  assumed  in  Germany,  and  still 
less  into  the  nature  of  the  opinions  which  have  begun  to  prevail  in 
his  own  neighbourhood.  According  to  the  Alumnus,  it  is  better 
adapted  to  mislead  than  to  inform  the  reader,  as  far  as  this  latter 
point  is  concerned.  "  You  announce,"  says  he  to  Mr.  Norton,  "  as 
the  theme  of  your  discourse,  '  the  characteristics  of  the  times,  and 
some  of  those  opinions  now  prevalent,  which  are  at  war  with  a 
belief  in  Christianity.'  This,  certainly,  was  a  judicious  opening, 
and  I  only  speak  the  sentiments  of  your  whole  audience,  when  I 
say  that  it  was  heard  with  universal  pleasure.  It  at  once  brought 
up  a  subject  of  the  highest  importance,  of  no  small  difficulty,  and  of 
singular  interest  to  our  community  at  the  present  moment.  It  gave 
promise  that  you  would  discuss  the  character  and  tendency  of 
opinions  now  prevalent  in  the  midst  of  us;  that  you  would  meet 
some  of  the  objections  which  have  been  advanced  to  popular  the- 
ological ideas  ;  that  you  would  come  directly  to  the  great  questions 
that  are  at  issue  between  different  portions  of  the  audience  which 
you  addressed.  But,  instead  of  this  mode  of  proceeding,  you 
adopted  one  which  could  not  have  been  expected  from  your  state- 
ment of  the  subject,  and  which  I  conceive  to  have  been  singularly 
irrelevant  to  the  demands  of  your  audience,  and  the  nature  of  the 
occasion.     Instead  of  meeting,  face  to  face,  the  opinions  which 

*  It  was  his  habit  to  have  these  hymns  printed  on  slips  of  paper  and  distributed  to 
the  people  at  the  door  of  his  church. 


672  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

have  found  favour  with  many  of  the  theologians  in  this  country, 
which  are  publicly  maintained  from  the  pulpit  and  the  press,  in  our 
own  immediate  community,  which  form  the  cardinal  points  on 
which  speculation  is  divided  among  us,  you  appear  studiously  to 
avoid  all  mention  of  them  ;  no  one  could  infer  from  your  remarks, 
that  any  novel  ideas  had  been  broached  in  our  theological  world, 
excepting  such  as  can  be  traced  back  to  the  sceptical  reasonings 
of  Spinosa  and  Hume,  and  a  comparatively  small  class  of  the 
modern  theologians  of  Germany."*  He  then  denies  that  the  writ- 
ings of  Spinosa,  Hume,  or  of  the  German  Rationalists  (in  the 
limited  sense  of  that  term),  were  exerting  any  influence  among  the 
theologians  of  Boston,  and  that  the  speculations  which  really  pre- 
vailed, had  a  very  different  origin. 

It  is  clear,  from  all  this,  that  a  serious  and  wide  breach  has  oc- 
curred between  different  classes  of  the  Unitarian  divines  in  New 
England,  but  the  real  character  of  the  novel  ideas  cannot  be  learn- 
ed either  from  Mr.  Norton's  Discourse  or  from  the  letter  of  the 
Alumnus.  It  is,  indeed,  sufficiently  plain,  from  the  manner  in 
which  the  latter  speaks  of  pantheistic  writers,  that  the  new  philo- 
sophy is  the  source  of  the  difficulty.  Speaking  of  the  system  of 
Spinosa,  which  he  admits  to  be  pantheistic,  in  a  philosophical 
sense,  inasmuch  as  it  denies  "  real,  substantial  existence  to  finite 
objects,"  he  says,  "  no  one  who  understands  the  subject,  will  accuse 
this  doctrine  of  an  irreligious  tendency.  It  is  religious  even  to 
mysticism;  on  that  account,  as  well  as  for  certain  philosophical 
objections  it  labours  under  (the  Bible,  it  seems,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  question),  I  cannot  adopt  it  as  a  theory  of  the  universe ; 
but  I  trust  I  shall  never  cease  to  venerate  the  holy  and  exalted  spi- 
rit of  its  author,  who,  in  the  meek  simplicity  of  his  life,  the  trans- 
parent beauty  of  his  character,  and  the  pure  devotion  with  which 
he  wooed  truth,  even  as  a  bride,  stands  almost '  alone,  unapproach- 
ed,'  among  men." — P.  126.  Such  language,  in  reference  to  a  sys- 
tem which  denies  the  existence  of  a  personal  God,  the  individuality 
of  the  human  soul,  which  necessarily  obliterates  all  distinction  be- 
tween right  and  wrong,  betrays  a  singular  perversion  of  ideas,  and 
an  entire  renunciation  of  all  scriptural  views  of  the  nature  of  reli- 
gion. To  call  that  obscure  and  mystic  sentiment  religion,  which 
arises  from  the  contemplation  of  the  incomprehensive  and  infinite, 
is  to  change  Christianity  for  Buddhism.  The  result,  in  fact,  to 
which  the  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  brought  its 
votaries. 

In  another  place,  however,  he  says  of  the  leading  school  in  mo- 
dern German  theology,  "that  the  impression  of  the  powerful 
genius  of  Schleiermacher  is  everywhere  visible  in  its  character ; 
but  it  includes  no  servile  disciples ;  it  combines  men  of  free  minds, 
who  respect  each  other's  efforts,  whatever  may  be  their  individual 
conclusions ;  and  the  central  point  at  which  they  meet  is  the  ac- 

*  Letter,  Sec.,  pp.  17, 18. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  673 

knowledgment  of  the  divine  character  of  Christ,  the  divine  origin 
of  his  religion,  and  its  adaptation  to  the  world,  when  presented  in 
a  form  corresponding  with  its  inherent  spirit,  and  with  the  scientific 
culture  of  the  present  age.  There  are  few  persons  who  would 
venture  to  charge  such  a  school  with  the  promulgation  of  infi- 
delity ;  there  are  many,  I  doubt  not,  who  will  welcome  its  princi- 
ples, as  soon.as  they  are  understood,  as  the  vital,  profound,  and  en- 
nobling theology  which  they  have  earnestly  sought  for,  but  hitherto 
sought  in  vain." — P.  146. 

It  is  difficult  to  know  how  this  paragraph  is  to  be  understood. 
If  restricted  to  a  few  of  the  personal  friends  and  pupils  of  Schleier- 
macher,  such  as  Liicke,  Ullmann,  Twesten,  and  a  few  others,  the 
description  has  some  semblance  of  truth.  But,  in  this  case,  it  is 
no  longer  the  "  leading  school  of  modern  German  theology"  that 
the  writer  is  describing.  And  if  extended  to  the  really  dominant 
school,  the  description  is  as  foreign  from  the  truth  as  can  well  be 
imagined. 

We  have  so  lately  been  concerned  with  the  nature  of  the 
prevalent  system  of  German  theology  and  philosophy,  that  we 
may  well  be  excused  from  enlarging  on  it  here.  As,  however, 
it  is  a  subject  of  constantly  increasing  interest,  it  may  not  be 
amiss  to  give  a  few  additional  proofs  of  the  true  character  of 
the  latest  form  of  infidelity.  In  doing  this,  we  shall  avail 
ourselves  of  the  authority  of  such  men  as  Leo,  Hengstenberg, 
and  Tholuck,  men  of  the  highest  rank  in  their  own  country 
for  talents,  learning,  and  integrity.  We  shall  let  them  describe 
this  new  form  of  philosophy  which  is  turning  the  heads  of  our 
American  scholars,  inflating  some  and  dementing  others  ;  and  we 
shall  leave  it  to  our  transcendental  countrymen,  if  they  see  cause, 
to  accuse  these  German  scholars  and  Christians  of  ignorance  and 
misrepresentation. 

It  is  well  known  to  all  who  have  paid  the  least  attention  to  the 
subject,  that  the  prevalent  system  of  philosophy  in  Germany  is  that 
of  Hegel ;  and  that  this  system  has,  to  a  remarkable  degree,  dif- 
fused itself  among  all  classes  of  educated  men.  It  is  not  confined 
to  recluse  professors  or  speculative  theologians,  but  finds  its  warm- 
est advocates  among  statesmen  and  men  of  the  world.  It  has  its 
poets,  its  popular  as  well  as  its  scientific  journals.  It  is,  in  short, 
the  form  in  which  the  German  mind  now  exists  and  exhibits  itself 
to  surrounding  nations,  just  as  much  as  Deism  or  Atheism  was 
characteristic  of  France  during  the  reign  of  terror.  That  a  sys- 
tem thus  widely  diffused  should  present  different  phases  might  be 
naturally  anticipated.  But  it  is  still  one  system,  called  by  one  name, 
and  despite  of  occasional  recriminations  among  its  advocates,  re- 
cognised by  themselves  as  one  whole.  The  general  characteristic 
of  this  school  is  pantheism.  This,  as  we  have  quoted,  is  "  the  public 
secret  of  Germany ;"  and  "  we  must,"  says  Hengstenberg,  "  de- 
signedly close  our  own  eyes  on  all  that  occurs  around  us,  if  we 

43 


674  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

would  deny  the  truth  of  this  assertion."*  And  on  the  following 
page,  he  says,  that  though  there  are  a  few  of  the  followers  of  He- 
gel who  endeavour  to  reconcile  his  principles  with  Christianity, 
yet  these  are  spoken  of  with  contempt  by  their  associates,  who,  as 
a  body,  are  "  with  the  clearest  consciousness,  and  as  consequently 
as  possible  devoted  to  pantheism."  They  are,  moreover,  he  adds, 
hailed  as  brothers  by  the  advocates  of  popular  pantheism,  who 
denounce,  under  the  name  of  pietism,  at  once  Christianity,  Juda- 
ism and  Deism.  This  was  written  four  years  ago,  a  long  period 
in  the  history  of  modern  philosophy,  and  since  that  time,  the  cha- 
racter of  the  school  has  developed  itself  with  constantly  increasing 
clearness. 

In  allusion  to  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  this  school  is 
divided  into  two  parts,  the  right  and  the  left.  The  former  teaches 
the  principles  of  the  philosophy  in  an  abstruse  form,  as  a  philoso- 
phy :  the  other  gives  them  a  more  popular  and  intelligible  form. 
This  latter  division,  again,  is  divided  into  the  centre  left  and  ex- 
treme left ;  the  one  preserving  some  decorum  and  regard  to  pub- 
lic morals  in  their  statements,  and  the  other  recklessly  carrying 
out  their  principles  to  the  extreme  of  licentiousness.  To  the  ex- 
treme left  belong  the  class  which  is  designated  the  "  Young  Ger- 
many," of  which  Heine  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  leaders.  This 
class  profess  themselves  the  true  disciples  of  the  extreme  right ; 
the  extreme  right  acknowledge  their  fellowship  with  the  centre 
left,  and  the  centre  left  with  the  extreme  left.  The  respectable 
portion  of  the  party  of  course  express  themselves  with  disappro- 
bation of  the  coarseness  of  some  of  their  associates,  but  they 
speak  of  them  only  as  the  unworthy  advocates  of  truth.  Thus  says 
Hengstenberg,  "  rrof.  Vischer,  one  of  the  most  gifted  of  the  party, 
expresses  himself  with  an  energy  against  the  '  young  Germans,' 
which  shows  that  his  better  feelings  are  not  obliterated,  and  yet 
acknowledges  their  principles  with  a  decision  and  plainness  which 
prove  how  deep  those  principles  enter  into  the  very  essence  of 
the  system,  so  that  the  better  portion  of  the  party  cannot,  with 
any  consistency,  reject  them.  In  the  Halle  Jahrbuch,  p.  1118, 
he  speaks  of  the  Rehabilitationistsf  as  the  '  unworthy  prophets  of 
what,  in  its  properly  understood  principle,  is  perfectly  true  and 
good.'  He  says,  '  It  is  well,  if  in  opposition  to  the  morality  of 
Kant  and  Schiller,  the  rights  of  our  sensual  nature  should,  from 
time  to  time,  be  boldly  asserted.'  He  complains,  p.  507,  of  the 
pedantry  of  his  country,  where  the  want  of  chastity  is  placed  on 
a  level  with  drunkenness,  gluttony  or  theft,  and  so  expresses  him- 
self that  every  one  sees  that  he  considers  incontinence  a  virtue 
under  certain  circumstances,  and  conjugal  fidelity  a  sin."J    Though 

*  Kirchen-Zeitung,  January,  1836,  p.  19. 

f  The  name  assumed  by  those  who  plead  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  flesh,  i.  e., 
for  the  restoration  of  the  sensual  part  of  our  nature  to  its  rights,  of  which  Chris- 
tianity has  so  long  deprived  it. 

X  Preface  to  Kirchen-Zeitung,  for  1839,  p.  30. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  675 

this  dominant  party,  therefore,  has  its  divisions,  its  outwardly  de- 
cent, and  its  openly  indecent  members,  it  is  one  school,  and  is  lia- 
ble to  the  general  charges  which  have  been  brought  against  it  as  a 
whole. 

It  may  well  be  supposed  that  a  system  so  repugnant  to  every 
principle  of  true  religion  and  sound  morals  could  not  be  openly 
advocated,  without  exciting  the  most  decided  opposition.  This 
opposition  has  come  from  various  quarters  ;  from  professed  philo- 
sophers and  theologians,  and  from  popular  writers,  who  have  at- 
tacked the  system  in  a  manner  adapted  to  the  common  mind.  Pro- 
fessor Leo,  of  Halle,  has  adopted  this  latter  method  of  assault. 
He  is  one  of  the  most  distinguished  historians  of  Germany  ;  and, 
until  within  a  few  years,  himself  belonged  to  the  general  class  of 
Rationalists.  His  history  of  the  Jews  was  written  in  accordance 
with  the  infidel  opinions  which  he  then  entertained.  Having,  how- 
ever, become  a  Christian,  he  has  publicly  expressed  his  sorrow  for 
having  given  to  the  history  just  mentioned  the  character  which  it 
now  bears,  and  has,  with  great  boldness  and  vigour,  attacked  the 
writings  of  the  leading  German  school  in  theology.  This  step  has 
excited  a  virulent  controversy,  and  produced  an  excitement,  par- 
ticularly at  Halle,  such  as  has  not  been  known  for  many  years. 
Hengstenberg  says,  that  Leo  has  not  been  sustained  in  this  con- 
flict by  the  friends  of  truth,  as  he  had  a  right  to  expect.  "  One 
principal  reason,"  he  adds,  "  of  this  reserve,  is  no  doubt,  in  many 
cases,  the  reckless  vulgarity  of  many  of  his  opponents.  When 
they  see  what  Leo  has  had  to  sustain,  they  tremble  and  exclaim, 
Vestigia  me  terrent !  A  decorous  controversy  with  opponents  who 
have  something  to  lose,  they  do  not  dread,  but  they  are  unwilling 
to  allow  themselves  to  be  covered  with  filth."*  Hengstenberg, 
however,  is  not  the  man  to  desert  the  truth  or  its  advocates,  let 
what  will  happen.  He  stands  like  a  rock,  despite  the  violent  as- 
sault of  open  enemies  and  the  coolness  of  timid  friends,  the  firmest 
and  the  most  efficient  defender  of  Christianity  in  Germany. 

Leo  entitled  his  book  against  the  latest  form  of  infidelity,  "  He- 
gelingen;"  that  is,  Hegelians  of  the  left,  in  allusion  to  the  division 
of  the  school  into  a  right  and  left  side.  It  is  presumed  he  gave  it 
this  title  because  it  was  intended  to  be  a  popular  work,  designed 
to  exhibit  the  principles  of  the  school  in  a  manner  suited  to  the 
apprehensions  of  the  ordinary  class  of  educated  people.  It  was, 
therefore,  directed,  not  against  that  division  of  the  school  which 
wrapped  up  its  doctrines  in  the  impenetrable  folds  of  philosophical 
language,  but  against  that  division  which  has  spoken  somewhat 
more  intelligibly. 

With  regard  to  the  charges  which  Leo  brings  against  this  school, 
Hengstenberg  says,  "  No  one  at  all  familiar  with  the  literature  of 
the  day,  needs  evidence  of  their  truth.  Instead  of  doubting,  he 
may  rather  wonder  that  an  abomination  advocated  for  years  past, 

*  Kirchen-Zeitung,  p.  21. 


676  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

should  now  first,  as  though  it  were  something  new,  be  thus  vehe- 
mently assaulted,  and  that  the  charges  should  be  directed  against 
comparatively  few  and  unimportant  writers."  This  latter  circum- 
stance, he  adds,  however,  is  accounted  for,  as  Leo  professed  to 
confine  himself  to  the  productions  of  the  year  preceding  the  pub- 
lication of  his  own  book. 

Leo's  first  charge  is  this  :  "  This  party  denies  the  existence  of  a 
personal  God.  They  understand  by  God,  an  unconscious  power 
which  pervades  all  persons,  and  which  arrives  at  self-consciousness 
only  in  the  personality  of  men.  That  is,  this  party  teaches  athe- 
ism without  reserve."  With  regard  to  this  charge,  Hengstenberg 
remarks,  "  Whoever  has  read  Strauss's  Life  of  Jesus,  and  Vatke's 
Biblical  Theology,  where  Pantheism,  which  every  Christian  must 
regard  as  only  one  form  of  Atheism,  is  clearly  avowed,  cannot 
ask  whether  the  party  in  general  holds  these  doctrines,  but  simply 
whether  the  particular  persons  mentioned  by  Leo  belong,  as  to  this 

?oint,  to  the  party.  About  this  who  can  doubt,  when  he  hears 
'rofessor  Michelet  say,  beside  many  other  things  of  like  import, 
I  God  is  the  eternal  movement  of  the  universal  principle,  con- 
stantly manifesting  itself  in  individual  existences,  and  which  has 
no  true  objective  existence  but  in  these  individuals,  which  pass 
away  again  into  the  infinite.'  [In  other  words,  God  is  but  the 
name  given  to  the  ceaseless  flow  of  being.]  When  he  hears  him 
denouncing  as  unworthy  of  the  name,  '  the  theistical  Hegelians, 
who  believe  in  a  personal  God  in  another  world  V  " — P.  22.  "  Pro- 
fessor Vischer ,"  adds  Hengstenberg,  "  is  so  far  from  being  ashamed 
of  Pantheism,  that  he  glories  in  his  shame,  and  represents  it  as 
the  greatest  honour  of  his  friend  Strauss,  that  he  has  '  logically 
carried  out  the  principle  of  the  immanence  of  God  in  the  world.' 
That  the  professors  Gans  and  Benary  agree  with  him  and  with 
Strauss,  not  only  in  general,  but  in  this  particular  point,  Michelet, 
I  certain  of  their  assent,'  has  openly  declared.  According  to  Dr. 
Kiihne,  Hegel's  God  '  is  not  Jehovah,'  he  is  '  the  ever-streaming 
immanence  of  spirit  in  matter.'  To  this  representation  Dr.  Meyen 
agrees,  and  says,  '  I  make  no  secret,  that  I  belong  to  the  extreme 
left  of  Hegel's  school.  I  agree  with  Strauss  perfectly,  and  con- 
sider him  (seine  Tendenz)  as  in  perfect  harmony  with  Hegel.' 
Another  writer,  the  anonymous  author  of  the  book  '  Leo  vor  Ge- 
richt,'  ridicules  the  charge  of  atheism  as  though  it  were  a  trifle. 
He  represents  the  public  as  saying  to  the  charge,  '  What  does  it 
mean  ?  Mr.  Professor  Leo  is  beyond  our  comprehension  ;  Wodan, 
heathenism,  Hegel's  God,  atheism  !  ha  !  ha  !  ha  !'  " 

That  Tholuck  looks  on  the  doctrine  of  Strauss,  with  whom  these 
other  writers  profess  agreement,  and  who  is  an  avowed  disciple  of 
Hegel,  in  the  same  light,  is  clear  from  his  language  in  his  Anzeiger, 
for  May,  1836;  "  Strauss,"  he  says,  "  is  a  man  who  knows  no  other 
God  than  him  who,  in  the  human  race,  is  constantly  becoming 
man.  He  knows  no  Christ  but  the  Jewish  Rabbi  who  made  his 
confession  of  sin  to    John  the   Baptist,  and  no  heaven  but  that 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  677 

which  speculative  philosophy  reveals  for  our  enjoyment  on  the 
little  planet  we  now  inhabit." 

Nothing,  however,  can  be  plainer  than  Strauss's  own  language. 
a  As  man,  considered  as  a  mere  finite  spirit,  and  restricted  to  him- 
self, has  no  reality ;  so  God,  considered  as  an  infinite  spirit,  restrict- 
ing himself  to  his  infinity,  has  no  reality.  The  infinite  spirit  has 
reality  only  so  far  as  he  unites  himself  to  finite  spirits  (or  manifests 
himself  in  them),  and  the  finite  spirit  has  reality  only  so  far  as  he 
sinks  himself  in  the  infinite."*  How  does  this  differ,  except  in  the 
jargon  of  terms,  from  le  peuple-dieu,  of  Anacharsis  Clootz,  the 
worthy  forerunner  of  these  modern  atheists  ?f 

"  If,"  says  another  writer  in  Hengstenberg's  Journal,  "  mankind 
is  the  incarnate  Godhead,  and  beside  this  incarnate  divine  spirit 
there  is  no  God,  then  we  have  a  most  perfect  atheism,  which  re- 
moves us  from  Christianity  far  beyond  the  limits  of  Mohammedan- 
ism, the  heathenism  of  the  Indians  and  Chinese,  or  of  our  pagan 
ancestors."  "  Hegel  and  his  school  maintain  that  God  is  not  an 
individual  person,  as  opposed  to  other  individuals,  since  individu- 
ality is  of  necessity  exclusive,  limited,  and  finite.  Since  God  is  a 
trinity,  wherein  the  outwardness  of  number  is  merged  in  substan- 
tial unity,  so  God  is  a  universal  person ;  because  the  comprehen- 
sion of  individuals  in  unity  is  universality.  This  is  what  is  meant 
by  the  expression,  '  God  is  personality  itself.'  The  simple  question, 
whether  they  believe  in  the  God  whom  Christians  are  bound  to 
honour  and  love,"  continues  this  writer,  "  is  here  complicated  with 
an  obscure  definition  of  the  trinity,  which  no  man  can  think  re- 
moves the  mystery  of  the  subject  by  saying,  Die  Ausserlichtkeit 
der  Zahl  zu  einer  substantiellen  Einheit  umgebogen  ist  (the  out- 
wardness of  number  is  merged  in  substantial  unity).  The  charge 
of  denying  the  true  God  remains  in  full  force,  this  justification  of 
themselves  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding."  And  on  the  follow- 
ing page,  he  adds,  "  that  this  school,  to  be  honest,  when  asked, 
*  Do  you  deny  God  and  Christianity  ?'  ought  to  answer,  '  Certainly, 
what  you  Christians  of  the  old  school  call  God  and  Christianity ; 
we  would  teach  you  a  better  doctrine.'  "J 

We  have  seen  how  that  portion  of  this  dominant  school,  who 
retain  some  respect  for  themselves  and  for  the  opinions  of  others, 
veil  their  God-denying  doctrines  in  philosophical  formulas  unintel- 
ligible to  the  common  people,  and  mysterious  and  mystical  to 
themselves.  Stripped  of  its  verbiage,  the  doctrine  is,  that  men  are 
God  ;  there  is  no  other  God  than  the  ever-flowing  race  of  man ;  or 
that  the  universal  principle  arrives  at  self-consciousness  only  in  the 
human  race,  and  therefore  the  highest  state  of  God  is  man.  The 
extreme  left  of  the  school  trouble  themselves  but  little  with  words 

*  Leben  Jesu,  p.  730. 

t  "  Je  prechai  hautement,"  said  Clootz,  in  the  French  Convention,  "  qu'il  n'y  a 
pas  d'autre  Dieu  que  la  nature,  d'autre  souverain  que  le  genre  humain,  le  peuple- 
dieu." — Thiers's  Histoire  de  la  Revolution  Fran.,  vol.  v.,  p.  197. 

X  Kirchen-Zeitung,  February,  1839. 


678  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

without  meaning.  They  speak  out  boldly,  so  that  all  the  world 
may  understand.  "  We  are  free,"  says  Heine,  "  and  need  no  thun- 
dering tyrant.  We  are  of  age,  and  need  no  fatherly  care.  We 
are  not  the  hand-work  of  any  great  mechanic.  Theism  is  a  reli- 
gion for  slaves,  for  children,  for  Genevese,  for  watch-makers." 

2.  "  Leo,"  says  Hengstenberg,  "  charges  this  party  with  deny- 
ing the  incarnation  of  God  in  Christ,  and  with  turning  the  Gospel 
into  a  mythology.  If  the  previous  charge  is  substantiated,  this 
requires  no  special  proof.  If  the  existence  of  God,  in  the  Chris- 
tian sense  of  the  terms,  be  denied,  we  must  cease  to  speak  of  an 
incarnation  in  the  Christian  sense  of  the  word.  The  doctrine  of 
the  immanence  of  God  in  the  world,  says  Professor  Vischer  (Halle 
Jahrbuch,  s.  1102),  forbids  us  to  honour  *  God  in  the  letter,  or  in 
single  events,  or  individuals,'  It  regards,  '  as  a  breach  in  the  con- 
catenation of  the  universe,  that  an  individual  should  be  the  Abso- 
lute.' According  to  this  view,  there  is  no  other  incarnation  than 
that  which  Professor  Michelet,  in  harmony  with  the  Chinese  phi- 
losophers, teaches,  that  *  God  must  constantly  appear  here  on 
earth  in  a  form  which  affects  our  senses  (als  sinnlicher),  though 
constantly  changing  that  form  (als  ein  sich  aufgehebender  und 
aufgehobener),  and  in  this  statement,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  whole 
school  will  recognise  the  eternal  incarnation  of  God.'  The  Ab- 
solute attains  consciousness  in  a  series  of  individuals,  no  one  of 
which  fully  represents  him,  but  each  has  significance  only  as  a 
member  of  the  whole.  This  incarnation  of  God  is  eternal,  but  all 
individuals  are  perishing  and  transitory  ;  the  Absolute  constantly 
fashions  for  itself  new  individuals,  and  rejects  the  former  as  soon 
as  they  have  answered  their  end.  These  form  the  ■  Golgotha  of 
the  Absolute  Spirit ;'  they  surround,  like  bloodless  ghosts,  the 
throne  of  the  monster  that  devours  his  own  children ;  that,  void  of 
love,  strides  through  ages,  trampling  and  destroying  all  that  lies  in 
his  way."  Such  is  the  awful  language  in  which  Hengstenberg 
describes  the  God  of  the  Hegelians. 

The  incarnation  of  God,  then,  according  to  this  school,  did  not 
occur  in  Christ,  but  is  constantly  occurring  in  the  endless  succes- 
sion of  the  human  race.  Mankind  is  the  Christ  of  the  new  sys- 
tem, and  all  the  Gospel  teaches  of  the  Son  of  God  is  true  only  as 
it  is  understood  of  mankind.  Strauss  teaches  this  doctrine  with  a 
clearness  very  unusual  in  a  philosopher.  "  The  key,"  says  he,  •  of 
the  whole  doctrine  of  Christ,  is  that  the  predicates  which  the 
church  has  affirmed  of  Christ,  as  an  individual,  belong  to  an  Idea, 
to  a  real,  not  to  a  Kantian  unreal  idea.  In  an  individual,  in  one 
God-man,  the  attributes  and  functions  which  the  church  attributes 
to  Christ,  are  incompatible  and  contradictory  ;  in  the  idea  of  the 
race  they  all  unite.  Mankind  is  the  union  of  the  two  natures,  the 
incarnate  God,  the  infinite  revealed  in  the  finite,  and  the  finite  con- 
scious of  its  infinity.  The  race  is  the  child  of  the  visible  mother 
and  of  the  invisible  Father,  of  the  Spirit  and  of  nature  ;  it  is  the 
true  worker  of  miracles,  in  so  far  as  in  course  of  its  history,  it 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  679 

constantly  attains  more  complete  mastery  over  nature,  which  sinks 
into  the  powerless  material  of  human  activity.  It  is  sinless,  so  far 
as  the  course  of  its  development  is  blameless  ;  impurity  cleaves 
only  to  the  individual,  but  in  the  race,  and  its  history,  it  is  removed. 
The  race  dies,  rises  again,  and  ascends  to  heaven,  in  so  far  as  by 
the  negation  of  its  natural  element  (Natiirlichkeit)  a  higher  spirit- 
ual life  is  produced,  and  as  by  the  negation  of  its  finitude  as  a  per- 
sonal, national,  worldly  spirit,  its  unity  with  the  infinite  spirit  of 
heaven  is  manifested.  By  faith  in  this  Christ  is  man  justified  be- 
fore God  ;  that  is,  by  the  awakening  the  idea  of  the  nature  of  man 
in  him,  especially  as  the  negation  of  the  natural  element,  which  is 
itself  a  negation  of  the  spirit,  and  thus  a  negation  of  a  negation  is 
the  only  way  to  true  spiritual  life  for  man,  the  individual  becomes 
a  partaker  of  the  theanthropical  life  of  the  race.  This  alone  is  the 
real  import  of  the  doctrine  of  Christ ;  that  it  appears  connected 
with  the  person  and  history  of  an  individual,  has  only  the  subject- 
ive ground,  that  his  personality  and  fate  were  the  occasion  of  awa- 
kening this  general  truth  in  the  consciousness  of  men,  and  that%t 
that  period  the  culture  of  the  world,  and  indeed  the  culture  of  the 
mass  at  all  periods,  allowed  of  their  contemplating  the  Idea  of  the 
race,  only  in  the  concrete  form  of  an  individual."* 

Tholuck,  whose  charity  for  philosophical  aberrations  is  very 
wide,  remarks  on  this  passage  :  "  As  the  incarnation  of  God  oc- 
curred not  in  an  individual,  but  comes  to  pass  only  in  the  constant 
progress  of  the  race,  so  the  individual,  as  a  mere  item  of  the  race, 
has  fulfilled  his  destiny  at  the  close  of  his  earthly  course,  and  the 
race  alone  is  immortal.  It  is  not  we  that  enter  a  future  world, 
the  future  world  goes  forward  in  this,  the  more  the  spirit  becomes 
aware  of  its  infinitude,  and  by  the  power  of  reason  gains  the  mas- 
tery over  nature.  This  ideal  perfection  is  to  be  attained,  not  in 
heaven,  but  in  the  perfection  of  our  political  and  social  relations. 
This  system,  therefore,  comes  to  the  same  result  with  the  materi- 
alism of  the  Encyclopedists,  who  mourned  over  mankind  for  hav- 
ing sacrificed  the  real  pleasures  of  time  for  the  visionary  pleasures 
of  eternity,  and  the  protracted  enjoyments  of  life,  for  the  momen- 
tary happiness  of  a  peaceful  death.  It  agrees,  moreover,  despite 
of  its  intellectual  pretensions,  with  the  wishes  of  the  materialistical 
spirit  of  the  age,  which  sets  as  the  highest  end  of  man,  not  the 
blessings  promised  by  the  church,  but  according  to  the  "  Young 
Germans,"  the  refined  pleasures  of  life,  and  according  to  politi- 
cians, the  perfection  of  the  state." 

It  is  strange  that  men  holding  such'views  should  trouble  them- 
selves at  all  with  the  Gospel.  As  this  system,  however,  has  arisen 
in  a  Christian  country,  there  was  but  one  of  two  things  to  do, 
either  to  say  that  real  Christianity  means  just  what  this  system 
teaches,  or  to  explode  the  whole  evangelical  history.     Some  have 

*  Strauss's  Leben  Jesn,  th  ii.,  s.  731,  quoted  by  Tholuck,  in  his  Glaubwiirdigkeit, 
&c.,  p.  19. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

taken  one  course,  and  some  the  other,  while  some  unite  both. 
That  is,  they  reject  the  Gospel  history  as  a  history  ;  they  represent 
it  as  a  mere  mythology ;  but  as  the  ancient  philosophers  made  the 
mythology  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  a  series  of  allegories,  con- 
taining important  truths,  so  do  these  modern  philosophers  repre- 
sent the  Gospels  as  a  mere  collection  of  fables,  destitute  in  almost 
every  case  of  any  foundation  in  fact,  but  still  expressive  of  the 
hidden  mysteries  of  their  system.  It  is  by  a  mytho-symbolical 
interpretation  of  this  history  that  the  truth  must  be  sought.  The 
life  of  Jesus  by  Strauss  is  a  laborious  compilation  of  all  the  critical 
objections  against  the  New  Testament  history,  which  he  first  thus 
endeavoured  to  overturn,  and  then  to  account  for  and  explain  as  a 
Christian  mythology.  "  Had  this  book,"  says  Hengstenberg, 
"  been  published  in  England,  it  would  have  been  forgotten  in  a 
couple  of  months."*  In  Germany  it  has  produced  a  sensation 
almost  without  a  parallel.  It  has  become  the  rallying  ground  of 
all  the  enemies  of  Christianity,  open  and  secret,  and  the  number 
of  its  advocates  and  secret  abettors  is,  therefore,  exceedingly  great. 
"  The  author,"  says  Tholuck,  "  has  uttered  the  sentence  which  so 
few  dared  to  utter  ;  *  The  evangelical  history  is  a  fable.'  He  has 
uttered  it  at  a  time  when  the  deniers  of  the  truth  were  filled  with 
spleen  at  the  prospect  of  a  constantly  increasing  faith  in  the  Gospel. 
With  what  joy  then  must  this  hypocritical  and  timid  generation 
hail  a  leader  who  gives  himself  to  the  sweat  and  dust  of  the  battle, 
while  they  hide  behind  the  bushes,  and  rub  their  hands,  and  smile 
in  each  other's  faces  !"f 

3.  Leo's  third  charge  against  this  party  is,  that  they  deny  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  "  This  point  also  needs  no  further  proof," 
says  Hengstenberg,  "  since  the  former  have  been  proved.  With 
the  personality  of  God  falls  of  course  that  of  man,  which  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  an  existence  hereafter.  To  a  pantheist, 
■  the  subject  which  would  assert  its  individual  personality,  is  evil 
itself  (Michelet).  It  is  regarded  as  godless  even  to  cherish  the 
desire  of  immortality.  According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  eternal 
incarnation  of  God,  it  must  appear  an  intolerable  assumption  for 
an  individual  to  lay  claim  to  that  which  belongs  only  to  the  race  ; 
he  must  freely  and  gladly  cast  himself  beneath  the  wheels  of  the 
idol  car  that  he  may  make  room  for  other  incarnations  of  the 
Spirit  better  adapted  to  the  advancing  age.  The  proofs,  however, 
of  this  particular  charge  are  peculiarly  abundant.  Hegel  himself, 
who  ought  not  to  be  represented  as  so  different  from  the  Hegelin- 
gen,  since  the  difference  between  them  is  merely  formal  and  not 
essential,  involved  himself  in  the  logical  denial  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul.  This  has  been  fully  proved  with  regard  to  him  and 
Dr.  Marheineke,  in  a  previous  article  in  this  journal  (that  is,  the 
Kirchen-Zeitung).     It  has  also  been  demonstrated  by  Weise  in 

*  Kirchen-Zeitung,  Jan.  1,  1836,  p.  35.  f  Glaubwiirdigkeit,  p.  34. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  681 

the  work,  "  Die  philosophische  Geheimlehre  von  der  Unsterblich- 
keit,"  as  far  as  Hegel  is  concerned ;  and  with  Weise,  Becker  has 
more  recently  signified  his  agreement.  If  this  happens  in  the  green 
tree,  what  will  become  of  the  dry  ? 

"  Richter  came  out  with  such  a  violent  polemic  against  the  doc- 
trine of  immortality,  that  the  party  had  to  disavow  him,  for  fear 
of  the  public  indignation.  When,  however,  they  thought  it  could 
be  done  unnoticed  or  without  danger,  they  acknowledged  the  same 
doctrine.  Michelet  endeavours  most  earnestly  to  free  Hegel's 
system  from  the  charge  of  countenancing  the  doctrine  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  as  from  a  reproach.  He  speaks  out  clear  and 
plain  his  own  views  in  words  which,  according  to  him,  Hegel  him- 
self had  spoken, '  Thought  alone  is  eternal,  and  not  the  body  and 
what  is  connected  with  its  individuality,'  that  is,  the  whole  person- 
ality which,  according  to  this  system,  depends  entirely  on  the  body 

(Leiblichkeit) Ruge  (Hall.  Jahrb.,  s.  1011)  ridicules  the 

scruples  of  theologians  as  to  whether  '  Philosophy  can  make  out 
the  immortality  of  the  human  soul ;  whether  it  can  justify  the 
gross  doctrines  of  hell,  of  wailing  and  gnashing  the  teeth,'  &c. 
1  Such  vulgar  craving,'  he  says,  '  is  beginning  to  mix  itself  with 
purely  philosophical  and  spiritual  concerns,  and  threatens  to  merge 
philosophy  in  its  troubled  element.  The  more  this  dogmatical 
confusion  arrogates  to  itself;  the  more  this  senseless  justification 
of  the  wretched  errors  of  orthodoxy  dishonours  the  free  science  of 
philosophy,  the  more  necessary  will  it  be  to  cast  out  this  dung-heap 
of  nonsense  to  the  common  mind  (in  das  gemeine  Bewusstseyn). 
Meyen  at  first  puts  on  the  air  of  one  who  would  acknowledge 
the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  *  The  Hegelians,'  he 
says, '  do  indeed  reject  the  sensual  conceptions  of  immortality,  but 
they  admit  the  doctrine  as  presented  by  Marheineke  in  his  Theolo- 
gy.' The  dishonest  ambiguity  of  this  sentence  will  not  escape 
notice.  Dr.  Marheineke  denies  the  continued  personal  existence 
of  the  soul  after  death,  and  attributes  the  belief  of  such  a  doctrine  to 
selfishness.  'Whoever,'  continues  Meyen,  'is  so  conversant  as 
Hegel  with  what  is  eternal  in  connexion  with  spirit,  must  admit 
the  eternity  of  the  spirit.'  Here  again  is  intentional  ambiguity. 
The  question  concerning  the  continued  personal  existence  of  the 
soul  is  silently  changed  for  the  question  about  the  eternity  of 
spirit.  A  veil  is  thrown  over  the  fact  that  Hegel,  while  he  ad- 
mitted the  latter,  denied  the  former,  as  Michelet  and  others  have  suf- 
ficiently shown.  These  preliminary  remarks,  transparent  as  they 
are,  were  only  intended  to  prevent  his  being  quoted  in  proof  of  the 
disbelief  of  immortality  in  the  school  to  which  he  belongs.  He 
immediately  comes  out  plainly  with  his  own  views  and  those  of 
his  party,  yet  so  as  still  to  leave  a  door  open  behind  him.  '  What 
though  a  Hegelian,'  says  he,  '  did  not  believe  in  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  in  a  Christian  sense — let  it  be  noticed  that  the  words  are 
here  so  placed,  that  the  uninformed  should  infer  that  the  school,  as 
a  whole,  and  its  above  mentioned  leaders,  do  believe  in  immor- 


682  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

tality  in  a  Christian  sense — what  then  ?  If  I  resign  myself  to  this, 
am  I  thereby  a  different  person,  or  is  the  world  for  me  different  ? 
I  would  seek  to  acknowledge  God  in  his  works  before,  and  I 
would  live  as  morally  as  ever.'  At  last,  however,  it  becomes  too 
hot  for  him,  even  in  these  thin  clothes,  and  he  casts  them  off, 
having  assumed  them  only  for  the  sake  of  his  brothers  in  Hegel, 
who  happen  to  be  in  office.  i  Grass,'  says  he,  '  is  already  growing 
on  the  grave  of  Daub,  is  he,  therefore,  dead  for  his  friends  and  for 
the  world  ?  his  works,  and  hence  also  his  spirit,  live.  Many  winter 
storms  have  already  swept  over  the  graves  of  Hegel  and  of  Goethe, 
but  does  not  their  spirit  still  live  among  us  ?  It  is,  as  Christ  said, 
where  two  of  you  are  met  together,  there  am  I  in  the  midst  of 
you.*  Thus  each  continues  to  live  according  to  his  works.  The 
citizen  in  the  remembrance  of  his  family  ;  he  who  has  distinguished 
himself  in  the  kingdom  of  the  spirit,  still  lives  in  that  kingdom,  and 
hence,  he  who  has  worked  for  eternity  is  immortal.' " 

4.  "  Leo  finally,"  says  Hengstenberg,  "  accuses  this  school  of 
wishing  to  pass  themselves  for  Christians,  by  means  of  disguising 
their  ungodly  and  abominable  doctrines  under  a  repulsive  and  un- 
intelligible phraseology.  This  is  a  heavy  charge.  Honesty  and 
candour  have  ever  been  the  ornament  of  our  national  character. 
They  have  ever  been  regarded  as  the  innate  virtues  of  a  German. 
Whoever  undermines  them  is  a  disgrace  to  his  country.  Yet  who 
can  say  the  charge  is  not  well  founded  ?  Several  proofs  of  its 
truth  have  been  given  in  what  has  already  been  said.  A  state- 
ment, however,  by  Professor  Vischer,  in  his  character  of  Dr. 
Strauss  (Hall.  Jahrb.,  s.  Ill),  is  worthy  of  special  attention. 
'  How  firm  his  (Strauss's)  conviction  as  to  the  main  point  even 

*  To  this  passage  Hengstenberg  has  the  following  note  :  "  We  frequently  meet,  in 
the  writings  of  this  school,  with  similar  shameful  profanations  of  the  scriptures, 
which  are  seldom  quoted  without  some  mutilation,  which  is  characteristic  of  the 
relation  of  the  party  to  the  word  of  God.  These  writers  delight  to  transfer  to  Hegel 
what  the  scriptures  say  of  Christ.  According  to  BayrhofFer  (Halle  Jahrb.,  s.  343), 
Hegel  '  is  the  absolute  centre  arouad  which  the  present  revolves.'  His  first  disci- 
ples are  compared  with  the  apostles.  '  Hinrich  is  the  rock  of  terminology,  the 
strength  and  the  support  of  the  school'  (Jahrb.,  s.  672).  Leo,  who  has  left  the 
party,  is  compared  with  Judas,  and  even  designated  as  •  the  fallen  angel  of  specula- 
tion' (Hegel's  doctrine  concerning  the  State).  The  school,  as  a  whole,  is  a  copy  of 
the  church  of  Christ.  According  to  BayrhofFer  (Hegelings,  s.  29),  it  should  no  longer 
be  called  a  school,  but '  the  congregation  of  the  idea,'  or  '  the  spiritual  kingdom  of 
the  idea.'  Ruge  applies  the  passage,  •  The  kingdom  of  heaven  suffered  violence, 
and  the  violent  take  it  by  force,'  to  the  popular  exhibition  of  Hegel's  philosophy  by 
Erdmann.  The  most  shameful  of  these  perversions,  however,  relate  to  the  passages 
concerning  the  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost.  Whoever  comes  out  boldly  against  the 
spirit  of  Hegel,  or  of  his  disciples,  or  of  the  time,  or  of  hell,  is  declared  guilty  of  the 
sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit,  or  rather  the  Spirit  (for  the  word  holy  they  commonly 
leave  out,  it  savours  too  much  of  morality  ;  when  it  is  inserted,  it  is  only  for  the  sake 
of  the  allusion).  '  The  writings,'  says  Meyen,  '  in  which  Leo  has  presented  his  new 
opinions,  blaspheme  the  Spirit — and  hence  God  himself  To  which  we  answer: 
Yes,  your  spirit  and  your  God  we  wish  to  blaspheme,  for  blasphemy  of  him  is  the 

praise  of  the  God  of  heaven  and  of  his  Spirit "     We  can  hardly  express  the 

admiration  which  we  feel  for  Hengstenberg.  No  one  who  does  not  know  how  much 
alone  and  aloft  he  stands,  and  how  much  he  has  had  to  endure  for  his  uncompro- 
mising opposition  to  the  enemies  of  God  and  religion,  can  appreciate  the  noble  firm- 
ness and  vigour  of  his  character." 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  683 

then  was,  is  shown  in  a  highly  interesting  correspondence  between 
him  and  one  of  his  friends,  communicated  to  me  through  the  kind- 
ness of  the  latter,  and  which  now  lies  before  me.  It  is  touching 
to  observe  with  what  cheerful  confidence  in  the  saving  power  of 
the  truth  he  endeavours  to  remove  the  anxiety  and  scruples  of  his 
friend,  who  felt  pained  by  the  chasm  which  his  scientific  convic- 
tions had  made  between  him  and  his  congregation  ;  how  clearly 
he  shows  that  it  is  no  dishonesty  to  speak  the  language  of  the  ima- 
gination (der  Vorstellung),  to  introduce  unobserved  into  the  figures 
which  alone  float  before  the  believer,  the  thoughts  of  the  knower 
(des  Wissenden)/  Here  the  zeal  and  skill  with  which  Dr.  Strauss 
teaches  his  friend  how  to  lie,  and  instructs  him  how  to  steal  from 
the  congregation  what  they  regard  as  the  most  precious  treasure 
(and  what,  for  that  very  reason,  it'will  be  found  impossible  to  rob 
them  of),  are  represented  as  a  great  merit,  and  the  reader  is  ex- 
horted to  allow  himself  to  be  affected  by  this  proof  of  his  amiable- 
ness,  and  in  the  warmth  of  his  sympathy  to  press  his  hand,  and 
exclaim,  O  how  good  you  are  !  We,  however,  cannot  regard  such 
conduct  without  the  deepest  moral  abhorrence.  The  school  en- 
deavour to  justify  this  course,  from  the  relation  which  Hegel  has 
established  between  conception  and  thought  (Vorstellung*  und 
Begriff).  But  this  justification  is  completely  worthless.  It  is  not 
one  whit  better  than  the  theories  by  which  the  robbers  in  Spain 
justify  their  vocation.  Evil  is  no  better,  but  on  the  contrary 
worse,  and  the  more  to  be  condemned  when  it  is  brought  infor- 
mant artis.  The  relation  assumed  by  Hegel,  between  conception 
and  thought,  would  allow  at  most  of  a  formal  accommodation. 

That  yours  is  of  that  nature,  you  cannot  assert 

If  the  difference  between  your  thought  (Begriff)  and  our  concep- 
tion (Vorstellung)  is  merely  formal,  why  do  you  rave  with  such 
hatred  against  us  ?  Why  do  you  say  that  '  Pietism  is  a  disease 
which  corrupts  the  very  life  of  the  spirit  V  (Vischer,  p.  526.) 
How  can  the  question  be  about  a  mere  formal  difference  ?  Our 
Conception  and  your  Thought  are  just  as  far  apart  as  heaven  and 
hell.  We  confess  God  the  Father  the  maker  of  heaven  and  earth, 
and  Jesus  Christ  his  only  begotten  Son  ;  you  deny  both  the  Father 
and  the  Son,  and  confess  Antichrist,  yea,  would  yourselves  be  his 

members " 

Hengstenberg  afterwards  remarks,  that  it  is  almost  incredible  to 
what  an  extent  this  deception  and  hypocrisy  is  carried.     This 

*  This  translation  of  the  words  Vorstellung  and  Begriff  is  no  doubt  inadequate 
The  technical  terms  of  a  system  do  not  admit  of  adequate  translation,  because  the 
sense  assigned  to  them  in  the  system  is  arbitrary.  The  only  method  that  can  be 
pursued  in  such  cases,  is  to  give  their  nearest  corresponding  words  the  same  arbi- 
trary signification.  Hegel  calls  that  form  of  truth  which  is  the  object  of  absolute 
knowledge,  a  pure  thought,  Begriff;  and  that  form  in  which  it  is  the  object  of  faith 
or  feeling,  Vorstellung.  Or,  the  exercises  of  feeling,  desire,  will,  &c.,  considered  as 
objects  of  attention,  are  Vorstellungen ;  these  it  is  the  office  of  philosophy,  by  the 

f process  of  thinking,  to  turn  into  thoughts,  Begriffe.     And  hence,  he  says,  Vorstel- 
ungen  can  be  regarded  as  the  metaphors  of  Begriffe.     See  his  Encyklopadie,  p.  5. 


684  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

course  of  conduct,  however,  though  very  characteristic  of  this 
modern  school,  is  an  old  device.  The  Rationalists,  to  go  no  further 
back,  were  accustomed  to  speak  of  the  Lamb  of  God.  of  the  blood  of 
Christ,  &c,  with  the  avowed  purpose  that  the  people  should  attach 
to  these  expressions  their  scriptural  sense,  while  they  employed 
them  in  a  very  different  one.  How  strange,  too,  it  sounds  to  hear 
this  Alumnus  of  Cambridge  speaking  of  "  the  divine  character  of 
Christ,"  of  "  the  cross  of  Christ  as  the  hope  of  the  world,"  and  "  of 
the  anointing  of  the  Holy  Ghost !"  This  community,  we  trust,  is 
not  prepared  to  have  such  solemn  words  made  playthings  of.  Let 
philosophers  and  errorists,  who  deny  the  truths  of  the  Bible,  find 
words  for  themselves,  and  not  profane  the  words  of  God  by  making 
them  a  vehicle  for  the  denial  of  his  truth.  One  of  the  most  mon- 
strous examples  of  this  perversion  of  scriptural  language  occurs  in 
a  passage  quoted  above  from  Strauss.  He,  too,  will  have  it  that 
man  is  justified  by  faith  in  Christ,  because  as  God  is  incarnate  in 
the  race,  the  race  is  Christ,  and  by  faith  in  the  race,  or  by  coming 
to  a  proper  apprehension  of  his  own  nature,  man  reaches  his  high- 
est state  of  perfection.  Mr.  Bancroft,  in  his  history,  talks  of  men 
being  justified  by  faith,  meaning  thereby  that  they  are  justified  by 
their  principles.  And  the  Oxford  divines  teach  that  we  are  justi- 
fied by  faith,  since  the  Thirty-nine  Articles  say  so,  but  then  it  is  by 
the  faith  of  the  church.* 

"  With  this  last  charge,  Leo,"  says  Hengstenberg,  "  entered 
upon  the  department  of  morals ;  and  we  could  wish  that  he  had 
dwelt  longer  on  this  part  of  the  subject.  It  would  then  have  been 
shown,  how  this  party  are  labouring  to  destroy  all  that  Rational- 
ism has  left  of  religion  and  morality.  What  their  ethics  are,  may 
be  readily  inferred  from  their  religion.  Where  there  is  no  personal 
God,  there  is  no  law  which  men  need  fear  to  violate,  as  the  ex- 
pression of  his  will.  If  the  distinction  between  God  and  man  is 
removed,  if  man  is  set  in  the  place  of  God,  then  nothing  is  more 
natural  than  that  men  should,  without  reserve,  and  upon  principle, 
give  themselves  up  to  all  their  inclinations  and  lusts.  To  suppress 
these  desires,  is  to  hinder  the  development  of  God  ;  if  they  do  not 
become  God  as  developed,  they  do  become  the  nascent  God  ;  if 
not  good  in  themselves,  they  are  relatively  good  as  transition-points 

*  It  should  be  here  stated  that  Dr.  Strauss,  at  the  close  of  his  "  Life  of  Jesus,"  as 
first  printed,  had  freely  admitted  the  incompatibility  of  his  views  with  the  exercise 
of  the  ministry  in  the  Christian  church.  This  admission,  in  the  last  edition,  he  has 
suppressed ;  and  in  his  letter  to  the  authorities  of  Zurich,  when  appointed  a  profes- 
sor of  theology  in  the  university  of  that  city,  he  says,  he  should  not  consider  it  a 
difficult  matter  to  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  those  who  feared  that  he  would  labour 
to  overthrow  the  Christian  religion,  that  he  would  endeavour  to  sustain  "  the  funda- 
mental truths  of  Christianity,"  and  only  try  to  free  it  "  from  human  additions." 
When  it  is  considered  that  he  regards  as  human  additions  almost  everything  that 
the  people  of  Zurich  hold  to  be  fundamental  truths,  there  can  be  but  one  opinion  of 
the  dishonesty  of  this  statement.  The  reputation  for  candour,  which  he  had  gained 
by  his  first  admission,  has  been  lost  entirely  by  these  subsequent  proceedings.  Our 
readers  are  aware  that  the  attempt  to  force  Strauss  on  the  people  as  a  professor,  led 
to  one  of  the  most  remarkable  revolutions  of  our  times.  The  people  rose  en  masse 
and  overthrew  the  government. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  685 

in  the  progress  of  development.  It  is  not  sin  that  is  sinful,  but 
only  impenitence,  that  is,  cleaving  to  the  relative  good,  which  is 
vulgarly  called  evil,  as  though  it  were  the  absolute  good.  These 
painful  results  of  the  doctrine  of  this  school  are  everywhere,  with 
the  most  logical  consrquence,  avowed  and  brought  to  light.  Ruge, 
in  a  passage  already  quoted,  attributes  the  question,  whether  phi- 
losophy has  any  ethics,  to  *  vulgar  craving '  (gemeinen  Bedurltig- 
keit),  as  much  as  the  question,  whether  it  can  vindicate  the  gross 
doctrine  of  hell,  &c.  ;  and  insists  that  this  whole  ■  dung-heap 
should  be  cast  out  into  the  mire  of  the  common  mind.'  In  connec- 
tion with  Leo,  and  the  editor  (Hengstenberg  himself),  Menzel  is 
designated  as  '  the  incarnation  of  Protestant  Jesuitism'  (Meyen,  p. 
5),  because  he  has  appeared  in  defence  of  morality,  now  com- 
pletely antiquated,  against  the  Young  Germany.  On  every  side, 
efforts  are  made  to  represent  him,  before  the  whole  nation,  as  a 
marked  man,  on  account  of  his  conflict  with  that  which  the  spirit 
of  the  pit  in  our  day  says  to  the  common  man.  '  Upon  Wolfgang 
Menzel,'  says  Meyen,  '  judgment  is  already  executed  ;  he  lies  like 
a  scurvy  old  dog  on  the  foul  straw  which  Herr  von  Cotta  has  in 
compassion  left  him,  and  can  seldom  muster  courage  to  yelp,  that 
all  is  over  with  his  pitiful  morality,  which  has  gone  to  its  rest.'* 
The  principles  of  the  *  Young  Germany '  have  been  advanced  in 
the  Literary  Magazine  of  Berlin  with  shameless  effrontery,  and 
the  infamous  advocates  of  those  principles  defended,  and  the 
sottish  prudery  of '  the  grey  heads  of  the  age,'  who  were  disgusted 
at  their  song :  '  We  lead  a  merry  life,'  has  been  turned  into  ridi- 
cule." Hengstenberg  then  introduces  the  passage  from  Professor 
Vischer,  quoted  on  a  previous  page,  in  which,  while  he  condemns 
these  young  Germans  as  unworthy  prophets,  he  defends  their 
principles.' 

This  Pantheistic  school,  therefore,  is  as  subversive  of  all  morality 
as  it  is  of  all  religion.  It  does  not  admit  the  idea  of  sin.  As  there 
is  no  God  there  is  no  law,  and  no  transgression.  Everything 
actual  is  necessary.  The  progress  of  the  race,  the  ever  nascent 
God,  goes  on  by  eternal  undeviating  laws,  and  all  that  occurs,  in 
fact,  is  the  action  of  the  only  God  of  which  this  system  knows.f 
We  do  not  think  it  right  to  stain  our  pages  with  the  indecent  rav- 
ings of  those  writers  who,  availing  themselves  of  the  principles  of 
the  decent  portion  of  the  school,  have  applied  them  to  the  service 
of  sin.  It  is  enough  to  show  the  nature  of  the  system,  that  the 
Pantheist  "  does  not  believe  in  the  continued  existence  of  the  indi- 
vidual, in  the  reality  of  his  freedom,  in  the  deadly  nature  of  sin, 
and  its  opposition  to  God.     Individuals  are  to  him  but  the  phantas- 

*  Wolfgang  Menzel  was  the  editor  of  a  periodical,  called  the  Morgen-Blatt,  belong- 
ing to  von  Cotta,  one  of  the  principal  booksellers  of  Germany.  In  that  Journal, 
Menzel  attacked,  with  great  manliness  and  effect,  the  libertine  principles  of  Heine, 
Gutzkow,  and  other  writers  of  the  extreme  left  of  the  Pantheistic  school. 

t  Die  Geschichte  is  der  werdende  Gott,  und  dies  Werden  Gottes  geschicht  nach 
ewigen  Gesetzen  ;  nirgends  ein  Sprung,  liberal  nur  Entwickelung.  Hengstenberg,  in 
Kirchen-Zeitung,  January,  1836. 


686  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

\ 

magoria  of  the  spirit.  Liberty  is  but  the  subtle  moment  of  deter- 
mination. Sin  is  what  a  man,  with  his  measure  of  knowledge  and 
power,  cannot  avoid  :  remorse  is,  therefore,  a  forbidden  emotion 
in  his  system."* 

The  most  offensive  aspect  of  this  whole  system  is,  that  in  deify- 
ing men,  it  deifies  the  worst  passions  of  our  nature.  "  This,"  says 
a  writer  in  Hengstenberg's  Journal,  "  is  the  true,  positive  blas- 
phemy of  God, — this  veiled  blasphemy — this  diabolism  of  the  de- 
ceitful angel  of  light — this  speaking  of  reckless  words,  with  which 
the  man  of  sin  sets  himself  in  the  temple  of  God,  showing  himself 
that  he  is  God.  The  Atheist  cannot  blaspheme  with  such  power 
as  this ;  his  blasphemy  is  negative  ;  he  simply  says  there  is  no 
God.  It  is  only  out  of  pantheism  that  a  blasphemy  can  proceed, 
so  wild,  of  such  inspired  mockery,  so  devoutly  godless,  so  despe- 
rate in  its  love  of  the  world ;  a  blasphemy  at  once  so  seductive, 
and  so  offensive,  that  it  may  well  call  for  the  destruction  of  the 
world."f 

As  an  illustration,  at  once,  of  the  confidence  and  character  of 
these  modern  pantheists,  we  shall  give  one  more  passage  from 
Strauss,  the  most  prominent,  and,  perhaps,  most  respected  writer 
of  the  school :  "  This  disposition  is  not  a  secret  of  the  philosophers 
only  •,  as  an  obscure  instinct,  it  has  become  the  universal  spirit  of 
the  age.  It  is  acknowledged,  that  we  no  longer  know  how  to 
build  churches.  But  on  the  other  hand,  from  an  impulse,  which, 
as  a  miasma,  has  spread,  especially  over  all  Germany,  monuments 
to  great  men  and  lofty  spirits  arise  on  every  side.  There  is  much 
that  is  ridiculous  mixed  with  this  feeling  ;  but  it  has  its  serious  as- 
pect, and  is  assuredly  a  sign  of  the  times.  The  Evangelical 
Church  Journal  (Hengstenberg's)  has  taken  the  right  view  of  the 
matter,  when  it  pronounces  accursed,  as  a  new  idolatry,  the  honour 
paid  to  the  man  on  the  pillar  in  the  Place  Vendome,  and  to  him  of 
the  Weimar  Olympus.  In  fact,  they  are  Gods,  before  whom  the 
God  of  the  Church  Journal  may  well  tremble  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
a  heathenism  which  endangers  its  Christianity.  If  Heine  has 
compared  the  accounts  of  O'Meara,  Antommarchi,  and  Las  Cases, 
with  Matthew,  Mark,  and  Luke,  will  not  some  one  soon  discover 
in  Bettina's  Letters,J  a  new  Gospel  of  John  ?  A  new  Paganism, 
or  it  may  be,  a  new  Catholicism,  has  come  over  Protestant  Ger- 
many. Men  are  no  longer  satisfied  with  one  incarnation  of  God : 
they  desire,  after  the  manner  of  the  Indians,  a  series  of  repeated 
avatars.  They  wish  to  surround  the  solitary  Jesus  with  a  new 
circle  of  saints,  only  these  must  not  be  taken  from  the  church 
alone ;  but,  as  in  the  private  chapel  of  the  Emperor  Alexander 
Severus,  the  statue  of  Orpheus  stood  beside  those  of  Christ  and 
of  Abraham,  so  the  tendency  of  the  age  is  to  honour  the  revela- 
tion of  God  in  all  the  spirits  which  have  wrought,  with  life  and 

*  Kirchen-Zeitung,  1836,  p.  571.  t  Ibid. 

X  An  enthusiastic  girl,  who  wrote  a  series  of  Letters  to  Goethe,  filled  with  a  sort 
of  raving  Platonic  love. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  687 

creative  power,  on  mankind.  The  only  worship— we  may  de- 
plore it,  or  we  may  praise  it,  deny  it  we  cannot — the  only  worship 
which  remains  for  the  cultivated  classes  of  this  age,  from  the  re- 
ligious declension  of  the  last,  is  the  worship  of  genius."* 

Such,  then,  is  the  latest  form  of  infidelity.  It  knows  no  intelli- 
gent or  conscious  God  but  man  ;  it  admits  no  incarnation,  but  the 
eternal  incarnation  of  the  universal  spirit  in  the  human  race  ;  the 
personality  of  men  ceases  with  their  present  existence,  they  are 
but  momentary  manifestations  of  the  infinite  and  unending,  there 
is  neither  sin  nor  holiness ;  neither  heaven  nor  hell.  Such  are  the 
results  to  which  the  proud  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury has  brought  its  followers.  We  nave  not  drawn  this  picture. 
We  have  purposely  presented  it  as  drawn  by  men,  with  regard  to 
whose  opportunities  and  competency  there  can  be  no  room  for  cavil. 
It  might  be  supposed,  that  a  system  so  shocking  as  this,  which  destroys 
all  religion  and  all  morality,  could  be  adopted  by  none  but  the  in- 
sane or  the  abandoned ;  that  it  might  be  left  as  St.  Simonianism, 
Owenism,  or  Mormonism,  to  die  of  its  own  viciousness.  This 
supposition,  however,  overlooks  the  real  nature  of  the  system. 
We  have  presented  it  in  its  offensive  nakedness.  It  is  not  thus  that 
it  addresses  itself  to  the  uninitiated  or  timid.  What  is  more  offen- 
sive than  Romanism,  when  stripped  of  its  disguises,  yet  what  more 
seductive  in  its  bearing,  for  the  vast  majority  of  men  ?  There  is 
everything  to  facilitate  the  progress  of  this  new  philosophy.  It 
has  a  side  for  all  classes  of  men.  For  the  contemplative  and  the 
sentimentally  devout,  it  has  its  mysticism,  its  vagueness,  its  vast- 
ness.  It  allows  them  to  call  wonder,  a  sense  of  the  sublime  or  of 
the  beautiful,  religion.  For  the  poet,  too,  it  has  its  enchantments, 
as  it  gives  consciousness  and  life  to  everything,  and  makes  all 
things  expressive  of  one  infinite,  endless  mind.  For  the  proud,  no 
Circe  ever  mingled  half  so  intoxicating  a  cup.  Ye  shall  be  as 
God,  said  the  archtempter  of  our  race :  ye  are  God,  is  what  he 
now  whispers  into  willing  ears.  For  the  vain  and  frivolous,  it  has 
charms  scarcely  to  be  resisted.  It  gives  them  easy  greatness. 
They  have  only  to  talk  of  the  I,  and  the  not  I  (or,  as  they  prefer 
to  have  it,  the  me  and  the  not  me),  and  they  are  beyond  the  depth 
of  all  ordinary  men.  And  even  then,  they  are,  according  to  the 
system,  far  greater  than  they  can  possibly  think  themselves  to  be. 
For  the  sensual,  it  is  a  perfect  heaven.  It  legitimates  and  digni- 
fies all  enjoyments.  It  makes  self-indulgence  religion.  It  forbids 
all  remorse  and  all  fear.     That  a  system  so  manifold  as  this,  which 

*  Vergangliches  und  Bleibendes  in  Christenthum.  Selbst-gesprache  Von  Dr. 
Strauss.  In  der  Zeitschrift  :  Der  Freihafen,  Gallerie  von  Unternaltungsbildern  aus 
den  Kreisen  der  Literatur,  Gesellschaft  und  Wissenschaft.  Mit  Beitragen  von  Carus, 
Gans,  Kbnig,  Mises,  Barnhagen  von  Ense,  dem  Fiirsten  von  Puckler,  Rosenkranz, 
Strauss,  Theodor  Mundt,  Kuhne,  u.  A.  Drittes  Heft.  The  names  of  the  contributors 
to  this  Journal,  may  give  some  idea  of  its  character.  Here  we  have  Gans,  Rosen- 
kranz, Strauss,  prominent  Hegelian  philosophers  or  theologians,  and  the  libertine 
prince  of  Puckler. 


688  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

has  a  chamber  of  imagery  for  every  imagination,  should  find  ad- 
vocates and  friends  on  every  hand,  is  not  a  matter  of  surprise. 
There  is  still  another  circumstance  which  must  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration in  accounting  for  the  rapid  progress  of  this  new  philoso- 
phy, and  in  speculating  on  its  prospects.  It  has,  in  some  of  its 
principles,  a  certain  resemblance  to  the  truth.  The  God  of  the 
Bible  is  not  the  God  of  the  Deist,  of  the  rationalist,  or  of  the 
worldling,  a  God  afar  off,  who  has  no  oversight  or  direction  of  his 
creatures.  The  world  is  not  a  machine  wound  up  and  left  to  itself. 
The  wonders  of  vegetable  and  animal  life  are  not  the  result  of  the  pro- 
perties of  matter  acting  blindly  and  without  guidance.  The  God  of 
the  Bible  is  an  everywhere  present,  and  ever  active  God,  in  whom 
we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  ;  it  is  his  Spirit  that  causes  the 
grass  to  grow ;  it  is  he  that  fashions  the  curious  mechanism  of  our 
bodies,  who  numbers  the  hairs  of  our  heads,  and  directs  all  our 
goings.  All  the  changes  in  nature  are  produced  by  his  power,  so 
that  everything  we  see  is  in  truth  a  manifestation  of  God.  But 
then  the  Bible  does  not  merge  God  in  the  world,  or  the  world  in 
God.  Though  everywhere  present  in  the  world,  God  is  not  the 
world  ;  but  a  Being  of  infinite  intelligence,  power,  excellence  and 
blessedness,  guiding  and  controlling  his  creatures,  whose  acts  and 
consciousness  are  their  own  and  not  his.  The  chasm  which  di- 
vides the  pantheistic  from  the  scriptural  view  of  God  is  bottom- 
less, and  the  difference  in  the  effects  of  the  two  views  is  infinite  ; 
it  is  all  the  difference  between  infinite  good  and  infinite  evil.  If 
there  is  anything  impressed  clearly  on  the  Bible,  it  is  the  person- 
ality of  God ;  it  is  the  ease  and  confidence  with  which  his  people 
can  say  Thou,  in  calling  on  his  name  ;  it  is  that  he  ever  says  I  of 
himself,  and  you,  when  addressing  his  creatures. 

It  is  doubtless  in  a  good  degree  owing  to  the  deceptive  show  of 
truth  in  this  new  system — to  its  pretending  to  bring  back,  if  we 
may  reverently  so  speak,  God  to  the  world  from  which  Deists  and 
Rationalists  had  so  long  banished  him,  that  we  are  to  attribute  the 
hold  which  it  has  taken  of  many  of  the  better  sort  of  minds ;  and 
it  is  to  this  that  it  owes  its  most  alarming  aspect ;  since  those  er- 
rors are  always  the  most  dangerous  which  can  put  on  the  nearest 
resemblance  to  truth.  A  conflict,  therefore,  is  anticipated  by  the 
Christians  of  Germany  with  this  new  form  of  infidelity,  far  more 
lasting  and  deadly  than  any  that  has  yet  afflicted  the  church  in  that 
country.  If  rationalism,  so  unattractive,  so  lifeless,  made  such  in- 
roads upon  the  church,  "  What,"  say  they,  "  may  be  expected  from 
Pantheism,  a  system  so  full  of  life,  of  feeling,  of  mysticism,  of 
poetry,  whose  disciples  can,  with  a  deceptive  show,  boast  that  they 
are  religious,  that  they  are  introducing  a  new,  beautiful  and 
universal  religion,  and  give  themselves  out  as  a  new  sort  of  Chris- 
tians ;"  nay,  who  pretend  at  times  to  be  real  Christians,  who  say 
they  believe  in  the  Trinity,  in  the  incarnation,  redemption,  resur- 
rection, and  all  other  doctrines  of  the  Bible,  that  is,  they  express 
some  philosophical  enigma  under  these  terms ;  or  at  times  speak 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  689 

of  Christianity  with  affected  respect,  as  good  for  the  people  in 
their  present  state,  professing  with  Cousin  that  "  philosophy  is  pa- 
tient   happy  in  seeing  the  great  bulk  01  mankind  in  the 

arms  of  Christianity,  she  offers,  with  modest  kindness,  to  assist  her 
in  ascending  to  a  yet  loftier  elevation."* 

Strange,  therefore,  as  it  may  seem,  when  we  look  at  this  system 
in  its  true  character,  it  undoubtedly  has  already  prevailed  to  a  great 
extent  in  Germany  ;  and  is  making  some  progress  in  France,  Eng- 
land, and  our  own  country.  Its  true  nature  is  disguised  in  obscure 
philosophical  language,  which  many  use  without  understanding, 
until  it  comes  at  last  to  the  expression  of  their  real  opinions.  We 
have  evidence  enough  that  this  Pantheistic  philosophy  has  set  its 
cloven  foot  in  America.  First  we  had  a  set  of  young  men  capti- 
vated by  the  genius  and  mysticism  of  Coleridge,  republishing  works 
through  which  were  scattered  intimations  more  or  less  plain  of  the 
denial  of  a  personal  God.  This  was  the  first  step.  In  the  writings 
of  Coleridge  the  general  tone  and  impression  was  theistical.  He 
was  an  Englishman  ;  he  had  received  too  many  of  his  modes  of 
thinking  and  of  expressions  from  the  Bible,  to  allow  of  his  being 
a  Pantheist,  except  when  musing.  Next  we  had  the  writings  of 
Cousin,  a  man  of  different  cast,  with  none  of  Coleridge's  solemnity 
or  reverence.  A  Frenchman,  on  whose  mind  the  Bible  had  left  no 
strong  impress.  Vain  and  presumptuous,  and  yet  timid;  intimating 
more  than  he  durst  utter.  As  he  has  given  the  world  nothing  in 
the  form  of  a  system,  it  is  only  by  these  occasional  intimations  that 
his  readers  can  judge  how  far  he  adopts  the  ideas  of  the  German 
school,  whence  all  his  opinions  are  borrowed.  These  intimations, 
however,  are  sufficiently  frequent  and  sufficiently  clear  to  make  it 
plain  that  he  is  a  denier  of  God  and  of  the  Gospel.  He  uses 
almost  the  very  language  of  the  Hegelians  in  expressing  his 
views  of  the  nature  of  God.  "  God  exists  as  an  idea,"  says  the  He- 
gelian ;f  "these  ideas,"  i.  e.,  of  the\ infinite,  finite,  and  the  rela- 
tion between  them,  "  are  God  himself,"  says  Cousin. J  According 
to  the  Hegelians,  God  arrives  to  consciousness  in  man ;  and  so 
Cousin  teaches,  "God  returns  to  himself  in  the  consciousness  of 
man."  The  German  school  teaches  that  everything  that  exists  is 
God  in  a  certain  stage  of  development;  so  also  Cousin,  "God  is 
space  and  number,  essence  and  life,  indivisibility  and  totality,  prin- 
ciple, end,  and  centre,  at  the  summit  of  being  and  at  its  lowest  de- 
gree, infinite  and  finite  together,  triple  in  a  word,  that  is  to  say,  at 
the  same  time  God,  nature,  and  humanity.  In  fact,  if  God  is  not 
everything  he  is  nothing."^  Surely  there  can  be  but  one  opinion 
among  Christians,  about  a  system  which  admits  of  no  God  but 
the  universe,  which  allows  no  intelligence  or  consciousness  to  the 
infinite  Spirit,  but  that  to  which  he  attains  in  the  human  soul,  which 


*  Cousin's  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  57.    f  Marheineke's  Dogmatik,  §  174. 
$  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  400.  §  Ibid.,  p.  399. 

44 


690  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

makes  man  the  highest  state  of  God.  And  we  should  think  there 
could  be  among  the  sane  but  one  opinion  of  the  men  who,  dressed 
in  gowns  and  bands,  and  ministering  at  God's  altars,  are  endeavour- 
ing to  introduce  these  blasphemous  doctrines  into  our  schools,  col- 
leges and  churches.  "  Ancient  chronicles  relate,"  says  Leo,  "that 
there  were  watchtowers  and  castles  for  which  no  firm  foundation 
could  be  obtained,  until  (by  the  direction  of  the  practitioners  of  the 
black  art)  a  child  was  built  up  in  the  walls.  They  made  a  little 
chamber  in  the  foundation,  placed  within  it  a  table  with  sugar  and 
playthings,  and  while  the  poor,  unconscious  little  victim  was  re- 
joicing over  its  toys,  the  grim  masons  built  up  the  wall."  This  is 
a  fable  ;  or,  if  true,  belongs  to  a  pagan  age,  and  every  nerve  with- 
in us  trembles,  when  we  think  of  this  abomination  of  heathenism. 
But  are  not  those  who  cut  the  people  loose  from  the  more  than 
thousand  years' old  foundation  of  their  morality  and  faith,  by  teach- 
ing the  rising  generation  that  there  is  no  personal  God ;  that  the 
history  of  his  only  begotten  Son  is  a  cunningly  devised  fable,  which 
does  indeed,  if  properly  understood,  give  a  good  philosophical 
sense  ;  that  all  subjective  consciousness  and  feeling  end  with  death  ; 
that  the  greatest  abominations  that  ever  occurred  were  necessary, 
and  thus  reasonable,  and  a  conscious  and  wilful  opposition  to  God 
is  alone  evil ;  are  not  these  men  the  most  cruel  of  masons,  who  im- 
mure the  children  of  Germany  in  the  walls  of  the  tower  of  heathen 
ideas,  in  the  bastions  and  watchtowers  of  the  devil,  enticing  them 
within  with  the  sugar  toys  of  their  vain  philosophy,  that  they  may 
perish  in  the  horrors  of  unsatisfied  hunger  and  thirst  after  the  word 
of  the  Lord  ?"* 

Shocking  as  this  whole  system  is,  we  doubt  not  it  will,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  prevail  even  among  us  ;  and  God  may  bring  good  out  of 
the  evil.  "  There  are  two  people,"  says  Hengstenberg,  "  in  the 
womb  of  this  age,  and  only  two.  They  will  become  constantly 
more  firmly  and  decidedly  opposed,  the  one  to  the  other.  Unbelief 
will  more  and  more  exclude  what  it  still  has  of  faith ;  and  faith, 
what  it  has  of  unbelief.  Unspeakable  good  will  hence  arise. 
'  And  the  Lord  said  unto  Gideon,  By  the  three  hundred  men  that 
lapped,  will  I  save  you,  and  deliver  the  Midianites  into  thy  hand  ; 
and  let  all  the  other  people  go,  every  man  unto  his  own  place.'  Had 
the  spirit  of  the  times  continued  to  make  concessions,  concessions 
would  have  been  constantly  made  to  it.  But  now,  since  every 
concession  only  renders  it  more  importunate,  those  who  are  not 
ready  to  give  up  everything,  will  more  and  more  resist,  and  de- 
mand back  again  what  they  have  already  yielded.  They  began 
by  giving  up  the  first  chapter  in  Genesis  as  mythological,  which 
even  well-meaning  theologians,  as  Seiler  and  Muntinghe,  thought 
of  little  consequence.  Soon,  for  the  supposed  greater  honour  of 
the  New  Testament,  they  gave  up  the  whole  Old  Testament  his- 

*  Conclusion  of  his  Hegelingen. 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  691 

tory  as  mythological.  Scarcely  was  this  point  reached,  when  they 
felt  themselves  under  the  necessity  of  giving  up  the  first  chapters  of 
Matthew  and  Luke,  with  the  sincere  assurance  that  these  scruples 
about  the  early  history  of  Jesus  did  not  at  all  endanger  the  re- 
maining portions  of  his  life.  Soon,  however,  besides  the  beginning, 
they  gave  up  the  end,  the  account  of  the  ascension  of  Christ,  as 
fabulous.  Even  here  there  was  no  rest.  It  was  not  long  before 
the  first  three  Gospels  were  yielded  to  the  enemy.  They  then  re- 
tired on  the  Gospel  of  John,  and  loudly  boasted  that  there  they 
were  safe,  not  without  some  secret  misgivings,  however,  that  they 
lived  only  by  the  forbearance  of  the  foe.  He  has  already  appear- 
ed, and  availed  himself  of  the  same  weapons  which  had  already 
gained  so  many  victories,  and  the  Gospel  of  John  is  now  no  better 
off  than  the  rest.  Now,  at  last,  a  stand  must  be  taken  ;  a  choice 
must  be  made  ;  either  men  must  give  up  everything,  or  they  must 
ascend  to  the  point  whence  they  first  set  out,  and  through  the  very 
same  stations  through  which  they  descended.  To  this  they  will 
not  be  able,  at  once,  to  make  up  their  minds ;  they  will  at  first  be- 
lieve that  they  can  escape  at  a  cheaper  rate  ;  but  let  them  twist 
and  turn  as  they  may,  let  them  use  what  arts  they  please,  the  mat- 
ter can  have  no  other  issue."*  This  has  a  special  reference  to  the 
state  of  opinion  in  Germany.  But  it  is  not  without  its  application 
to  us.  There  are  those  in  our  country,  even  among  the  orthodox, 
who  talk  of  a  mythology  of  the  Hebrews,  and  others  among  the 
Unitarians,  who  give  up  not  only  the  miracles  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, but  those  of  the  New.  All  such  must  either  go  on  or  go 
back.  Professor  Norton  cannot  give  up  the  first  chapters  of  Mat- 
thew as  fabulous,  and  call  him  an  infidel  who  gives  up  the  remain- 
der. This  new  philosophy  will  break  up  the  old  divisions.  It  will 
carry  some  on  to  Atheism,  and  drive  others  back  to  the  unmutilated 
Bible. 

This  is  not  the  only  effect  which  this  new  leaven  may  be  expect- 
ed to  produce.  As  in  Germany  it  has  operated  to  the  destruction 
of  Rationalism,  so  here  it  may  serve  to  bring  Socinianism  and 
Taylorism  into  contempt.  Even  some  Unitarian  ministers  at  Bos- 
ton, we  are  told,  have  already  discovered  that  "the  religion  of  the 
day  seemed  too  cold,  too  lifeless,  too  mechanical,  for  many  of  their 
flock."!  "  There  are  many,  I  doubt  not,"  says  this  same  authority, 
"  who  will  welcome  its  principles  (i.  e.,  the  principles  '  of  the  lead- 
ing school  in  modern  German  theology ')  as  soon  as  they  are 
understood,  as  the  vital,  profound,  and  ennobling  theology,  which 
they  have  earnestly  sought  for,  but  hitherto  sought  in  vain."J     If 

*  Kirchen-Zeitung,  January,  1S36.  We  commend  the  above  passage  to  the  special 
consideration  of  Professor  Norton. 

t  Letter  to  Mr.  Norton,  p.  12. 

X  Ibid.,  p.  149.  The  above  passage  must  not  be  understood  as  referring  to  the 
principles  of  the  school  described  in  the  preceding  pages.  The  Alumnus  seems  to 
think  that  the  little  set  of  Schleiermacher's  pupils  constitute  the  leading  school  in 
Germany.  In  this,  we  think,  he  is  greatly  mistaken ;  but  we  do  not  wish  to  be  un- 
derstood to  represent  him  as  endorsing  the  doctrines  of  the  Hegelians.  He  sayi  he 
is  no  Pantheist,  though  he  thinks  Pantheism  very  religious. 


692  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

this  is  so,  then  farewell  to  Socinianism,  and  farewell  to  Taylorism. 
If  only  for  consistency's  sake,  those  who,  with  this  Alumnus,  find 
in  the  transcendentalism  of  Schleiermacher  the  true  philosophy, 
must  feel  or  affect  the  contempt  which  he  felt  for  the  Rationalists 
and  Pelagians.  The  ground  on  which  they  stand,  however,  is  too 
narrow  to  afford  them  a  footing.  Schleiermacher  gave  up  almost 
everything,  except  the  incarnation  of  God  in  Christ.  This  was 
the  centre  of  his  system.  Those  whom  he  brought  off  from  Ra- 
tionalism, have  almost  all  gone  on,  with  the  Hegelians,  to  Atheism, 
or  turned  back  to  the  Bible.  And  so  it  will  be  here.  Indeed,  the 
man  who  can  see  no  harm  in  Pantheism,  who  thinks  it  a  most  reli- 
gious system,  and  venerates  its  advocates,  as  is  the  case  with  this 
Alumnus,  has  but  one  step  to  take,  and  he  is  himself  in  the  abyss. 
We  should  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  to  see,  in  the  providence  of 
God,  this  new  philosophy,  which  is  in  itself  infinitely  worse  than 
Socinianism  or  Deism,  made  the  means  of  breaking  up  those  dead- 
ening forms  of  error,  and  while  it  leads  many  to  destruction,  of 
driving  others  back  to  the  fountain  of  life. 

Though,  for  the  reasons  stated  above,  we  think  it  not  unlikely 
that  this  system  will  make  a  certain  degree  of  progress  in  our 
country,  we  have  no  fear  of  its  ever  prevailing  either  here  or  in 
England,  as  it  does  in  Germany.  Apart  from  the  power  of  true 
religion,  which  is  our  only  real  safeguard  against  the  most  extra- 
vagant forms  of  error,  there  are  two  obstacles  to  the  prevalence 
of  these  doctrines  among  Englishmen  or  their  descendants.  They 
do  not  suit  our  national  character.  A  sanity  of  intellect,  an  inca- 
pacity to  see  wonders  in  nonsense,  is  the  leading  trait  of  the  Eng- 
lish mind.  The  Germans  can  believe  anything.  Animal  magnetism 
is  for  them  as  one  of  the  exact  sciences.  What  suits  the  Germans, 
therefore,  does  not  suit  us.  Hence  almost  all  those  who,  in  Eng- 
land or  in  this  country,  have  professed  transcendentalism,  have 
made  themselves  ridiculous.  If  it  were  not  for  its  exorbitant  profane- 
ness,  what  could  be  more  ludicrous  than  Mr.  Emerson's  Address  ? 
He  tells  us  that  religious  sentiment  is  myrrh,  and  storax,  and  chlo- 
rine, and  rosemary ;  that  the  time  is  coming  when  the  law  of  gra- 
vitation and  purity  of  heart  will  be  seen  to  be  identical,  that  man 
has  an  infinite  soul,  &c.  It  will  not  do.  Such  men  were  never 
made  for  transcendentalists.  This  is  not  meant  in  disparagement  of 
those  gentlemen.  It  is  a  real  compliment  to  them,  though  not 
exactly  to  their  wisdom.  Coleridge  is  the  only  Englishman  whom 
we  know  anything  about,  who  took  the  system  naturally.  To  him 
it  was  truth ;  he  was  a  mystic  ;  he  had  faith  in  what  he  said,  for 
his  words  were  to  him  the  symbols  of  his  own  thoughts.  It  is 
not  so  with  others.  They  repeat  a  difficult  lesson  by  rote,  striving 
hard  all  the  while  not  to  forget. 

It  is  not,  however,  only  or  chiefly  on  this  want  of  adaptation  of 
the  German  mysticism  to  the  sane  English  mind,  that  we  would 
rely  to  counteract  the  new  philosophy  ;  it  is  the  influence  of  the 
Bible  on  all  our  modes  of  thinking.     We  believe  in  God  the  Father, 


TRANSCENDENTALISM.  693 

the  maker  of  heaven  and  earth.  We  must  have  a  God  who  can 
hear  prayer.  In  Germany,  the  educated  classes,  little  in  the  habit 
of  attending  church,  have  for  generations  felt  comparatively  little 
of  the  power  of  the  Bible.  There  was  no  settled  idea  of  a  per- 
sonal God,  such  as  is  visible  in  every  page  of  the  scriptures,  en- 
graven on  their  hearts.  They  were,  therefore,  prepared  for  specu- 
lations which  destroyed  his  very  nature,  and  were  content  with  a 
blind  instinctive  power,  productive  of  all  changes,  and  struggling 
at  last  into  intelligence  in  the  human  race.  Such  a  God  may  do 
for  a  people  who  have  been  first  steeped  in  infidelity  for  genera- 
tions ;  but  not  for  those  who  have  been  taught,  with  their  first 
lispings,  to  say,  Our  Father  who  art  in  heaven.  The  grand  danger 
is,  that  this  deadly  poison  will  be  introduced  under  false  labels  ; 
that  thid  Atheism,  enveloped  in  the  scarcely  intelligible  formulas  of 
the  new  philosophy,  may  be  regarded  as  profound  wisdom,  and 
thus  pass  from  mouth  to  mouth  without  being  understood,  until  it 
becomes  familiar  and  accredited.  We  feel  it  to  be  a  solemn  duty 
to  warn  our  readers,  and  in  our  measure,  the  public,  against  this 
German  Atheism,  which  the  spirit  of  darkness  is  employing  minis- 
ters of  the  Gospel  to  smuggle  in  among  us  under  false  pretences. 
No  one  will  deny  that  the  Hegelian  doctrines,  as  exhibited  above, 
are  Atheism  in  its  worst  form  ;  and  all  who  will  read  the  works  of 
Cousin  may  soon  satisfy  themselves  that  his  system,  as  far  as  he 
has  a  system,  is,  as  to  the  main  point,  identical  with  that  of  Hegel. 


ESSAY    XXIII. 

ON   CAUSE  AND   EFFECT,* 


The  late  Dr.  Brown,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh,  some  years  ago,  published  a  book  entitled 
"  Cause  and  Effect,"  in  which  he  revived  and  defended  the  opinion 
of  Mr.  Hume,  on  the  subject  of  power.  It  is  due,  however,  to  the 
ingenious  author,  to  state  that  he  distinctly  disavowed  Hume's 
sceptical  inferences  from  this  doctrine. 

The  same  opinions,  and  the  same  reasonings  in  support  of  them, 
are  exhibited  in  his  lectures  on  the  philosophy  of  the  mind,  a  more 
recent  publication.  And  as  the  philosophy  of  Dr.  Brown  has 
many  admirers  in  this  country,  and  has  received  unqualified  re- 
commendations from  high  authority,  it  will  not,  we  trust,  appear 
unreasonable  or  unnecessary,  even  at  this  late  period,  to  bring  his 
theory  to  the  test  of  a  fair  examination  ;  this  is  the  object  of  the 
present  article. 

The  opinion  of  Dr.  B.,  to  which  we  have  referred,  is,  that  in  phi- 
losophical accuracy  there  is  no  such  thing  as  causation  or  power ; 
that  immediate  invariable  antecedence  is  all  that  properly  enters 
into  the  idea  of  a  cause,  and  immediate  invariable  consequence 
the  true  idea  of  effect ;  and,  accordingly,  that  power  is  nothing 
else  but  the  relation  between  an  immediate  invariable  antecedent 
and  consequent.  In  plain  English,  his  opinion  is  that  there  is  no 
such  thing  in  nature  as  power:  and  that  when  we  mean  anything 
more  by  this  word,  than  merely  to  express  the  invariable  antece- 
dence of  one  thing  to  another,  we  speak  inaccurately  and  unphilo- 
sophically.  The  words  cause,  causation,  power,  energy,  efficacy, 
&c,  express  nothing,  according  to  his  theory,  that  is  intelligible,  be- 
sides the  mere  relation  of  antecedence  and  sequence. 

It  is  admitted,  however,  by  Dr.  B.  that  almost  the  whole  human 
race  have  annexed  to  these  terms,  or  those  which  correspond  with 
them  in  their  respective  languages,  ideas  different  from  what  he 
considers  correct.  The  structure  of  all  languages  furnishes  irre- 
fragable proof  of  this  fact.  The  notion  of  action,  causation,  ener- 
gy, &c,  is  so  common  among  men,  that  children  and  savages 
entertain  it  as  familiarly  as  any  others.  It  is  an  idea  which  is 
contained  in  every  active  verb,  and  no  man  can  divest  himself  of 

*  Published  in  1829. 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  605 

it  or  speak  half  a  dozen  sentences  without  using  words  which 
plainly  convey  this  meaning.  This  fact  is  so  manifest,  that  the 
ingenious  author  does  not  call  it  in  question.  He  admits  that  the 
opinion  which  he  maintains  is  contrary  "to  the  almost  universal 
sense  of  mankind."  Now  such  a  general  consent  is  commonly, 
and  we  think  justly,  considered  as  a  strong  proof  that  the  idea  or 
sentiment,  in  which  men  so  agree,  is  founded  in  nature,  and  ac- 
cordant with  truth.  It  must  be  strong  reasoning,  indeed,  which 
shall  demonstrate  that  an  opinion  entertained  by  men  of  all  nations, 
however  different  in  language,  in  manners,  in  education,  in  govern- 
ment, and  religion,  is  false.  If  this  could  be  done,  then  all  differ- 
ence between  truth  and  prejudice  would  be  obliterated.  To  estab- 
lish the  certainty  of  the  existence  of  power  or  causation,  the 
argument  derived  from  universal  consent  appears  to  us  to  be  irre- 
sistible ;  for  we  cannot  suppose  that  all  men  of  all  nations,  from 
early  childhood  to  hoary  age,  could  be  led  to  adopt  an  opinion  which 
had  no  foundation,  without  admitting  the  absurd  consequence,  that 
all  men  are  so  constituted  that  they  are  by  necessity  led  to  embrace 
error  instead  of  truth.  And  this  supposition  would  not  answer  the 
purpose  of  Dr.  Brown,  as  it  would  render  it  impossible  for  him  to 
establish  any  opinion  as  true ;  for  that  constitution  of  human  na- 
ture which  leads  men  invariably  astray,  in  one  case,  ought  to  be 
suspected  in  all.  The  true  principles  of  philosophizing  should  have 
led  to  a  directly  opposite  course  of  reasoning.  He  should  have 
assumed  the  fact,  that  all  men  possessed  of  reason  entertain  from 
their  earliest  years  the  opinion  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  power 
or  causation ;  and  this  idea  being  incorporated  inseparably  with 
every  language  in  the  world,  it  is  a  just  conclusion  that  this  is  one 
of  those  common  notices,  or  self-evident  truths,  which,  from  the 
very  constitution  of  our  nature,  we  are  under  the  necessity  of  re- 
ceiving. Let  any  man  attempt  to  form  a  language  from  which  all 
idea  of  active  energy  or  causation  shall  be  excluded,  and  he  will 
soon  find  that  this  is  no  vulgar  prejudice,  but  a  fundamental  truth; 
an  idea,  which,  if  it  were  removed  from  the  human  mind,  would 
leave  a  vast  chasm  in  all  our  reasonings  and  systems  of  truth,  in 
every  branch  of  science.  If  a  people  should  ever  be  discovered 
who  used  a  language  which  did  not  involve,  in  every  sentence,  the 
conception  of  power  and  causation,  this  single  fact  would  go  fur- 
ther to  prove  them  to  be  of  another  species,  than  all  the  diversities 
which  have  hitherto  been  observed  among  the  nations  of  the  earth. 
But  let  us  see  how  Dr.  B.  disposes  of  this  acknowledged  fact,  of 
the  almost  universal  existence  of  the  idea  of  power.  He  attempts 
to  show  that  there  are  analogous  cases  in  which  prejudices  have, 
for  a  long  time,  had  an  almost  universal  prevalence.  The  instance 
which  he  adduces,  and  to  which  he  often  recurs,  is  the  notion  of  a 
certain  something  existing  with  all  bodies,  which  the  schoolmen, 
after  Aristotle,  called  form,  or  substantial  forms.  This  notion,  it 
may  be  admitted,  was  as  extensive,  and  existed  as  long,  as  the 
Aristotelian  logic  prevailed.     But  the  case  is  nowise  parallel  to 


696  ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

the  one  under  consideration.  The  opinion  respecting  substantial 
forms  belonged  to  a  peculiar  system  of  philosophy,  and  as  long  as 
that  system  maintained  its  ground  would,  of  course,  be  enter- 
tained ;  but  it  was  never  the  opinion  of  the  great  body  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  mass  of  mankind  never  heard  of  such  an  opinion  ;  and 
even  in  those  countries  where  it  was  held,  it  was  merely  the 
opinion  of  the  learned.  The  common  people,  then,  knew  as  little 
and  believed  as  little  about  substantial  forms  as  they  do  now.  The 
idea  is  not  incorporated,  as  is  the  case  in  regard  to  power,  with  all 
languages.  It  is  not  common  to  children  and  adults,  savages  and 
philosophers.  The  case  adduced,  therefore,  does  not  serve  to  ac- 
count for  the  fact  of  the  universal  consent  of  mankind  in  receiving 
this  opinion.  But  it  is  time  to  attend  to  the  proofs  which  Dr.  B. 
offers  in  support  of  his  theory  ;  and  that  we  may  do  no  injustice  to 
his  meaning,  we  will  give  them  in  his  own  words : — The  first  is, 
"  That  we  have,  in  fact,  no  other  idea  in  our  mind,  when  we  speak 
of  cause  and  effect,  than  an  invariable  antecedence  and  conse- 
quence." "  Thus,  when  a  spark  falls  on  gunpowder  and  kindles 
it  into  explosure,  every  one  ascribes  to  the  spark  the  power  of  en- 
kindling the  inflammables.  But  let  any  one  ask  himself  what  it 
is  which  he  means  by  the  term,  and  without  contenting  himself  with 
a  few  phrases  which  signify  nothing, — reflect  before  he  gives  his 
answer,  and  he  will  find  that  he  means  nothing  more  than  this,  in 
all  similar  circumstances  the  explosion  of  gunpowder  will  be  the 
immediate  consequence  of  the  application  of  a  spark.  To  take 
an  example  more  immediately  connected  with  our  own  science,  we 
all  know  that  as  soon  as  any  one  in  the  usual  circumstances  of  health 
and  freedom  wills  to  move  his  arm  the  motion  of  his  arm  follows, 
and  we  believe  that  in  the  same  circumstances  of  health  and  free- 
dom, the  motion  of  the  arm  will  constantly  follow  the  will  to  move 
it.  If  we  knew  and  believed  nothing  more  than  that  the  motion  of 
the  arm  would  uniformly  follow  the  will  to  move  it,  would  our 
knowledge  of  the  phenomenon  be  less  perfect  V  "  Let  us  suppose 
ourselves  then  to  know  all  the  antecedents  and  consequents  in  na- 
ture, and  to  believe,  not  merely  that  they  have  once  or  repeatedly 
existed  in  connexion,  but  that  they  have  uniformly  done  so,  and 
will  continue  for  ever  to  recur  in  a  similar  series ;  so  that  but  for 
the  intervention  of  the  divine  will  (which  would  be  itself,  in  that 
case,  a  new  antecedent),  it  will  be  impossible  for  any  of  the  ante- 
cedents to  exist  again  without  being  immediately  followed  by  its 
original  consequent." 

Again :  "  To  him  who  had  previously  kindled  a  fire,  and  placed 
on  it  a  vessel  full  of  water,  with  a  certainty  that  in  that  situation 
the  water  would  speedily  become  hot,  what  additional  information 
would  be  given  by  telling  him  that  the  fire  had  the  power  of 
boiling  water?"  "  It  is  only  by  confounding  casual  with  uniform 
and  invariable  antecedence,  that  power  can  be  conceived  to  be 
something  different  from  antecedence."  "  Such  is  the  simple  and, 
as  it  appears  to  me,  only  intelligible  view  of  power,  as  discovera- 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  697 

ble  in  the  successive  phenomena  of  nature,  and  how  very  different 
from  this  simple  view  is  the  common,  or,  I  may  almost  say,  the 
universal  notion  of  the  agencies  which  are  supposed  to  be  con- 
cerned in  the  phenomena  which  are  the  objects  of  philosophical 
inquiry."  "  To  me  it  appears  indeed  so  obvious  a  truth,  that  the 
substances  which  exist  in  nature — the  world,  its  living  inhabitants 
and  their  adorable  Creator,  are  all  the  real  existences  in  nature, 
and  that  in  the  various  changes  which  occur,  there  can  as  little 
be  any  powers  or  susceptibilities  different  from  the  antecedents  and 
consequences  themselves,  as  there  can  be  forms  differing  from  the 
co-existing  particles  of  matter  which  constitute  them." 

The  author  feeling,  however,  that  it  was  incumbent  on  him  to 
account  more  fully  for  the  fallacy  which  he  supposes  to  exist 
almost  universally  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  a  cause,  attributes  it 
to  "  abstraction  aided  and  perpetuated  by  the  use  of  language." 
But  the  principal  cause  to  which  he  ascribes  this  universal  preju- 
dice is,  "  the  imperfection  of  the  senses."  "  We  are  frequently," 
he  observes,  "  incapable  of  perceiving  the  immediate  antecedent 
to  a  consequent,  and  are,  therefore,  in  danger  of  connecting  it  with 
a  wrong  antecedent ;  by  this  means  we  are  led  to  inquire  after  the 
true  causes  of  things,  that  is,  after  their  real  and  immediate  ante- 
cedents." "  As  our  senses  are  at  present  constituted,  they  are  too 
imperfect  to  enable  us  to  distinguish  all  the  elements  that  co-exist 
in  bodies  ;  and  of  elements  which  are  themselves  unknown  to  us, 
the  minute  changes  which  take  place  in  them  must  of  course 
be  unknown."  "  And  since  it  is  only  between  immediate  antece- 
dents and  consequents  that  we  suppose  any  permanent  and  inva- 
riable relation,  we  are,  therefore,  constantly  on  the  watch  to  detect 
in  the  more  obvious  changes  that  appear  to  us  in  nature  some  of 
those  minuter  elementary  changes  which  we  suspect  to  intervene." 
"  He  who  for  the  first  time  listens  to  the  delightful  sound  of  a  vio- 
lin, if  he  be  ignorant  of  the  theory  of  sound,  will  very  naturally 
suppose  that  the  touch  of  the  strings  by  the  bow  is  the  cause  of 
the  melody  which  he  hears.  He  learns,  however,  that  this  pri- 
mary impulse  would  be  of  little  effect  were  it  not  for  the  vibrations 
excited  by  the  violin  itself;  and  another  discovery  still  more  im- 
portant shows  him  that  the  vibration  of  the  instrument  would  be 
of  no  effect  were  it  not  for  the  elastic  medium  interposed  between 
his  ear  and  it.  It  is  no  longer  to  the  violin,  therefore,  that  he  looks 
as  the  direct  cause  of  the  sensation  of  sound,  but  to  the  vibrating 
air;  nor  will  even  this  be  long  considered  as  the  cause,  if  he  turns 
his  attention  to  the  structure  of  the  organ  of  hearing.  He  will 
then  trace  effect  after  effect,  through  a  long  series  of  complex  and 
very  wonderful  parts,  till  he  arrives  at  the  auditory  nerve,  and  the 
whole  mass  of  the  brain."  "  The  expectation  of  discovering  some- 
thing intermediate  and  unknown  between  all  known  events  is  easily 
convertible  into  the  common  notion  of  power,  as  a  secret  and  in- 
visible tie." 

In  the  conclusion  of  his  lecture  on  Cause  and  Effect,  Dr.  B. 


698  ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

inquires  how  this  notion  will  correspond  with  our  idea  of  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  great  Creator,  in  the  production  of  the  universe;  and 
seems  to  find  no  difficulty  here.  The  divine  will,  he  makes  the 
grand  antecedent  of  those  glorious  effects  which  the  universe  dis- 
plays. "  The  power  of  God  is  not  anything  different  from  God  ; 
but  is  the  Almighty  himself  willing  whatever  seems  to  him  good." 
"  We  do  not  see  any  third  circumstance  existing  intermediately 
and  binding,  as  it  were,  the  will  of  the  omnipotent  Creator  to  the 
things  which  are  to  be  ;  we  conceive  only  the  divine  will  itself,  as 
if  made  visible  to  our  imagination,  and  all  nature  at  the  very 
moment  rising  around.  It  is  evident,  that  in  the  case  of  the  divine 
agency,  as  well  as  in  every  other  instance  of  causation,  the  intro- 
duction of  any  other  circumstance  as  a  bond  of  closer  connexion, 
would  only  furnish  a  new  phenomenon  to  be  itself  connected." 
u  God  speaks  and  it  is  done  ;  we  imagine  nothing  intermediate." 

Thus,  we  have  endeavoured  to  present  a  fair  view  of  Dr.  Brown's 
•'theory,  and  with  the  explanations  and  reasons  by  which  he  endea- 
vours to  support  it.  We  shall  now  make  some  remarks  on  the 
several  particulars  which  have  been  brought  into  view,  intended 
to  show  the  unreasonableness  and  dangerous  tendency  of  his 
doctrine. 

1.  It  will  be  admitted  that  Dr.  Brown  has  been  successful  in 
proving,  by  an  elaborate  analysis,  in  his  treatise  on  Cause  and 
Effect,  that  we  have  no  direct  conceptions  of  anything  else  but  the 
antecedents  and  consequents,  in  those  series  of  events  which  take 
place  within  us,  or  without  us.  It  is  true,  that  in  no  case  we  are 
able  to  form  any  distinct  conception  of  the  operation  of  any  cause ; 
we  see  the  antecedent,  and  we  see  the  consequent,  but  how  the 
latter  is  effected  by  the  former  we  perceive  not.  If  Dr.  Brown 
had  contented  himself  with  drawing  the  conclusion  (which  is  the 
only  one  that,  from  the  premises,  he  had  a  right  to  draw),  that  we 
are  capable  of  forming  no  distinct  idea  of  the  nature  of  causation, 
we  should  have  acquiesced  in  his  reasoning.  But,  are  there  not 
many  things  which  we  certainly  know  to  exist,  of  which  our  ideas 
are  merely  relative  ?  This  is  true  of  every  substance.  We  can 
form  a  direct  conception  only  of  the  properties,  not  of  the  sub- 
stance itself.  We  are,  nevertheless,  led  by  the  constitution  of  our 
nature  to  believe  that  there  is  a  subject,  or  substratum,  in  which 
these  properties  inhere,  and  to  which  they  belong.  The  same  may 
be  observed  respecting  dispositions  or  principles  of  action.  Now, 
our  persuasion,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  causation,  is  as  uniform 
and  as  irresistible  as  the  belief  of  material  and  immaterial  sub- 
stances. It  is  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  universally  experienced 
convictions  of  the  human  understanding.  We  see  an  effect,  and 
immediately  we  believe  that  some  sort  of  energy  has  been  excited 
in  its  production.  A  million  of  men  will  all  have  the  same  feeling 
— there  must  be  a  cause.  But  Dr.  Brown  asserts  that  this  idea  of 
efficiency  or  energy  is  a  mere  illusion,  and  that  it  is  not  necessary 
to  assign  any  other  cause,  than  merely  to  ascertain  what  circum- 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  699 

stance  invariably  precedes  the  event.     Which  shall  we  believe  to 
be  correct,  the  million  or  the  one  ? 

2.  There  seems  to  be  some  inconsistency  in  Dr.  Brown's  state- 
ment of  the  facts  connected  with  this  subject.  On  the  one  hand 
he  admits  that  the  common  opinion,  indeed,  the  almost  universal 
opinion  of  men,  is  different  from  what  he  believes  to  be  the  true 
philosophical  opinion  ;  and  yet,  he  seems  to  say,  that  if  we  would 
carefully  attend  to  the  conception  which  we  have  of  power,  we 
should  find  that  it  includes  nothing  but  simple  antecedence.  "  Let 
any  one,"  says  he  in  a  passage  already  quoted,  "  ask  himself  what 
it  is  which  he  means  by  the  term,  and  he  will  find  that  he  means 
nothing  more  than  that,  in  all  similar  circumstances,  the  explosion 
of  gunpowder  will  be  the  immediate  and  uniform  consequence  of 
the  application  of  a  spark."  From  this  it  should  seem,  that  after  all, 
the  ideas  of  men  respecting  power  are  not  so  erroneous  as  has 
been  represented  ;  that  when  they  think  of  a  cause,  they  do,  in  fact, 
think  of  not/ring  but  an  invariable  immediate  antecedent.  If  this 
is  correct,  we  cannot  but  think  that  the  laborious  investigation  of 
the  author  was  useless.  But  how,  in  consistence  with  this,  can  it 
be  maintained  that  men  are  almost  universally  in  a  fallacy  on  this 
point  ?  Indeed,  if  the  theory  of  Dr.  B.  is  correct,  it  will  be  found 
extremely  difficult  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  power 
or  agency.  How  such  a  conception  should  enter  the  mind  of  man 
is  incomprehensible. 

3.  Dr.  Brown  attributes  this  illusion  of  men  to  "  abstraction, 
aided  and  perpetuated  by  the  use  of  language,  and  the  unavoida- 
ble modes  of  grammatical  construction."  But  how  abstraction 
should  be  the  cause  of  error  in  men  who  are  very  little  in  the  habit 
of  forming  abstract  ideas,  and  how  it  should  produce  a  uniformly 
erroneous  effect  in  men  of  every  nation  and  condition,  is  a  problem 
not  easily  solved.  Neither  is  it  manifest  how  this  error  could  be 
"  aided  and  perpetuated  by  the  use  of  language,  and  the  unavoida- 
ble modes  of  grammatical  construction."  Language  receives  its 
structure  and  its  forms  from  ideas  already  existing,  and  from  the 
modes  of  thinking  which  are  common  to  all  men,  or  peculiar  to 
some  one  nation.  It  is  certainly  no  very  natural  process  to  adopt 
such  modes  of  speech  as  have  no  modes  of  thought  corresponding 
with  them  ;  and  then,  to  suppose  that  these  modes  of  speech  should 
generate  the  ideas  which  they  represent.  What  the  ingenious 
author  advances  in  illustration  of  his  opinions  on  this  point,  is  far 
from  possessing  that  clearness  and  precision  which  usually  attend 
him,  in  his  attempts  at  elucidating  an  obscure  subject. 

4.  But  the  principal  reason  assigned  by  Dr.  Brown  for  the 
general  illusion  on  the  subject  of  cause  and  effect,  is  "  the  imper- 
fection of  our  senses."  How  the  ingenious  author  applies  this  to 
the  subject,  we  have  already  seen.  But  it  amounts  to  no  more 
than  this,  that  from  our  ignorance  of  the  true  nature  of  things  we 
are  often  led  to  ascribe  effects  to  the  wrong  causes,  and  knowing 
our  liableness  to  error  on  this  ground,  when  two  things  appear 


700  ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

related,  as  cause  and  effect,  or  as  an  immediate  antecedent  and 
consequent,  we  suspect  that  they  are  not  so  related,  but  that  there 
is  still  something  not  discovered,  which  is  intermediate,  and  thus, 
by  searching  for  these  invisible,  intermediate  links  in  the  concate- 
nation of  events,  we  come,  by  association,  to  imagine  a  mysterious 
connexion  between  the  antecedents  and  consequents  ;  that  is,  we 
come  at  length  to  suppose  that  one  thing  exerts  an  efficacy  to  pro- 
duce what  follows.  The  analysis  of  the  process  of  the  mind  in 
seeking  after  the  true  causes  of  phenomena,  given  by  the  author, 
may  be  admitted ;  but  it  casts  no  light  on  the  main  point  in  ques- 
tion. As  to  the  principle  so  universally  received,  that  there  must 
be  a  cause  for  every  effect,  it  has  no  dependence  on  our  knowledge 
of  the  true  cause.  Our  conviction  is  equally  firm,  that  there  must 
be  an  exertion  of  power,  where  an  effect  is  produced,  when  we  see 
no  cause,  as  when  we  certainly  know  what  it  is.  We  may  be- 
lieve that,  in  most  cases,  we  are  ignorant  of  the  real  efficient 
causes  of  events  ;  or  we  may  be  in  doubt,  of  a  number  of  apparent 
causes,  which  is  the  real  one  ;  but  this  has  no  effect  on  our  con- 
viction, that  there  is  a  real  efficient  cause  somewhere.  Philo- 
sophers may  dispute  whether  the  effects,  apparently  produced  by 
the  agency  of  material  causes,  are  not  rather  to  be  attributed  to 
some  spiritual  agency,  either  of  the  first  cause,  operating  through 
all  nature,  or  of  subordinate  agents  under  his  control  ;  but  they  all 
agree  that  these  effects  must  have  an  adequate  cause.  When  I 
will  to  move  my  arm,  it  may  be  disputed  whether  the  effect  is  pro- 
duced by  my  volition,  or  by  some  other  cause  acting  harmoniously 
with  my  will,  but  it  can  never  be  disputed  that  the  motion  of  my 
arm  has  a  real,  efficient  cause,  whatever  it  may  be.  So  when  I 
observe  that  my  thoughts  follow  each  other  in  a  certain  order,  and 
that  thoughts  of  a  certain  kind  are  invariably  followed  by  certain 
other  thoughts,  it  may  be  matter  of  dispute  whether  the  antecedent 
thought  or  desire  is  the  real  cause  of  that  which  follows.  The 
affirmative,  however  probable,  is  not  capable  of  demonstration ; 
for  it  is  possible  that  this  effect  may  be  produced  by  some  supe- 
rior and  invisible  agent.  But  while,  in  all  these  cases,  we  may 
doubt  about  the  real  cause,  even  when  we  are  certain  of  the  imme- 
diate and  invariable  antecedent  of  one  thing  to  another,  yet  we 
never  doubt  whether  there  does  not  exist  a  cause  of  the  effect  pro- 
duced. This  conviction  is  one  which  attends  us  everywhere,  and 
of  which  we  can  no  more  divest  ourselves  than  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  existence.  It  is  one  of  those  intuitive,  self-evident  truths, 
which  cannot  be  rendered  clearer  or  more  certain  by  any  reason- 
ing. In  fact,  all  reasoning  is  built  upon  it,  as  on  its  most  solid 
foundation  ;  and  if  it  were  possible  to  dislodge  it  from  the  minds 
of  men  (which  it  is  not),  all  reasoning  and  all  human  exertions 
would  cease. 

5.  But  not  to  rest  merely  on  the  defensive,  we  would  next  re- 
mark that  immediate,  invariable  antecedence  does  not,  in  many 
cases,  give  us  the  idea  of  a  cause.     There  are  innumerable  in- 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  701 

stances  of  immediate  invariable  antecedence,  in  which  we  never 
think  of  ascribing  causation  to  the  antecedents.  From  the  moment 
of  our  birth,  the  pulsations  of  the  heart  succeed  each  other  imme- 
diately and  invariably,  but  we  do  not,  therefore,  consider  one  pul- 
sation as  the  true  cause  of  the  next  succeeding  one.  One  portion 
of  duration  immediately  and  invariably  succeeds  another,  but  who 
ever  thought  that  one  moment  was  the  cause  of  the  one  following? 
When  the  electricity  of  the  clouds  strikes  an  object,  light  is  uni- 
formly emitted,  but  we  do  not  consider  light  to  be  the  cause  of  the 
effects  produced.  We  are  accustomed  to  distinguish  between  a 
sign  and  cause,  although  the  former  may  be  as  immediate  and 
invariable  as  the  latter. 

6.  According  to  Dr.  Brown's  theory,  there  is  no  need  that  there 
should  be  any  proportion  between  the  cause  and  effect ;  for  if  an- 
tecedence be  all  that  is  included  in  the  idea  of  a  cause,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  most  important  event  may  be  conceived  to  have,  as 
its  antecedent,  the  most  trivial  thing  in  the  universe.  Thus  the 
song  of  the  sky-lark,  if  it  only  had  immediate,  invariable  antece- 
dence, might  be  the  cause  of  the  rising  of  the  sun ;  and  the  chirp- 
ing of  the  sparrow,  of  the  revolution  of  the  planets. 

7.  Again,  upon  this  theory,  all  reasoning  from  the  nature  of  an 
effect  to  the  character  of  the  cause,  and  from  the  nature  of  the 
cause  to  the  character  of  the  effect,  must  be  vain.  For  it  matters 
not  what  be  the  nature  of  the  cause  or  effect,  provided  only  there 
be  immediate  invariable  antecedence  and  consequence. 

All  arguments,  therefore,  for  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  first 
cause,  derived  from  a  consideration  of  the  appearances  of  design 
in  the  universe,  must,  on  this  theory,  be  perfectly  futile.  All  we 
want,  to  account  for  anything,  however  great,  or  good,  or  wise,  is, 
that  something,  it  matters  not  what,  should  precede  it  immediately, 
and  invariably.  Indeed,  we  see  not  why  nothing  may  not,  upon 
these  principles,  be  the  cause  of  all  things,  as  well  as  a  self-existent 
Deity ;  for  as  there  is  no  efficiency  or  energy  in  a  cause,  all  the 
requisites  of  the  most  potent  cause  may  be  found  in  nothing,  as 
well  as  in  something  which  has  real  existence.  It  is  due  to  the 
ingenious  author  to  say,  that  he  appears  to  entertain  exalted  con- 
ceptions of  the  great  Creator,  and  rejects  every  idea  of  Atheism. 
This,  however,  does  not  alter  the  nature  and  tendency  of  his  the- 
ory, which  must  be  judged  on  its  own  merits.  When  the  author 
speaks,  as  we  have  seen  he  does,  of  all  things  springing  into  exist- 
ence from  the  mere  will  of  God,  the  sentiment  is  just  and  noble ; 
but  in  this  case  we  do  not  exclude  the  idea  of  energy,  power,  and 
efficiency ;  we  conceive  that  God  is  so  perfect  that  the  mere  act 
of  his  will  includes  in  it  all  energy.  It  is  the  supreme  efficiency. 
But  if  you  view  it  merely  as  an  antecedent,  anything  else  conceiv- 
able might  be  the  cause  of  all  things  as  well.  Why  must  the  di- 
vine will  be  the  antecedent  to  the  existence  of  the  universe,  if 
there  be  no  efficiency — if  there  be  no  such  thing  as  real  causation? 

8.  When  the  ingenious  author  makes  the  whole  of  a  cause,  in 


702  ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

every  case,  to  consist  in  immediate  and  invariable  antecedence,  it 
seems  that  all  idea  of  contact,  contiguity  in  place,  or  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  antecedent  with  the  consequent,  is  excluded.  Con- 
nexion in  time  seems  to  be  the  only  thing  necessary,  according  to 
this  theory.  Therefore,  the  causes  of  events  may  be  at  an  infinite 
distance.  If  an  occurrence  in  the  planet  Saturn  should  uniformly 
precede  an  event  on  this  earth,  it  would  therefore  be  its  cause. 

9.  But  again,  an  effect  may  have  more  invariable  antecedents 
than  one ;  and  which  then  is  the  true  cause  ?  According  to  the 
theory  under  consideration,  both.  Thus  we  may  have  many 
causes  of  the  same  effect,  which  would  introduce  perfect  confusion 
into  every  department  of  philosophy. 

10.  It  does  not  appear,  according  to  the  theory  under  consider- 
ation, what  we  are  to  think  of  those  things  which  occur  very  often, 
as  antecedents  and  consequents,  and  yet  not  invariably ;  or  rather 
it  does  not  appear,  why  these  do  not  partake,  in  proportion  to  their 
frequency  of  connexion,  of  the  nature  of  cause  and  effect.  Sup- 
pose one  thing  to  precede  another  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine 
times,  and  then  fail  once,  and  so  on,  why  is  this  antecedence  to  be 
excluded  entirely  from  the  class  of  causes  ?  We  see  no  good  rea- 
son for  it.  Indeed,  it  is  not  made  evident  by  the  author,  why  the 
succession  must  be  invariable,  to  constitute  a  cause.  As  antece- 
dence in  time  is  the  whole  idea  of  power,  it  would  seem  to  be 
more  reasonable  to  consider  everything  a  cause  when  it  happened 
to  precede  another,  whether  its  antecedence  were  invariable  or 
casual. 

11.  Moreover,  if  invariable  attendance  is  necessary  to  constitute 
a  cause,  then  those  effects  which  occur  but  once  have  no  cause ; 
and  all  effects,  when  they  first  existed,  were  without  cause ;  or 
must  have  been  so  considered  by  an  intelligent  spectator.  For  al- 
though he  might  observe  that  something  immediately  preceded  the 
effect,  it  could  not  be  known  whether  the  connexion  between  the 
antecedent  and  consequent  was  casual  or  invariable.  And  it  is  the 
confounding  these  two  things,  to  which  Dr.  Brown  attributes  a 
great  part  of  our  errors  on  this  subject.  Indeed,  if  invariable  as 
well  as  immediate  antecedence  be  necessary  to  the  idea  of  a  cause, 
it  is  manifest  that  long  experience  was  requisite,  before  men  could 
judge  anything  respecting  cause  and  effect.  And  after  all,  our  ob- 
servation is  confined  within  so  narrow  bounds,  that  we  are  little 
capable  of  determining  whether  the  connexion  of  things  which  we 
see  in  any  case  is  absolutely  invariable.  And  what  judgment 
could  we  form,  on  these  principles,  of  a  miraculous  event  ?  For 
in  this,  the  effect  is  contrary  to  those  which  usually  follow  from 
such  antecedents  as  we  perceive  to  exist.  If  a  miracle  can  occur 
on  Dr.  Brown's  principles,  can  it  be  of  use  to  establish  any  doc- 
trine ?  Suppose  a  manifest  miracle  to  occur  before  our  eyes  ;  the 
question  will  be,  to  what  cause  must  it  be  attributed  ?  According  to 
the  old  doctrine  of  cause  and  effect,  the  answer  is,  to  the  power  of 
God,  because  nothing  else  can  produce  such  a  work.     But  if  there 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  703 

be  no  such  thing  as  power,  we  can  draw  no  such  inference.  As  it 
has  no  invariable  antecedent,  it  can  have  no  cause  ;  or  as  mere  an- 
tecedence is  the  only  idea  of  a  cause,  it  may  have  been  produced 
by  any  cause,  it  matters  not  what,  provided  only  it  preceded  the 
miracle.  And  we  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  if  an  inquiry  be 
made  respecting  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  the  world.  The 
event  being  single  it  could  have  no  invariable  antecedent ;  but 
supposing,  as  Dr.  Brown  evidently  does,  that  there  are  some  cases 
in  which  mere  antecedence  is  all  that  is  necessary  in  a  cause,  the 
other  consequence  presses  upon  us,  that  any  preceding  thing,  or 
even  nothing,  as  was  shown  before,  may  be  the  cause  of  the  uni- 
verse. It  is  in  vain  that  the  philosopher  talks  sublimely  of  the  will 
of  God  being  the  antecedent,  for  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  demon- 
strate upon  his  principles,  that  any  such  antecedent  is  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  the  universe.  For  if  he  should  insist  that  no 
other  antecedent  is  adequate  to  such  a  work  of  magnificence,  he 
immediately  abandons  his  main  and  favourite  principle,  viz.,  that 
kmere  antecedence  is  cause,  and  mere  consequence  effect.  If  the 
wisdom  and  will  of  God,  as  the  author  everywhere  admits,  are 
necessary,  as  the  antecedent  or  cause  of  the  universe,  then  there 
must  be  something  in  a  cause  besides  mere  immediate  invariable 
antecedence.  There  must  be  something  in  the  cause  proportioned 
to  the  effect  produced.  In  short,  where  marks  of  intelligence  are 
manifest  in  the  effect,  there  must  be  wisdom  as  well  as  power  in 
the  cause.  And  this  brings  us  back  to  the  old  common-sense  doc- 
trine of  cause  and  effect,  in  departing  from  which  there  is  nothing 
to  be  gained  but  much  to  be  lost. 

12.  Finally,  if  power  be  nothing,  and  causation  be  mere  antece- 
dence, we  do  not  perceive  how  we  shall  be  able  to  maintain  the 
accountableness  of  man,  or  any  other  moral  agent,  for  his  actions. 
According  to  his  theory,  all  actions  are  separate,  independent 
events,  which  have  no  relation  whatever  to  one  another,  except 
that  of  antecedence  and  consequence.  We  do  not  see,  therefore, 
on  what  point  we  can  fix  man's  responsibility.  If  we,  this  moment, 
have  a  will  to  do  a  good  action  the  next  moment,  and  if  that  good 
action  should  follow  invariably  this  volition,  still,  according  to  the 
theory,  the  volition  had  no  influence  in  the  production  of  the  con- 
sequent good  action.  They  are  both  links  in  a  chain  which  cannot 
be  broken ;  or  rather  fixed  points  in  a  succession,  which  have  no 
other  dependence  on  one  another,  or  relation  to  each  other,  than 
this,  that  in  the  succession,  certain  points  stand  next  in  order  to 
certain  other  points.  Thus  necessity,  in  its  most  forbidding  form, 
is  established ;  and  human  power,  liberty,  and  responsibility,  are 
subverted.  We  know,  indeed,  that  Dr.  Brown  and  his  followers 
do  not  admit  these  to  be  legitimate  inferences  from  their  doctrine, 
and  of  course  we  do  not  charge  such  opinions  upon  them.  But 
as  they  appear  to  us  to  be  just  deductions,  it  is  fair  to  bring  them 
forward  as  arguments  against  a  system,  which  appears  to  us 
fraught  with  danger  to  sound  philosophy.     Nothing  has  tended 


704  ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT. 

so  much  to  bring  mental  philosophy  into  disrepute,  as  the  para- 
doxical and  extravagant  opinions  of  some  ingenious  men,  who 
in  their  reasonings  have  too  much  lost  sight  of  first  principles,  and 
have  trusted  too  much  to  abstruse  speculations.  In  no  science  are 
sobriety  of  mind  and  soundness  of  judgment  more  requisite,  than 
in  the  philosophy  of  the  mind. 

It  is  a  pleasing  reflection,  that  such  is  our  constitution,  that  opi- 
nions subversive  of  the  first  principles  of  truth  can  never  prevail 
to  any  great  extent.  Our  safety  from  errors  of  the  most  enormous 
kind  consists  in  the  impossibility  of  adopting  them.  Men  may, 
indeed,  by  pursuing  a  course  of  intricate  and  sophistical  reason- 
ing, come  to  conclusions,  which  are  repugnant  to  those  truths 
which  are  primary  and  self-evident;  and  while  the  mind  is  intent 
on  its  own  reasoning,  there  may  be  an  assent  to  these  absurd  con- 
clusions ;  and  in  writing,  and  discourse,  they  may  be  defended  with 
much  pertinacity  and  ingenuity,  but  in  common  life,  where  philoso- 
phical principles  are  lost  sight  of,  the  sceptic  thinks,  and  believes,  and 
acts  like  other  men.  To  common  people,  who  are  guided  entirely 
by  plain,  evident  truth,  these  sceptical  opinions  of  philosophers  al- 
ways appear  not  only  paradoxical,  but  nonsensical,  and  they  feel 
no  inclination  to  adopt  them  ;  so  that  there  is  no  danger  of  their 
spreading  very  extensively.  But  false  opinions  of  this  sort  are 
nevertheless  attended  with  much  injury.  Young  men,  who  have 
learned  that  many  opinions  which  they  acquired  in  the  nursery,  or 
in  their  narrow  domestic  circle,  are  mere  prejudices  of  education, 
are  prone  to  suspect  everything  which  they  have  been  taught,  and 
have  been  accustomed  to  receive  as  true.  When  we  perceive  that 
many  notions  which  were  long  considered  undoubted  truths,  are 
proved  by  the  light  of  philosophy  to  be  altogether  unfounded,  we 
naturally  incline  to  be  sceptical  about  everything.  And  this  is  not 
all.  When  the  darkness  of  ignorance  and  prejudice  begins  to  be 
scattered  by  the  increasing  lights  of  science  and  philosophy,  pride 
of  learning  is  apt  to  spring  up ;  and  a  desire  to  appear  superior  to 
the  vulgar  leads  many  to  embrace  and  cherish  opinions  which  dif- 
fer widely  from  the  common  belief.  Because,  in  some  things,  they 
have  seen  that  vulgar  opinions  are  false,  they  too  hastily  conclude 
that  the  more  any  opinion  differs  from  that  commonly  received,  the 
more  certain  it  is  ;  and  by  professing  it,  that  their  superior  wis- 
dom is  rendered  more  manifest.  Now,  the  theories  of  ingenious 
sceptical  philosophers  find  in  such  minds  a  soil  in  which  they  rea- 
dily take  root.  Thus,  Hume  by  his  metaphysical  subtleties,  the 
tendency  of  which  is  often  to  render  all  things  uncertain,  has  be- 
wildered and  perverted  the  minds  of  many  aspiring  youth.  And 
although  we  would  by  no  means  put  Dr.  Brown  in  the  same  class 
as  Mr.  Hume,  for  he  appears  always  ingenuous,  and  friendly  to 
religion,  yet  we  think  it  is  manifest  that  he  had  been  too  conver- 
sant with  Hume's  philosophy.  He  was  probably  carried  away, 
before  his  judgment  was  mature,  with  admiration  of  the  writings 
of  this  fascinating  sceptic.     And  while  his  good  principles  led  him 


ON    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT.  705 

to  reject  Hume's  atheistical  opinions,  he  endeavoured  to  retain  and 
support  some  of  the  most  dangerous  of  his  philosophical  theories. 

What  will  be  the  effect  of  the  publication  of  Dr.  Brown's  philo- 
sophy, in  this  country,  it  is  not  easy  to  foretell.  Attention  to  this 
department  of  science  is  yet  confined  to  a  comparatively  small 
number,  even  of  our  reading  population.  But  the  taste  for  meta- 
physical inquiries  is  increasing,  and  no  writer  is  likely  to  attract 
more  readers  than  Dr.  Brown,  as  he  contrives,  by  the  peculiar 
buoyancy  of  his  mind,  and  by  the  elegance  and  frequency  of  his 
classical  allusions,  to  spread  a  charm  over  a  subject,  commonly 
considered  the  least  capable  of  being  rendered  amusing.  There  is  also 
so  much  that  is  original  and  accurate,  in  his  Lectures ;  there  are  so 
much  distinct  and  perspicuous  analysis,  and  so  much  elegant  descrip- 
tion, and  so  much  superiority  to  the  authority  and  influence  of  for- 
mer systems,  and  of  great  names,  that  it  is  much  to  be  regretted, 
that  in  a  few  points  of  fundamental  importance  he  has  adopted  and 
inculcated  opinions  so  absurd  and  dangerous.  That  his  theories 
have,  in  some  instances,  operated  unfavourably  on  young  men  of 
ardent  minds,  we  know  to  be  a  fact :  but  in  our  opinion,  the  right 
way  to  prevent  the  bad  consequences  of  such  books,  is  not  to  pro- 
hibit the  reading  of  them,  but  to  answer  them,  and  to  lead  young 
men  to  peruse  them  with  caution,  and  at  the  proper  time. 


THE  END. 


<lc/ 


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BERKELEY 

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